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Biddle, Anthony J. Drexel, 1942-1944
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Biddle, Anthony J. Drexel, 1942-1944
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President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
Diplomatic Correspondence
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PSF
A.J. D, Biddle, Jr.
1942-44
Biddle Folder
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W.,1.
January 30, 1942.
My dear Mr. President:
1/
In handing me the enclosures (a) copy of a "Survey
2/
of the situation on the Eastern Front, and (b) report on
the "Morale among the Germans based on information
received from Poland in December 1941", General Sikorski
said he believed you might be interested in their con-
tents.
I am aware that John Winant has already sent you
General Sikorski's Survey of the Eastern Front. This he
did following his conversation with General Sikorski at
the time when he, John, was trying to appraise the reaction
of the Eastern and Central European Allied Governments to
M. Stalin's expressed ideas on post-war Europe. In giving
this report to John, General Sikorski felt that it might
serve
The President,
The White House,
Washington.
- 2 -
serve to clarify his Polish viewpoint vis-à-vis
M. Stalin's expressed intentions.
Furthermore, in that recent months have brought
to light the value of Dr. Benes' as well as General
Sikorski's confidential information on Germany and
3/
Russia, I am also enclosing a copy of a report which
Dr. Benes has just handed me, "Report from Berlin re-
garding the situation and the conflict between the
High Command of the Army and Nazi Party".
With warmest regards and every good wish,
I am
Faithfully TouyBiddle yours
Enclosures:
as stated 1/2/3/ 1/
Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch Polish Series 112
January 29, 1942 from the Embasay at London.
COPY
I
A SURVEY OF THE SITUATION ON THE EASTERN FRONT
At the time of their attack on Russia the
Germans were more efficiently organised and better
equipped than the Russians. Their discipline and
training were superior. A spirit of success and
confidence in their leaders prevailed throughout
the German Armies. These advantages, in addition
to the blunders committed at the outset by the Soviet
High Command, accounted for the initial superiority
of the Germans over the Russian Army during the first
months.
Since the outbreak of the German-Russian war
repeated information tended to indicate that the pur-
pose of the German offensive operations was to attain
in 1941 e. line between Archangel and Astrachan. The
success of such an achievement was expected not only
to signify the doom of Soviet Russia. It would more-
over bring about Russia's downfull upon which Hitler
grounded political schemes on a tremendous scale which
he intended to disclose in conquered Mosdow. Had the
Germans been successful, they would have acquired the
most vital agricultural and industrial areas of the
Russian Empire including the Donetz and Krivorog
Basins, the capital towns of Moseow, Leningrad and
Kiev, and particularly the oil-fields of the Caucasus.
In accordance with their plan the Germans originally
deployed their action in three directions: Leningrad,
Moscow, Kiev. The progress of the German offensive
extenusted their armed forces and obliged them to
limit their main thrusts at first to two and finally
to one direction. Moreover, the brunt of their main
effort was more than once transformed from one strategic
direction to the other.
During the latest phase of the campaign the
Germans conducted offensive operations on the south-
ern sector in the direction of Rostov on the Don, with
the purpose of severing communications between Russia
and the Caucasus, and north-eastwards in the direction
of Moscow.
An offensive in the south led to a partial con-
trol of Rostov. It was met however by a Soviet counter-
action which was launched from the north-east against the
flank and the rear of the German Forces fighting for
Rostov. It was directed against Taganrog and even as
far
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 4 1972
By J. Schauble Date
- 2 -
far in depth as Maripol. The Russian counter-offensive
succeeded in driving the Soviet Army forward as far as
Taganrog and compelled the Germans to withdraw from
the Rostov area where they suffered heavy losses. The
next main Soviet effort was transferred further west-
ward in the direction of Mariupol, with the object of
intercepting the withdrawal of German forces operating
in the region of Taganrog.
The German manoeuvre against MOBCOW was executed
according to the old "Schliefen" formula by means of a
bilateral encircling movement with simultaneous engage-
ment of the enemy in a frontal attack. The southern
German wing struck in the direction of Tula-Ryazan,
while at the same time carrying out an operation in
depth towards Orel and Jelec. This thrust resulted
in the occupation of the region north-east of Tula and
Jelec. The northern German wing, attacking along the
line Kalinin-Jaroslav, occupied the region of Kalinin-
Maly Jaroslavec. It is difficult to ascertain along
which of their wings the Germans directed the main ef-
fort. It seems probable that the main weight was trans-
ferred from one direction to the other, in accordance
with the gravitation of Russian resistance. The en-
circling operations in the Moscow area did not bear signs
of a general large scale success along a broad front.
They merely resulted from the system, adopted by the
Germans in this campaign, of piercing through nemy con-
centrations by driving wedges of panzer units followed up
by mechanized forces. These operations produced the
formation of deep pockets whose flanks were threatened
in permanence by the Russian Forces occupying the ter-
ritory which had not been directly overrun by the thrusts
of the panzer divisions. The Russians took advantage of
this situation, counter-attacked the exposed German
wedges and wiped out in turn the pockets in the regions
of Jelec, Kalinin, and Tula.
Except for the counter-offensive in the Rostov
area, the Soviet counter attacks have 80 far been suc-
cesses rather of a tactical nature. There has not as
yet been a grand style counter-offensive of serious
strategic importance. Fresh Siberian divisions, trans-
ported by rail from the Far East, as well as large quan-
tities of cavalry were brought to the Moscow area and
thrown into action near Kalinin and Tula. As a result
of these operations the German Forces embarked on their
retreating maoeuvre along the whole front. The Soviet
Supreme Command and the Soviet Army are resolved to
take every advantage presented to them by the conditions
of winter in order to continue offensive.
Unless the Germans prepared adequate defensive
positions in their rear during the offensive on Moscow
and Rostov, it will be extremely difficult for them to
fortify
- 3 -
fortify a defense line sufficient to withstand Russian offen-
sive action.
The terrain west of the line attained by the Germans
during their offensive is not favourable to defensive opera-
tions. There are no natural obstacles which might facilitate
a stand. The first advantageous line from the point of view
of defence runs along the river Luga, the river Lowat, the
"gate" of Smolensk, the easter border of the Polesie marshes
and the river Dnieper. The Germans are said to have pre-
pared some extent of defence along that line.
Their withdrawal however to those positions would equal
the surrender of vast areas which had previously been con-
quered against a particularly heavy toll of blood. Hitler's
last speech, delivered on the occasion of his taking over the
supreme command, seems to indicate that the Germans, after
rectifying their front, would at all costs endeavour to hold
as large as possible a part of the conquered areas. It re-
mains to be seen whether and how far they may be successful.
There is no doubt however that the further the Germans retire
westward the more distant will become the purpose of their
campaign and the less will be afforded them for the reorgani-
zation of their extenuated land and air force units.
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SOVIET ARMY
During the present campaign the Soviet Army has suf-
fered enormous losses in men and equipment. Owing to the fact
that Russia has almost boundless human resources, loss of life
is less important than loss of war material which is expected
to be replaced by Britain and the U.S.A. Russia is incap-
able of absorbing all men of military age in the ranks and
reserve centres of fighting forces on account of the techni-
cal impossibility of providing sufficient food, equipment and
maintenance for such tremendous masses of soldiers.
The losses in armoured and mechanized equipment are
particularly grave and should be completed during the winter
months. The Russian is a good fighter. So far the morale
of the Red Army has not been shaken. This circumstance is
a proof of the exceptional power of resistance of the Russian
soldier, who has not only managed to withstand the long retreat
in passive resistance, but furthermore proved his ability to
fight on the offensive.
The Soviet Supreme Command, or more precisely Stalin,
has been throwing and will go on throwing huge masses of
troops into battle with complete disregard for human life.
So far the discipline of the soldiers has not been shaken, nor
does it seem likely to be weakened in spite of heavy losses.
The bolshevik règime has stood the trial of war and would have
stood even the fall of Moscow. The officers of middle and
lower ranks are efficient. This is not always the case with
the senior O.C.B and staffs, who seem to be inadequately pre-
pared for conducting large scale offensive operations.
With the progress of the war, however, the Soviet High
Command is acquiring experience and Field-Marshal Timoshenko
has
- 4 -
has come to the fore as a leader. I have had the oppor-
tunity to see for myself that the Russian Army is well pre-
pared for a winter campaign in the heaviest possible cli-
matic conditions.
One of the weakest points of the Soviet Army is the
communication problem. The railway over the whole of Rus-
sian territory is extremely scarce and its transport capac-
ity is very limited. Owing to insufficient organization
of transport and lack of rolling stock it cannot be put to
its full advantage. Motor-transport is also deficient owing
to shortage of vehicles and especially of spare parts, which
limits the possibilities of repair. At the present moment
climatic conditions also greatly reduce the efficiency of
rail and motor transport.
After the ultimate recapture of areas held by the
Germans, who before retreating would have destroyed all
means of communication, the Russians will be obliged to
put themselves to a tremendous effort in order to prevent
a deterioration in their transport service which would
directly enfanger the supply and the maintenance of the
fighting forces at the front. Notwithstanding serious
losses suffered during the first days of the war, especi-
ally from the bombing of air-fields, the Soviet air force
is still powerful. It has proved itself capable of dealing
with the Luftwaffe and lately has even acquired a certain
degree of superiority in the air. The supply system has
so far been working satisfactorily and the Soviet soldier is
well clothed and sufficiently fed to keep going. On the
other hand the civilian population of Russia this year will
be threatened with famine. The Army and the Government as
well as the war industry will not be affected, since Stalin
has sufficient reserves at his disposal for these purposes.
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GERMAN ARMY
It is the opinion of neutral observers who visited
the eastern German front, that the Germans have so far suf-
fered very heavy losses both in men and war material. These
losses are estimated at 1,500,000 killed and missing, and
over 2,000,000 wounded. Numerous cases of frostbite among
the soldiers have lately been confirmed in hospitals behind
the lines and throughout the country. The problem of
completing their losses in human material is becoming to the
Germans a cause of growing anxiety. The material losses
of the panzer units are estimated to equal the establishments
of 12 panzer divisions. In spite of the fact that almost the
whole of the European continent is toiling for the production
of armaments for the German Forces, their losses are 80 heavy
that they will be extremely difficult to replace. The
German Army has not been sufficiently equipped for &
Russian winter campaign. During our conversation Stalin
compared the German Armies to those of Napoleon in 1812
when they were retreating from Moscow. He stated that the
Germans who were taken prisoners in the Moscow area wore
civilian and even women's clothing. The German soldier, un-
accustomed to the severe Russian winter, is more seriously
affected by the cold than the Soviet soldier. So far the
operational
- 5 -
operational achievements of the Germans resulted chiefly
from the great superiority of their panzer and motorized
units over the Russians. The conditions established by
the Russian winter have greatly diminished the power of
their armoured forces, reducing their efficiency and there-
by transferring the advantage to the Russians.
My visit to Moscow occurred at a crucial moment of
the eastern campaign of 1941. At that time the battles
for Moscow and Rostov, which strategically governs the
entrance to the Caucasus, were reaching their decisive
stage.
The history of warfare will no doubt recognize these
battles as examples of determination and of skilful resis-
tance during a grave crisis. The will-power of Stalin, the
Supreme Commander, and his unshaken obstinacy to persever,
together with the bearing of the Russian soldier prevented
Moscow from being surrendered and accounted for the recapture
of Rostov.
It was not only the Russian winter however, that
checked the German offensive, as Hitler and Goebbels en-
deavoured to explain. Hitler recognized his defeat before
the gates of Moscow and ordered a retreat. The Soviet
counter-attack on Rostov, which was carried out with much
talent, took General von Kleist's army completely by sur-
prise and forced it to a disordered retreat.
The battles for Moscow and Rostov will bear decisive-
ly upon the eastern campaign and considerably influence the
progress of the war against Germany.
It would be difficult to anticipate the consequences
of these events. There is no doubt, however, that they
brought about the defeat of the Germans during the campaign
of 1941. For the time being it can be assumed that the
interruption of the German offensive in the east and the
resulting breach in the faith of the nation in ultimate
victory, have given cause to serious ferment within the
Reich. With the British successes in Africa, these disorders
will become serious. If the North African campaign is
brought by the British to a successful ending, which is not
an easy task, their "second front" in the country would be
shaken and defeatism would spread. Anticipation of defeat
may already be observed especially among the German troops.
According to information which I received upon my
return to London, there are signs of growing dissatisfaction,
slackening of discipline and morale among the German Army
and people. There also appears to be a breach between the
leaders of the Army and the National-Socialist party.
It is doubtful whether the German General Staff
still lays much confidence in Hitler or his strategic
genius. It is more likely that the bulk of the German
troops are beginning for the first time to question the
merit of the decisions of their Supreme Commander. The
German
- 6 -
German Command is at present faced with the problem 8.8 to
where and how they will succeed in halting their armies
in the East in order to withstand the winter and reestablish
their decimated, weakened, inadequately supplied and ill-
equipped forces, and prepare their stand for a fresh offen-
sive in the spring or even for defensive action. It is pos-
sible that the future months will give a clearer picture
of the sonsequences of Hitler's defeat during the first year
of his campaign against Soviet Russia.
The Russians will no doubt employ the winter months
to solidify their gains and prevent the enemy from estab-
lishing winter billets behind an organize front. At the
present moment the initiative along the entire front line
is passing to the Soviet Supreme Command. This fact has
been proved by the daring operations in the Crimea. It is
difficult, however, to establish the extent and the consequences
of this initiative, owing to the scarcity of accurate informa-
tion.
The Soviet Army disposes of highly trained ski-units
and masses of well-equipped cavalry which may play & signifi-
cant part in winter operations when mechanized equipment and
to a certain extent the air force are severely handicapped.
The eastern front will continue to engage the main
German forces hindering their movements in other directions
and probably preventing the German Army from undertaking any
major operation during this winter. The Germans are pur-
posely spreading various rumours on this subject in order
to conceal the present weakness and embarrassment of Hitler.
Nevertheless efforts of minor counter-action and organized
diversion may be expected (for instance in the direction
of Tripolis, with the object of restoring Hitler's prestige).
In spite of heavy losses the German Army has not yet
been broken and still represents a great operational force
which has not yet so far suffered a single decisive defeat.
It failed however to deal a final blow to the Red Army in
1941, according to Hitler's plan. It is the first frustra-
tion and may become a turning point. If, on the other hand,
the Russians were to commin a similar blunder by underesti-
mating the enemy's forces, they would expose themselves to
all consequences.
In connection with the developments on the eastern
front, it is most expedient to lay stress upon the great
importance of organizing a second front on the European
continent. The Allied Forces, in the first place British
and American, should enter in the spring of this year,
when Hitler is likely to commence a new offensive against
Russia.
London, January 8th, 1942.
Enclosure NO. 2 to Despatch Polish Series No. 112.
January 29, 1942 from the Embassy at London.
COPY
SECRET
POLISH GENERAL STAFF
6-th Department.
Ref.310.
22nd January, 1942.
Morale among the Germans -
based on information received from Poland in December, 1941.
I.ARMY.
1.
Front line units:
Information obtained from:
a. Soldiers' correspondence during the period from
9th Septemer to 6th October, 1941, from 165 different
units, mostly from the central front and, to a les-
ser degree, from the southern and northern ones.
If the two thousand letters examined only approximately
15-% were of a general nature. It is interesting to
note that the correspondence between soldiers serving
in different units gives more information about the
fighting and general military situation than letters
to and from home. It would appear that the censorship
in the first case is more lenient, or less careful.
b. Man returning from the front.
General fatigue caused by the excessive efforts to
which theArmed Forces had been subjected during the
last few months of the Russian campaign, seems to
prevail in the Army. Owing to primitive conditions
in Russia, made even worse by thorough destruction, the
Germans have to bear with extremely poor living con-
ditions, bad food and difficult communications. Fear
of lice, disease, poisoning, 88 well as a yearning
for a more cultural life, affects the nervous resistance
of the soldiers. Morale is further affected by the in-
creasing fear at the approach of winter.
The tremendous losses borne by the Germans have a simi-
lar effect. Hitler's proclamation read to the soldiers
before the beginning of the Moscow campaign was received
with complete silence, - in contrast to the great
enthusiasm which usually greeted the Commander-in-Chief's
appeals.
Discipline is, however, unaffected and the Army continues
to fight very well. This is, undoubtedly, due to
German propaganda which has succeeded in convincing the
entire Army that it is fulfilling an historic mission
by saving not only Germany but the entire World Civili-
sation from the menace of Bolshevism. "The Democracies
and the U.S.A. should be grateful to us for spilling
German blood in their cause" - writes General Zeits.
The success of German propaganda has, to a certain extent,
been
- 2 -
been due to the fact that German sddiers have, them-
selves, come into contact with the reality of Soviet
life. "What was written about Russia before the war
is nothing, compared to reality" - writes one of the
soldiers - "The slight bombardments which you from
time to time have, are infinitely better than if you
were overrun by the Bolsheviks they are animals" -
writes another.
Having convinced the German nation of its historic
mission, German propaganda now is engaged in convincing
the Army of the necessity of enduring a winter campaign
in Russia. The fruitful results of this propaganda
are already manifest in recent letters from the Leningrad
front. "It is possible that we may have to spend the
winter here, because we are not going to spill any
more blood, but will starve them out. It will be a
hard winter, but better than for these animals to invade
you".
Such letters are frequent, particularly from the Northern
front and it is interesting to note than many of them
speak of starving Leningrad out.
Naturally, there are many letters expressing discourage-
ment and nervous exhaustion, "You cannot imagine our
misery" - writes a soldier to his colleague - "there is
no Joy in living, it rains, one is constantly knee-deep
in mud, and one's clothes never dry, and it is 80 cold
at night that one cannot sleep".
"I can't imagine what the winter is going to be like". -
"We all curse this land whose vastness is so oppressive...
"Psychologically and nervously we are exhausted
three
weeks of hardest imaginable fighting and inconceivable
sacrifices is really too much". "I hope we do not have
to remain here for the winter, or we shall go slowly
but surely nad" - writes a soldier from the Southern
front as far back 8.8 the 6th of September.
Occasionally information points to the losses being 58
high as 60-%, and there is mention that N.C.O.S of such
and such a unit have been completely wiped out, etc.
Open criticism of the Party is also more and more fre-
quent. "No are like the Communists, where everybody is
watched by a G.P.U. agent. If you aty anything, you
at once fall into disfavour and no matter whether you
are an officer or a soldier, you are punished, What is
happening here is similar to what happens in the German
Army - Communist instruction from books. What do you
think of that? We who were in hospital were left behind
as a punishment" - writes one officer to another. A
soldier to his family: "if this denouncing at the base
and spying at home does not stop, I shall start such an
upheaval that these "gentlemen" will think twice".
Enthusiasm,
- 3 -
Enthusiasm, pathos ani boestfulness which until
recently were 80 prevalent, have now disappeared almost
entirely. Even so, it uld appear that the great
majority of the Geruan army is still well disciplined
and, should the German Command be able to give the men
a respite and better living conditions for the winter,
they will for some considerable time yet be a powerful
fighting force.
II. BASE
There are no material changes since our last report. There is
one new point of interest - the ever increasing number of
Soviet prisoners of war.
Evidence of the bostial treatment of Bolshevik prisoners of
war by the guards of prisoners' camps is further substantiated by
a letter written by one of the soldiers - guard at a camp. The
writer of this letter shows complete look of understanding that
the prisoners are hungry and his only feeling for them is that
of a deep scorn. This letter is worthy of quotation:
"My colleague and I are to organize a prisoners' of war camp.
10 thousand of them were sent to us in two days. Can you
imagine, what it was like! The hoard was hungry and exhausted.
Short time ago we had another transport. These were really
wild animals let loose. One evening they tried to raid the
kitchen and even set fire to the building. They were unlucky -
six of them pay for it with their lives. They were beaten
while clearing up the debris and beaten again, when driven back
to the camp at night. This appears to have cured them of
the desire for further outrages. The Asiatics are the worst
of them. They are a tribe of murderers. Things which are
happening here are beyond belief and if one had not experienced
them oneself, one would imagine them to be the ravings of a
madman. During the first two days we had frequently to shoot
into them. The moment one of them fell the hoard rushed at
him and took all he had, even though they might not have needed
these things themselves. This is Gospel truth! On two
occasions they devoured the bodies. On one occusion a man was
murdered and eaten, bit by bit. They are a hoard of wild
beasts. Nothing will satisfy them, nothing will improve them.
They only respond to force. What would have happened to
our towns and women, if these hoards had been allowed to pene-
trate into Germany. How fortunate that our Leader in his
wisdom WSS able to foresce and forstall it".
III. THE REICH
The enthusiasm of the German people seens completely to have
vanished and their belief in their ultimate victory is on the
wane. The anxiety for their near ones and dear ones and the
over increasing problems of every-day life are becoming all-
absorbing. In spite of the very efficient distribution of
food and clothing stolen from occupied countries, the 'Black
market' transactions are becoming more and more popular; the
villages are engaged on barter, and every Sunday the inhabitants
of towns make mass excursions to far away provinces to buy food.
In
- 4 -
In other words the hitherto well-disciplined population
is beginning to break food regulations, which fact may
have serious consequences in the future.
Discord and friction between the Party and the population
over which they 80 ruthlessly and brutally rule, is
over growing. Internal terror is almost as bad as
in occupied countries. Letters, either genuine or
forged, purporting to have been written by the Bishop
of Muenster, condemning methods used by the Gestapo, are
circulated amoing the Catholic population.
News of the successes of German armed forces are greeted
with growing indifference. Fewer and fewer people
believe in the permanence of their conquests, and more
and more express the hope for a speedy end of hostillities
while Germany is still on top and in a position to pay
for peace. Even the greatest enthusiasts are willing to
make far-reaching concessions. Religion is gaining
ground. On the other hand, demoralisation and a tendency
to fast living is growing, particularly among the youth.
Considerable nervous strain is noticeable in bombed sreas.
It is said in Berlin that three or four consecutive nights
of bombing are bearable, but nerves would certainly
give way under the strain of longer periods of bombard-
ment.
The comparatively small amount of damage caused by bombard-
ments has helped to maintain the spirits of the population.
The German propaganda attributes this to the efficiency
of their anti-aircraft defence, which, they allege, causes
the enemy to unload their bombs at random.
Discontent is growing among the workers, one of the
reasons being longer working hours.
The Communist Party is in process of organization; no other
activity is, however, perceptable.
The alleged sabotage is rather the result of over-strain
and under-nourishment of the workers, than of any con-
scious anti-war mov ement.
In conclusion it should be stated that within the Reich
enthusiasm is gradually diminishing and a desire for a
speedy end of hostilities, even at the price of far-
reaching concessions, is ever growing. Antagonism between
Party and population is increasing, as are. the whispered
runours of an internal coup being organized by the military.
The new Leader, to be chosen by the Army /Marshal Reichenau's
name was mentioned, / would be charged with concluding a
speedy peace "with honour".
Fear of the collapse of their Italian ally is ever growing.
Interesting resarks on this subject are to be found in
Enclosure No.1. They originate from Lt. Colonel Les or
Lerich of the German Intelligence Service, whose main in-
terest is the morale of their allies. He expressed his
views
- D -
views very frankly to & man in whom he had implicit faith.
Nevertheless, the German people are well sware that in order
to avoid complete defeat they must unreservedly obey the
dictates of their Har Leaders. An internal disruption of
Germany is, therefore, at present quite out of the question.
It is, of course, conceivable that concentrated effective
bombardment coupled with land successes of the Allied Armies,
or the collupse of Italy, might bring about a change of atti-
tude of the German people, at present, however, the foregoing
would Germany. appear to be a true picture of the present state of
COPY
Report of a German Intelligence officer, dated
October, 1941.
According to rumours current in military circles, the of-
fensive on Moscow was planned personally by Hitler, and
was not the idea of the Wermacht. Prostige and the neces-
sity to improve the morale of Germany and, what is even more
important, in Italy, were supposed to be the dominating reasons
for this step. Great importance was attached to this offen-
sive; its success might have far-reaching results, whereas
its failure may be a signal for defeat.
It was considered that the occupation of Mosdow and other
important centre in Russia would release some of the German
armed forces which might be needed in Italy in the event of
a collapse of that country. Should the offensive on Moscow
succeed, further activities on the Eastern front would, most
likely, have been postponed until spring. In the event of the
position in the East become difficult, the Germans are pre-
pared to use gas.
The offensive was launched with incredible power and ruthless-
ness. Small roups of prisoners are not taken; even if
they surrender, they are shot.
Similarly - this rule of terror is applied to the resisting
civilian population.
Success appears to have gone to the soldiers' heads and they
no longer believe in the true value of their victories.
Generally speaking, informant maintains that the Cermans will
not lose the war by a military defeat - they have sufficient
supplies of ammunition, armament and aircraft to last them
for a long time yet and the morale of the soldier is good -
trouble might, however, start from within and surprises from
their own population and, principally, that of Italy, are
possible.
The situation in Italy is cerefully watched by the Germans;
it is fairly difficult and hunger demonstrations took place
in certain sectors of the front. The Gestapo consider them of
little importance and easy to deal with, Mussolini, however,
exaggerates their importance and uses them as a political
argument.
The recent conversations between Hitler and Mussolini were of
a sharp nature, - Mussolini demanded economic assistance and
larger supplies of anti-aircraft artillery, whereas Hitler
asked for better armed forces to be sent to the eastern front,
Both parties refused, and Hitler was alleged to have stated that
he had been misled by an over-estimation of the Italian
military power. À Colonel of the Gestapo was present at all
the meetings of the two dictators.
Both
- 2 -
been due to the fact that German addiers have, them-
selves, come into contact with the reality of Soviet
life. "What was written about Russia before the war
is nothing, compared to reality" - writes one of the
soldiers - "The slight bombardments which you from
time to time have, are infinitely better than If you
were overrun by the Bolsheviks they
are
animals"
-
writes another.
Having convinced the German nation of its historic
mission, German propaganda now is engaged in convincing
the Army of the necessity of enduring a winter campaign
in Russia. The fruitful results of this propaganda
are already manifest in recent letters from the Leningrad
front. "It is possible that we may have to spend the
winter here, because we are not going to spill any
more blood, but will starve them out. It will be a
hard winter, but better than for these animals to invade
you".
Such letters are frequent, particularly from the Northern
front and it 1s interesting to note than many of them
speak of starving Leningrad out.
Naturally, there are many letters expressing discourage-
ment and nervous exhaustion. "You cannot imagine our
misery" - writes a soldier to his colleague - "there is
no Joy in living, it rains, one is constantly knee-deep
in mud, and one's clothes never dry, and it is 80 cold
at night that one cannot sleep".
"I can't imagine what the winter is going to be like". -
"We all curse this land whose vastness is 80 oppressive.-
"Psychologically and nervously we are exhausted
three
weeks of hardest imaginable fighting and inconceivable
sacrifices is really too much". "I hope we do not have
to remain here for the winter, or we shall go slowly
but surely mad" - writes a soldier from the Southern
front as far back as the 6th of September.
Occasionally information points to the losses being 58
high as 60-%, and there 18 mention that N.C.O.S of such
and such a unit have been completely wiped out, etc.
