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Italy, 1933-1938

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PSF Italy 1933-38 Italy-1933 COPY THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May 14th, 1933. My dear Mr. Prime Minister:- I am asking Ambassador Long, who is a very old personal friend of mine, to give you this note when he presents his credentials. I only wish that I might have the opportunity to see you myself, to give you my greetings and to talk over many things in which you and I have a common interest. May I tell you how much I appreciated my talks with Signor Jung? His frankness, his complete understanding of our mutual problems, and his delightful personality gave me great pleasure and great confidence. Thank you for sending him. Those two very wonderful volumes have thrilled me, not only because of their great artistic merit, but also because Vergil and Horace were my favorites in my student days - and I shall keep them among my treasures. When I am gone they will repose in the Library of Congress. And in the meantime they will be symbols of the greatness of the spirit and understanding of the Italian people - and of you their leader whom I hope some day to meet. I am, my dear Mr. Mussolini, Very sincerely yours, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT His Excellency Signor Benito Mussolini, Head of the Government, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Italy, Rome. PsF Italy THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON December Return 4, 1933. Dear Mr. President: I beg to call to your attention a very interesting and confidential telegram from Ambassador Long, under yesterday's date, in which he reports the substance of recent conversations between Hitler and the French representative in Berlin. The telegram is excellently prepared and is a real contribu- tion. Wellam Faithfully yours, Phease The President The White House. Returned 12/5/33 IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO My oen m₂ Fresident. in response to your request to have m exchange of views concerning the wald economic and publitive problems in Wich the Unites states and They me mutually interested J have sker the Miniffer to of Finance Hm. Suide jury to come Washington as my uprentative. Kinoeft personal requids and greetings. He will M₂ July i) bringing you my Hell you with how great an intact J an following the Wnk of the United states Sormement, fn the intention of the wals present officulties with only can be solves by the muture cooperation and grodwill of the nating. m young with the reprimation of the manuferipts It is with great pleasure that entrugt of Viigil ans HANCE which are kept at Her hibrary in therence imy representative will have the hma of conveying them to you M a mark of my milt unrial feelings. J chook thole two anthos not only because their prictice wnks represent the greatelt legacy of Rom in the fils of letters but also because they stand as exemples of that greateness of spirit ans human mostaning wich J believe are the two central qualities of the American Character. With best withes and fentiments of expeem behere me very tinerly your Mumui Roma 24 ymile 1933 - XI XI Italy - 1933 4-24-33 Hm hanklin X. Rooserelt Frankent of the United States Washington. C.C. PSF will file mal Italy 67 DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON February 21, 1935 My dear Mr. President: With respect to the letter from Ambassador Long at Rome dated February 3, I wish to state that I re- ceived from Mr. Long on February 1 a cable, in which he stated that he had taken up the matter of the pos- sibility of cotton trade with Suvich. The cable con- tained no information as to what he had in mind. The State Department had no information about Mr. Long's conversation, before leaving the United States, with Oscar Johnston, Morgenthau, Wallace, and others on the matter of cotton trade. On February 3, the same day that he wrote his letter to you, Mr. Long sent a cable stating that he had talked with Signor Mussolini and that Signor Mussolini had asked if there were a chance that we could have some agreement on some few articles so as to make some immediate advance in the volume of trade, and The President, The White House. -2- and that he hoped that some such arrangement might be arrived at in advance of the more general arrange- ments to follow. Mr. Long said that he had replied that he thought this was possible. In reply to his cable, I wired that it was not clear what he had specifically in mind. There had been some earlier proposal with respect to raw silk. I pointed out that raw silk was already on the free list, and that if any arrangement carried a definite obligation to purchase raw silk, some agency of the Government would have to buy this silk and distribute it, an arrangement which would obviously present diffi- culties. I pointed out that a preliminary trade agree- ment containing a few items could not be made until after public hearings had been held, and that the announcement for such hearings had already been made for March 11, 1935, and that if preliminary arrange- ments were entered into in advance of such hearings, American protected interests could charge that they had not been heard. I asked Mr. Long to give us an expression of his views as to what might be done under these circumstances, and stated that it would be most helpful if he could secure from Signor Mussolini and his officials any suggestions that they might have. Mr. -3- Mr. Long replied the next day, February 6, 1934, expressing his gratitude for my exposition of the situation. He stated that he had made it clear in his conversations that the American Government was not able to purchase commodities of any kind, and that the pur- chase of silk was therefore out of the question. He had suggested that they find some other items of Italian origin which might be considered in an arrangement which would protect the market in Italy for American cotton. He stated further that he would now wait until they approached him and then report to us. I think the foregoing exchange of views between the Ambassador and the Department since his letter of February 3, 1934, to you, has brought us all abreast of the situation and that we are now in a position to give careful consideration to any suggestions which the Italian officials might make. I am enclosing copies of all the telegrams relating to this matter. As these telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated 1f they could be returned to the Department at the President's con- venience for appropriate disposition. Faithfully yours, Enclosures: As above [1935] star ETHIOPIAN MOBILIZATION ORDER. This is a perfect example of a streamlined operations order. If they didn't win it wasn't the fault of their order! "When this order is received all men and all boys able to carry a spear will go to Addis Ababa. Every married man will bring his wife to cook and wash for him. Every unmarried man will bring any unmarried woman he can find to cook and wash for him. Women with babies, the blind, and those too aged or infirm to carry a spear are excused. Anyone found at home after receiving this order will be hanged." Petiman PSF Italy COPY No. 74 AMERICAN CONSULATE Nairobi, Colony of Kenya, Africa. June 25, 1935. SUBJECT: Italian Activities in Italian Somaliland. THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON. SIR: I have the honor to submit the following in- formation regarding the activities of the Italian Army in Italian Somaliland which was related to me by one Mr. Petersen, a traveling representative of the Caterpillar Tractor Company who visited that area during the latter part of May. In submitting this information it is not my intention to encroach upon the political reporting activities of other Consulates, but it is believed that some of the in- formation may help to augment that already submit- ted to the Department. At the time of Mr. Petersen's visit to Italian Somaliland there were some 38,000 Italian troops stationed in and about Mogadiscio. Most of these are understood to be from the south of Italy and are inclined to be sour and unruly. Consequently, one unit of Black Shirts has been brought in for po- lice duty. In addition to the Italian troops there are some 30,000 Somali troops under arms. Captain Vivian -2- Vivian Ward, a retired British army officer resid- in in Nairobi, who has had considerable experi- ence with Somali troops, ventures the opinion that the Italian Government will be very foolish if it places much dependence upon the Somali troops since they are known to be extremely unreliable. It is understood that 32,000 additional Ital- ian troops are expected to arrive in Mogadiscio dur- ing June and that 800 more Black Shirts will also arrive to augment the unit now on duty there. On May 24th a parade of all the troops and equipment in the area was held at Mogadiscio. In addition to the troops mentioned above the follow- ing equipment was observed:- 39 planes, about equal- ly divided between fighters and bombers; 40 small tanks; and 36 - 75 millimeter field pieces. It was not known what equipment in the way of artillery, et cetera, would accompany the troops expected to arrive during June. No barracks have a.8 yet been provided, and all the troops are quartered under canvas, among the sand dunes surrounding Mogadiscio. All of the wells in the vicinity are brackish, and all water used for the troops must be distilled from sea water. Ap- paratus for distillation appears to be limited and water is rationed, the allowance for all purposes being two litres per day per person. About once a week the troops are marched to the beach for a bath, but by the time they have marched back to the camp in a temperature of 100 to 120° F., the salutary effects -3- effects of the bath have been dissipated. The region produces no foodstuffs except ba- nanas, and all meats and vegetables must be import- ed. To date the importations have not kept pace with needs and the troops are all on short rations. As a result of flies and the bad water available, a goodly number of the troops are suffering from dysentery. The harbor of Mogadiscio will accommodate a maximum of 16 vessels, but due to the lack of equip- ment and labor only two vessels can be unloaded at one time. Vessels are forced to anchor about one mile out and are unloaded into Arab dhows. Conse- quently, in rough weather all loading or unloading operations must cease. After being off-loaded into dhows the cargo is taken to the dooks. The port fa- cilities comprise one dook about 120' long, on which there 18 one ten ton orane which will not handle ten tons and one three ton crane. As a result of the limited facilities the shortest time taken to un- load one ship is three days, while some vessels have remained as long as thirty-three days before unloading was completed. Mogadiscio has a normal population of only 800 and, although every able- bodied man in town 18 employed, the labor shortage 18 most acute and the Italians are now attempting to recruit additional labor elsewhere. There are no warehouses or other facilities for storing supplies and to date no material has been imported either for the construction of warehouses or of 4- or of barracks. Several large shipments of flour and cement were imported just prior to the advent of the rainy season and were stored in large stacks on the shore with not even any sort of waterproof- ing covering to protect them from the rain. As a result the greater portion has been ruined. In order to facilitate troop movements the Italians are constructing three roads from the coast to the Abyssinian border. The main road will run from Mogadiscio in a north-westerly di- rection. The other two roads will start at points north and south of Mogadiscio and will tend to con- verge with the Mogadiscio road as they approach the Abyssinian border. To date little progress has been made except on the main road from Mogadiscio, for which the Italians have imported six 40 H.P. Cater- pillar Diesel Tractors. Although Mogadiscio is approximately 250 miles from the Abyssinian border, the Italian forces have constructed a complete system of entrenchments and barbed wire entanglements in a semi-circle nine miles from Mogadiscio. Whether these entrenchments will be used for training purposes only or whether the Italians expect to make a last stand there should they be driven that far from the Abyssinian border is not known. It is recognized in Mogadiscio that the Ital- ian Government can not expect to commence any seri- ous war-fare until after the monsoon period, which lasts during May, June and July. During this per- iod -5- 1od the sea is almost invariably rough which ham- pers the loading and unloading of ships, and the rain which accompanies the monsoon will effectually prevent any operations on a large scale inland. Well informed persons in Mogadiscio make no hesita- tion about saying that active hostilities will com- mence about September lst and that when the Ital- ians consider themselves sufficiently prepared, a series of incidences or border clashes will be cre- ated which will be used as an excuse for sending troops into Abyssinia. It would appear, however, that unless the Italian Government goes about its war preparations in a much more businesslike manner than it has to date, they may find themselves seri- ously embarrassed by lack of equipment and supplies and by sickness among her troops. An amusing incident in connection with the pur- chasing of supplies in Kenya for the Italian Govern- ment has occurred. The local firm of Mitchell Cotts & Company has obtained the authority for the purchase of all foodstuffs and other supplies needed for the Italian troops which may be obtained in East Africa. About two weeks ago a large order for various things was received and the first item on the list read:- "500 ladies of easy virtue". Although Kenya has a reputation abroad for a singular lack of morals a- mong its white settlers, people in Nairobi felt that this was going a little too far. It is understood that this portion of the order was passed on to con- nections -6- nections in Bombay who are in a better position to fill the order than is the local firm. Respectfully yours, (Signed) Robert B. Streeper Robert B. Streeper American Consul. The PSF Italy THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON July 15, 1935. Dear Mr. President: I enclose two interesting tele- grams from Paris, dated July 13th and 14th, respectively. They indicate clearly the way the wind is blowing between Italy and Ethiopia. Faithfully Milhau The President The White House. PSF JS This telegram must be closely paraphrased be- fore being communicated to anyone (B) PARIS Dated July 13, 1935 Rec'd 3:05 p.m. Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. RUSH, 591, July 13, 5 p.m. URGENT AND I FOR THE SECRETARY I saw Laval this afternoon accompanied by Tuck and communicated to him the sense of your 270, July 11, 1 p.m. and 275, July 11, 8 p.m. He replied that he is equally anxious to avoid war that he believes that it might be avoided by Italian mandate over Abyssinia which would give Italy territorial concessions, econ- omic advantages and a form of administrative control but he does not know whether that would be acceptable to the Emperor. Laval expressed himself as willing to cooperate with United Stated and England to settle the dispute if that could be arranged. I told him of your expressed ignorance of details of controversy to which he replied that he had no knowledge of Mussolini's reply to Eden in Rome except published reports He feels that Italy is bent on war if war is necessary to accomplish her purpose. In regard to my question -2- From Paris July 13, #541 question as to the effect on Europe of sending four hundred thousand Italian troops to Abyssinia he said "that is Mussolini's business - not mine." STRAUS CIB REP This telegram must be closely paraphrased be- PARIS fore being communicated to anyone. (B) Dated July 14, 1935 Rec'd 1:05 p. m. Secretary of State, Washington. RUSH 592, July 14, 3 p. m. FOR THE SECRETARY. Saw Italian Ambassador to France it anniversary review this morning. In answer to my question he said that in his opinion war in Abyssinia is inevitable; that British Ambassador here had suggested to Laval a meeting between Mussolini, Laval and Hoare in an endeavor to find a solution that might avoid an armed conflict; that Laval had telephoned to Mussolini, and that Mussolini had replied that discussion would not alter his determination to maintain his position. STRAUS RR physical PSF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE Italy WASHINGTON August 9, 1935 Dear Mr. President: Referring again to your desire to be kept informed in regard to the health of Italian troops now in East Africa, I beg to enclose for your in- formation a memorandum on the subject which has been prepared for me by our Division of Near Eastern Affairs. It is true that most of the information contained in our despatches is based on rumors and reports, but read together they present a rather definite picture. I also bring to your attention a elegram just received from our Embassy at Rome, with regard to the same subject. We have yet to hear from our new effort to obtain information from Port Said. Faithfully yours, The President, The White House. PSF Italy DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS August 8, 1935. In connection with the interest recently ex- pressed by the President in obtaining information regarding the number and health of troops now being invalided home to Italy from East Africa, I have had a search made of all despatches from Rome on the subject of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and think the following excerpts may be of some value, al- though it will be noted that most of the information is based on rumors and reports: "It is .... rumored that the morale of the troops in Somalia is not good and that they are suffering gréatly from the excessive heat, lack of an adequate water supply and from unsatisfactory sanitary conditions". (Despatch #1077 from Rome, May 3, 1935). "It is reported that some 50% of the crews on the transports used in the East African service are demanding a transfer to some other service on account of impaired health and overwork incidental to tropical conditions". (Despatch #1108 from Rome, May 23, 1935). "Rumors concerning serious outbreaks of illness among the Italian troops and workmen in East Africa continue to be heard. A report, attributed to the American Consul at Port Said, has reached the Embassy that a large Italian ship returning from Eritrea to Italy had recently passed through the Suez Canal under strict quarantine with many sick on board, and that it is believed that, in addition to malaria, cholera has broken out among the troops in Eritrea". (Despatch #1135 from Rome, June 6, 1935). 2 "Rumors of bad health conditions among the men sent to East Africa continue to circulate. The Consulate General at Naples reports that some 340 laborers in- valided home from Eritrea were disembarked at that port from June 2nd to June 6th Despite official announce- ments to the contrary, it is generally believed that most of these men were in a very serious condition. It is understood that the strictest silence concerning living conditions in the East African Colonies has been enjoined upon the men invalided home, but rumors of extremely unsatisfactory health and sanitary conditions continue to emanate from the families and friends of men there. It is unofficially but fairly reliably re- ported that an alarming number of cases of dysentery and sunstroke are occurring in Somalia and that it is very difficult to get the Italians to understand the necessity for protecting themselves adequately from the tropical sun". (Despatch #1146 from Rome, June 13, 1935). "Rumors and reports belie the newspaper state- ments concerning the excellent health conditions prevail- ing in the East African colonies. The American Consul in Palermo reports in this connection that there are some 300 men hospitalized in Palermo and between 700 and 800 in Messina who have been invalided home from Eritrea and Somalia. THE LONDON MORNING POST is said to have published an interview on June 18th with Pro- fessor Aldo Castellani, an Italian authority on tropical diseases whose work is well known in London, and who has recently returned from a tour of inspection in Eritrea, to the effect that, in spite of reports to the contrary, the sanitary situation is 'absolutely satisfactory'. A report has reached the Embassy, however, attributed to one who is close to Castellani, that he found an alarm- ing number of cases of malaria in Eritrea and a wholly inadequate supply of quinine and other medicines to com- bat it". (Despatch #1166 from Rome, June 20, 1935). "With regard to the health of the troops in East Africa the Embassy continues to hear unofficial reports and rumors concerning the increasing number of men being returned to Italy for hospital treatment". (Despatch #1180 from Rome, June 27, 1935). "The English Consul at Messina reports that, on June 10th, 800 sick soldiers, returning from Eritrea, were 3 were debarked at that port". (Report #14533 from the Military Attache at Rome, June 28, 1935). According to the account of a militiaman returned to Naples in February of this year from Eritrea on account of illness, which was transmitted to the Embassy by the Consul General at Naples, laborers in East Africa are discontented but are placated by their high wages. "With regard to the health conditions of the troops in Eritrea this militiaman reports that out of the 340 men sent there with him in November 1934, one half have since been returned to Italy on account of illness. He himself suffered from malaria. He also reported a water shortage at Asmara, but in view of the time that has elapsed since his departure from Eritrea, this informa- tion is not thought to be of value". (Despatch #1227 from Rome, July 25, 1935". cib This telegram must be closely paraphrased be- ROME fore being communicated to anyone. (B) Dated August 8, 1935. Received 4:18 p.m. Secretary of State Washington. 456, August 8, 7 p.m. My 446, August 6, 4 p.m. Rumors regarding unfavorable health conditions among the Italian troops in East Africa were not generally circu- lated in Italy until the month of April but from that date reports of cases of sunstroke, malaria, dysentery, typhoid, and cholera among those troops were current as well as threatened water shortage and inadequate sanitary facilities at Massaua and elsewhere. The circulation of these reports was apparently finally taken into consideration by the central authorities and statements have been published in the press announcing that since January 1st, 624 troops have been invalided from the colonies and 37 have died of which 7 were officers and that during the same period 2,000 laborers have been ropatriated and 113 have died. American consular officers, particularly those at Naples and Palormo, have submitted reports of hospital casos at those ports as well as at Messina but owing to the difficulty of obtaining details as to the nature of those cases no satisfactory -2- No. 456, August 8, 1935, from Rome. satisfactory check with the official figuros has boon possible. The publishod accounts and statistics rolating to the health of the troops sent to East Africa have boen invariably accompanied by commont intended to show that the proportion of illnesses and deaths is negligible and a rocont statement outlines the progress of sanitation in the East Africa colonies and the difficulties which are being overcome in the fight against disease thore. According to this statomont the hospital facilitios which consisted originally of eight hundrod bods has been increased to 20,000 bods of which 3,000 aro dostined for Somaliland and the romaindor for Eritrea. In this connection, according to information supplied by an Italian officer in the army medical corps who has recontly returned from Eritroa, it would appoar the policy is being adopted of reducing the numbor of ropatriation casos by sonding tho sick to the high platoau regions of Eritroa where an extonsivo hospital commiserating systom is boing installed for which supplies and equipment are now being purchased. This system is intended to care for the sick as well as for eventual casualties. KIRK CIB HSS PSF PSF Italy Italy THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON August 20, 1935. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE In regard to Kirk's meeting with Mussolini, and the latter's remarks: It would be well in any sub- sequent note or message by us, either to Italy or to other Nations, to point out that it is never too late to avoid an armed conflict. The mere fact that Italy has mobilized a million men and spent two billion lire does not mean "destruction of her prestige in in- curring the disdain of other countries who would be ready to accuse her of having attempted to bluff or of having engaged in an undertaking which she found she was unable to carry out." On the contrary, we could well point out that after all these preparations Italian prestige would be enhanced and not harmed if Italy could take the magnificent position that rather than resort to war, she would cancel the military preparations and submit the whole question to peaceful settlement by arbitration. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON -2- In other words, a very strong document can be based on Mussolini's statement by making an appeal to the higher and not the lower ideal. F. D. R. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Print THE SECRETARY August 19, 1935. Memorandum for The President. I attach a part of telegram No. 500, from K1rk in Rome, which I think you will find interesting. The balance of the telegram 18 badly garbled and difficulty is being experienced in decoding. I also enclose a copy of tele- gram No. 708, from Marriner in Paris, and call your attention to the marked paragraph. C.Huee C.H. PSF gill Italy (s)ch MED This message must be ROME closely paraphrased before being communi- Dated August 19, 1935 cated to anyone (c) Received 2:20 p.m. Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. RUSH, 500, August 19, 1 p.m. Strictly confidential. My 499, August 19, 11 a.m. Mussolini received me shortly before 11:30 this morning and I left his office at noon. I presented him with a copy of the message contained in your 136, August 18, 1 p.m., and explained to him that it was a personal and confidential message sent to him by the Secretary of State at the direction of the President which the Depart- ment would not give out to the press. Mussolini read the message carefully. He then asked me to convey to the President and the Secretary his appreciation of the expression of friendliness and of the character of the message. As to the subject matter, however, it was now too late to avoid an armed conflict. Italy, he continued, had mobilized a million men and had spent two billion lire. Two hundred thousand men had already been sent to East Africa and one hundred fifty thousand more were ready to go at any time. Two Black MED - 2 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m., from Rome Black Shirt divisions were being sent out this week and others were to follow. In the face of this preparation and the sacrifices which it implied, any alteration in purpose now would be absolutely disastrous to Italy and would entail consequences from which she would not recover for a century. No nation; and he specifically referred to the United States, could expect that Italy could draw back now and destroy her prestige in incurring the disdain of other countries who would be ready to accuse her of having attempted to bluff or of having engaged in an undertaking which she found she was un- able to carry out. Six months ago perhaps some solution might have been found but the opposition of other countries and England in particular, although it had brought the Italian people unanimously to the support of the govern- ment, had strengthened the position of the Negus so that now only a military defeat at the hands of Italy could accomplish the ends which Italy had a right to obtain. Mussolini went on to say that for years Italy had made every effort to cooperate with the Abyssinians to the mutual advantage of both countries. Practically everything that had been done to improve the condition of the Abyssinians and advance their progress along modern lines had been due to the Italians. The treaty of 1928 MED - 3 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m., from Rome of 1928 was intended to declare this policy of amity and and to render this collaboration effective. This Treaty, however, had remained entirely ineffective owing to the attitude of the Abyssinians and all efforts to give effect to the purposes of the Treaty were of no avail. Even prior to the construction of the (?) of the road to Assab as an outlet to the sea, for the past few days had met with the opposition of the Abyssinian Government and no progress could be made. It is true, he added, that during that time the influence of the French which during those years was unfriendly towards Italy, was a factor in negativing Italy's efforts at cooperation in Abyssinia but the main difficulty lay in Abyssinia's attitude toward Italy herself. Italy in 1896 had lost the battle of Adowa. That was forty years ago and the circumstances were such that Italy herself need not harbor a necessity for revenge. The Abyssinians, however, regarded Adowa as the triumph of their force over a powerful white nation and this spirit, which had been encouraged by the friendly attitude and support of other European nations, had created a situation in Abyssinia which absolutely precluded the possibility on the part of Italy of safeguarding or developing her legitimate MED - 4 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m. from Rome legitimate interests, This situation could only be met by a display of force and could only be remedied by inflicting a defent on the Abyssinians. The Abyssinians, Mussolini continued, were known to have 450,000 men under arms. (End section one). KIRK HPD:CSB MED This telegram must be ROME closely paraphrased before being communi- Dated August 19, 1935 cated to anyone (C) Received 2:15 p.m. Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. RUSH, 500, August 19, 1 p.m. (Section two). their military plan was to retreat before the Italian advance and then when the Italian lives were extended to launch attacks against those lives in the form of guerilla warfare. The Abyssinians were not taking sufficiently into account the Italian air force which would eliminate the chance of success of these tactics. Mussolini expressed complete confidence in the outcomo of this military set up and he intimated that he believed it would be brief. Ho indicated that following this phaso nogotiations for a final adjustment would be simple and in this connection ho pointed out the success of Italian administration in Eritroa where great progress along modorn linos had boon made and where no opposition on the part of the natives had ever been encountered. In giving the foregoing account Mussolini took pains to omphasize general attitude so far as onvisaging the matter sololy from the point of view that the conflict would be confined exclusively to Italy and Abyssinia and had MED - 2 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m. from Rome and had been alluding to the part played by other govern- ments only insofar as they affected the relations between those two countries. If the conflict could be so limited he said no anxiety need be felt as to the con- sequences. He went on to say, however, that the attitude of England had brought to the fore the possibility that it might not be 80 confined and in that event he fore- saw the gravest consequences to the peace of the world. The conversations at Paris which onded yesterday showed an attitude which gave littlo indication that there was an unwillingness to admit the Italian view- point. The proposals which had boon put forward involving concessions in Abyssinia though vague were clear enough to show that they were entiroly un- acceptable to Italy. England, he said, might profess not to know what Italy really wanted in Abyssinia but she know very well (End of two). KIRK RR:CSB MJD Paris This telegram must be Dated August 19, 1935. closely paraphrased before being communi- Rec'd. 11:45 a. m. cated to anyone. (B) Secretary of State, Washington. 708, August 19, 4 p. M. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL Dopartment's 332, August 18, lp. m. I saw Leger and Eden this morning and com- municated orally and in the strictest confidence the nature of the message which Kirk has been in- structed to deliver to Mussolini. I informed them that it was not being given to the press and they both agreed that in the present position of affairs this was the wisest means of bringing to Mussolini's attention the solidarity of the world in the inter- est of poace. Both Leger and Eden expressed themselves as boing extromely gratoful for the prompt and effec- tive action of the American Government in this matter and felt that even though the negotiations in Paris had broken down it was not too late for its offects to be felt in Italy. It was Leger's opinion that with the return of -2- No. 708, August 19, from Paris of Aloisi to Rome, Mussolini would gain a more accurate impression of the solidarity against him which oxisted hore and what he would have to faco in Geneva, where, in accordance with the information which the French have received from Rome, Mussolini still intends to send his represontatives on September 4. (End of section onc.) MARRINER RR CSB MJD Paris This telegram must be Dated August 19, 1935. closely paraphrased before being communi- Rec'd. 1:00 p. m. cated to anyone. (B) Secretary of State, Washington. 708, August 19, 2 p. m. (Section two) Neither Leger nor Eden felt that the failure of conversations here was necessarily the final chapter and that there was still time for Rome to alter its program. Apparently Mussolini refused even to consider the Anglo-French offer as a basis of discussion. Eden's analysis of the Italian reply was that Mussolini would only be willing to accept through the medium of the League what he would take by force of arms if it were not granted. Eden said that in his conversation with Laval this morning they both considered that in searching their consciences no offorts had been spared and no means neglected to find a poaceful settlement of the question. In this connection Leger told me that the only benefit that he folt had been de- rived from the negotiation was a much closor rapprochement -2- NO. 708 (Section two) August 19, from Paris rapprochement and understanding botwoon Great Britain and Francc. Eden leaves late this after- noon for London and Vansittart for Aix-les-Bains whore he will see Baldwin. It is possible that a Cabinot meeting will be called in London for August 22. (End message.) MARRINER RR CSB file DEPARTMENT OF STATE file OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER November 7, 1935. Mr. Secretary: I attach on the basis of the best available material we have been able to secure up to the present, the follow- ing: (1) Table 1. A record of our total exports to Italy during October, 1935, divided into the main classes of exports and compared with the record for October, 1934. Included in the same table is a record of our total exports to Italy by the same main classes during the first ten months of 1935, as compared with the same period of 1934. (2) Table 2. A comparison of the trade of American exports of numerous important specific items to Italy comparing that trade for October, 1935, with the trade in the same items for October, 1934, with increases and de- oreases. (3) Table 3. A comparison of the American export trade to Italy of the same group of specific items as in Table 2 comparing the monthly average of our exports dur- ing the first ten months of 1935 with the monthly average for 1934, with increases and decreases. This -2- This material covers trade with Italy alone and we are still waiting to receive from Commerce the information which will make possible a comparable record for Italian Africa and Ethiopia. In the meanwhile, I attach tables 4 and 5 which give the record of export shipments to these countries for October, 1935, by main classes. Attached to these tables is a short memorandum which is really a footnote pointing out the defects and neces- sary corrections to this statistical record. Our trade records are being kept on a weekly basis and by the end of the afternoon there will be available a record for October, 1935, divided into a weekly basis. Because of the delays in forwarding of the necessary docu- ments by the Customs Houses, this weekly record is still not complete enough to be wholly reliable. However, the tables will show a falling-off in total shipments subse- quent to the President's proclamation. EA:HF:DJW Table(1) Total Exports to Italy With Division by Classes. First ten months October 1934 1935 1934 1935 Total Exports $50,865,070 $54,105,361 $6,184,491 $5,840,781 Textile fibers and manufactures 25,422,675 24,465,433 3,956,452 2,678,293 (Unmanufactured cotton) (24,456,254) (23,511,579) ( 3,740,755) (2,602,443) Nonmetallic minerals 5,830,942 6,594,203 382,821 969,816 Machinery and vehicles 4,757,371 7,085,201 390,426 626,003 Metals and manufactures, except machinery and vehicles 6,081,287 9,301,790 502,030 1,085,322 Wood and paper 2,705,768 2,297,133 329,583 142,398 Animals and animal products 2,130,065 1,102,656 198,686 31,575 Chemicals and related products 1,422,972 1,646,427 138,103 142,805 Vegetable food products and beverages 961,889 354,504 138,032 29,397 Vegetable products, inedible, except fiber and wood 922,849 772,468 80,801 95,397 Miscellaneous 685,252 478,386 67,557 39,775 * Sulstantialshipments to Italian africa VN addition to this Table No. 2 Comparison of American Exports to Italy October 1934 and October 1935 in Some Important Items of Trade Increase Commodity October 1934 October 1935 or Decrease Cotton $3,740,755 $2,602,443 -1,038,312 Petroleum products. 626,068 1,363,767 + 737,699 Refined copper 188,237 534,094 + 345,857 Iron and steel scrap 179,458 463,817 + 284,359 Aircraft and engines 4,081 179,540 + 175,459 Steel plates, sheets, etc 46,822 6,368 - 40,454 Rubber and manufac- tures 20,808 275 - 20,533 Automobiles, parts, and accessories. 48,108 8,125 - 39,983 Other ferro-alloys. 11,306 450 - 10,856 External cylindrical grinding machines 9,304 33,843 + 24,539 Nickel 16,564 11,132 - 5,432 Gear-cutting machines 8,460 10,623 + 2,163 Engine lathes I 44,134 + 44,134 Internal grinding machines. 4,183 65,147 + 60,964 Coal 4,650 I - 4,650 Tin and manufactures I - - Ferro-tungsten 544 -- - 544 Tin plate scrap I - - Lead -- -- I Table No. 3 Comparison of Monthly Average of American Exports to Italy, fifst ten months of 1935 as compared with Monthly Average for Whole Year 1934 Monthly Averages 12 Mos. 10 mos. Increase Commodity 1934 1935 or Decrease Cotton $2,698,662 $2,351,158 - $347,304 Petroleum products 312,318 433,995 + 121,677 Refined copper... 267,649 471,391 + 203,742 Iron and steel scrap 185,517 335,284 + 149,767 Aircraft and en- gines 8,941 65,305 + 56,364 Steel plates, sheets, etc.... 25,710 15,043 - 10,767 Rubber and manu- factures 28,650 13,372 - 15,278 Automobiles, parts, and accessories 60,099 61,307 + 1,208 External cylindri- cal grinding machines 4,765 29,003 + 24,238 Nickel 3,855 7,832 + 3,977 Gear-cutting machines 3,003 18,005 + 15,002 Engine lathes 2,233 19,090 + 16,857 Internal grinding machines 1,550 19,517 + 17,967 Coal 20,500 9,284 - 11,216 Tin and manufac- tures 376 617 + 241 Ferro-tungsten... 270 924 + 654 Tin plate scrap.. I 3,644 + 3,644 Lead 204 108 I 96 PSF Italy Table 4 U. 8. EXPORTS TO ITALIAN AFRICA, OCTOBER 1935, SHOWN BY MAIN CLASSI- FICATIONS Animals and animal products. $ -- Vegetable food products and beverages -- Vegetable products, inedible, except fiber and wood 1,247 Textile fibers and manufactures -- Wood and paper - Nonmetallic minerals 118,126 Metals and manufactures, except machin- ery and vehicles. 1,381 Machinery and vehicles 206,511 Motor trucks, busses, and chassis, 36,116 Automobile parts and accessories, 12,115 Trailers 118,980 Chemicals and related products 25,868 Benzol 25,868 Miscellaneous 1,475 Total exports 354,608 Table 5 U. S. EXPORTS TO ETHIOPIA OCTOBER 1935, SHOWN BY MAIN CLASSIFICATIONS Animals and animal products $ -- Vegetable food products and beverages -- Vegetable products, inedible, except fiber and wood - Textile fibers and manufactures - Wood and paper -- Nonmetallic minerals, -- Metals and manufactures, except machinery and vehicles -- Machinery and vehicles 361 Chemicals and related products 500 Miscellaneous - Total exports 861 FOOTNOTE TO TABLES 1, 2 AND 3, AND 4 & 5 DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER November 8, 1935. The monthly statistics of American foreign trade are not strictly on a calendar month basis. The figures al- ways include a certain amount of trade which actually took place in a previous time period. The figures for any one month usually include some shipments which were actually made in the previous month, and do not include some shipments made towards the end of the month dealt with (these appear under the heading of a later month). Therefore, in order to have the October statistics of our import and export trade more closely comparable with previous periods the figures in the preceding tables were left uncorrected. Figures are available, however, showing what part of the trade recorded in the preceding table as being October trade actually was shipped earlier than October. These figures are as follows: Animals and animal products $ 3,636 Vegetable food products and bev- erages 944 Textile fibers and manufactures 184,810 Wood and paper 44,956 Non-metallic minerals 39,006 Metals and manufactures, except machinery and vehicles 263,499 Machinery and vehicles 208,819 Chemicals and related products 31,039 Miscellaneous 540 TOTAL $777,249 Arrangements - 2 - What actual shipments in October still remain to be reported cannot be estimated with sufficient reliability at this moment; they would be an offset to the figures of earlier trade included in the October figures. Arrangements have been worked out whereby future records of monthly trade with the belligerents will be more closely adjusted to the actual trade of each month. EA:HF:LWW PSF Pulice Italy DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE UNDER SECRETARY November 14, 1935 Mr. Secretary: In view of the information brought us by Mr. Hack- worth this morning as a result of the discussions in New York last night, my feelings are as follows: 1. The argument of the representatives of the ten big oil companies that while they would abide by the wishes of the Federal Government and would, there- fore, be willing to refrain from exporting oil to the belligerents, the 120 odd American companies certainly would not do 80. These are small companies purely out for gain and would undoubtedly take advantage of the situation created by the failure of the big companies to export. 2. We do not yet know precisely what sanctions are going into effect nor how far-reaching they will be. We know enough to presume that there will be a flow of materials into Italy from Germany, Rumania, Hungary, Austria, Brazil and the Argentine to make it exceedingly doubtful whether there will be any severity in the sanctions as prescribed. The question is whether the United States should undertake to penalize American -2- American trade before we have any knowledge as to the real situation resulting from the action of the League on the 18th instant. It does not seem to me quite fair to American trade to put in "on the spot" in this way. Therefore, I recommend that we wait until after the League has acted before making the appeal. With especial reference to oils, I do not like the idea of putting the President in the position of making an appeal to the oil industries of the country, which 1s not respected by the smaller companies and therefore not effective, nor do I like the idea, at this moment, before the League action for the President to "black list" the exporting companies by announcing their names. In brief I believe that it will be wiser to await the result of the League action in this case rather than to act somewhat precipitously now. It may even be wiser to await action by our Congress in order that the Gov ernment may be in a position to exercise real restraint upon the export of raw materials - a restraint which will be equally effective upon all companies exporting raw materials. ur William Phillips. DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY Confidential for the President from Secretary Hull. Nov. 23, 1935. PSF Italy At Warm Springs, Ga., November 27, 1935. Dear Cordell:- That memorandum of your conversation with the Italian Ambassador on November twenty- second is a classic. You did a splendid job in making our position clear and, at the same time, pointing out the very untenable position in which Italy has deliberately placed herself. In regard to the 1871 treaty, there is, of course, the undoubted fact that Italy, by a deliberate violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, made strict compliance with the old treaty 1m- possible. Furthermore, I very much doubt whether the language in the 1871 treaty was ever intended to apply to a situation in which one nation was engaged in a war in which that nation was the aggressor. As ever yours, The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington, D. 0. PSF F Italy November 22, 1935. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND THE ROYAL ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, SIGNOR AUGUSTO ROSSO The Italian Ambassador called by his own request and after some preliminary exchanges of the usual nature he said that he called upon instruction of his Government to lay before me two views which his Govern- ment supports; that he was not handing me & note or any other formal instrument of writing; that he had re- duced to writing the oral conversation that he is pro- posing to conduct. The Ambassador thereupon proceeded to read to me the typewritten copy of his proposed oral conversation: "1 - The various official declarations and public statements issued from the Federal Govern- ment during the last two months with regard to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, and par- ticularly the statement of the Secretary of State of November 15, cannot be interpreted otherwise than an extension and aggravation, to the principal detriment of Italy, of the meaning of the Neutrality Act of August 31, 1935. "Although these declarations and state- ments apply, formally and theoretically, to both the contending parties, it 1s well known that their practical result would be actually to impair the freedom of trade only with respect to Italy. "Such -2- "Such an assumption has been confirmed by the fact that the statement made by the Secretary of State on November 15 specifically mentions certain commodities which Italy has been used to buy in the United States and which, being largely employed for non military purposes, are essential to the needs of the economic and social life of any civilized country. "We maintain that any measure or policy aiming at, or resulting in, imposing restric- tions which actually are detrimental to only one of the contending parties, goes against the spirit of neutrality. "2 - We maintain also that the above mentioned statement of the Secretary of State 1s contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Treaty signed between the United States and Italy in 1871 - and still in force - which reciprocally guarantees each contracting party a 'complete freedom of commerce and navigation'. "No justification whatsoever for the 11mi- tation of the freedom guaranteed by the Treaty can be found in any international Act dealing with the status of neutrals. Reference is made in this respect to the Hague Convention of 1907. "Such a limitation, if and when applied, is bound to assume the meaning of a 'sanction' and therefore the positive character of an unfriendly act. November 22, 1935." The Ambassador paused briefly here and there in the course of the reading to elaborate with one or two sen- tences, but they did not change the purport of the in- strument of writing. He then indicated his desire to answer any question or listen to any comment I might see fit to offer in case I desired to do so. I addressed the -3- the Ambassador and said that, of course, he and his Government should keep in mind all of the essential phases of the situation as it relates to this country; that in all of the past the most cordial and friendly relations have existed between the people of this coun- try and those of Italy; that the people of this country today do not feel personally unfriendly towards the people of Italy, but that they are vigorously and almost wildly against war and are at all hazards in favor of keeping out of the present war; that, if those partici- pating in the war were double cousins and twin brothers of the American people, the people of this country would be just as violently and eternally against the war and in favor of peace and, above all considerations, as far in favor of keeping A away from and out of the war B.B would be possible. I said that it was in these circum- stances and in this highly wrought up state of the public mind of this country that the Neutrality Act of last August vas enacted and the Executive Department was directed to pursue the policy of neutrality which it provided; that this mandate of Congress was promptly put into effect when the President declared a state of war to exist between Ethiopia and Italy and declared an embargo on the shipment of arms, ammition and implements of war to either of the belligerents; that at - 4 - at the time heavy pressure was brought to bear upon the State Department also to include a number of prime and essential war materials out of which finished arms, ammunition and implements of war might be made in large quantities over night; that since that time insistent demands representing large groups of senti- ment in this country have been made upon the Executive Department to include these war materials in the embargo issued under the Neutrality Act against arms, ammuni- tion and implements of war. I added, in this connection, that I hoped that the Ambassador and his Government would recall the experience of the people of this coun- try in ways that will shed much light upon the state of mind and the viewpoint of the people and of this Government in accordance with it, and that is that our country sent 2,000,000 men to Europe to fight for Italy and other countries at an enormous cost to this Govern- ment and this country; that we likewise loaned Italy much money at the time and afterwards; that we later made almost a nominal settlement with the Italian Gov- ernment at twenty-five cents on the dollar, all of which, with interest, is due and unpaid, to say nothing of other vast indebtedness in Europe; that I have been besought dur- ing past months to demand aggressively, if necessary, payment -5- payment by the Italian Government of this indebtedness in- stead of its spending hundreds of millions in this Ethiopian conquest. I said that I had not done 80 thus far, but until this time I had been willing, on a suitable occasion, to sit down with the Ambassador and seek a satisfactory adjustment of the indebtedness. I then said that with the extremely disastrous and unsatisfactory experience of the American people in going to Europe and aiding Italy and other countries to the extent they did, they are almost wild in their demand that we not only avoid being drawn into the war but that we stay entirely away from the same; that the people of this country are in no state of mind to engage in any activities or steps except those primarily looking towards keeping out of the war and in a secondary or subordinate sense mani- festing proper interest in peace and the shortening of the duration of the war in the light of our obligations under the Kellogg Pact; that it is in this highly wrought up state of mind of the American people that the Govern- ment of Italy now arraigns this Government upon both a charge of unneutrality and of violating the provisions of the treaty between the United States and Italy of 1871 pledging complete freedom of commerce and naviga- tion. I said that these are surprising as well as serious MUDIT coudges besta beAmout -6- serious complaints in the circumstances. I said I might remark here that from the outset this Government has pursued its own separate, independent course and initiative with respect to all phases of the controversy between Ethiopia and Italy; that we have had no agree- ments whatsoever, directly or indirectly, with Geneva or London or Paris; that they did not know of any of the steps this Government had taken until they read about the same in the press; that this Government be- lieves that it has been consistent in its course and policies and naturally feels constrained to adhere to them; that the Government, as stated, placed in opera- tion its embargoes and at the same time the President warned all Americans against any business or economic contacts with any of the belligerents, except at their own risk. The President and myself in public statements during the weeks that followed made it clear that this warning statement of the President was intended, generally, to discourage any business or economic relationships between our nationals and the belligerents; that nothing further was said by the President, myself or the Govern- ment officials relative to business dealings with the belligerents until some days ago when the official statistics showed that some five essential war materials were I/Ve #1831 -7- were being exported from this country to belligerents in abnormal quantities compared with similar shipments during any recent period, and that I thereupon made a further official statement, in which I said that this class of business was directly contrary to the policy of the Government in opposition to selling war materials to belligerents, which policy was held and believed to be strictly within the spirit of the Neutrality Act; that nothing further has been said by the President or myself with respect to trade relations between this country and the belligerents. I then said that the Ambassador must realize that just as soon R.S the Ameri- can people discovered that abnormal quantities of essen- tial war materials were being shipped on an increasing scale to belligerents without protest but with the silent acquiescence of the proper Government officials, there would probably be & storm of criticism and 8. loud demand for the immediate convening of Congress to take adequate steps in the premises, and that the result scarcely beyond any question would be a swift passage of a drastic not dissolving every possible relationship with the belligerents pending the war. I repeatedly expressed surprise that the Italian Government would make a complaint against this Government in all the circumstances in the severe language that it does. I inquired VIII 2 ASI -8- inquired whether and what the Italian Government had said to Germany in the light of st more sweeping and inflexible prohibition of business relations with the belligerents than this Government has taken. The Ambas- eador replied that he did not know whether his Govern- ment had made any representations to Germany. I com- mented rather emphatically and stated that I had seen no published account of any complaint whatsoever, and that it was therefore all the more strange to me to read this rather harsh complaint against this Govern- ment; that it seemed all the more surprising when both the Ambassador and I know that the bitterest critics of the Executive branch of the Government and the most extreme isolationists who are demanding that all Ameri- cans stay entirely away from the war zone do not in the slightest question the integrity of the neutrality poli- cies of this Government 8.8 they are being carried out in accordance with the letter or the spirit, or both, of the Neutrality Act. I said that it was really astonishing to find that a government cannot be neutral without being attacked and a demand made to supply war materials to 1. belligerent under penalty of being charged with an unfriendly act. The Ambassador emphasized the view that the manner in which this Government is con- ducting -9- ducting its policy of neutrality operates as a dis- crimination against Italy. I replied that under the law of neutrality in the past any belligerent controlling the high seas was usually at an advantage over its enemy with respect to obtaining goods from neutral countries, that a poor belligerent without means of purchasing and paying for supplies from neutrals was at a disad- vantage under the operation of neutrality laws, and likewise where one country has or can produce its mill- tary supplies and another is without such facilities or equipment, the latter suffers under the operation of the neutrality law. I then pointed out that, in fact, under the policy this Government 1s now pursuing neither Italy nor Ethiopia should be securing war materials with the result that both countries are 88 nearly on a parity in this respect as it is possible for them to be. The charge of discrimination, therefore, does not apply. I repeatedly inquired of the Ambassador why his Govern- ment does not sit down with others and work out this difficulty in a peaceful manner. He made very slight and casual comment in reply. The Ambassador sought to emphasize the idea that the attitude of his Government was not fully understood in this country and that it had been misrepresented to a considerable extent. I commented - 10 - commented that his Government might well have thought of all of these and other unsatisfactory phases before getting into the war. I stated as emphatically as possible that these trading incidents to which the