Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
331916992
label
Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force C - Part 5 of 9
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
331916992
contentType
document
title
Report to the National Security Council by Project Solarium Task Force C - Part 5 of 9
citationUrl
collections
Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Eisenhower Administration)
National Security Council Subject Files
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
331916992
levelOfDescription
item
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
acec2fcc4885a142
ocrText
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
The Daight D DE
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
B. REGIONAL ACTIONS
1. U.S.S.R.
Authority DECLASSIFIED 144-15)only
By CJA NLDDE Date 08/13/2014
a. Political
(1) Soviet power is the product of two principal elements:
The political-military-economic power of the Soviet Union and its Satellites
on the one hand, and on the other the fifth column potential of its dis-
ciplined servitors and sympathizers in the world. These two elements of
Soviet power reinforce and support each other. A policy designed to reduce
the power of the Soviet Bloc must be directed at both elements.
(2) The courses of action proposed with respect to the Soviet
Union may be summarized as a long-term series of time and sequence phased
actions, all with the ultimate goal of liquidating the Soviet power posi-
tion in the world, but the full scope of which is only gradually revealed
as the free world gathers strength and confidence. It is proposed that in
the initial phase the major emphasis in Europe should be placed on bringing
about the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from East Germany, Austria, and
the Satellites; in the Far East on the prosecution of the Korean and Indo-
Chinese wars to a. favorable conclusion; in the world at large on a serious
campaign both overt and covert directed at undermining the power of Com-
munist idealogy and inflicting the greatest possible injury to the Moscow
directed apparatus of international Communism, while accelerating the con-
sideration of free world strength. The second phase places the major em-
phasis on the separation of Satellites both West and East, leaving the
Soviet Union itself to be dealt with in the final phase of this program for
action.
144 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Dwight
TOP SECRET
THE
10
SOL-TF/C-1
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIBIRTY
(3) This phasing of courses of action is designed to meet as
far as is possible the limitations imposed on us both by our relative power
relationship to the Soviet Bloc as well as by our Allies, most of whom will
be timid partners in our campaign to reduce the sources of Soviet power and
would be thoroughly panicked if its depth were revealed to them at the out-
set. Furthermore, Soviet reaction to our individual courses of action will
depend in part on their estimate of our ultimate intentions. There would
be little prospect of effecting the removal of Soviet forces from Germany
and Austria if the negotiations were timed to coincide with the triggering
of an operation on our part to subvert the Czechoslovak Government or take
Albania out of the orbit. Finally, the degree of risk of general war tends
to be minimal at the outset of the program and increases as they sense the
depth and extent of our challenge to Soviet power.
(4) Since the end of World War II the Vestern world has lived
under the fear of Soviet aggression and a new world war. As far as Europe
is concerned, no single factor has contributed more to this unhealthy con-
dition than the presence in Central Europe of massive Soviet occupation
forces in Eastern Germany and Austria. It is submitted that despite the
progress achieved in recent years in developing their spiritual and material
defensive resources, it is hopeless to expect to bring along the countries
of Western Europe in a more aggressive policy toward the Soviet Union as
long as this very real and tangible element of Soviet power sits athwart the
center of Europe. The beneficial results which would flow from the achievement
of the withdrawal of these forces from their present zones of occupation would
- 145-
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Dwight
TOP SECRET
The
OF
SOL-TF/C-1
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
be very great in both the strategical and psychological fields. Western
Europe would take heart to see the Red Have recede; Germany and Austria
freed of the incubus of Soviet occupation would add their resrorces, geo-
graphic position and influence to the side of the free world; a greater
expanse of Satellite territory would be exposed to the West; the Soviet
Union would at least lose the juridic excuse for the presence of its forces
in the Satellite states of Eastern Europe and might even feel constrained
to remove the visible evidence of their presence there.
(5) A resolution of the German question can only be accept-
able if it does not inflict serious damage on our military position in
Western Europe. The withdrawal of U.S.-British-French occupation forces
from Western Germany, which would presumably be an inescapable condition
to a corresponding Soviet withdrawal, could not be accepted unless there
were worked out with the members of NATO a plan for the deployment else-
where of those forces in a manner such as to preserve the present level
of defensive strength in that theater. A settlement which permitted the
eventual participation of a unified Germany in a European defense system
would be the most acceptable, but the probability is that the Soviet Govern-
ment would hold out for something approaching the formal neutralization of
Germany with permission to develop limited national defense forces. We
submit that under a policy accepting a high degree of risk in order to
materially reduce Soviet power, this is a risk which might be taken, if
it be tacitly understood on our part that we regarded the settlement as
temporary and that once the Soviet forces were withdrawn we would feel
-146 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Dwight
THE
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
under no obligation to restrain ourselves from giving German neutrality
a content which in fact would put that nation securely on the side of the
West. The manifold problems involved in achieving this advance are pro-
portionate to the potential rewards.
(6) It may well be that we find ourselves today passing
through a period of opportunity in this regard which will not be repeated.
The population of East Germany is demonstrating its revulsion against its
Soviet rulers in a courageous and daring manner unprecedented in the history
of Soviet imperialism. The Soviet Government itself is hindered at home
in the difficult situation of trying to resolve the struggle for the power
released at Stalin's death and under the presence of what appears to be a
deteriorating political and economic situation throughout the Soviet Bloc.
We can be sure that the Soviet Government has, in principle, the techniques
and the means, if given the time, to straighten out and bring under control
the restive Eastern Germans. The issue is to preclude such a result. The
moment could hardly be more favorable for us to press forward on the German
question.
(7) Elsewhere in the Soviet Orbit there is evidence that the
removal from the scene of the autocrat who guided the destinies of the Soviet
Union and World Communism for more than a quarter of a century has led to
indecision and confusion and added to the difficulties of controlling the
area and coping with its problems. Moscow itself is providing a growing
accumulation of evidence that it would welcome at least a superficial reduc-
tion both in world tensions and tensions at home. Yet given the inherently
- 147 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Deight
PUL
OF
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
LISTED
predatory character of the Soviet system, such transitory periods of apparent
retreat should be probed and exploited to the utmost. It cannot be pre-
dicted how long these favorable conditions will prevail. The difficulties,
both political and military, inherent in this course of action require no
elaboration, but it is the basic step which must be taken if the program
for reducing Soviet strength in Europe is to be gotten underway.
