Memorandum of Conference with the President Authored by Andrew J. Goodpaster

This memorandum authored by Andrew J. Goodpaster describes President Dwight D. Eisenhower's concerns about the grave risks posed by overflights of the Soviet Union with U-2 spy planes. He questioned whether the intelligence gained is worth the potential damage to negotiations...

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TOP arenet April 11, 1959 MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT April 7, 1959 Others present: Secretary McElroy Mr. Bissell General Goodpaster The President said he had asked Mr. McElroy and Mr. Bissell to come in to tell them that he had decided not to go ahead with certain reconnaissance flights for which he had given tentative approval the preceding day. He said he wanted to give them REA his thinking. First, we now have the power to destroy the Soviets without need for detailed targeting. Second, as the world is going now, there seems no hope for the future unless we can make some progress in negotiation (it is already four years since the Geneva meeting) Third, we cannot in the present circumstances afford the revulsion of world opinion against the United States that might occur the U. S. being the only nation that could conduct this activity. Fourth, we are putting several hundred million dollars into programs for more advanced capabilities. In summary, the President said he did not agree th at this project would be worth the political costs. He added that he had called Secretary Dulles who had taken the view that if the planned action were in the East he would see no objection but in the North and South of their sector he would not do it. Mr. Dulles had added that if the current negotiations fail, we must at once get the most accurate information possible. The President said he agreed on the need for information. This need is highlighted by the distortions several senators are making of our military position relative to that of the Soviets, and they are helped in their "demagoguery " by our uncertainties as to Soviet programs. He was concerned over the terrible propaganda impact that would be occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail. He added that there is some evidence that the Soviets really want a Summit Meeting. The President himself feels that there is need DECLASSIFIED TON 101 E.O. 12958. SEC. 3.6(b) MR 93 - 17301 BY His DATE 9/11/96