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Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy
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12004577
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Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy
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Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Eisenhower Administration)
National Security Council Policy Papers
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The President
TOP SECRET
file
SECURITY INFORMATION
NSC 162/2
COPY NO. 1
A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
on
BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
October 30, 1953
Libracy The
WASHINGTON
Box ᵗ 26
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
Authority PUBLICATION IN IN UNITED STATES VIETNAM ROLATIONS 1945-67
C GPO EDITION) BOJK -140-171-200
Bv DJH NLE DATE 11/8/16
TOP SECRET
NSC 162/2
SECURITY INFORMATION
October 30, 1953
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
References:A. NSC 162 and NSC 162/1
B. NSC Action Nos. 853, 868, 886, 926 and 944
C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
subject, "Review of Basic National Security
Policy", dated October 28, 1953
D. NSC 153/1
E. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
subject, "Project Solarium", dated July 23, 1953
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the
Budget, the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, and the
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, at the 168th Council
meeting on October 29, 1953, adopted the statement of policy
contained in NSC 162/1 subject to the changes which are set
forth in NSC Action No. 944-a.
In connection with this action the Council also noted:
a. The President's statement that if the Department
of Defense hereafter finds that the provisions of
subparagraph 9-a-(1), when read in the context of
the total policy statement, operate to the dis-
advantage of the national security, the Secretary
of Defense should bring this finding before the
Council for reconsideration.
b. That action should be promptly taken to conform
existing arrangements regarding atomic weapons to
subparagraph 39-b.
c. That the policy in NSC 162/1 does not contemplate
any fixed date for D-Day readiness.
Library The
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₫. That the Planning Board would submit for Council
consideration a revision of "U. S. Objectives vis-
a-vis the USSR in the Event of War" as presently
stated in the Annex, in the light of the provisions
of NSC 162/1, as amended.
The President has this date approved the statement of
policy contained in NSC 162/1, as amended and adopted by the
Council and enclosed herewith, and directs its implementation
by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the
U. S. Government. As basic policy, this paper has not been
referred to any single department or agency for special coordin-
ation.
Accordingly, NSC 153/1 is hereby superseded.
It is requested that special security precautions be
observed in the handling of the enclosure and that access to
it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary
THE
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
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REVIEW OF BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Table of Contents
Page
General Considerations
1
Basic Problems of National Security Policy
1
The Soviet Threat to the United States
1
Defense Against the Soviet Threat
5
Present State of the Coalition
10
The Uncommitted Areas of the World
13
U. S, Ability to Support Security Expenditures
14
The Situation as to U. S. Manpower
16
Morale
17
Policy Conclusions
18
Basic Problems of National Security Policy
18
Nature of the Soviet Threat
18
Defense Against Soviet Power and Action
19
Defense Against the Threat to the U. S. Economy
and Institutions
23
Reduction of the Soviet Threat
24
Annex (U. S. Objectives vis-a-vis the USSR in the Event
of War)
26
The
LIGISTRY
.o
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STATEMENT OF POLICY
by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Basic Problems of National Security Policy
1. a. To meet the Soviet threat to U. S. security.
b. In doing so, to avoid seriously weakening
the U. S. economy or undermining our fundamental
values and institutions.
The Soviet Threat to the United States
2. The primary threat to the security, free insti-
tutions, and fundamental values of the United States is
posed by the combination of:
a. Basic Soviet hostility to the non-communist
world, particularly to the United States.
b. Great Soviet military power.
c. Soviet control of the international
dision
communist apparatus and other means of subversion
or division of the free world.
Name
OHL
3. a. The authority of the Soviet regime does not
appear to have been impaired by the events since
Stalin's death, or to be likely to be appreciably
weakened during the next few years. The transfer
of power may cause some uncertainty in Soviet and
satellite tactics for some time, but will pro-
bably not impair the basic economic and military
strength of the Soviet bloc. The Soviet rulers
can be expected to continue to base their policy
on the conviction of irreconcilable hostility
between the bloc and the non-communist world.
This conviction is the compound product of Marxist
belief in their historically determined conflict
with, and inevitable triumph over, "world
capitalism" led by the United States, of fear
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for the security of the regime and the USSR,
especially in the face of a hostile coalition,
of distrust of U. S. aims and intentions, and of
long-established reliance on techniques of con-
spiracy and subversion. Accordingly, the basic
Soviet objectives continue to be consolidation
and expansion of their own sphere of power and
the eventual domination of the non-communist
world.
b. Soviet strategy has been flexible and
will probably continue so, allowing for retreats
and delays as well as advances. The various
"peace gestures" so far have cost the Soviets
very little in actual concessions and could be
merely designed to divide the West by raising
false hopes and seeking to make the United
States appear unyielding. It is possible,
however, that the USSR, for internal and other
reasons, may desire a settlement of specific
issues or a relaxation of tensions and military
preparations for a substantial period. Thus
far, there are no convincing signs of readiness
to make important concessions to this end.
INSIMO
OHL
4. a. The capability of the USSR to attack the
United States with atomic weapons has been con-
tinuously growing and will be materially enhanced
by hydrogen weapons. The USSR has sufficient
bombs and aircraft, using one-way missions, to
inflict serious damage on the United States,
especially by surprise attack. The USSR soon
may have the capability of dealing a crippling
blow to our industrial base and our continued
ability to prosecute a war. Effective defense
could reduce the likelihood and intensity of a
hostile attack but not eliminate the chance of
a crippling blow.
b. The USSR now devotes about one-sixth of
its gross national product to military outlays
and is expected to continue this level. It has
and will continue to have large conventional
military forces capable of aggression against
countries of the free world. Within the next
two years, the Soviet bloc is not expected to
increase the size of its forces, but will
strengthen them with improved equipment and
training and the larger atomic stockpile.