(8) Austria is the other important area which must be cleared
of Soviet forces as soon as possible. The Soviet Government has as yet
shown no disposition to reach an agreement on an Austrian State treaty, but
the position would be greatly improved once an arrangement has been reached
on Germany if it had not been possible to effect an Austrian settlement as
a preliminary to the German. As in the case of Germany, there would be both
a price and a risk involved. The Soviets would presumably hold out for com-
pensation for German assets and seek a commitment for the neutralization of
Austria. Yet as in the case of Germany it is estimated that this course of
action must be pursued to a successful conclusion if one is to lay the basis
for further encroachments on Soviet power.
(9) The esent position with respect to Soviet armed forces
in the European Satellites is that under the Balkan peace treaties and the
Potsdam agreement the Soviet Union has the right to maintain Soviet forces
in Hungary and Rumania to protect her lines of communication to Soviet occu-
pation forces in Austria and similarly in Poland to protect her line of com-
munications to Eastern Germany. No doubt the Soviet Government would arrange
to find a new legal basis for continuing the presence of the forces in those
-148 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
SEC. VII
The
Dwight
OF
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIST
areas once the initial justification ceased to exist, if it felt such action
to be necessary. This could easily be done by bilateral security agreements,
undertaken at the initiative of the individual Satellite governments concerned.
On the other hand, Moscow might find it preferable for political and propa-
ganda reasons, both internal and external, to avoid such action if possible.
(10) The presence or absence of Soviet forces in the several
Satellite countries will have an important bearing on the nature of the prob-
lem which those countries will pose for the course of action intended in the
second or mid-term phase, namely, their progressive release from Soviet con-
trol. Some influence may be exerted on this aspect in the degree to which
we prematurely reveal to Moscow our ultimate intentions with respect to those
areas. Certainly there would be an advantage if it were possible initially
to convey to the Soviet government the impression that the resolution of the
German and Austrian problems represented our ultimate basic objective in
Europe. A grave disadvantage inherent in such an apparent policy, however,
would be the blow it would deal to resistance morale in the Satellites. The
damage this might do would depend in part on the length of time involved in
completing phase one, plus the Eastern European and Balkan reaction to the
settlement reached on Germany and the to them unwelcome fact of the emergence
of that country from its present occupied status.
(11) The third or long-term phase deals with the Soviet Union
itself. It is possible that successful prosecution of our proposed courses
of action through the first and second phases would so encourage disruptive
forces within the Soviet Union that when we were ready to launch our final
_149 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
The
Dwight
OF
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
campaign we would find ourselves confronting a Soviet Government which no
longer posed a threat to the outside world, but was busily cultivating its
own garden. Yet equally possible is the converse, and we would find that
our successes against the extension of Soviet power beyond the Soviet borders
had reacted to consolidate and strengthen the internal situation of that
country. It would then be necessary to estimate what character and magnitude
of assault against the U.S.S.R. itself was justified in terms of our respec-
tive power positions, in terms of the result that might reasonably be ex-
pected to flow from such an undertaking, and the probable risks and costs
thereof.
(12) The pursuit of our courses of action will require coordi-
nated and forceful activity in all functional fields. Once launched on our
program we must instill respect in our Allies and adversary by the speed and
determination with which we patiently pursue step by step our declared ob-
jectives in turn. We should return the greatest possible diplomatic flexi-
bility and at all times be ready to discuss matters of mutual interest with
the Soviet Government through diplomatic channels, but refuse to get drawn
into unreasonably protracted conferences of the Palais Rose and Panmunjon
variety unless we see a commensurate propaganda or other dividend to be de-
rived therefrom. It is believed that our recent practice of entering nego-
tiations with the Soviets on positions of maximum objectivity should give
way for a more oriental technique of advancing the maximum requirements
that can be supported, albeit over a basis of soundly developed positions
and the constant awareness that only enforceable agreements have any inherent
- 150 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
The
Dwight Di
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIBITY
value. The slightly apologetic manner which has sometimes characterized
our approach to Soviet problems should give way to a confidence and firm
presentation of what we and everyone else must surely realize to be the
essence of reasonableness and equity. There is something contagious in
such an attitude, if convincingly maintained by the leading power of the
free world. The political presentation of our objectives must be forceful
and repetitive. Unresolved problems would not be permitted to lie weeks
at a time but be kept constantly on the table. We should take the slack
up in our relations with the Soviet Government, be quick to seek reprisal
for any infraction on their part and equally quick to exploit any opening
which affords an opportunity to advance our interests or block a Soviet move.
b. Military
(1) We should move in the military field to stop the growing
Soviet encroachment on the traditional freedom of the Baltic Sea. A resump-
tion of naval visits to Danish and Swedish ports, to be followed by regular
requests for naval visits to Soviet ports, is indicated. Pressure could
equally be maintained for permission to visit Soviet Black Sea and Far
Eastern ports. It would no doubt be refused more often than not, but the
matter might well be left before the Russians. We have a greater Navy than
all the other fleets of the world put together. It would be salutary to
hold this fact politely but firmly before the eyes of the Kremlin. However,
once we have achieved a reasonable infrastructure platform for strategic
air and NATO forces, wisdom would dictate not gratuitously pointing extra
daggers at the Soviet heart, at least not in the short-term and mid-term
- 151 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
a E Divid OHL Library
phases of our program when it is under no circumstance our intention to
convince the Kremlin that they have no alternative but to wage general
war to avoid extinction.
Co Economic
(1) On the economic front, East-West trade should continue
to be controlled to the degree that it weakens the enemy more than it
weakens our Allies. Probably a highly selective embargo played so as to
disrupt and confuse Soviet efforts at developing self-sufficiency in stra-
tegic items would be the most effective. Other things being equal, the
political, economic and psychological return of maximum liberty of trade
for our European allies is of course evident. In addition, this should
result in creating administrative problems requiring policy decision.
d. Propaganda
(1) There is no propaganda target more difficult to reach
than the peoples of the Soviet Union. It is a basic policy of their govern-
ment to deny them access to the truth, and this policy is well implemented.
In the Soviet Union all media of communication are controlled by the state,
and the degree of police terrorization is so intense as to discourage any-
thing resembling a normal exchange of news and ideas between individuals.
To this must be added the fact that more than three decades of enforced
exposure to the not too consistent official Soviet version of everything
that happens under the sun has developed the resistance and cynicism of
the Soviet citizen toward any kind of propaganda to a very high degree.