Italian Government refers and about which it complains are entirely trivial compared with the real problems and deep concern which the Ethiopian-Italian war causes this Government; that the Ambassador must realize the awful repercussions that make their immediate appearance in far and remote parts of the world, but which are calculated to give this nation and perhaps others, in- cluding Italy, unimaginable troubles for a generation. The Ambassador immediately indicated that he knew the Far East was in mind. I added that the second condition which is giving this Government immense concern relates to the possible spread of the war to any number of other countries at almost any time with unimaginable troubles and injuries and consequences to this country as well as others; that it is, therefore, all the more deplorable to see the Italian nation moving forward with the war, which it must realize threatens to create these terrific problems and conditions so far-reaching that the imagina- tion cannot grasp their possibilities. I inquired why these considerations were not in the mind of the Italian Government -11- Government before it went into the war and again re- iterated my surprise that the Italian Government, on the contrary, is upbraiding this Government virtually because it is thus 80 deeply concerned and is striving in every possible way to keep entirely away from and out of the var. I remarked then that the Ambassador well recalls that the President and I pleaded with and almost prayed with Mr. Mussolini to keep out of the war but that he ignored our plea and now seems to ex- pect us to furnish him with war supplies while he prosecutes the war ad libitum. I added that regardless of anything or anybody this nation proposed to stay out of and as far away from the war as possible, and that we feel most deeply the indifference with which the world is subjected to the threat of of general war and with the frightful repercussions in the Far East; that this Government is keeping its attitude flexible under the Neutrality Act and the spirit of that Act which is being carried out in connection with the policy of opposition to the supplying of certain war materials to the belligerents; that if the war should spread, for example, this Government will be in an attitude to take further steps relative to both miscellaneous trade and the five war materials which I recently referred to in 8. statement opposing their shipment to the belligerents; that - 12 - that this Government cannot think of any course or any precautionary plans short of these, in view of the fact that aeroplane bases, naval bases and submarine bases dot the entire Mediterranean section with the result that almost at any time a conflagration might be touched off; that it is in the light of these dangerous possibilities, which to the American people seem to be probabilities, that this country is almost madly opposed to our Government taking the slightest risk of being drawn into the war by permitting its nationals to trade promiscuously with belligerents in and about this dangerous war zone, especially in essen- tial war materials. I stated that during the past three years I had almost worn myself out physically in an effort to aid in world economic rehabilitation so that Italy and other countries would have an adequate amount of international trade to afford contentment to their respective populations, and that the Ambas- sador could not begin to imagine the deep disappoint- ment I feel at the effort to renew the practice which all nations have recently undertaken to abandon, relating to that of military aggression by any and all coun- tries at any and all times, and that, of course, if one country is to be allowed to violate this new policy of the pacific settlement of disputes, then every Lean press Joet THE from -13- every country may do 80 with consequences that one shudders to contemplate. I pointed out to the Ambas- sador the fact that the League of Nations organization at Geneva solemnly adjudged an aggressor in this war, while the United States did not; that the Geneva agency seeks to aid Ethiopia, which the United States does not; that the Geneva agency seeks to embargo all imports from Italy, which this Government does not; that this Government, as stated, is pursuing its own separate course without understanding or collaboration with other governments or peace agencies, and that in these circumstances it is not only difficult to understand the Italian complaint but I repeat that it is surpris- ing to contemplate it; that the mere fact that there are some concurring nots on the part of the League of Nations in pursuing sanctions and of the United States in frankly carrying out its policy of neutrality is, in the circumstances, no basis whatever for a charge against the United States of unneutrality and of un- friendliness. This makes 8. mere coincidence or its absence determine the question of whether the United States is or 16 not neutral, in the eyes of the Italian Government. In other words, if there were no attempted sanotions at Geneva the United States would be entirely neutral are -14- neutral in carrying out its present policies of oppos- ing the sale of war materials to belligerents. I added that when I issued my statement on the 15th of November, about which complaint is now made, I did not know and, in my opinion, no one here knows yet what the League of Nations may or may not do regarding concerted action to curb exports to Italy of oil and other prime war materials, and yet here is a charge that this Govern- ment is engaged in an unfriendly act as stated. The Ambassador said that this step, in his opinion, would be taken on the 38th of this month at Geneva. I 0011-> mented that, of course, that remains to be seen. I inquired of the Ambassador why his Government had not taken $100,000,000 to Ethiopia and brought back a key D. to the entire Empire instead of expending several hundred million dollars in its military conquest with all of the worry and threat of danger to the balance of the world. He replied that Italy had been attempting for forty years to effect colonizations in Ethiopia, but without success. I repeated that the people of this country are LS yet entirely friendly to the Italian people but added that if his note should be made public in the United States, an inflamed public that nobody could control or curb would be almost instantly aroused end that, of course, the pressure of 8. surprising charge such TM eyes FUR woner -15- such 19 he is bringing against this Government will in due time make the American people personally hostile to the people of Italy, and naturally it would endure long in their minds. I took up the complaint of viola- tion by this Government of the treaty of freedom of commerce and navigation of 1871 with Italy and at once stated that I was satisfied that international and all other law makes it possible for either country a party to this commercial treaty to remain neutral in the event the other country becomes involved in war; that it is inconceivable that either Italy or the United States in an ordinary commercial treaty signed away its right to remain neutral in case of war on the part of the other and that that is the precise reason this Govern- ment is undertaking to pursue and has no other 1dea than to pursue it; that, furthermore, with both Italy and America signatories of the Paris Peace Pact with the solemn obligations it imposes upon each, it is not possible to understand how Italy can go to war and announce to the United States Government that despite the Paris Paot it must supply Italy with materials of war under penalty of being guilty of an unfriendly act, as stated. I remarked further, without discussing the merits, that the American people cannot be convinced that -16- that the Italian Government is not under most solemn obligations to keep the peace under three or four treaties, and it is incomprehensible to them to find Italy demanding of this Government that to be neutral it must furnish war supplies and that if it fails to do 80 it is guilty of an unfriendly not. I repeatedly emphasized my great surprise and incomprehension and repeatedly inquired why his Government had not thought of these phases before it went into the war. I finally said that, while entirely satisfied as to the lack of interference of the treaty of 1871 with the present course of this Government, I would, 28 a. matter of courtesy to the Ambassador, again give some further attention to the authorities, although I have no doubt that I have examined them fully and accurately. The Ambassador did not attempt any aggressive utterances and I endeavored throughout the conversation to make the impression upon him that our nation and most other peace loving nations were greatly pained and hurt to find their traditional friends, the Italian people, involved in this war despite the minerous treaties of peace to which the Government 10 a party, and despite the awful menage to the peace of the world which this war creates. 8 CH:MK PSF department OF STATE paula Italy - 4935 ASSISTANT SECRETARY (5)(2) (5) December 11, 1935. My dear Miss LeHand: I am again referring to the matter of the shipment of oil to the Italian Government on the tanker ULYSSES. Since our telephone conversation yesterday afternoon, I have ascer- tained definitely that as early as September, 1935, the owner of the vessel was expecting to arrange for such a transaction, and he placed the tanker in dry dock, where it was recondition- ed at an expense of certainly not less than $25,000 and per- haps as much as $40,000; that on October 25 the vessel was chartered to the Reed Company for a voyage to Italy, and that on the same date the Italian interests entered into an agree- ment with the Reed Company for the vessel to carry a cargo of oil to the Italian Government. If the carriage of the oil is forbidden, the Reed Company will be liable to a suit for dam- ages; the owner of the vessel will almost certainly look to our Government for the payment of damages; and the prospect of the vessel being kept in business so as to afford its owner some opportunity of paying the Government's mortgage will be gone. It is thought by the Department of Commerce and the Department of State that we should not stand in the way of the transaction being completed. You will bear in mind that October 25 was prior to the announcement being made with reference to the shipment to the belligerents of five specified articles, one of - 2 - of which is oil. The only reason I am writing you is that I wish the President to have all the facts, and if he desires to do so, confirm the understanding you gave me yesterday that he leaves the matter to the determination of the two de- partments mentioned. I hope on receipt of this you may be able to see the President within at least an hour or so, and telephone me. Yours very sincerely, A-M RWM:HM P.F girly Drawd DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON February 6, 1936 My dear Mr. President: With reference to inquiries which you have made previously concerning conditions in Italian East Africa I believe that you may be interested in reading the attached report from our Military Attache at Rome, re- counting a conversation which he had with Mr. W. B. Courtney, a representative of COLLIER'S WEEKLY, who has just returned from a three weeks' visit to Eritrea. Faithfully yours, Enclosure: Report from Military Attaché at Rome. The President, The White House. Department of State NE BUREAU DIVISION ENCLOSURE TO Letter drafted ADDRESSED TO The President, The White House. # * - - number - - 1-195 PSF Italy Enclosure No. 1 (Report No. 2) to despatch No. 1471 of Jan. 3, 1936, from the Embassy at Rome. G-2 Report. 6920. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. ITALY (COMBAT). Subject: Minor Field Operations. Visit to Theater of Operations by American Correspondent. Mr. W. B. Courtney, representing Collier's has just return- ed to Rome after being three weeks in Eritrea and Tigre. The following notes were made during a conversation with him concern- ing his trip. They represent of course Mr. Courtney's impressions but are perhaps worthwhile as indicating an objective view of some of the details in East Africa as he saw them. Mr. Courtney left Naples on November 18th, 1935, on the S. S. "SANNIO" of 9,900 tons, carrying Marshal Badoglio and 2,500 workmen. Marshal Badoglie took this boat rather than one of the Italian liners with better accommodations as an example to the Black Shirt elements of his command. Conditions aboard the "SANNIO" were far from ideal. The 2,500 workmen were crowded below decks. During a storm in the Red Sea just before reaching Massaua it was necessary to station Carabinieri at each of the hatches to prevent the workmen from coming on deck. Toilet facilities and water supply were inadequate and the living accommodations for these workmen were described by Mr. Courtney as nothing short of filthy. At Massaua two old tankers were tied up at wharfs and drums were being filled from these ships and stacked in a dump adjoin- ing the docks. Every ounce of gasoline was concentrated in this one dump. It is estimated that the supply is sufficient for about 3 months. The Italian supply service in estimating its require- ments failed to take into consideration the fact that the trucks would have to operate almost continually in low gear, and conse- quently what was expected to be a year's supply will probably not last beyond the present dry season. Sanitary condition in Massaua leave much to be desired. The port is crowded with men and supplies. There is only one public toilet in the town and no sewage system. The streets are used indiscriminately as latrines. No warehousing facilities exist. Supplies are stacked in open dumps and when rains occur prior to removal of supplies to the plateau, large quantities are spoiled. There are no hotels or other sleeping accommodations excepting one or two freighters anchored in the harbor and used to accommodate casualties awaiting shipment to Italy. These freighters are so infested with vermin and bugs as to be almost uninhabitable. Press correspondents and others who were acquainted with the situation preferred to stay ashore until they could get aboard a transport. Even here it is next to impossible to sit down anywhere because of the accumulated filth. Many have found it more agreeable to seek accommodations in the native brothels rather than go aboard the freighters. Communication From: M.A. Rome, Italy. Report No. 14,986. January 3, 1936. - 2 - Communication between Massaua and Adowa depends on one road and this road has been very badly cut up by the heavy travel. The stretch between Nefasit and Asmara is especially bad. It is out out of the side of the mountain with straight drops of over 1000 feet. It is narrow and passing is only done with great difficulty. For a while traffic was controlled on this road - one way during certain hours - but so many exceptions were made that the control has now broken down completely and traffic moves both ways, passing on such turnouts as could be built. Heavy traffic has ground the road surfacing to powder and the shoulders give way under the weight of the trucks. Accidents are frequent. Often several trucks, their drivers blinded by the dust, have followed each other over the bank. The same is true of the newly constructed roads from Asmara to the front. Casualties due to road accidents have exceeded those due to battle. In one 31 mile stretch of road (a section of the Senafe-Adigrat road) there are 1700 hair-pin turns. On another section of the road between Asmara and Adowa Mr. Courtney counted 27 trucks down the embank- ment. He came to one truck fully loaded and bound for the front which had broken down and after some delay this truck was rolled over the bank with its entire cargo. He stated that the casualties among trucks due to accidents and breakdown ran as high as 5% per day, many of these of course being repaired and returned to service. While en-route from Asmara to Adowa Mr. Courtney passed many 75 m. guns and 105 mm. howitzers returning from Adowa. It is not possible to use anything except pack artillery in this zone. There is a fertile plateau around Axum and between Adowa and Axum. Other than that the country that he saw is not even suit- able for grazing. Mr. Courtney got as far forward as the Dam- beguina Pass. He left before the fighting which took place in this vicinity the middle of December. He subsequently learned that the Italian advanced elements which were driven back from Mai Timchet were blocked in this pass and suffered severe casual- ties. The Italians were similarly ambushed during the advance from Adigrat to Macalle in a canyon north of Azbi. The Danakil column (Mariotti group of natives) which consisted of two battalions of Askaris and about 1000 Danakils marched into a gorge without sufficient reconnaissance and were trapped in the gorge, suffer- ing heavy casualties. Attempts to communicate by radio with the Corps Commander, General Santini, failed because the radio sets were not functioning. The column remained in the gorge through- out the day and night but the Abyssinians withdrew without attempting to annihilate it. The attack was such a surprise that the supply units (combat trains) had to abandon their sup- plies and close up in order to avoid being cut off. The column continued on to the village of Azbi without food or water. The radio equipment was repaired and a message gotten through to the Corps Commander who managed to transport supplies by air but the supplies were dropped at the wrong place and were taken by the natives before the troops could get to them. This column had to rejoin the corps by its own efforts before it could receive any assistance. The Askaris are good soldiers. As one Italian officer put it: "They are a lot better than the Black Shirts". The Black Shirts have made lots of noise in East Africa but have not been effective as combat troops. The regular soldiers are much better. Morale - 3 - Morale among the Italian troops is not high. There is a great deal of the usual grumbling, but also a lot of real dissatis- faction with the existing conditions. If it was hoped that many of the troops now in East Africa would want to settle there, the hope will not be realized, for almost to & man the Italian soldiers would like nothing better than a transport home. The Askaris have borne the brunt of the fighting to date and in consequence have adopted a rather superior attitude toward the Italians. Mr. Courtney was 111 for a time in the hospital at Aksum. He describes this hospital as without any sanitary arrangements at all. The only latrines are open straddle-trenches, and bathing facilities do not exist. A moat around the city contains some fresh water and is used indiscriminately for drinking purposes, sewage disposal, watering animals and washing pigs and goats. The natives seem to have attained an immunity to typhoid but there is lots of syphilis and African ulcers. The white troops have suf- fered somewhat from pneumonia, but on the whole their health has been surprisingly good considering the conditions. As soon as Marshal Badoglio assumed command, all war corres- pondents have been ordered back to Asmara. There they get very little information. Frequently the official communiques are not delivered to them until several days after they have been publish- ed in Rome. Mr. Courtney feels that the Italians are now definitely stopped in their present positions and will not be able to ad- vance again this season. He feels that Marshal Badoglio will be fortunate if he can hold on to territory now occupied. The aviation has been of little real value. The country is so vast and there are so many opportunities to hide in the brush and among the rocks that air observers find it impossible to pick up even large bodies of native troops. The natives are becoming accustomed to the Italian aircraft and know how to avoid being seen. They have even gone 80 far as to prepare traps for the Italian aviation by setting up a camp in a valley, then abandon- ing the camp and taking positions on the steep sides of the mountains from which they can fire from above on any aircraft attempting a low altitude attack on the camp. As a result Italian air attacks now are being made from an altitude of 10,000 feet. The tanks have been of somewhat more value, especially in advancing against villages, but the country has been too rough for their extended use. NOTE: This picture drawn by Mr. Courtney may be very much overdrawn. It is reported for what it may be worth as the im- pression of an American journalist gained from a three weeks' visit to the soene of operations in East Africa. NORMAN E. FISKE Major, Cavalry, U.S.A., Asst. Military Attache. file PSF Italy THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON State June 30, 1936. Dear Mr. President: It appears that the United Press gave out yesterday a somewhat misleading report, which has found its way into the Italian press. The Embassy has this morning sent us the item, as it appears in this morning's papers in Rome, and I attach a copy of the despatch. Inasmuch as it was announced from St. Louis yesterday that Long had resigned, it occurs to me that possibly you may care, in your press conference, to confirm the fact of his resignation and at the same time say something to the effect that, in due course, you would make an announcement of a new American Ambassador to Rome, whose appointment would be in the ordinary routine. The United Press statement that a "special ambassador" is to be sent from this country to Italy for The President The White House. 2 for certain special purposes, perhaps might well be disposed of as soon as possible before it gains headway. I am expecting a reply from Rome at any moment for the requested agrement for the new Ambassador, but meanwhile, as is 80 often the case, the United Press is giving out another statement mentioning my name in this connection. Needless to say, I have said nothing to the press whatsoever. Faithfully yours, WCNS79 THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO SEND UNDERSECRETARY PHILLIPS TO ROME, THE UNITED PRESS SAYS UNDER A COPYRIGHT. PHILLIPS WILL ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT AMERICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE NEW ITALIAN EMPIRE WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRINCIPLE OF NOT RECOGNIZING TERRITORIAL GAINS MADE BY FORCE. THE IMPORTANCE WITH WHICH BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY REGARD THE ETHIOPIAN PROBLEM IS SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT THEY ARE EXCHANGING UNDERSECRETARIES OF STATE AS ENVOYS. ITALY HAS JUST APPOINTED FULVIO SUVICH, PHILLIP'S ITALIAN COUNTERPART, AS AMBASSADOR TO THIS COUNTRY. HE WILL REPLACE AUGUSTO ROSSO. 6/30.-RB134P PSF Italy JS Gray ROME Dated June 30, 1936 Rec'd 7:00 a.m. Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 241, June 30, 10 a.m. Following United Press. report under Washington date line of June 29th published in this morning's papers: "From a most reliable source it is learned that a high official of the Federal Government will go to Rome in the near future to discuss and settle with the Italian Government questions of direct interest to the United States which have arisen as a consequence of the Italian annexation of Ethiopia. At the State Department there is neither confirm- ation nor denial of the rumor that the American Ambass- ador to Rome Breckinridge Long is being at least tem- porarily replaced by special ambassador. Long, it will be recalled, is still in & hospital at Rochester, Minn- esota, and has asked to be replaced in his mission to Rome." KIRK JS IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO My ocar Mr Trendent, years J have often wmembered our In the left three exchange of letters of 1433 , and regrettes that the course of events hy not allowes the first contacts then extablisher bet ween ourselves in our intention. to be purpres with the entirentry wich was It if therefore with the repent interfaction that J avoil myself of the occasion presentes by your triumphae relection to the Residency ito comvery to you my Warmat ungrotulating for this expression of missue that your great wnk has met with I all, oerive to express to you my very time withes fn the ere-greater proprity , with - I - J am /me- - the Uniler 11ty will achieve under your enlightenent guidance. Hoping that our relating how re-e/tablisher, may not undergo any further interingation ,J dm my Demth Tressment very hundy yours Munnhii Roma 19 novembre 1y36- XV IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO STANDARD FORM No. 14A APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT MARCH 10, 1925 FROM The White PSF: staly Mashington TELEGRAM OFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES files friend CABLEGRAM U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 72082 January 27, 1937. H. E. AUGUSTO ROSSO HOTEL PRINCE DE GALLES PARIS MY WARM GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES TO YOU BOTH ROOSEVELT Obticive ATSCH IF DIE LOB THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON January 25, 1937. The Secretary of State encloses for the informa- tion of the President copies of the telegrams indicated below. Since some of these telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if the enclosures could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropri- ate disposition. Enclosures: Telegram No. -, Paris. (dated January 25, 12:15 p.m.) U GRAY Paris Dated January 25, 1937 Rec'd 12:15 p.m. Secretary of State Washington PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT: Rosso, former Italian Ambassador to Washington, is to be married in Paris on the morning of January 28 to an American lady, Mrs. Bunker. I am to be witness at the marriage. From a conversation I had with Rosso I know that he would be deeply moved if you should send him a personal telegram of good wishes. His address is Hotel Prince de Galles. BULLITT CSB:HPD FAST DIRECT RCA RADIOGRAM R.C.A. COMMUNICATIONS. INC. A RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA SUBSIDIARY TO ALL THE WORLD - BETWEEN IMPORTANT U.S. CITIES - TO SHIPS AT SEA WN15CL RFK604 PARIS 32 28 NFT RECEIVED AT 1112 CONNECTICUT RCA AVENUE Ps= ITaly LC PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT file WASHINGTON, D. C. WHITE HOUSE 1937 JAN 28 AM 8 51 AT WASHINGTON STANDARD TIME DEEPLY TOUCHED BY YOUR KIND MESSAGE WE BEG YOU TO ACCEPT OUR MOST HEARTFELT THANKS AND THE EXPRESSION OF OUR SINCERE DEVOTION FRANCES AND AUGUSTO ROSSO TELEPHONE: NATIONAL 2600 To secure prompt action on inquiries, this original RADIOGRAM should be presented at the office of R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, Inc. In telephone inquiries quote the number preceding the place of origin. FORM 112WN-W PSF.Staly Rasso Paris, February 2, 1937. Dear Miss Le Hand: I am enclosing herewith, for transmittal to the President, a letter from His Excellency Augusto Rosso, former Italian Ambassador in Washington and now Italian Ambassador in Moscow. With all good wishes and kindest regards, I remain, Hastily and sincerely yours, Offie Carmel Offie. P. S. -- All is quiet on the Seine! But l know Enclosure. somebody who feels Miss Marguerite Le Hand, like braining you Private Secretary to the President, for not writting The White House, Washington, D. C. Paris, January 29th, 1937 Dear Mr. President, Having asked the advice of my friend Bullitt as to the way a former Ambassador to Washington should follow in sending his wedding announcement to the President of the United States, the answer was : "Just write a personal letter. The President does not mind an occasional breach of the Rules of Protocol !". Following Mr. Bullitt's advice, I take the liberty of addressing to you this informal communication of my marriage with Mrs. Frances Wilkinson Bunker of Washington, formerly an American citizen, and since yesterday the Italian Ambassadress in Moscow. I wonder, Mr. President, if you happen to remember that two years ago, at the diplomatic reception His Excellency Franklin D. Roosevelt President of the United States The White House Washington, D.C. at the White House, you teased me for my delay in obeying the Duce's ukase to his diplomats : "Marry or quit!". !". This is one of the reasons why I thought I should let you know that I have actually complied with the order of my Boss ! But I have been prompted to do so also by the memory of the great kindness and friendliness you have always shown me during my mission in Washington, which makesme feel doubly happy to-day for the new tie binding me to a country and a people I have learnt to know and love. May I respectfully ask you, also in the name of my wife, to convey to Mrs. Roosevelt our deepest regards, and to accept yourself on this occasion, the assurance of our sincere devotion. Believe me, dear Mr. President, most sincerely yours Ross P.S. This Petter was already within when I had the pleasure of receiving your not grawary cable, fn wish we mush to thank you again R. PsF department OF STATE THE SECRETARY July 6, 1937. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, SIGNOR FULVIO DE SUVICH Trade Agreements Program. The Ambassador of Italy called at his own request. He had just returned from a three weeks' trip to the Pacific Coast. For several minutes we discussed what he saw and heard on this trip. He spoke of Hollywood and the different stars he met there and ended with the statement that there was a great deal of rare genius among them. I took this lead to state that unless Italy was well represented among the foremost of these geniuses it would be the first time that that great country had not been well represented among the best minds of the world in one or more lines of thought; that this re- minded me that many more of Italy's statesmen should visit this country, just as American statesmen visit Italy and other countries of Europe and other European statesmen visit this country. I then added that one of the valuable policies which contributed very much to the enthusiasm of the conference of American nations, both at Montevideo and Buenos Aires, was that each proposed DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY -3- proposed a. full and constant interchange between all of the American nations of the educational, cultural, ar- tistic and other valuable attainments of each country to the end that each would have the benefit of the best that all could produce. I then launched into the strongest possible discussion of nationalism in its extreme form, carefully distinguishing between sane, practical nationalism within reasonable limits and the extreme type which during the post-war period has con- stituted the worst disease that could overtake the human family. I repeated my illustration of a. community of families, 8.8 set forth in a radio address of mine during Foreign Trade Week, in which I pointed out what happened to a family that undertook to live 8. hermit existence without a single friend emong the families of the same community, how it stagnated and steadily became hope- lessly decadent. I said, "This is the great curse of the world today and threatens civilized nations with still more disastrous effects, unless the nations 1m- mediately begin at least to move in R. different direc- tion with 8. definite and sound program. I remarked that our entire program promulgated at Buenos Aires contains department OF STATE THE SECRETARY - 3 - contains a reasonable, practical and most urgent set of principles and policies as the single alternative to the present disastrous course of affairs in Europe, -- that 18, a peaceful settlement and adjustment and re- habilitation of all worthwhile and indispensable inter- national relationships. I said that it is nobody's fault in particular that after eighteen years the only foundation which Europe presents for a restored inter- national order is the narrowest, cutthroat, trouble- breeding method of trading and 8. wild, runaway race in armaments; but that this is in striking contrast with the program of the 21 American nations, and of several European countries which have approved it in the main, which does provide 8. solid and permanent foundation for a stable structure of business, of peace, and of govern- ment; that the single question is whether the civi- lized nations will wait until it is too late before proclaiming and pursuing this practical and constructive course. I elaborated further with my usual arguments in support of this program and especially emphasized the extreme necessity for its support by European countries generally, before too late. The DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY -4- The Ambassador interjected, for illustration and without criticism, the view that the British are engaged in an armament program which will require two years for completion, and that, considering altogether conditions in Europe, the time is not ripe just now for 8. movement in support of the program to which I was referring in some detail; that within another year or two the time would be ripe. I replied that we were talking now as citizens of the world, rather than 8.8 officials representing our two governments and that I desired his permission to discuss the other side of the view he was expressing. I then said that I had been reared in an undeveloped mountainous region, where on Saturday afternoons the neighbors gathered in and about the country store; that when I would see several of the younger element, who were still engaged in sowing their wild oats, come in armed with pistols, I knew there was most likely to be 8. cigar stub or a cigarette stub dropped accidentally during the afternoon and somebody would get hurt; that these same persons would get hurt even though none of them intended or desired 8. pistol fight; on the other hand, DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY -5- hand, that when these young men would come in of 8. Saturday afternoon with no sign of firearms at all, everyone breathed 8. sigh of relief because of the assurance there would be no violence undertaken during the day. I said, "Human nature among statesmen and among nations is very much the same. Furthermore, all of the nations never get fully armed under a policy of rearmament races; one or more always desires longer time to get more fully armed and equipped; and, in the end, en explosion inevitably occurs." I con- tinued, "This is the situation in Europe today. It is to avoid just such 8. cataclysm that the 21 American nations have offered a program and are pleading to all other civilized nations to embrace it and give it sup- port without a day's delay." I referred to the recent statements on economic and military peace made by Mussolini and said that these gave hope and gratifica- tion to all -- the only trouble was that the masses of the people everywhere, within almost 24 hours, forget and that, therefore, it is necessary that the program for business restoration and peace must be preached each week by the important statesmen of each country; that department OF STATE THE SECRETARY - 6 - that I desired to request the Ambassador again to tell Mussolini how much we appreciated these statements of his but that we profoundly hope he or his statesmen will deliver 8. speech along these lines each week. I said that there was never before such an opportunity for some important country in Europe to furnish leadership with just this sort of a program as I had outlined; that 8 few addresses proclaiming it and supporting it would result in an amazing awakening of peace and good neighbor sentiment and that a wave of grateful public sentiment would sweep over Europe and over the entire Western world. I said, "This government is keeping entirely away from the political difficulties in Europe. It is preserving neutrality with respect to both politi- cal and military activities and complications. We are hoping and praying we may be able to keep 3,000 miles away from any undesirable experiences in Europe. We have 8. rather definite neutrality act which 18 very inflexible in certain respects, and we are assuming that no governments - - such as the British, the Russian, the German, the French, the Italian, or any other -- will say or do enough officially to require the carrying into operation of the neutrality act." The Ambassador department OF STATE THE SECRETARY - 7 - The Ambassador was not very vocal in reply to this and did not take issue or offer definite comment except, by inference, to the effect that nothing of this nature was contemplated so far 8.8 he knew. He again came back to the question of the time not being propitious for 8. movement in support of an alternative program for econ- omic and peace restoration. I replied that if each nation waits until the time is exactly right from its standpoint, then I must again repeat that the time never would become propitious; that the experience of recent years in Europe clearly demonstrates this view; that it has not been possible for the nations of Europe to settle any one or two of the 7 or 8 point program involved, or, in other words, the situation is merely drifting amidst increasing turbulence and uproar in Europe, 8.8 well as in certain other parts of the world; that the develop- ment of a. broader background and a more favorable psychology is probably vital to a broad and successful attack upon the numerous problems presented; that our method of approach and our championship in the Western hemisphere of the Buenos Aires program should be a splendid example; that I could offer no better illustra- tion of what I had in mind than to say that if Italy and other important countries of Europe were preaching our department OF STATE THE SECRETARY - 8 - our Buenos Aires program today, they and the 26 other governments, parties to the non-intervention pact, would meet in London on next Friday with a softened state of mind, with a friendlier spirit and one of mutual conces- sion, and with a strong disposition to find ways for the complete settlement of the matters of difference before they ceased their efforts or adjourned their meeting; that this is in wide contrast to a. meeting next Friday where there may be just a little aloofness from each other, a little too much suspicion of each other's motives and purposes and a lack of that confidence and neighborly spirit which is 80 necessary on the occa- sion of great crises; that, in brief, the preachment and the championship of a program such as pointed out by me was probably indispensable to the development of the necessary psychology among statesmen and nations to deal adequately and promptly with present emergency problems; that statesmen must develop an interest and 8. disposition and a will to cooperate in a broad and flexible manner in support of a basic program of peace and business restoration -- otherwise that it will not be possible to induce nations to halt their present armament races and to suppress their present suspicions and lack of trust in DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY - 9 - in each other to an extent sufficient to enable them to cooperate in support of a desirable program. The Ambassador took no issue with this view but seemed to be much interested. I elaborated here on the general situation in Europe, referring to it as serious and what many would call dangerous. I remarked that either another war or a deep-seated economic panic would be utterly destructive of all that is worthwhile in the affairs of the western world, and yet absolutely nothing in Europe is being done in the way of permanent planning in the direction of peace and general stability. I said that today there are probably 4 million wage-earners in Germany engaged in armament production, who, with their families, com- prise 15 to 20 million of the entire German population of 70 million; that relative numbers in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, France, and other countries, are likewise engaged; that within another eighteen months, when the resources of most countries necessary for further increased armaments are exhausted, it would not be humanly possible to find other gainful and productive employment for all the millions and millions and millions of wage-earners now engaged in military production; and that DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY - 10 - that yet, with the roar of the economic and the military Niagara below, now within distinct hearing, and with the certain knowledge that the happening of either catastrophe would be fatal, nations are drifting and drifting and drifting with no broad or permanent or peaceful planning. The Ambassador again came back to the idea that the armament workers could a year or two hence be gradually transferred to productive industry. I said that I must distinctly differ on this point; that noth- ing in the future could be more clear than that the races in armaments by industrial nations, as happens to be the case, and continued delay in adopting a coopera- tive program for general rehabilitation, would within another two years have compelled all of the surplus- producing food and surplus-producing raw material countries to establish their own manufacturing and other industrial plants, thus leaving surplus-producing industrial countries, like Italy and others in Europe, not to mention the United States, high and dry 80 far as anything resembling a real and profitable international trade in the future would be concerned. I. further stated that there DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY - 11 - that there could beyond question be restored 30 billion dollars of mutually desirable and mutually profitable international trade above the present depleted volume; that there are many things Italy and other industrial countries produce, differing materially in value or quality or use, which it would be highly profitable for the United States and other countries to purchase, thus giving employment to capital and labor in both countries; that another two years of armament races and failure to adopt 8. program of peace and economic rehabilitation would inevitably fasten upon the world permanent conditions of the most extreme economic nationalism and all of its unthinkable consequences and deep privations. I said that it is in these cir- cumstances that this country, as stated before, while taking every precaution to keep aloof from political and military involvements abroad, strongly feels that each civilized country right now has the unshirkable responsibility of making a real contribution to promote peace and normal international relationships; that therefore it and the other American nations are behind the broad economic program and its kindred provisions to which I had referred, and that naturally we are looking DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY - 12 - looking longingly to leading countries in Europe to offer a similar contribution to peace and economic well-being; that unless they do awaken and give support to such a program and movement, an economic collapse in Europe within 18 to 24 months is inevitable. The Ambassador made very little further comment, except to agree in principle on all that I was saying about the economic situation and the desire for peace. He then said that his government requested him to say to this government that Italy has no purpose whatever to occupy Spanish territory in any event and is only concerned in that respect to see that a Com- munist government does not prevail in Spain. He then added that his government strongly favored recognition of belligerent rights of General Franco's organization, not recognition of the Franco organization as a govern- ment as Italy and Germany had recognized it. His theory seemed to be that recognition of belligerency by all the nations would clarify and serve to solve the present important differences relative to the Spanish situation. He emphasized the point 8.8 stated that Italy continues to adhere to the non-intervention pact DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY - 13 - pact along with the other 26 governments signatory to it. I thanked him for the information and expressed the hope that the interested nations in Europe would find ways to compose every difference; that, as indicated, this country has 8. rather definite and inflexible neutrality act, and that, of course, with our variety of popula- tion some people at all times are urging us to take steps; that naturally we have been assuming that none of the many governments interested will be disposed to indulge in such official utterances or acts 8.8 would raise the question of placing it in operation. The Ambassador said, "I observe that you are not operating the embargo provisions", to which I replied that this is upon the assumption, as just stated, that no other government will engage in such official acts 8.8 would aggravate or complicate the situation any further in 80 far as it would relate to our neutrality law. The Ambassador made no further comment on this particular phase. He then proceeded to say that his government would be flexible in its attitude in con- ference with other governments, and that it was the purpose of his government, while going as far in dealing DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY - 14 - dealing with 8. given phase as was deemed necessary or advisable, to stop short of action which might be calculated to provoke violence or hostility with another country or countries. C.H. S CH:HR PSF File Italy Personal DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON July 7, 1937 My dear Mr. President: I received this morning a personal letter from Bill Phillips dated June 22 in which he says that he is considerably worried because of the long delay which has elapsed in your sending a reply to Mussolini's letter to you of November 19, 1936. He says that "This long delay is really unfortunate", and expresses the belief that it would be very helpful if you saw fit to send a reply in the near future. I remember that you spoke to me some weeks ago about this matter and indicated that you were then pre- paring to draft a reply. It may be that because of recent developments you have thought it better to wait a while longer before sending your answer, but in view of the concern which Bill Phillips expressed, I thought I had better bring his request personally to your attention. Believe me The President, Faithfully yours, halls A The White House. Published in Foreign Relations of the U. S. 1937 Vol. I General PP. 662-664 musiline (s) to Condroll / Is Then ik. ? the Summer and I heartity approve dure see Foreign Dignitaries file Signar for longhen litten from PSF Italy 1937 July 29, 1937. My dear Signor Mussolini:- I have waited for many months to thank you for your gracious and much appreciated letter to me, which I found on my return from South America last December. I have delayed writing you because through all these months I have been hoping that the world situation would clarify sufficiently for me to discuss with you neasures looking toward the stabilisation of peace among nations. But, unfortunately the situation today seems no clearer than before, and, indeed, in some aspects the drift of events has been toward and not away from an ultimate crisis. I have been gratified in read- ing of your statements in favor of the principles of reduction of armament. AD you know, the Secretary of State has had my full support in his effective efforts toward the increase of international trade and the lowering of barriers against trade. Nevertheless, all of these efforts, even if they are joined by additional nations, and even if a greater total of world trade results in the coming years, will not prove a pletely effective guarantee of international peace if world areament among the nations continues on its present scale. + The two things must go hand in hand. It seems clear to me that if the nations cannagree on armazent reduction, even if it be in the form of a progressive reduction over a period of years, they can far more effectively discuss practical instruments for reduction of trade barriers, thus building up employment in industry to take the place of employ- ment in armament. and I recognise that as a part of the discussion of increasing trade, every con- sideration should be given to a more ready access to raw materials' markets for those nations which in themselves do not produce the raw materials necessary to industry. I am confident, my dear Duce, that you share with me the fear that the trend of the present international situation is ominous to peace. And I am confident that you share with me the desire to turn the course of the world toward stabilising peace. I have often wished that I might talk with you frankly and in person because from such a meet- ing great good night come. But we both realise the great difficulties that stand in the way - inter- national difficulties as well as the distances of the Atlantic Goean and the Nediterranean Sea. I was very happy to learn that my youngest son, John, had the privilege of meeting you last week. I had charged him with conveying to you my very warm regards. Some day you and I must and shall meet in person. Believe me, with every good wish, Faithfully yours, His Excellency Signor Benito Mussolini, Chief of the Government, Rome, Italy. P.S. This is your birthday and I send you wishes for many happy returns of the day. ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON, D.C. mills PSF Italy DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON In reply refer to February 9, 1938 NE 865D.01/378 My dear Mr. McIntyre: In accordance with the President's memorandum of January 31, 1938, I am returning the letter of Janu- ary 15 addressed to the President by Dr. W. C. Martin on behalf of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. The Department has instructed the Embassy at London to make appropriate acknowledgment of Dr. Martin's communication. Sincerely A yours, Mills Enclosure: From Dr. Martin, January 15, 1938. The Honorable Marvin H. McIntyre, Secretary to the President, The White House. Department of State BUREAU NE DIVISION ENCLOSURE TO Letter drafted ADDRESSED TO The Honorable Marvin H. McIntyre. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1-1088 TEL. KENSINGTON 7433. DEPARTMENT OF STATE FDR 5, PRINCE'S GATE, S.W.7. 1938 JAN 30 PM 2 28 IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION January 15th938. LONDON DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS President Franklin D. Roosevelt, The White House, Washington, D.C. Sir, I have the honour to thank you heartily in the name of His Majesty The Emperor of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian People for your right and noble act in refusing to recognize the unjust and precarious occupation and pretended sovereignty of the King of Italy over the Ethiopian Empire. Such a firm stand for international right and justice on the part of the Head of the great American People is a great encouragement for us and for all weak peoples and at noble example to the world, and we have no doubt that perseverance in these vital moral principles by the great democracies will in the end overcome all difficulties and bring peace and security to the peoples of the world. I have the honour to be, With the highest consideration, Sir, Your obedient Servant, Wartin d-1-30 WHITE HOUSE PSF Italy WASHINGTON August 31, 1938. C MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE: The following comes from a person who actually has & somewhat intimate access to Mussolini: "On May 29th, Mussolini received a telegram from Hitler saying that on May 24th he had informed Henlein and also Esterhazy (of Hungary) that they should lay low for the moment to give Hitler the necessary time of ten weeks to complete his defense line -- at which time Hitler would be ready to present an ultimatum to Prague. At that time the "ring" of Germany, Austria and Hungary would be ready to act 8.8 a concerted unit. One item of the ultimatum under consideration would be the discharge of Benes by Czechoslovakia. I merely pass this on to you. The informa- tion was sent me early in July but only just reached me. It is worth noting that ten weeks from the end of May brings us approximately to the early part of September. F.D.R. FDR/dj Swayon 5. 1/11. 38. confidented her Dear - Before leav. my Haly I wa asked tarry you a Henage about a cer tain matter Which undoubtedy has abread Came Don attention in Leveral ways So Dam Send- the if along Ron as heing abso. lately autherities - (so I wa asker to tell Jan )- in case any ane is landering has Much truth there is in the suman that on may the 29th more olini in for had Hen lein & also 5 Say inj that on may I 24th received a telep am from he Hi had then (Wes is, I he lieve, the Hungariag par lia mentary Spatter mar Jam Slorakia in the Progue partichent), & to Jether with them Har thy- to Rielow for the mo ment, wing him the recessary time of tea Treek to Caup lete his defence line at which time he lower he ready to present an ulli atam Thogue to act as a Can carted unit. & which time the ning he heady It Seems also in theair that the of the / tem under Casi- Deration hi this ultimation Could he the Dihissia of Bene (an they fay "Benes"S head It Lae write at Lay ing, doesn't ih?- that Benes power and fres tige hifidet outfide his Country Could he reg under as an obvide handi cap to the lazy -realization the Subcute program. Haven in add tia to this alltoo. loident of act- there has been of fored a definite explanation toward Bene which I have her of the mitrolini antag Thisa Toed is has being in ver tigated. 7 Caurse the in tes Jeetia /perhaps one could say A the British at that point hat ex- ih Difficult Day nod & that- actly part of the program. ) makes each free plan # Her may if will in flude ee or have amend been formulating spaking until You, then I loor re- quester to Keep in Kind that Those who as Red the to do this there es- pecially can eerned hat Loudon auther tieits A this Hitler telegram also he informed as to the undombled to hurnolini- & here them Jelse Ch- Deavoring to fet a reliable hers enger through & Poud an - and although ) Said at the time I feet none of this would he her lither Doe or to Lowon - I was of cause willing to pass the mess age along. as for Rua the Centlal Suropean moblect is, as ih always has been, Com- pley & haffling I am foory the Cannot fit then for it loneshe in tere, this the & loss cauforting Hen Denelop meals there, X the background ofor offer a cup of tea speaking of these later in a way that word cannot manage. Butlan are, happil, At to a Der tinatia, which promise to he nu eli wore fun. program is hebical - that the holi- Thope of the the trans Crutin ental dog will he refres ling in every toog- Always fairs Affectiaale Dance C Gave ) [Frances Crane ] PSF Italy THE COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE file WASHINGTON September 22, 1938. Dear Mr. President: A question has been raised as to whether the request should be met of those who are interested to exempt from the payment of customs duties a number of household furnishings that are being brought in. from Italy to be used in a house that is being provided in Washington by or under the direction of the Vatican State. Assistant Secretary Gibbons of the Treasury tells me that he will feel justified in granting the request should the State Department indicate to him that it will be glad to see it granted as an act of international courtesy. So far as I know, none of us here who have consider- ed the matter perceive any objection to a note being written to Mr. Gibbons on which he may base an order exempting the articles, which I do not understand to be of any considerable value, from the payment of customs duties. When the matter was casually men- tioned in a conversation with the Secretary yester- day, he thought it would be well for me to bring it to your attention, and therefore I am now doing this in the hope that you can find time to have someone telephone me as to whether or not you see any ob- jection. Mr. Gibbons would like to know as soon as possible what to do. The suggested action would not imply any recog- nation by our Government of the Vatican State. Yours very sincerely, The President, The White House. PSF. staly President Roosevelt to the Chief of the Italian Government (Mussolini), Washington, December 7, 1938. (re: political refugees) Published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Volume I, General, pages 858-859. RLJ 5/24/57