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c. The Soviet bloc now has the capability
of strong defense against air attack on critical
targets within the USSR under favorable weather
conditions, and is likely to continue to
strengthen its all-weather air defenses.
5. a. The recent uprisings in East Germany and
the unrest in other European satellites evidence
the failure of the Soviets fully to subjugate
these peoples or to destroy their desire for
freedom; the dependence of these satellite
governments on Soviet armed forces; and the
relative unreliability of satellite armed
forces (especially if popular resistance in
the satellites should increase). These events
necessarily have placed internal and psycholo-
gical strains upon the Soviet leadership.
Nevertheless, the ability of the USSR to
exercise effective control over, and to ex-
ploit the resources of, the European satellites
has not been appreciably reduced and is not likely
to be so long as the USSR maintains
adequate military forces in the area.
Statemer
Liquid
b. The detachment of any major European
satellite from the Soviet bloc does not now
.a
appear feasible except by Soviet acquiescence
or by war. Such a detachment would not decisively
affect the Soviet military capability either in
delivery of weapons of mass destruction or in
conventional forces, but would be a considerable
blow to Soviet prestige and would impair in
some degree Soviet conventional military
capabilities in Europe.
c. The Chinese Communist regime is firmly
in control and is unlikely to be shaken in the
foreseeable future by domestic forces or rival
regimes, short of the occurrence of a major war.
The alliance between the regimes of Communist
China and the USSR is based on common ideology
and current community of interests. With the
death of Stalin and the Korean truce, Communist
China may tend more to emphasize its own
interests, though limited by its present economic
and military dependence on the USSR, and, in
the long run, basic differences may strain or
break the alliance. At present, however, it
appears to be firmly established and adds
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strategic territory and vast reserves of
military manpower to the Soviet bloc.
6. a. The USSR does not seem likely delib-
erately to launch a general war against the
United States during the period covered by
current estimates (through mid-1955). The
uncertain prospects for Soviet victory in a
general war, the change in leadership, satellite
unrest, and the U. S. capability to retaliate
massively, make such a course improbable.
Similarly, an attack on NATO countries or other
areas which would be almost certain to bring on
general war in view of U. S. commitments or
intentions would be unlikely. The Soviets
will not, however, be deterred by fear of
general war from taking the measures they con-
sider necessary to counter Western actions
which they view as a serious threat to their
security.
b. When both the USSR and the United
States reach a stage of atomic plenty and
BUE
ample means of delivery, each will have the
probable capacity to inflict critical damage on
the other, but is not likely to be able to prevent
major atomic retaliations. This could create
a stalemate, with both sides reluctant to ini-
tiate general warfare; although if the Soviets
believed that initial surprise held the prospect
of destroying the capacity for retaliation, they
might be tempted into attacking.
c. Although Soviet fear of atomic reaction
should still inhibit local aggression, increas-
ing Soviet atomic capability may tend to diminish
the deterrent effect of U. S. atomic power against
peripheral Soviet aggression. It may also sharpen
the reaction of the USSR to what it considers
provocative acts of the United States. If either
side should miscalculate the strength of the
other's reaction, such local conflicts could
grow into general war, even though neither
seeks nor desires it. To avoid this, it will
in general be desirable for the United States to
make clear to the USSR the kind of actions which
will be almost certain to lead to this result,
recognizing, however, that as general war becomes
more devastating for both sides the threat to
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resort to it becomes less available as a
sanction against local aggression.
7. The USSR will continue to rely heavily on
tactics of division and subversion to weaken the free
world alliances and will to resist the Soviet power.
Using both the fear of atomic warfare and the hope
of peace, such political warfare will seek to exploit
differences among members of the free world, neutralist
attitudes, and anti-colonial and nationalist senti-
ments in underdeveloped areas. For these purposes,
communist parties and other cooperating elements will
be used to manipulate opinion and control govern-
ments wherever possible. This aspect of the Soviet
threat is likely to continue indefinitely and to
APPLICATION
grow in intensity.
9
only
8. Over time, changes in the outlook and policies
of the leadership of the USSR may result from such
factors as the slackening of revolutionary zeal, the
growth of vested managerial and bureaucratic interests,
and popular pressures for consumption goods. Such
changes, combined with the growing strength of the
free world and the failure to break its cohesion,
and possible aggravation of weaknesses within the
Soviet bloc through U. S. or allied action or other-
wise, might induce a willingness to negotiate. The
Soviet leadership might find it desirable and even
essential to reach agreements acceptable to the United
States and its allies, without necessarily abandoning
its basic hostility to the non-Soviet world.
Defense Against the Soviet Threat
9. In the face of the Soviet threat, the security
of the United States requires:
a. Development and maintenance of:
(1) A strong military posture, with
emphasis on the capability of inflicting
massive retaliatory damage by offensive
striking power;
(2) U. S. and allied forces in readiness
to move rapidly initially to counter aggres-
sion by Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital
areas and lines of communication; and
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(3) A mobilization base, and its pro-
tection against crippling damage, adequate
to insure victory in the event of general
war.
b. Maintenance of a sound, strong and
growing economy, capable of providing through
the operation of free institutions, the strength
described in a above over the long pull and of
rapidly and effectively changing to full mobili-
zation.
c. Maintenance of morale and free institu-
tions and the willingness of the U. S. people to
support the measures necessary for national
security.