Radio is the only overt medium which can regularly pass the Iron Curtain,
- 152-
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
OHE
Dwight
OF
SOL-TF/C-1
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIBITY
but its effectiveness is seriously limited by Soviet jamming on a massive
scale. The violence and intensity of Soviet anti-American propaganda in
recent years is another factor which must be considered.
(2) In these circumstances, the character and quality of propa-
ganda to the Soviet Union is of high importance. Factual accounts of world
events and the explanation of U.S. actions in accordance with the general
philosophy showing our devotion to freedom and the rights of the individual
outlined elsewhere in this report are the most valuable subjects for treat-
ment. Our propaganda should be prompt to exploit all appropriate opportuni-
ties to criticize and question the acts of the Soviet Government, and equally
prompt to get there first with the news. It should be tailored to give
maximum support to our current political objectives and not hold out pro-
mises which are unattainable or out of line with our predetermined courses
of action.
(3) There is a great temptation to seek premature returns
in propaganda to the Soviet Union by taking sides with the non-Russian
nationalities against the Great Russians, or vice versa. This is a trap
one should not fall into. A decision to make such a choice would only be
called for in the final phase of our program for action or in the event of
general war and only then if it could be made to support our objectives
with regard to the post-war political settlement of the Soviet Union.
(4) The difficulties in the way of reaching the Soviet people
should not deter us from a constant effort to keep our standard before them
and draw the maximum possible profit. To judge by the enormous effort it
- 153 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
OHL
Dwight
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIBIT
expends to thwart us in this field, the Soviet Government must share this
view.
e. Covert
(1) Because of the highly developed Soviet skill and pre-
occupation with security matters, covert operations on any appreciable scale
within the Soviet Union can only be possible after a long and arduous period
of preparation. At present our assets of this character are minimal. Wis-
dom would dictate the desirability of an early decision to set about the
careful development of such an apparatus with the clear realization that
probably a decade of intense effort will be required for its preparation.
Inasmuch as the all-out exploitation of such assets as would be developed
would only come into consideration in the third or long-term phase of our
program, nothing would be lost by reason of this long lead-time. Interim
dividends in the form of intelligence and the availability of channels for
black propaganda would present themselves as the organization of the appara-
tus progressed. The inherent difficulties in this course of action within
the Soviet Union are demonstrated by the meager results obtained by the
Germans and the Japanese in this field before the war, despite the magnitude
of effort on both their parts.
(2) A more accessible field for covert warfare with the Soviet
Union and one which is proposed for immediate exploitation is provided by
the extensions of Soviet power in the world outside the Soviet power bloc.
The apparatus of international Communism, the various Soviet espionage nets
and other organizations under Soviet control offer themselves as targets for
- 154 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIDIETY OH1
this purpose. Subtle sabotage of Soviet economic and other interests abroad
would be a step in the process of hacking away at Soviet power and certainly
every possibility of thwarting Soviet political maneuvers abroad through
covert means should be used. It would appear that the only restraints which
need be maintained in this field of endeavor are, first, that such operations
remain truly covert, that is to say not attributable to the United States,
and, second, that they support and not run counter to our over-all political
objectives and courses of action of the moment.
- 155 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Dwight
The
DI
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
SEC. VII
LIBIRTY
SECURITY INFORMATION
2. Satellites
a. Next in importance to the Soviet armed forces of occupation in
Eastern Germany and Austria as an extension of Soviet power in Europe are the
Eastern European Satellites. They augment the political, economic and mili-
tary power of the Soviet Bloc and weigh heavily in the present imbalance of
power on the Continent. It is proposed that they should receive the major
emphasis of the second or mid-term plan of the Alternative C program.
b. For the short term, we should use all appropriate means to
hamper the consolidation of Soviet control over the Satellites and to keep
alive their morale and aspirations for national independence without, how-
ever, inciting them to premature and suicidal insurrection. But in addition
to these courses of action, the first phase period should be devoted to a
well-planned and executed covert program of underground organization in
preparation for more intensive activity at a later date. We should not,
as a general rule, use military force, or the active threat of use of mili-
tary force, during the opening period of Phase I operations when the emphasis
of our effort is directed to obtaining the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces
from Eastern Germany and Austria, and while significant progress toward that
end is being made.
c. The withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Germany and
Austria is the basic requirement from both a military and political point
of view for the implementation of a more aggressive policy toward the
Satellites, designed to bring about their liberation from the control of
Moscow. The success of such a policy will, of course, depend on the
- 156 a
TOP-SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
BHL
Duight
of
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
L
interplay of many factors, but it is not possible to envisage substantial
progress along this line in the presence of more than thirty Soviet divi-
sions in and about the area. A single possible exception is offered by the
case of Albania, which is geographically isolated and has no point of terri-
torial contact with the other Satellites or the Soviet Union itself, but the
situation of that country poses certain other problems which must be resolved
and will require careful preparation before its liberation can be reasonably
undertaken. With the exception of that country, the Satellites of Eastern
Europe are bound together and to the Soviet Union by a series of mutual
defense treaties which are known to commit the signatories to go to each
other's aid in the event of hostile action from without.
d. It is self-evident that the active pursuit of a policy aimed at
overthrowing the Soviet regimes in these countries and bringing them out
from Soviet control will involve from the outset a grave risk of general
war. Of equal gravity will be the strain this will place on relations with
our Allies and the world at large. Clearly the political and military
preparations which must lead up to this course of action are of the utmost
importance. The greater the contribution made in each case by indigenous
elements nourished and directed by controlled covert operations, the less
we will appear as the aggressive instigators. The choice of target areas
and the methods employed to precipitate each individual undertaking will
require painstaking evaluation of the local assets, of the probable
reaction in countries both friendly and hostile and of the odds for
success, and all this against the backdrop of the world situation, probable
- 157 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
17-008-5-1-6
The
Dwight DI
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
Soviet reaction, and the risk of general war. Soviet retaliation would not
necessarily take the form of a general war declared by the Soviet Union. It
might well take the form of military reaction through Satellites with unavowed
but essential Soviet support or particularly in the case of Albania, which is
not contiguous to Soviet controlled territory, by retaliatory action in an
entirely different sector. However, the nature of the Soviet relationship
to the regime in these countries is of a character at the present time to
render probable at least direct Soviet intervention wherever their stability
is threatened. It should be apparent that a marked shift in our favor in
the European balance of power is an essential condition to this mid-term
phase of our program unless previously precipitated by developments within
the area itself.
e. At the moment there is ample evidence of a deterioration of the
political and economic situation within the area. Whether the Kremlin will
succeed in arresting and reversing this trend cannot be predicted, although
it is a reasonable assumption that until there is some resolution of the
power struggle in the Kremlin itself, the Satellite governments will not
regain their former authority. It may also be reasonably assumed that even
in that contingency the damage now being done to Kremlin prestige will not
be repaired for many a day.
f. To consider briefly the several countries comprising the Soviet
Satellites of Eastern Europe:
(1) Albania is the most vulnorable. It is a small and primitive
country geographically separated from the other members of the Soviet Bloc.