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    "ocrText": "PSF\nItaly\n1933-38\nItaly-1933\nCOPY\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMay 14th, 1933.\nMy dear Mr. Prime Minister:-\nI am asking Ambassador\nLong, who is a very old personal friend of mine,\nto give you this note when he presents his\ncredentials. I only wish that I might have\nthe opportunity to see you myself, to give you\nmy greetings and to talk over many things in\nwhich you and I have a common interest.\nMay I tell you how much\nI appreciated my talks with Signor Jung? His\nfrankness, his complete understanding of our\nmutual problems, and his delightful personality\ngave me great pleasure and great confidence.\nThank you for sending him.\nThose two very wonderful\nvolumes have thrilled me, not only because of\ntheir great artistic merit, but also because\nVergil and Horace were my favorites in my student\ndays - and I shall keep them among my treasures.\nWhen I am gone they will repose in the Library\nof Congress.\nAnd in the meantime they\nwill be symbols of the greatness of the spirit\nand understanding of the Italian people - and\nof you their leader whom I hope some day to meet.\nI am, my dear Mr. Mussolini,\nVery sincerely yours,\nFRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT\nHis Excellency\nSignor Benito Mussolini,\nHead of the Government,\nPrime Minister of the\nKingdom of Italy,\nRome.\nPsF Italy\nTHE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nDecember Return 4, 1933.\nDear Mr. President:\nI beg to call to your attention a\nvery interesting and confidential telegram\nfrom Ambassador Long, under yesterday's date,\nin which he reports the substance of recent\nconversations between Hitler and the French\nrepresentative in Berlin. The telegram is\nexcellently prepared and is a real contribu-\ntion.\nWellam Faithfully yours, Phease\nThe President\nThe White House.\nReturned 12/5/33\nIL CAPO DEL GOVERNO\nMy oen m₂ Fresident.\nin response to your request to have\nm exchange of views concerning the wald economic\nand publitive problems in Wich the Unites states\nand They me mutually interested J have sker\nthe Miniffer to of Finance Hm. Suide jury to\ncome Washington as my uprentative.\nKinoeft personal requids and greetings. He will\nM₂ July i) bringing you my\nHell you with how great an intact J an\nfollowing the Wnk of the United states Sormement,\nfn the intention of the wals present officulties\nwith only can be solves by the muture\ncooperation and grodwill of the nating.\nm young with the reprimation of the manuferipts\nIt is with great pleasure that entrugt\nof Viigil ans HANCE which are kept at Her\nhibrary in therence imy\nrepresentative will have the hma of conveying them\nto you M a mark of my milt unrial feelings.\nJ chook thole two anthos not only\nbecause their prictice wnks represent the greatelt\nlegacy of Rom in the fils of letters but also\nbecause they stand as exemples of that greateness\nof spirit ans human mostaning wich J\nbelieve are the two central qualities\nof the American Character.\nWith best withes and fentiments\nof expeem behere me\nvery tinerly your\nMumui\nRoma 24 ymile 1933 - XI XI\nItaly - 1933\n4-24-33\nHm hanklin X. Rooserelt\nFrankent of the United States\nWashington. C.C.\nPSF\nwill\nfile mal\nItaly 67\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 21, 1935\nMy dear Mr. President:\nWith respect to the letter from Ambassador Long\nat Rome dated February 3, I wish to state that I re-\nceived from Mr. Long on February 1 a cable, in which\nhe stated that he had taken up the matter of the pos-\nsibility of cotton trade with Suvich. The cable con-\ntained no information as to what he had in mind. The\nState Department had no information about Mr. Long's\nconversation, before leaving the United States, with\nOscar Johnston, Morgenthau, Wallace, and others on\nthe matter of cotton trade.\nOn February 3, the same day that he wrote his\nletter to you, Mr. Long sent a cable stating that he\nhad talked with Signor Mussolini and that Signor\nMussolini had asked if there were a chance that we\ncould have some agreement on some few articles so as\nto make some immediate advance in the volume of trade,\nand\nThe President,\nThe White House.\n-2-\nand that he hoped that some such arrangement might\nbe arrived at in advance of the more general arrange-\nments to follow. Mr. Long said that he had replied\nthat he thought this was possible.\nIn reply to his cable, I wired that it was not\nclear what he had specifically in mind. There had\nbeen some earlier proposal with respect to raw silk.\nI pointed out that raw silk was already on the free\nlist, and that if any arrangement carried a definite\nobligation to purchase raw silk, some agency of the\nGovernment would have to buy this silk and distribute\nit, an arrangement which would obviously present diffi-\nculties. I pointed out that a preliminary trade agree-\nment containing a few items could not be made until\nafter public hearings had been held, and that the\nannouncement for such hearings had already been made\nfor March 11, 1935, and that if preliminary arrange-\nments were entered into in advance of such hearings,\nAmerican protected interests could charge that they\nhad not been heard. I asked Mr. Long to give us an\nexpression of his views as to what might be done under\nthese circumstances, and stated that it would be most\nhelpful if he could secure from Signor Mussolini and\nhis officials any suggestions that they might have.\nMr.\n-3-\nMr. Long replied the next day, February 6, 1934,\nexpressing his gratitude for my exposition of the\nsituation. He stated that he had made it clear in his\nconversations that the American Government was not able\nto purchase commodities of any kind, and that the pur-\nchase of silk was therefore out of the question. He\nhad suggested that they find some other items of Italian\norigin which might be considered in an arrangement which\nwould protect the market in Italy for American cotton.\nHe stated further that he would now wait until they\napproached him and then report to us.\nI think the foregoing exchange of views between the\nAmbassador and the Department since his letter of\nFebruary 3, 1934, to you, has brought us all abreast of\nthe situation and that we are now in a position to give\ncareful consideration to any suggestions which the\nItalian officials might make. I am enclosing copies of\nall the telegrams relating to this matter. As these\ntelegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's\nconfidential codes, it would be appreciated 1f they could\nbe returned to the Department at the President's con-\nvenience for appropriate disposition.\nFaithfully yours,\nEnclosures:\nAs above\n[1935] star\nETHIOPIAN MOBILIZATION ORDER.\nThis is a perfect example of a streamlined operations order.\nIf they didn't win it wasn't the fault of their order!\n\"When this order is received all men and all\nboys able to carry a spear will go to Addis Ababa.\nEvery married man will bring his wife to cook and\nwash for him. Every unmarried man will bring any\nunmarried woman he can find to cook and wash for him.\nWomen with babies, the blind, and those too aged or\ninfirm to carry a spear are excused. Anyone found at\nhome after receiving this order will be hanged.\"\nPetiman PSF Italy\nCOPY\nNo. 74\nAMERICAN CONSULATE\nNairobi, Colony of Kenya, Africa.\nJune 25, 1935.\nSUBJECT:\nItalian Activities in Italian Somaliland.\nTHE HONORABLE\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE,\nWASHINGTON.\nSIR:\nI have the honor to submit the following in-\nformation regarding the activities of the Italian\nArmy in Italian Somaliland which was related to me\nby one Mr. Petersen, a traveling representative of\nthe Caterpillar Tractor Company who visited that\narea during the latter part of May. In submitting\nthis information it is not my intention to encroach\nupon the political reporting activities of other\nConsulates, but it is believed that some of the in-\nformation may help to augment that already submit-\nted to the Department.\nAt the time of Mr. Petersen's visit to Italian\nSomaliland there were some 38,000 Italian troops\nstationed in and about Mogadiscio. Most of these\nare understood to be from the south of Italy and\nare inclined to be sour and unruly. Consequently,\none unit of Black Shirts has been brought in for po-\nlice duty. In addition to the Italian troops there\nare some 30,000 Somali troops under arms. Captain\nVivian\n-2-\nVivian Ward, a retired British army officer resid-\nin in Nairobi, who has had considerable experi-\nence with Somali troops, ventures the opinion that\nthe Italian Government will be very foolish if it\nplaces much dependence upon the Somali troops since\nthey are known to be extremely unreliable.\nIt is understood that 32,000 additional Ital-\nian troops are expected to arrive in Mogadiscio dur-\ning June and that 800 more Black Shirts will also\narrive to augment the unit now on duty there.\nOn May 24th a parade of all the troops and\nequipment in the area was held at Mogadiscio. In\naddition to the troops mentioned above the follow-\ning equipment was observed:- 39 planes, about equal-\nly divided between fighters and bombers; 40 small\ntanks; and 36 - 75 millimeter field pieces. It was\nnot known what equipment in the way of artillery,\net cetera, would accompany the troops expected to\narrive during June.\nNo barracks have a.8 yet been provided, and all\nthe troops are quartered under canvas, among the\nsand dunes surrounding Mogadiscio. All of the wells\nin the vicinity are brackish, and all water used for\nthe troops must be distilled from sea water. Ap-\nparatus for distillation appears to be limited and\nwater is rationed, the allowance for all purposes\nbeing two litres per day per person. About once a\nweek the troops are marched to the beach for a bath,\nbut by the time they have marched back to the camp\nin a temperature of 100 to 120° F., the salutary\neffects\n-3-\neffects of the bath have been dissipated.\nThe region produces no foodstuffs except ba-\nnanas, and all meats and vegetables must be import-\ned. To date the importations have not kept pace\nwith needs and the troops are all on short rations.\nAs a result of flies and the bad water available,\na goodly number of the troops are suffering from\ndysentery.\nThe harbor of Mogadiscio will accommodate a\nmaximum of 16 vessels, but due to the lack of equip-\nment and labor only two vessels can be unloaded at\none time. Vessels are forced to anchor about one\nmile out and are unloaded into Arab dhows. Conse-\nquently, in rough weather all loading or unloading\noperations must cease. After being off-loaded into\ndhows the cargo is taken to the dooks. The port fa-\ncilities comprise one dook about 120' long, on which\nthere 18 one ten ton orane which will not handle ten\ntons and one three ton crane. As a result of the\nlimited facilities the shortest time taken to un-\nload one ship is three days, while some vessels\nhave remained as long as thirty-three days before\nunloading was completed. Mogadiscio has a normal\npopulation of only 800 and, although every able-\nbodied man in town 18 employed, the labor shortage\n18 most acute and the Italians are now attempting\nto recruit additional labor elsewhere.\nThere are no warehouses or other facilities for\nstoring supplies and to date no material has been\nimported either for the construction of warehouses\nor of\n4-\nor of barracks. Several large shipments of flour\nand cement were imported just prior to the advent\nof the rainy season and were stored in large stacks\non the shore with not even any sort of waterproof-\ning covering to protect them from the rain. As a\nresult the greater portion has been ruined.\nIn order to facilitate troop movements the\nItalians are constructing three roads from the\ncoast to the Abyssinian border. The main road\nwill run from Mogadiscio in a north-westerly di-\nrection. The other two roads will start at points\nnorth and south of Mogadiscio and will tend to con-\nverge with the Mogadiscio road as they approach the\nAbyssinian border. To date little progress has been\nmade except on the main road from Mogadiscio, for\nwhich the Italians have imported six 40 H.P. Cater-\npillar Diesel Tractors.\nAlthough Mogadiscio is approximately 250 miles\nfrom the Abyssinian border, the Italian forces have\nconstructed a complete system of entrenchments and\nbarbed wire entanglements in a semi-circle nine\nmiles from Mogadiscio. Whether these entrenchments\nwill be used for training purposes only or whether\nthe Italians expect to make a last stand there\nshould they be driven that far from the Abyssinian\nborder is not known.\nIt is recognized in Mogadiscio that the Ital-\nian Government can not expect to commence any seri-\nous war-fare until after the monsoon period, which\nlasts during May, June and July. During this per-\niod\n-5-\n1od the sea is almost invariably rough which ham-\npers the loading and unloading of ships, and the\nrain which accompanies the monsoon will effectually\nprevent any operations on a large scale inland.\nWell informed persons in Mogadiscio make no hesita-\ntion about saying that active hostilities will com-\nmence about September lst and that when the Ital-\nians consider themselves sufficiently prepared, a\nseries of incidences or border clashes will be cre-\nated which will be used as an excuse for sending\ntroops into Abyssinia. It would appear, however,\nthat unless the Italian Government goes about its\nwar preparations in a much more businesslike manner\nthan it has to date, they may find themselves seri-\nously embarrassed by lack of equipment and supplies\nand by sickness among her troops.\nAn amusing incident in connection with the pur-\nchasing of supplies in Kenya for the Italian Govern-\nment has occurred. The local firm of Mitchell Cotts\n& Company has obtained the authority for the purchase\nof all foodstuffs and other supplies needed for the\nItalian troops which may be obtained in East Africa.\nAbout two weeks ago a large order for various things\nwas received and the first item on the list read:-\n\"500 ladies of easy virtue\". Although Kenya has a\nreputation abroad for a singular lack of morals a-\nmong its white settlers, people in Nairobi felt that\nthis was going a little too far. It is understood\nthat this portion of the order was passed on to con-\nnections\n-6-\nnections in Bombay who are in a better position to\nfill the order than is the local firm.\nRespectfully yours,\n(Signed) Robert B. Streeper\nRobert B. Streeper\nAmerican Consul.\nThe\nPSF Italy\nTHE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 15, 1935.\nDear Mr. President:\nI enclose two interesting tele-\ngrams from Paris, dated July 13th and 14th,\nrespectively.\nThey indicate clearly the\nway the wind is blowing between Italy and\nEthiopia.\nFaithfully\nMilhau\nThe President\nThe White House.\nPSF\nJS\nThis telegram must be\nclosely paraphrased be-\nfore being communicated\nto anyone (B)\nPARIS\nDated July 13, 1935\nRec'd 3:05 p.m.\nSecretary of State,\nWashington, D.C.\nRUSH, 591, July 13, 5 p.m.\nURGENT AND\nI\nFOR THE SECRETARY\nI saw Laval this afternoon accompanied by Tuck\nand communicated to him the sense of your 270, July\n11, 1 p.m. and 275, July 11, 8 p.m. He replied that he\nis equally anxious to avoid war that he believes that\nit might be avoided by Italian mandate over Abyssinia\nwhich would give Italy territorial concessions, econ-\nomic advantages and a form of administrative control\nbut he does not know whether that would be acceptable\nto the Emperor. Laval expressed himself as willing to\ncooperate with United Stated and England to settle the\ndispute if that could be arranged. I told him of your\nexpressed ignorance of details of controversy to which\nhe replied that he had no knowledge of Mussolini's\nreply to Eden in Rome except published reports\nHe feels that Italy is bent on war if war is\nnecessary to accomplish her purpose. In regard to my\nquestion\n-2-\nFrom Paris July 13, #541\nquestion as to the effect on Europe of sending four\nhundred thousand Italian troops to Abyssinia he said\n\"that is Mussolini's business - not mine.\"\nSTRAUS\nCIB\nREP\nThis telegram must be\nclosely paraphrased be-\nPARIS\nfore being communicated\nto anyone. (B)\nDated July 14, 1935\nRec'd 1:05 p. m.\nSecretary of State,\nWashington.\nRUSH\n592, July 14, 3 p. m.\nFOR THE SECRETARY.\nSaw Italian Ambassador to France it anniversary\nreview this morning. In answer to my question he said\nthat in his opinion war in Abyssinia is inevitable;\nthat British Ambassador here had suggested to Laval\na meeting between Mussolini, Laval and Hoare in an\nendeavor to find a solution that might avoid an armed\nconflict; that Laval had telephoned to Mussolini, and\nthat Mussolini had replied that discussion would not\nalter his determination to maintain his position.\nSTRAUS\nRR\nphysical\nPSF\nTHE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE\nItaly\nWASHINGTON\nAugust 9, 1935\nDear Mr. President:\nReferring again to your desire to be kept\ninformed in regard to the health of Italian troops\nnow in East Africa, I beg to enclose for your in-\nformation a memorandum on the subject which has\nbeen prepared for me by our Division of Near\nEastern Affairs. It is true that most of the\ninformation contained in our despatches is based\non rumors and reports, but read together they\npresent a rather definite picture.\nI also bring to your attention a elegram\njust received from our Embassy at Rome, with\nregard to the same subject. We have yet to hear\nfrom our new effort to obtain information from\nPort Said.\nFaithfully yours,\nThe President,\nThe White House.\nPSF Italy\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nDIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS\nAugust 8, 1935.\nIn connection with the interest recently ex-\npressed by the President in obtaining information\nregarding the number and health of troops now being\ninvalided home to Italy from East Africa, I have had\na search made of all despatches from Rome on the\nsubject of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and think\nthe following excerpts may be of some value, al-\nthough it will be noted that most of the information\nis based on rumors and reports:\n\"It is\n....\nrumored that the morale of the\ntroops in Somalia is not good and that they are\nsuffering gréatly from the excessive heat, lack of\nan adequate water supply and from unsatisfactory\nsanitary conditions\". (Despatch #1077 from Rome,\nMay 3, 1935).\n\"It is reported that some 50% of the crews on\nthe transports used in the East African service are\ndemanding a transfer to some other service on account\nof impaired health and overwork incidental to tropical\nconditions\". (Despatch #1108 from Rome, May 23, 1935).\n\"Rumors concerning serious outbreaks of illness\namong the Italian troops and workmen in East Africa\ncontinue to be heard. A report, attributed to the\nAmerican Consul at Port Said, has reached the Embassy\nthat a large Italian ship returning from Eritrea to\nItaly had recently passed through the Suez Canal under\nstrict quarantine with many sick on board, and that it\nis believed that, in addition to malaria, cholera has\nbroken out among the troops in Eritrea\". (Despatch\n#1135 from Rome, June 6, 1935).\n2\n\"Rumors of bad health conditions among the men\nsent to East Africa continue to circulate. The Consulate\nGeneral at Naples reports that some 340 laborers in-\nvalided home from Eritrea were disembarked at that port\nfrom June 2nd to June 6th Despite official announce-\nments to the contrary, it is generally believed that\nmost of these men were in a very serious condition. It\nis understood that the strictest silence concerning\nliving conditions in the East African Colonies has been\nenjoined upon the men invalided home, but rumors of\nextremely unsatisfactory health and sanitary conditions\ncontinue to emanate from the families and friends of\nmen there. It is unofficially but fairly reliably re-\nported that an alarming number of cases of dysentery\nand sunstroke are occurring in Somalia and that it is\nvery difficult to get the Italians to understand the\nnecessity for protecting themselves adequately from the\ntropical sun\". (Despatch #1146 from Rome, June 13, 1935).\n\"Rumors and reports\nbelie the newspaper state-\nments concerning the excellent health conditions prevail-\ning in the East African colonies. The American Consul\nin Palermo reports in this connection that there are\nsome 300 men hospitalized in Palermo and between 700\nand 800 in Messina who have been invalided home from\nEritrea and Somalia. THE LONDON MORNING POST is said\nto have published an interview on June 18th with Pro-\nfessor Aldo Castellani, an Italian authority on tropical\ndiseases whose work is well known in London, and who has\nrecently returned from a tour of inspection in Eritrea,\nto the effect that, in spite of reports to the contrary,\nthe sanitary situation is 'absolutely satisfactory'. A\nreport has reached the Embassy, however, attributed to\none who is close to Castellani, that he found an alarm-\ning number of cases of malaria in Eritrea and a wholly\ninadequate supply of quinine and other medicines to com-\nbat it\". (Despatch #1166 from Rome, June 20, 1935).\n\"With regard to the health of the troops in East\nAfrica the Embassy continues to hear unofficial reports\nand rumors concerning the increasing number of men being\nreturned to Italy for hospital treatment\". (Despatch\n#1180 from Rome, June 27, 1935).\n\"The English Consul at Messina reports that, on\nJune 10th, 800 sick soldiers, returning from Eritrea,\nwere\n3\nwere debarked at that port\". (Report #14533 from the\nMilitary Attache at Rome, June 28, 1935).\nAccording to the account of a militiaman returned\nto Naples in February of this year from Eritrea on account\nof illness, which was transmitted to the Embassy by the\nConsul General at Naples, laborers in East Africa are\ndiscontented but are placated by their high wages.\n\"With regard to the health conditions of the troops\nin Eritrea this militiaman reports that out of the 340\nmen sent there with him in November 1934, one half have\nsince been returned to Italy on account of illness. He\nhimself suffered from malaria. He also reported a water\nshortage at Asmara, but in view of the time that has\nelapsed since his departure from Eritrea, this informa-\ntion is not thought to be of value\". (Despatch #1227\nfrom Rome, July 25, 1935\".\ncib\nThis telegram must be\nclosely paraphrased be-\nROME\nfore being communicated\nto anyone. (B)\nDated August 8, 1935.\nReceived 4:18 p.m.\nSecretary of State\nWashington.\n456, August 8, 7 p.m.\nMy 446, August 6, 4 p.m.\nRumors regarding unfavorable health conditions among\nthe Italian troops in East Africa were not generally circu-\nlated in Italy until the month of April but from that date\nreports of cases of sunstroke, malaria, dysentery, typhoid,\nand cholera among those troops were current as well as\nthreatened water shortage and inadequate sanitary facilities\nat Massaua and elsewhere. The circulation of these reports\nwas apparently finally taken into consideration by the\ncentral authorities and statements have been published in\nthe press announcing that since January 1st, 624 troops\nhave been invalided from the colonies and 37 have died of\nwhich 7 were officers and that during the same period\n2,000 laborers have been ropatriated and 113 have died.\nAmerican consular officers, particularly those at Naples\nand Palormo, have submitted reports of hospital casos at\nthose ports as well as at Messina but owing to the difficulty\nof obtaining details as to the nature of those cases no\nsatisfactory\n-2- No. 456, August 8, 1935,\nfrom Rome.\nsatisfactory check with the official figuros has boon\npossible.\nThe publishod accounts and statistics rolating to\nthe health of the troops sent to East Africa have boen\ninvariably accompanied by commont intended to show that\nthe proportion of illnesses and deaths is negligible and\na rocont statement outlines the progress of sanitation in\nthe East Africa colonies and the difficulties which are\nbeing overcome in the fight against disease thore. According\nto this statomont the hospital facilitios which consisted\noriginally of eight hundrod bods has been increased to\n20,000 bods of which 3,000 aro dostined for Somaliland and\nthe romaindor for Eritrea. In this connection, according\nto information supplied by an Italian officer in the army\nmedical corps who has recontly returned from Eritroa, it\nwould appoar the policy is being adopted of reducing the\nnumbor of ropatriation casos by sonding tho sick to the\nhigh platoau regions of Eritroa where an extonsivo hospital\ncommiserating systom is boing installed for which supplies\nand equipment are now being purchased. This system is\nintended to care for the sick as well as for eventual\ncasualties.\nKIRK\nCIB HSS\nPSF PSF Italy Italy\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nAugust 20, 1935.\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nIn regard to Kirk's meeting\nwith Mussolini, and the latter's remarks:\nIt would be well in any sub-\nsequent note or message by us, either\nto Italy or to other Nations, to point\nout that it is never too late to avoid\nan armed conflict. The mere fact that\nItaly has mobilized a million men and\nspent two billion lire does not mean\n\"destruction of her prestige in in-\ncurring the disdain of other countries\nwho would be ready to accuse her of\nhaving attempted to bluff or of having\nengaged in an undertaking which she\nfound she was unable to carry out.\"\nOn the contrary, we could well point\nout that after all these preparations\nItalian prestige would be enhanced and\nnot harmed if Italy could take the\nmagnificent position that rather than\nresort to war, she would cancel the\nmilitary preparations and submit the\nwhole question to peaceful settlement\nby arbitration.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\n-2-\nIn other words, a very strong\ndocument can be based on Mussolini's\nstatement by making an appeal to the\nhigher and not the lower ideal.\nF. D. R.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nPrint\nTHE SECRETARY\nAugust 19, 1935.\nMemorandum for The President.\nI attach a part of telegram\nNo. 500, from K1rk in Rome, which I\nthink you will find interesting.\nThe balance of the telegram 18 badly\ngarbled and difficulty is being\nexperienced in decoding.\nI also enclose a copy of tele-\ngram No. 708, from Marriner in Paris,\nand call your attention to the\nmarked paragraph.\nC.Huee\nC.H.\nPSF\ngill\nItaly (s)ch\nMED\nThis message must be\nROME\nclosely paraphrased\nbefore being communi-\nDated August 19, 1935\ncated to anyone (c)\nReceived 2:20 p.m.\nSecretary of State,\nWashington, D. C.\nRUSH, 500, August 19, 1 p.m.\nStrictly confidential. My 499, August 19, 11 a.m.\nMussolini received me shortly before 11:30 this\nmorning and I left his office at noon. I presented him\nwith a copy of the message contained in your 136, August\n18, 1 p.m., and explained to him that it was a personal\nand confidential message sent to him by the Secretary of\nState at the direction of the President which the Depart-\nment would not give out to the press.\nMussolini read the message carefully. He then\nasked me to convey to the President and the Secretary his\nappreciation of the expression of friendliness and of\nthe character of the message. As to the subject matter,\nhowever, it was now too late to avoid an armed conflict.\nItaly, he continued, had mobilized a million men and\nhad spent two billion lire. Two hundred thousand men\nhad already been sent to East Africa and one hundred\nfifty thousand more were ready to go at any time. Two\nBlack\nMED - 2 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m., from Rome\nBlack Shirt divisions were being sent out this week and\nothers were to follow. In the face of this preparation\nand the sacrifices which it implied, any alteration\nin purpose now would be absolutely disastrous to Italy\nand would entail consequences from which she would not\nrecover for a century. No nation; and he specifically\nreferred to the United States, could expect that Italy\ncould draw back now and destroy her prestige in incurring\nthe disdain of other countries who would be ready to\naccuse her of having attempted to bluff or of having\nengaged in an undertaking which she found she was un-\nable to carry out. Six months ago perhaps some solution\nmight have been found but the opposition of other countries\nand England in particular, although it had brought the\nItalian people unanimously to the support of the govern-\nment, had strengthened the position of the Negus so that\nnow only a military defeat at the hands of Italy could\naccomplish the ends which Italy had a right to obtain.\nMussolini went on to say that for years Italy had\nmade every effort to cooperate with the Abyssinians\nto the mutual advantage of both countries. Practically\neverything that had been done to improve the condition\nof the Abyssinians and advance their progress along\nmodern lines had been due to the Italians. The treaty\nof 1928\nMED\n- 3 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m., from Rome\nof 1928 was intended to declare this policy of amity and\nand to render this collaboration effective. This\nTreaty, however, had remained entirely ineffective\nowing to the attitude of the Abyssinians and all efforts\nto give effect to the purposes of the Treaty were of no\navail. Even prior to the construction of the (?)\nof the road to Assab as an outlet to the sea, for the\npast few days had met with the opposition of the\nAbyssinian Government and no progress could be made.\nIt is true, he added, that during that time the influence\nof the French which during those years was unfriendly\ntowards Italy, was a factor in negativing Italy's efforts\nat cooperation in Abyssinia but the main difficulty lay\nin Abyssinia's attitude toward Italy herself. Italy\nin 1896 had lost the battle of Adowa. That was forty\nyears ago and the circumstances were such that Italy\nherself need not harbor a necessity for revenge. The\nAbyssinians, however, regarded Adowa as the triumph of their\nforce over a powerful white nation and this spirit, which\nhad been encouraged by the friendly attitude and support\nof other European nations, had created a situation in\nAbyssinia which absolutely precluded the possibility\non the part of Italy of safeguarding or developing her\nlegitimate\nMED\n- 4 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m. from Rome\nlegitimate interests, This situation could only be\nmet by a display of force and could only be remedied\nby inflicting a defent on the Abyssinians.