10. In support of these basic security require-
ments, it is necessary that the United States:
LIBIT
a. Develop and maintain an intelligence
system capable of:
.0
SUL
(1) Collecting and analyzing indications
of hostile intentions that would give maximum
prior warning of possible aggression or sub-
version in any area of the world.
(2) Accurately evaluating the capabilities
of foreign countries, friendly and neutral as
well as enemy, to undertake military, political,
economic, and subversive courses of action
affecting U. S. security.
(3) Forecasting potential foreign
developments having a bearing on U. S.
national security.
b. Develop an adequate manpower program
designed to:
(1) Expand scientific and technical
training.
(2) Provide an equitable military
training system.
(3) Strike a feasible balance between
the needs of an expanding peacetime economy
and defense requirements.
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(4) Provide for an appropriate distribu-
tion of services and skills in the event of
national emergency.
c. Conduct and foster scientific research and
development so as to insure superiority in quantity
and quality of weapons systems, with attendant
continuing review of the level and composition of
forces and of the industrial base required for
adequate defense and for successful prosecution
of general war.
d. Continue, for as long as necessary, a state
of limited defense mobilization to develop military
readiness by:
(1) Developing and maintaining production
plant capacity, dispersed with a view to
minimizing destruction by enemy attack and
capable of rapid expansion or prompt con-
Library
version to essential wartime output.
(2) Creating and maintaining minimum
a
PUL
essential reserve stocks of selected end-
items, so located as to support promptly and
effectively the war effort in areas of
probable commitment until war production and
shipping capacity reaches the required war-
time levels.
(3) Maintaining stockpiling programs.
and providing additional production facili-
ties, for those materials the shortage of
which would affect critically essential
defense programs; meanwhile reducing the
rates of other stockpile materials,
e. Provide reasonable internal security against
covert attack, sabotage, subversion, and espionage,
particularly against the clandestine introduction and
detonation of atomic weapons.
11. Within the free world, only the United States
can provide and maintain, for a period of years to
come, the atomic capability to counterbalance Soviet
atomic power. Thus, sufficient atomic weapons and
effective means of delivery are indispensable for U. S.
security. Moreover, in the face of Soviet atomic
power, defense of the continental United States becomes
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vital to effective security: to protect our strik-
ing force, our mobilization base, and our people. Such
atomic capability is also a major contribution to the
security of our allies, as well as of this country.
12. The United States cannot, however, meet its
defense needs, even at exorbitant cost, without the
support of allies.
a. The effective use of U. S. strategic
air power against the USSR will require over-
seas bases on foreign territory for some years
to come. Such bases will continue indefinitely
to be an important additional element of U. S.
strategic air capability and to be essential
to the conduct of the military operations on
the Eurasian continent in case of general war.
LIBIBIA
The availability of such bases and their use
by the United States in case of need will de-
a
OMBIRE
OHL
pend, in most cases, on the consent and co-
operation of the nations where they are located.
Such nations will assume the risks entailed only
if convinced that their own security will
thereby be best served.
b. The United States needs to have aligned
on its side in the world struggle, in peace and
in war, the armed forces and economic resources
and materials of the major highly-industrialized
non-communist states. Progressive loss to the
Soviet bloc of these states would so isolate
the United States and alter the world balance as
to endanger the capacity of the United States to
win in the event of general war or to maintain
an adequate defense without undermining its
fundamental institutions.
c. U. S. strategy including the use of
atomic weapons, therefore, can be successfully
carried out only if our essential allies are
convinced that it is conceived and will be im-
plemented for the purpose of mutual security
and defense against the Soviet threat. U. S.
leadership in this regard, however, does not
imply the necessity to meet all desires of our
allies.
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d. Our allies are, in turn, dependent on
the United States for their security: (1)
they lack that atomic capability which is the
major deterrent to Soviet aggression; (2) most
lack political and economic stability sufficient
to support their military forces. The United
States should be able for the foreseeable
future to provide military aid, in more limited
amounts than heretofore, to our essential
allies. It should be possible in the near
future, however, generally to eliminate most
grant economic aid, if coupled with appropriate
U. S. economic and trade policies.
13. a. Under existing treaties or policies,
an attack on the NATO countries, Western Germany,
Berlin, Japan, the Philippines, Australia,
New Zealand, and the American Republics, or on
the Republic of Korea, would involve the United
States in war with the USSR, or at least with
Communist China if the aggression were Chinese
AMOUNT
alone.
b. Certain other countries, such as Indo-
China or Formosa, are of such strategic im-
portance to the United States that an attack
on them probably would compel the United States
to react with military force either locally at
the point of attack or generally against the
military power of the aggressor. Moreover, the
principle of collective security through the
United Nations, if it is to continue to
survive as a deterrent to continued piecemeal
aggression and a promise of an eventual effec-
tive world security system, should be upheld
even in areas not of vital strategic importance.
c. The assumption by the United States, as
the leader of the free world, of a substantial
degree of responsibility for the freedom and
security of the free nations is a direct and
essential contribution to the maintenance of
its own freedom and security.