- 158 -
Approved
TOP
SECRET
7-008-5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
The indigenous Communist movement is not significant and Soviet control is
maintained through an extensive infiltration of all the institutions of the
State by Soviet Union personnel. Security is provided by the usual Communist
police terror. The subversion of the country through covert means poses no
insuperable problem and the country has already become in fact a sort of
training ground for agents of interested governments. It is known that
apart
from the U.S. and Britain,
Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy all conduct opera-
tions in the mountains of Albania. The problem here lies in the territorial
ambitions of Albania's neighbors and Albanian fears that removal of the Com-
munists would not necessarily mean independence for Albania. Agreement be-
tween Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy and their guarantee of Albanian independ-
ence are political conditions which must be met before action is taken in
that area. Otherwise one might do more damage to anti-Soviet solidarity in
the West than gain advantage by the expulsion of the Soviets from that sector,
Nevertheless, Albania offers the least difficult point of departure for
direction action against the Satellites. The new political and military
relationship being developed between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia under the
aegis of their recently signed pact of friendship and mutual assistance
offers a mechanism which can be used in preparing the ground for this action.
As of today operation "Albania" would seem to be indicated as soon as the
necessary political arrangements can be made and the stage set.
(2) Bulgaria is the next smallest of the Satellites. Its
importance to the Soviet Union is strategic and military rather than
economic. Moscow has accordingly devoted special attention to building
- 159 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
The
Dwight
10
SOL-TF/C-1
Approved
TOP SECRET
17-008-5-1-6
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
up relatively large and thoroughly Sovietized armed forces in the area.
Although no uniformed elements of the Soviet forces are known to be in
Bulgaria, the country is under the military domination of these controlled
indigenous forces, backed up by the proximity of strong Soviet forces in
Rumania and the Soviet Union itself. Geographically Bulgaria is flanked on
the west and south by the anti-Soviet countries of Greece, Turkey and Yugo-
slavia. Reports indicate widespread popular resentment throughout the
country against Soviet control. Despite the high degree of Sovietization of
the army, it is believed the rank and file share the discontent of their
relatives among the peasantry, which constitutes the vast majority of the
country's population. The fact that Bulgaria has no common land frontier
with the Soviet Union is an additional asset to a plan for its release from
Moscow. On the negative side must be recognized its value as a strategic
outpost for the U.S.S.R. It may be assumed that the Kremlin will not
relinquish control of this area in the absence of overwhelming pressure,
yet on balance Bulgaria probably follows Albania as the next most vulner-
able target among the Satellites. It should be noted that the new Balkan
entente (Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia) has already started its psychologi-
cal campaign toward Bulgaria with a public invitation to that country to
free itself from Muscovite domination and join its Western and Southern
neighbors.
(3) Czechoslovakia, both central in size and geographic posi-
tion among the Satellites, is of particular economic importance to the
U.S.S.R. The most highly industrialized country in the group, it has been
- 160 -
Approved
TOP
SECRET
17-008-5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
Approved
TOP 20 SECRET
-008-5-1-6
The
Duight D
SEC. VII
10
SECURITY INFORMATION
forced to further develop its heavy industry in the service of Moscow and
has suffered severe economic strains in the process. Although Slav in race
and tradition, Czechoslovakia as the most developed of the Satellites is
more orientated toward Western Europe. Yet it has the largest Communist
party in proportion to population and one with a long history of political
influence. Although no Soviet forces are stationed in Czechoslovakia, there
is no evidence of true underground resistance. Popular dissatisfaction at
economic conditions and the Communist manhandling of the trade unions has
indeed expressed itself, but the Czechs have a long tradition of bowing to
foreign power in the conviction that with time their independence will be
returned to them. On the record the Czechs would seem temperamentally among
the least disposed to risk much in asserting their desire for freedom. They
will also for various reasons react badly in the initial period at least to
the unification of Germany and its liberation from Soviet and Allied occupa-
tion.
(4) Hungary has only a short and mountainous common frontier
with the Soviet Union, but it is securely held by Soviet occupation forces
both within the country and in Austria and Rumania to the West and East. It
has strategic value to Moscow because of its geographic position on the
approaches to the Balkans and Italy and economic value as a producer of
specialized light industrial products and foodstuffs. Traditionally anti-
Slav and anti-Russian and without any significant popular support for the
present Communist party, it is probably a receptive area for subversion
although there has been little evidence of organized resistance there to
- 161 -
Approved For
TOP 00 SECRET
008-5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2001/08/23 NLE-117-008-5-1-6
Dwight
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
OF
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
THE
date. Against this must be set Hungary's undoubted value to the Soviet
Union.
(5) Poland is the largest of the Satellites in terms of
population and territory, and is of high importance to Moscow both econom-
ically and strategically. It is the largest coal producer in Eastern
Europe and mong the Satellites has an industry second only to Czecho-
slovakia. Strategically it sits on the main approaches to Germany and
Western Europe. A historic enemy of Russia, its population is overwhelm-
ingly Catholic and pro-Western. Yet its anti-Soviet character is in part
counterbalanced by well-grounded fear and distrust of Germany. This aspect
is strengthened by the fact that one-quarter of present Polish territory
was annexed from Germany after the war. Although the most daring of the
Satellite peoples and with a long record of courageous resistance to foreign
rule, the presence of Soviet troops and the efficiency of Communist police
controls have precluded the underground forces which undoubtedly exist from
engaging in any significant operations. It is estimated that Moscow would
consider a threat to its domination of Poland as tentamount to one against
the Soviet Union itself.