Open criticism of the Party is also more and more fre-
quent. "No are like the Communists, where everybody is
watched by a G.P.U. agent. If you say anything, you
at once fall into disfavour and no matter whether you
are an officer or a soldier, you are punished, What is
happening here is similar to what happens in the German
Army - Communist instruction from books. What do you
think of that? We who were in hospital were left behind
as a punishment" - writes one officer to another. A
soldier to his family: "if this denouncing at the base
and spying at home does not stop, I shall start such an
upheaval that these "gentlemen" will think twice".
Enthusiasm,
Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch Czechoslovak Series No.7.
January 27, 1942 from the Legation at London.
COPY
REPORT FROM BERLIN REGARDING THE SITUATION AND THE
CONFLICT between THE HIGH COMMAND 07 THE ARMY
AND THE NAZI PARTY.
Borlin, 26th December, 1941.
1. The serious crisis in the higher administration of
Geruany which was first of all kept from the Gorman
army and people and was later adumbrated through the
retirement of Field Marshals Brauchitsch and Book, and
which has now finally become known in all its extent
through the spread of rumours, is engaging the attention
of public opinion in Germany - in so far as such a thing
can be said to exist - to an extress degree. The orisis
has produced the greatest confusion and general state
of dopression. There are increasing indications of
the fact that what is involved is a eleft between the
Party and the Army which is unbridgeable and which has
been maturing for a long time past.
2. The versions of the course of this develop-
ment are being circulated in well-informed military
circles:
One considers Brauchitsch as being the victim
of a far-reaching intrigue of the Masi Group amongst the
generals /List, Jodl, Reichenau, sto./, based upon the
decision of Brauchitsch and the more moiorate generals
/Book, Rundstedt, Leeb, etc./ to fall back upon the line
Smolensk-Kharkov after the failure of the last offensive
against Moscow. The Nazi Group protested against this
step, advancing the argument that the Red Army also was
too exhausted, and too deficient in material reserves,
to sustain B counter-offensive. As proof of their
assertion they pronounced secret reports from the German
espionage service which had been witheld from Brauchitsch
and his General Staff. Violent disputes, in the course of
which Hitler charged the Supreme Commander with having
fallen back when he really knew better, led to Brauchitch's
retirment and to now operational orders being issued,
according to which the retreat was to be stopped on the
line Vyazma-Bryansk.
3. The second version is based upon the circum-
stance that the offers of resignation by Brauchitsch, Book,
Leeb, Rundstedt, Guderian, Schmidt, etc. had practically
all been made in the early days of December. This leads
to the conclusion that what is involved is a. planned
"revolt" of the whole group of the Army Commanders,
who were not willing to assume the responsibility for the
winter offen ive which had been forced upon then by
Hitler
- 2 -
Ritler and his aycophants for reasons of prestige and will th
poor results and who wanted to avoid having the retreat
which they foressw laid at their own door.
4. Further, the Generals considered that, in view
of the deprivations which the German people are undergoing
and the difficulties in occupied Europe, the moment was
propitious for n. break with the Party circles, who were
thoroughly opposed to exclusive command being in the hands
of the Army. of the worthy ermy leaders only List was
outside the circle of the "conspirators", probably simply
because he was at the time inaccessible in Bulgaria,
and probably also because of his long-standing personal
links with his one-time subordinate, Hitler. Keitel
remains neu ral and would seem not to have fallen into
disgrace with his more enterprising comrades.
5. Both versions - although apparently contra-
dictory - can however be sem to be reconcilable with
one another. Their point of intersection is the fact
that Hitler in his stormy discussions with Brauchitsch
and the others made the allegation that the generals had
failed to carry out his grandiose strategical plans and
that the breakdown of the MOBOOW offensive was to be
attributed to this fact.
There can be no doubt that the event will have far-
reaching consequences as the sudden and simultaneous retire-
ment /there can no longer be any question of being
"released from one's services"/ of army leaders who had
previously been valued by Hitler as war heroes of a
historical stature, and who had been rewarded by him with
titles and decorations, has increased to an extraordinary
degree the feeling of uncertainty in the German masses and
shaken their confidence in his own leadership.
6. Whether it is 6. question of the intrigues of a
group of Naxi generals of an ambitious and pushing type
who are not tested leaders / such as Jodl and Reichenau/
against their senior comraies, or of the "stratogic with-
drawl" of these last from an intolerable responsibility, and
at the came time of an attempt / as in 1918/ to save the
prentige of the Army and to sacrifice thereto the prestige
of the Fuhrer, and perpahs also his person, it remains
true that there is now an open crisis and also an open
conflict between the field grey Army of the Generals and
the "brown" Army of Adolf Hitler of which the Germans
have already taken account.
The consequences of this erisis will certainly be
far-reaching, although it cannot yet be said when its nature
will become fully apparent to the general public.
PS F: Biddle Folder
fulfusomal
HR
40, ,Berkeley Square,
London, W.,1.
February 16, 1942.
My dear Mr. President:
1/
I am attaching hereto for your information
the recent report, which Dr. Benes received from
what, he tells me, is a highly placed and usually de-
pendable source in Germany. As his reports have
hitherto proven interesting and enlightening, I
thought you might like to have this one,as well as
those I have previously sent you.
With warmest regards and every good wish, I
am
Faithfully yours,
Tomy Birder
The President,
The White House,
Washington.
Enclosure:
1/ as stated.
COPY
REPORT FROM BERLIN
End of January
1942
The serious disagreements between the generals and
Hitler are becoming increasingly marked. The first
contemplate with & certain malicious satisfaction the
strategic errors which are being committed. The German
losses in men and material are gigantic, while the cold
is an even more severe factor than the Russian tanks.
Although there has been a great deal of propaganda
regarding the collection of clothing, according to the
information here available it has had a very poor moral
success among the people. Compared with earlier
collections it was in no sense voluntary; on the
contrary the Party in different places extorted their
last supplies of winter clothing from the population
under threats. As also the cltohes, and particularly the
shoes, are deteriorating more and more in the remote
districts many civilians, particularly amongst the work-
ing classes, were reluctant to hand over their worn cloth-
ing, which was often better than the new. But they
were forbidden to do so as in the individual districts
precise lists of names were drawn up and checked either
by the Party or by especially appointed functionaries.
Many who were hesitating were threatened with being
publicly exposed.
2) The view is held in Berlin that the Russiens
will increase their offensive as the cold becomes more
acute, and fears are expressed that the German power of
resistance will weaken. Those troops who have been
stationed at the front since the beginning of the campsign
and who are familiar with the Russian style of fighting,
have become worn out by terrible hardships and cold, and
the new reserves which have been drafted from Germany
and France etc. simply cannot exist under the Russian
climatic conditions.
3) The German Air Force is no longer able to go
into action with the power demanded of it. All reports
agree in stating that there is a lassitude and war weari-
ness amongst the German population which has never been
observed previously. And here we must take account of
the fact that tens of thousands of familites have had no
news of their relatives since November last, while they all
hear the messages sent from all the broadcasting stations
addressed
- 2 -
addressed nightly to the field hospitals in Russia,
which, however, for the most part remain unanswered,
and, therefore, have a bad moral effect. The transmissions
were first of all prohibited, but finally the High Command,
as a result of the pressure exercised upon it by the
German women's organizations, was obliged for prudential
reasons to permit these messages, which are transmitted
from 4 a.m. onwards. There are reliable grounds for
believing that they have a very demoralizing effect upon
German women, who have no news of their relatives.
4) Almost all the soldiers between 20 and 40
from Germany itself and the occupied territories have been
transferred, formed up into new units, and after & brief
training sent to the Russian front. At least 25 divisions,
whose training, particularly in the tank and motorized
detechments, was still completely inadequate, and who
should normally have gone into action only in the spring,
were precipitously entrained and despatched to different
parts of the front. In the same way thousands of im-
perfectly trained pilots were drafted to squadrons
operating at the front in order to make up for the
severe losses which have taken place.
5) Although the munition and armament industries
are working in Germany and all the occupied territories,
according to the reports of our informants in spite
of all efforts and expenditure the production figures,
particularly in the occupied territories, are declining.
On the other hand, the damage done in the Ruhr and other'
industrial regions through bombing is greatly exaggerated
in the British reports. Ports and dockyards in France,
Holland and Germany, however, are suffering severely.
6) In Russia Hitler, regardless of losses in men
and material, using every means to stabilize the front at
any price, so as to keep up his own prestige and it is
hoped in Germany this will be possible along the line
Leningrad - Velikie Luki - Smolensk - Kharkov, while
everything will certainly be done to retain command of the
Crimea. When the great winter frosts are over an offensive
is to begin at a number of points.
7) One must allow for the fact that in Libya
Rommel, of whom Hitler has an enormously high opinion,
will receive sufficient reinforcements and that, probably
at the beginning of February, he will proceed to & major
counter-offensive. It is believed that if it is successful
a new attack will follow, perhaps via Bulgaria, so as, if
possible, to attack Egypt from two sides. But this will
fundamentally depend upon the situation on the Russian
front.
8) The situation with regard to America - in so
far as one can make a picture thereof by combinging reports
from Europe and the East - would seem to be that her
preparations for war are completely inadequate, and that
we must therefore expect serious losses for America,
England and Holland in the Far East. One must believe
that
- 3 -
that the Phillipines, the Dutch colonies and also
Singapore cannot be held unless America risks her
navy and air force - which, according to our trusted
informants, she will not do. It is not believed that
Australia is in serious danger, as Japan has not sufficient
shipping accommodation to undertake such a large-scale
action so far from her home ports, although after the
possible occupation of different island groups Japan
could acquire vital air and naval bases - which would have
a marked influence on the Australian morale.
9) It is expected that America, both in respect
of ships as well ES of tanks and aircraft and their
manning, will soquire an ultimate superiority, although
this will require from 12 to 18 months. It is further
stated in Berlin that Germany will put into service in
the spring a large number of small and magnificently
equipped submarines which have partly been built in
Italian yards, and which will finally operate on the
Atlantic coast of America and Canada from secret bases
(Alaska).
10) The psychological atmosphere in Italy is
very dim, and in every respect Italy represents only a
debit for Germany. This works back upon Spain, and it
is not believed that the Germans will succeed in engaging
her in the world conflict without resorting to military
measures, although all indications are in favor of
the fact that German influence, which is exercised by
gold and resourcesful propaganda, remains very powerful
both in Portugal and Spain.
Biddle Folder
March 7, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
You may remember that I talked to you about this
telegram when Admiral Standley and I were having lunch
with you and that you suggested that London be informed
along the lines laid down in your memorandum to me of
March 7.
As a result of our talk I sent on March 6 a tele-
gram to Biddle of which I enclose a copy for your in-
formation.
Believe me
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure:
Telegram to London,
March 6, 1942.
The President,
The White House.
note: See Summer welles folder for complete Corres. ne above.
PSF: Biddle Folder
1-42
March 13, 1942.
Dear Margaret:-
I think it is horrid that your present
to me was stolen from you! Nevertheless, the
idea was definitely yours and when you get back
your name will go in Volume I, with the added
thought "Original Patentee".
I am glad to hear that Sally sees you
often and that she is well.
You and Tony should know that I think
I have saved you from the Governorship of
Pennsylvanial The fact is that to-date nobody
has agreed on anybody and, as the situation was
extremely chaotic, I told them that I much
preferred to have you both remain in the most
unique diplomatic post -- or rather posts --
in all history!
Thank you ever 60 much for the stamps.
I had not seen them before.
Affectionately,
Hrs. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle,
Ritz Hotel,
London,
England.
Ritz Hotel,
Piccadilly,
London, W.I.
February 16th, 1942.
Dear Mr. President,
Many thanks for your letter of December 24th.
Having duly informed you of what your Christmas present
was, I do not quite know how to explain what has
happened to it since.
It comes down to this. When the Prime Minister
returned from his visit with you, he set about looking
for first editions of his books for you. He has now
found that I had been ahead of him, and had literally
scoured not only London but England to get the complete
set, which I had been successful in doing. These books
are now at the binders being bound for you in a lovely
red leather. The Prime Minister sent word to me that
that W&S what he wished to give to you and that he
would appreciate it very much 11 I would be kind enough
to turn the books over to him, 80 that he could send
them to you as a personal remembrance from himself.
Naturally, there was nothing else for me to do but to
agree and I am really very distressed that we won't
have the opportunity of giving you something which we
knew you wanted.
I do not think the Prime Minister knows that you
have been told you were getting this present from me.
Anyway, it is all very complicated, but the net result
1s that I have been left high and dry regarding your
Christmas present, but that you are receiving the books
from the Prime Minister himself.
Tony and I are very well and manage to keep busy.
I can quite honestly say I have never had as interesting
a time in my life as I an having now, and I am thoroughly
enjoying it.
- 2 -
Sally spends most weekends with us. As you know,
she is now in the American Red Cross, where I am part
of each week. She is working hard and doing an
awfully good job.
I am enclosing two sets of Free French stamps
which have just been issued by the Free French forces
here. I do not think they are on the market as yet,
and I thought you might be interested in having them.
I understand there will be two more sets coming out
shortly. These stamps were designed by the man who
did the beautiful lacquer work in the "Normandie".
I think his name is Edmond Dulac.
Our thoughts are 80 often with you, and we pray
that you are keeping well in spite of your busy life
in such difficult times.
My love to you,
Affectionately,
margare/Bidelle
PSF: PSF.Biddle Biddle
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 16, 1942.
REMINDER
Give the attached to the
President just before General
Sikorski comes in to see him.
G.
filention
Folder
Published in
1-42
Foreign Relations of the United States
Vol. 111 Europe
1942
Pages 108-110
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W. 1.
February 20, 1942.
My dear Mr. President:
In the thought that it might serve as a
useful reference, I am sending you the attached
indexed survey (a) on the reactions of Allied
government circles here to M. Stalin's reported
post-war ideas; and (b) on the views of leading
officials of these circles on the shape of
things to come.
No sooner had I found that the Polish Govern-
ment had learned of M. Stalin's post-war ideas,
than I became apprehensive lest the Poles
initiate some action which might prove offensive
to the Russians. I had not long to wait. On
March 31 General Sikorski proposed, at a lunch
which he gave for the representatives of the
Belgian, Greek and Yugoslav Governments, that a
declaration be made by all Allied Governments
here, looking towards post-war collaboration.
The enthusiastic reception accorded his proposal
on this occasion spurred him to further efforts.
Unfortunately, his and his associates' thirst
for publicity resulted in a press notice the
following day to effect that he had given this
luncheon for the purpose of discussing a post-war
European reconstruction plan.
This, in turn, drew the attention and sus-
picion of the Russian Embassies here and served
to antagonize his colleagues in Allied govern-
mental circles, who thus suspected him of seeking
leadership of their circles.
Subsequently, the General and several of his
associates asked me what I thought of the proposal
for/
-2-
for a declaration, stating the envisaged terms thereof,
in only the most vague way. I replied that I person-
ally believed that before launching any such move at
this time, it should be put to the "acid test": would
it in any way prove offensive to the Russians? -
could it be interpreted by the Russians as a move to
form a bloc against them? I added that it might be
best to consult the Russians themselves in the matter.
I subsequently made the same reply to similar questions
asked me by representatives of the Norwegian, Czecho-
slovak, Yugoslav and Belgian Governments.
In response to my observations on this score, the
Norwegian Foreign Minister said that my remarks had
served to convince him that his own first impression
was right: he considered that the making of a
declaration at this time, such as was proposed by
General Sikorski, would only incite Russian suspicions;
he would advise Russian authorities of his Government's
invitation to join the declaration, and of his
disinclination to accept.
The Yugoslav Foreign Minister, in response to my
observations, said that he had hitherto been in a
quandary, since the Poles had urged him so strongly
to join the declaration. My observations, however,
had confirmed his own second thoughts in the matter.
He believed, therefore, that his Government should
do everything possible to dispel Russian suspicion,
and, rather, to create an atmosphere of collaboration.
Judging by General Sikorski's and his associates'
reactions, at this stage, to M. Stalin's reported post-
war intentions, I should look for them to become more
and more exercised, the closer the Russians draw to
the Polish border.
In this connection, I am aware that Sikorski and
his associates consider British public opinion as a
whole, "too much at Russia's feet", and that by
comparison, the attitude of the "United States towards
Russia is better balanced"; they have failed to
conceal their interest in what they appraise as a
"division/
-3-
"division of American opinion vis-á-vis Russia".
Accordingly I feel it would be only a wise precaution
to keep an eye open for traces of any possible
attempt, inspired by Polish circles here, to exploit
this aspect to the advantage of Poland's interests
and perhaps to the detriment of Russia in the eyes
of American public opinion.
In advising this I feel that I should give you
my following impressions concerning General Sikorski's
frame of mind: while he is & thoroughly honest,
sincere and courageous character, he has gained,
during the past few months, an inordinate ambition,
and thirst for publicity. He pictures himself on
the one hand as leader of post-war Poland, on the
other hand, now that France has disappeared as a
dominant influence on the continent, the leader of
continental Europe. I mention the foregoing because
I feel that his ambitions, his thirst for publicity,
and his characteristically Polish suspicions of
Russia, might possibly some day cloud his otherwise
comparatively clear perspective - and lead him to
permit some of his compatriots to launch some form
of subtle anti-Russian play amongst the Polish-
American community in our country.
I believe you might be interested in reading
Dr. Benes' views, pages 7 to 11, and General Sikorski's
views, pages 18 to 20 - also my observations as to the
differences between their respective opinions, page 30.
With warmest regards and every good wish, I am,
Yours faithfully,
Tom Bidder & r
The President,
The White House,
Washington.
Biddle Folder
1-42
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 4, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HARRY HOPKINS:
TO READ AND RETURN.
F.D.R.
Cable London March 3, 12:58 P.M.
from Biodle Polish Series re Biddle's
dispatch 119, Feb. 20th
JENDEX
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
SURVEY OF REACTIONS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENT
CIRCLES TO M. STALIN'S REPORTED POST-WAR
INTENTIONS, AND THEIR FORWARD-LOOKING VIEWS
TITLE
PAGE NO.
FACTORS MOTIVATING FRESH CONCERN
2
GENERAL SIKORSKI'S EFFORTS TO FORM AN ALLIANCE
BETWEEN THE TWO CONFEDERATIONS, AND TO BRING
ABOUT A DECLARATION BY THE ALLIED GOVERN-
MENTS LOOKING TOWARDS POST-WAR COLLABORATION
5
PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS (a) AS TO UNLIKELIHOOD
OF SIKORSKI'S SUCCEEDING IN RALLYING ALL
ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO HIS PROPOSED DECLARA-
TION AT THIS TIME; (b) ON THE REACTIONS
THERETO; AND (c) ON OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED
BY THE PROPOSAL TO GAIN FRESH INSIGHT TO
FORWARD - LOOKING VIEWS OF GOVERNMENTS
CONCERNED
5
DISCERNIBLE PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF ALLIED
GOVERNMENT CIRCLES TO GENERAL SIKORSKI'S
PROPOSAL, AND THEIR RESPECTIVE FORWARD -
LOOKING VIEWS
7
CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY REACTIONS
AND FORWARD - LOOKING VIEWS
7
DR. BENES' VIEWS ON MEANS OF DISPELLING RUSSIA'S
DOUBTS AND SUSPICIONS
9
DR. BENES' VIEWS ON THE NECESSITY OF AN ALLIED,
NOT A RUSSIAN VICTORY, TO INSURE AN ALLIED
NOT A RUSSIAN PEACE
11
DR. BENES' VIEWS AS TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF POST-
WAR REVOLUTIONS ON EUROPEAN CONTINENT, AND
A POSSIBLE MEANS OF "CANALIZING" THEM
12
DR. BENES' HOPES CONCERNING CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S
FUTURE
14
- 2 -
TITLE
PAGE NO.
DR. BENES' VIEWS REGARDING THE COMINTERN
AFTER THE WAR
15
CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO
OSSUSKY'S VIEWS ON POSSIBILITY OF POST-WAR
COMINTERN ACTIVITIES
16
GENERAL SIKORSKI'S APPREHENSIONS AND FORWARD -
LOOKING VIEWS
18
MOTIVE BEHIND SIKORSKI'S DESIRE THAT RACZYNSKI
VISIT WASHINGTON
18
AUTHORITATIVE ASSURANCES HERE AS TO NO
CONTEMPLATED COMMITMENTS TO RUSSIA
19
SIKORSKI'S SENSE OF RELIEF ON LEARNING MOLOTOV
NOT EXPECTED HERE UNTIL LATER THAN FORMERLY
REPORTED
19
PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS RE BACKGROUND FOR
IMPRESSION THAT SIKORSKI HOPES FOR SOME FORM
OF "REINSURANCE" FROM US AGAINST ANY TENDENCY
TO YIELD TO POSSIBLE RUSSIAN PRESSURE FOR
COMMITMENTS
20
SIKORSKI'S CONVERSATION WITH SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS;
THE LATTER'S OBSERVATIONS; SIKORSKI'S RE-
ACTIONS THERETO
21
SUBSTANCE OF SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS' VIEWS ON
RUSSIA AND HER POTENTIAL BEARING ON POST-
WAR EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION, AS EXPRESSED
TO GENERAL SIKORSKI
21
GENERAL SIKORSKI'S REACTIONS TO CRIPPS' REMARKS
22
GENERAL SIKORSKI'S FURTHER REACTIONS TO
CRIPPS' OBSERVATIONS; AND OBSERVATIONS AS
TO HIS FORWARD - LOOKING THOUGHTS REGARD-
ING POLAND
23
SIKORSKI'S DISAPPOINTMENT OVER CRIPPS' VIEWS
REVIVED HIS UNHAPPY IMPRESSION OF VARIOUS
SHADES OF BRITISH REACTION TO POLISH-RUSSIAN
AGREEMENT
24
FURTHER LIGHT ON VIEWS OF POLISH GOVERNMENT AS
A WHOLE
27
GENERAL SIKORSKI'S IRRITATION OVER GENERAL
DE GAULLE'S RADIO BROADCAST FAVORABLY
REMARKING UPON RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE FUTURE
28
COMPARISON OF BENES' AND SIKORSKI'S VIEWS AS
TO METHODS AND TIMING OF PROCEDURE IN
CONSULTATION BETWEEN MAJOR WESTERN POWERS
AND RUSSIA
30
- 3 -
TITLE
PAGE NO.
PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF NORWEGIAN GOVERN-
MENT TO SIKORSKI'S PROPOSED DECLARATION,
AND ITS FORWARD - LOOKING VIEWS
31
PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF BELGIAN GOVERNMENT
TO SIKORSKI'S DECLARATION AND ITS FORWARD -
32
LOOKING VIEWS
PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT
TO SIKORSKI'S PROPOSED DECLARATION AND
ITS FORWARD - LOOKING VIEWS
32
YUGOSLAV AND GREEK GOVERNMENTS PRELIMINARY
REACTIONS TO GENERAL SIKORSKI'S PROPOSED
33
DECLARATION
YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN OVER IMPLICA-
TIONS OF WHAT IT BELIEVES TO BE M. STALIN'S
POST-WAR INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS BULGARIA
......
35
Near the Polish Government
LONDON, February 20, 1942.
Polish Series
No. 119
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: Survey of reactions of
Allied Government circles
to M.Stalin's reported post-
war intentions, and their
forward-looking views.
(see attached index).
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington
Sir:
Supplementing my despatch Polish Series No.
115, January 30, 1942, depicting the tendency of
the Allied Governments of Eastern, Central and
Southeastern/
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78
By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972
-2-
Southeastern Europe to "huddle together" in face
of what they understood to be M.Stalin's post-war
intentions, I have the honor herein to report
(a) evidence of their fresh concern over develop-
ments which have taken place both before and
since the signing of the Greeko-Yugoslav and
Poliah-Czechoslovak treabies; and (b) the reactions
and. forward-looking views of Dr. Benes, of General
Sikorski, and of Yugoslav and Greek authorities,
as well as of Allied Government circles in general.
FACTORS MOTIVATING FR SE CONCERN.
Fresh concern arose from the following factors:
(a) General Sikorski's and his associates' indignation
over what they understand to be M.Stalin's intentions
(1)(2)
to include Lithuania as well as Latvia and Esthonia
(1) In an article by Polish Ambassador and Acting
Foreign Minister, Count Raczynski, which appeared in
"The Sunday Times", January 11, he mentioned Poland's
historic interest in Lithuania, adding in effect that
Poland and Lithuania would be bound in the future by
friendship and mutual interest. The following day,
Russian Ambassador to the Polish Government Bogomolov,
protested, pointing out to Raczynski in effect that
Lithuania lay in Russia's post-war orbit. At the same
time M. Bogomolov drew attention to another recent
article by a prominent Pole; Bogomolov protested
against the inclusion of a photograph of Vilno and
references to past and possible future connections with
Poland. In response to these protests, General Sikorski
made it clear in a stiff note to Bogomolov expressing
his Government's astonishment over the latter's protests
on the- above scores.
(2) The question put to the Acting Secretary at his
February 13 Press conference, as to whether the Depart-
ment had any knowledge of reported conversations in
London between the British and Russians which indicated
agreements had been tentatively reached, including
among others, post-war territorial settlements whereby
Russia would be given the Baltic States, Bessarabia,
and Bukowina, recalls to mind the following: (a) my
July conversation wherein Mr. Eden agreed with my
-3-
within Russia's post-war orbit; (b) General Sikoraki's
(3)
apprehension over his report of January 6, from
Polish Embassy, Kuibyshev, definitely indicating that,
contrary to his understanding of the spirit and terms
of his recent agreement with (.Stalin, the Russian
authorities are restricting enrolment in the Polish
(4)
forces to racial Poles, thus excluding the enrolment
of Polish nationals of other origin and extraction;
(c) the Polish, the Yugoslav, the Greek, and perhaps
to a lesser degree, the Czechoslovak, Governments'
concern over what they believe to be M.Stalin's
intention to include at least the coastal area of
Bulgaria within Russia's post-war strategic area.
I am aware, moreover, that these circles, at
least in part, look with some concern upon the
implications of the recent Russian proposal that the
expressed opinion that more and more pressure might
be expected for territorial commi tments (see Polish
series No.31, July 27,1941), and (b) my recent
conversation with an official of the Polish Govern-
ment wherein he said that the Baltics looked to the
United States as their only hope for the future. If,
he said, the United States did not intend to help
them towards restoration of independence of their
respective states, this should be made clear to them
so that the people of the Baltic States might fight
out their battles on their own. Hence the afore-
mentioned inquiry at the press conference would seem
to bear the earmarks of combined Polish and Baltic
inspiration.
(3) The Polish Government's apprehension over this
report was reflected in the publication of an article
entitled "The Curzon Line" in the January 16 issue of
"Free Europe". In effect, the article stated that
the "Curzon Line", which was brought up whenever the
question of Poland's Eastern frontier was discussed
in the British Press or in certain British political
circles, was usually referred to as an equitable
frontier based on the ethnographical principle.
After going into considerable detail as to various
decisions and treaties bearing on the post-great-war
settlement of the Polish-Russian frontier, the
article ends by stating a number of conclusions which
might be drawn therefrom:
-4-
Lieth-Ross Committee extend the scope of its studies
to that of post-war price policy. Recalling that
when the Lieth-Ross Committee was formed, the
Russians made a number of reservations, these circles
are inclined to regard this proposal as significant.