14. a. The United States should keep open
the possibility of settlements with the USSR.
compatible with basic U. S. security interests,
which would resolve specific conflicts or reduce
the magnitude of the Soviet threat. Moreover,
to maintain the continued support of its allies,
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the United States must seek to convince them
of its desire to reach such settlements. But,
in doing so, we must not allow the possibility
of such settlements to delay or reduce efforts
to develop and maintain adequate free world
strength, and thus enable the Soviets to
increase their relative strength.
b. It must be recognized, however, that
the prospects for acceptable negotiated settle-
ments are not encouraging. There is no evidence
that the Soviet leadership is prepared to modify
its basic attitudes and accept any permanent
settlement with the United States, although it
may be prepared for a modus vivendi on certain
issues. Atomic and other major weapons can be
controlled only by adequate and enforceable safe-
guards which would involve some form of inter-
national inspection and supervision. Acceptance
of such serious restrictions by either side would
be extremely difficult under existing conditions
of suspicion and distrust. The chances for such
disarmament would perhaps be improved by agree-
ments on other conflicts either beforehand or at
the same time, or by possible realization by the
Soviets, in time, that armament limitation will
serve their own interests and security.
c. The United States should promptly de-
termine what it would accept as an adequate
system of armament control which would effec-
OUL
tively remove or reduce the Soviet atomic and
military threat, and on what basis the United
States would be prepared to negotiate to obtain it.
Present State of the Coalition*
15. a. The effort of the United States, es-
pecially since 1950, to build up the strength,
cohesion and common determination of the free
world has succeeded in increasing its relative
strength and may well have prevented overt
military aggression since Korea.
*The term "coalition" refers to those states which are
parties to the network of security treaties and regional
alliances of which the United States is a member (NATO,
OAS, ANZUS, Japan, etc.), or are otherwise actively
associated in the defense of the free world.
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b. In Western Europe the build-up of
military strength and the progress of economic
recovery has, at least partially, remedied
a situation of glaring weakness in a vital
area. NATO and associated forces are now
sufficient to make aggressive action in Europe
costly for the USSR and to create a greater
feeling of confidence and security among the
Western European peoples. However, even though
significant progress has been made in building
up these forces, the military strength in Western
Europe is presently not sufficient to prevent a
full-scale Soviet attack from overrunning Western
Europe. Even with the availability of those
German forces presently planned within the frame-
work of EDC, present rates of defense spending
by European Nations and present rates of U. S.
Military Assistance certainly could not be ex-
F
pected to produce forces adequate to prevent the
initial loss of a considerable portion of the
territory of Western Europe in the event of a full-
IVBIMO
scale Soviet attack. Therefore, since U. S.
Military Assistance must eventually be reduced, it
is essential that the Western European states,
including West Germany, build and maintain maximum
feasible defensive strength. The major deterrent
to aggression against Western Europe is the mani-
fest determination of the United States to use
its atomic capability and massive retaliatory
striking power if the area is attacked. How-
ever, the presence of U. S. forces in Western
Europe makes a contribution other than military
to the strength and cohesion of the free world
coalition.
c. In the Far East, the military strength
of the coalition now rests largely on U. S.
military power plus that of France in Indochina,
the UK in Malaya and Hong Kong, and the in-
digenous forces of the Republic of Korea, Viet-
nam, and Nationalist China. Any material in-
crease will require the revival of the economic
and military strength of Japan.
d. The strength and cohesion of the
coalition depends, and will continue to depend,
on the continuing strength and will of the
United States as its leader, and upon the as-
sumption by each coalition member of a proper
share of responsibility.
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16. While the coalitonn is founded on common
interest and remains basically sound, certain factors
tend to weaken its cohesion and to slow down the
necessary build-up of strength.
a. Some of these factors are inherent in
the nature of a coalition led by one strong
power. The economic and military recovery by
our NATO allies from their low point of a few
years ago, and the revival of Germany and Japan,
has given them a greater sense of independence
from U. S. guidance and direction. Specific
sources of irritation are trade with the Soviet
bloc, the level of the defense effort, use of
bases and other facilities, and the prospect
of discontinuance of U. S. economic aid without
a corresponding change in U. S. trade policies.
b. The coalition also suffers from certain
other weaknesses and dilemmas. A major weakness
is the instability of the governments of certain
NATO partners, such as Italy and France. The
colonial issue in Asia and Africa, for example,
has not only weakened our European allies but
has left those areas in a state of ferment which
weakens the whole free world. Efforts by the
United States to encourage orderly settlements
tend to leave both sides dissatisfied and to
create friction within the alliance. Age-old
issues such as divide France and Germany, or
Italy and Yugoslavia, still impede creation of
a solid basis of cooperation against the Soviet
threat.
c. Moreover, allied opinion, especially
E
in Europe, has become less willing to follow
U. S. leadership. Many Europeans fear that
American policies, particularly in the Far
East, may involve Europe in general war, or
will indefinitely prolong cold-war tensions.