(6) Rumania is the key to Soviet control of the Danube basin
and Balkan peninsula. To this strategic importance must be added its eco-
nomic contribution to the Soviet Bloc in terms of oil and certain industrial
products. The Communist party was never strong and in modern times the
country has been definitely anti-Russian with a political and cultural
orientation to Western Europe. Although popular dissatisfaction is
- 162 -
Approved For
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
CHE
Dwight Di
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
widespread, there is no evidence of any organized Rumanian resistance.
Soviet domination is effected by the ease of access to Rumania along a
long common land and sea frontier, reinforced by the actual presence in
Rumania of strong Soviet occupation forces.
g. Political and Diplomatic.
(1) As stated above, it is recommended that in the initial
period we should use all appropriate means to hamper the consolidation of
Soviet control over the Satellites and to keep alive their morale and
aspirations for national independence, without, however, inciting them to
premature or suicidal insurrection.
(2) American diplomatic missions still operating in the Satel-
lites (in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania) should be retained as
long as the returns therefrom in the form of intelligence, protection of U.S.
interests, propaganda guidance and local contacts, official and unofficial,
are deemed to outweigh the disadvantages such as apparent loss of U.S.
prestige in the face of local harassment and the necessity for reasons of
reciprocity of receiving Satellite missions in this country.
(3) Albania is without doubt the area most susceptible of early
treatment in the second phase. As of today Bulgaria probably. offers on
balance the second target which should receive the emphasis of our effort.
Poland and Rumania would appear to be the most difficult Satellites to
separate from the Soviet Bloc.
h. Economic.
(1) Trade with Eastern Europe is at a low level because of the
- 163 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
oal
Duight
of
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
27/21/17
Soviet policy of developing economic self-sufficiency within the Soviet Bloc
which is in turn reinforced by our own East-West trade controls. Within the
limits available a flexible policy of economic warfare is recommended which
will permit the exploitation of such opportunities as are offered against a
particular Satellite government as will best support U.S. interests at a
given time. It should be recognized, however, that the possibilities in
this field are very limited.
i. Propaganda.
(1) We should use all available techniques to reach the popu-
lations of the Satellite states with the object of promoting and preserving
nationalist and anti-Communist sentiment and their faith in eventual libera-
tion, yet avoiding any commitments as to how and when this will occur and
any incitement to suicidal acts of resistance.
j. Covert.
(1) Covert operations should be set in motion throughout the
Satellite area with a view to building up assets which can be exploited
during the second phase of Alternative C program. Earlier dividends should
include intelligence information and the facilities for black propaganda
designed to SOW confusion among the local Communists and to support the
morale of the anti-Communists.
(2) The present U.S. policy with respect to the encouragement
of the defection of key Satellite personnel should continue. Similarly,
support should be extended to exiled leaders and other refugees who can
contribute to U.S. objectives.
- 164 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved
TOP SECRET
17-008-5-1-6
SOL-TF/C-1
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
PROVIDER IS
3. China
a. Communist China
(1) Communist China is the world's most populous Communist
state and its Communist Party is the largest outside the Soviet Union. While
its leaders were Moscow trained, the Chinese Communist Party planned and oar-
ried out its own revolution with no decisive aid from the Soviet Union.
(2) Some of the principal ways in which Communist China
adversely affects the United States interests are:
(a) The threat of expansion into the Korean Peninsula with
its resultant serious threat to the security of Japan.
(b) The continued challenge to the prestige of the U.S. by
successfully fighting us to a "standstill" in Korea, thereby belittling our
military stature and capabilities in the eyes of the world, particularly the
Asian world and, at the same time, establishing herself as a major military
power.
(c) Through participation in the Korean War, Communist
China has forced the United States to bear the huge costs of military opera-
tions in Korea and to mal-deploy its forces so as to be at a great disadvantage
if war should break out in Western Europe.
(d) It has created severe strains and tensions between the
United States and its principal Allies.
(e) It has enabled the Viet Minh to conduct successful
operations in Indo-China which have been a major factor in weakening French
defense efforts in Western Europe.
- 165 -
Approved TOP SECRET 17-008-5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For
TOP SECRET
08-5-1-6
ONLY
Buight Di
SOL-TF/C-1
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
(f) This Communist-dominated, anti-U.S. and aggressive
Asiatic power has enabled the U.S.S.R. to split U.S. efforts between two
widely separated fronts -- the Far East and Europe -- without comparable
expenditures of Soviet effort.
(3) Recent U.S. attempts to formulate clear, far-reaching poli-
cies with respect to the nations of the Far East, and the existence of virtual
military stalemates in Korea and Indo-China, indicate that, short of waging
successful global war against the Soviet Union, the U.S. must regard Communist
China as the greatest obstacle to achieving its objectives in the Far East.
Furthermore, the lack of past U.S. desire or ability to take effective mill-
tary action against Communist China points up the need of promptly taking more
effective action in all fields against her. The extent of the Asian land
mass, the existence of friendly Chinese forces, U.S. mobility and control of
the sea and air offers us many opportunities to harass and injure Communist
China. We believe that we should promptly exploit those opportunities.
(4) The greatest problem facing the Chinese Communists in con-
solidating their hold on the Chinese people is that of convincing the Chinese
millions of their ability to improve China economically. We believe, there-
fore, that our actions under our assigned policy should be designed to prevent
the Chinese Communists from successfully solving this problem. We should by
every feasible means weaken and isolate Communist China politically and prevent
her being seated in the U.N. and other international bodies. We should take
every measure to destroy her economy. To that end, we should maintain a total
embargo on trade with Communist China, prohibit U.S. shipping to Communist
- 166 -
Approved For
TOP SECRET
008-5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
The
Dwight
DI
SOL-TF/C-1
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
LISTED
China and induce our Allies and the other free nations of the world to do
the same. If military operations continue in Korea, we should, with the
Chinese Nationalists, blockade Communist China. If a cease-fire agreement is
reached in Korea, we should utilize the Chinese Communist-Nationalist War as
the basis for the blockade and provide the Chinese Nationalists with the
means required to blockade the Chinese coast, thereby augmenting the effec-
tiveness of our embargo.
(5) If a cease-fire agreement is reached in Korea, we should
immediately, with our other Allies, issue the "greater sanctions" statement to
insure that the Chinese and Korean Communists clearly understand that we
intend promptly to resist any renewal of an armed attack and would not limit
our efforts in that regard to the geographical limits of Korea. We should
also inform the Chinese Communists that initiation of aggression elsewhere on
their part or increase of their contribution to Viet Minh forces in Indo-China
would be regarded as violation of the purposes and intent of a cease-fire
agreement in Korea.