Their preliminary reaction is that it would be
premature to discuss this aspect now. They feel
that the study of post-war price-fixing would open
up many other channels of far-reaching considerations
of important bearing upon the whole fabric of post-
war reconstruction plans. Moreover, some with whom I
have discussed the matter, emphasize the importance of
bearing in mind what a psychologically strong trading
position the Russians, due to their current wave of
military successes, would have at this time, were
they to press their point in this respect.
(1) The "Curzon Line" WELB never intended to be a
frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia;
(2) A delimitation made by the Supreme Council
reserves Poland's right to territorial claims
east of this Line;
(3) Soviet Russia consistently refused to recog-
nize this line, and even denounced it in
official documents;
(4) Throughout the Polish-Soviet peace negotiations
neither side ever mentioned this Line. The
"Curzon Line", the article continued, was in no
way connected with the question of nationalities
in their adjoining territories.
In the British press, however, the article continued,
the view had been expressed that this line equitably
divided the areas inhabited predominantly by Poles
and Russians (or Ukrainians). It had furthermore
stated in the British Press that Russia had occupied
Polish territories up to the Curzon Line in September
1939, and then had deliberately stopped because of
the ethnographical character of this line. This was
inaccurate. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland
had been actuated by strategic rather than ethno-
graphical motives. The German Soviet Line of demark-
ation connected with the "Curzon Line" only in the
middle reaches of the River Bug.
-5-
GENERAL SIKORSKI'S EFFORTS TO FORM AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN
THE TWO CONFEDERATIONS, AND TO BRING ABOUT A DECLARATION
BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS LOOKING TOWARDS POST-WAR
COLLABORATION.
Yugoslav, Greek, and Czechoslovak, as well as Polish
official circles, each to a greater or lesser degree,
discernibly suffered a fresh wave of apprehension over
the foregoing factors. General Sikorski promptly
initiated moves (1) to form an alliance between the
(6)
Polish-Czechoslovak and Creeko-Yugoslav confederations;
and (2) to bring the other Allied Governments, established
here, into a joint declaration of principles, looking
(5)(6)
towards some form of post-war collaboration.
Personal observations (a) as to unlikelihood of
Sikoraki's succeeding in rallying all Allied Governments
to his proposed declaration at this time: (b) on the
reactions thereto; and (c) on opportunity afforded by
the proposal to gain fresh insight to forward-looking
views of Governments concerned.
(4) In raising the point with Russian Ambassador Bogomolov,
General Sikorski received what he considers an evasive
reply to the effect that the Russian authorities are
carrying out the agreement, and are placing no obstacles
in the way of "Poles" joining the forces. Sikorski's
suspicion as to the implications of Bogomolov's use of
the word "Poles" was, in the General's opinion, borne
out by his very recent report from his Ambassador in
Kuibyshev. This indicated that the Russian authorities
were understood to be issuing Russian passports to the
former inhabitants of the Polish eastern provinces, in
which the Russians had held plebiscites in 1940 to
show that 99.9% of the populations thereof wished to be
incorporated in the U.S.S.R. This turn of events, I am
aware, does not facilitate Sikorski's position vis-á-vis
those who formed the opposition last July to his signing
the Agreement with Russia, for it was apprehension on
this very score which WELE one of the main causes of
their bitterness (see my Polish series No.31, July 27,
1941).
(5) In effect, according to General Sikorski and his
closest associates, his proposal envisages a statement
of principles along lines of the Atlantic Charter.
-6-
Notwi thatanding General Sikorski's energetic
efforts, I do not look for him to succeed in
rallying all the Allied Governments to his proposal
at this time. Judging by the preliminary reactions
of certain officials in these circles, I perceive
that the General's suggestions ne ither as to
substance nor as to timing of the declaration,
accord with their respective views.
Notwithstanding its unlikelihood of succeeding,
Sikorski's proposal not only has evoked some
enlightening and interesting reactions, but also
has afforded a valuable opportunity to goin a
fresh insight to the forward-looking views of the
Governments approached.
Moreover, this statem nt would call for post-war
military as well as economic collaboration, in terms
of tariff and transportation considerations (a draft
of the General's proposals is, I understand, still
in the process of preparation).
(6) I should be definitely inclined to look for the
Russian authorities to take an unfavorable and
suspicious view of these moves at this time -
especially in event that they perceive traces of
Polish initiative. In that case, moreover, General
Sikorski might run the risk of a complete set-back
in his recent agreement with M. Stalin. Furthermore,
since I personally feel that everything possible
should be done to dispel Russian suspicion of her
Allies and associates, any move at this time which
might prove offensive to her should be avoided. In
response to informal questions from Polish, Norwegian,
Czechoslovak, Belgian and Yugoslav officials, I have
informally made my private opinion clear, emphasizing
that I thought that any contemplated mover of the
above character should be submitted to the "acid
test": Could it in any way be construed by the Russians
as a move directed against them In terms either of the
near or long range outlook.
-7-
DISCERNIBLE PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENT
CIRCLES TO GENERAL SIKORSKI'S PROPOSÁL, AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE FORWARD-LOOKING VIEWS.
Czechoslovak Government's preliminary reactions and
forward-looking views.
In connection with General Sikorski's initiative
in the matter of the proposed declaration by the
Allied Governments, I have the impression that while
Dr. Benes is no less opposed than the General to any
plan implying eventual Russian encirclement of
Czechoslovakia, as well as of Poland and of other
states in that area, he has thus for been careful
not to show his hand in any moves which the Russians
might interpret as efforts to build up a blook
against them. Accordingly, I have the impression
that, desiring to avoid the risk of incurring Russian
suspicion and ire, he usually confines expression
of whatever apprehensions he might have to discrete
(7)
conversations with the British authorities and ourselves.
(7) In this connection, it may be recalled that, in
my despatch Czechoslovak series No.7, January 27, 1942,
I reported Dr. Benes' view that it was Russia alone
which had thus far conceived a definite post-war plan
aglicable to certain areas in Europe. It was highly
important, therefore, that the United States and Britain
together consider and formulate, at least in principle,
a clear-cut plan of their own. This was urgently
necessary in order to be prepared for the moment when
Russie might possibly bring pressure to bear on
Washington as well as on London for commitments in
light of her own plan. He felt, moreover, that once
the United States and Britain had agreed between
themselves, they would be in position to meet with the
Russians, to discuss their respective plans. He had, he
said, energetically striven in the years leading up to
the outbreak of the war to bring about an understanding
between Russia and France and Britain in preparation for
the war. Now he was earnestly hopeful of an understanding
between the United States, Britain and Russia, in
preparation for the peace.
-&-
Dr. Benes and Foreign Minister Dr. Ripka, are
both of the firm belief (a) that the degree both
of justice in a durable post-war European settlement,
and of order or chaos in a post-war Europe, depend
upon the degree of understanding between the United
States, Britain and Russia; and (b) that towards
such understanding an agreement in principle at
least, between the United States and Britain on a
post-war plan for Europe, is an essential preliminary
to eventual American-British-Russian conversations
looking towards a three-cornered accord on this and
other post-war aspects. Hence, since they would not want
to run the risk of incurring Russia's doubts and
suspicions, mean hile, they would be averse to
participating in a move which the Russians might
interpret as envisaging a bloc directed against them.
They moreover both share the firm view that, since
experience has shown that the only way to hold an
ever ambitious Germany in check is to convince her
that she would face a two-front war, it is necessary
for the future to create a durable bridge of
understanding between the major Western Powers and
Russia, as well as the states between the Baltic
and the Aegean. Great care, they hold, should be
taken in creating and maintaining such a bridge, with
view to preventing the Germans from ever again thinking
it possible to isolate one side from the other.
Moreover, in my recent talks with Dr. Benes and Dr.
Ripka/
-9-
Ripka, they disclosed that in suggesting that their
Government join in the proposed declaration, General
Sikorski had spoken only in the vaguest terms concern-
ing the envisaged substance thereof. However he had
emphasized his view that the declaration would be
helpful both to President Roosevelt and to Prime
Minister Churchill. It would give important evidence
of efforts in the direction of their jointly expressed
hopes for post-war cooperation; adherence to the
policy set forth in the "Atlantic Cherter"; it
would strengthen their hands in focussing attention
of their respective peoples on Hitler as "Enemy No.1".
Moreover, Allied Governmental initiative in the matter
would serve to allay possible Russian suspicions that
the declaration had found its inspiration in "Anglo-
American scheming". In response to the General's
remarks, Dr. Benes and Dr. Ripka had told him that
before taking action in the matter they would want
first to consult the three Major powers. Dr. Benes
thereupon significantly remarked to no that, from
the Czechoslovak Government's standpoint, a cardinal
condition for the Polish-Czechoslovak Fact was a
friendly relationship between Poland and Russia.
Dr. Benes' views on means of dispelling Russia's
doubts and suspicions,
Further clarifying his views, Dr. Benes went on
to say that in order to dispel Russian suspicions it
was necessary (1) to avoid giving any impression
either that the Allied Governments concerned were
forming a bloc against Russia, or that Britain and
the United States were encouraging this; (2) to
dispel/
-10-
dispel Russian apprehension lest Britain and the
United States would refuse to grant Russia even a
hearing on what Russia considered to be matters
purely of Russian interest. These were: the 1941
Russien frontier with Finland, the Baltic States,
the Eastern frontier of Poland, and Bessarabia.
As regards the Finnish-Russion frontier question,
the Russians would more than likely take the
position that they would not care again to risk
Finland's becoming the instrument of German military
policy against them. With regard to the Baltics,
the Russians would likely adopt a similar line of
argument, claiming in addition that these states
lay within their natural economic as well as
strategic orbit.
Concerning Poland's Eastern frontier with
Russia, they would probably take the position that
in certain areas along the Polish side of the 1939
frontier, peoples of Russian origin and extraction
were predominant.
In further connection with the Polish-Russian
frontier, Dr. Benes continued, General Sikorski had
already given him the impression that he was
confident that he and Stalin could settle this
question between themselves. Benes,felt, moreover,
that although, for obvious reasons, Sikorski would
hesitate to divulge it to his associates at this
time, Sikorski was entertaining the thought at the
back of his head that he might succeed in working
out some "rectification" along this frontier,
provided/
- 11 -
provided Poland were compensated elsewhere. This,
of course, Benes said, meant primarily the elimina-
tion of the East Prussian enclave, and consequently
the "corridor" question.
As for Bessarabia, Russia would undoubtedly
argue that this lay within her natural orbit.
Dr. Benes went on to say that in considering
these questions realistically, he did not overlook
the remoteness of Britain and the United States
from these areas of Europe. Nor did he overlook
the possibility that if the United States and Britain
differed with Russia concerning these areas, and
were at the same time not in the mood to support
their views with force, Russia might settle the matter
in her own way. In this connection, he had in mind
the proximity of Russia to these areas, and the
swiftness with which Russia might move, should she
decide to take matters in her own hands.
Dr. Benes' views on the necessity of an Allied,
not a Russian victory, to insure an Allied not a
Russian peace.
Speaking of the prosecution of the war, Dr. Benes
held that, in event the Russians broke through, and
headed in the direction of Berlin, it would be
necessary that the Polish and Czechoslovak forces
join up the Russian drive, in order to be at hand in
their respective countries at the time of Russian
penetration. It would be, moreover, equally
necessary that the forces of the western powers
drive towards Berlin at the same time. In brief,
an allied, not a Russian victory, was essential
in
- 12 -
(8)
in order to insure an allied, not a Russian peace.
Dr. Benes' views as to the likelihood of post-war
revolutions on European continent, and a possible
meansof "canalizing" them.
Of the possible immediate aftermath of war in
Europe, Dr. Benes expressed his opinion that the
cossation of hostilities would find an outbreak of
revolutions in most European States. He felt,
however, that, in event of a friendly understanding
between Britain and ourselves and Russia, these
uprising could be "canalized".
Even in Czechoslovakia a revolution was
inevitable, Dr. Benes said, but in milder form than
that which was likely to take place in other countries.
By comparison with the other smaller states of
Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe, Czecho-
slovakia had enjoyed a more balanced social and
(9)
economic structure.
(8) Of connected bearing, Dr. Benes said that in
recent friendly and informal talks with Russian
Ambassadors Maisky and Bogomolov he had stated
his frank opinion that Russia TO uld make a funda-
mental mistake 1f she were ever to move her troops
into Prague. In the first place, the Czechoslovaks
would react towards the Russians as they were not
reacting towards the Germans. Moreover, through
the tragic results of German occupation of Prague,
he had pointed out the world had learned the full
meaning of Bismark's statement that whoever
mastered Prague would be master of Europe. The world
had learned its lesson on this score - and it was
well for them to bear this in mind, in case the
Russians were ever tempted to occupy Prague.
Indeed, he had stressed, the presence of Russian
troops in Prague would no doubt eventually provoke
a consolidation of world forces against her. (Russia)
(9) As for his country's future, he had alroady
conceived a "new deal" programme envisaging broad
agrarian and economic reforms. He earnestly
hoped thereby to re-invigorate the social and
economic structure of the country, and to improve
working and living conditions for the people as a
whole. They must, he said, be made to know they
were well off and that revolution would 10ad only
to something worse.
- 13 -
As for Poland, a revolution there was also in-
evitable, but, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, of
minor degree. The end of the war would probably
find Poland no longer able to continue her hitherto
unbalanced social-economic life: the great disparity
between the large landowners and the peasants. Hence,
Poland might be expected to emerge from the war
better prepared to develop a more balanced national
structure.
In Hugary, the revolution would assume a more
violent form: the masses against the large landowners.
In Rumania, the revolution would likewise assume
a more vident form.
In Bulgaria, the masses, who by nature were
naturally pro-Russian, would probably rise against
the King and his followers.
As for France, she would more than likely pass
through what the Germans called a "blood bath". More-
over, due to her continued tragic condition, together
with the inevitable revolution, she would not be
likely to take her place again as 8. first class nation
for perhaps seven to eight years or more. This would
alter the historic balance in Europe, and would tend
to make all the moro necessary a group of strong
regional confederations of independent states in East
and Central and Southeast Europe.
At this point Dr. Benes again stressed his opinion
that an American-British-Russien understanding was a
pre-requisite to the "canalization" of these antici-
pated revolutions.
As
- 14 -
As regards the post-war internal political
structure of France, he said he considered it might
best be directed under the leadership of a strong
Left bourgeoisie. This might succeed if supported
by the friendly interest of Britain, the United
States and Russia. As for General de Gaulle's part
in the early period of reconstruction, Benes
considered that he might be expected to playan
important, yet perhaps not the leading role.
Dr. Benes' hopes concerning Czechoslovakia's future.
As regards Dr. Benes' views on post-war Czechoslovakia,
he would like the British Government 6.8 soon 8.8 possible
to repudiate "Munich" formally and juridically, reserv-
ing at the same time rights to discuss with the "Great
Powers" and Czechoslovekia, the latter's future frontiers
and their implications. Pending British action along
these lines, Dr. Benes does not feel in position to go
further in his negotiations with the Poles.
Moreover, he would like to cede territory on the
West (Egerland), North and North-east territory, territory
which contains 600,000 to 700,000 Sudeten Germans. He
also would want certain "rectifications" on the
strategically weakest portion of the frontier on the
North, North-east, in order that he could describe
these modifications as an "exchange" rather than a
cession of territory. In order to rid himself of as
many Sudeten Germans as possible, he would like to
expel two "without territory" for every one "with
territory
- 15 -
territory". Accordingly, of the total of approximately
3,200,000 within the old frontiers, he would be left
with 3,200,000 less 650,000 "with territory", less
twice 650,000 "without territory".
In connection with the above views, I may add
that I am aware that British authorities have told
Dr. Bones that due, among other factors, to promises
to us, they could make no commitments of this nature.
Speaking of Czechoslovakia's future, Dr. Benes
said that his country wanted to be friends with
Russia, but not her slaves, He was, therefore,
earnestly hopeful of American as well as British
friendly interest not only in the restoration of his
country but also in the reconstruction of Eastern,
Central and Southeastern Europe as a whole.
This is the gist of Dr. Benes' considered views
and hopes in connection with the future of his
country and of his part of Europe in particular, and
of Europe in general.
Dr. Benes' views regarding the Comintern after the war.
As regards Dr. Benes' views on the Comintern after
the war, he told me that on frequent occasions Russian
Ambassadors Maisky and Bogomolov had both taken pains
to emphasize that M.Stalin had no intentions of inter-
fering in the internal affairs either of Czechoslovakia,
Poland or other states of Europe. Dr. Benes said that
while he welcomed these assurances, there was, to his
mind, at the moment, no certainty that the policy of
"world-revolution" would not be revived after the war.
Czechoslovak
- 16 -
Czechoslovak Minister without Portfolio Ossusky's views
on possibility of post-war Comintern activities
Doctor Stephan Ossusky, of Slovak origin, formerly
Ambassador to France and presently Minister without
Portfolio in Doctor Benes' Cabinet, stated to me in
effect the following:
As regards the possibility of a post-war revival
of the Comintern's activities, he felt that while Stalin
had dispensed with the policy of world revolution,
there was no certainty that he would not revive these
tactics after the close of the war. As compared to
Dr. Benes' activities, Dr. Ossusky stated he is convinced
that the Soviet Government had in mind solely a post-war
settlement which would allow it to develop its own
country in peace. Moscow he held had no illusions
about the standard of living which remained desperately
low. Moreover, the signs of imperialism now clearly
emerging did not presage any attempt at world conquest,
but had their origin in reaction against the Comintern
and Communism. Everyone in power in Russia was fully
aware that there was no communism left in that country,
even if there ever was any. With the Comintern it was
different. When Lenin, he continued, who with Trotsky
was a man of theories as well as action, as opposed to
Stalin, who was a shrowd Georgian peasant opportunist,
began arranging the educational system for the U.S.S.R.
he charged Lunacharsky to burn every Russian history
book and substitute a new history of Russia which would
gloss over patriotism of any kind and would glorify the
revolutionaries who had from time to time appeared in
the history of the country. Whoever they were and
however
- 17 -
however obscure, these revolutionary leaders were to
be written up as heroes. This astonishing history
book had been the sole one in use in schools and
universities up to 1937. He, Ossusky, had a copy.
In 1937 Stalin sent for his Minister of Education and
ordered the destruction of every copy of this book.
A new history of Russia was to be written, based on
the principal revolutionary histories, glorifying all
the conquerors and any man whose patriotism stood out
beyond the average. Certain members of the Ministry
of Education brought up themselves on Lunacharsky's
history of Russia protested at this staggering volte-
face and the violation at what they had been taught
to believe. They were liquidated. The new history
of Russia, which is surprisingly similar to the
writings of such persons as Professor Von und zu
Almedingen had formed the basis of historical
instruction in the U.S.S.R. since the beginning of 1938.
At the same time, Lenin had ordered the destruction
of all the works of the Great Russian patriot poet,
Pushkin. It was a criminal offence to possess a copy.
Stalin heard of this writer in 1937; ordered his
resurrection and the translation of his works into sixty
odd languages spoken in the U.S.S.R. This had been done.
Up to the outbreak of the present war, 32,000,000 copies
of Pushkin had been sold in Russia. Finally up to 1939,
the Soviet Army had taken an oath to defend the
Communist Party and Communist ideas anywhere and every-
where. Stalin was then Secretary General of the
Communist Party. In 1940, the Red Army oath was
altered
- 18 -
altered to the same one taken in the days of the Czar,
though naturally amended in a suitable fashion. They
were sworn to defend the sacred fatherland and the
Government of the U.S.S.R. Stalin had then placed
himself at the head of the Army.
GENERAL SIKORSKI'S APPREHENSIONS AND FORWARD-LOOKING
VIEWS.
Motive behind Sikorski's desire that Raczynski visit
Washington.
As I cabled, following Polish Acting Foreign
Minister Raczynski's request for a visa for the United
States, it became increasingly clear (a) that the main
reason behind General Sikorski's eagerness that
Raczynski visit Washington, was his concern over the
implications of M.Stalin's reported post-war intentions
(10)
vis-à-vis Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe;
(b) that the General accordingly hoped that Raczynski
might be given a hearing in Washington concerning his
Government's views on these intentions, before we
might have determined our position in the matter; md
(11)
(c) that in thus stating his Government's views,
Raczynski might obtain, in effect, some form of
"reinsurence" against any possible tendency to yield
to pressure for commitments, in connection with
M.Stalin's reported intentions.
(10) Refer page 2, Despatch Polish Series 104, January
10, 1942.
(11) In contemplating visiting Washington himself,
General Sikorski regards Reczynski's visit in the light
of "paving the way" for him subsequently to develop in
greater detail certain views of his Government.
- 19 -
no
Authoritative assurances here as to/contemplated
commitments to Russia.
I am aware that General Sikorski has already
received authoritative assurance here of no con-
templated commitments on the above score. In fact,
he confidentially told me that Mr. Churchill had
assured him in effect that he did not consider this
(12)
the time to discuss the question of frontiers. This
could be settled in good time. However, 1f it
eventually became necessary to como to some arrange-
ment with Russia on this question, it would have to
be settled on a basis of justice.
Sikorski's sense of relief on learning Molotov not
expected here until later than formerly reported.
Mr. Churchill had told him, moreover, that M.
Molotov's proposed visit to London, in return for
Mr. Eden's visit to Moscow, would probably not take
place until about May-June. General Sikorski
greeted this information with a sense of marked
relief, for he had previously understood that
M.Molotov might be coming here about February-March.
He had been deeply apprehensive lest so early a visit
as February-March might have far-reaching, unhappy
consequences. To engage in conversations when the
Russians were at the height of a wave of successes,
he felt, would be risky. It would be better to "wait
and see" the course of the anticipated "spring drive".
(12) See page 10 last paragraph this despatch for Dr. Benes'
observations re General Sikorski's back-of-the-head thought
on post-war Polish-Russian frontier. Also refer my des-
patch Polish Series No. 117, February 2, 1942, page 4 for
my observations re same subject.
- 20 -
He would be inclined to construe any Russian search
for commitments before that time, as en effort to
obtain "reinsurance" in form of minimum claims, in
case an allied victory found the Caucasus in Cerman
hands, and the Russian forces pushed beyond the Volga.
Personal observations re background for impression
that Sikorski hopes for some form of "reinsurance"
from us against any tendency to yield to possible
Russian pressure for commitments.
In connection with my above stated impression
that General Sikorski entertains hopes of some form
of "reinsurance" from us against any tendency to
yield to possible Russian pressure for commitments
on M.Stalin's intentions, I feel that either
consciously, or unconsciously, the General is motivated
by M.Stalin's remarks in their last conversation in
Moscow. According to the General, M.Stalin had told
him that by comparison with his satisfaction over the
favorable trend of British public opinion regarding
Russia, the underlying division of American opinion
as regards Russia was for him a cause of considerable
concern. I recall that when General Sikorski imparted
this to me following his return from Moscow, he
(13)
remarked that, to his mind, the British as a whole,
were inclined to be "too much at the feet of Russia" -
and he thought that the United States had a more
balanced point of view regarding Russia.
(13) The General and his associates are constantly
vigilant as to all shades of British opinion,
especially in regard to Poland, and the Continent in
general.
-21-
Sikorski's conversation with Sir Stafford Cripps; the
latter's observations; Sikorski's reactions thereto.
In further connection with his reactions as to
the trend of British opinion, the General more recently
confided to me that his talk with Sir Stafford Cripps,
immediately after the latter's return here, had been
for him a source of considerable disappointment. The
General said that judging by Sir Stafford's remarks,
the latter seemed, in his opinion, overly-impressed
by Russia - to the point where he was apt to lose
sight of other important considerations.
Substance of Sir Stafford Gripps' views on Russia and
her potential bearing on post-war European reconstruction,
as expressed to General Sikorski.
The General went on to say that Sir Stafford had
made the following observations:
If the United States intended to take decisions
with Britain, on European reconstruction, it was
essential that these decisions must not be delayed
any longer than possible. Russia was already suspicious
both of the United States and Britain, and delay would
only serve to sharpen these suspicions. A clear,
friendly, and durable understanding with Russia was a
pre-requisite to cooperation between the Western powers
and Russia in the reconstruction of Europe. Without
this cooperation the world could look forward to little
short of chaos. If, provided she intended to cooperate
in post-war European reconstruction, the United States
and Britain did not find themselves in cooperation with
Russia before Russia might have reached Berlin, the
smaller European nations would have to take their
orders from the Soviet Union. The perspective of many
people/
-22-
people was still clouded by old conceptions, old fears
of the spread of "world revolution". He did not believe
Russia would treat communism as an export item after
the war. The danger of this possibility would be more
likely to arise if the western powers were either to
attempt to isolate Russia or to adopt a hostile
attitude. The Russian Government would find a tremen-
dous task of its own after this war, and would have to
devote a great part of its energies to reconstruction
within its own frontiers. Its paramount aim would
naturally be to rebuild a strong Russia. He was
convinced that the Russian Government had no desire
to interfere in the internal affairs of other European
countries. Moreover, he did not look for imperialistic
expansion. He felt, however, that the Russian Govern-
ment would want strategically sound frontiers.
General Sikorski's reactions to Cripps' remarks.
Immediately following this conversation General
Sikorski asked me to come to see him. I found him in
a discernibly exorcised state of mind. He repeated
Sir Stafford Cripps' foregoing remarks, emphasizing
his own opinion that Sir Stafford was overly-impressed
with Russia.
Referring to Sir Stafford's remarks about the
Comintern, the General said that in a very recent talk
with Ambassador Maisky, the latter had said that he
shared M.Stalin's opinion that the Poles could not
be "Russified", and he could moreover assure Sikorski
that Russia would not interfere in Poland's internal
affairs/
- 23 -
affairs. He, personally, would like to see the world
profit by Russia's experience in the social economic
fields - but he dia not believe that this could
become a reality during his life time.
The General added that the Comintern was at
present headquartered at a remote point in Siberia.
He said he refrained from drawing attention to this
fact, however, since he was apprehensive lest it
give us, as well as the British, a false sense of
repose, He personally was of the opinion that there
could be no certainty that M.Stalin and his associates
would not revive the world revolutionary policy of
the Comintern after the war.
General Sikorski's further reactions to Cripps'
observations; and observations as to his forward-
looking thoughts regarding Poland.
In connection with Sir Stafford's reference to
frontiers, I recall that General Sikorski told me,
soon after his return from Moscow, that he felt
confident the question of the Polish-Russian frontier
could eventually be settled directly between the Poles
and the Russians. However, as pointed out in despatch
Polish Series No. 117, February 2, 1942, I do not
believe that he is optimistic as to a satisfactory
outcome, in terms of Poland's claims; he is
sufficiently realistic not to count upon a settlement
of the question on basis of 1939 frontier. I further-
more have the impression that, at the back of his
head, he has linked the question of possible
"rectifications" of the frontier with post-war compensa-
tion elsewhere: incorporation of East Prussia, some
form
- 24 -
form of union with Lithuania, and perhaps inclusion of
part of pre-war German Silesia within Poland's frontiers.
He would, to my mind, hesitate, however, to divulge such
views to his associates or to Polish army circles here.