Many consider U. S. attitudes toward the Soviets
as too rigid and unyielding and, at the same
time, as unstable, holding risks ranging from
preventive war and "liberation" to withdrawal
into isolation. Many consider that these
policies fail to reflect the perspective and
confidence expected in the leadership of a
great nation, and reflect too great a pre-
occupation with anti-communism. Important
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sectors of allied opinion are also concerned
over developments within the United States which
seem to them inconsistent with our assumed role
of leader in the cause of freedom. These allied
attitudes materially impair cooperation and, if
not overcome, could imperil the coalition.
d. Fear of what a general war will mean for
them is deeply rooted and widespread among our
allies. They tend to see the actual danger of
Soviet aggression as less imminent than the
United States does, and some have a fatalistic
feeling that if it is coming they will not be
able to do much about it. In the NATO countries,
many have serious doubts whether the defense
requirements can be met without intolerable
political and economic strains. Certain of
our allies fear the rearmament of Germany and
Japan on any large scale, and in Germany and
Japan themselves strong currents of opinion
oppose it as unnecessary or dangerous. More-
Libiary
over, in certain countries, particularly France
and Italy, grave domestic problems have called
into question not only the authority of the
14.1
governments, but also the basic foreign
policies and alignments which they have followed.
All these factors lead to allied pressure in
favor of new major efforts to negotiate with
the USSR, as the only hope of ending the present
tension, fear and frustration. This pressure
has increased with recent "peace gestures" of
the new Soviet leadership, which has made
every endeavor to exploit it. Whether these
hopes are illusory or well-founded, they must
be taken into consideration by the United States.
The Uncommitted Areas of the World
17. Despite the Soviet threat, many nations and
societies outside the Soviet bloc, mostly in the under-
developed areas, are so unsure of their national
interests, or so preoccupied with other pressing
problems, that they are presently unwilling to align
themselves actively with the United States and its
allies. Although largely undeveloped, their vast
manpower, their essential raw materials and their
potential for growth are such that their absorption
within the Soviet system would greatly, perhaps
decisively, alter the world balance of power to our
detriment. Conversely, their orderly development into
more stable and responsible nations, able and willing
to participate in defense of the free world, can in-
creasingly add to its strength.
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18. In many of these uncommitted areas, forces of
unrest and of resentment against the West are strong.
Among these sources are racial feelings, anti-colonialism,
rising nationalism, popular demand for rapid social and
economic progress, over-population, the breakdown of
static social patterns, and, in many cases, the conflict
of local religious and social philosophies with those of
the West. The general unreliability of the governments
of these states and the volatility of their political
life complicate the task of building firm ties with
them, of counteracting neutralism and, where appropriate
and feasible, of responding to requests for assistance
in solving their problems. Outside economic assistance
alone cannot be counted on either to solve their basic
problems or to win their cooperation and support. Con-
structive political and other measures will be required
to create a sense of mutuality of interest with the
free world and to counter the communist appeals.
U. S. Ability to Support Security Expenditures
19. The United States must maintain a sound
economy based on free private enterprise as a basis
both for high defense productivity and for the main-
tenance of its living standards and free institutions.
Not only the world position of the United States, but
the security of the whole free world, is dependent on
the avoidance of recession and on the long-term ex-
pansion of the U. S. economy. Threats to its stability
or growth, therefore, constitute a danger to the
security of the United States and of the coalition
which it leads. Expenditures for national security,
in fact all federal, state and local governmental
expenditures, must be carefully scrutinized with a
view to measuring their impact on the national
economy.
20. The economy of the country has a potential
for long-term economic growth. Over the years an
expanding national income can provide the basis for
higher standards of living and for a substantial
military program. But economic growth is not
automatic and requires fiscal and other policies
which will foster and not hamper the potential for
long-term growth and which will operate to reduce
cyclical fluctuations.
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21. Excessive government spending leads to in-
flationary deficits or to repressive taxation, or to
both. Persistent inflation is a barrier to long-
term growth because it undermines confidence in the
currency, reduces savings, and makes restrictive
economic controls necessary. Repressive taxation
weakens the incentives for efficiency, effort, and
investment on which economic growth depends.
22. In spite of the reimposition of tax rates
at approximately the peak levels of World War II,
expenditures have risen faster than tax receipts,
with a resulting deficit of $9.4 billion in fiscal
year 1953. Despite anticipated larger receipts,
without the imposition of new taxes, and assuming sub-
stantially unchanged world conditions, a deficit of
$3.8 billion is estimated for fiscal year 1954.
23. a. Under existing law, tax reductions of
$5 billion a year will become effective next
January. A proposal to impose substitute taxes
therefor would be a reversal of policy.
b. Additional revenue losses of $3 billion
a year are due to occur on April 1, 1954. Con-
gress has not acted on the President's recom-
mendation that these reductions be rescinded.
Even if the $3 billion reduction is rescinded,
or offset by revenue from new sources, large
deficits would occur in FY 1955 and FY 1956.
at present levels of expenditures.
C. The economic problem is made more
difficult by the need to reform the tax system
in the interests of long-term economic growth.
Inevitably, many of the changes necessary to
reduce the barriers to growth will lead to a
loss of revenue in the years immediately fol-
lowing their adoption.
24. Any additional revenue will have to be
secured by new taxation on a broad base.
25. The present high level of the Government
debt further complicates the financial and economic
problems of the country. Substantial additional
borrowing could come only from sources which would
be inflationary.
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26. There is no precise level or duration of
government expenditures which can be determined in
advance, at which an economic system will be
seriously damaged from inflationary borrowing on the
one hand or from repressive taxation on the other.
The higher the level of expenditures, the greater is
the need for sound policies and the greater are the
dangers of miscalculations and mischance. These
dangers are now substantial.
27. The requirement for funds to maintain our
national security must thus be considered in the light
of these dangers to our economic system, including the
danger to industrial productivity necessary to support
military programs, arising from excessive levels of
total Government spending, taxing and borrowing.
28. Modifications of the foregoing fiscal
policies to promote long-term growth may be neces-
sitated for a limited period: (1) to deal with
short-term cyclical problems or (2) to achieve
overriding national objectives that justify departure
from sound fiscal policies.
The Situation as to U. S. Manpower
29. a. The national security programs of the
United States rest upon the manpower to
operate them, the economy to produce the
material for them, and the financial re-
sources to pay for them.
b. The qualified manpower annually coming
of military age is adequate to carry out our
existing military programs. However, the con-
tinuing development of more complicated weapons,
machines, and devices used by the military
greatly increases the need for military man-
power possessed of higher skills, and for
their better utilization, and emphasizes the
need for expanded technical training and re-
tention of technically trained personnel.
c. Any considerable increase in the need
for military manpower would require considera-
tion of:
(1) Broadening the present criteria
governing draft eligibility.
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(2) Broadening the physical re-
quirements for enlistment, particularly
to secure technicians.
(3) Extension of the average length
of military service, including increased
incentives for re-enlistment.
(4) Increased recruitment of long-
term volunteers and of women.
(5) Greater use of civilians for
technical maintenance work.
(6) Leadership to develop a national
response to increased needs, including
steps to make military service a matter
of patriotic pride and to increase the
attractiveness of a military career.
d. Any decisions on these matters should
be made in the light of a comprehensive study,
to be submitted to the President by the Office
of Defense Mobilization by December 1, on
manpower availability under varying assumptions
as to the degree and nature of mobilization re-
quirements.
Morale
30. Support for the necessary security programs,
based upon a sound productive system, is ultimately
dependent also upon the soundness of the national
morale and the political willingness of the country
to support a government which it feels is holding
the proper balance between the necessary sacrifices
and the necessary defense. Accordingly, the American
people must be informed of the nature of the Soviet-
Communist threat, in particular the danger inherent
in the increasing Soviet atomic capability; of the
basic community of interest among the nations of the
free world; and of the need for mobilizing the spiritual
and material resources necessary to meet the Soviet
threat.
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POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Basic Problems of National Security Policy
31. a. To meet the Soviet threat to U. S.
security.
In doing so, to avoid seriously weaken-
ing the U. S. economy or undermining our funda-
mental values and institutions.
Nature of the Soviet Threat
32. a. With increasing atomic power, the Soviets
have a mounting capability of inflicting very
serious and possibly crippling damage on the
United States. The USSR will also continue to
have large military forces capable of aggressive
action against countries of the free world.
Present estimates are, however, that the USSR
will not deliberately initiate general war
during the next several years, although gen-
eral war might result from miscalculation. In
the absence of general war, a prolonged period
of tension may ensue, during which each side
increases its armaments, reaches atomic plenty
and seeks to improve its relative power posi-
tion.
b. In any case, the Soviets will continue
to seek to divide and weaken the free world
coalition, to absorb or win the allegiance of
the presently uncommitted areas of the world,
and to isolate the United States, using cold
war tactics and the communist apparatus. Their
capacity for political warfare against the United
States as well as its allies will be enhanced by
their increased atomic capability.
33. a. A sound, strong, and growing U. S.
economy is necessary to support over the long
pull a satisfactory posture of defense in the
free world and a U. S. capability rapidly and
effectively to change to full mobilization. The
United States should not weaken its capacity
for high productivity for defense, its free
institutions, and the incentives on which its
long-term economic growth depends.
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b. A recession in the level of U. S.
economic activity could seriously prejudice the
security of the free world.
Defense Against Soviet Power and Action
34. In the face of these threats, the United
States must develop and maintain, at the lowest fea-
sible cost, requisite military and non-military
strength to deter and, if necessary, to counter
Soviet military aggression against the United States
or other areas vital to its security.
a. The risk of Soviet aggression will be
minimized by maintaining a strong security pos-
ture, with emphasis on adequate offensive re-
taliatory strength and defensive strength. This
must be based on massive atomic capability, in-
cluding necessary bases; an integrated and ef-
fective continental defense system; ready forces
of the United States and its allies suitably
deployed and adequate to deter or initially to
counter aggression, and to discharge required
initial tasks in the event of a general war; and
an adequate mobilization base; all supported by
the determined spirit of the U. S. people.
b. This strong security posture must also
be supported by an effective U. S. intelligence
system, an adequate manpower program, superior
scientific research and development, a program
of limited defense mobilization, reasonable
internal security, and an informed American
people.
c. Such a strong securi ty posture is es-
sential to counter the Soviet divisive tactics
and hold together the coalition. If our allies
were uncertain about our ability or will to
counter Soviet aggression, they would be
strongly tempted to adopt a neutralist posi-
tion, especially in the face of the atomic
threat.
35. In the interest of its own security, the
United States must have the support of allies.
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a. The military striking power necessary
to retaliate depends for the foreseeable future
on having bases in allied countries. Further-
more, the ground forces required to counter
local aggressions must be supplied largely by
our allies.
b. The loss of major allies by subversion,
divisive tactics, or the growth of neutralist
attitudes, would seriously affect the security
of the United States.