(6) In our efforts to weaken the political control and the
economy of Communist China, we should step up
in Communist China. The general character of the actions to
be taken in this regard would be:
- 167 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SOL-TF/C-1
Approved
TOP SECRET
17-008-5-1-6
THE Dwight D
25X1C SEC VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
b. Nationalist China
(1) The U.S. has committed itself to support the Nationalist
Government of the Republic of China (NGRC) in its was with Communist China,
We are also similarly committed to the U.K. ad France. This creates a
dilemma in our foreign policy in the Far East because of the divergent views
and policies between the U.S. and NGRC on one hand, and the U.K. and France
on the other. Effective U.S. countermeasures exinst Chinese Communist aggres-
sion have heretofore been restricted because the U.K. maintains diplomatic
relations with Communist China and apparently would support a proposal to
seat that Government in the United Nations; France is heavily engaged in
Indo-China and is fearful of involvement with Communist China as a result of
U.S. policy.
(2) The NGRC military potential, built up with U.S. aid, is an
instrument capable of being used (because of the state of war which has long
existed between the NGRC and the Communists) for conducting active military
operations, including naval blockade, against the Chinese Communists without
unduly straining relations with our Western Allies. Increased use of the
forces of the NGRC for military operations will require greater U.S. military
assistance and logistic support. Notwithstanding the additional costs involved,
- 168 -
Approved TOP SECRET -008-5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved
TOP SECRET
17-008-5-1-6
SOL-TF/C-1
THE
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
STATE
we recommend that the time has now come to make greater and more effective use
of these forces for operations against Communist China, These forces have
now been in training on Formosa for five years and are not getting any
younger. They have not been in combat for years while the Chinese Communists
have obtained much valuable combat experience in Korea.
(3) Operations to Recapture Hainan. In seeking a suitable
objective against which to first employ the NGRC forces with minimum risk,
we consider that the Island of Hainan (because of its separation from the
mainland) has definite advantages not attainable elsewhere. There are only
about 60,000 Chinese Communist forces on the island. They are widely scat-
tered and cannot be easily reinforced. We do not consider that the NGRC
forces are sufficiently strong at this time to undertake the more ambitious
program of establishing and maintaining a lodgement on the mainland of China.
They first need a limited objective operation. to test their effectiveness and
future value. After their past unimpressive performance on the mainland,
they need a victory to bolster their morale and establish confidence in them-
selves. A successful operation against Hainan would be the beginning of the
"march back" and would certainly have a profound psychological impact on the
NGRC and the Chinese people. In addition, the capture of Hainan by the NGRC
would assist greatly in controlling the sea approaches to Haiphong and Hanoi,
which would contribute toward cutting off the support presently being pro-
vided by sea to Viet Minh forces in Indo-China from Communist China.
(4) Operations to re-capture Hainan would also give the U.S. an
opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the NGRC forces ultimately to
- 169 -
Approved For TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2001/08/23 : NLE-117-008-5-1-6
THE
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
undertake expanded operations against the mainland. The results should go
a long way toward determining whether they have the capability, with our
material assistance, of being developed into an effective offensive military
force or whether our future efforts in their behalf should be limited to
building them up for the sole limited task of defending Formosa.
- 170 -
Approved For Release
TOP 20SECRET.008-5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For 008-5-1-6
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
ORL
Dwight
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
4. Free Europe - Northwest Africa
a. In relation to Alternative C, the free nations of Europe and
their Northwest African dependencies appear in three principal lights:
(1) As actual and potential sources of Western strength in
both hot and cold war.
(2) As potential additions to Soviet strength if they were to
be lost to the West.
(3) As restraints -- some would say millstones -- upon U.S.
action vis-a-vis the Soviets and other areas in the world struggle.
b. It is accordingly the task of U.S. policy to reconcile the
three not-always-harmonious goals of:
(1) Denial of the area to the Soviets.
(2) Development and enlistment of its support for U.S. objec-
tives, and
(3) Limitation of the scope of their "veto" on U.S. policy
and action outside their own area. This suggests that the U.S. objectives
for which European concurrence or support is sought should be tightly cir-
cumscribed as to subject matter and as to level of effort sought from them --
the more nearly these objectives can be confined to the simple denial of the
area to the Soviets the better.
C. The backdrop of our examination is a brutally-frank look at
present-day Europe -- a Europe in which great potentialities are frustrated
and confined by failure of leadership and political institutions. One cannot
fai to be impressed by the striking contrast of rich physical and strategic
- 171 -
Approved
For TOP SECRET
008-5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2001/08/23 : NLE-117-008-5-1-6
OHL
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
LIBITY
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
resources with governmental weakness. We must fix firmly in our minds that
we are dealing with a Europe of politically-weak states -- a Europe which,
except for Germany, has lost its elan vital, and its leadership, and shows
little sign of recovering them, yet one which cannot be allowed to slide under
Soviet control. Energy and resolution in government are lacking, and the
resulting lack of will and capability to act has been institutionalized in
key instances in constitutions, in multiplicity of parties, and in delicately-
balanced policy agreements on which coalitions are based. The recent example
of France simply showed this situation in unusually striking form. Disillu-
sionment of national societies with the good faith, competence, and value of
their political agents and agencies is deep-rooted. Political action has
little appealin terms of the dynamics of a promise of economic betterment,
except to those who, attracted by the Communist Lorelei, represent a threat
rather than a support to the West. Otherwise, such appeal as political action
has is chiefly in terms of rigid protection of the interests, programs, and
policies which contending groups have had embodied in legislation and govern-
mental administrative rulings. The picture is one of stalemated, checked and
balanced political groups, unable to take the steps to develop strength or
even, for example, in France, to correlate funding with approved programs.
d. Little of a dynamic nature is apparent torolieve the strains
that exist. In particular, economic expansion, which through provision of
new increments of resources would allow progress and improvement in selected
sectors, is slowing in several countries. Possible stimulants exist, partic-
ularly in the EPU's widening of the trading market, and in the Coal-Steel pool
- 172 -
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/08/23 NLE-117-008-5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved
TOP SECRET
OHL
Dwight
17-008-5-1-6
SCL-TF/C-1
SEC. VII
my
SECURITY INFORMATION
which may introduce new dynamic forces into European industry at a very
fundamental level. Coupled with this are indications of widening interest
in business and government in increased productivity and reduction of
restrictive practices, together with the emergence of at least a few
younger industrialists of more expansionist outlook.
e. Other dynamic factors, however, work to increase the strains.