In this connection, it is unlikely that he has forgotten
the views of former Foreign Minister Zaleski, during the
course of the negotiations for the Polish Russian Agree-
ment. Zaleski, voicing the opinion of those who opposed
the terms of the Polish-Russisn agreement, held that the
negotiations leading up to the signing thereof had clearly
revealed that Russia had no intention of returning all,
but only certain portions of Polish territory occupied by
Russian forces.
Sikorski's disappointment over Cripps' views revived
his unhappy impression of various shades of British
reaction to Polish-Russian agreement.
I am aware that Sikorski's disappointment over
Sir Stafford's views was the sharper for its having
reawakened his hitherto lingering doubts as to what
attitude British public opinion might eventually
assume with regard to Poland's position in E post-war
settlement. These doubts, which for months have been
gnawing at the back of his mind, arose mainly from the
unhappy impression he had gained from the implications
of the following publications, as to the reaction of
various shades of British opinion to the Polish-
Russian Agreement in July: (1) The implications of
an editorial, "Peace and Power", in the "Times" of
August 1, 1941, to effect that after this war leader-
ship
-25-
ship in Eastern Europe could fall only to Germany or
Russia, Neither Britain nor the United States could
exercise, or would aspire to exercise, any predominant
role in these regions; and it would be fatal to
revive the allied policy of 1919, which created a
bond of union between Germany and Russia against
Western Europe. There could be no doubt that British
and Russian - and it might be admitted, American -
interests alike, demanded that Russian influence in
Eastern Europe should not be eclipsed by that of
Germany; (2) the implications of en article in "Truth"
of August 8, 1941, to effect that the real value of
the Polish-Russian Agreement to Britain was that it
enabled Britain, with a clear conscience, to wash its
hands of the Russo-Polish problem. Now that Russia
and Poland had come to terms, Britain was mercifully
spared of its obligation in its pact with Poland to
restore Poland. This would have meant that after
beating Germany, Britain would have been obliged to
wrest the remaining Polish provinces from Britain's
Russian allies.
His thoughts, furthermore, flashed back to Minister
(14)
of Labor, Mr. Bevin's, disclosure, in July, to effect
that he shared the attitude of a large portion of his
party towards the question of fixing frontiers at
this time; that the question of Poland's frontier
should be left in a fluid state until a general peace
settlement; that they had, moreover, never looked with
favor upon the territorial changes which had taken
(14) See page 2 despatch Polish series No.31, July 27,1941.
- 26 -
place along the Polish-Russian border after the designa-
tion of the Curzon Line; that he personally was utterly
opposed to Britain's making any commitment regarding
frontiers in general.
Further and more current causes of irritation,
contributing to Sikorski's concern over British opinion
as regards Poland's potential position in a European
settlement, were the following: (1) a recent open
letter to the weekly periodical "Free Europe", from
Commander Stephen King-Hall, M.P., in which he stated
that the man who was as likely as anyone to decide
what would happen to Germany was M. Stalin. The writer
would make a guess that M. Stalin would not split
Germany, but would arrange for & Communist Germany;
and (2) G.D.H.Coles' recently published book "Europe,
Russia and the Future", wherein the writer, in spite
of his confession of unhappiness, preferred a post-
war Europe based on the Soviet Union. Accordingly,
his ideas envisaged the inclusion of Central Europe,
the Baltic, Danubian and Balkan countries in & greater
U.S.S.R. Even a socialist Germany might form part of
it. As for the exiled Governments of the Allied
countries, the writer expressed the charitable hope
that they would never see their native lands again.
In connection with the foregoing causes of Sikorski's
concern, I am aware that he is deeply appreciative of
Mr. Churchill's assurances as to no contemplated commitments
in connection with M. Stalin's expressed post-war ideas.
At the same time, however, the aforecited indications, I am
equally aware, caused Sikorski and associates to feel none
too
- 27 -
too confident of public opinion here, in event that
a possibly war-weary people eventually found victory
at hand.
FURTHER LIGHT ON VIEWS OF POLISH GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE.
Further light was thrown on the views of the Polish
"overnment as a whole (a) as to the importance of a post-
war "cooperative Great Power" between the Baltic and Aegean,
and (b) as to the factors essential to the creation thereof;
by the following observations of several leading Polish
officials in my recent talk with them:
They said that British press comment on the recent
Agreements between the Polish and Czechoslovak, and the
Yugoslav and Creek overnments, was on the whole favorable,
though = estrained as far as the role of the great powers
was concerned. Any efforts, they held, of the nations of
Central and Southeastern Europe to form an area of strength
between the Baltic and the Aegean would be thwarted unless
supported by the great powers. Europe had to be rebuilt in
such a way as to prevent Germany's starting a third war.
The line Danzig-Salonika was the spinal cord of the lands
east of Germany. The interests of the English speaking
nations demanded that those nations must take an active
part in creating a "cooperative Great Power" in that area.
A "strong bloc" east of Germany, lay also in the interests of
Russia. Russia could take exception to such a block, if,
on the one hand, she could reasonably believe that its
policy could be hostile to her, or, on the other hand, if
she designed to bring these countries under her own domination.
It was obvious that the first possibility Was unthinkable.
As for the second possibility, that was, that Russia might
want
-28-
want to shift her frontier westwards, it was well to
recall the Soviet experiment of 1940, when "sham plebisdtes"
were held in the Baltic states, Eastern Poland, Bukovina and
Bessarabia, to prove that 99.9 percent of the populations
of these districts wanted to be incorporated in the Soviet
Union. Such plebisdtes, my informants held, could not be
recognized and the Polish Government had to have the cor-
tainty that Moscow would not resort to such experiments
in the future. Any solutions based on them could not
make for & just and durable peace in Europe. Russia,
Europe, and the rest of the world, had to be spared the
sufferings and upheavals which were bound to follow this
type of imperialism.
GENERAL SIKORSKI'S IRRITATION OVER GENERAL DE GAULLE'S
RADIO BROADCAST FAVORABLY REMARKING UPON RUSSIA'S ROLE
IN THE FUTURE.
An illustration of General Sikorski's agitated state of
mind as a result of the aforementioned causes of irritation
and events, was his action following a recent radio broad-
cast of General de Gaulle. The latter had spoken of the
future "equilibrium" in Europe, declaring that it was
possible only with Russia taking an active part in the
future organization of European security. Accordingly, he
hoped for a Europe composed of two main security blocks,
closely cooperating - one based mainly on Russia, and the
other on Britain and France. The very next day following
the broadcast, General Sikorski told me, he had "called
General de Gaulle to account, over the contents of his
address
- 29 -
address, stating that it seemed to him that de Gaulle
was playing into the hands of the Russians - and emphasizing
that de Gaulle would be merely a tool in Russian hands,
only to be cast aside when he would have served Russia's
purpose.
I am aware that in response General de Gaulle good
naturedly replied that what he had said was only good
common sense. Russia meant business; her energies were
admirably devoted to a total effort to win the war. Moreover,
Russia was serious and would have to be taken into serious
consideration in connection with any post-war reconstruction
plan. He in fact believed in Russia's sincerity of purpose
to the extent of having already sent a combined diplomatic
and military Mission to Moscow. He concluded by stating that
he felt a. durable peace could be attained best by an under-
standing between the major powers of western Europe and Russia.
Another cause of recent irritation for General Sikorski,
was the radio broadcast views of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister
Ripka, on January 23, to effect that Russia would hereafter
be a decisive factor in world politics, and in the organizing
of Central Europe. He held moreover, that the closer colla-
boration between Czechoslovakia and Poland had been facili-
tated by the rapproahement between Poland and Russia. He
further spoke of his country's future "friendly cooperation
with the great powers of western Europe, and particularly
(15)
with the Soviet Union".
(15) In this connection since this broadcast, I have discerned
Sikorski's characteristically Polish tendency to worry lest
his Czechoslovak colleagues' friendly relations with Russia
prove a disadvantage to Poland's interest. On the other hand,
I am aware that the keynote of Ripka's as ell as Benes' policy
is "to be friends but not slaves of Russia".
- 30 -
COMPARISON OF BENES'S AND SIKORSKI'S VIEWS AS TO METHODS
AND TIMING OF PROCEDURE IN CONSULTATION BETWEEN MAJOR
WESTERN POWERS AND RUSSIA.
While Benes and Sikorski share the view that an
agreement between the United States and Britain as to a
post-war European reconstruction plan is a pre-requisite
to an understanding between these two major powers and
Russia, they differ as to the methods and timing of procedure.
Benes would like to see early three-cornered conversations
after the Americans and British had agreed upon a plan.
Sikorski would like to see an early Anglo-American agreement
on a European post-war plan, but he considers it would be
better to wait and see the turn of events in the spring,
before these two powers discussed such a plan with Russia.
Sikorski, characteristic of the attitude of his
Government as a whole, would like to 300 built up in the
quickest possible order, a great cooperative power with
western support. Benes, on the other hand, wishing to
dispel Russian suspicions, tries discretely to soft-pedal
any moves by his colleagues which might prove offensive to
the Russians, hoping meanwhile that after the major western
powers might have agreed upon a post-war European plan, they
would enter into conversations with Russia looking towards a
durable peace. Accordingly, he endeavors to exercize & quiet,
restraining influence on any discernible tendency on
part of the Poles to give vent to their recurrent waves
of distrust of Russia. On the other harid, Benes in his
cautiousness, is at times apt to strike Sikorski as being
unduly passive.
PRELIMINARY
- 31 -
PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO SIKORSKI'S
PROPOSED DECLARATION, AND ITS FORWARD-LOOKING VIEWS.
As for the Norwegian Government, I am aware that
in the first place, M. Stalin already sent word to
Foreign Minister Lie, through Ambassador Maisky, that he
had no post-war designs on Norway. While the Norwegian
Government greeted with a sense of discernible but un-
expressed concern information concerning M. Stalin's desire
to reestablish Russia's 1941 frontier with Finland,
it has derived a sense of comfort from X. Stalin's message
regarding Norway, Hence, I do not believe that the Nor-
wegian Government would be likely to join in any move
which might at this time incite Russian doubts and sus-
picions. Nor would it care to join in any move of
exclusively Allied governmental membership - it would
want Britain and, if possible, the United States as well,
included. On the other hand, the present Norwegian
Government has, since its coming to office in 1935, been
opposed to alliances and other commitments aside from
those of cultural nature, with states beyond Norway's
aphere of interests. Moreover, Foreign Minister Lie
in an address on November 18, 1940, envisaged Norway's
post-war position as one of the "Atlantic States".
In line with this policy, the Government feels that,
due to its extensive interests as a shipping and seafaring
nation, any future cooperation should be especially intimate
with the United States and the British Empire. It is
moreover, willing to par ticipate in an international
order in Europe, if the United States and Britain are
willing
- 32 -
willing to cooperate, and if Russia and China Join them
amicably.
PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF BELGIAN GOV ERNMENT TO SIKORSKI'S
DECLARATION AND ITS FORWARD LOOKING VIEWS.
As for the Belgian Government, while there is a
tendency on the part of some of its members to "flirt" with
the idea of an Allied governmental declaration as proposed
by General Sikorski, I believe that the Government as a whole
would more than likely be guided mainly by whatever decision
the Netherlands Government might take in the matter.
PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF NETHERLANDS GOV ERNMENT TO SIKORSKI'S
PROPOSED DECLARATION AND ITS FORWARD LOOKING VIEWS.
Às for the Netherlands Government, it is at this time
considering exchanging diplomatic representatives with
Russia, and is unlikely to look with favor upon any Allied
governmental declaration which might conceivably incite
Russian suspicion. Looking on the other hand to ards the
future, in terms of post-war reconstruction the views of
the Netherlands Government might be characterized as cautiously
hopeful. The Prime Minister, reflecting the trend of opinion
amongst his associates, confidentially expressed to me his
opinion that "things had not yet sufficiently taken form"
(16)
to warrant the setting up of post-war donfederations.
(16) Although the leading members of the Nethorlands Govern-
ment have hitherto discouraged efforts to interest their
Government in Dutch participation in a post-war regional
grouping, Foreign Minister van Kleffens has, in the course of
the past several months, had a number of exploratory conversa-
tions with representatives of the Norwegian and Belgian Govern-
ments, regarding the possibilities of post-war collaboration in
the economic field. These talks, however, have been motivated
mainly by apprehension lest Article 4, "Atlantic Charter" imply
a post-war revival of the Ottawa Agreement. Hence, I am in-
clined at this stage, to consider these talks in the nature
partly of a tactical move (care has been taken that the British
authorities were not kept in the dark regarding the discussions
and the purpose thereof) and partly of a serious search for
a workable formula in case of a post-war return to "Ottawa"
- 33 -
I am aware, that his Government has already replied
to this effect to the Belgian Government's several soundings
on the possibility of a post-war Netherlands-Belgian
grouping. As to planning for post-war reconstruction,
the Prime Minister emphasized the importance of setting up
any post-war international machinery on the basis of a
realistic conception. He could see no durability in an
unreal conception such as a purely European grouping of nations.
As in the case of the Norwegian and Belgian Government's
views regarding the positions of their respective countries,
it is clear that in the Metherlands Government's point of
view, there is a greater community of interest between the
Netherlands and the United States, Britain and other over-
seas states, than between the "etherlands and purely European
groupings.
YUGOSLAV AND GREEK GOVERNMENTS PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO
GENERAL SIKORSKI'S PROPOSED DECLARATION.
As for the Yugoslav and Greek Governments, ther appre-
hension over the reportedly rapid growth of Communism in
their respective countries, coupled with their uneasiness
over Russia, tends to overshadow other considerations at
the moment. This moreover, leads them to lend a receptive
ear to proposals, such as that of General Sikorski, looking
towards the strengthening of their area in particular and the
continent in general.
In recent conversation with Yugoslav Foreign Minister
Nintchitch, I gained the impression that while the preliminary
inclination of his associates as a whole was to lend a
receptive
- 34 -
receptive ear to Sikorski's proposal, he personally did
not overlook the importance of considering Russia's
possible reactions in the matter. In line with my impression
on this score, he outlined his forward looking views,
stating that experience over the past 25 years had shown that
the peace of Europe W&B indivisible. To insure a durable
peace there would have to be found a formula allowing for
measures to prevent peace's being jeopardized in any section
of Europe. This would be possible only if Britain play her
role as a part of Europe. It was equally essential that
there be a friendly understanding and collaboration between
Britain and Russia. Therein would lie the only real hope
of dispelling mutual doubts and suspicions arising out of
differences in internal political systems as between Russia
and certain other states. Regional groupings were helpful
towards establishing closer political and economic ties
between the states concerned and thus towards diminishing the
causes of war. However, regional groupings were helpful
mainly as a basis upon which to create the essential broader
structure: a European organization.
In recent conversation with the Greek Prime Minister
and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Tgouderos, he
stressed the interdependence of continents as well as
of states and individuals. Like Dr. Nintchitch, he believed
that the regional confederations were a step forward in the
direction of a broader basis for the maintenance of peace:
a
- 35 -
a European structure. Emphasizing that economic colla-
boration was essential to political stability, he was
hopeful that the scope of closer economic and political
ties which might result from the establishment of regional
grouping, would eventually be extended on & broader scale
not only between the states of Europe - but also between
the continents. Also like Dr. Nintchitch, Dr. Tsouderos
feels that Britain's participation in the reconstruction
of Europe is an essential to peace and that equally 1m-
portant is a friendly understanding and collaboration between
Britain and Russia.
YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN OVER IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT
IT BELIEVES TO BE M. STALIN'S POST-WAR INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS
BULGARIA.
Concerning Bulgaria, the Yugoslav Vice Premier recently
told me that previous to signing the Treaty with the Greek
Government, he and his associates had been disturbed by
reports concerning M. Stalin's post-war intentions in con-
nection with Bulgaria, among other states. Further indications
received subsequent to the signing of the Yugoslav-Groek
Treaty, had served to increase his Government's concern.
He and his associates had thus gained the distinct impression
that M. Stalin envisaged the inclusion of the Black Sea
coastal area of Bulgaria in the Mussian strategic orbit.
Moreover, he said, not long ago, an official of the Russian
Overnment in Kuibyshev had hinted to the Yugoslav Minister
that if Russia, for strategic purposes, found it necessary to
include the Bulgarian ports in her defense system, Yugoslavia
and Greece might do well to divide the rest of Bulgaria
between them.
My
- 36 -
My informant went on to say that anxiety over the
implications of the foregoing had lod to lengthy meetings
of his Government during the past days. It was the consensus
of opinion that if Bulgaria went Communist, nothing would
prevent Serbia, where Communism had gained considerable
ground during the past year, and subsequently the rost of
the Balkans, from following auit. Quite aside from concern
over these intentions, with regard to Bulgaria, his Govern-
ment was worried lest, in the event of a Russian victory
over Germany, Bulgaria might immodiately declare itself a
part of the U.S.S.R. This she might do, they feared, in
order to be on the side of victory. Recent reports indicated
moreover, that the Communists in Bulgaria were decidedly on
the increase, and better organised then the Agrarians. Be-
sides, he continued, there were the sontimental links between
the Bulgarian masses and Russia. The former still regarded
Russia as "Matjuchka Russia": "Crandmother Russia" - ir-
respective of Russia's current political complexion.
Reverting to conditions in Serbia, my informant reiterated
his and his associates' alarm over the rapid strides of
communism in Serbia. Like the Bulgarians, the Serbs had
historically looked to Runsia in the light or "Opandmother
Russia". Now, even the Orthodox Clergy continued in this
loaning, regardless of the Communist aspect. Several months
ago, former Premier and Minister of Defense, General Simovitch,
had deemed it necessary to ask Moscow to use its influence
towards bringing the Serb insurgents to take orders from
General
- 37 -
General Mihailovitch. The reply had clearly been evasive.
More recently, newly appointed Premier Jovanovitch had
made a similar request of Russian Ambassador to the Allied
Governments, Bogomolov; the latter had answered that
nothing could be done in the matter. My informant said
he had pointed out these facts to me, in order to show the
extent of his Government's cognizance of Moscow's influence
inside Yugoslavia.
with further reference to influences at play inside
his country, my informant said that in Croatia sabotage
and atrocities had broken out only after Germany's attack
on Russia. Germany had seen to this in order to reqwaken
old friction.
In Serbia, Mihailovitch had at the outset opposed
sabotage, and had embarked on a plan to organize all
villages for action at an opportune mement. However, the
Communist agents had imposed sabotage at the outbreak of
the Russian-German war. My informant concluded, by stating
it was his, and his associates' opinion that Russia wan ted
to be the direct master of the Balkan area. For this reason,
he believed, Moscow was opposed to the Yugoslav-Greek
Treaty. In fact, Vishinski had told the Yugoslav Minister
in Kuibyshev, in response to the latter's inquiry as to the
Russian Government's reaction, that he had nothing to say.
Respectfully yours,
A.J.Drexel Biddle, Jr.
AJDB:EMC:GMT:MWMCK
(In Quintuplicate)
7000 DOF)
OF TIME
ORINGS
Biddle Folder 1-42
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
file Fermal mal
WASHINGTON
April 7, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing for your information a secret
message I have received today from General Sikorski
through the Polish Ambassador in Washington.
I am sending a copy of this message to Secretary
Stimson with the request that he let me know what reply
I may make to the request contained in the last para-
graph of the message from General Sikorski.
Believe me
Faithfully A yours, Niths
Enclosure.
The Presi dent,
The White House.
MOST
GEORDT:
Before leaving Canada for England, General Sikorski sent me the following
very secret information, received by me on April 5. requesting me to
communicate it to Secretary Sumner Welles:
" During the stay of General Sikorski in Washington the Polish Militar
Authorities carried through three secret flights into Poland. In the cour
of these flights I8 specialists for Diversion work and sabotage were
landed, one million dollars in gold and paper currency, half a million
German marks and considerable quantities of diversion material. Several
more flights are contemplated. The British Authorities have been most
efficiently helpful. These flights willhave to be abandoned in the end
of April on account of the short nights.
The evacuation of the Polish troops from Soviet Russia is progressing
rapidly. The first transports of soldiers are already in Iran. The evacua-
tion of the civilians, of women and children is causing great difficulty.
The number of the latter evacuees reaches some I0.000 at present.
In view of the above mentioned facts, General Sikorski would be
grateful for the favorable decision concerning the granting to the Polish
High Command of the 6(six) ong distance bombing planes which he asked fc
and for the speeding up of the credits so urgently needed to carry on th
seccet work in Poland and the aid to the civilians, women and children
being evacuated from Russia.
J.Ciecharrows.R
Washington, Polish Embassy, April 6. I942.
BEST AVAILABLE COPY.
PSF: Biddle Folder
(Pdand) 1-42
file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
April 9. 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing for your information a copy of
a letter dated April 3 from Ambassador Ciechanowski
in which the appreciation of General Sikorski 1s
expressed for the sympathetic understanding shown by
you for the problems of Poland as presented personally
by General Sikorski. Mr. Ciechanowski's letter has
been acknowledged by me.
"aithfully yours, Malls
Enclosure:
From Polish Ambassador
April 3, 1942.
The President,
The White House.
5
Department of State
BUREAU
}
Eu
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted 4/7
ADDRESSED TO
The President
- * - -
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Eu:AMR)
RED:
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AMBASADA
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ
W WASZYNGTONIE
-
POLISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON
2640 - 16th Street, N. W.
April 3, 1942.
Dear Mr. Secretary,
I have today received a telegram fron General
Sikorski who left Canada this morning, requesting me
to ask you to convey to the President the General's
most sincere thanks for the sympathetic understanding
which The President showed him regarding all the pro-
blems of Poland which he had the honor of discussing
with The President and with you.
General Sikorski would like especially to express
his gratitude for the President's support of these
matters in Moscow and London.
At the same time General Sikorski asks me to con-
vey to you personally his thanks for all your kindness
and your favorable attitude in all the questions which
he submitted to you. He would like you to know that,
according to cable information received by him yester-
day from the Polish Ambassador in the U.S.S.R., the
effect of the support granted to him during his visit
in Washington 1s already apparent in improving the pre-
sent situation between Poland and the Soviet Union.
This has been evidenced by the cooperation on
the part of the Soviet authorities in the evacuation
of part of our army from Russia to Iran.
General Sikorski foresees that the British au-
thorities in Iran will have a difficult task in looking
after the families of our military, a limited number of
whom have already arrived in Iran. He would be most
grateful
The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Acting Secretary of State.
-2-
grateful if the United States Minister in Iran would
lend his valuable assistance to the British authorities
in this matter.
General Sikorski concludes by expressing the con-
viction that the method of friendly and frank dealing
pursued by him in his relations with Premier Stalin
and the U.S.S.R. Government has proved effective and
best calculated to serve the interests of the United
Nations.
With warm regards, I am, dear Mr. Secretary,
Yours very sincerely,
J. CIECHANOWSKI
PSF: Biddle Folda
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W. 1.
April 24, 1942.
My dear Mr. President:
Coincidental with the receipt of your letter
to Queen Wilhelmina, which I immediately transmitted
to her, she gave Harry a letter to transmit to you.
You were very thoughtful to have sent me the copy
of your letter to the Queen, which I read with the
utmost interest and which, knowing her frame of
mind and her sincere esteem for you, I am confident
has touched her deeply. In fact, no sooner had she
read it than she told me that she wanted to write
another letter to you. Accordingly, I have the
1/
honor to transmit it to you herewith - and while I
do not know its contents, I believe you will find
that it is a spontaneous expression of enthusiastic
appreciation of your magnificent letter to her.
Harry's and General Marshall's visit here had
a very wholesome and stimulating effect on British
mass opinion, as well as on British official circles.
I accompanied Harry on his visits to Queen
Wilhelmina and to King Haakon, and thoroughly enjoyed
my lengthy, interesting talks with him in addition.
You may be sure that his visits both with the Queen
and the King, and his messages to them from you, were
for them a source of real gratification and encourage-
ment.
With warmest regards and every good wish, I am,
Yours faithfully, TouyBilder
The President,
The White House,
Washington.
Enclosure:
1/ as stated.
PSF: Biddle Folder
40 Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.
April 25, 1942.
My dear Mr. President:
It was a great pleasure for me to meet General
Marshall. I find him just as fine a fellow and
officer as I had been previously led to believe. I
want you to know how much I appreciate his
cooperation in having received, during his crowded
hours, General Hansteen, recently appointed Commander-
in-Chief of Norwegian land, air and sea forces.
Though rushed in his time, General Marshall accorded
General Hansteen a friendly welcome, and I am aware
that the latter was very much touched not only by General
Marshall's cordial reception, but also by the confidential
and helpful exchange of views.
In the course of conversation, General Hansteen
said that Mr. Churchill, on his return here from
Washington, had confidentially mentioned to Norwegian
Foreign Minister Lie, that in discussing various
pro jects with you, he, Mr. Churchill, had mentioned
the possibility of an eventual combined military,
naval and air operation to regain Norway; that you
had expressed your interest in this possibility; that
you felt the Norwegian Government might lend a helpful
hand in lining up Norwegian-American interest and
support for such an eventuality.
In
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
In this connection General Hansteen went on to
say that during Prime Minister Nygaardsvold's forth-
coming visit to the United States, he would be prepared
to discuss with you, all aspects of this project, and
to offer the cooperation of himself, of his Government,
and of his armed forces, in any way you might require.
As I previously wrote you, N ygaardsvold, whom I
have personally known since he came to office in 1935,
was formerly an unrealistic dreamer of Norway's ability
to remain neutral under all conditions. Events, however,
have disillusioned him. He has come down to earth, and
is now a realist. I believe the story he has to tell
the Norwegian-Americans amongst whom he used to live
and work, may go far towards awakening in them a sense
of real interest in the land of their forbears.
With warmest regards and every good wish, I am
Faithfully yours,
Torry Tony Biddly Biddly
OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
fill
Jony Biddle Folder
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
1-42
WASHINGTON, a c.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 12. 1942
My dear General Watson:
There 1s enclosed herewith a copy of Mr. Biddle's
strictly confidential despatch no. 142 of April 22,
1942, which was marked for the President. The despatch
is concerned with Anglo-Russian conversations which
began early in April of this year.
I Sincerely yours,
Flls
Enclosure:
From Ambassador Biddle
April 22, 1942.
Major General Edwin M. Watson,
FORDEFENSE
Secretary to the President,
BUY
UNITED
STATES
The White House.
SAVINGS
BONDS
ARD STAMPS
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
Eu
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted 5/11
ADDRESSED TO
Major General Watson
- - - - -
I-1053
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Near the Polish Government
LONDON, April 22, 1942.
No. 142
CTRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: Referring to telegram No. 30, April 13;
transmitting strictly confidential
letter from General Sikorski to Mr. Eden.
FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER SECRETARY
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.
Sir:
Referring to my telegram Polish Series No. 30,
April 13, I have the honor to report that following
the Polish Government's notification by the British
Government that Anglo-Russian conversations looking
toward an accord would commence on April 13, General
Sikorski addressed a letter to Mr. Eden, April 16,
1/ & 2/
copy and translation of which are enclosed herewith.
In handing me a copy or this letter, General Sikorski
stressed the importance of treating it in utmost con-
fidence. I expect to learn at an early date the sub-
stance of Mr. Eden's reply, and I shall promptly inform
you thereof.
Respectfully yours,
ANTHONY J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.
Enclosures:
1/ & 2/ 8.8 stated.
AJDBJr: EMoQ:GMT
DECLASSIFIED
Forwarded in quintuplicate.
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 4 1972
By J. Schauble Date
Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 142, April 22, 1942,
Polish Series, from the Embassy, London.
INFORMAL TRANSLATION
London, April 16, 1942
Strictly
confidential
and personal.
In thanking you for the frankness with which you
yesterday provided me with information regarding the
negotiations in progress with the USSR, I desire to
summarize my own viewpoint with the same sincerity.
Permit me to communicate to you confirmation of the
conversation which we have had both with you yourself
and your collaborators, the following considerations.
Never, either in the USSR itself - by the creation
there of a Polish army - or elsewhere - have I ever
ceased to give proof of my ardent desire to collaborate
loyally with the USSR. I am nevertheless obliged to
object in the most decided manner, to the ambitions of
Soviet Russia which is striving to follow the road
followed by Czarist imperialism and which the policy
of Peter the Great symbolizes, to which M. Stalin re-
fers. It is this imperialism, which moreover has
caused such grave prejudice to Europe and the entire
world, that Poland owes its partitions. It is this
same imperialism which 1s at the bottom of the demands
of the Soviet Government in the negotiations in ques-
tion. The proposed agreement between the British Gov-
ernment and the USSR does not, helas, constitute an
act directed against our common enemy, Germany, as
should be the case in simple justice, but rather
against the vital interests of Poland, the earliest
ally of Great Britain.
The scope of a general formula dealing with the
maintenance of our pre September 1, 1939 frontiers, to
which you have alluded, Mr. Minister, would not meet
either our interests, or your own, even on the hypo-
thesis that M. Stalin would be disposed to accept them.
I do not yet have knowledge of the tenor of the
note which His Majesty's Government is in process of
communicating to our Minister for Foreign Affairs; 1
am nevertheless convinced, that in spite of your ob-
servations of yesterday, you will agree with me that
the Polish viewpoint is entirely consistent with the
1939. spirit of the Anglo-Polish Agreement of August 23,
I consider
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-79
FEB
By J. Schauble Date
1
1972
-2-
I consider the proposed Anglo-Soviet agreement,
8.8 I have already indicated to you, as susceptible
of giving rise to very grave consequences for the
subsequent conduct of the war.
If it is concluded, it would be tantamount to
the definitive encirclement of Poland. Enemy propa-
ganda would seize the opportunity to explain to all
the interested countries that the U.S.S.R. has ob-
tained from Great Britain, a signature analogous to
that which the German Reich had given it in the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement of 1939. To sacrifice
not only vital interests of Poland, but also to give
over 8. considerable part of Europe to Soviet Russia,
whose final object is to provoke a world revolution
rather than to subdue Germany, constitutes in my
opinion an error capable of engendering incalculable
consequences. All the countries of Europe - stretching
from Norway to Greece - defend an identical and united
point of view when it concerns the safeguarding of
their independence and of their internal regime.
And 1 do not doubt for an instant that the hopes
placed in Russia of seeing her fulfilling the role
in Europe which formerly had fallen on France are
most illusory not only because of reasons of a social
nature but also of a geo-political nature. The Federa-
tion blocs called to hold in check the German state,
from west to east, in my opinion should assume this
role.
Moreover the future federation of the countries
of Central Europe would in principal be destroyed by
the agreement. Soviet Russia would give it a direct
blow, by demanding for herself in a manner equally
artificial and cynical, Bukovina, just as on the other
hand she claims Lithuania.
The proposed agreement 1s essentially contrary to
the stipulations that Poland concluded with the U.S.S.R.
in 1941. The Polish-Russian Agreement of July 30 last
annulled the past conventions between Soviet Russia
and the German Reich regarding the partition of Poland.
It annulled precisely the German-Soviet demarkation
line of October 4, 1939, to which the U.S.S.R. refers
today 8.8 her 1940 frontier and which the draft Anglo-
Soviet agreement confirms.
It 1s self-evident that Poland cannot be a party
to this negotiation nor can she give her consent to
the Agreement itself, but as I ascertained yesterday
with painful emotion, this fact is not susceptible of
influencing negotiations which are at present taking
place between His Majesty's Government and the U.S.B.R.
It 1s not for me to pre-judge the policy which
the United States will follow in this matter although
it is true that President Roosevelt and his Government
have entirely shared the point of view and attitude
of Poland in the matter of the claims of the U.S.S.R.
But
-3-
But I must express my fears, based upon personal obser-
vations and conversations, that the Agreement in question
risks strengthening considerably the action of Isola-
tionists and all elements hostile to Great Britain and
the U.S.S.R., which should not be a matter of indif-
ference to the last mentioned Power.
I am firmly convinced that the Polish attitude so
clearly expressed on such a complex and difficult
problem will cast no shadow, my dear Minister, on our
personal relations, which are founded upon mutual
respect.
Accept, my dear Minister, the assurance of my very
devoted sentiments.
His Excellency
Anthony Eden,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London.
confident
Jony Biddle Folder
1-42
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 13, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I believe you will be interested in reading a
despatch of May 6 from Tony Biddle, of which I am
enclosing a copy herewith. This despatch relates to
the present negotiations between the British and the
Soviet Union.
Believe me
Faithfully yours, Alls
Enc.
The President,
The White House.
DUPLICATE
No. 144
Near the Polish Government
London, May 6, 1942.
I
FOR THE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDERSECRETARY
Subject: Confidential disclosure by
usually well-informed Polish
official concerning a recent
resolution by "Watching Com-
mittee" of British Conservative
Party, regarding contemplated
Anglo-Russian Agreement.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78
By J. Schauble Date
FEB 4 1972
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
Sir:
Referring to my cablè No. 42, April 27, 12 midnight,
I have the honor to report that in connection with the
interest of Polish circles here in the contemplated
Anglo-Russian Agreement, a highly placed Polish official
disclosed
- 2 -
disclosed to me in strictest confidence the following:
He said that he had just learned confidentially
that the "Watching Committee" of the British Conservative
Party had passed EX resolution on April 30 to the effect
that the British Government should enter into no agree-
ment with other powers which was not in accord with the
policy of the United States. In revealing this to me
the
my informant said that this indicated that there was an
important element at least in Conservative Circles, which
was definitely opposed to Britain's contracting an agree-
ment with Russia if it did not enjoy the full approval of
the United States. He added his opinion that this
resolution, by so influential a group within the Conservative
Party ranks, might possibly serve as a check rein on
what he considered had hitherto been a wave of blind
enthusiasm here for the aforementioned agreement.
Respectfully yours,
A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.
AJDBJR:EMCQ
(In Quintuplicate)
TIMED she
the
The
White
House,
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
Jony Biddle Folder
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
1-42
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 24. 1942
My dear General Watson:
There are enclosed herewith copies of Mr. Biddle's
strictly confidential despatches, nos. 158, June 2,
1942 and 159, June 2, 1942 which were marked for the
President.
The despatches are concerned with conversations
which took place in May between Ambassador Biddle and
General Sikorski regarding, respectively, missing Polish
officers in Russia, and the evacuation of Polish children
from Russia.
A Sincerely yours, Dally
Enclosures:
From Ambassador Biddle,
nos. 158 and 159 of
June 2, 1942.
Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
Department of State
BUREAU
DIVISION
}
Eu
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
6/20
ADDRESSED TO
Major General Watson
# . - , OFFICE
1-1023
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
near the Polish Government
LONDON, June 2, 1942.
No. 158
CTRICTLY
COMP
Subject: General Sikorski's conversation regarding
missing Polish officers in Russia.
FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER-SECRETARY
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.
Sir:
Supplementing my despatch Polish Series No. 157, June
2, 1942, I have the honor to report that in recent conver-
sation with General Sikorski he said, in effect, the fol-
lowing:
MISSING OFFICERS. In summer 1940 several thousands of
Polish officers prisoners of war, who were kept in 3 camps
in Central Russia (Ostashkov, Starobyelsk, Kozelsk) were
taken to an unknown destination in the Far North of Russia.
Since then they have not been heard of. Their number has
been variously described but is usually accepted as 8,300;
1/3 of whom are professional officers and 2/3 reserve offi-
cers. The latter are for the most part professional men
including about 800 physicians and many University profes-
sors and lecturers as well as a number of distinguished
specialists. The Polish Military authorities have lists
covering over 4,800 of these officers. These lists have
been communicated to Stalin. The Soviet Government have
many times been requested to release them. They invariably
replied that every available prisoner of war in Russia had
already been released. This statement is obviously inac-
curate. There are reasons to believe that the officers in
question have been deported to Franz-Joseph Islands, North
of Spitzbergen, and to North-Eastern Siberia to camps on
the River Kolyma, in the North of the Yakut Republic. It
is more than probable that most of them have died of Hunger,
scorbut
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 4 1972
By J. Schauble Date
-2-
scorbut and cold. If the supposition as to their places of
imprisonment 1s correct, there are but two months of sum-
mer when for technical reasons they could be brought back to
Russia. Or, on the other hand, they could either be brought
via the Kolyma River to Alaska or from Franz-Joseph Islands
to Iceland. The absence of these officers 1s the princi-
pal reason of the shortages of officers in the Polish Forces
in Russia, whither officers from Scotland had to be sent
lately. The possible death of these men, most of whom have
superior education, would be a severe blow to the Polish
national life. Their evacuation during the present summer
seems to be the last chance to save those who may still be
alive.
In concluding his remarks, the General said that he
felt confident that if in the course of pending conversations
with the Russians in Washington, our authorities concerned
were to express an interest in the above-mentioned problem,
the Russians might act favorably in the matter.
Respectfully yours,
A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.
AJDBJr:CMT
(In quintuplicate).
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
near the Polish Government
LONDON, June 2, 1942.
No. 159.
CONFIDENDIAL
Subject: General Sikorski's remarks concerning the
evacuation on Polish children from Russia.
FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY, AND THE UNDER-SECRETARY
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.
Sir:
Supplementing my despatch Polish series No. 158, June
2, 1942, I have the honor to report that General Sikorski
has asked me to express to you his heartfelt thanks for your
kind interest and great help in connection with the Polish
children in Russia. He said that there wasn't a Pole
throughout the world who no uld not be everlastingly grate-
ful for this human act on your part.
He had already sent Ambassador Ciechanowski all the in-
formation available, and by way of keeping me informed in the
1/
matter he took occasion to hand me a memorandum, copies of
which are attached hereto.
In conclusion the General said that as in the questions
of further recruiting and of the search for missing Polish
officers, so the question of evacuating the children from
Russia depended on the goodwill of the Soviet Government.
He felt, moreover, that if our authorities express their in-
terest in the question of evacuation these children, during
the course of pending conversations, the Soviet Government
would give the matter its favorable consideration.
Respectfully yours,
A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.
ALDBJr:GMT
(In quintiplicate)
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78
Enclosure
By J. Schauble Date
FEB
1972
1/ as stated
Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch Polish Series No. 159,
June 2, 1942, from the Embassy, London.
POLISH CHILDREN. According to latest despatches from
Russia, the food situation there has lately deteriorated
to a very great extent. In the Southern parts of Russia
(Central Asia) rations for those who are at work have been
limited to 4 OZ. of flour daily. Those who do not work
receive no rations. Prices on the free market are astro-
nomic and only a small number of privileged people can af-
ford to buy non-rationed food. In consequence many cases
of death from starvation are reported and it is likely that
their number will increase. The children are the first to
succomb. In the Republic of Uzbekistan (Central Asia) be-
tween 5 and 14% of Polish children have died of hunger with-
in the last few months.
In these circumstances, if these Polish children in
Russie are to be saved from certain death, the evacuation of
50.000 of them, together with several thousands of mothers
and guardians (a large proportion of these childrem are
already orphans) is a paramount necessity. The Soviet Govern-
ment would raise no objection to their evacuation 1f it were
effected in a very discreet manner. They naturally do
not want to disclose hunger conditions in Russia. There-
fore 1f these people were evacuated, any information regard-
ing conditions in Russia should be altogether withheld.
Even before receipt of this latest news on hunger
conditions in parts of Russia, Ambassador Ciechanowski sub-
mitted to Mr. Summer Welles the desire of the Polish Govern-
ment to begin a large-scale evacuation of children from
Russia. President Roosevelt has very generously taken a
personal interest in the matter and instructed the Depart-
ment of State and the American Red Cross to prepare the
evacuation of 10.000 children from Persia to South Africa.
Should this evacuation be effected there would be room
in Persia for snother 10.000 children from Russia. This,
however, would mean the salvation of only a small number
of the children in question. Truly heroic measures are
needed 1f Polish children, belonging to all classes of
society and representing 8 valuable part of the nation's
future, are to be saved.
DHN
PSF; Biddle Folder
July 30, 1942.
Private and Confidential
Dear Tony:
A lot of good people in Pennsyl-
vania are anxious to have you and Margaret
come home to make one or two speeches in
behalf of the ticket in Pennsylvania this
Fall -- in September, if possible.
I leave it wholly to you. It
would help the ticket and perhaps you both
would like to be home for six weeks or so --
you deserve it -- but I leave it wholly to
you.
As ever yours,
Honorable Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
Ritz Hotel,
London, England.
fdr/ggt
dj
PSF: Biddle Folder
full mal
rh-1
40 Berkeley Square,
LONDON, July 31, 1942.
My dear Mr. President:
I have just received two telegrams, one
from the Department of State, granting me, by
your authority, leave of absence when and as
I consider conditions permit; another one from
Joe Guffey, stating he had discussed this mat-
ter with you and that he hoped I would take
advantage of your authorized leave of absence.
On the one hand, I want you to know how
very much both Margaret and I appreciate your
thoughtfulness; on the other hand, I want you
to know that Joe's suggestion to you on this
score was done without his having discussed it
with me in advance. Otherwise, I should have
told him that circumstances in connection with
the business of my Mission here are such as to
prevent my taking advantage of a leave of ab-
sence at this time.
As you know, relations between the Poles
and the Russians have become very tense in the
past few weeks, and in my opinion, the situation
requires daily attention. Very fortunately,
there has been a turn for the better in Russia's
attitude, namely: that Moscow has just promised
the Polish Government to commence the evacua-
tion, on August 1, of the three organized
Polish
The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
Polish Divisions, consisting of 45,000 men, as
well as 25,000 civilians -- making a total of
70,000 Poles. While I am very hopeful that this
will serve to tranquilize growing Polish anger,
I believe that our Polish friends will need
some one to "hold their hands" daily until the
present crisis will have been liquidated. I am
hopeful, moreover, that with careful attention
we can bring the Poles to approach a possible
liquidation of this crisis with a spirit of
compromise. In connection with this very recent
agreement on Russia's part to evacuate the
aforementioned 70,000 Poles, I feel confident
that it is due to your own grand influence.
This situation, together with outstanding
matters relating to the affairs of other Govern-
ments, and which require careful and personal
watching and treatment, would make this a difficult
period in which to absent myself from here.
Margaret joins me in warmest regards and
in every good wish.
Faithfully yours,
Biddley
P.S. I am communicating the foregoing to
Joe Guffey. Faithfully
Jony
Biddle Folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 25, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR
MY SIGNATURE.
F.D.R.
Let from Biddle, London, Aug. 12 enclosing
secret memo regarding certain matters which
General Sikorski took up with Biddle after
Harriman's departure for Moscow.
Biddle Folder
August 26, 1942.
Dear Tony:-
Many thanks for yours of the
seventeenth in regard to the Argentine.
I have only shown it to the Secretary
and Under Secretary of State.
My best to you and Margaret.
Always sincerely,
Hon. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle,
Ritz Hotel,
London,
England.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 25, 1942.
OBORET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR YOUR EYES ONLY. PLEASE
RETURN FOR MY FILES.
F.D.R.
Thanks-
CH
DECLASSIFIED
By Depu'y Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
40 Berkeley Square,
LONDON, August 17, 1942.
My dear Mr. President:
For your information, I am attaching hereto,
1/
a copy of a strictly confidential report dated
"Buenos Aires, August 7", which the authorities
of a Government to which I am accredited, have
just received from their secret sources in the
Argentine. In that these particular authorities
have hitherto proven a usually reliable source
of intelligence; (especially as regards the
European Continent), I am inclined to attach
importance to the contents of the attached.
In handing me this report, my informants
urged me most earnestly to guard their identity
in utmost secrecy, due to the delicate position
of
The President
The White House.
- 2 -
of their secret sources in the Argentine.
With my warmest regards and every good
wish, I am
Faithfully yours,
Tom Biddeer
Enclosure:
Copy of strictly confidential
report as stated.
Buenos Aires, 7th August, 1942.
SECRET REPORT FROM CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES IN
ARGENTINE.
In connection with the military situation and especially
that in Russia a number of confidential conferences of higher
officers was held in the Argentine. It is considered that
the situation of the Germans is exceptionally favorable and
that it is useful to show profound sympathies to the Axis
cause. It has been decided in the event of the situation
developing unfavorably for the Allies to carry out an entire
change of the Argentine Cabinet in the sense appropriate to
the new situation. This new Cabinet will have a temporary
character and will be followed up by a next one which will
be entirely totalitarian. The interior affairs will pass
into the hands of the army. A campaign against Communism
is proposed and also an antisemitic movement. The foreign
policy will remain under strict control of military circles.
In general it is planned to keep up a strong course on the
whole continent of South America including support for any
totalitarian "putsch" in neighbouring countries. Conferences
of military leaders and the Germans are continuing with the
aim of creating a South American block with an unified foreign
policy and inimical attitude towards the USA. The Germans
suggest the classification of South American countries
according to the attitude adopted by them during the war.
With regard to Uruguay heavy sanctions are foreseen. The
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
-2-
atmosphere of the talks is well illustrated by the details
already discussed, as f. inst. that Uruguay will have to
pay 40 million pesetas damages in connection with the
sinking of the Graf von Spee.
Biddle Folder
Published in
1-42
Foreign Relations of the United States
1942 Vol. 111 Europe
September 10, 1942
Pages 183 - 184
Dear Tony:
Thank you very much for your letter of
August 12 and its attached memorandum of your
conversation with General Sikorski regarding the
alleged discrimination against Polish citizens
by the Soviet authorities.
I have learned from the Department of State
that similar allegations have been made by the
Polish Ambassadors in Washington and Kuibyshev
and while it 1s believed that there may be con-
siderable truth to the allegations, no direct
confirmation has been received from other sources.
In regard to General Sikorski's request that
the question of according equal treatment to
Polish Jews in the USSR be taken up with Mr. Stalin,
I agree with your suggestion that, in view of the
general deterioration of Polish-Soviet relations
during the past months, it would be more politic
to limit such an appeal to the general question
of bringing about an improvement in these relations
rather than citing too many specific problems. In
this way, if our efforts to bring about a better
basis of understanding and cooperation between the
two Governments are successful, specific problems
may then be discussed if the facts 80 warrant.
In this connection, you will be interested
to learn that on the basis of urgent appeals
made by the Polish Government I again asked
Admiral Standley on August 19, in his discretion,
Signed original of the letter send w the
Sing. State you delivery
9/11/12
hm
to bring up the question of Polish-Soviet relations
with the Soviet authorities and express the hope
of the United States Government that no avenue will
remain unexplored which might lead to a solution of
these problems satisfactory to both the Soviet
Union and Poland.
Furthermore, I have asked Mr. Willkie, after
consultation with Admiral Standley, to express to
Mr. Stalin the hope of this Government that an
improvement in Polish-Soviet relations may be
effected.
With every good wish, I am
Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) Franklin D Roosevelt
The Honorable
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
American Embassy,
London.
40 Berkeley Square,
LONDON, August 12, 1942.
My dear Mr. President:
Shortly after Averell Harriman's departure
for Moscow, General Sikorski came to see me
regarding certain matters covered in the attached
memorandum, which I am forwarding for your con-
fidential information. (In view of the confidential
character of the subject matter, I am keeping no
copies either of this letter of of the attached
memorandum).
With warmest regards and every good wish,
I am
Yours faithfully,
Tomy Bidder V
Enclosure:
Memorandum as stated.
The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1942
Vol. 111
Europe
Pages 171 - 173
August 12, 1942.
SECRET MEMORANDUM
Shortly after Averell Harriman's departure
for Russia, General Sikorski told me he under-
stood that the President had requested him to
urge, in the course of his conversations with
M. Stalin, the release of the arrested Polish
Welfare personnel. The General, moreover, wanted
me to let the President know of his deep gratitude.
The General went on to say that he had cabled
instructions to Mr. Sokolnicki, Charge d'Affairs
of the Polish Embassy, Kuibyshev, (a) to contact
Averell Harriman, and (b) to ask him whether he
might see his way clear to mention, among other
matters, in his conversation with M. Stalin, the
question of the Polish Government's desire that
the Soviet authorities' grant the Jewish Polish
citizens residing in the USSR, treatment equal to
that granted the Polish citizens of other religious
categories.
Sikorski thereupon pointed out to me that he
had received alarming telegrams from American
Jewry concerning this problem. Moreover, the
Polish Jews in Russia had strongly appealed to
him for defense of their rights as Polish citizens.
His
- 2 -
His own interventions thus far, however, had
proved of no avail, in view of the negative
attitude of the Soviet authorities.
I told him I thought that any appeal addressed
to the Soviet Government on behalf of the Polish
citizens in Russia, might best be applied to the
Polish citizens as a whole, rather than to any
particular group among them.
In response, he said that his instructions
to his Charge d'Affairs were motivated by the
same thought; that he stood by the principle of
equality of rights, irrespective of creed, color
et cetera. As regards the attitude of the Soviet
authorities, however, experience had shown that
in treating with Polish citizens, they discriminated
against Polish citizens of the Jewish faith.
In this connection, the General said that in
disclosing their point of view, the Soviet author-
ities had emphasized that all too frequently, the
Polish Jews make trouble for the Soviet, following
their release from confinement -- especially those
enjoying wide contacts with American Jewry. By
way of illustration, the Soviet authorities had
cited the following case (of about seven months ago):
following their release from confinement, a Mr. Alter
and a Mr. Ehrlich, leaders of the Polish Bund, had
cabled
- 3 -
cabled from Kuibyshev, to the Bund in the United
States, a message stating that they had been
badly treated. This message had been picked up
by the Soviet censor, and had led to an investi-
gation of the activities of these two men. The
investigation had brought to light that they were
"Trotskyists", and they were consequently promptly
placed in prison again.
In connection with the question of the Soviet
authorities' recognition of Polish citizens, I
feel that it is well not to lose sight of the fact
that previous to the signing of the Anglo-Soviet
Agreement, Moscow, according to General Sikorski,
regarded as Soviet citizens, all Poles from areas
east of the then envisaged Soviet post-war "security
frontiers". I mention this, as I have received
insufficient information since the signing of the
aforementioned Agreement, upon which to form a
definite opinion as to whether or not this might
possibly be the case even now. (For further details
see my despatch Polish Series No. 137 of March
30, 1942).
Department of State
BUREAU
Eu
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted 9/1/42
ADDRESSED TO
The President
1 1. . - - -
1-1022
-
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
September 4. 1942
My dear Mr. President:
There 1s attached a draft reply to Ambassador Biddle's
letter of August 12. If you should approve the draft
and have it returned to us we shall see that the letter
is dispatched to Ambassador Biddle.
Faithfully Cordillshiel yours,
Enclosures:
1. To Ambassador Biddle.
2. From Ambassador Biddle,
August 12, 1942, with
enclosure.
The President,
The White House.
Biddle Folder
file
Personal
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.
September 28, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
1/
In forwarding you the attached copy of a
secret report which General Sikorski just handed me,
I share his belief that the contents would be of
interest to you.
In brief, the report treats largely with the
morale of the German people and German armed forces.
The information is based upon 5832 letters exchanged
between German troops and "home", as well as upon
close observation by the Polish reporters.
of connected bearing, you may recall that in
my Despatch Polish Series No. 205, September 16, 1942,
I reported the substance of information and observa-
tions on the morale both of the German people and the
German armed forces, as imparted to me by General
Kleeberg, (former Polish Military Attache in Paris,
and now chief of Polish underground forces in France.)
In short, General Kleeberg, based upon his secret
reports from inside Germany and upon his examination
of Frenchmen and Poles escaping from German prison
camps, was of the very definite opinion (a) that, under-
lying the morale of the German "home front", there
were, today, all the makings in terms of depressing
factors for an abrupt decline; (b) that, while the
situation was thus "all set" for the decline, certain
additional forms of pressure were needed to "touch it
off"; (c) that the most effective weapons for this
purpose would be a program of intensified, merciless
aerial bombardment, synchronized with an organized
campaign of sabotage and terrorism by foreign labour,
(4,500,000 - 6,000,000) in Germany,
- 2 -
In examining the attached report, General
Sikorski and I find that the information, therein,
concerning German morale corresponds, in large
measure, with General Kleeberg's aforementioned
disclosures. This is particularly interesting, in
that General Kleeberg's disclosures are based upon
his observations from France, while the information
contained in the attached report comes from confi-
dential sources inside Poland.
With warmest regards and my every good wish,
I am
Yours faithfully
Truy Biddee.r
The President,
The White House,
Washington
Enclosure
1/ as stated
AJDBJR:TH
MEMORANDUM HANDED ME BY GENERAL SIKORSKI
September 24, 1942
I. MORALE IN THE GERMAN ARMY.
This estimate is based on oral statements and 5832
letters, of which some 500 were written by soldiers of
detachments marching up to the front, about 1000 from
hospitals and the immediate and deep rear, and the remain-
der from the central sector of the front, (VITEBSK, SMOLENSK,
VIAZMA, BRIANSK, OREL, HOMEL, KURSK). They were written
to BERLIN, HAMBURG, BREMEN, SAXONY, HESSEN, NASSAU, THUR-
INGEN, BADEN, LORRAINE, SILESIA, EAST PRUSSIA. They cover
the period from the end of May to the end of June. About
300 of these letters were written by the police, some by
STRALO4 About 490 letters (8.3%) did not contain exclusive-
ly personal matters. As compared with the previous pe riod,
the percentage of letters has increased containing estimates
of events and expressions of views. This happened in spite
of further restrictions as regards censorship, and as such
must be taken into account in gauging the candour of this
type of correspondence.
The troops have been informed of these new regulations
concerning censorship; This is demonstrated by such remarks
as: "We are forbidden to write how we are and what we are
doing."
"Recently quite a number of letters have been rejected
and severe fines imposed."
"We must write that our food is good, that we are fine,
and that we rarely meet the Bolsheviks. You will not learn
the truth from the wireless either."
"Recently a number of letters were opened and two of
our comrades were punished."
These regulations were received with great dissat-
isfaction. The soldiers write: "Letters are the only link
with our families and even this has been forbidden us."
Some suggest: "In future we shall learn to read between
the lines." "Never carry my letters on you, remember to
burn them always."
Out of all those who discuss the censorship, only one
agrees with fate: "It is better for you to know less, at
least you do not worry unnecessarily."
1
STRASSEN TRANSPORTLEITUNG OST.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
- 2 -
1. Morale of soldiers on the Eastern Front.
a)
The beginning of operations brought in its wake a
considerable detente of the atmosphere among the
troops, including also units which did not take a
direct part in the operations.
One may conclude from these enunciations that the
German soldier is determined to see the end of it all,
is anxious to: "See the ultimate great decision".
No enthusiasm was, however, created by the begin-
ning of operations.
In some detachments there is considerable self-
assurance. The majority of s0ldiers speak of the cer-
tainty of victory, but doubts are frequently expressed
as well; the time factor plays its part in their fears;
"Time is flying, and winter is nigh." "One cannot fore-
see anything in this situation, because one does not
know where the front is - before us - or behind us."
"The Russians will exhaust themselves quickly - but we
shall do 80 before them."
So far these letters lack an estimate of the opera-
tions on the CRIMEA and near KHARKOV. There were only
two mentions of these matters:
A private wrote: "I thought we should advance
quicker, and meanwhile the resistance is too strong."
A doctor writes: "According to the opinion of
officers, the operations are not taking the favourable
turn which was expected. The losses are too heavy."
4.6.42, during an air raid: "Gosh, how we are getting
it, and we have no defences."
Many of the writers realise the influence of the
Russian campaign on the whole of the war, but they
all stress their own moral and material exhaustion.
A second winter is regarded as the symbol of de-
feat. They keep on repeating: "We do not give up
hope."
- 3 -
It is interesting to note the following views:
"We must finish, and finish as soon as possible, other-
wise we shall fare badly; you people at home do not
realise what is going on here, how many are killed, how
much material is destroyed."
The High Command fully realises that the war must
end this year, no matter how. We do not know their
thoughts, but the ordinary soldier who is in touch with
the front, has the worst forebodings: "If we lost the
war, then those soldiers who are in the East would
never see their fatherland again."
"We should have seen the end of the war a long
time ago, but the Fuhrer cannot withdraw any longer,
and there is no other way out, 80 we must endure."
The estimate of the Soviet soldier and Soviet
culture has not undergone any changes, but at present
guerillas are worse than the Soviet front-line soldiers,
they are the purest personification of Bolshevik culture -
they fight to the bitter end.
It is noteworthy that for the first time a justi-
fication of their tenacity and a criticism of German
behaviour was voiced, although the majority of German
soldiers fully approve of their own cruelties:
"After all they have the same faces as we have and
such faces as we were shown on pictures. Our gentlemen
are surprised that they should defend themselves - but
in reality they are only paying us back in our own
coin." (A letter by a chauffeur of the STRALO)
"Only the scum associate with our men. All the
better Russians treat us as intruders."
The German soldiers are much more concerned about
news from Germany than about the offensive and the
"Endsieg". They beg for the truth, they despair at
not knowing it: "I prefer to starve, provided I have
some news from home."
- 4 -
"The lack of mails, which are so frequently des-
troyed by the guerillas, upsets us."
"The most important thing is that our nerves
should not give way - and the worst to bear is our
anxiety about you at home."
The raid on COLOGNE created the strongest impres-
sion, next to it, the raids on ROSTOCK and BREMEN.
One soldier curses the English: Let us only
finish off the Russians, and the day of revenge will
dawn; still it is irritating to learn that the Flak
cannot deal with the English."
"When we have bad news, we are incapable of fight-
ing. Sometimes I try to calm myself with the thought,
for instance, that DRESDEN can only get very light
bombs, and the shelters should prove sufficient pro-
tection against them" - but nevertheless he advises
his family to take all valuables to the shelters with
them and to look after fire-fighting equipment."
The C.O. of one unit complains that all his men
want to go back to Germany to defend their families,
and he has a very difficult time trying to keep them
in check,
The raids have pushed aside all the other internal
troubles of Germany, which had until now preoccupied
the soldiers, even hunger, about which they now write
less, though they frequently remark that men returning
from leave in Germany are lean of face and come back
with pleasure even to the Russian front, because here
one may still requisition food.
Another subject engrossing the German soldiers,
to a degree almost equal to the raids, is the behaviour
of German women. The tone of their utterences is in-
creasingly vehement: "Today the soldiers ask you to
behave - tomorrow they will very likely threaten you."
- 5 -
"The German woman of today must needs be degenerate
if she can betray her husband with a Pole or a Bolshevik."
"Comrades returning from leave fall straight into
the arms of Russian women; I do not wonder at it; some-
thing has happened to the proverbial faithfulness of the
German woman.¹
Events on other fronts create but small echoes so
far. The capture of TOBRUK was greeted with disbelief;
"This must be some English trickery". "Can one really
believe?"
One man expressed curiosity as to what mischief
CHURCHILL was up to in America and thinks that Turkey
will shortly enter the war.
Events in the PROTECTORATE are only touched upon
by those freshly arrived from there (chiefly police
units).
"It is a good thing we are not there; occupying
a country is one of our plagues."
Reprisals are approved of on the whole, e.g. one
man writes to PARIS on 16.6.: "I thought the French
were more intelligent; I wonder they still try to
kill off our soldiers. This looks almost like our
dealings with guerillas."
Daily complaints and grumblings about the plague
of mosquitoes (spreading malaria and frequently mortal
infection through typhoid), lack of sleep due to con-
tinuous raids and guerrillas attacks, unjast promotion
and decorations, sometimes ill treatment by officers:
"I feel the difference between an officer and a Nazi
soldier. If these people only realised how they are
wronging us they would stop to think."
The most frequently encountered word is "leave".
It is the subject of a humorous letter entitled "Return
of one division from Russia in 1980" in which soldiers
- 6 -
returning from Russia have forgotten all their German
with the exception of the one word "leave" - the mean-
ing of which they have, however, forgotten.
Complaints of bad food have decreased. Not that
food has improved, but the soldiers can supplement it
by barter, which is strictly forbidden, or by requisi-
tions. Hence there are frequent thefts of parcels from
home, and the reason given by the perpetrators when
caught is - hunger.
The writers actually mention five cases of suicide
and two death sentences in that connection; and an
allusion is made to larger numbers of suicides.
Occasionally one comes across sentences which
might be the echo of communist propaganda or opposition
views, such as: "We are living like coolies". "It is
the leaders of the states and not we soldiers, who are
responsible for this horrible carnage which is going on."
"We are fed up with everything."
The wounded brought to hospitals frequently have
appeals to workers and soldiers sewn into their clothes.
Their experiences during the winter have deepened
the soldiers; the long sojourn at the front has taught
them to think. This evolution continues.
The subjects of meditation are limited to their own
front, the course of the war and its outcome. They won-
der about the object of wars. The soldiers become
introspective, grow critical of everything outside
those things which they see and experience themselves.
With the exception of what is going on in Germany, they
lose interest in all other matters, even in other fronts;
and they have not even become aware of the problem of
the Second Front.
2. Morale in detachments going up to the front.
Units marching towards the front are taciturn and
reserved. They suffer serious losses en route owing to
- 7 -
raids and guerrilla operations. This is their hardest
experience on the threshold of Russia.
These units are now composed for the most part of
older people, in despair at having been called up, who
learned only on arriving at the goal of their journey
that they were destined for the front and who are given
strenuous training in the immediate rear of the front.
Observation from outside shows an entire lack of
enthusiasm, even a state of depression.
Older soldiers at the front estimate the fighting
value of the youngest and the oldest elements as very
poor.
3. Morale in units in the rear.
Morale depends on the course of events at the
fronts. TOBRUK and SEBASTOPOL created demonstrations
of joy among garrisons stationed in Poland.
Soviet diversion is acutely felt. The soldiers
realise their own helplessness and its main reasons:
"We are definitely too few to cover the areas in which
we have found ourselves; there should be at least
three times as many of us. For this reason we do not
see any end to it."
It was these feelings which caused the 0.0. the
LWOW garrison to issue an order to the troops ordering
them to behave in a proper and non-provocative manner
towards the local population.
Observation shows that morale is gradually, although
very slowly, going down. This finds expression, so far,
only in an increasing wave of thefts and embezzlements
(several senior officers were arrested in VILNO) and in
drunkmaness.
There were sporadic cases of breaches of discipline,
such as leaving a sentry post, etc.
- 8 -
We have insufficient data dealing with desertion
to estimate this phenomenon, which occurs fairly fre-
quently, but not en masse.
We may quote as an example: on 21.5. twenty men
were shot in VILNO whose nerves had given way and who
had to be removed for the sake of example.
Orders No.s 17 and 18 of the Kommandantur at
BRZESC n/B mention nine death sentences for desertion,
carried out during March 1942.
It was rumoured that during April there were two
executions daily for the same reason.
4. Morale of the Axis-Allied troops.
To judge by the conversations held with them, they
are informed in an entirely misleading manner by German
propaganda about conditions in Polish lands (they are
led to believe that the Poles are very satisfied with
the occupation, etc.). Nevertheless, on many occasions
Italian soldiers ostentatiously showed their friendli-
ness to the Poles, stepped forward in defence of beaten
and robbed travellers, visited Polish churches (which
the Germans are forbidden to do;) the Italians confess
to Polish priests, etc.
There are no data about other German satellite
countries.
Otherwise, morale is the same as in previous
periods.
II. MORALE AMONG THE GERMAN CIVILIAN POPULATION.
1. In occupied territories.
No changes in the general situation.
More important events and symptoms: the round-up
of German officials who are trying to evade the call-
up; this has caused great dissatisfaction and depress-
ion, especially in Pomerania and DANZIG and has also
affected Party members.
- 9 -
The raids on Germany have caused the following:
A circular issued on 1.6.42 by the WARSAW Bahndir-
ektion, destined for Reiche - and Volkadeutsche, limit-
ing the use of the official telephone services and for-
bidding any conversations to be held "on the subject of
enemy operations and their results" as well as "about
the state of the weather in the country or in occupied
territories". All such conversations to be treated as
aiding the enemy or "treason to the country due to
negligence".
The Landrat of SIERADE, in his instructions to the
mayor of ZDUNSKA WOLA instructs him to report any panic
being spread by refugees from ROSTOCK and, should a
raid occur, to forbid the passage of any information
about the results of the raid and to forbid access by
civilians to any damaged places.
Considerable anxiety is caused by Soviet diversion.
Under the influence of these events Volkdeutsche
in some centres have become humbler in their behaviour -
to a visible extent. They have again begun to speak
about Poland.
2. Inside the Reich.
This estimate is based on the press, oral statements,
400 letters written to the front during June 1942; 10%
of these letters are of a nature to lower morale, in
spite of censorship restrictions of which the writers
were aware and which are mentioned in the letters. The
letters were written from BADEN, MANNHEIM, LUDWIGSHAFEN,
KIEL, MUNICH, AUGSBURG, BERLIN, EAST PRUSSIA.
The factors affecting the state of mind of the
péople inside the Reich are in order of importance:
air raids, losses on the fronts, successes in the CRIMEA
and in Africa, hunger. Otherwise all factors mentioned
in previous reports are also operative.
The dominant features are still: fatigue, depress-
ion and anxiety.
- 10 -
Since the summer the people have been fed methodi-
cally with stimulating propaganda; they have been
accustomed to bewildering successes and need new stimu-
li all the time in order to maintain their morale.
The first injection of optimism, after the winter,
was the capture of KERCH. It was less exploited by
propaganda than other victories, but it immediately
improved the general temper of the people by awaken-
ing hopes for a speedier ending of the war.
Letters dated from that period contain repeatedly
the word "wieder": "Again we have the hope that the
war will end some time, possibly better than we have
come to expect."
African victories were fully exploited by propa-
ganda. We lack data about the reaction of the people.
There have been no echoes of the KHARKOV battle,
not even in the letters from the front.
Another stimulus is the realisation of the slogan:
"Victory at any price". One of the elaborations of
this slogan is: "To work, to endure, to restrict one-
self in everything, to win."
The third stimulus is enforcement.
The regulation about "those unfit for social life"
has been enforced in some of the "Gau's" only up to
the present; it has now been extended over the whole
of Germany. The execution of this regulation has now
been entrusted to administrative authorities and the
decisions to the Party.
In spite of counteraction, tension does not dis-
appear. It is fostered by the mass-training of reserve
forces for a.a. defence and by thousands of refugees
from the bombed cities.
It is said that more than 80,000 fled from COLOGNE
alone; they scattered all over the Reich and the
occupied countries, spreading panic.
- 11 -
The spring did not bring the great events which
were awaited with such anxiety; these events are now
anticipated for the autumn, and even, as one letter
puts it: "Everybody is making forecasts, to such an
extent that one becomes breathless: peace is to be
concluded by August, but how can one believe it?"
Others, on the other hand "believe that things
cannot go on for long like this, because we have
nothing left to eat.'
Letters dated 18.5.42: "People are depressed
and look gloomily into the future."
News is continually arriving from the fronts
about relatives killed and inside the country, too,
there are many casualties.
Prophecies saying that the war will end this year
are definitely wrong. The raids are disorganizing
the life of the various centres and to some extent
the life of those places where the refugees have fled.
Hence the authorities do their best to try and stop
them from flight.
The authorities tried to stem the panic spread by
the scattering of tales about the raids by concilia-
tory measures; in ROSTOCK, for example, free meals
were served and additional bread and tobacco ration-
cards were issued. The people were upset and terri-
fied and for two weeks after the raid continued to
descend every night into the shelters.
Letter from KIEL: "No one laughs any more in
Germany."
Letter from Hamburg: "People are going away, if
only for a few days, to calm down a little.
There is energenic recruiting of young men for the
WAFFEN S.S. There are cases where compulsion is applied.
This recruiting is aimed at strengthening the founda-
tions of the regime. The recruits are taught: "You
must do your duty regardless of what may be going round on
- 12 -
you: even if you saw your mothers and wives dying of
starvation and destitution, you must endure bravely
to the end."
Those going to the front are told that under no
conditions may an S.S. man be taken prisoner.
III. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
The events in Africa roused slumbering hope only
in the rear and inside the Reich; these were fully
exploited by propaganda in order to allay fear of the
second front which was gnawing at the people. There
was a distinct tendency to quiet all discussions on
this subject. On the eastern front these events crea-
ted no repercussion whatever.
As far as the offensive campaign in Russia is con-
cerned, propaganda approached the subject warily, avoid-
ing promises of victory. In this respect it chimes
with the mood of the army. Only KERCH and SEBASTOPOL
were exploited to some extent, and the importance of
these victories was based chiefly on calculations as
to the forces of the enemy.
The press demonstrated the sensitivity of the Ger-
man people and army to British and Soviet propaganda
and launched a campaign against these influences;
their method was irony, and a combatting of the enemy's
arguments.
The authorities in Germany are distinctly alarmed
at the diminishing resistance of the German people,
which is manifested, among other things, in increasing
demoralisation.
The army continues to be morally strong - in spite
of exhaustion, irritation and depression.
The main organs of the press continually stress
the unshaken heroism of the nation.
The raids and the food situation have a greater
influence on the shaping of morale than has been
exerted
- 13 -
by the victories won in 1942; they weaken and disor-
ganize the people and deflect the attention of the
soldiers from their tasks at the front.
The troops greeted the beginning of operations in
the east with relief. The soldiers wish for a speedy
defeat of Russia, because they wish to return home to
defend their families and they are afraid of another
winter, which they identify with defeat.
The slogan of a "Victory at all costs" is being
realised materially inside the Reich and in occupied
lands. But allied to this realisation, there are very
discreet attempts to prepare the people for possible
failures.
IV. PROPAGANDA.
This estimate is based on the press in the Reich
and the occupied territories in the east, for the per-
iod 15.6. - 15.7.42., Party publications (DAS VERFELD -
a training publication of the S.N.D.A.P. in the General
Gouvernement and others) HITLERJUNGEN, MITTELUNGEN FUER
DIE TRUPPE Nos. 181, 188, 190, 193, 195, 196, 198, 199,
201, 202, 203 from April, May and June 1942.
The main facts exploited by German propaganda dur-
ing that period of time were:
The Anglo-Soviet agreement and the successes in
Africa - which were brought into prominence while the
beginning of the offensive in Russia was left in the
shade; the fighting on the DON was overshadowed by the
smashing of a British convoy in the ARCTIC, which was
represented as "the greatest defeat of England".
All these facts were used for the underlining of
the slogans used during the last few months.
1. a) The first information about the Anglo-Soviet
was given by the WARSCHAUER ZEITUNG. In the press
inside the Reich this treaty caused great misgivings
and it was discussed in all newspapers along lines
- 14 -
officially laid down for the press. The alleged
"secret clauses" were especially stressed and were
said to threaten the "small nations" betrayed by the
British. The essence of the treaty, i.e. the danger
of a second front, was entirely glossed over.
b) The opportunity was exploited to start a new and
powerful campaign against the Anglo-Saxon countries,
as the only perpetrators of the war. Four consecutive
articles by GOEBBELS launched this campaign.
The main press organs and the "MITTEILUNGEN" took
a very prominent part in this campaign, while the
press in occupied countries was rather reserved in
its enunciations.
In the mass of statements about the disintegration
of the British Empire, one notices the attitude of
the FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG, which said that the "British
were tough opponents and an unusually talented nation",
as well as the careful sentence of GOEBBELS, ending
a series of victorious fanfares: "We know that the
chances of a submarine war are changeable."
2. a) The African successes were exploited to the full
and brought forth a series of assurances about the
invincibility of the German Army and the decisive
bearing of this victory on the outcome of the whole
war.
Next to it, CHURCHILL'S speech and the debate in
the Commons created an outbreak of violent indigna-
tion at the whole of the British people, who are
immature and misled and proved unable to overthrow
the Prime Minister. Although the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER
of 5.7. stated that the defeat of England was complete,
the press of the occupied countries remained very
reserved.
WARSCHAUER ZEITUNG gave assurances that the Axis
does not make any prophecies concerning the future
course of the campaign, because in this fight for
the future of Europe, it is assured of ultimate
victory.
- 15 -
In another article entitled "This is different
from 1918" it says that it is a mistake to compare
the present war with the Napoleonic campaigns (not
only his Egyptian campaign).
b) The fall of TOBRUK was used as a proof of the
impossibility of creating a second front. Feverish
discussion of this subject, kept up for a number of
weeks, was ended by two enunciations for a compromise
character:
- Such a front had existed on several occasions,
but it never last long.
- According to GOEBBELS (5.7.42) the Germans
"are prepared for all Allied experiments, and
anyway they are not interested in this one."
After this date we do not encounter any further men-
tion of the second front.
The "HITLERJUNGEN" has 80 far not touched on this
subject, and devoted more space to the successes of
German submarines.
3.
The anniversary of 22.6. was hardly mentioned in
the press. No sayings of HITLER or appeals of last
year were quoted.
The beginning of the offensive was announced by:
a) WARSCHAUER ZEITUNG, which acts as the chief in-
formant on Russian matters.
According to this paper the aim of the offensive
is to solve those problems, which had been left un-
solved since November 1941. The paper makes no pro-
phesies for the future, although "the dice are cast"
but "no one knows whether the war will end owing to
the present decisions, and when this will happen."
b) The press within the Reich discusses the present
fighting in Russia with less reserve, although it
continues to stress the strength of Russian resist-
ance; then it announces the complete annihilation of
TIMOSHENKO's army and the an proaching decisive
moment of the war.
- 16 -
a) MITTEILUNGEN, in a discussion of the May opera-
tions, stresses the importance of the capture of
KERCH, where more prisoners were taken than in the
famous battle of TANNENBERG in 1914 (this is &
frequent example used by this paper). The article
ends: "This May has again rendered us secure in
the trust and assurance that the ultimate victory
will be ours."
4. There were fewer enunciations during that period
on the subject of war aims, nor were any new forulas
on the subject drawn up.
Only MITTEILUNGEN tried to adapt former aims to the
present requirements and to the latest official statements.
For them the aim of the war is an economic and poli-
tical unity of Europe, which will assure for her freedom
in raw material supplies. The word "freedom" has a speci-
fic meaning in German minds; it means to assure for
our ever-growing nation the possession of sufficient
food, and the Lebensraum of Europe is the Lebensraum
of the German nation.
Considerations about the re-building of Europe
continue to be the subject of Party publications of the
type destined for educational purposes and in books,
which depend to a lesser degree on the current mood of
the people and events at the front.
5. The slogan "Victory at all costs", formulated in the
spring, has reached the General Gouvernement in the
shape of posters.
GOEBBELS returns to this subject on 21.6., giving
the keynote to the whole press, by announcing the possi-
bility of temporary setbacks and appealing for a proper
appreciation of the enemy. "There is nothing left for
us to do, but to strengthen unto the ultimate limits,
our direction of the war until the absolute exhaustion
of our war potential. War, as such, must needs pass
through various stages."
- 17 -
a) This slogan is now used for the preparation -
moral and material - of the wide masses of the people
for & protracted and difficult war.
Now propaganda confesses to the winter failures
in Russia and Africa.
b) The imperative orders for economy in every walk
of life explain the gradual limitation of the produc-
tion of various articles. The use of arguments about
the superiority of National-Socialist economies over
the capitalist system is aimed at calming public
opinion, which realises the economic potential of the
Anglo-Saxon countries, and which is irritated by the
ceaseless limitations of consumption.
At the same time the people are told that in
spite of her possibilities, the UKRAINE cannot assure
bread supplies for Germany.
The thesis is also being developed about the
pre-historical "Germanness" of the whole of eastern
Europe, for which the Germans alone can ever secure
an economic and cultural development.
Under this group of arguments comes the acute
problem of labour. Inhabitants of towns are en-
couraged forcibly to spend their leaves in the
country on land work. School children have all been
regimented for it, the teaching programmes being
adapted to this end.
Under this head the MITTEILUNGEN appeals to the
soldiers to regard each Soviet prisoner of war as a
valuable labourer, necessary for victory, and not
only as an enemy who will no longer fight.
6. Several new subjects have made their appearance:
a) The identity of aims of Germany and Japan and
the importance of the part played by Japan in this
war - the possibility of a Russo-Japanese conflict.
b) The rebellion of the conquered nations, mentioned
by GOEBBELS in the FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG and by the
- 18 -
main press organs. They all agree that it is just
an invention of enemy propaganda, impossible to put
into practice, and quite contrary to the earnest
wishes of the peoples concerned. At the same time they
threaten reprisals.
This subject was brought up at the same time as
V. GAYDA revealed the position of Italians in JUGO-
SLAVIA.
a) Propaganda and its significance. The press has
betrayed the present sensitivity of the German people
to foreign influences and all negative moods in Ger-
many and the distrust of German propaganda are, as a
matter of fact, ascribed to these foreign influences.
The FRANKFURTER zeitung started the campaign
of depreciating British propaganda and ridiculing
Soviet propaganda by answering its arguments; this
policy has now been adopted by the MITTEILUNGEN.
It is perhaps particularly noticeable in the
letter publication, that five articles out of 11
issues were devoted to this problem as well as the
whole of No. 193. The official German thesis has
again been resussitated that the defeat in 1918 was
the result of extremely brilliant and efficient
Allied propaganda and not of a military defeat.
PSF:Biddle folder
STANDARD FORM No. 14A
1-42
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
FROM
MARCH 10, 1926
The White House
Mashington
TELEGRAM
OCTOBER 28 1942
OFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES
CABLEGRAM
...
BIDDLE
LONDON
PLEASE TELL GENERAL SIKORSKI I SHALL BE DELIGHTED TO SEE HIM
BETWEEN NOVEMBER THIRTIETH AND ECEMBER TENTH
ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 29, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
I am enclosing herewith
a letter from Ambassador Biddle
for your information I wired
Biddle last night telling him that
I should be delighted to see
General Sikorski between November
thirtieth and December tenth.
Please return Biddle's letter
when you have finished with it.
F. D. R.
Enclosure
Let to the President 10/12/42 from Amb.
Biddle re the proposed visit of Gen.
Sikorski possibly late in November.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 29, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
I am enclosing herewith
a letter from Ambassador Biodle
for your information. I wired
Biddle last night telling him that
I should be delighted to see
General Sikorski between November
thirtieth and December tenth.
Please return Biddle's letter
when you have finished with it.
F. D. R.
Enclosure
Thanks
CAK
Biddle folder 1.42
40 Berkeley Square,
LONDON, October 12, 1942.
My dear Mr. President:
I was happy to receive your letter of September 23,
which arrived shortly after my receipt of the State
Department's cable No. 26, 7 pm., concerning General
Sikorski's proposed visit to the United States. I
promptly conveyed your message to him. He was very
much touched by your kind expression of appreciation of
the friendly spirit which had prompted his proposal.
He wanted me to assure you, in his behalf, that he
fully understood the reasons for your desire that he
postpone his visit.
He now wondered, whether you might find it con-
venient to receive him at some date in late November.
He earnestly hoped so, for he would be ready by that
time to submit to you, as he likewise intended to
submit to Mr. Churchill, a plan of attack on the Axis
forces.
He had just had a message from Ambassador Ciechanowski,
indicating that your time would be completely taken up
during the month of December; that you had therefore
kindly intimated you would be prepared to see him at
some date between January 5th and 30th.
The January suggestion, the General said, unfor-
tunately conflicted with his scheduled visit to his
forces in the Middle East. It was therefore, for this
reason, that he had asked me to find out whether a
date in late November would be convenient to you.
As
The President
The White House.
- 2 -
As regards his "plan of attack", he told me that,
in collaboration with his General Staff, he had recently
been engaged in preparing a plan for attacking the Axis
forces in the early part of next year. He had given
study to this question, and in order to accelerate the
drawing up of the plan, he had appointed his Corps
Commander, General Kukiel, to the post of Minister for
War, hitherto occupied by himself. He said that, general ly
speaking, the plan envisaged (a) action against the western
part of the Continent from Britain; synchronized with
(b) action against southern coasts of the Continent from
North Africa; and with (c) action from the Middle East.
The plan envisaged, moreover, action through the Balkans,
counting with the active support of Turkey. He was most
anxious to submit his plan to you and to Mr. Churchill
as soon as he and his collaborators would have completed
it.
For your further information, I have discreetly
ascertained that, in his next meeting with you, the
General hopes to discuss the following points:
1. The general trend of the conduct of the war
(besides submitting to you his plan of campaign).
2. Polish post-war problems bearing on frontiers,
claims, et cetera.
3. The Polish-Czechoslovak Federation.
4. Polish-Russian relations.
With warmest regards and every good wish, I am
Yours faithfully,
Tony Biddle r
7543
September 23, 1942
Ny dear Tony:
Thank you very much for your kind letter of
September second relative to the invitation ex-
tended by Dr. Swietlick to General Sikorski to
speak at a Polish-American mass meeting to be
held at Soldiers' Field, Chicago, on October six-
X
teenth.
I an deeply appreciative of the generous
offer made by General Sikorski and especially of
the fine spirit prompting it. We do have, how-
ever, such overwhelming support of the people in
the prosecution of the war that I do not deem it
necessary at this time to take advantage of
General Sikorski's highly valued offer of cooper-
ation.
It is with the deepest regret that X thus
venture to suggest the postponement of General
Sikorski's visit but I an sure that you will
understand the situation.
#
with every good wish, I an
Very sincerely yours,
(Sgd)FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The Honorable
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jre,
1667
American Embassy,
XPP7554
London.
xpp778
X463-A
September 25, 1942
Respectfully referred to the Secretary
of State.
M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President
Letter to the President-9-19-42
From: Cordell Hull
cap
Enclosing a draft to the President to sign to
Hon. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., American Embassy, London.
which he signed.
Department of State
BUREAU
Eu
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted 9/18/42
ADDRESSED TO
The President
" " . - - -
*
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATE 45 TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Dolls
WASHINGTON
September 19. 1942
My dear Mr. President:
There 1s attached a draft reply to Ambassador Biddle's
letter of September 2. If you should approve the draft
and have it returned to us we shall see that the letter is
dispatched to Ambassador Biddle, and a summary of the
letter will be sent by cable advising him that the letter
18 en route.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosures:
1. To Ambassador Biddle.
2. From Ambassador Biddle,
September 2, 1942.
The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
@
September 12, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE: x20
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.
F.D.R.
Letter from Hon. Tony Biddle, Jr., Embassy of
the U.S.A., 40 Berkeley Square, London, 9/2/42,
to the President, in re talks with General
Sikorski concerning his earnest hope that the
President might indicate his approval of his
accepting an invitation from Dr. Swietlick,
Dean of the LawSchool of Marquette University, to
address & Mass Meeting of Polish-Americans
at Soldiers Field, Chicago, on October 16.
Mr. Biddle asks that if the President sees his
way clear towards indicating in some way, that he
would welcome General Sikorski's vist to the U.S.,
he notify Mr. Biddle to this effect.
40 Berkeley Square,
LONDON, September 2,1942.
My dear Mr. President:
I have just had one of a series of lengthy talks
with General Sikorski concerning his earnest hope that
you might indicate your approval of his accepting an
invitation from Dr. Swietlick, Dean of the Law School
of Marquette University, to address a Mass Meeting of
about 200,000 Polish-Americans at Soldiers Field,
Chicago, on October 16. He considers that this would
X
offer an excellent occasion to rally the enthusiastic
support of American citizens of Polish extraction and
origin, behind your "banner" in the coming elections.
He said, moreover, that if this idea met with your
approval, he would like to propose, for your further
approval, his making five other speeches in the key
Polish-American centers -- perhaps Milwaukee, Buffalo,
Scranton, and two other places to be named. He has
agreed to my preliminary suggestion, subject of course
to your approval, that in constructing his proposed
speeches, he direct the major portion thereof along
lines of informing his audiences concerning the general
trend of events, and of the role of the Polish Forces
in connection therewith; that having thus engaged his
listeners' interest, he end up with focussing their
attention upon you, and all that you stand for, as
champion of the cause against the forces of aggression;
as the great leader of the cause of freedom, and the
cause of the common man. This, I emphasized, would
serve to bring about the desired results, with the
minimum of provocation of suspicion by the opposition,
that he was interfering in internal politics.
He
The President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
He tells me that in discussing with Mr. Churchill
the possibility of his going to the United States for
this purpose, Mr. Churchill's preliminary reaction was
highly enthusiastic. Mr. Churchill too, had cautioned
him to guard against giving any impression of delving
in internal politics.
In the event that you approve of General Sikorski's
coming over, I wonder whether you might see your way
clear towards indicating in some way, that you would
welcome his visit to the United States. He is, as I
have previously told you, a sincere admirer of yours;
moreover, as he is highly sensitive, he would not be
likely to make any plans to go, unless he had some
encouraging word from you. I shall await word from
you, before saying anything further to the General
regarding this matter.
With my warmest regards and my every good wish,
I am
Yours faithfully
Tomy Biddee
Biddle folder
1-42
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 30, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES. .
F. D. R.
Letter from Ambassador Biddle
to the President, dated October 1,
1942, enclosing memorandum re
Argentine Political Developments.
Tony Biddle folder
the THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 30, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I am returning to you herewith Tony Biddle's
letter to you of October 1, with which he enclosed a
memorandum which he had obtained with regard to cer-
tain features of the present political situation in
Argentina. I have read this with much interest and,
in accordance with your request, I am returning it
for your files.
Believe me
A Raithfully yours,
Alls
off
Enc.
The President,
The White House.
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.
October 1, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I beg to refer to my letter of August 17,
and enclosed memorandum containing secret information
regarding political developments in the Argentine, as
imparted to me by a usually reliable allied govern-
mental source here.
1/
In connection therewith, I am attaching, here-
to, a copy of a confidential memorandum, containing
further information on the same subject and which I
just received from the same aforementioned sources.
With warmest regards and every good wish,
I am
Yours faithfully,
Tomy Binsee Biddle
The President,
The White House,
Washington
Enclosure
1/ as stated
AJDBJR:TH
MEMORANDUM RE ARGENTINE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
(Supplementing information contained in my letter
August 17, 1942.)
In Argentine the leadership of the totalitarian
movement has been taken over at present by Dr. Frasco
who remains in closest relations with President
Castillo. Lately, in the Argentine totalitarian circles,
great nervousness has been noticed, which was caused,
first of all, by the steadily proceeding isolation of
that country.
On the 26th of August at Dr. Fresco's, in Moron, a
meeting took place in order to define the policy of
the totalitarian movement in connection with the existing
situation. At the meeting Dr, Fresco reported on the
situation in Europe and on the totalitarian movement
in South America. He stated that, according to his
information from Berlin, a few weeks after the expected
occupation of Stalingrad, a conference will be called
in Berlin, in order to establish the new order in
Europe. The totalitarian movements in America, however,
must not expect any financial help from Berlin.
With regard to the internal situation in Argentina,
Dr. Fresco stated that plans, aiming at winning over
Paraguay have failed, which was proved on the occasion
of General Tomazzis's (Peraguayan Minister of War)
visit in Asuncion. Also, the situation in Chile is
unfavourable for the Argentinian nationalism. In
conchsion, the meeting has decided to try to create a
secret fund in the Argentinian Ministry of War, for
the/
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
-2-
the purpose of financing revolutionary movements in
nei hbouring countries. With regard to Bolivia, it
has been decided to force the entry into the Cabinet
by means of an agreement with the National Government,
in order to take up the role of the Fifth Column
inside the Government. As to Paraguay, it was decided
to try to find ways for the recapture or the lost ground.
Dr. Fresco is to present the decisions of the
conference to the President of the Republic.
In connection with the existing situation in the
Argentine military circles, two groups have been formed:
one which eims at a speedy and radical solution; the
second is rather desirous of awaiting the developments
in Europe.
October 30, 1942
My dear Mr. President:
I am returning to you herewith Tony Biddle's
letter to you of October 1, with which he enclosed a
memorandum which he had obtained with regard to cer-
tain features of the present political situation in
Argentina. I have read this with much interest and,
in accordance with your request, I am returning it
for your files.
Believe me
Faithfully yours,
SUMNER WELLES
Enc.
The President,
The White House.
PSF: Biddle folder 1-42
fund
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W.,1.
November 4,1942.
My dear Mr. President:
I beg to refer to the Department's Cable
Czechoslovak Series No. 2 of October 24, 1942 (2 p.m.)
wherein I was instructed to inform the Czechoslovak
Government that you intended to address Dr. Benes
as the President of the Czechoslovak Republic in a
message on the occasion of Czechoslovakia's National
Day, October 28; that we would henceforth drop the
term "Provisional" when referring to the Czechoslovak
Government; that we found no necessity for exchanging
writings in connection with this matter or for revising
my credentials accordingly.
Immediately upon receipt of this cable I called
upon Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Jan
Masaryk, Dr. Benes being absent from town. When I
imparted the substance of your message he leapt into
the air like a boy, embraced me warmly and, with tears
in his eyes, stated with genuine earnestness that your
action had touched him very deeply; that it was for
him, and would be for Dr. Benes and their fellow country-
men a source of real gratification. He wanted me to
send you an expression of his warmest thanks.
Subsequently, on Czechoslovakia's National Day,
when Dr. Benes received all the Chiefs of Missions
accredited to his Government, he made it a point to
come across the room to shake my hand warmly and to
ask
The President,
The White House,
Washington.
- 2 -
ask me to convey to you an expression of his deep
gratitude. As he went on to tell me how profoundly
touched he and his associates were and how much this
would mean to his countrymen in Czechoslovkia, I
could discern that he was sincerely moved. As for-
merly in the case of Minister Masaryk Dr. Benes did
not attempt to conceal his tears. I never before
saw him show so much emotion. I only regret that
you yourself could not have witnessed how much your
message meant to these two men and their associates.
With my warmest regards and every good wish, I am
Yours faithfully
Tomy Touy Bidder Bidder
be
PSF:
perso 1-42
are
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NAVAL PASSED grow CENSOR BY
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1942
The The White President NAVY M. House -
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Washington D.C.
a.g. 9.J.D.,Biddle D. 1-43 Biddle
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
December 3, 1942
CONF IDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE Secretary of State
THE Under Secretary of State
For your information. Please
return for my files.
F. D. R.
Enclosure
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
am
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 3, 1942
CONF IDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE Secretary of State
THE Under Secretary of State
For your information. Please
return for my files.
F. D. R.
Enclosure
Let to the President from Amb.
A. J. Drexel Biddle, London, England
11/23/42 re the reactions to the
North Africa offensive and the
assumption of authority of Admiral
Darlan, etc.
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date
FEB 4 1972
My dear Uer President:-
This has been probably Mr most strumous
week I have experienced since assuming my
dutise hers - This from the standpoint of having to
"clients". nassure a rather panicky, buildend group of
Following wruts in north Africa, their
Emotions ran from our Extresse to another: from
Exaltation over The successful landings of our
expeditionary foress - to approximion, anxisty
over Mr short. term bearing and the long-Hrin
implications of admiral Darlan's assumption of
authority. In view of the high pitch of their
initial ruthusiasm, Their reaction to the latkr
went was all the mon. acute.
I did my utmost to allay Min apportencion
by pointing out That we with witnessing a phase
wherein militery considerations were bound
to be parament that Mr prine aim of our
Military authorities was to secure occupation
speed, and with the minimum of bloodshed
of the trintories emerrued with the Maximum
This was as I personally saw the picture, and
endravond to bring my clients" to SEE it. 2
The light in which 2, accordingly concentionaly
fully realized monover, that Merrs were imported
considerations of farreaching braving which
could not be made clear at that time.
that the arrangreent with adviral Darlan was
then cause your hourmber 17th declaration
only a kuporary Expedient I lost no time in
Empliasinging The substance of your shatement, and
in driving home the importance ofits braving.
2.
I believe that them efforts succreded to the point
whereat Even sour of the "clients" fret nassured.
However, in all of them, including the latter category
than has bren Engrudered a since of buighring
apprehausion (in ann cases it is won appoint than in other).
(a) as to the next steps in north africa;
(b) as to The effect of admiral Warlaws present
role upon Merin respective frelow.countrymen
under Civis occupation- and wen when so, as
to what their maction would G, should the next skps
prove (c) a cause the for alarm rather Than for nassurance;
"Wilitary Expediency". unight be applied in the case
as to possibility that the saver technique of
of their own respective countries.
2 furthermors, gained an insight to Swedish
reaction in the course of a very reent three-cornend
talk between the Swedish Minister to Britain,
the norwrgian Minister for Forsign liffairs and
enpelf. The Surdish Univer Emplissing that
win he a member of any of ther allied Sourants
her, he would be decidedly apprhensive on The
above scors (subsrations (c)) On this, as on like
occassions I did my utmost, of course, to dispell
his and Winster Lie's apprehensions
In addition, I have Encountend one other
the Russian artitude towards the Darlan positor
compart which, to my wind, calls for watching:
I had anderstand that my Russian vis-a-vis has alorady
and whether on not this is a flash Au-pain,
some unfavorable things to say on this score,
or the out-croppinings of serious objection remains
to be seen. I Que awars, however, of the strugth
of the Communist organization in Continental
Frauce, as described in the recent cleret port
from experienced agreets of the Polish undergraund
organization in France (see Mis asport of October 30,",
and under title of Coumunist activity", page 12,
aftached to my despatch No. 228, war the Polish
Lout., november 6,1942) that
Mr observations of M. Barrean, chief of the
Fighting Frush diplomatic Mission to Russia,
open the activities of certain Communist centres
on Ans European Continut, an deserving of
absution. (my page 2, paragraph 2 to and ofdropatch
no 30, wasthe yugoslav Sout, out 15,1942)
3. 2 word, Iarrean believes There centres an
deliberately a being Kept shoked up in order to
arror as instruments of pressure and/or
infiltration for when and as required He states,
morrover, That he is convinced that lusseaw
main tains close contact with there crutks
in general, and with the organisation in France
in particular.
In considering the various aspects of the
new Farm in developments, I believe The
moment way arrive when may serve you
and Mr grueral Effort to smaker advantage
with the Brucy in the firld. I do not think
Mis would be unwelcowe to my "clients",
Since role they have already area the important
Mr Unilitory authorities have been
playing in recent soents. Microor, as
regards Me recilitary authorities, my recent
association with That group has leads we
addition. to believe 2 would not be an unwelcome
Microus I sincerely believe 2 have the
confidence of my "clients". Therefore, when,
in Mr future situations arise, which for
strategic it reasons, cannot be applained
who fully undershood Mirin points of virw
might br nassuring to them, if someone
and problems was on the spot.
I have written you the foregoves in the
Monght that you wight wish to know the
"Clients" machions, as were as those of other factors
mentioned - also to kee you what has been
passing through my own mind in connection
with developments in-the-making
with my warrest Kyards and my
Every good wish I am
faithfully,
november 23-1942.
TouyBiddle
PSF: agu Biddle folder 1-42
STANDARD FORM No. 14A
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
FROM
MARCH 10, 1926
The White House
Mashington
TELEGRAM
$17/28/42
OFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES
...
16-6481
VIA STATE DEPARTMENT
CABLEGRAM
AMBASSADOR BIDDLE
LONDON
Can you give me any information about plans of Mr. Smith
and Colonel Brown? Many thanks to you and Margaret for your
telegram. Best of New Years to you both
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
DEC 24 10 44 AM 1942
TELEGRAM
file
The White House
Mashington
W5PO RA. 19-
NY. LONDON, DECEMBER 23,1942
LC. PRESIDENT AND MRS. ROOSEVELT,
WASHINGTON.
HEARTIEST CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR GREETINGS.
MARGARET AND TONY BIDDLE.
with
a.g.D. Bidder folan
annary 54
Dear mr. President-
The enclosed
eartoon came put
Q short time ago
and 2 thought it
might amuse
403- Trues and I are
well and continue
busy - Tray Wilt
his "seven children
and I with my
Red Cross Club jos
army nurses -
I am operating
8 houses Dr Dre
street where the
nurses the americas
Ferry Pilors and
Red bross women
Per sonnel stay - -
We also had the
first waac officers
there - They were
a very fine sroup
2 women: I was
greatly impressed
or their. after
the was with all
my present
feel that I will
experien D.
be qualifiedut
to run
hotel Club B a "mght
2 am so prond of
the picture you
sent us. If is
sitting on my
desk- - I won't
even share it
with Tony-
My love to 4R-
as always,
Margarers radle
U. S.
attention
JAN
6
Free
Mrs. - Eben
1943
NAVY
The President
OK, For
TRANSMISSION
By
POUGH
to
The Washington White House
D.C.
U.S. NAVAL ATTACHE'S OFFICE,
AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON, ENGLAND,
TE.WALKER
RUNNING AWAY WITH SANTA SCHICKELGRUBER.
(465) him Signed original of the letter stal 8 hm the Seay. State
a. Biddle
follow
January 9, 1943
Dear Tony:
I refer to your letter of December 4, 1942
concerning King Zog's desire to draw against his
accounts in this country. I have made inquiries and
find that while King Zog has an account with the
Guaranty Trust Company of some $242,000, the Cen-
tral Hanover Bank and Trust Company could find no
record of an account with him. I see no objection
to permitting King Zog access to his account in this
country although for various reasons I believe that
the amounts withdrawn at any one time should be
limited. Consequently, I suggest that you advise
him to request the Guaranty Trust Company of New York
to make application to the Treasury Department for
the necessary license to permit withdrawals from
the account. You should inform King Zog that it
will not be possible to release more than $30,000
semi-annually from the account and his instructions
to the bank should embrace these limitations.
With best wishes for the New Year, I am
Sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The Honorable
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
Care of American Embassy,
London.
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W.,1.
December 4,1942.
My dear Mr. President:
In the course of recent confidential conversation
with the King and Queen of Albania, they expressed their
sense of concern over their inability to draw on funds
in the name of "His Majesty Zogou I, Hotel Ritz, London,
W.1. England". The King said that his Diplomatic and
Information Services were entirely dependent upon his
own private funds; that he was willing to continue de-
fraying all expenses in connection therewith until his
country had regained its independence. As a matter of
fact, he added, his private funds were the only means in
signt for carrying on the work. He, therefore, asked
me whether I might be able to ascertain discreetly,
whether it was possible to make arrangements whereby he
might draw on his funds in New York to the extent of
covering the aforementioned expenses. He most earnest-
ly hoped that some formula might be found.
While I did not mention to him that I intended
to address you personally in the matter, I thought it
advisable to take it up directly with you, and to
quietly seek your reaction. For your information, the
King has $242,288.40 to his account as of July 30,1942
at the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, as well as
$82,408.58 at the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company,
New York.
With warmest regards and every good wish, I am
Yours faithfully, Touy Bidder.ru
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
,
Department of State
BUREAU
}
Eu
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted 1-6-43
ADDRESSED TO
The President
% us a. - ------- -
1-2003
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 8. 1943
My dear Mr. President:
With reference to your confidential memorandum
of December 19, 1942 enclosing a letter from Ambassador
Biddle. I am submitting a draft reply for your signa-
ture if you approve.
While I perceive no objection to granting King
Zog access to his funds in this country, I consider
it the wiser course, since we cannot be assured of the
purpose for which the funds will be used, to limit the
amounts of withdrawals. The question of application
for a license and related matters have been discussed
with the Treasury Department which has agreed to give
favorable consideration to an application for the re-
lease of a portion of these funds when it receives a
request in this sense from the Guaranty Trust Company
of New York.
You will remember that King Carol has been
permitted
The President,
The White House.
-2-
permitted to draw upon his accounts in this country
with certain limitations as to amounts and periods.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosures:
1. From Mr. Biddle,
returned.
2. Draft reply.
a.) a.g.N N Biddle folder
1-48
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 19, 1942
CONTH
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
For personal and informal
reply by me to Tony Biddle.
F.D.R.
Enclosure
Let to the P. 12/4/42 from Tony Biddle
40 Berkeley Square, London, W., 1.
re financial arrangements for King and
Queen of Albania,
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
fulsnal.
mel.
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W.,1.
January 21,1943.
My dear Mr. President:
Immediately upon receipt of your letter
of January 9, 1943, I had a meeting with King
Zog. Following my disclosure of the substance
of your letter, the King asked me to write you
that he was profoundly touched by your kindness
in this matter. He realized, he said, that you
had given the matter your personal attention, and
he was deeply grateful for this further proof of
your "bigness", and your human understanding.
He would follow your suggestion and would accord-
ingly request the Guaranty Trust Company of New
York to make application to the Treasury Depart-
ment for the necessary licence to permit with-
drawals from this account. Moreover, he assured
me that his instructions on this score would em-
brace the limitations of semi-annual withdrawals
of $30,000 from the account.
He furthermore explained that as regards
his former account at the Central Hanover Bank and
Trust Company, this dollar account, since he hadfirst
discussed the matter with me, had been exchanged
for a sterling account through arrangements with
the British Government.
I am aware that your kindness in this mat-
ter is for the King a source of genuine gratification.
With warmest regards and my every good wish,
I am
Yours Touy Biddes faithfully,
The President,
The White House,
Washington,D.C.
a.g.w. Biddle folder
COPY
1-48
EMBASSY OF THE
UNIT ED STATES OF AMERICA
1
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W.I.
10th March, 1943.
My dear Joe:
Both Margaret and I are delighted to receive your very
thoughtful and newsy letter which brought us well up-to-date both with
the activities in the political arena at home, and with the activities
of the Guffey family. I want you to know, moreover, that both of us
deeply appreciate your confidence and friendship for us, as indicated
by your reference to our possible role in the future political picture
of our State. This, coming from you, really touches us a great deal
and is a source of encouragement and gratification to us.
Now as concerns the bearing of such a move on our political
picture at home, both Margaret and I have carefully considered this
aspect - and we both agree that the situation boils down approximately
as follows:
We took up this job in the spirit of helping, not only
these governments, but also the peoples in their respective Occupied
Countries, to regain their self-respect, to continue the struggle to
3
regain independence. This is known not only by these governments here
but also by the unfortunates in the Occupied territories. I believe,
furthermore, that the American citizens of the extraction or origin of
these countries are well aware of what we have personally felt and
represented in behalf of our country. The war in Europe has now
reached a stage whereat drastic decisions will soon have to be made
as to the immediate treatment not only of these Allied Governments
established here, but also of their respective countries. The decisions
in all cases may or may not be to the liking of the Nationals concerned.
The chances are that in some cases decisions will be taken that will
be decidedly unfavorable in the eyes of some, which may in turn produce
unhappy repercussions among some of the descendant groups at home.
This may prove to be the case especially as regards the Slavic groups.
Therefore, facing the situation and its possible turn, I believe that
if I were to step out of the picture at this point up to which I have
established a record of doing my all in the interests of each Government
and country concerned - I would be of greater political value to our
party eventually, than if I were to remain, and possibly become the
agency of "bad news" for those concerned. which would only serve
to undo in their minds the record thus far maintained. In other words,
taking a long range view, I believe it would be politically astute thus
to keep our record clear and to hold us up the sleeve for the future.
(Sheet Two)
Margaret shares my belief that you will understand this
reasoning and will agree with our point of view in the matter.
The purpose of this letter is to let you know our inner
and every thought, and to ask you to please let us know your own
reaction. If I do not hear in the near future from the President,
I may cable you to ask you to be good enough to talk to him about it.
Margaret has written recently to Pauletta giving her our
personal news over here. She joins me in sending you and the family
our affectionate regards.
Sincerely yours - your friend -
TONY BIDDLE (SIGNED)
COPY
March 9, 1943
Dear Tony and Margaret,
Enclosed please find copy of & speech I delivered on the floor
of the Senate last Friday. I hope that both Margaret and yourself will ap-
prove.
I delivered this speech in view of the fact that the Republi-
cans, ever since this session opened, have been playing politics of the mean-
est and smallest way, and I thought it was timo to say something.
I wouldn't be surprised at all if I saw both Margaret and
yourself in this country about the time the robins nest and the bluebirds
sing.
Forry Laucks' farms, including 1,085 acres, the house with
which you are familiar, the barn with all the livestock, amounting to ap-
proximately 400 head of Holstein-Friesian and Jersey cattle, and his mag-
nificent herd of Duroc Jersey hogs with the necessary building, and his
plant for raising Holland White turkeys. The Chase National Bank Execu-
tors are asking $265,000. for the property. I believe it can be bought for
$40,000. or $50,000. less, and now that it is run as a farm and not as a
fad, I am glad to say it is in the black.
On the floor of the Senate recently I stated that Pennsyl-
vania would go Democratic in 1944 and after that I would have a Democratic
colleague. When I said that I had only one man in mind.
With kindest personal regards to Margaret and yourself, and
with the hope of seeing you both soon,
Believe me to be
Very sincerely yours,
Honorable and Mrs. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle
American Embassy
London, England
Enclosure
Via Diplomatic Pouch
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
JUN 1 6 1943
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MR. WELLES
JUN 17 1943
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
E'C'S
To read and return
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
and
NOTED COMIC 20 XHL
JUN 17 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR
STATE 10 SECHETARY
June 16, 1943
WASHINGTON
#
THE WHITE HOUSE
\
MAYE '0' ,6.0
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W. 1.
June 2, 1943.
My dear Mr. President:
In the belief that it may be of interest and
possibly helpful in connection with problems
Arising from the suspension of Polish-Russian
relations, I beg to mention the following thoughts
which have occurred to me, and which might
possibly correspond to General Sikorski's views.
In the first place, it now seems clear that
the three main points upon which Moscow would
insist as conditions for a resumption of relations
are: 1/ changes in the composition of the Polish
Government; 2/ suppression of part, and a friendly
attitude of the remaining section of the Polish
press; 3/ tranquilization of the anti-Soviet
attitude of the Polish armed forces both here and
in the Middle East.
As regards the first condition, it might, in
my opinion, be possible for Sikorski to meet this
without impairing the dignity and prestige of the
Polish position* provided (a) he carried it out by
stages over an extended period, say 6 to 8 weeks,
and (b) the changes were effected on the pretext
both of differences in matters of internal policy,
and of the General's belief that a "change of
guard" is from time to time a wholesome move.**
Furthermore/
* "change of guard" is an expression conceived and
used by the late Marshal Pilsudaki and subsequently
used by other Polish leaders, to explain to the
people changes they were making in the composition
of their respective Governments.
** In further regard to the question of a change in
the composition of the Polish Government, I have long
felt that Sikorski would do well to replace at least
several of his Cabinet Ministers. I have in mind
particularly Minister for Information Kot, and
Minister without Portfolio, in charge of the Depart-
ment of Post-War Planning, Marian Seyda. For your
1/
further information, the attached memorandum contains
additional details on this score.
-2-
Furthermore, by proceeding thus Sikorski would
be the less likely to appear to be acting under
direct pressure from Moscow.
It seems to me, moreover, that provided this
procedure were conducted quietly, with a minimum of
publicity, and provided the Russians were sincerely
willing to accept the fulfilment of the foregoing,
among other conditions, as a basis for the renewal
of relations, the way might thus possibly have been
cleared for a resumption, perhaps by late Summer -
early Fall.
In talks with General Sikorski, previous to his
very recent departure for the Middle East, where he
expects to remain about six weeks, I gained the
impression that he was inclined to keep an open mind
in the matter. I therefore believe that if he could
be brought to feel reasonably sure of obtaining
effective results from the application of a formula
somewhat along the above suggested lines, he might
give it his favorable consideration.
As regards the Russian conditions for a resumption
of relations, both Russian Ambassadors Maisky and
Bogomolov, in their conversations respectively with
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk and with me,
concurred in their insistence upon the reconstruction
of the Polish Government. In comparing their state-
ments on this aspect, however, I note a difference
in detail. Bogomolov insisted upon a "replacement of
the Sikorski Government" by one which would be
friendly and more realistic towards the USSR; Maisky
told Masaryk he considered that his Government might
find its way clear to working with Sikorski and
Raczynski; that they were more realistic than other
members of the Polish Government. I am inclined to
feel that Maisky's statement corresponds more than
Bogomolov's with the terms upon which Moscow might
be willing to settle. In appraising the difference
between the statements of the two Ambassadors, I am
inclined to asoribe Bogomolov's more drastic tone
partly to the quarrelsome relations which he has
personally experienced with the Poles over recent
months.
As regards the Polish press, the two Ambassadors
were in effect alike in insisting upon its suppression
except for one official organ.
As regards the question of tranquilizing the
openly anti-Soviet attitude of the Polish armed forces,
here again the Ambassadors differed, for, I believe,
the same reasons as above cited. Maisky said there
would/
-3-
would have to be a tranquilization of the anti-Soviet
attitude among the Polish armed forces both here and
in the Middle East, and the elimination of the
sources of inspiration of this attitude, in view of
the long-range as well as of the immediate bearing
thereof on Polish-Russian relations. Bogomolov,
for his part, said that the Polish military authorities
would have to rid the army of the "militantly anti-
Soviet, Pilsudski-ist officers" from the forces both
here and in the Middle East.
As regards the frontier question, Maisky said
this might best be left for discussion later on, or
even after the war. Bogomolov said this was a closed
question as far as those parts of Soviet White
Russia and Soviet Ukraine which had formed part of
pre-war Poland, were concerned.
With warmest regards and my every good wish,
Faithfully yours,
Tomy Biddle
The President,
The White House,
Washington.
Enclosure:
1/ as stated.
DIRIVIDI
CONFIDENTIAL.
MEMORANDUM
Subject: Background, 1/ Professor Kot,
Polish Minister of Information;
2/ Minister in charge of Post-
War Planning, Marian Seyda; and
3/ Professor Grabski, President
of the Polish National Council.
1/ The present Minister of Information, Professor
Kot, following his replacement as Ambassador to Moscow,
served as Minister of State in Iran, before returning
to London to take up his present post in the Cabinet.
Previous to his appointment to Russia he had served
in Sikorski's Cabinet in France, and subsequently here
following France's capitulation.
Kot is a pronounced egoist, ambitious in the
extreme. His bitterness, which finds its roots (a)
in his deep hatred of the late Marshal Pilsudski during
the latter's lifetime, and now of his "ghost"; and
(b) in his failure to achieve political distinction
during the ten years leading up to the outbreak of war
in Poland; leads him to avenge his feelings on all who
had anything to do directly or indirectly with the
Pilsudski regime, whether it was in military or
political circles. From the day he first joined
Sikorski's cabinet in France, his activities proved
costly to the latter in terms of internal politios.*
At that time Kot prevailed upon Sikorski to permit him
to go forward with a purge of all officers and N.C.O's,
and/
*At about the same time, in the course of the last war,
that the late Marshal Pilsudski was forming his secret
organization, which laid the groundwork for Poland's
liberation, there was being formed another secret Polish
group in Cracow, but under the surveillance and even, it
was suspected by other sections of Poland, the secret
inspiration and influence of the Austrians. In glancing
over the list of this group, Pilsudski said he would like
to have Sikorski join his organization; he was a good
patriot and a good artillery man. Word came back that
Sikorski was on his way, but what about Professor Kot?
(then a Professor of History at Cracow University). In
response, Pilsudski sent back word that Professor Kot
had better stick to teaching history. This enangered
Kot, and he has, ever since, been embittered against
the name and even memory of Pilsudski. Unfortunately,
in the old days together in Cracow, Sikorski developed
a complex about Kot. It seems that at the outset of
their association, he came to regard Kot in the light
of his intellectual superior. Conscious of this
influence, Kot has never failed to take advantage of it
at moments when he requires Sikorski's support.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 4 1972
By J. Schauble Date,
-2-
and even men in the private ranks who had been
identified directly or indirectly with Pilsudski. As
regards the officers, he arranged to have them sent
to an isolation camp in southern France. He thereupon
made two lists, a "black" and a "grey". Those on the
black list were forbidden to join any of the Polish
units either at the front or in the back areas. Those on
the grey list, few in number, were put under
surveillance for many months at the camp, and in some
cases were eventually allowed to rejoin their
respective units. The aforementioned category of
N.C.O's were reduced to the rank of private, and the
aforementioned category of privates were expelled
from the army. While the officers' pay was maintained
in full, the privates thus expelled were given no
means of support directly or indirectly by the Polish
Government. At the same time Kot let it be known
throughout Polish political and military circles in
France that the Government would not countenance even
the mention of Pilsudski's name. Later, when the
Polish forces came to Britain, the above-cited officers
from the isolation camp in France were likewise treated
in Scotland; they were sent to an "isolation area" on
the Island of Bute.#
Sikorski's acquiescence to Kot's persistence in
carrying forward both the purge of the officers and
men and the tabooing of reference to the late Marshal
has proved costly to the General's personal popularity
among the armed forces, as well as certain sections of
Polish political circles. For aside from the older
men who had formerly served with Pilsudski, and who
liked and admired him, the younger men have been
brought up since childhood to revere Pilsudald's name.
Both categories have deeply resented the attitude thus
apparently adopted by the Government as a whole.
Another political move which Kot conceived and
urged upon Sikorski, was the formation in France of a
refugee Parliament, the present Polish National Council.
No sooner had this body been formed than Kot, together
with several of his close associates, deliberately
inspired it to proceed with the sentencing to death of
the former regime. It was only through the most
energetic and discreet efforts on part of the British
Ambassador, Sir William Howard Kennard, and myself, with
the/
# a large proportion of these officers are graduates of
the Ecole de Guerre in Poland, and, in addition, a number
of them received courses at the Ecole de Guerre in France.
All of them are veterans of the 1939 war in Poland, and
many of them, in addition, are veterans of the Great War.
-3-
the cooperation of the French Government, that instruc-
tions were eventually given the National Council to drop
the matter. In brief, the Polish National Council may,
to my mind, be characterized mainly as a debating
society. Moreover, the utterances of many of its
members manifest more of a "demagogic" tendency than of
an understanding of democracy. Like Kot, many of the
members are embittered by the fact that they did not
succeed during the ten years or more, leading up to the
outbreak of this war, in playing a more important role
in their country. It may be recalled that in previous
writings from Poland, I pointed out that while there
was much opposition throughout the country to the
former regime, no one appeared on the political horizon
sufficiently strong to consolidate and lead that
opposition against the regime.
In brief, Kot has no particular liking either for
the United States or for Britain; he has a deep
distrust and hatred of Russia, and regards the war 8.8
the business mainly of us three from now on, permitting
him to go on playing his own "game of political marbles".
His actions are motivated mainly by personal ambitions, and
he works, in my opinion, with his eye, so-to-speak,
"around the corner", dreaming of the day when, perhaps,
he may become the leading political figure in his own
country. In this connection, I have been advised by
our Liaison Officer with the Polish forces in the
Middle East, that Kot, while he was in Iran as Minister
of State, and even at this time, was undermining
Sikorski with the Polish Underground organization in
Poland; that Kot was placing his own men in important
positions with a view to his own personal forward-
looking interests.
When recently sounded out by a close associate of
Sikorski as to my reaction to the possibility of Kot's
replacing Ambassador Ciechanowsld, in case it became
advisable to replace Kot in the present Government, I
emphasized my opinion that it was highly inadvisable
to consider changing their Ambassador at this stage.
The question was sufficient to indicate the trend of
thought in the back of Sikorski's mind. Indeed, any
future developments may cause Sikorski to try even
perhaps to invent some posts for Kot and Seyda in the
United States. Having observed their activities over
the past three years, I should earnestly recommend
that in the event that requests are eventually made
for their visas to go to the United States, some
reason be found for suggesting in effect that their
services might be more useful to Poland in some other
country. In short, they are both trouble-makers, and
if allowed to circulate among the Americans of Polish
origin and extraction, would undoubtedly become "political
headaches" for us in the United States. Particularly
Kot is the type of Pole, which, to my mind, is very
apt,/
-4-
apt, in permitting his personal ambitions and his
emotions to cloud his perspective, to lose sight of
the broader objective. In playing one force against
another to gain its own ends, this type of Polish
mind is apt to overlook the potential danger of the
effect of its inspired activities upon the broader
aspect of the struggle. Moreover, I believe that if
Kot and Seyda are eventually replaced in the Government,
it would be well for the British authorities to see
that they are not permitted to stay here where they
would undoubtedly engage in intrigue amongst Polish
circles; it would be better to send them to some dis-
tant land with a helthy climate and where there are
no other Poles with whom they could intrigue.
2/ Minister Seyda, in charge of post-war planning,
and a prominent member of ENDEK (National Democrats -
Right Wing) is considered by the Poles here as a
representative of the moderate faction of his party.
It may be said that he is a reactionary of the "old"
school, in contra-distinction to the "younger", and
what Russian diplomatic quarters here consider the
more Fascist-minded ENDEK faction, headed by Thadeusz
Bielecki. This faction holds that the old party is not
sufficiently militant (Bielecki, in his weekly "Mysl
Polska" - "The Polish Thought" - has been vigorously
attacking the Sikorski Government on the grounds that
it has fallen under the influence of "Jewish Liberalism"
and "Freemasonry").
It may be recalled that Minister Seyda resigned
from his post as Minister of Justice as a result of his
opposition to the signing of the Polish-Soviet Agreement.
He was later "forgiver" by Sikorski on the grounds that
he had acted impulsively under severe pressure from
General Somkowski and a group of intriguers around the
General. Later he drew the fire of severe criticism of
Russian diplomatic quarters here by his pamphlet entitled
"Poland and Germany and the Post-War Reconstruction of
Europe" published in September 1942 for "Private
Circulation". In my talks with Ambassador Bogomolov,
he has on numerous occasions made it a point to throw
off on this pamphlet. He was particularly scornful of
Seyda's remarks that, even if the Polish frontiers were
modified quite rationally, and if Poland were to obtain
all the sea coast to which she naturally gravitated, this
would not be sufficient to secure territorially her
peace, if she were not simultaneously assured the
freedom of the roads leading from the Baltic to the
North Sea. Bogomolov said that this was just another
example of the "big eyes" through which so many Poles
saw the future. Bogomolov was equally critical of
Seyda's remarks that Poland must in particular retain
the eastern frontier she had hitherto possessed, as
the result of the voluntary compromise between her and
the USSR. No less annoyed was Bogomolov over Seyda's
reference to the formation of post-war blocks or
associations/
-5-
associations of states in Central and South Eastern
Europe. In this connection, Seyda wrote that the
region of Central and South Eastern Europe comprised:
Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania,
Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and, to a
certain extent, Turkey; that the block of the afore-
mentioned states of Central and South Eastern Europe
may be organized either as one federation or con-
federation, or as two associations closely collaborat-
ing with one another. Seyda added that while they
must cooperate with Russia in the task of maintaining
peace, this did not in the least mean that they should
be left under Russia's leadership. Bogomolov said that
these statements, including the cool mention of Lithuania,
& member Republic of the USSR, as a future partner or
member of the envisaged grouping, was sufficient to
indicate the real character of the dish being served.
These and like views expressed by other Polish reaction-
aries in various sections of the Polish press brought
to light their aims to create from the Baltic to the
Aegean a vast confederacy of reaction, and with the
purpose of maintaining, even increasing, the power of the
former ruling circles of Poland, working hand-in-glove
with sympathetic regimes in other states. These and
other points in Seyda's pamphlet had, according to
Bogomolov served to antagonize Moscow.
3/ I am aware that, in addition to the aforementioned
Cabinet members, Professor Stanislaw Grabski, President
of the Polish National Council, has through certain
public utterances, writings in "UTRO" - "Tomorrow" -
as well as by certain activities, drawn the fire of
severe criticism from Russian diplomatic quarters here.
Ambassador Bogomolov has on several recent occasions
imparted to me his annoyance over the anti-Soviet tone
of Grabski's recent utterances and writing. He
furthermore emphasized his irritation over certain
Polish activities, directed by Professor Grabski, aimed
at contacting the Right Wing of the Orthodox Church
in Russia through certain Balkan Orthodox circles.
This, Bogomolov said, could be aimed at only one thing
and that was to stir up trouble.
a.J.D.Biddle folders 1-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
and
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
To read and return.
F. D. R.
Enclosure
Let to the P. 6/2/43 from Amb. Biddle
40, Berkeley Square, London, W. 1,
enclosing strictly confidential memo
re background Professor Kot, Polish
Minister of Info; Minister in charge
of Post-War Planning, Marian Seyda;
and Professor Grabski, President of the
Polish National Council
Capy in Poland folder 1-43.
a.J.D. Briddu focar
COMP
I
Jamary 4, 1944.
file
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:
The work of Tony Biddle in London 1s
assuming and will assume more and more the
aspect of military liaison between the govern-
ments he 10 accredited to and the American-
British operations this syring. This means
that he will, of necessity, be closer to General
Eisenhower's staff. The latter would be glad
to see him as part of the staff and it would
be much easier if Biddie could have a commission
in the Army.
I think there is no reason why he cannot
have such a commission and at the same time remain
as Ambassador to the various countries to which
he is accredited. He would draw, of course,
only one salary -- that of Ambassador.
It is my thought that the Army would
commission him as a Lieutenant Colonel or perhaps
a Colonel. This would make his work easier and
at the same time would make no difference in his
relationship to the State Department.
F.D.R.
for
00 to Jack McCloy
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. c.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 4, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I am informed that Ambassador Biddle is about to
be commissioned as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army
and will be assigned to act as liaison between General
Eisenhower and various authorities of the exiled
Governments residing in London. Since I understand
that it would be contrary to existing statutes for
Mr. Biddle to retain his post 8.8 Ambassador, and since
I believe it important that a successor be promptly
appointed to fill the post, I should like to suggest
that Mr. Joseph C. Grew be named. Will you let me know
if this suggestion meets with your approval.
CH
No - he can I am
sure hold both posts.
F. D. R.
FORVICTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES
DEFENSE
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
a.J.D. Biddle folder 1-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 30, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
Will you speak to me about
this?
F.D.R.
Memo from Gen. Marshall returning letters
from Tony biddle which the President recd.
and Gen. Marshall suggests that he be given
a commission of Lt.Col. to be connected
with Civil Affairs Division in London with
Gen. Devers.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
September 7, 1943.
I attach a suggested
reply to Ambassador Biddle's
letter of March 6. I hope it
will serve to induce him to
carry on as Ambassador.
CH
THE WHITE HOUSE
anthony filsent iD.
WASHINGTON
September 7. 1943
Dear Tony:
I have given long and careful thought to your letter
of March 6 and appreciate the fullness and frankness with
which you have set forth your problem as you see it. I
have every sympathy with your desire to transfer your
services to the Army; in fact, knowing you as I do I
should have been much surprised if you didn't feel that
way. As I keep turning the matter over in my mind, Tony,
and look at it primarily from the point of view of where
your services will do the most good toward winning the
war and also toward winning the peace, I come back always
to the conclusion that you can't be spared from your present
job. I know how irksome and trying it must be and how at
times you must get some feeling of futility, but I can't
agree with you that the job is done and that our relations
with the Exiled Governments may safely be entrusted to less
capable hands. In fact I have had in mind speaking to
Cordell about building up your staff 80 that you will have
high ranking assistants to help you deal with each of your
countries in preparation for the day when separate Missions
will move into their respective countries. Your job I
feel will grow more important, not less. Looked at from
the perspective of Washington it seems to me that as the
war progresses we are reaching the very stage where your
knowledge of the innermost thoughts of the London Exiles
would be of the greatest practical help and I don't think
if we consider the complications involved in their relation-
ships that you could give me the same degree of help
as a Civil Affairs officer on General Devers staff. I
have tried to think of someone with your background and
understanding of our Exiled friends who could take your
place without a dangerous time lag at this critical
stage but frankly no one comes to mind. So, much 8.8 I
The Honorable
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
Care of American Embassy,
London.
-2-
should like to release you for a more soul-satisfying
job, I really feel I need you as Ambassador to the
Exiled Governments. Please think it over and talk
it over with Margaret -- and then write me that you
will carry on.
All the best to you both.
Very sincerely yours,
40, Berkeley Square,
London, W. 1.
October 18, 1943.
My dear Mr. President:
On several occasions recently Polish Prime
Minister Mikolajczyk has asked me whether I
thought you might find it convenient to receive
him at some time in the not distant future. I
told him the first time he asked that I was
confident that you would be glad to see him,
and that if he wished me to enquire discreetly
as to what would be the best time I should be
glad to do so. He has accordingly just asked
me to ascertain whether you might find it
possible to receive him at some date in late
November - early December. If so he would
immediately make preparations to arrive in
Washington about that time.
You may possibly remember him as having
accompanied General Sikorski on his first visit
to you at the White House. At that time
Mikolajczyk was Deputy Prime Minister with the
portfolio of Minister of the Interior. Having
long played a prominent role in the Polish
Peasant Party, he has come to be regarded as
the Party's chief representative outside the
country. He has broadened perceptibly in
perspective during the past four years, and might
today be considered middle road in political
outlook. Moreover he takes a considerable pride
in claiming to represent continuity in policies
conceived and pursued by the late General.
He/
The President
The White House,
Washington.
-2-
He is a great admirer of yours, and I know
it would mean a great deal to him if he were
afforded the opportunity of having a talk with
you. In the event that you may see your way
clear to set a date, I should send you well in
advance of his departure an outline of the
main points which he might be expected to bring
up in the course of discussion.
With warmest regards and my every good wish,
I am
Yours faithfully
Tony Biader.r
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 5. 1943
My dear Mr. President:
There is enclosed for your approval a reply to
Mr. Biddle's letter of October 18, 1943 relative to the
desire of the Polish Prime Minister to visit Washington.
Enclosures:
1. To Mr. Biddle.
2. From Mr. Biddle,
October 18, 1943.
The President,
The White House.
Department of State
BUREAU
Eu
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted 11/2/43
ADDRESSED TO
The President
u.s. I - -
I
toas
9.2. NO. Biddle folder 1-43
40, Berkeley Square,
Lendon, W. 1.
October 20, 1943.
My dear Mr. President:
Even in these trying times a laugh turns
up every once in a while. The latest one I
have run across is contained in the attached
1/
copy of "THE WEEK" edited by one Claude
Cookburn, who incidentally writes in the London
"DAILY WORKER" under the name of Pitcairn. This
is the first time he has ever to my knowledge
ventured from the field of political commentary,
and in this deviation he seems to have gone out
in a big way on farm livestock. I thought it
might give you a good laugh.
With my warmest regards and every good wish,
I am
Yours faithfully,
Y
The President,
The White House,
Washington.
Enclosure:
1/ as stated.
THE WEEK
New Series No. 51
21 BLOOMSBURY WAY
TELEPHONE
LONDON, W.C.I
CHANCERY 6565
October 15th, 1943.
THE PRICE OF MODESTY
What might have been one of the fruitiest libel actions in years was
settled out of court at a cost of around £2,000 to a leading newspaper
proprietor, following the discovery that the modesty of his lady wife had
led unwittingly to the libelling of a stud bull.
The case threw a sufficiently eerie light on the present state of the
British libel laws.
What happened was that there came into the office of one of the
newspapers concerned a picture of a prize-winning stud bull.
Nothing very unusual in that. Unusual was, naturally since the beast
was a prize-winner, the size of the creature and in particular the size of
the organ which had carried it to the top of the list.
Her Ladyship has for some time been playing an increasingly important
role in the general conduct of her husband's newspaper. "Intervention" has
become her middle name. And on this occasion her influence had to be
exerted to the full.
She took the view that a family newspaper designed for circulation
among the masses of the British public, quite certainly could not publish a
picture of that nature.
A picture of a. bull, yes. A picture of that section of the bull which
made him worth picturing at all--no.
So they castrated the photograph.
And the next thing they knew, after publishing the no longer offending
picture of the poor brute, was that they got a letter from the farmer-owner
of the said bull declaring that his bull had been the victim of a monstrous
libel, that he had been depicted in a physical condition which could not be
considered otherwise than gravely humiliating and damaging to his prestige,
and that restitution must be made or else.
It worked out at £2,000 for the farmer.
T-185
a.g.n. Biddle folder 1-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 27, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.
To prepare reply, but noting
that I may be away from Washington
until the end of December. It is O.K.
with me after that time.
F.D.R.
Letter to the President, 10-18-43, from
Tony Biddle, Jr., 40 Berkeley Square, London
saying that the Polish Prime Minister
Mikolajczyk has asked him to ascertain
whether the Pres. could receive him in late
Nov. -- early Dec.
(2087)
Signed original 7 this letter sends the office
hms
of the hmo Under Secy. State for delivery a.g. D. Biddle free 1-43
November 8, 1943
Dear Tony:
Thank you very much for your letter of
October 18 regarding Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's
desire to visit me in Washington.
I remember the Prime Minister very well from
his previous visit here, and I am looking forward
to having the pleasure of seeing him again particu-
larly since I feel it 1s most desirable when possible
to maintain personal contacts between the various
leaders of the United Nations.
While I am anxious to see the Prime Minister at
the earliest convenient time, I have a rather full
schedule for the next two months. Consequently I
should prefer, if the Prime Minister is agreeable,
to receive him sometime subsequent to the reopening
of Congress after the Christmas holidays. I would
appreciate it, therefore, if you could explain this
to the Prime Minister and ascertain whether it would
be convenient for him to delay his visit to Washington
until sometime after January 15.
Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELI
The Honorable
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
American Ambassador to Poland,
Care of American Embassy,
London.
2128
a.g.n
November 12, 1943.
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
The President directs me to
forward to you the enclosed envelope,
with the request that you be good
enough to deliver it to the Norwegians.
With all good wishes to you
and Mrs. Biddle,
Very sincerely yours,
Grace G. Tully
Private Secretary
Honorable A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.
The American Embassy,
London, England.
Enclosure.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
a.g. file D. Biddle fredu
THE SECRETARY
January 19, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I have received your memorandum of January 14
indicating your feeling that it would be more satis-
factory for Mr. Biddle to serve as a military liaison
officer only, rather than to continue as Ambassador
to the several governments in exile. I should be glad
to make the necessary arrangements and in accordance
with your suggestion will see that Mr. Rudolph Schoenfeld
is left 8.8 Charge d'Affairs of our Embassy to the
exiled governments.
With regard to Mr. Biddle's suggestion that addi-
tional officers be assigned to that Mission, each to
work on the problems of a specific country, you will be
glad to know that we have been giving the desirability
of this proceedure careful consideration for some weeks
and are taking the necessary steps to put it into effect.
In accordance with your request, Mr. Biddle's letter
to you is returned herewith.
CA
J
Enclosure:
Mr. Biddle's letter to
the President, dated
January 13, 1944.
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
January 18, 1944.
My Dear Mr. President:
One thing that I did not mention in the memo-
randum which I asked Miss Tully to be so kind as to transmit to
you, is the following point:
That the more I consider the matter from every
angle, the more convinced I em that in order to carry out effect-
ively the constructive ideas we discussed the other day, my contem-
plated assignment as Liason Officer between our military author-
ities and the Allied Governments should be separated from the role
of Ambassador. Accordingly, I earnestly believe that my retire-
ment as Ambassador and assignment as Liason Officer would permit
me to be employed in the most useful way possible in our interests
as well as in those of the governments and their respective peoples
concerned. As the forthcoming stage will, in the eyes of these
governments, be mainly military in character, at the same time
involving political considerations, I feel I could better serve
our and their interests in the position of Liason Officer than as
Ambassador during that stage. For, as far as the diplomatic
functions of my Mission are concerned, they have already given way
mainly to military and connected considerations.
Therefore, I feel that the main task of the dip-
lomatic section of my Mission, during the coming months, loading
up to the liberation of the occupied territories concerned, will
be one of constructive preparation to meet eventual requirements.
Accordingly, I strongly suggest, that in order to preserve the
continuity of established contact and manner of conducting the
business of the Mission, Rudolf Schoenfeld, my capable and exper-
ienced Counsellor, be designated Charge d'Affairs, and be known as
Acting Chief of Mission during the forthcoming mainly military
stage; that there be assigned to the Mission, under his direction,
a number of diplomatic officers, each or several of whom would
study a given country preparatory either to heading or accompanying
a Mission to that country as it is liberated.
Knowledge of these constructive preparations would
be gratifying and encouraging to the Allied Governments concerned,
and they would, in my opinion, comprise the main functions of the
diplomatic section of the Wission in the forthcoming stage. Mean-
while, as Liason Officer, I would be in position to put my experience
with, and understanding of the mentality and problems of the govern-
ments concerned, to the maximum advantage to ours and their interests.
In making the foregoing recommendations, I do so
only after most careful consideration of all aspects of the question,
and in the strongest belief that the constructive objective in mind
may be served the more effectively by your withdrawing me as Ambass-
ador and appointing me Liason Officer.
With my affectionate regards and my every good wish,
I nm
Faithfully yours,
The President,
Truy Bidder
The White House.
9.9 D.Biddle nel forger vy
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
hus
January 14, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
This letter from Tony Biddle
(please send it back) puts a new
phase on the matter of his remain-
ing as Ambassador and serving, at
the same time, as military liaison
officer.
I wish you would let me know
what you think. Biddle has, of
course, accomplished a wonderful
job in handling all these govern-
ments-in-exile without any friction
and in a way which has brought him
the real regard of the heads of
these governments.
However, there is something
to be said for his suggestion,
especially in that Schoenfeld would
become the Charge d'Affairs and
that Biddle would continue his
connection with them as liaison
officer. In fact, it would mean
only that he would transfer from
cigilian clothes to a uniform.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
-2-
I hope the governments themselves
would understand the new relationship
and not be insulted because we did not
appoint a successor as Ambassador.
F. D. R.
P.S. I am also enclosing & memo-
randum from Biddle, together with copy
of one which he sent to Jimmy Dunn.
Will you let me know what you think?
F. D. R.
Carlton
WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 11, 1944.
Miss Grace Tully,
Secretary to the President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.
My Dear Miss Tully:
Following our telephone conversation of this
morning, I take pleasure in forwarding you the attached memorandum
containing certain suggestions which I venture to offer in the hope
that they may prove helpful in the matter of procedure, in connection
with my contemplated new assignment.
As you may percieve, I am making the suggestions
only in the thought that the President should, and justifiably so,
derive all possible "political profit" from this assignment, that he
so richly deserves.
We are passing through a phase involving con-
siderable political anxiety on the part of the "smaller nations" in
general, of the Poles in particular. It, therefore, occurred to
me that something along the line of the contents of my attached mem-
or_andum might prove of psychological benefit at this time.
I am at the Carlton Hotel and shall await orders
from our magnificent Chief.
With warmest regards and with my every good wish,
Very sincerely yours,
anthony Biddle
P.S. For the Presidents information 2 our
also attaching copy of a Memorandure
which 2 am handing Mr. James
arthe Dhatr Department
appy
file THE washington WHITE
Tony Biddle focher 1-44
HOUSE PSF
January 22, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
I gave your message -- that you
thought Tony Biddle should be made a
Colonel -- to General Marshall.
General Marshall asked as &
special favor that he be allowed to appoint
him first a Lieutenant Colonel, at the same
time giving instructions to promote him to
full Colonel, he said, within the month.
General Marshall believes this quite im-
portant and he felt the President would allow
him to do it. I wanted you to fully under-
stand the situation, aS I told the General
you believed Biddle's rank as Ambassador
entitled him to a full Colonelcy.
General Marshall tells me, in-
cidentally, that this is what Eisenhower
wants and that Biddle is very happy with
the arrangements, and understands his pro-
motion is in the bug.
Emur
SECRET
peder
1-VV
WAR DEPARTMENT
1
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
I have just received a message from General Eisenhower
in which he stated he would like to have Tony Biddle on his
staff in London without announced portfolio. He plans to
use Biddle as his contact with the governments of the vari-
ous countries for whom he is now responsible. The Secretary
of State, Mr. Hull, informs me this is agreeable to him.
I recommend that Biddle be commissioned a Lieutenant
Colonel in the Army and assigned to duty in this capacity.
If this meets with your approval, I will proceed accordingly.
Chief of Staff.
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
FORVICTORY
Date- 3-17-59
BUY
UNITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
Signature- Carl d. spicer
STAMPS
SECRET