Memorandum of Conference with the President Authored by Andrew J. Goodpaster

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TOD peart
- 2 -
to make some kind of progress at the summit, even though we
cannot be sure that this is possible. There are, however, some
straws in the wind indicating the prospect is not wholly hopeless.
He told the group that if at a later time they think the situation
has changed, or if a crisis or emergency occurs, or new equip-
ment becomes available, they could raise the matter with him
again.
Mr. McElroy said it is far easier for Cabinet officers to recommend
this activity than for the President to authorize it, and that he
accepted the President's decision very willingly. Mr. McElroy
added that currently the Soviet long-range Air Force, which is
of very limited size, is the threat. Later, if we do not have
solid information, we will have to put our forces on air alert. In
addition, there is a need to base our missile program on the hard-
est possible information regarding the Soviet program.
Earlier the President had discussed this matter at length with me.
In response to his request for my advice, I analyzed the proposal
as to the importance of possible costs and possible gains, and
indicated I would be disposed to favor the two particular actions
proposed. I added that, while I had confidence in my analysis
of the costs and gains, I felt less sure of the evaluation of their
relative importance and would readily defer to the President's own
assessment in this respect.
G.
A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA
for SEGRET
TOD

Document source description

This memorandum records President Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision not to proceed with aerial surveillance overflights at that time.

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Page context

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"ocrText": "[4111/59]\nTOD peart\n- 2 -\nto make some kind of progress at the summit, even though we\ncannot be sure that this is possible. There are, however, some\nstraws in the wind indicating the prospect is not wholly hopeless.\nHe told the group that if at a later time they think the situation\nhas changed, or if a crisis or emergency occurs, or new equip-\nment becomes available, they could raise the matter with him\nagain.\nMr. McElroy said it is far easier for Cabinet officers to recommend\nthis activity than for the President to authorize it, and that he\naccepted the President's decision very willingly. Mr. McElroy\nadded that currently the Soviet long-range Air Force, which is\nof very limited size, is the threat. Later, if we do not have\nsolid information, we will have to put our forces on air alert. In\naddition, there is a need to base our missile program on the hard-\nest possible information regarding the Soviet program.\nEarlier the President had discussed this matter at length with me.\nIn response to his request for my advice, I analyzed the proposal\nas to the importance of possible costs and possible gains, and\nindicated I would be disposed to favor the two particular actions\nproposed. I added that, while I had confidence in my analysis\nof the costs and gains, I felt less sure of the evaluation of their\nrelative importance and would readily defer to the President's own\nassessment in this respect.\nG.\nA. J. Goodpaster\nBrigadier General, USA\nfor SEGRET\nTOD"
}