\nThe Abyssinians, Mussolini continued, were\nknown to have 450,000 men under arms. (End section one).\nKIRK\nHPD:CSB\nMED\nThis telegram must be\nROME\nclosely paraphrased\nbefore being communi-\nDated August 19, 1935\ncated to anyone (C)\nReceived 2:15 p.m.\nSecretary of State,\nWashington, D. C.\nRUSH, 500, August 19, 1 p.m. (Section two).\ntheir military plan was to retreat before the Italian\nadvance and then when the Italian lives were extended\nto launch attacks against those lives in the form of\nguerilla warfare. The Abyssinians were not taking\nsufficiently into account the Italian air force which\nwould eliminate the chance of success of these tactics.\nMussolini expressed complete confidence in the outcomo\nof this military set up and he intimated that he believed\nit would be brief. Ho indicated that following this\nphaso nogotiations for a final adjustment would be simple\nand in this connection ho pointed out the success of\nItalian administration in Eritroa where great progress\nalong modorn linos had boon made and where no opposition\non the part of the natives had ever been encountered.\nIn giving the foregoing account Mussolini took pains to\nomphasize general attitude so far as onvisaging the\nmatter sololy from the point of view that the conflict\nwould be confined exclusively to Italy and Abyssinia\nand had\nMED - 2 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m. from Rome\nand had been alluding to the part played by other govern-\nments only insofar as they affected the relations between\nthose two countries. If the conflict could be so limited\nhe said no anxiety need be felt\nas to the con-\nsequences. He went on to say, however, that the attitude\nof England had brought to the fore the possibility that\nit might not be 80 confined and in that event he fore-\nsaw the gravest consequences to the peace of the world.\nThe conversations at Paris which onded yesterday\nshowed an attitude which gave littlo indication that\nthere was an unwillingness to admit the Italian view-\npoint. The proposals which had boon put forward\ninvolving concessions in Abyssinia though vague were\nclear enough to show that they were entiroly un-\nacceptable to Italy. England, he said, might profess\nnot to know what Italy really wanted in Abyssinia but\nshe know very well (End of two).\nKIRK\nRR:CSB\nMJD\nParis\nThis telegram must be\nDated August 19, 1935.\nclosely paraphrased\nbefore being communi-\nRec'd. 11:45 a. m.\ncated to anyone. (B)\nSecretary of State,\nWashington.\n708, August 19, 4 p. M.\nSTRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL\nDopartment's 332, August 18, lp. m.\nI saw Leger and Eden this morning and com-\nmunicated orally and in the strictest confidence\nthe nature of the message which Kirk has been in-\nstructed to deliver to Mussolini. I informed them\nthat it was not being given to the press and they\nboth agreed that in the present position of affairs\nthis was the wisest means of bringing to Mussolini's\nattention the solidarity of the world in the inter-\nest of poace.\nBoth Leger and Eden expressed themselves as\nboing extromely gratoful for the prompt and effec-\ntive action of the American Government in this\nmatter and felt that even though the negotiations\nin Paris had broken down it was not too late for\nits offects to be felt in Italy.\nIt was Leger's opinion that with the return\nof\n-2- No. 708, August 19, from Paris\nof Aloisi to Rome, Mussolini would gain a more\naccurate impression of the solidarity against\nhim which oxisted hore and what he would have\nto faco in Geneva, where, in accordance with the\ninformation which the French have received from\nRome, Mussolini still intends to send his\nrepresontatives on September 4. (End of section\nonc.)\nMARRINER\nRR\nCSB\nMJD\nParis\nThis telegram must be\nDated August 19, 1935.\nclosely paraphrased\nbefore being communi-\nRec'd. 1:00 p. m.\ncated to anyone. (B)\nSecretary of State,\nWashington.\n708, August 19, 2 p. m. (Section two)\nNeither Leger nor Eden felt that the failure of\nconversations here was necessarily the final chapter\nand that there was still time for Rome to alter its\nprogram.\nApparently Mussolini refused even to consider\nthe Anglo-French offer as a basis of discussion.\nEden's analysis of the Italian reply was that\nMussolini would only be willing to accept through\nthe medium of the League what he would take by\nforce of arms if it were not granted.\nEden said that in his conversation with Laval\nthis morning they both considered that in searching\ntheir consciences no offorts had been spared and\nno means neglected to find a poaceful settlement\nof the question. In this connection Leger told\nme that the only benefit that he folt had been de-\nrived from the negotiation was a much closor\nrapprochement\n-2- NO. 708 (Section two) August 19, from Paris\nrapprochement and understanding botwoon Great\nBritain and Francc. Eden leaves late this after-\nnoon for London and Vansittart for Aix-les-Bains\nwhore he will see Baldwin. It is possible that\na Cabinot meeting will be called in London for\nAugust 22. (End message.)\nMARRINER\nRR\nCSB\nfile\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nfile\nOFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER\nNovember 7, 1935.\nMr. Secretary:\nI attach on the basis of the best available material\nwe have been able to secure up to the present, the follow-\ning:\n(1) Table 1. A record of our total exports to Italy\nduring October, 1935, divided into the main classes of\nexports and compared with the record for October, 1934.\nIncluded in the same table is a record of our total\nexports to Italy by the same main classes during the first\nten months of 1935, as compared with the same period of\n1934.\n(2) Table 2. A comparison of the trade of American\nexports of numerous important specific items to Italy\ncomparing that trade for October, 1935, with the trade in\nthe same items for October, 1934, with increases and de-\noreases.\n(3) Table 3. A comparison of the American export\ntrade to Italy of the same group of specific items as in\nTable 2 comparing the monthly average of our exports dur-\ning the first ten months of 1935 with the monthly average\nfor 1934, with increases and decreases.\nThis\n-2-\nThis material covers trade with Italy alone and we\nare still waiting to receive from Commerce the information\nwhich will make possible a comparable record for Italian\nAfrica and Ethiopia.\nIn the meanwhile, I attach tables 4 and 5 which give\nthe record of export shipments to these countries for\nOctober, 1935, by main classes.\nAttached to these tables is a short memorandum which\nis really a footnote pointing out the defects and neces-\nsary corrections to this statistical record.\nOur trade records are being kept on a weekly basis\nand by the end of the afternoon there will be available\na record for October, 1935, divided into a weekly basis.\nBecause of the delays in forwarding of the necessary docu-\nments by the Customs Houses, this weekly record is still\nnot complete enough to be wholly reliable. However, the\ntables will show a falling-off in total shipments subse-\nquent to the President's proclamation.\nEA:HF:DJW\nTable(1)\nTotal Exports to Italy With Division by Classes.\nFirst ten months\nOctober\n1934\n1935\n1934\n1935\nTotal Exports\n$50,865,070\n$54,105,361\n$6,184,491\n$5,840,781\nTextile fibers and manufactures\n25,422,675\n24,465,433\n3,956,452\n2,678,293\n(Unmanufactured cotton)\n(24,456,254)\n(23,511,579)\n( 3,740,755)\n(2,602,443)\nNonmetallic minerals\n5,830,942\n6,594,203\n382,821\n969,816\nMachinery and vehicles\n4,757,371\n7,085,201\n390,426\n626,003\nMetals and manufactures, except\nmachinery and vehicles\n6,081,287\n9,301,790\n502,030\n1,085,322\nWood and paper\n2,705,768\n2,297,133\n329,583\n142,398\nAnimals and animal products\n2,130,065\n1,102,656\n198,686\n31,575\nChemicals and related products\n1,422,972\n1,646,427\n138,103\n142,805\nVegetable food products and\nbeverages\n961,889\n354,504\n138,032\n29,397\nVegetable products, inedible,\nexcept fiber and wood\n922,849\n772,468\n80,801\n95,397\nMiscellaneous\n685,252\n478,386\n67,557\n39,775\n*\nSulstantialshipments to Italian africa VN addition to this\nTable No. 2\nComparison of American Exports to Italy October 1934 and\nOctober 1935 in Some Important Items of Trade\nIncrease\nCommodity\nOctober 1934\nOctober 1935\nor Decrease\nCotton\n$3,740,755\n$2,602,443\n-1,038,312\nPetroleum products.\n626,068\n1,363,767\n+ 737,699\nRefined copper\n188,237\n534,094\n+ 345,857\nIron and steel scrap\n179,458\n463,817\n+ 284,359\nAircraft and engines\n4,081\n179,540\n+ 175,459\nSteel plates, sheets,\netc\n46,822\n6,368\n-\n40,454\nRubber and manufac-\ntures\n20,808\n275\n-\n20,533\nAutomobiles, parts,\nand accessories.\n48,108\n8,125\n-\n39,983\nOther ferro-alloys.\n11,306\n450\n-\n10,856\nExternal cylindrical\ngrinding machines\n9,304\n33,843\n+ 24,539\nNickel\n16,564\n11,132\n-\n5,432\nGear-cutting machines\n8,460\n10,623\n+\n2,163\nEngine lathes\nI\n44,134\n+ 44,134\nInternal grinding\nmachines.\n4,183\n65,147\n+ 60,964\nCoal\n4,650\nI\n-\n4,650\nTin and manufactures\nI\n-\n-\nFerro-tungsten\n544\n--\n-\n544\nTin plate scrap\nI\n-\n-\nLead\n--\n--\nI\nTable No. 3\nComparison of Monthly Average of American Exports to Italy,\nfifst ten months of 1935 as compared with Monthly Average\nfor Whole Year 1934\nMonthly Averages\n12 Mos.\n10 mos.\nIncrease\nCommodity\n1934\n1935\nor Decrease\nCotton\n$2,698,662\n$2,351,158\n- $347,304\nPetroleum products\n312,318\n433,995\n+ 121,677\nRefined copper...\n267,649\n471,391\n+ 203,742\nIron and steel\nscrap\n185,517\n335,284\n+ 149,767\nAircraft and en-\ngines\n8,941\n65,305\n+ 56,364\nSteel plates,\nsheets, etc....\n25,710\n15,043\n- 10,767\nRubber and manu-\nfactures\n28,650\n13,372\n- 15,278\nAutomobiles, parts,\nand accessories\n60,099\n61,307\n+\n1,208\nExternal cylindri-\ncal grinding\nmachines\n4,765\n29,003\n+ 24,238\nNickel\n3,855\n7,832\n+\n3,977\nGear-cutting\nmachines\n3,003\n18,005\n+ 15,002\nEngine lathes\n2,233\n19,090\n+ 16,857\nInternal grinding\nmachines\n1,550\n19,517\n+ 17,967\nCoal\n20,500\n9,284\n- 11,216\nTin and manufac-\ntures\n376\n617\n+\n241\nFerro-tungsten...\n270\n924\n+\n654\nTin plate scrap..\nI\n3,644\n+\n3,644\nLead\n204\n108\nI\n96\nPSF Italy\nTable 4\nU. 8. EXPORTS TO ITALIAN AFRICA,\nOCTOBER 1935, SHOWN BY MAIN CLASSI-\nFICATIONS\nAnimals and animal products.\n$\n--\nVegetable food products and beverages\n--\nVegetable products, inedible, except\nfiber and wood\n1,247\nTextile fibers and manufactures\n--\nWood and paper\n-\nNonmetallic minerals\n118,126\nMetals and manufactures, except machin-\nery and vehicles.\n1,381\nMachinery and vehicles\n206,511\nMotor trucks, busses, and chassis,\n36,116\nAutomobile parts and accessories,\n12,115\nTrailers\n118,980\nChemicals and related products\n25,868\nBenzol\n25,868\nMiscellaneous\n1,475\nTotal exports\n354,608\nTable 5\nU. S. EXPORTS TO ETHIOPIA\nOCTOBER 1935,\nSHOWN BY MAIN CLASSIFICATIONS\nAnimals and animal products\n$ --\nVegetable food products and beverages\n--\nVegetable products, inedible, except fiber\nand wood\n-\nTextile fibers and manufactures\n-\nWood and paper\n--\nNonmetallic minerals,\n--\nMetals and manufactures, except machinery\nand vehicles\n--\nMachinery and vehicles\n361\nChemicals and related products\n500\nMiscellaneous\n-\nTotal exports\n861\nFOOTNOTE TO TABLES 1, 2 AND 3, AND 4 & 5\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nOFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER\nNovember 8, 1935.\nThe monthly statistics of American foreign trade are\nnot strictly on a calendar month basis. The figures al-\nways include a certain amount of trade which actually\ntook place in a previous time period. The figures for\nany one month usually include some shipments which were\nactually made in the previous month, and do not include\nsome shipments made towards the end of the month dealt\nwith (these appear under the heading of a later month).\nTherefore, in order to have the October statistics of\nour import and export trade more closely comparable with\nprevious periods the figures in the preceding tables\nwere left uncorrected. Figures are available, however,\nshowing what part of the trade recorded in the preceding\ntable as being October trade actually was shipped\nearlier than October. These figures are as follows:\nAnimals and animal products\n$ 3,636\nVegetable food products and bev-\nerages\n944\nTextile fibers and manufactures\n184,810\nWood and paper\n44,956\nNon-metallic minerals\n39,006\nMetals and manufactures, except\nmachinery and vehicles\n263,499\nMachinery and vehicles\n208,819\nChemicals and related products\n31,039\nMiscellaneous\n540\nTOTAL\n$777,249\nArrangements\n- 2 -\nWhat actual shipments in October still remain to be\nreported cannot be estimated with sufficient reliability\nat this moment; they would be an offset to the figures\nof earlier trade included in the October figures.\nArrangements have been worked out whereby future\nrecords of monthly trade with the belligerents will be\nmore closely adjusted to the actual trade of each month.\nEA:HF:LWW\nPSF\nPulice\nItaly\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE UNDER SECRETARY\nNovember 14, 1935\nMr. Secretary:\nIn view of the information brought us by Mr. Hack-\nworth this morning as a result of the discussions in\nNew York last night, my feelings are as follows:\n1. The argument of the representatives of the\nten big oil companies that while they would abide by\nthe wishes of the Federal Government and would, there-\nfore, be willing to refrain from exporting oil to the\nbelligerents, the 120 odd American companies certainly\nwould not do 80. These are small companies purely\nout for gain and would undoubtedly take advantage of\nthe situation created by the failure of the big\ncompanies to export.\n2. We do not yet know precisely what sanctions\nare going into effect nor how far-reaching they will\nbe. We know enough to presume that there will be a\nflow of materials into Italy from Germany, Rumania,\nHungary, Austria, Brazil and the Argentine to make it\nexceedingly doubtful whether there will be any severity\nin the sanctions as prescribed. The question is\nwhether the United States should undertake to penalize\nAmerican\n-2-\nAmerican trade before we have any knowledge as to the\nreal situation resulting from the action of the League\non the 18th instant. It does not seem to me quite\nfair to American trade to put in \"on the spot\" in this\nway. Therefore, I recommend that we wait until after\nthe League has acted before making the appeal.\nWith especial reference to oils, I do not like the\nidea of putting the President in the position of making\nan appeal to the oil industries of the country, which 1s\nnot respected by the smaller companies and therefore\nnot effective, nor do I like the idea, at this moment,\nbefore the League action for the President to \"black\nlist\" the exporting companies by announcing their\nnames.\nIn brief I believe that it will be wiser to await\nthe result of the League action in this case rather than\nto act somewhat precipitously now. It may even be\nwiser to await action by our Congress in order that the\nGov ernment may be in a position to exercise real\nrestraint upon the export of raw materials - a restraint\nwhich will be equally effective upon all companies\nexporting raw materials.\nur\nWilliam Phillips.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\nConfidential\nfor the President\nfrom Secretary Hull.\nNov. 23, 1935.\nPSF\nItaly\nAt Warm Springs, Ga.,\nNovember 27, 1935.\nDear Cordell:-\nThat memorandum of your conversation\nwith the Italian Ambassador on November twenty-\nsecond is a classic. You did a splendid job in\nmaking our position clear and, at the same time,\npointing out the very untenable position in which\nItaly has deliberately placed herself.\nIn regard to the 1871 treaty, there\nis, of course, the undoubted fact that Italy, by\na deliberate violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact,\nmade strict compliance with the old treaty 1m-\npossible. Furthermore, I very much doubt whether\nthe language in the 1871 treaty was ever intended\nto apply to a situation in which one nation was\nengaged in a war in which that nation was the\naggressor.\nAs ever yours,\nThe Honorable\nThe Secretary of State,\nWashington, D. 0.\nPSF F Italy\nNovember 22, 1935.\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND\nTHE ROYAL ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, SIGNOR AUGUSTO ROSSO\nThe Italian Ambassador called by his own request\nand after some preliminary exchanges of the usual\nnature he said that he called upon instruction of his\nGovernment to lay before me two views which his Govern-\nment supports; that he was not handing me & note or\nany other formal instrument of writing; that he had re-\nduced to writing the oral conversation that he is pro-\nposing to conduct. The Ambassador thereupon proceeded\nto read to me the typewritten copy of his proposed\noral conversation:\n\"1 - The various official declarations and public\nstatements issued from the Federal Govern-\nment during the last two months with regard\nto the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, and par-\nticularly the statement of the Secretary of\nState of November 15, cannot be interpreted\notherwise than an extension and aggravation,\nto the principal detriment of Italy, of the\nmeaning of the Neutrality Act of August 31,\n1935.\n\"Although these declarations and state-\nments apply, formally and theoretically, to\nboth the contending parties, it 1s well\nknown that their practical result would be\nactually to impair the freedom of trade only\nwith respect to Italy.\n\"Such\n-2-\n\"Such an assumption has been confirmed\nby the fact that the statement made by the\nSecretary of State on November 15 specifically\nmentions certain commodities which Italy has\nbeen used to buy in the United States and which,\nbeing largely employed for non military purposes,\nare essential to the needs of the economic and\nsocial life of any civilized country.\n\"We maintain that any measure or policy\naiming at, or resulting in, imposing restric-\ntions which actually are detrimental to only\none of the contending parties, goes against\nthe spirit of neutrality.\n\"2 - We maintain also that the above mentioned\nstatement of the Secretary of State 1s contrary\nto the letter and the spirit of the Treaty\nsigned between the United States and Italy in\n1871 - and still in force - which reciprocally\nguarantees each contracting party a 'complete\nfreedom of commerce and navigation'.\n\"No justification whatsoever for the 11mi-\ntation of the freedom guaranteed by the Treaty\ncan be found in any international Act dealing\nwith the status of neutrals. Reference is\nmade in this respect to the Hague Convention\nof 1907.\n\"Such a limitation, if and when applied,\nis bound to assume the meaning of a 'sanction'\nand therefore the positive character of an\nunfriendly act.\nNovember 22, 1935.\"\nThe Ambassador paused briefly here and there in the\ncourse of the reading to elaborate with one or two sen-\ntences, but they did not change the purport of the in-\nstrument of writing. He then indicated his desire to\nanswer any question or listen to any comment I might\nsee fit to offer in case I desired to do so. I addressed\nthe\n-3-\nthe Ambassador and said that, of course, he and his\nGovernment should keep in mind all of the essential\nphases of the situation as it relates to this country;\nthat in all of the past the most cordial and friendly\nrelations have existed between the people of this coun-\ntry and those of Italy; that the people of this country\ntoday do not feel personally unfriendly towards the\npeople of Italy, but that they are vigorously and almost\nwildly against war and are at all hazards in favor of\nkeeping out of the present war; that, if those partici-\npating in the war were double cousins and twin brothers\nof the American people, the people of this country\nwould be just as violently and eternally against the\nwar and in favor of peace and, above all considerations,\nas far\nin favor of keeping A away from and out of the war B.B\nwould be possible. I said that it was in these circum-\nstances and in this highly wrought up state of the public\nmind of this country that the Neutrality Act of last\nAugust vas enacted and the Executive Department was\ndirected to pursue the policy of neutrality which it\nprovided; that this mandate of Congress was promptly\nput into effect when the President declared a state of\nwar to exist between Ethiopia and Italy and declared\nan embargo on the shipment of arms, ammition and\nimplements of war to either of the belligerents; that\nat\n- 4 -\nat the time heavy pressure was brought to bear upon\nthe State Department also to include a number of\nprime and essential war materials out of which finished\narms, ammunition and implements of war might be made\nin large quantities over night; that since that time\ninsistent demands representing large groups of senti-\nment in this country have been made upon the Executive\nDepartment to include these war materials in the embargo\nissued under the Neutrality Act against arms, ammuni-\ntion and implements of war. I added, in this connection,\nthat I hoped that the Ambassador and his Government\nwould recall the experience of the people of this coun-\ntry in ways that will shed much light upon the state\nof mind and the viewpoint of the people and of this\nGovernment in accordance with it, and that is that our\ncountry sent 2,000,000 men to Europe to fight for Italy\nand other countries at an enormous cost to this Govern-\nment and this country; that we likewise loaned Italy\nmuch money at the time and afterwards; that we later\nmade almost a nominal settlement with the Italian Gov-\nernment at twenty-five cents on the dollar, all of which,\nwith interest, is due and unpaid, to say nothing of other\nvast indebtedness in Europe; that I have been besought dur-\ning past months to demand aggressively, if necessary,\npayment\n-5-\npayment by the Italian Government of this indebtedness in-\nstead of its spending hundreds of millions in this Ethiopian\nconquest. I said that I had not done 80 thus far, but\nuntil this time I had been willing, on a suitable occasion,\nto sit down with the Ambassador and seek a satisfactory\nadjustment of the indebtedness. I then said that with\nthe extremely disastrous and unsatisfactory experience\nof the American people in going to Europe and aiding\nItaly and other countries to the extent they did, they\nare almost wild in their demand that we not only avoid\nbeing drawn into the war but that we stay entirely away\nfrom the same; that the people of this country are in\nno state of mind to engage in any activities or steps\nexcept those primarily looking towards keeping out of\nthe war and in a secondary or subordinate sense mani-\nfesting proper interest in peace and the shortening of\nthe duration of the war in the light of our obligations\nunder the Kellogg Pact; that it is in this highly wrought\nup state of mind of the American people that the Govern-\nment of Italy now arraigns this Government upon both a\ncharge of unneutrality and of violating the provisions\nof the treaty between the United States and Italy of\n1871 pledging complete freedom of commerce and naviga-\ntion. I said that these are surprising as well as\nserious\nMUDIT\ncoudges\nbesta\nbeAmout\n-6-\nserious complaints in the circumstances. I said I\nmight remark here that from the outset this Government\nhas pursued its own separate, independent course and\ninitiative with respect to all phases of the controversy\nbetween Ethiopia and Italy; that we have had no agree-\nments whatsoever, directly or indirectly, with Geneva\nor London or Paris; that they did not know of any of\nthe steps this Government had taken until they read\nabout the same in the press; that this Government be-\nlieves that it has been consistent in its course and\npolicies and naturally feels constrained to adhere to\nthem; that the Government, as stated, placed in opera-\ntion its embargoes and at the same time the President\nwarned all Americans against any business or economic\ncontacts with any of the belligerents, except at their\nown risk. The President and myself in public statements\nduring the weeks that followed made it clear that this\nwarning statement of the President was intended, generally,\nto discourage any business or economic relationships\nbetween our nationals and the belligerents; that nothing\nfurther was said by the President, myself or the Govern-\nment officials relative to business dealings with the\nbelligerents until some days ago when the official\nstatistics showed that some five essential war materials\nwere\nI/Ve\n#1831\n-7-\nwere being exported from this country to belligerents\nin abnormal quantities compared with similar shipments\nduring any recent period, and that I thereupon made a\nfurther official statement, in which I said that this\nclass of business was directly contrary to the policy\nof the Government in opposition to selling war materials\nto belligerents, which policy was held and believed to\nbe strictly within the spirit of the Neutrality Act;\nthat nothing further has been said by the President or\nmyself with respect to trade relations between this\ncountry and the belligerents. I then said that the\nAmbassador must realize that just as soon R.S the Ameri-\ncan people discovered that abnormal quantities of essen-\ntial war materials were being shipped on an increasing\nscale to belligerents without protest but with the\nsilent acquiescence of the proper Government officials,\nthere would probably be & storm of criticism and 8. loud\ndemand for the immediate convening of Congress to take\nadequate steps in the premises, and that the result\nscarcely beyond any question would be a swift passage\nof a drastic not dissolving every possible relationship\nwith the belligerents pending the war. I repeatedly\nexpressed surprise that the Italian Government would\nmake a complaint against this Government in all the\ncircumstances in the severe language that it does. I\ninquired\nVIII\n2\nASI\n-8-\ninquired whether and what the Italian Government had\nsaid to Germany in the light of st more sweeping and\ninflexible prohibition of business relations with the\nbelligerents than this Government has taken. The Ambas-\neador replied that he did not know whether his Govern-\nment had made any representations to Germany. I com-\nmented rather emphatically and stated that I had seen\nno published account of any complaint whatsoever, and\nthat it was therefore all the more strange to me to\nread this rather harsh complaint against this Govern-\nment; that it seemed all the more surprising when both\nthe Ambassador and I know that the bitterest critics\nof the Executive branch of the Government and the most\nextreme isolationists who are demanding that all Ameri-\ncans stay entirely away from the war zone do not in the\nslightest question the integrity of the neutrality poli-\ncies of this Government 8.8 they are being carried out\nin accordance with the letter or the spirit, or both,\nof the Neutrality Act. I said that it was really\nastonishing to find that a government cannot be neutral\nwithout being attacked and a demand made to supply war\nmaterials to 1. belligerent under penalty of being charged\nwith an unfriendly act. The Ambassador emphasized the\nview that the manner in which this Government is con-\nducting\n-9-\nducting its policy of neutrality operates as a dis-\ncrimination against Italy. I replied that under the\nlaw of neutrality in the past any belligerent controlling\nthe high seas was usually at an advantage over its enemy\nwith respect to obtaining goods from neutral countries,\nthat a poor belligerent without means of purchasing\nand paying for supplies from neutrals was at a disad-\nvantage under the operation of neutrality laws, and\nlikewise where one country has or can produce its mill-\ntary supplies and another is without such facilities or\nequipment, the latter suffers under the operation of\nthe neutrality law. I then pointed out that, in fact,\nunder the policy this Government 1s now pursuing neither\nItaly nor Ethiopia should be securing war materials\nwith the result that both countries are 88 nearly on a\nparity in this respect as it is possible for them to be.\nThe charge of discrimination, therefore, does not apply.\nI repeatedly inquired of the Ambassador why his Govern-\nment does not sit down with others and work out this\ndifficulty in a peaceful manner. He made very slight\nand casual comment in reply. The Ambassador sought to\nemphasize the idea that the attitude of his Government\nwas not fully understood in this country and that it\nhad been misrepresented to a considerable extent. I\ncommented\n- 10 -\ncommented that his Government might well have thought\nof all of these and other unsatisfactory phases before\ngetting into the war. I stated as emphatically as\npossible that these trading incidents to which the\nItalian Government refers and about which it complains\nare entirely trivial compared with the real problems\nand deep concern which the Ethiopian-Italian war causes\nthis Government; that the Ambassador must realize the\nawful repercussions that make their immediate appearance\nin far and remote parts of the world, but which are\ncalculated to give this nation and perhaps others, in-\ncluding Italy, unimaginable troubles for a generation.\nThe Ambassador immediately indicated that he knew the Far\nEast was in mind. I added that the second condition which\nis giving this Government immense concern relates to\nthe possible spread of the war to any number of other\ncountries at almost any time with unimaginable troubles\nand injuries and consequences to this country as well\nas others; that it is, therefore, all the more deplorable\nto see the Italian nation moving forward with the war,\nwhich it must realize threatens to create these terrific\nproblems and conditions so far-reaching that the imagina-\ntion cannot grasp their possibilities. I inquired why\nthese considerations were not in the mind of the Italian\nGovernment\n-11-\nGovernment before it went into the war and again re-\niterated my surprise that the Italian Government, on\nthe contrary, is upbraiding this Government virtually\nbecause it is thus 80 deeply concerned and is striving\nin every possible way to keep entirely away from and\nout of the var. I remarked then that the Ambassador\nwell recalls that the President and I pleaded with and\nalmost prayed with Mr. Mussolini to keep out of the\nwar but that he ignored our plea and now seems to ex-\npect us to furnish him with war supplies while he\nprosecutes the war ad libitum. I added that regardless\nof anything or anybody this nation proposed to stay\nout of and as far away from the war as possible, and\nthat we feel most deeply the indifference with which\nthe world is subjected to the threat of of general war\nand with the frightful repercussions in the Far East;\nthat this Government is keeping its attitude flexible\nunder the Neutrality Act and the spirit of that Act\nwhich is being carried out in connection with the policy\nof opposition to the supplying of certain war materials\nto the belligerents; that if the war should spread,\nfor example, this Government will be in an attitude to\ntake further steps relative to both miscellaneous trade\nand the five war materials which I recently referred to\nin 8. statement opposing their shipment to the belligerents;\nthat\n- 12 -\nthat this Government cannot think of any course or\nany precautionary plans short of these, in view of the\nfact that aeroplane bases, naval bases and submarine\nbases dot the entire Mediterranean section with the\nresult that almost at any time a conflagration might\nbe touched off; that it is in the light of these\ndangerous possibilities, which to the American people\nseem to be probabilities, that this country is almost\nmadly opposed to our Government taking the slightest\nrisk of being drawn into the war by permitting its\nnationals to trade promiscuously with belligerents in\nand about this dangerous war zone, especially in essen-\ntial war materials. I stated that during the past\nthree years I had almost worn myself out physically\nin an effort to aid in world economic rehabilitation\nso that Italy and other countries would have an adequate\namount of international trade to afford contentment\nto their respective populations, and that the Ambas-\nsador could not begin to imagine the deep disappoint-\nment I feel at the effort to renew the practice which\nall nations have recently undertaken to abandon, relating\nto that of military aggression by any and all coun-\ntries at any and all times, and that, of course,\nif one country is to be allowed to violate this new\npolicy of the pacific settlement of disputes, then\nevery\nLean\npress\nJoet\nTHE\nfrom\n-13-\nevery country may do 80 with consequences that one\nshudders to contemplate. I pointed out to the Ambas-\nsador the fact that the League of Nations organization\nat Geneva solemnly adjudged an aggressor in this war,\nwhile the United States did not; that the Geneva agency\nseeks to aid Ethiopia, which the United States does\nnot; that the Geneva agency seeks to embargo all imports\nfrom Italy, which this Government does not; that this\nGovernment, as stated, is pursuing its own separate\ncourse without understanding or collaboration with\nother governments or peace agencies, and that in these\ncircumstances it is not only difficult to understand\nthe Italian complaint but I repeat that it is surpris-\ning to contemplate it; that the mere fact that there\nare some concurring nots on the part of the League of\nNations in pursuing sanctions and of the United States\nin frankly carrying out its policy of neutrality is,\nin the circumstances, no basis whatever for a charge\nagainst the United States of unneutrality and of un-\nfriendliness. This makes 8. mere coincidence or its\nabsence determine the question of whether the United\nStates is or 16 not neutral, in the eyes of the Italian\nGovernment. In other words, if there were no attempted\nsanotions at Geneva the United States would be entirely\nneutral\nare\n-14-\nneutral in carrying out its present policies of oppos-\ning the sale of war materials to belligerents. I added\nthat when I issued my statement on the 15th of November,\nabout which complaint is now made, I did not know and,\nin my opinion, no one here knows yet what the League of\nNations may or may not do regarding concerted action\nto curb exports to Italy of oil and other prime war\nmaterials, and yet here is a charge that this Govern-\nment is engaged in an unfriendly act as stated. The\nAmbassador said that this step, in his opinion, would\nbe taken on the 38th of this month at Geneva. I 0011->\nmented that, of course, that remains to be seen. I\ninquired of the Ambassador why his Government had not\ntaken $100,000,000 to Ethiopia and brought back a key\nD.\nto the entire Empire instead of expending several hundred\nmillion dollars in its military conquest with all of\nthe worry and threat of danger to the balance of the\nworld. He replied that Italy had been attempting for\nforty years to effect colonizations in Ethiopia, but\nwithout success. I repeated that the people of this\ncountry are LS yet entirely friendly to the Italian\npeople but added that if his note should be made public\nin the United States, an inflamed public that nobody\ncould control or curb would be almost instantly aroused\nend that, of course, the pressure of 8. surprising charge\nsuch\nTM\neyes\nFUR\nwoner\n-15-\nsuch 19 he is bringing against this Government will\nin due time make the American people personally hostile\nto the people of Italy, and naturally it would endure\nlong in their minds. I took up the complaint of viola-\ntion by this Government of the treaty of freedom of\ncommerce and navigation of 1871 with Italy and at once\nstated that I was satisfied that international and all\nother law makes it possible for either country a party\nto this commercial treaty to remain neutral in the event\nthe other country becomes involved in war; that it is\ninconceivable that either Italy or the United States\nin an ordinary commercial treaty signed away its right\nto remain neutral in case of war on the part of the\nother and that that is the precise reason this Govern-\nment is undertaking to pursue and has no other 1dea\nthan to pursue it; that, furthermore, with both Italy\nand America signatories of the Paris Peace Pact with\nthe solemn obligations it imposes upon each, it is not\npossible to understand how Italy can go to war and\nannounce to the United States Government that despite\nthe Paris Paot it must supply Italy with materials of\nwar under penalty of being guilty of an unfriendly act,\nas stated. I remarked further, without discussing the\nmerits, that the American people cannot be convinced\nthat\n-16-\nthat the Italian Government is not under most solemn\nobligations to keep the peace under three or four\ntreaties, and it is incomprehensible to them to find\nItaly demanding of this Government that to be neutral\nit must furnish war supplies and that if it fails to\ndo 80 it is guilty of an unfriendly not. I repeatedly\nemphasized my great surprise and incomprehension and\nrepeatedly inquired why his Government had not thought\nof these phases before it went into the war. I finally\nsaid that, while entirely satisfied as to the lack of\ninterference of the treaty of 1871 with the present\ncourse of this Government, I would, 28 a. matter of\ncourtesy to the Ambassador, again give some further\nattention to the authorities, although I have no doubt\nthat I have examined them fully and accurately. The\nAmbassador did not attempt any aggressive utterances\nand I endeavored throughout the conversation to make\nthe impression upon him that our nation and most other\npeace loving nations were greatly pained and hurt to\nfind their traditional friends, the Italian people,\ninvolved in this war despite the minerous treaties of\npeace to which the Government 10 a party, and despite\nthe awful menage to the peace of the world which this\nwar creates.\n8 CH:MK\nPSF\ndepartment OF STATE\npaula Italy - 4935\nASSISTANT SECRETARY\n(5)(2) (5)\nDecember 11, 1935.\nMy dear Miss LeHand:\nI am again referring to the matter of the shipment of\noil to the Italian Government on the tanker ULYSSES. Since\nour telephone conversation yesterday afternoon, I have ascer-\ntained definitely that as early as September, 1935, the owner\nof the vessel was expecting to arrange for such a transaction,\nand he placed the tanker in dry dock, where it was recondition-\ned at an expense of certainly not less than $25,000 and per-\nhaps as much as $40,000; that on October 25 the vessel was\nchartered to the Reed Company for a voyage to Italy, and that\non the same date the Italian interests entered into an agree-\nment with the Reed Company for the vessel to carry a cargo of\noil to the Italian Government. If the carriage of the oil is\nforbidden, the Reed Company will be liable to a suit for dam-\nages; the owner of the vessel will almost certainly look to\nour Government for the payment of damages; and the prospect of\nthe vessel being kept in business so as to afford its owner some\nopportunity of paying the Government's mortgage will be gone.\nIt is thought by the Department of Commerce and the Department\nof State that we should not stand in the way of the transaction\nbeing completed. You will bear in mind that October 25 was\nprior to the announcement being made with reference to the\nshipment to the belligerents of five specified articles, one\nof\n- 2 -\nof which is oil.\nThe only reason I am writing you is that I wish the\nPresident to have all the facts, and if he desires to do\nso, confirm the understanding you gave me yesterday that\nhe leaves the matter to the determination of the two de-\npartments mentioned. I hope on receipt of this you may\nbe able to see the President within at least an hour or so,\nand telephone me.\nYours very sincerely,\nA-M RWM:HM\nP.F\ngirly Drawd\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 6, 1936\nMy dear Mr. President:\nWith reference to inquiries which you have made\npreviously concerning conditions in Italian East Africa\nI believe that you may be interested in reading the\nattached report from our Military Attache at Rome, re-\ncounting a conversation which he had with Mr. W. B.\nCourtney, a representative of COLLIER'S WEEKLY, who\nhas just returned from a three weeks' visit to Eritrea.\nFaithfully yours,\nEnclosure:\nReport from Military\nAttaché at Rome.\nThe President,\nThe White House.\nDepartment of State\nNE\nBUREAU\nDIVISION\nENCLOSURE\nTO\nLetter drafted\nADDRESSED TO\nThe President,\nThe White House.\n# * - - number - -\n1-195\nPSF Italy\nEnclosure No. 1 (Report No. 2) to despatch No. 1471\nof Jan. 3, 1936, from the Embassy at Rome.\nG-2 Report.\n6920.\nFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.\nITALY (COMBAT).\nSubject: Minor Field Operations.\nVisit to Theater of Operations by American\nCorrespondent.\nMr. W. B. Courtney, representing Collier's has just return-\ned to Rome after being three weeks in Eritrea and Tigre. The\nfollowing notes were made during a conversation with him concern-\ning his trip. They represent of course Mr. Courtney's impressions\nbut are perhaps worthwhile as indicating an objective view of\nsome of the details in East Africa as he saw them. Mr. Courtney\nleft Naples on November 18th, 1935, on the S. S. \"SANNIO\" of\n9,900 tons, carrying Marshal Badoglio and 2,500 workmen. Marshal\nBadoglie took this boat rather than one of the Italian liners\nwith better accommodations as an example to the Black Shirt\nelements of his command. Conditions aboard the \"SANNIO\" were\nfar from ideal. The 2,500 workmen were crowded below decks.\nDuring a storm in the Red Sea just before reaching Massaua it\nwas necessary to station Carabinieri at each of the hatches to\nprevent the workmen from coming on deck. Toilet facilities and\nwater supply were inadequate and the living accommodations for\nthese workmen were described by Mr. Courtney as nothing short of\nfilthy.\nAt Massaua two old tankers were tied up at wharfs and drums\nwere being filled from these ships and stacked in a dump adjoin-\ning the docks. Every ounce of gasoline was concentrated in this\none dump. It is estimated that the supply is sufficient for about\n3 months. The Italian supply service in estimating its require-\nments failed to take into consideration the fact that the trucks\nwould have to operate almost continually in low gear, and conse-\nquently what was expected to be a year's supply will probably\nnot last beyond the present dry season.\nSanitary condition in Massaua leave much to be desired. The\nport is crowded with men and supplies. There is only one public\ntoilet in the town and no sewage system. The streets are used\nindiscriminately as latrines. No warehousing facilities exist.\nSupplies are stacked in open dumps and when rains occur prior to\nremoval of supplies to the plateau, large quantities are spoiled.\nThere are no hotels or other sleeping accommodations excepting one\nor two freighters anchored in the harbor and used to accommodate\ncasualties awaiting shipment to Italy. These freighters are so\ninfested with vermin and bugs as to be almost uninhabitable. Press\ncorrespondents and others who were acquainted with the situation\npreferred to stay ashore until they could get aboard a transport.\nEven here it is next to impossible to sit down anywhere because of\nthe accumulated filth. Many have found it more agreeable to seek\naccommodations in the native brothels rather than go aboard the\nfreighters.\nCommunication\nFrom: M.A. Rome, Italy.\nReport No. 14,986.\nJanuary 3, 1936.\n- 2 -\nCommunication between Massaua and Adowa depends on one road\nand this road has been very badly cut up by the heavy travel.\nThe stretch between Nefasit and Asmara is especially bad. It is\nout out of the side of the mountain with straight drops of over\n1000 feet. It is narrow and passing is only done with great\ndifficulty. For a while traffic was controlled on this road -\none way during certain hours - but so many exceptions were made\nthat the control has now broken down completely and traffic moves\nboth ways, passing on such turnouts as could be built. Heavy\ntraffic has ground the road surfacing to powder and the shoulders\ngive way under the weight of the trucks. Accidents are frequent.\nOften several trucks, their drivers blinded by the dust, have\nfollowed each other over the bank. The same is true of the newly\nconstructed roads from Asmara to the front. Casualties due to\nroad accidents have exceeded those due to battle. In one 31 mile\nstretch of road (a section of the Senafe-Adigrat road) there are\n1700 hair-pin turns. On another section of the road between\nAsmara and Adowa Mr. Courtney counted 27 trucks down the embank-\nment. He came to one truck fully loaded and bound for the front\nwhich had broken down and after some delay this truck was rolled\nover the bank with its entire cargo. He stated that the casualties\namong trucks due to accidents and breakdown ran as high as 5%\nper day, many of these of course being repaired and returned to\nservice.\nWhile en-route from Asmara to Adowa Mr. Courtney passed\nmany 75 m. guns and 105 mm. howitzers returning from Adowa. It\nis not possible to use anything except pack artillery in this zone.\nThere is a fertile plateau around Axum and between Adowa and\nAxum. Other than that the country that he saw is not even suit-\nable for grazing. Mr. Courtney got as far forward as the Dam-\nbeguina Pass. He left before the fighting which took place in\nthis vicinity the middle of December. He subsequently learned\nthat the Italian advanced elements which were driven back from\nMai Timchet were blocked in this pass and suffered severe casual-\nties.\nThe Italians were similarly ambushed during the advance from\nAdigrat to Macalle in a canyon north of Azbi. The Danakil column\n(Mariotti group of natives) which consisted of two battalions of\nAskaris and about 1000 Danakils marched into a gorge without\nsufficient reconnaissance and were trapped in the gorge, suffer-\ning heavy casualties. Attempts to communicate by radio with the\nCorps Commander, General Santini, failed because the radio sets\nwere not functioning. The column remained in the gorge through-\nout the day and night but the Abyssinians withdrew without\nattempting to annihilate it. The attack was such a surprise\nthat the supply units (combat trains) had to abandon their sup-\nplies and close up in order to avoid being cut off. The column\ncontinued on to the village of Azbi without food or water. The\nradio equipment was repaired and a message gotten through to the\nCorps Commander who managed to transport supplies by air but the\nsupplies were dropped at the wrong place and were taken by the\nnatives before the troops could get to them. This column had to\nrejoin the corps by its own efforts before it could receive any\nassistance.\nThe Askaris are good soldiers. As one Italian officer put\nit: \"They are a lot better than the Black Shirts\". The Black\nShirts have made lots of noise in East Africa but have not been\neffective as combat troops. The regular soldiers are much better.\nMorale\n- 3 -\nMorale among the Italian troops is not high. There is a great\ndeal of the usual grumbling, but also a lot of real dissatis-\nfaction with the existing conditions. If it was hoped that many\nof the troops now in East Africa would want to settle there, the\nhope will not be realized, for almost to & man the Italian soldiers\nwould like nothing better than a transport home.\nThe Askaris have borne the brunt of the fighting to date and\nin consequence have adopted a rather superior attitude toward the\nItalians.\nMr. Courtney was 111 for a time in the hospital at Aksum.\nHe describes this hospital as without any sanitary arrangements\nat all. The only latrines are open straddle-trenches, and bathing\nfacilities do not exist. A moat around the city contains some\nfresh water and is used indiscriminately for drinking purposes,\nsewage disposal, watering animals and washing pigs and goats. The\nnatives seem to have attained an immunity to typhoid but there is\nlots of syphilis and African ulcers. The white troops have suf-\nfered somewhat from pneumonia, but on the whole their health has\nbeen surprisingly good considering the conditions.\nAs soon as Marshal Badoglio assumed command, all war corres-\npondents have been ordered back to Asmara. There they get very\nlittle information. Frequently the official communiques are not\ndelivered to them until several days after they have been publish-\ned in Rome.\nMr. Courtney feels that the Italians are now definitely\nstopped in their present positions and will not be able to ad-\nvance again this season. He feels that Marshal Badoglio will\nbe fortunate if he can hold on to territory now occupied. The\naviation has been of little real value. The country is so vast\nand there are so many opportunities to hide in the brush and\namong the rocks that air observers find it impossible to pick\nup even large bodies of native troops. The natives are becoming\naccustomed to the Italian aircraft and know how to avoid being\nseen. They have even gone 80 far as to prepare traps for the\nItalian aviation by setting up a camp in a valley, then abandon-\ning the camp and taking positions on the steep sides of the\nmountains from which they can fire from above on any aircraft\nattempting a low altitude attack on the camp. As a result\nItalian air attacks now are being made from an altitude of\n10,000 feet.\nThe tanks have been of somewhat more value, especially in\nadvancing against villages, but the country has been too rough\nfor their extended use.\nNOTE: This picture drawn by Mr. Courtney may be very much\noverdrawn. It is reported for what it may be worth as the im-\npression of an American journalist gained from a three weeks'\nvisit to the soene of operations in East Africa.\nNORMAN E. FISKE\nMajor, Cavalry, U.S.A.,\nAsst. Military Attache.\nfile\nPSF Italy\nTHE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nState\nJune 30, 1936.\nDear Mr. President:\nIt appears that the United Press gave out\nyesterday a somewhat misleading report, which has\nfound its way into the Italian press. The Embassy\nhas this morning sent us the item, as it appears\nin this morning's papers in Rome, and I attach a\ncopy of the despatch.\nInasmuch as it was announced from St. Louis\nyesterday that Long had resigned, it occurs to me\nthat possibly you may care, in your press conference,\nto confirm the fact of his resignation and at the\nsame time say something to the effect that, in due\ncourse, you would make an announcement of a new\nAmerican Ambassador to Rome, whose appointment would\nbe in the ordinary routine.\nThe United Press statement that a \"special\nambassador\" is to be sent from this country to Italy\nfor\nThe President\nThe White House.\n2\nfor certain special purposes, perhaps might\nwell be disposed of as soon as possible before\nit gains headway.\nI am expecting a reply from Rome at any\nmoment for the requested agrement for the new\nAmbassador, but meanwhile, as is 80 often the\ncase, the United Press is giving out another\nstatement mentioning my name in this connection.\nNeedless to say, I have said nothing to the\npress whatsoever.\nFaithfully yours,\nWCNS79\nTHE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO SEND UNDERSECRETARY PHILLIPS\nTO ROME, THE UNITED PRESS SAYS UNDER A COPYRIGHT.\nPHILLIPS WILL ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT AMERICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE NEW\nITALIAN EMPIRE WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRINCIPLE\nOF NOT RECOGNIZING TERRITORIAL GAINS MADE BY FORCE.\nTHE IMPORTANCE WITH WHICH BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY REGARD\nTHE ETHIOPIAN PROBLEM IS SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT THEY ARE EXCHANGING\nUNDERSECRETARIES OF STATE AS ENVOYS. ITALY HAS JUST APPOINTED\nFULVIO SUVICH, PHILLIP'S ITALIAN COUNTERPART, AS AMBASSADOR TO THIS\nCOUNTRY. HE WILL REPLACE AUGUSTO ROSSO.\n6/30.-RB134P\nPSF Italy\nJS\nGray\nROME\nDated June 30, 1936\nRec'd 7:00 a.m.\nSecretary of State,\nWashington, D.C.\n241, June 30, 10 a.m.\nFollowing United Press. report under Washington date line\nof June 29th published in this morning's papers:\n\"From a most reliable source it is learned that a\nhigh official of the Federal Government will go to Rome\nin the near future to discuss and settle with the Italian\nGovernment questions of direct interest to the United\nStates which have arisen as a consequence of the Italian\nannexation of Ethiopia.\nAt the State Department there is neither confirm-\nation nor denial of the rumor that the American Ambass-\nador to Rome Breckinridge Long is being at least tem-\nporarily replaced by special ambassador. Long, it will\nbe recalled, is still in & hospital at Rochester, Minn-\nesota, and has asked to be replaced in his mission to\nRome.\"\nKIRK\nJS\nIL CAPO DEL GOVERNO\nMy ocar Mr Trendent,\nyears J have often wmembered our\nIn the left three\nexchange of letters of 1433 , and regrettes that\nthe course of events hy not allowes the first\ncontacts then extablisher bet ween ourselves\nin our intention.\nto be purpres with the entirentry wich was\nIt if therefore with the repent\ninterfaction that J avoil myself of the\noccasion presentes by your triumphae\nrelection to the Residency ito comvery\nto you my Warmat ungrotulating for\nthis expression of missue\nthat your great wnk has met with\nI all, oerive to express to you\nmy very time withes fn the ere-greater\nproprity , with - I - J am /me- - the Uniler 11ty\nwill achieve under your enlightenent guidance.\nHoping that our relating how\nre-e/tablisher, may not undergo any further\ninteringation ,J dm my Demth Tressment\nvery hundy\nyours\nMunnhii\nRoma 19 novembre 1y36- XV\nIL CAPO DEL GOVERNO\nSTANDARD FORM No. 14A\nAPPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT\nMARCH 10, 1925\nFROM\nThe White\nPSF: staly\nMashington\nTELEGRAM\nOFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES\nfiles\nfriend\nCABLEGRAM\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 72082\nJanuary 27, 1937.\nH. E. AUGUSTO ROSSO\nHOTEL PRINCE DE GALLES\nPARIS\nMY WARM GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES TO YOU BOTH\nROOSEVELT\nObticive\nATSCH IF DIE\nLOB\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nJanuary 25, 1937.\nThe Secretary of State encloses for the informa-\ntion of the President copies of the telegrams indicated\nbelow.\nSince some of these telegrams were transmitted in\none of the Department's confidential codes, it would be\nappreciated if the enclosures could be returned to the\nDepartment at the President's convenience for appropri-\nate disposition.\nEnclosures:\nTelegram No. -, Paris. (dated January 25, 12:15 p.m.)\nU\nGRAY\nParis\nDated January 25, 1937\nRec'd 12:15 p.m.\nSecretary of State\nWashington\nPERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT:\nRosso, former Italian Ambassador to Washington,\nis to be married in Paris on the morning of January 28\nto an American lady, Mrs. Bunker. I am to be witness at\nthe marriage.\nFrom a conversation I had with Rosso I know that he\nwould be deeply moved if you should send him a personal\ntelegram of good wishes. His address is Hotel Prince\nde Galles.\nBULLITT\nCSB:HPD\nFAST\nDIRECT\nRCA\nRADIOGRAM\nR.C.A. COMMUNICATIONS. INC.\nA RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA SUBSIDIARY\nTO ALL THE WORLD - BETWEEN IMPORTANT U.S. CITIES - TO SHIPS AT SEA\nWN15CL RFK604 PARIS 32 28 NFT\nRECEIVED AT\n1112 CONNECTICUT RCA AVENUE\nPs= ITaly\nLC PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT\nfile\nWASHINGTON, D. C.\nWHITE HOUSE\n1937 JAN 28 AM 8 51\nAT\nWASHINGTON\nSTANDARD TIME\nDEEPLY TOUCHED BY YOUR KIND MESSAGE WE BEG YOU TO ACCEPT OUR MOST\nHEARTFELT THANKS AND THE EXPRESSION OF OUR SINCERE DEVOTION FRANCES\nAND AUGUSTO ROSSO\nTELEPHONE: NATIONAL 2600\nTo secure prompt action on inquiries, this original RADIOGRAM should be presented at the office of\nR. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, Inc. In telephone inquiries quote the number preceding the place of origin.\nFORM 112WN-W\nPSF.Staly\nRasso\nParis, February 2, 1937.\nDear Miss Le Hand:\nI am enclosing herewith, for transmittal\nto the President, a letter from His Excellency\nAugusto Rosso, former Italian Ambassador in\nWashington and now Italian Ambassador in Moscow.\nWith all good wishes and kindest regards,\nI remain,\nHastily and sincerely yours,\nOffie\nCarmel Offie.\nP. S. -- All is quiet on the Seine!\nBut l know\nEnclosure.\nsomebody who feels\nMiss Marguerite Le Hand,\nlike braining you\nPrivate Secretary to the President,\nfor not writting\nThe White House,\nWashington, D. C.\nParis, January 29th, 1937\nDear Mr. President,\nHaving asked the advice of my friend Bullitt\nas to the way a former Ambassador to Washington should\nfollow in sending his wedding announcement to the\nPresident of the United States, the answer was : \"Just\nwrite a personal letter. The President does not mind\nan occasional breach of the Rules of Protocol !\".\nFollowing Mr. Bullitt's advice, I take the\nliberty of addressing to you this informal communication\nof my marriage with Mrs. Frances Wilkinson Bunker of\nWashington, formerly an American citizen, and since\nyesterday the Italian Ambassadress in Moscow.\nI wonder, Mr. President, if you happen to\nremember that two years ago, at the diplomatic reception\nHis Excellency\nFranklin D. Roosevelt\nPresident of the United States\nThe White House\nWashington, D.C.\nat the White House, you teased me for my delay in obeying\nthe Duce's ukase to his diplomats : \"Marry or quit!\". !\".\nThis is one of the reasons why I thought I should\nlet you know that I have actually complied with the order\nof my Boss !\nBut I have been prompted to do so also by the\nmemory of the great kindness and friendliness you have\nalways shown me during my mission in Washington, which\nmakesme feel doubly happy to-day for the new tie binding\nme to a country and a people I have learnt to know and\nlove.\nMay I respectfully ask you, also in the name\nof my wife, to convey to Mrs. Roosevelt our deepest\nregards, and to accept yourself on this occasion, the\nassurance of our sincere devotion.\nBelieve me, dear Mr. President,\nmost sincerely yours\nRoss\nP.S. This Petter was already within when\nI had the pleasure of receiving your not\ngrawary cable, fn wish we mush to thank\nyou again\nR.\nPsF\ndepartment OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\nJuly 6, 1937.\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL\nAND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, SIGNOR FULVIO DE SUVICH\nTrade Agreements Program.\nThe Ambassador of Italy called at his own request.\nHe had just returned from a three weeks' trip to the\nPacific Coast. For several minutes we discussed what\nhe saw and heard on this trip. He spoke of Hollywood\nand the different stars he met there and ended with the\nstatement that there was a great deal of rare genius\namong them. I took this lead to state that unless Italy\nwas well represented among the foremost of these geniuses\nit would be the first time that that great country had\nnot been well represented among the best minds of the\nworld in one or more lines of thought; that this re-\nminded me that many more of Italy's statesmen should\nvisit this country, just as American statesmen visit\nItaly and other countries of Europe and other European\nstatesmen visit this country. I then added that one\nof the valuable policies which contributed very much\nto the enthusiasm of the conference of American nations,\nboth at Montevideo and Buenos Aires, was that each\nproposed\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n-3-\nproposed a. full and constant interchange between all of\nthe American nations of the educational, cultural, ar-\ntistic and other valuable attainments of each country\nto the end that each would have the benefit of the best\nthat all could produce. I then launched into the\nstrongest possible discussion of nationalism in its\nextreme form, carefully distinguishing between sane,\npractical nationalism within reasonable limits and the\nextreme type which during the post-war period has con-\nstituted the worst disease that could overtake the human\nfamily. I repeated my illustration of a. community of\nfamilies, 8.8 set forth in a radio address of mine during\nForeign Trade Week, in which I pointed out what happened\nto a family that undertook to live 8. hermit existence\nwithout a single friend emong the families of the same\ncommunity, how it stagnated and steadily became hope-\nlessly decadent. I said, \"This is the great curse of\nthe world today and threatens civilized nations with\nstill more disastrous effects, unless the nations 1m-\nmediately begin at least to move in R. different direc-\ntion with 8. definite and sound program. I remarked\nthat our entire program promulgated at Buenos Aires\ncontains\ndepartment OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n- 3 -\ncontains a reasonable, practical and most urgent set of\nprinciples and policies as the single alternative to\nthe present disastrous course of affairs in Europe, --\nthat 18, a peaceful settlement and adjustment and re-\nhabilitation of all worthwhile and indispensable inter-\nnational relationships. I said that it is nobody's\nfault in particular that after eighteen years the only\nfoundation which Europe presents for a restored inter-\nnational order is the narrowest, cutthroat, trouble-\nbreeding method of trading and 8. wild, runaway race in\narmaments; but that this is in striking contrast with\nthe program of the 21 American nations, and of several\nEuropean countries which have approved it in the main,\nwhich does provide 8. solid and permanent foundation for\na stable structure of business, of peace, and of govern-\nment; that the single question is whether the civi-\nlized nations will wait until it is too late before\nproclaiming and pursuing this practical and constructive\ncourse. I elaborated further with my usual arguments\nin support of this program and especially emphasized\nthe extreme necessity for its support by European\ncountries generally, before too late.\nThe\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n-4-\nThe Ambassador interjected, for illustration and\nwithout criticism, the view that the British are engaged\nin an armament program which will require two years for\ncompletion, and that, considering altogether conditions\nin Europe, the time is not ripe just now for 8. movement\nin support of the program to which I was referring in\nsome detail; that within another year or two the time\nwould be ripe.\nI replied that we were talking now as citizens of\nthe world, rather than 8.8 officials representing our\ntwo governments and that I desired his permission to\ndiscuss the other side of the view he was expressing.\nI then said that I had been reared in an undeveloped\nmountainous region, where on Saturday afternoons the\nneighbors gathered in and about the country store; that\nwhen I would see several of the younger element, who\nwere still engaged in sowing their wild oats, come in\narmed with pistols, I knew there was most likely to be\n8. cigar stub or a cigarette stub dropped accidentally\nduring the afternoon and somebody would get hurt; that\nthese same persons would get hurt even though none of\nthem intended or desired 8. pistol fight; on the other\nhand,\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n-5-\nhand, that when these young men would come in of 8.\nSaturday afternoon with no sign of firearms at all,\neveryone breathed 8. sigh of relief because of the\nassurance there would be no violence undertaken during\nthe day. I said, \"Human nature among statesmen and\namong nations is very much the same. Furthermore,\nall of the nations never get fully armed under a\npolicy of rearmament races; one or more always desires\nlonger time to get more fully armed and equipped; and,\nin the end, en explosion inevitably occurs.\" I con-\ntinued, \"This is the situation in Europe today. It\nis to avoid just such 8. cataclysm that the 21 American\nnations have offered a program and are pleading to all\nother civilized nations to embrace it and give it sup-\nport without a day's delay.\" I referred to the recent\nstatements on economic and military peace made by\nMussolini and said that these gave hope and gratifica-\ntion to all -- the only trouble was that the masses of\nthe people everywhere, within almost 24 hours, forget\nand that, therefore, it is necessary that the program\nfor business restoration and peace must be preached\neach week by the important statesmen of each country;\nthat\ndepartment OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n- 6 -\nthat I desired to request the Ambassador again to tell\nMussolini how much we appreciated these statements of\nhis but that we profoundly hope he or his statesmen will\ndeliver 8. speech along these lines each week. I said\nthat there was never before such an opportunity for some\nimportant country in Europe to furnish leadership with\njust this sort of a program as I had outlined; that 8\nfew addresses proclaiming it and supporting it would\nresult in an amazing awakening of peace and good\nneighbor sentiment and that a wave of grateful public\nsentiment would sweep over Europe and over the entire\nWestern world. I said, \"This government is keeping\nentirely away from the political difficulties in Europe.\nIt is preserving neutrality with respect to both politi-\ncal and military activities and complications. We are\nhoping and praying we may be able to keep 3,000 miles\naway from any undesirable experiences in Europe. We\nhave 8. rather definite neutrality act which 18 very\ninflexible in certain respects, and we are assuming that\nno governments - - such as the British, the Russian, the\nGerman, the French, the Italian, or any other -- will\nsay or do enough officially to require the carrying into\noperation of the neutrality act.\"\nThe Ambassador\ndepartment OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n- 7 -\nThe Ambassador was not very vocal in reply to this\nand did not take issue or offer definite comment except,\nby inference, to the effect that nothing of this nature\nwas contemplated so far 8.8 he knew. He again came back\nto the question of the time not being propitious for 8.\nmovement in support of an alternative program for econ-\nomic and peace restoration. I replied that if each\nnation waits until the time is exactly right from its\nstandpoint, then I must again repeat that the time never\nwould become propitious; that the experience of recent\nyears in Europe clearly demonstrates this view; that it\nhas not been possible for the nations of Europe to settle\nany one or two of the 7 or 8 point program involved, or,\nin other words, the situation is merely drifting amidst\nincreasing turbulence and uproar in Europe, 8.8 well as\nin certain other parts of the world; that the develop-\nment of a. broader background and a more favorable\npsychology is probably vital to a broad and successful\nattack upon the numerous problems presented; that our\nmethod of approach and our championship in the Western\nhemisphere of the Buenos Aires program should be a\nsplendid example; that I could offer no better illustra-\ntion of what I had in mind than to say that if Italy\nand other important countries of Europe were preaching\nour\ndepartment OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n- 8 -\nour Buenos Aires program today, they and the 26 other\ngovernments, parties to the non-intervention pact, would\nmeet in London on next Friday with a softened state of\nmind, with a friendlier spirit and one of mutual conces-\nsion, and with a strong disposition to find ways for\nthe complete settlement of the matters of difference\nbefore they ceased their efforts or adjourned their\nmeeting; that this is in wide contrast to a. meeting\nnext Friday where there may be just a little aloofness\nfrom each other, a little too much suspicion of each\nother's motives and purposes and a lack of that confidence\nand neighborly spirit which is 80 necessary on the occa-\nsion of great crises; that, in brief, the preachment and\nthe championship of a program such as pointed out by me\nwas probably indispensable to the development of the\nnecessary psychology among statesmen and nations to deal\nadequately and promptly with present emergency problems;\nthat statesmen must develop an interest and 8. disposition\nand a will to cooperate in a broad and flexible manner\nin support of a basic program of peace and business\nrestoration -- otherwise that it will not be possible to\ninduce nations to halt their present armament races and\nto suppress their present suspicions and lack of trust\nin\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n- 9 -\nin each other to an extent sufficient to enable them\nto cooperate in support of a desirable program. The\nAmbassador took no issue with this view but seemed to\nbe much interested.\nI elaborated here on the general situation in\nEurope, referring to it as serious and what many would\ncall dangerous. I remarked that either another war or\na deep-seated economic panic would be utterly destructive\nof all that is worthwhile in the affairs of the western\nworld, and yet absolutely nothing in Europe is being\ndone in the way of permanent planning in the direction\nof peace and general stability. I said that today there\nare probably 4 million wage-earners in Germany engaged\nin armament production, who, with their families, com-\nprise 15 to 20 million of the entire German population\nof 70 million; that relative numbers in the United States,\nGreat Britain, Italy, France, and other countries, are\nlikewise engaged; that within another eighteen months,\nwhen the resources of most countries necessary for\nfurther increased armaments are exhausted, it would not\nbe humanly possible to find other gainful and productive\nemployment for all the millions and millions and millions\nof wage-earners now engaged in military production; and\nthat\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n- 10 -\nthat yet, with the roar of the economic and the military\nNiagara below, now within distinct hearing, and with\nthe certain knowledge that the happening of either\ncatastrophe would be fatal, nations are drifting and\ndrifting and drifting with no broad or permanent or\npeaceful planning.\nThe Ambassador again came back to the idea that\nthe armament workers could a year or two hence be\ngradually transferred to productive industry. I said\nthat I must distinctly differ on this point; that noth-\ning in the future could be more clear than that the\nraces in armaments by industrial nations, as happens to\nbe the case, and continued delay in adopting a coopera-\ntive program for general rehabilitation, would within\nanother two years have compelled all of the surplus-\nproducing food and surplus-producing raw material\ncountries to establish their own manufacturing and other\nindustrial plants, thus leaving surplus-producing\nindustrial countries, like Italy and others in Europe,\nnot to mention the United States, high and dry 80 far\nas anything resembling a real and profitable international\ntrade in the future would be concerned. I. further stated\nthat there\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n- 11 -\nthat there could beyond question be restored 30 billion\ndollars of mutually desirable and mutually profitable\ninternational trade above the present depleted volume;\nthat there are many things Italy and other industrial\ncountries produce, differing materially in value or\nquality or use, which it would be highly profitable\nfor the United States and other countries to purchase,\nthus giving employment to capital and labor in both\ncountries; that another two years of armament races\nand failure to adopt 8. program of peace and economic\nrehabilitation would inevitably fasten upon the world\npermanent conditions of the most extreme economic\nnationalism and all of its unthinkable consequences\nand deep privations. I said that it is in these cir-\ncumstances that this country, as stated before, while\ntaking every precaution to keep aloof from political\nand military involvements abroad, strongly feels that\neach civilized country right now has the unshirkable\nresponsibility of making a real contribution to promote\npeace and normal international relationships; that\ntherefore it and the other American nations are behind\nthe broad economic program and its kindred provisions\nto which I had referred, and that naturally we are\nlooking\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n- 12 -\nlooking longingly to leading countries in Europe to\noffer a similar contribution to peace and economic\nwell-being; that unless they do awaken and give support\nto such a program and movement, an economic collapse\nin Europe within 18 to 24 months is inevitable.\nThe Ambassador made very little further comment,\nexcept to agree in principle on all that I was saying\nabout the economic situation and the desire for peace.\nHe then said that his government requested him\nto say to this government that Italy has no purpose\nwhatever to occupy Spanish territory in any event and\nis only concerned in that respect to see that a Com-\nmunist government does not prevail in Spain. He then\nadded that his government strongly favored recognition\nof belligerent rights of General Franco's organization,\nnot recognition of the Franco organization as a govern-\nment as Italy and Germany had recognized it. His\ntheory seemed to be that recognition of belligerency\nby all the nations would clarify and serve to solve\nthe present important differences relative to the\nSpanish situation. He emphasized the point 8.8 stated\nthat Italy continues to adhere to the non-intervention\npact\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n- 13 -\npact along with the other 26 governments signatory to it.\nI thanked him for the information and expressed the hope\nthat the interested nations in Europe would find ways\nto compose every difference; that, as indicated, this\ncountry has 8. rather definite and inflexible neutrality\nact, and that, of course, with our variety of popula-\ntion some people at all times are urging us to take\nsteps; that naturally we have been assuming that none\nof the many governments interested will be disposed to\nindulge in such official utterances or acts 8.8 would\nraise the question of placing it in operation. The\nAmbassador said, \"I observe that you are not operating\nthe embargo provisions\", to which I replied that this\nis upon the assumption, as just stated, that no other\ngovernment will engage in such official acts 8.8 would\naggravate or complicate the situation any further in\n80 far as it would relate to our neutrality law.\nThe Ambassador made no further comment on this\nparticular phase. He then proceeded to say that his\ngovernment would be flexible in its attitude in con-\nference with other governments, and that it was the\npurpose of his government, while going as far in\ndealing\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY\n- 14 -\ndealing with 8. given phase as was deemed necessary or\nadvisable, to stop short of action which might be\ncalculated to provoke violence or hostility with another\ncountry or countries.\nC.H.\nS CH:HR\nPSF\nFile\nItaly\nPersonal\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 7, 1937\nMy dear Mr. President:\nI received this morning a personal letter from\nBill Phillips dated June 22 in which he says that he is\nconsiderably worried because of the long delay which\nhas elapsed in your sending a reply to Mussolini's\nletter to you of November 19, 1936. He says that \"This\nlong delay is really unfortunate\", and expresses the\nbelief that it would be very helpful if you saw fit to\nsend a reply in the near future.\nI remember that you spoke to me some weeks ago\nabout this matter and indicated that you were then pre-\nparing to draft a reply.\nIt may be that because of recent developments you\nhave thought it better to wait a while longer before\nsending your answer, but in view of the concern which\nBill Phillips expressed, I thought I had better bring\nhis request personally to your attention.\nBelieve me\nThe President,\nFaithfully yours, halls\nA\nThe White House.\nPublished in\nForeign Relations of the U. S.\n1937\nVol. I General\nPP. 662-664\nmusiline\n(s)\nto\nCondroll\n/\nIs Then ik. ?\nthe\nSummer and I heartity\napprove\ndure\nsee Foreign Dignitaries file\nSignar\nfor longhen litten from\nPSF Italy 1937\nJuly 29, 1937.\nMy dear Signor Mussolini:-\nI have waited for many months\nto thank you for your gracious and much appreciated\nletter to me, which I found on my return from South\nAmerica last December. I have delayed writing you\nbecause through all these months I have been hoping\nthat the world situation would clarify sufficiently\nfor me to discuss with you neasures looking toward\nthe stabilisation of peace among nations.\nBut, unfortunately the situation\ntoday seems no clearer than before, and, indeed, in\nsome aspects the drift of events has been toward\nand not away from an ultimate crisis.\nI have been gratified in read-\ning of your statements in favor of the principles\nof reduction of armament. AD you know, the Secretary\nof State has had my full support in his effective\nefforts toward the increase of international trade\nand the lowering of barriers against trade.\nNevertheless, all of these\nefforts, even if they are joined by additional\nnations, and even if a greater total of world trade\nresults in the coming years, will not prove a\npletely effective guarantee of international peace\nif world areament among the nations continues on\nits present scale.\n+\nThe two things must go hand in hand. It\nseems clear to me that if the nations cannagree on\narmazent reduction, even if it be in the form of a\nprogressive reduction over a period of years, they\ncan far more effectively discuss practical instruments\nfor reduction of trade barriers, thus building up\nemployment in industry to take the place of employ-\nment in armament. and I recognise that as a part\nof the discussion of increasing trade, every con-\nsideration should be given to a more ready access\nto raw materials' markets for those nations which in\nthemselves do not produce the raw materials necessary\nto industry.\nI am confident, my dear Duce, that you\nshare with me the fear that the trend of the present\ninternational situation is ominous to peace. And I\nam confident that you share with me the desire to\nturn the course of the world toward stabilising\npeace. I have often wished that I might talk with\nyou frankly and in person because from such a meet-\ning great good night come. But we both realise the\ngreat difficulties that stand in the way - inter-\nnational difficulties as well as the distances of\nthe Atlantic Goean and the Nediterranean Sea.\nI was very happy to learn that my youngest\nson, John, had the privilege of meeting you last week.\nI had charged him with conveying to you my very warm\nregards. Some day you and I must and shall meet in\nperson.\nBelieve me, with every good wish,\nFaithfully yours,\nHis Excellency\nSignor Benito Mussolini,\nChief of the Government,\nRome, Italy.\nP.S. This is your birthday and I send you wishes\nfor many happy returns of the day.\nADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON, D.C.\nmills\nPSF Italy\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nIn reply refer to\nFebruary 9, 1938\nNE 865D.01/378\nMy dear Mr. McIntyre:\nIn accordance with the President's memorandum of\nJanuary 31, 1938, I am returning the letter of Janu-\nary 15 addressed to the President by Dr. W. C. Martin\non behalf of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.\nThe Department has instructed the Embassy at\nLondon to make appropriate acknowledgment of Dr.\nMartin's communication.\nSincerely A yours, Mills\nEnclosure:\nFrom Dr. Martin,\nJanuary 15, 1938.\nThe Honorable\nMarvin H. McIntyre,\nSecretary to the President,\nThe White House.\nDepartment of State\nBUREAU\nNE\nDIVISION\nENCLOSURE\nTO\nLetter drafted\nADDRESSED TO\nThe Honorable\nMarvin H. McIntyre.\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE\n1-1088\nTEL. KENSINGTON 7433.\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nFDR\n5, PRINCE'S GATE,\nS.W.7.\n1938 JAN 30 PM 2 28\nIMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION\nJanuary 15th938.\nLONDON\nDIVISION OF\nCOMMUNICATIONS\nAND RECORDS\nPresident Franklin D. Roosevelt,\nThe White House,\nWashington, D.C.\nSir,\nI have the honour to thank you heartily in the name of\nHis Majesty The Emperor of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian People for\nyour right and noble act in refusing to recognize the unjust and\nprecarious occupation and pretended sovereignty of the King of\nItaly over the Ethiopian Empire.\nSuch a firm stand for international right and justice\non the part of the Head of the great American People is a great\nencouragement for us and for all weak peoples and at noble example\nto the world, and we have no doubt that perseverance in these vital\nmoral principles by the great democracies will in the end overcome\nall difficulties and bring peace and security to the peoples of the\nworld.\nI have the honour to be,\nWith the highest consideration,\nSir,\nYour obedient Servant,\nWartin\nd-1-30 WHITE HOUSE\nPSF Italy\nWASHINGTON\nAugust 31, 1938.\nC\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:\nThe following comes from a person who\nactually has & somewhat intimate access to\nMussolini:\n\"On May 29th, Mussolini received\na telegram from Hitler saying that on\nMay 24th he had informed Henlein and also\nEsterhazy (of Hungary) that they should lay\nlow for the moment to give Hitler the necessary\ntime of ten weeks to complete his defense line --\nat which time Hitler would be ready to present\nan ultimatum to Prague. At that time the \"ring\"\nof Germany, Austria and Hungary would be ready\nto act 8.8 a concerted unit. One item of the\nultimatum under consideration would be the\ndischarge of Benes by Czechoslovakia.\nI merely pass this on to you. The informa-\ntion was sent me early in July but only just\nreached me. It is worth noting that ten weeks\nfrom the end of May brings us approximately to\nthe early part of September.\nF.D.R.\nFDR/dj\nSwayon\n5. 1/11. 38.\nconfidented\nher Dear - Before leav.\nmy Haly I wa asked tarry\nyou a Henage about a cer tain\nmatter Which undoubtedy has\nabread Came Don attention\nin Leveral ways So Dam Send-\nthe if along Ron as heing abso.\nlately autherities - (so I wa\nasker to tell Jan )- in case\nany ane is landering has Much\ntruth there is in the suman\nthat on may the 29th more olini\nin for had Hen lein & also 5\nSay inj that on may I 24th\nreceived a telep am from he Hi had then\n(Wes is, I he lieve, the Hungariag\npar lia mentary Spatter mar Jam\nSlorakia in the Progue partichent),\n& to Jether with them Har thy- to\nRielow for the mo ment, wing him\nthe recessary time of tea Treek\nto Caup lete his defence line at\nwhich time he lower he ready to\npresent an ulli atam Thogue\nto act as a Can carted unit.\n& which time the ning he heady\nIt Seems also in theair that\nthe of the / tem under Casi-\nDeration hi this ultimation\nCould he the Dihissia of Bene\n(an they fay \"Benes\"S head\nIt Lae write at Lay ing, doesn't\nih?- that Benes power and fres\ntige hifidet outfide his Country\nCould he reg under as an obvide\nhandi cap to the lazy -realization\nthe Subcute program.\nHaven in add tia to this alltoo.\nloident of act- there has been of\nfored a definite explanation\ntoward Bene which I have her\nof the mitrolini antag Thisa\nToed is has being in ver tigated.\n7 Caurse the in tes Jeetia\n/perhaps one could say\nA the British at that point hat ex-\nih Difficult Day nod & that-\nactly part of the program. ) makes\neach free plan # Her may\nif will in flude ee or have amend been\nformulating spaking until You, then I loor re-\nquester to Keep in Kind that Those\nwho as Red the to do this there es-\npecially can eerned hat Loudon\nauther tieits A this Hitler telegram\nalso he informed as to the undombled\nto hurnolini- & here them Jelse Ch-\nDeavoring to fet a reliable hers enger\nthrough & Poud an - and although )\nSaid at the time I feet none of\nthis would he her lither Doe\nor to Lowon - I was of cause\nwilling to pass the mess age along.\nas for Rua the Centlal Suropean\nmoblect is, as ih always has been, Com-\npley & haffling I am foory the Cannot fit\nthen for it loneshe in tere, this the & loss cauforting Hen\nDenelop meals there, X the background ofor\noffer a cup of tea speaking of these later\nin a way that\nword cannot manage.\nButlan are, happil, At to a Der tinatia,\nwhich promise to he nu eli wore fun.\nprogram is hebical - that the holi-\nThope of the the trans Crutin ental\ndog will he refres ling in every toog-\nAlways fairs Affectiaale\nDance C Gave\n)\n[Frances Crane ]\nPSF Italy\nTHE COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE\nfile\nWASHINGTON\nSeptember 22, 1938.\nDear Mr. President:\nA question has been raised as to whether the\nrequest should be met of those who are interested\nto exempt from the payment of customs duties a\nnumber of household furnishings that are being\nbrought in. from Italy to be used in a house that\nis being provided in Washington by or under the\ndirection of the Vatican State. Assistant Secretary\nGibbons of the Treasury tells me that he will feel\njustified in granting the request should the State\nDepartment indicate to him that it will be glad to\nsee it granted as an act of international courtesy.\nSo far as I know, none of us here who have consider-\ned the matter perceive any objection to a note being\nwritten to Mr. Gibbons on which he may base an order\nexempting the articles, which I do not understand to\nbe of any considerable value, from the payment of\ncustoms duties. When the matter was casually men-\ntioned in a conversation with the Secretary yester-\nday, he thought it would be well for me to bring it\nto your attention, and therefore I am now doing this\nin the hope that you can find time to have someone\ntelephone me as to whether or not you see any ob-\njection. Mr. Gibbons would like to know as soon as\npossible what to do.\nThe suggested action would not imply any recog-\nnation by our Government of the Vatican State.\nYours very sincerely,\nThe President,\nThe White House.\nPSF. staly\nPresident Roosevelt to the Chief of the Italian Government\n(Mussolini), Washington, December 7, 1938.\n(re: political refugees)\nPublished in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938,\nVolume I, General, pages 858-859.\nRLJ 5/24/57"
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