Foremost among these are the problems of unemployment in Italy -- which,
though possibly exaggerated is nonetheless of serious significance -- and
the growing population pressure in the same country.
f. Except for Germany, free Europe is not an area from which greatly-
expanded efforts can be expected, or even decisiveness in public affairs.
g. The gnawing concern of fear and insecurity which existed as
little as two years ago has drastically reduced. The tendency to equate
general war with utter ruin and loss of everything prized is still general,
but is becoming less emotional than rational, and the probability of such
war in any particular limited period of time seems to be rated much lower,
at least in press and government, than formerly. Still, the reluctance
to invest in projects of medium or long-term return is prevalent.
h. It does not appear that the Communist threat in Northwest Africa
is now substantial. The main significance of the turbulence there is to
harass a French Government already nearly overwhelmed by other problems.
i. A few signs of a slight recent recovery in American prestige
are evident -- e.g., in military circles, at the "official" level of govern-
ment and in NATO, and in certain elements of the press. The "decline" in
- 173 -
Approved For
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
ONLY
Duight Dr
Approved For
TOP SECRET
08-5-1-6
SOL-TF/C-1
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
U.S. prestige in 1952 was probably exaggerated in the minds of many by a
mistaken assumption that the U.S., as such, enjoyed high prestige and influ-
ence prior to the decline.
j. Contrasting with these adverse factors are important, though
limited, assets. The military and economic power, and the political and
cultural influence of Western Europe are sufficient to constitute it a
power-center. While it is unlikely that Europe will provide military forces
sufficient to halt the Soviets, it is not unreasonable to expect that with
U.S. end-item aid and marginal economic aid, they will provide 2/3 of this
amount -- and probably more if a commensurate contribution from Germany can
be obtained.
k. Industrial output is such as to enable a large proportion of
military equipment requirements to be met -- particularly as expansion of
munitions output aided by off-shore procurement takes place -- Europe's
economy is able to provide a standard of living which is high in relation to
that of Eastern Europe and Asia, and is rising, in general, at a slow to
moderate rate. In basic industry such as the steel of the Ruhr, the Saar,
and the U.K., the output of Europe still forms a large portion of world pro-
duction. Great assets of highly skilled manpower exist, and Europe's man-
power in military units is on a par with the world's best.
1. Within the scope of established governmental policies and ap-
proved plans, there is thus a sizeable strength in Western Europe. It is not,
however, a strength which can be, in peace, commanded, employed and utilized
aggressively under the existing free governments. There does realistically
- 174 -
Approved For
01 SECRET
08-5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
OHL
Dwight
10
SOL-TF/C-1
Approved For TOP SECRET
SEC. VII
4.8/817
SECURITY INFORMATION
appear to be, however, a basis for the attainment of a rock-bottom minimum
acceptable U.S. objective for the area.
m. One element of the policy of Alternative C is to "accelerate
the consolidation of the Free World." An overall objective under that pol-
icy must be to deny the basic assets of the region to the Soviets, who would
not suffer from the same inhibitions as we, in mobilizing and utilizing them
to build up the Soviet power position. The Soviets are not bound to leave
free Governments in power. Further, we should support actions tending
toward integration, since the creation of larger markets may create a
dynamic which could break the present network of restrictions. We should
support the incorporation of Germany into the community of European nations,
for the dual reason that this action would enlist the German dynamic, and
at the same time tend to control it.
n. In the mid-term, we should strive to create in Europe a Defense
Force, basically conventional in type, that will increase our flexibility
by avoiding exclusive dependence upon atomic weapons and add to our ability
to retain major areas on the continent if the Soviets attack. If by mid-
term we have pressed the Soviets back to a point where they are ready to
accept atomic inspection and limitation, this force could prove a most
valuable element in Free World strength. In any case, it denies the
Soviets the hope of easy advance over a Western Europe blackmailed into
not using atomic weapons.
O. It is in the short-term, however, that concrete and definitive
action requirements may be stated. The first is to get the Soviet Union
- 175 -
Approved For Rele
TOP 08 SECRET
5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
OHL
Dwight
Approved For
O'SECRET
008-5-1-6
SOL-TF/C-1
SEC. VII
4281877
SECURITY INFORMATION
out of Eastern Germany. Likewise, they must be gotten out of Austria. The
second is to build up a considerable level of strength in the present NATO
area. The level of this strength, and the elements composing it, are pre-
sented more concretely in the discussion of lines of action at a later
point in this section.
p. A second major effort should be to cut down the Communist
strength in France and Italy, with the ultimate goal of stamping it out and
driving remaining elements underground. In the short and mid-term, effort
should be concentrated on splitting off major segments of Communist voting
strength, public support and labor strength that are not committed, hard-
core Communists. Immediate action should include: renewal of stimulation
of non-Communist labor unions, efforts to alienate the peasant vote from
the Communists, further efforts to identify the Communists as"enemies of
the Republic", and continued action to show up the speciousness of Commu-
nist appeals, particularly to the neutralists and near-neutralists. In
addition, there should be ever-increasing harassment of the Communist party
and apparatus, and a progressive series of operations aimed at the ultimate
destruction of the Communist Party structure in those countries.
q. A coordinated program of action related to short-term ends,
includes those listed below. (Note: These are examples. Obviously, in
the short time available to this study, full staff analysis has not been
possible. It is pointed out elsewhere in this report, however, t hat staffs
must develop the capability of formulating and initiating actions of this
kind in a matter of days not of months.)
- 176 -
Approved
FOTOP
20
SECRET
-008-5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For
TOPO SECRET
08-5-1-6
The
Dwight
SOL-TF/C-1
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
(1) Diplomatic-Political
(a) The development, among our allies, of sufficient
policy agreement concerning the actions which follow to allow them to go
forward, without damage to essential unity concerning Atlantic Community
affairs. France constitutes a special key. Combining political weakness
with intransigence on certain major issues, it has become in a sense a key
to progress in Western Europe. French agreement to German rearmament must
be obtained, if not through EDC then through standing aside while bilateral
and/or NATO arrangements are made. Further matters for early negotiation
with the French are set forth in the discussion of Indo-China.