36. United States policies must, therefore, be
designed to retain the cooperation of our allies, to
seek to win the friendship and cooperation of the pre-
sently uncommittedareas of the world, and thereby to
strengthen the cohesion of the free world.
a. Our allies must be genuinely convinced
that our strategy is one of collective security.
The alliance must be rooted in a strong feeling
of a community of interest and firm confidence
in the steadiness and wisdom of U. S. leadership.
b. Cooperative efforts, including equit-
able contributions by our allies, will continue
to be necessary to build the military, economic
and political strength of the coalition and
the stability of the free world.
C. Constructive U. S. policies, not related
solely to anti-communism, are needed to persuade
uncommitted countries that their best interests
lie in greater cooperation and stronger af-
filiations with the rest of the free world.
d. To enhance the capacity of free world
nations for self-support and defense, and to
reduce progressively their need for U. S. aid,
the United States should assist in stimulating
international trade, freer access to markets and
raw materials, and the healthy growth of under-
developed areas. In this connection, it should
consider a modification of its tariff and trade
policies.
e. In subsequent fiscal years economic
grant aid and loans by the United States to other
nations of the free world should be based on the
best interests of the United States.
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37. a. In Western Europe, a position of strength
must be based mainly on British, French, and
German cooperation in the defense of the continent.
To achieve a stronger Europe, the United States
should support, as long as there is hope of early
success, the building of an integrated European
Community (including West Germany and if possible
a united Germany), linked to the United States
through NATO. The United States should press for
a strong, united stable Germany, oriented to
the free world and militarily capable of over-
coming internal subversion and disorder and also
of taking a major part in the collective defense
of the free world against aggression. The
United States must continue to assist in creat-
ing and maintaining mutually agreed European
forces, but should reduce such assistance as
rapidly as United States interests permit.
b. In the Far East, strength must be
built on existing bilateral and multilateral
security arrangements until more comprehensive
regional arrangements become feasible. The
United States should stress assistance in
developing Japan as a major element of strength.
The United States should maintain the security
of the off-shore island chain and continue to
develop the defensive capacity of Korea and
Southeast Asia in accordance with existing
commitments.
c. In the Middle East, a strong regional
grouping is not now feasible. In order to assure
during peace time for the United States and its
allies the resources (especially oil) and the
strategic positions of the area and their denial
to the Soviet bloc, the United States should
build on Turkey, Pakistan and, if possible,
Iran, and assist in achieving stability in the
Middle East by political actions and limited
military and economic assistance, and technical
assistance, to other countries in the area.
d. In other areas of the free world the
United States should furnish limited military
aid, and limited technical and economic as-
sistance, to other free nations, according to
the calculated advantage of such aid to the
U. S. world position.
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38. a. As presently deployed in support of our
commitments, the armed forces of the United
States are over-extended, thereby depriving us
of mobility and initiative for future military
action in defense of the free world.
b. Under present conditions, however, any
major withdrawal of U. S. forces from Europe
or the Far East would be interpreted as a
diminution of U. S. interest in the defense of
these areas and would seriously undermine the
strength and cohesion of the coalition.
c. Our diplomacy must concentrate upon
clarifying to our allies in parts of the world
not gripped by war conditions that the best
defense of the free world rests upon a deploy-
ment of U. S. forces which permits initiative,
flexibility and support; upon our political
commitment to strike back hard directly against
any aggressor who attacks such allies; and
upon such allies' own indigenous security efforts.
39. a. In specific situations where a warning
appears desirable and feasible as an added
deterrent, the United States should make clear
to the USSR and Communist China, in general
terms or with reference to specific areas as
the situation requires, its intention to react
with military force against any aggression by
Soviet bloc armed forces.
b. (1) In the event of hostilities, the
United States will consider nuclear weapons
to be as available for use as other muni-
tions. Where the consent of an ally is
required for the use of these weapons
from U. S. bases on the territory of such
ally, the United States should promptly
obtain the advance consent of such ally
for such use. The United States should
also seek, as and when feasible, the
understanding and approval of this policy
by free nations.
(2) This policy should not be made
public without further consideration by the
National Security Council.
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Defense Against the Threat to the U. S. Economy and
Institutions
40. a. A strong, healthy and expanding U. S.
economy is essential to the security and stability
of the free world. In the interest of both the
United States and its allies, it is vital that
the support of defense expenditures should not
seriously impair the basic soundness of the U. S.
economy by undermining incentives or by inflation.
b. The United States must, however, meet
the necessary costs of the policies essential
for its security. The actual level of such costs
cannot be estimated until further study, but
should be kept to the minimum consistent with
the carrying out of these policies.
c. Barring basic change in the world situa-
tion, the Federal Government should continue to
make a determined effort to bring its total an-
nual expenditures into balance, or into substantial
balance with its total annul revenues and should
maintain over-all credit and fiscal policies de-
signed to assist in stabilizing the economy.
d. Every effort should be made to eliminate
waste, duplication, and unnecessary overhead in
the Federal Government, and to minimize Federal
expenditures for programs that are not essential
to the national security.
e. The United States should seek to main-
tain a higher and expanding rate of economic
activity at relatively stable price levels.
f. The economic potential of private
enterprise should be maximized by minimizing
governmental controls and regulations, and by
encouraging private enterprise to develop
natural and technological resources (e.g. nu-
clear power).
41. To support the necessarily heavy burdens for
national security, the morale of the citizens of the
United States must be based both on responsibility and
freedom for the individual. The dangers from Soviet
subversion and espionage require strong and effective
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security measures. Eternal vigilance, however, is
needed in their exercise to prevent the intimidation
of free criticism. It is essential that necessary
measures of protection should not be so used as to
destroy the national unity based on freedom, not on
fear.
Reduction of the Soviet Threat
42. a. The United States must seek to improve
the power position of itself and the rest of the
free world in relation to the Soviet bloc.
b. The United States must also keep open
the possibility of negotiating with the USSR and
Communist China acceptable and enforceable
agreements, whether limited to individual issues
now outstanding or involving a general settle-
ment of major issues, including control of
armaments.
c. The willingness of the Soviet leader-
ship to negotiate acceptable settlements, with-
out necessarily abandoning hostility to the non-
Soviet world, may tend to increase over time,
if the United States and its allies develop and
increase their own strength, determination and
cohesion, maintain retaliatory power sufficient
to insure unacceptable damage to the Soviet
system should the USSR resort to general war,
and prove that the free world can prosper des-
pite Soviet pressures, or if for any reason
Soviet stability and influence are reduced.
d. The policy of the United States is to
prevent Soviet aggression and continuing domina-
tion of other nations, and to establish an ef-
fective control of armaments under proper safe-
guards; but is not to dictate the internal
political and economic organization of the USSR.*
43. As a means of reducing Soviet capabilities
for extending control and influence in the free world,
the United States should:
* This paragraph does not establish policy guidance for
our propaganda or informational activities.
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REVIEW OF BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Substitute the following for para. 42-₫ of NSC 162/1:
d. The United States should make clear to the
leaders and peoples of the USSR that its policy is to
prevent Soviet aggression and continuing domination
of other nations, and to establish effective control
of armaments under proper safeguards; but is not to
dictate the internal political and economic organiza-
tion of the USSR.
Delahs
F.
The
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a. Take overt and covert measures to dis-
credit Soviet prestige and ideology as effective
instruments of Soviet power, and to reduce the
strength of communist parties and other pro-
Soviet elements.
b. Take all feasible diplomatic, political,
economic and covert measures to counter any
threat of a party or individuals directly or in-
directl responsive to Soviet control to achieve
dominant power in a free world country.
c. Undertake selective, positive actions
to eliminate Soviet-Communist control over any
areas of the free world.
44. a. Measures to impose pressures on the
Soviet bloc should take into account the de-
sirability of creating conditions which will
induce the Soviet leadership to be more re-
ceptive to acceptable negotiated settlements.
b. Accordingly, the United States should
take feasible political, economic, propaganda
and covert measures designed to create and ex-
ploit troublesome problems for the USSR, impair
Soviet relations with Communist China, com-
plicate control in the satellites, and retard
the growth of the military and economic poten-
tial of the Soviet bloc.
45. In the face of the developing Soviet threat,
the broad aim of U. S. security policies must be to
create, prior to the achievement of mutual atomic
plenty, conditions under which the United States and
the free world coalition are prepared to meet the
Soviet-Communist threat with resolution and to
negotiate for its alleviation under proper safeguards.
The United States and its allies must always seek
to create and sustain the hope and confidence of the
free world in the ability of its basic ideas and
institutions not merely to oppose the communist threat,
but to provide a way of life superior to Communism.
46. The foregoing conclusions are valid only so
long as the United States maintains a retaliatory
capability that cannot be neutralized by a surprise
Soviet attack. Therefore, there must be continuing
examination and periodic report to the National
Security Council in regard to the likelihood of such
neutralization of U. S. retaliatory capability.
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ANNEX
U.S. OBJECTIVES VIS-A-VIS THE USSR IN THE EVENT OF WAR
(The following paragraphs are taken verbatim from MSC 20/4,
approved in November, 1948. They also formed an annex to
to NSC 153/1, approved in June, 1953. This subject is
currently under review by the NSC Planning Board.)
1. In the event of war with the USSR we should
endeavor by successful military and other operations to
create conditions which would permit satisfactory accom-
plishment of J. S. objectives without a predetermined
requirement for unconditional surrender. War aims
supplemental to our peace-time aims should include:
a. Eliminating Soviet Russian domination in
areas outside the borders of any Russian state allowed
to exist after the war.
b. Destroying the structure of relationships
by which leaders of the All-Union Communist Party
have been able to exert moral and disciplinary
authority over individual citizens, or groups of
citizens, in countries not under communist control.
c. Assuring that any regime or regimes which may
exist on traditional Russian territory in the
aftermath of a war:
(1) Do not have sufficient military power
to wage aggressive war.
(2) Impose nothing resembling the present
iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.
d. In addition, if any bolshevik regime is left
in any part of the Soviet Union, insuring that it does
not control enough of the military-industrial poten-
tial of the Soviet Union to enable it to wage war
on comparable terms with any other regime or regimes
which may exist on traditional Russian territory.
e. Seeking to create postwar conditions which
will:
(1) Prevent the development of power
relationships dangerous to the security of the
United States and international peace.
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(2) Be conducive to the successful develop-
ment of an effective world organization based
upon the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.
(3) Permit the earliest practicable
discontinuance within the United States of
wartime controls.
2. In pursuing the above war aims, we should avoid
making irrevocable or premature decisions or commi tments
respecting border rearrangements, administration of
government within enemy territory, independence for
national minorities, or post-war responsibility for the
readjustment of the inevitable political, economic, and
social dislocations resulting from the war.
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