(b) Approach the Soviets with demands that they evacuate
East Germany. Press our allies to join with us. Use every kind of induce-
ment available, especially paper inducements which need not unduly bind us
later. E.g., cite the future threat to the U.S.S.R. now rapidly being
created, and the forming of extremist sentiment in Germany, and offer the
Soviets guarantees against German aggression. Seek to build up the idea
that Soviet presence in East Germany is a source of weakness, difficulty
and future threat to themselves, rather than a source of strength. These
actions are coupled with a propaganda campaign described below.
(c) The ideal solution we would wish to see is a united
and rearmed Germany integrated in the European Community. In the effort to
achieve this we should not exclude the possibility that an agreement with
the Soviet Government for the unification of Germany obtained on condition
that it be neutralized, though permitted a limited national defense
- 177 -
Approved For
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
ONLY
Duight D
Approved For
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET 8-5-1-6
SEC. VII
STATE
SECURITY INFORMATION
establishment, might serve as an interim stage toward this objective.
Allied forces might be withdrawn into limited enclaves. The risk involved
in such a strategy might well.come within the terms of reference of Alterna-
tive C. Our minimum requirement for Germanyis a rearmed West Germany asso-
ciated with the West. As time passes our liberty of maneuver and decision
with respect to this problem becomes increasingly restricted and the weight
of German opinion grows. We recommend that we press forward on both courses
until a point is reached compelling a definitive choice. Accordingly, we
further recommend that the EDC nations be given to understand that if they
are unable to institute their defense community by the end of the year, the
United States will be compelled to take steps to arrange the re-arming of
Western Germany on a bilateral basis.
(d) Press strongly and repeatedly for an Austrian treaty
that will get Soviet forces out of Austria (as a preliminary to later clear-
ing of Hungary and Rumania). Be prepared to withdraw allied forces if nec-
essary to get agreement (see, however, "covert" below). Be prepared to pay
the Soviets a "ransom" for Austria, and to assure Austria of continuing
financial support in order to get the Soviets out.
(e) Make repeated representations, and organize repeated
pressure drives in the U.N. concerning the Soviet "enslavement" of Eastern
European countries.
(f) Aim for a "settlement" in Central Europe, leaving
narrow loopholes for continued aggressive action against the satellites.
(g) Take no position concerning NW Africa which runs
- 178 -
Approved For Rele
TOP SECRET
5-1-6
SECURITY INFORMATION
onl
Duight
Approved For Rel
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP SECRET
LIBIT
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
counter to French policies prior to the initiation of German rearmament.
(This line of action does not, however, preclude the world-wide projection
by the U.S. of the principle of the development of self-government for those
areas and populations not now possessing it.)
(2) Military. In Western Europe such a level and kind of
force should be developed, at a minimum, as will maintain the alignment
of the area with the West during peace and assure its alignment with the
West in war. Effort should be made by the U.S. to have as much military
force as possible generated by the area itself. In this "defense-deficit"
area, unwilling or unable to provide its own defense completely, the U.S.
should avoid underwriting the deficit, except to the extent unavoidably
essential to preventing their psychology and spirit from deteriorating to
such point as to make subversion probable. Above the essential "morale-
minimum", the U.S. should assist toward enabling the Europeans to approach
meeting the requirements of defense asfar as U.S. resources and other U.S.
commitments will permit. However, it should be clearly understood that
ther are limits on what can be expected from these allies in peace (or
war), and that, in seeking to redress the U.S./Soviet power balance there
is a point beyond which the mobilization of U.S. potential and resources in
the form of further allied units is no longer the most efficient vehicle
for developing military power. The necessity for close military integration
within the scope of the common defense undertaking cannot be over-emphasized,
for if such integration is not accomplished, the military and psychological
benefits of collective security will be lost. Over and above the "morale-
- 179 -
Approved For TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
OHL
Dwight
Approved For
E
SOL-TF/C-1
TOP 00 SECRET -008-5-1-6
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
minimum", the U.S. should, for strategic reasons, develop the capability of
holding, with such allied assistance as may be reliably expected, a suitable
position on the continent despite Soviet attack, as a base for such later
operations as may be decided upon. In Germany sufficient allied military
force should be maintained on the ground prior to the development of German
forces to preclude a vacuum into which Soviet power on the ground (even if
covert) might flow, or into which the re-entrance of allied forces might be
difficult to accomplish. The potential German contribution should, of course,
be realized at the earliest possible time.
(3) Economic. The U.S. should give marginal support to the
economies of Western Europe where assessed by us to be necessary in order
to provide the resource levels for maximum indigenous contribution to the
programmed build-up and maintenance of military forces, and for civil re-
quirements to maintain living standards at levels and with increases com-
patible with continued holding down of communist influence. Long-term
commitments should be undertaken as an element of specific plans bringing
in German participation in defense, and thus constitute a quid pro quo.
Continue support of ameliorative economic and financial measures such as
reduction of obstacles to trade, EPU, and other efforts to widen the Euro-
pean trading systems.
(4) Propaganda. A key element in our propaganda projection to
Western Europe should be our disclosed attitude and policy toward Central
Europe. We should build up the necessity for a settlement in Central Europe
as a prerequisite to peace. We should stress the theme of "liberalization"
- 180 -
Approved For Relea
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
041
Dwight DI
SOL-TF/C-1
SEC. VII
SECURITY INFORMATION
LIBERTY
of police restrictions in the satellites. We should show a U.S. sympathy
to the Soviet need for Security safeguards in the satellites, and challenge
the Soviets to reconcile this with "liberalization." (As liberalization is
achieved, and in any case following the clearing of Germany and Austria, a
new phase would be opened aimed at subverting or displacing the Soviet-ori-
ented regimes in these countries).
(5) Covert
(a) Should prepare a base for covert penetration into the
satellites as soon as feasible.
Attempt to get the French and Italians to drive the Communist
Party underground in order to separate them from the non-communist voting
strength now supporting them.
(b) Develop the capability to initiate a campaign to
generate mass resistance culminating in rebellion of Eastern Germany along
the Iron Curtain in case Soviet forces have not been cleared from Germany
within two years. In Austria, develop a covert capability to assure against
a communist coup, in the event allied forces are withdrawn in order to ob-
tain Soviet withdrawal and a peace treaty.
- 181 -
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION