Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
These records pertain to Global Climate Change.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
285411031
label
Subject Files: Working Group on Global Climate Change #1 (IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and RSWG (Response Strategy Working Group) [Letters, Memorandums, Reports, and Other Information][3]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
285411031
contentType
document
title
Subject Files: Working Group on Global Climate Change #1 (IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and RSWG (Response Strategy Working Group) [Letters, Memorandums, Reports, and Other Information][3]
description
These records pertain to Global Climate Change.
citationUrl
identifierLocal
03679-011
collections
Records of the Council of Economic Advisors (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Richard L. Schmalensee Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
285411031
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
76712468c525fd95
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2017-0310-F
2017-0310-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Economic Advisers, Council of
Series:
Schmalensee, Richard, Files
Subseries:
OA/ID Number:
03679
Folder ID Number:
03679-011
Folder Title:
Subject Files: Working Group on Global Climate Change #1 (IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change) and RSWG (Response Strategy Working Group) [Letters, Memorandums, Reports, and
Other Information][3]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
n/e/r/a
National Economic Research Associates, Inc.
Consulting Economists
Carry
POLICY APPROACHES FOR CONTROLLING GREENHOUSE GASES
Prepared for
Energy Research Group
David Harrison
Vice President
National Economic Research Associates, Inc.
101 Main Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142
(617) 864-0170
May 1989
White Plains / Washington, DC
Los Angeles / Boston / Philadelphia
Ithaca / Seattle / London
A Marsh & McLennan Company
POLICY APPROACHES FOR CONTROLLING GREENHOUSE GASES¹
by
David Harrison
Vice President
National Economic Research Associates, Inc.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Concern for global warming and the "greenhouse effect" has been thrust
onto the public agenda. President Bush highlighted global warming as one of the
key environmental issues of his administration, and numerous commentators have
joined the chorus. A bill to control greenhouse gases--including a proposal to use a
CO2 tax as one of the control levers--was introduced in the last Congress and
reintroduced this year. Given the large revenues that such a tax might raise, global
warming might also figure into congressional deliberations on deficit reduction.
Although the public, through its elected officials, seems intent on "doing
something" about global warming, there are surprisingly few analyses of policy
options. Many scientific studies have assessed whether a warming trend is taking
place and, if so, what are the causes. (See Abrahamson 1989 for a summary of
recent evidence.) Despite disagreements among scientists on these issues, these
studies have been the catalysts for public concern. Other studies have described
the impacts that a warming trend would have on different parts of the world (see
Abrahamson 1989).
Economists and policy analysts have provided economic frameworks for
evaluating policy alternatives in light of the scientific evidence. (See Nordhaus
1982, Schelling 1983, and Lave 1988.) In addition, several authors have provided
specific recommendations for actions to reduce greenhouse gases, including reduced
dependence on the fossil fuels that generate CO₂ and other gases linked to global
1 The author would like to thank Scott Barrett, Mark Berkman, Joan Bodoff, Paul
Joskow, Albert Nichols, and members of the Energy Research Group for helpful
comments on an earlier draft, Diane Karlsruher and John Straub for research
assistance, and Marty Allen for preparation of the paper. The views expressed
are those of the author, who is solely responsible for any errors or omissions.
n/e/r/a
-2-
fuels altogether. (See e.g., Lovins 1981, Mintzer 1988, Mintzer 1987, Moomaw 1988,
and Schneider 1987.) None of these studies, however, has evaluated alternative
policy approaches to reduce greenhouse gases, including the CO₂ tax initiative
already proposed in Congress.
A. Objectives
This paper is not designed to address the scientific issues regarding
global warming and the decision whether or not to take action. Nor does it
consider alternative policies to accommodate the economic changes that might occur
as a result of global warming (e.g., changes in electricity requirements). (See, e.g.,
Starr 1988.) Rather, this paper begins with an assumption that greenhouse gases
are to be reduced in the U.S. and asks the question--how should this reduction be
accomplished? Should the U.S. rely upon the traditional "command-and-control"
approach in which the government sets specific control requirements? Or, should
the U.S. adopt an economic incentive approach, such as the CO₂ tax introduced in
Congress or a marketable permits scheme that has been suggested for
chlorofluorocarbons?
Answering these questions in detail requires an empirical study. However,
we can learn much from our background in pollution control--theory, empirical
studies, and past successes and failures--about the efficiency and distributional
properties of various approaches. Moreover, this background provides a structure
for identifying the information we need for an empirical study.
Although this paper focuses on greenhouse gases, these lessons are
applicable to other environmental problems. Indeed, there is increasing interest in
the economic incentive approach. For example, two U.S. Senators from opposite
poles of the traditional regulatory spectrum have sponsored a report calling for
widespread use of economic incentives to deal with problems as diverse as acid rain
n/e/r/a
-3-
and municipal trash (Stavins et al. 1988). The New York Times has reported that
their support confers a new political legitimacy on the economic incentive approach
and that environmental groups are increasingly interested in the approach (Passell
1988). As further evidence, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
recently released a report documenting the enormous potential cost savings from
allowing utilities flexibility in reducing their SO₂ emissions as part of an acid rain
control program (ICF Resources Inc. 1989). This greater political acceptability
suggests that economic incentives will move out of the academic realm and into the
world of serious policy debate. There is, therefore, even greater need to identify
their advantages and disadvantages both in theory and in practice.
B. Organization of the Paper
This paper is therefore organized as follows. In Section II, we summarize
the major policy alternatives. Section III describes the principal evaluative criteria
and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the alternatives. Section IV discusses
the key information needed to implement and evaluate the alternatives in practice.
The final section summarizes the conclusions.
II. POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Environmental policy consists of two principal elements. The first is the
setting of ambient goals. For example, the Clean Air Act establishes criteria for
ambient air quality that are then translated through administrative rulemaking by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) into specific ambient air quality
standards.
The second element is the translation of ambient goals into specific
emission limitations for individual sources. For air pollutants, the EPA sets specific
emission limits on new sources (e.g., new power plants) and the states set limits on
existing sources that, in theory, lead to compliance with the ambient standards.
n/e/r/a
-4-
Our principal concern is with the second element, the setting of
individual emission standards. The major choice is between mandatory controls--in
which the government sets specific emission limits for each source--and the
economic incentive approach that allows individual firms to set their own emissions
in response to prices. (See Lave 1981 for a general discussion of regulatory
alternatives.) Two versions of the economic incentive approach are usually
identified--an emission tax in which price is set directly, and a quota or permits
scheme in which price is set indirectly through competition for a limited number of
emission permits. In addition to these three alternatives, it is useful to add a
fourth "regulatory reform" option consisting of recent EPA reforms of the
mandatory controls approach.
A. Mandatory Controls
The dominant policy approach in the U.S. is to set technology-based
emission standards for major emission sources. These emission standards specify the
maximum amount of pollution permitted, usually expressed as a per unit of output or
input. For example, the nitrogen oxides (NOx) standard proposed for existing power
plant boilers in the South Coast Air Basin (Los Angeles) is 0.03 tons of NOx per
million Btus (South Cost Air Quality Management District 1988).
The set of emission standards that has evolved is complex but has a
relatively simple technology-based logic. Standards for both new and existing
sources are based primarily on the "availability" of control technology. For
example, the proposed NOx standard for existing Los Angeles power plants was
based upon the use of selective catalytic reduction at each plant. Standards for
new plants are typically more stringent because of the possibility of incorporating
the latest technology.
n/e/r/a
-5-
The logic for allocating standard-setting responsibility between
governments is primarily political. New sources are controlled directly by the
federal government--on the theory that states or regions should not compete for
industry by allowing higher limits--while existing sources are controlled by the
states as part of their state implementation plans (SIP) for each airshed within
their jurisdiction.
Economics plays a role in the standard-setting process, but distributional
impacts rather than economic efficiency are usually the motivating concern. Most
pollution control laws require that emission standards be economically achievable.
In practice, this means that discharge standards for industries cannot be set at such
a stringent level that a nontrivial number of plants would close or lay off
substantial numbers of workers. Even when a comparison of benefits and costs
might justify additional controls, such controls would not be required if the industry
could not afford them.
The process of setting emission standards for major industries has often
been characterized by brinkmanship and litigation. Congress typically sets specific
timetables for promulgating standards which encourages tough bargaining and
brinkmanship as the deadline approaches. For example, in the 1970 Clean Air Act,
Congress required EPA to set standards to reduce auto emissions by 90 percent by
the 1975-76 model years. As the deadline for meeting the standard approached--and
the EPA faced the possibility of shutting down the U.S. automobile industry if
standards were not met--there was a great deal of posturing that may well have
retarded technological progress toward reducing automobile emissions. (See Mills and
White 1978.)
Disagreements over the legality of emission standards often wind up in
the courts. Although the technology-based approach has the appearance of
n/e/r/a
-6-
objectivity, in fact there are often wide disagreements about what technology is
"available" and how effective it is in reducing emissions. Moreover, the setting of
standards can affect groups other than the regulated industries (or at least other
groups believe they will be affected). These groups can often affect regulatory
requirements.
The well-known case of setting sulfur dioxide (SO₂) standards for new
power plants illustrates the controversies that often surround standard setting. (See
Ackerman and Hasler 1981.) Although the standards were to be based upon the
"best available technology," there was little agreement on which technologies were
"available" and on which was "best." For example, in its initial evaluation, the EPA
pointed to several plants built in England and Japan with control equipment, but the
utility industry contended that the equipment was unreliable and expensive to
operate.
The EPA and the utilities were not the only interested parties. A
provision of the Clean Air Act requires that all new or substantially modified coal-
fired power plants remove some percentage of the sulfur contained in their boiler
fuel, regardless of its initial sulfur content. As Ackerman and Hassler point out,
the requirement was designed to discourage electric utilities from using low-sulfur
coal to meet emission standards, since this may have caused some unemployment
among midwestern miners of high-sulfur coal. Given the large stakes involved--all
parties agreed that the costs of controls would be billions of dollars--and the
ambiguity of the criteria, it is not surprising that the standards took many years to
promulgate and eventually wound up in court.
It is also not surprising that the set of standards that emerges from the
inherently political process does not minimize the overall cost of meeting ambient
n/e/r/a
-7-
standards. Standards set piecemeal on the basis of "technological feasibility" are
likely to result in widely divergent costs for given emission reductions.
B. Regulatory Reforms
In recent years, the EPA has modified its regulatory approach in several
ways that are designed to reduce the overall costs of pollution control without
compromising environmental quality. (See Hahn and Hester 1989 and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency 1986.) Referring to these changes as "controlled
trading," EPA emphasizes both that the changes are in fact trades rather than
reductions in overall control and that they are controlled by agency procedures and
personnel.
The controlled trading reforms include the following three major
elements:
(1) Bubbles: A single plant with several emission sources may be
permitted to increase emissions beyond the current standard at one location within
the plant if it makes a greater reduction in emissions somewhere else at the same
facility. (2) Offsets: A firm may add new emissions if it pays for a greater
reduction in emissions at another plant in the same area. (3) Banks: A firm that
reduces emissions below the standard may deposit as a credit some fraction of the
excess emission reductions in an emission bank. These banked emission credits can
then be sold to other firms seeking emission credits.
The trading allowed under these reforms--and thus the potential for cost
savings--is limited in several important ways by EPA. (See Hahn and Hester 1989).
Only a few air pollutants can be traded under current EPA regulations. Another
major limitation is that a firm can only include emissions from its own facilities
within a "bubble" and thus cannot trade with another firm. Moreover, a firm
cannot trade between new and existing sources, since the bubble policy only applies
n/e/r/a
-8-
to standards on existing plants. However, a firm can use the offset policy to locate
a new plant in an area that does not meet the ambient standards--and thus in
theory could prohibit new pollution sources--by paying another source to reduce its
emissions by more than the emissions from the new plant.
Trading also might not be worthwhile from a firm's standpoint. The
administrative obstacles and costs provide one reason. In addition, the advantages
from trading might be eliminated if EPA or the states tightened emission standards.
Engaging in trades may send a signal that standards can be tightened--because
tighter control technology is "available"-- and thus any temporary cost savings would
be overwhelmed by the increased costs of stricter controls.
C. Marketable Permits
A system of marketable permits can be viewed as an extension of the
controlled trading reforms that the EPA has already adopted. Rather than limiting
trades in various ways (only trades within a single facility, etc.), the EPA would set
an overall limit on emissions in an airshed and allow anyone to buy and sell
emission permits. Marketable permits would in effect be "uncontrolled trading."
There would be no need to set emission limits for individual sources
under the marketable permits scheme. Indeed, a major virtue of this approach is
that it decentralizes decision-making and allows firms to determine their pollution
output just as they determine their production levels. Firms can purchase pollution
permits just as they purchase other materials. Like other materials, a market price
would be established that reflects demand and supply conditions.
The simplest means of establishing the market for pollution permits would
be for the government to auction the permits and then make them freely
transferable. Although the EPA would still have to monitor individual sources, it
n/e/r/a
-9-
would not have to promulgate individual standards or determine "available
technology."
D. Emission Taxes
Emission taxes change the focus from regulating the quantity of emissions
to regulating the price; however, there are more similarities than differences
between a marketable permits scheme and an emission tax scheme. The similarities
are as follows: both decentralize the decisions on individual emission standards;
both result in a price for emissions that firms can use to determine their optimum
emission levels; both require that individual emissions be monitored, either to collect
tax revenues or to verify permit amounts; and both can result in payments to the
government treasury, either as tax payments or permit payments.
The emission tax scheme does, however, break the distinction between the
two elements discussed above--the setting of ambient targets and the setting of
individual emission standards. Unlike marketable permits, which begin with an
overall limit on emissions, ambient conditions would be determined by individual
firms' reactions to the tax.
III. THEORETICAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The theoretical advantages and disadvantages of economic incentive
schemes have been pointed out by many authors. (See, e.g., Anderson et al. 1977,
Barrett 1986, Baumol and Oates 1975, Crandall 1983, Freeman et al. 1973, Harrison
and Portney 1983, Kneese and Schultze 1975, Nichols 1983 and Rose-Ackerman 1973.)
Economists usually applaud economic incentive schemes primarily because they
promise to produce lower compliance costs. Although this efficiency advantage is
important, a complete analysis includes other criteria, such as distributional impacts
and administrative burdens. This section considers seven criteria related to the
efficiency and distributional properties of the various approaches.
n/e/r/a
-10-
In addition to using theory, this section uses information from empirical
case studies of economic incentive approaches. Although economic incentives have
not been adopted in the United States, these studies provide indications of how
they would perform in practice. Exhibit 1 lists seven empirical studies of which
three concentrate on marketable permits, two focus on emission taxes, and two
devote equal attention to both. (See Harrison and Portney 1982 for additional
discussion of five of these studies.) The air pollution examples include two
conventional pollutants that have been regulated for some time (NOx and SOx), one
hazardous pollutant that has recently been regulated (benzene), and one that is
linked to both global warming and ozone depletion (chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs).
A. Compliance Costs
Economic incentive schemes reduce compliance costs compared to
mandatory controls--for a given level of emission reduction--because they set a
common level for the marginal cost of control. This efficiency advantage is
analogous to the efficiency advantage of a common price in any market. The
common price puts a cap on the cost per ton--since a firm could pay the tax or
permit price rather than pay for controls that cost more per ton--and thus an
economic incentive approach avoids overly expensive control measures.
Exhibit 2 illustrates the potential for cost savings by considering two
hypothetical firms. Each firm emits 200 tons per day without controls and faces an
emission standard of 100 tons per day. The schedules show the marginal cost each
firm would incur if it reduced its emissions. The shape of the curve shows the
familiar pattern for pollution control costs--reducing the first tons is relatively
cheap, but the cost increases rapidly at high levels of control. For example, in the
case of SOx, relatively inexpensive coal washing can be used to remove the first
tons, but expensive scrubbers have to be installed to achieve high control levels.
nera
-11-
EXHIBIT 1
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF ECONOMIC
INCENTIVE SCHEMES
Geographic
Issues
Reference
Pollutant
Scheme(s)
Area
Considered
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Anderson et al.
Air/NOx
Marketable
Chicago
Cost savings
:
(1979)
Permits
Geographic variation
Emission
Income transfer
Taxes
David et al.
Water/
Marketable
Wisconsin
Cost savings
(1977)
Phosphate
Permits
Income transfer
Hahn and Noll
Air/SOx
Marketable
Los Angeles
Geographic variation
(1981)
Permits
Income transfer
Market power
Harrison
Aircraft
Emission
United States
Cost savings
(1983)
Noise
Taxes
and Boston's
Geographic variation
Marketable
Logan Airport
Income transfer
Permits
Nichols
Air/
Emission
United States
Cost savings
(1983)
Benzene
Charges
Geographic variation
Palmer et al.
Air/CFC
Marketable
United States
Cost savings
(1980)
Permits
Income transfer
Perl and Dunbar
Air/SO₂
Emission
United States
Cost savings
(1982)
taxes
n/e/r/a
AN EMISSIONS TAX REDUCES
OVERALL COMPLIANCE COSTS
Marginal Cost Curves
Marginal Cost Curves
30
30
n/e/r/a
Firm A
Firm A
-12-
Dollars per Ton
20
Dollars per Ton
20
Firm B
Firm B
10
10
0
0
0
100
200
0
100
200
Tons Emitted
Tons Emitted
Firm A Costs
Firm B Costs
(A) Mandatory Controls
(B) Emissions Tax
EXHIBIT 2
(100 tons)
($10 per ton)
-13-
Firm A is a "high cost" firm. To meet the emission standard of 100 tons,
the firm would have to pay $15 per ton to reduce the last ton (from 101 to
100 tons). The overall costs to Firm A of meeting the standard are shown by the
shaded area.
Firm B faces the same general pattern of increasing control costs, but its
costs are lower. Its marginal cost to achieve a standard of 100 tons would be one-
half of Firm A's cost, or $7.50 per ton. Its overall costs are the much smaller
shaded area shown for Firm B. Given the wide divergence in costs at the margin,
it is clear that overall costs would be reduced if control requirements were
reallocated.
Exhibit 2(b) shows that an economic incentive scheme would, in theory,
lead to lower compliance costs. If each firm faced an emission tax of $10--or if
the market price of a permit were $10--then each firm would control emissions up
to the point that its marginal costs equaled the tax. Firm A would increase its
control level and emit 133 tons, while Firm B would decrease its control level and
emit only 67 tons. The total number of tons would be the same--200 tons--but the
overall costs would be considerably less.
This same example can be used to illustrate the limitations of the
regulatory reform approach. If A and B represent two sources at the same facility
(e.g., two boilers at the same power plant), the bubble policy would allow the firm
to reallocate controls and minimize costs. However, these cost savings would not
be possible if the two sources were owned by different firms, or were owned by the
same firm but at different facilities.
All of the empirical case studies show cost savings from switching to an
economic incentive strategy. For example, Perl and Dunbar (1982) calculate the
cost savings to electric utilities from maintaining the same total so, emission
n/e/r/a
-14-
reductions but eliminating the arbitrary features that require utilities to use high
cost controls. Annual costs fall from $7.1 billion per year (1980 dollars) to $4.47
billion per year--a decline of 37 percent--when emissions in each region are held
constant but utilities are able to select the least-cost means of reducing emissions.
The cost savings come from increased use of low-sulfur coal and reduced use of
scrubbers. Costs would fall still further--to $3.7 billion per year--if national
emissions were held constant.
B. Level of Control
In theory, an emission tax set equal to the marginal benefits of control
will result in the "optimum" level of control--the level of control at which marginal
benefits equal marginal costs. (See Nichols 1983 for a discussion of complications
that arise in targeting requirements to achieve optimum controls.) Indeed, this
feature is often mentioned as a theoretical advantage of using a tax rather than a
marketable permits scheme.
This advantage is less marked in the case studies than it is in theory.
Setting such an ideal charge requires more information than is usually available. To
determine a price that equates marginal benefits and marginal costs, the regulator
must estimate the schedules relating marginal costs and benefits to the level of
control. The difficulty of making such estimates, together with reluctance to set
environmental goals solely on the basis of efficiency, probably explains why tax
proposals usually do not seek to achieve the most efficient level of control, but
only to enforce a somewhat arbitrary level of control at lower cost. For example,
one tax proposal for aircraft noise was based upon the cost of noise-control retrofit
for older planes. The tax is designed to induce the retrofit of most of these older
planes rather than to achieve the "optimum" level of noise control.
n/e/r/a
-15-
The one situation where an ideal charge can be set without estimating
the complete costs and benefits schedules is if the benefits are reasonably certain
and there are no thresholds. Harrison (1983) points out that aircraft noise is one
such case. However, global warming does not fit these conditions. The benefits of
controlling greenhouse gases are exceedingly difficult to assess. Moreover, much of
the concern for global warming is based upon the possibility of a threshold that
would lead to massive climatic changes. Thus, it seems unlikely that an emission
tax would be based upon a dollar calculation of the marginal benefits of controls.
Setting a greenhouse gas tax would, however, be easier than for most
other pollution problems in one important respect--greenhouse gases have the same
effect on global warming regardless of where they are emitted. As the case studies
of aircraft noise (Harrison 1983) and airborne benzene (Nichols 1983) emphasize, the
marginal damages from emissions depend upon where and when they occur. The
reason is simple--emissions in dense urban areas cause more exposure and thus more
damage than the same emissions in sparsely settled areas (Harrison and Nichols 1983
and Nichols 1983). Both the aircraft noise and benzene case studies illustrate the
advantages of tax rates that vary geographically (and the similar advantages of
geographically-varying standards).
The world-wide nature of global warming does, however, raise the
additional problem of obtaining international cooperation to reduce emissions, since
even large reductions in the U.S. may not have much effect on global warming if
they are not combined with similar efforts in the rest of the world. The conflict
between the U.S. and Canada over acid rain indicates that achieving international
cooperation is often difficult. The recent Montreal agreement among industrialized
nations to control CFCs indicates, however, that such cooperation is possible.
n/e/r/a
-16-
Indeed, the pressure to control greenhouse gas emissions in the United States may
well come from a similar international initiative.
C. Differential Impacts Among Firms
The major drawback to an economic incentive scheme--at least from the
standpoint of regulated firms--is the potential for large income transfers. Although
all the empirical studies demonstrate efficiency gains, these studies also show that
some groups lose.
Firms or industries that stand to lose by a switch to economic incentives
have the following characteristics:
1. low compliance costs;
2. high volumes of wastes; and
3. little ability to pass control costs on to consumers.
The example in Exhibit 2 illustrates how a firm with low compliance costs could
lose under a tax. Because Firm B's marginal cost of control under mandatory
controls ($7.50 per ton) is lower than the tax ($10 per ton), the tax will lead the
firm to increase its control level. In contrast, Firm A will cut back on controls
because its marginal cost ($15) is less than the tax.
Firms with little ability to pass on costs lose because of the way that
EPA currently sets emission standards. Because regulatory standards are generally
based on the "affordability" of compliance costs, firms and industries that cannot
pass costs on--either because they are marginal firms or because they face
substantial foreign competition-typically operate under less stringent environmental
regulations. These firms would therefore face higher costs (or greater likelihood of
going out of business) if EPA used a tax or permit approach. In contrast, firms or
industries that can afford control costs--either because they have "deep pockets" or
n/e/r/a
-17-
are permitted by regulatory authorities to pass on costs--would tend to gain from a
switch to economic incentives.
The empirical studies also indicate the size of these cost effects.
Exhibit 3 shows results for CFCs. While overall compliance costs fall by
$77.5 million (58 percent) under a hypothetical permit scheme, compliance costs
increase by $21.6 million for makers of solvents, a 25 percent increase from costs
under mandatory controls. However, the decreases in costs for the other two major
emitters are even more dramatic: compliance costs decrease for flexible foam and
rigid foam by $64.1 million (70 percent) and $35.0 million (90 percent), respectively.
Solvent manufacturers are nonetheless likely to have little enthusiasm for the permit
scheme. Differential impacts are even more dramatic for aircraft noise. With a
hypothetical noise charge for Boston's Logan Airport, overall landing fees would
triple; but for some carriers, the increase would be more than ten-fold.
Economic incentive schemes may also increase costs to firms or
municipalities whose emissions were previously ignored by the regulatory system. In
the Lake Michigan case, for example, Wisconsin regulations exempted small towns
from discharge limitations, even though they emitted about one-fourth of the
phosphorus in the lake. (See David et al. 1980.) Under a marketable permits
scheme, these exempted communities would share the cost of abatement.
D. Distributional Impacts on Business as a Whole
A fundamental difference between economic incentive schemes and
mandatory controls is the property rights they presume. Even stringent controls
usually allow some emissions, thereby implying that each source "owns" some right
to emit. In contrast, under the emission tax or permit approach, polluters must pay
for all their emissions.
n/e/r/a
-18-
EXHIBIT 3
COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR INDUSTRIES
UNDER A CFC MARKETABLE PERMIT SCHEME
Cumulative Effects of
Deviation from
Economic Incentives
Mandatory Controls
Product
Emissions
Compliance
Emissions
Compliance
Area
Reduction
Cost
Reduction
Cost
-(Million Permit
-(Million
-(Million Permit
-(Million
Pounds)-
Dollars)-
Pounds)-
(Dollars)-
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Flexible Foam
380.7
29.2
-120.5
-64.1
Solvents
390.3
67.3
+204.6
+21.6
Rigid Foam
26.7
3.8
-79.4
-35.0
Retail Food
18.3
7.3
-
I
Chillers
1.0
0.1
-
-
TOTAL
816.9
107.8
+4.6
-77.5
Source: Palmer, et al. (1980).
nera
-19-
Exhibit 4 shows that economic incentive schemes can generate very large
income transfers to the government. As discussed above, a tax allows firms to use
the cheapest means of reducing emissions, rather than the more expensive measures
that are often required under mandatory controls. But, unlike mandatory controls,
firms must pay for the emissions that they do not control. The size of the income
transfer depends upon the level of the tax, the costs of control, and the number of
tons emitted. Under the conditions illustrated in Exhibit 4, tax transfers would
almost certainly swamp any savings in compliance costs due to the tax.
These transfers are initially paid by businesses. But businesses will pass
some or all of the costs on to customers or labor in the form of higher product
prices or lower wages. The fraction passed on depends upon industry cost and
market conditions. Like the excise taxes they resemble, such costs tend to be
regressive, i.e., borne more than proportionately by the poor. (See Harrison 1975.)
In contrast to compliance costs--which represent expenditures of real
resources--tax or permit payments are transfers. When the government receives tax
or permit revenues, it can use the money to reduce other taxes or increase
spending. Nonetheless, transfer costs are likely to be considered real by the
businesses that initially pay them. The prospect of large payments undoubtedly
explains why business has not generally supported economic incentive schemes.
The empirical studies indicate that the sums involved are far from trivial.
The transfer payments for a CFC permit scheme would amount to about $150 million
per year (1976 dollars)--and that the present value of a ten-year program would be
between $1.15 billion and $1.7 billion--considerably greater than overall savings in
compliance cost of $78 million per year (Palmer and Quinn 1981). Harrison (1983)
estimates that a national aircraft noise tax with a baseline (no tax level) of
98 decibels would generate about $150 million per year in revenue (1980 dollars).
n/e/r/a
-20-
EXHIBIT 4
AN EMISSIONS TAX CAN REDUCE COMPLIANCE
COSTS BUT LEAD TO LARGE INCOME TRANSFERS
100
90
Marginal Cost Curve
80
70
60
Dollars per Ton
50
Tax Transfers
40
to Government
30
Emissions Tax
20
10
Compliance
Costs
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Tons Emitted
n/e/r/a
-21-
The empirical studies also indicate the factors that affect the relative
importance of compliance costs and transfer payments. The water pollution and
CFC studies illustrate the two extreme cases. The marginal cost of removing
phosphorus from Lake Michigan is graphed in Exhibit 5. Transfer payments are
relatively small because cities are required to remove 85 percent of the phosphorus
under either a mandatory control or a permit scheme, and thus only 15 percent was
previously "owned" by cities that must now buy permits. Compliance costs dominate.
In contrast, under the benchmark CFC control strategy that Rand evaluated--in
which CFC emissions are only reduced by about 15 percent--expenses for transfers
are about 14 times the costs of actually reducing emissions. The CFC case is thus
close to that shown in Exhibit 4. Indeed, only a few CFC-using firms have
compliance costs that exceed permit payments (assuming that all permits are
originally government owned).
E. Compensation to Avoid Transfers
The potential for large government revenues may not be viewed as a
defect of economic incentive schemes, given concerns about the federal deficit.
Indeed, some argue that the strategies are justified either as "user fees" or as the
most efficient means of raising necessary revenue (Terkla 1984). Nevertheless, large
transfers will certainly be viewed by some as undesirable side effects of the
schemes--at least from a political perspective--and the following questions arise:
How can the transfers be reduced? What effects would any modifications have on
the schemes' effectiveness and efficiency?
The empirical case studies indicate that large transfer payments can be
reduced, but only by increasing administrative costs and complexity.
n/e/r/a
-23-
1. Tax Revenues
Tax revenues can be reduced by setting a cutoff before the tax is levied.
For example, Harrison (1983) shows that using 98 decibels as the starting point for
the noise tax reduces the airline transfer payments dramatically without
compromising the efficiency advantages of the scheme. Exhibit 6 shows a simplified
version of this approach in which taxes are only charged on emissions above a
cutoff of 70 tons and revenues are decreased enormously.
Reducing tax revenues by setting a threshold is, however, a complicated
task. Thresholds would have to be established for individual sources rather than
total emissions, leading to the same complexities as setting mandatory standards. If
the cutoffs were set on the same basis as mandatory controls--i.e., emissions per
unit of output or input--the tax approach would lose some of its efficiency
advantages. This is because firms would not have the most efficient incentives to
reduce output or inputs. (See Nichols 1983.) Moreover, as a practical matter, it
would be extremely difficult to set thresholds that eliminated all tax payments, and
thus, at least some distributional effects would occur.
2. Permit Payments
The government could eliminate all permit payments simply by distributing
permits to polluters. Property rights would be split among polluters and the public
in much the same way as they are with mandatory controls; firms would "own" the
right to pollute up to the number of permits. The market for permits would
determine which firms actually control their emissions and by how much. Thus,
reducing transfers from polluters as a whole is not difficult, in theory.
The empirical studies, however, suggest that practical difficulties would
arise. For one thing, the distribution can create enormous wealth. Although
polluters as a group make no payments to the government, they would make
n/e/r/a
-22-
EXHIBIT 5
REMOVAL OF PHOSPHOROUS VERSUS COST
FOR LAKE MICHIGAN BASIN
Cost of removel
(Dollars/day)
I
6
85% removel - 17701.25 Ibs./day
4
o $1.899/lb.
2
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
9.142
(removel with
Upper limit
secondary
Basin Phosphorus removel, Ibs./day X 10°
18490 Ibs./day
treatment
only)
Source: David et al. (1980).
n/e/r/a
-24-
EXHIBIT 6
AN EMISSIONS TAX CAN BE MODIFIED
TO REDUCE THE INCOME TRANSFERS
100
90
80
70
60
Dollars per Ton
50
Tax Transfers for
40
Emissions Above 70 Tons
30
Emissions Tax
20
10
Compliance
Costs
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Tons Emitted
n/e/r/a
-25-
payments to one another. Firms whose initial allocations are greater than their
needs would reap large transfer benefits. For example, if CFC permits were
initially allocated solely to the five CFC producers, using historical production as a
criterion, DuPont would receive permit rights worth over $1 billion during a ten-
year period. (See Exhibit 7.) (Restricting CFC's may also add to producers wealth
by permitting price increases, in the same way that monopolistic output restrictions
would add to profits.)
Firms that do not receive the initial permits would no doubt argue that
the allocation is unfair. However, allocating permits to a larger number of users
increases administrative costs. For example, if CFC permits were issued to firms
that purchase (as opposed to produce) CFCs--in an effort to reduce the large
wealth effects--administrative costs could increase substantially, since the number of
CFC users is very large; over 140,000 firms install and service CFC-using mobile air
conditioning units alone. If as many as 250,000 firms were eligible for permits and
the cost of obtaining data and computing entitlements were $100 per firm, the
administrative costs would be $25 million.
F. Administrative Costs
A control strategy is worthless if it cannot be administered and enforced
effectively. A large number of activities are involved in promulgating and enforcing
regulations: collecting data, holding public hearings, drafting proposals, responding
to public comments, setting the regulations, dealing with legal challenges, etc.
Many regulatory schemes have failed because they have become mired in
administrative delay and litigation (Melnick 1983). New approaches such as
economic incentive schemes may be particularly vulnerable to such difficulties.
On theoretical grounds, the schemes have both administrative advantages
and disadvantages. Since EPA is familiar with mandatory controls, the
n/e/r/a
-26-
EXHIBIT 7
ESTIMATED TRANSFERS TO CFC PRODUCERS
RESULTING FROM DISTRIBUTION OF PERMITS
Millions
Discounted Cumulative
of
Receipts, 1981-1989
Producer
Permits
(1978 $ X 10⁶)
(1)
(2)
Allied
79.5
472.7
DuPont
197.4
1,173.8
Kaiser
25.0
148.7
Pennwalt
25.0
163.3
Racon
8.5
50.5
TOTAL
338.2
2,011.1
Source: Palmer and Quinn (1981).
n/e/r/a
-27-
implementation costs are likely to be greater for an economic incentive approach.
(See Drayton 1978.) However, once in place, the enforcement costs may well be
smaller. Because they avoid the "all-or-nothing" element of mandatory controls, tax
or permit strategies may be less susceptible to the brinkmanship and delay of
stringent mandatory controls. (See Mills and White 1978.)
Permit strategies are, however, likely to be considerably more difficult to
implement than taxes. For one thing, experimental studies of markets indicate that
the assumption that competitive permit prices will be established quickly and easily
may not be justified (Plott and Smith 1978). In addition, the empirical case studies
indicate that the permit market may not operate is a competitive fashion.
In the case of Los Angeles sulfates, Hahn and Noll (1982) concluded that
one source (a utility) would account for all net purchases of permits--all other
firms would be sellers. Thus, the utility would have strong incentives to engage in
monopsonistic purchasing practices. If the utility operated as a monopsonist, some
of the efficiency advantages of the economic incentive scheme would be lost; it
would buy fewer permits at a lower price than under a competitive market and thus
abate too much pollution. (Additional abatement is worthwhile to the monopsonist
because it would depress the price paid for permits it acquires from other
companies.)
Hahn and Noll suggest several ingenious ways to avoid the potential
problem of an uncompetitive market for permits. However, all of these other
allocation mechanisms add to the administrative burdens of the scheme. These
complicated distribution formulas may also reduce the political appeal of permits, as
the merits of the proposal might be buried in the controversies over the initial
allocation of permits.
n/e/r/a
-28-
G. Uncertainties in Control Costs
Because technology is often uncertain when controls are established,
actual costs may turn out to be much different than expected. Cost uncertainties
lead to different uncertainties for the various policy approaches. Under mandatory
controls, if the emission standards are not changed when new cost information
becomes available, the uncertainties are reflected primarily in costs rather than
environmental quality.
The two economic incentive schemes differ in the effects of control cost
uncertainty. Under a tax, if compliance costs increase, firms will decide to control
less and emit more. Thus, uncertainties will be reflected in changes in
environmental quality. This uncertainty no doubt explains some environmentalists'
objections to tax strategies.
In contrast, a marketable permit scheme guarantees a given level of
environmental quality regardless of changes in costs. (This guarantee is not as
secure when the effect of emissions differs by location or time; see Harrison and
Nichols 1983.) Indeed, setting a total number of tons of pollutants provides more
control over environmental quality than establishing a set of mandatory emission
controls. (See Harrison 1983.)
Exhibit 8 illustrates these differing effects of the tax and permit
schemes. Under the tax approach, higher costs will lead to more emissions than
expected, 250 tons rather than 200 tons. Although total control costs increase, the
tax puts a cap on the marginal cost. (No firm would pay more than $10 to reduce
a ton because they could always pay the tax instead.) In contrast, under the
permits strategy the number of tons remains the same, but the cost increase is
greater.
n/e/r/a
EMISSION TAXES AND MARKETABLE PERMITS HAVE DIFFERENT
EFFECTS WHEN CONTROL COSTS ARE UNCERTAIN
35
Actual Costs
30
Number of
Permits = 200
25
Expected Costs
n/e/r/a
Dollars per Ton
20
-29-
15
}
Costs Uncertain
Tax = $10 per ton
with Permits
10
Cost Increase
with Permits
5
0
8 LIBIHX3
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Tons Emitted
Emissions Uncertain with Tax
-30-
Transfer payments would increase under both strategies. For the tax, the
increase is equal to the tax rate times the increased emissions ($10 times 50 tons,
or $500 in the example in Exhibit 8). For the permits strategy, the increase is
equal to the number of permits times the increased price of permits (200 times
about $5, or $1000 in the example).
In sum, the two economic incentive schemes lead to different responses
to uncertain control costs. Tax strategies provide greater certainty in overall
compliance costs, but less certainty over emissions. Permit schemes provide
certainty over emissions, but less certainty over compliance costs.
Cost
uncertainty leads to changes in transfer payments under both strategies.
H. Incentives for Technological Progress
A common criticism of mandatory controls is that they provide no
incentive to develop technology to reduce emissions below the mandated level. In
theory, standards do encourage development of less costly technology for meeting a
given standard. In practice, however, many emission standards have generated
perverse incentives for technological development because compliance timetables
have encouraged firms to develop relatively costly, though more immediate,
technology. Automotive emissions are often cited as a case in point. Many
commentators believe that the 1975-76 deadline established in the 1970 Clean Air
Act for a 90 percent reduction in emissions forced the automobile companies to
choose high-cost, unreliable, "bolt-on" technology rather than lower-cost technology
that would not necessarily have been ready for production by the deadline (Mills
and White, 1978). According to this argument, an emission tax would have allowed
the auto manufacturers to develop less expensive and more reliable controls because
they would not have faced the prohibitive sanctions for noncompliance (a fine of
n/e/r/a
-31-
$10,000 per car). In addition, the automobile companies might have developed means
of achieving more than a 90 percent reduction in some pollutants.
The use of economic incentives thus promises to speed the introduction of
lower-cost technology in two ways. First, a tax or permit scheme would provide
incentives to develop control technology that reduces emissions below the levels set
by standards. Second, economic incentive schemes would provide flexibility for
firms to develop less costly control technology even if they could not be
implemented as quickly as a legislative timetable would require.
I. Summary of Theoretical Strengths and Weaknesses
The theoretical strengths and weaknesses of the four strategies are
summarized in Exhibit 9. Economic incentives promise to lower compliance costs,
provide greater incentives for technological development, and avoid some of the
brinkmanship of mandatory controls. However, because they are untried, economic
incentives are likely to be harder to implement. In addition, economic incentive
schemes can create large income transfers. Avoiding these income transfers may be
difficult and, in any event, would add to the administrative burden of implementing
incentive programs.
IV. KEY INFORMATION
Comparisons among policy approaches ultimately raise empirical questions.
For example, although we know on theoretical grounds that economic incentives can
lower compliance costs, the critical question is--by how much? Moreover, even if
we know the potential size of the savings, these savings might in theory be
overwhelmed by extra administrative costs. Thus, economic incentive schemes may
not be superior to mandatory controls, even when judged solely on efficiency
grounds. If we add the potential for large income transfers--which would certainly
n/e/r/a
-32-
EXHIBIT 9
COMPARISON OF MANDATORY CONTROLS
AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
Criteria
Mandatory Controls
Economic Incentives
(1)
(2)
1. Compliance costs
Lower costs
2. Distributive effects
Lesser effects than
Lesser effects than
uncompensated incentives
controls when compensated
:
3. Implementation
More familiar to EPA
Greater problems with permits
and with compensation
procedures
4. Enforcement
Avoids brinksmanship
5. Certainty of achieving
Greater certainty with
environmental goals
permits; less certainty
with taxes
6. Vulnerability to
Less with taxes
cost overruns
7. Incentives for new
Greater incentives
technology
n/e/r/a
-33-
be viewed negatively by those harmed--it becomes clear that any preference for
economic incentive schemes must ultimately rest on empirical information.
This section lays out the critical information needed to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches.
A. Inventory of Greenhouse Gases
A detailed inventory of greenhouse gases is an essential first element of
any empirical study. Exhibit 10 provides a breakdown of CO2 emissions by major
sectors in the U.S. economy. These figures are incomplete for two reasons. First,
:
U.S. emissions account for approximately one-fourth of worldwide CO2 emissions.
Second, CO2 emissions account for about one-half of total emissions linked to the
greenhouse effect. Other greenhouse gases include CFCs, methane, and nitrous
oxides.
It is important to identify all substantial sources of greenhouse gases--
and not just major sources such as utility CO2 emissions. Other sources may in
fact be easier and cheaper to control. In addition, the inventory should take into
account any major interactions with other control requirements. For example, there
is evidence that the scrubbers required to meet stringent SOx limitations would
increase CO2 emissions by between 6 and 10 percent. (See Exhibit 11.)
B. Technology and Costs to Reduce Emissions
Information on control technology and costs is the bedrock for any study
of regulatory options. As discussed above, technological options provide the
starting point for the setting of mandatory controls. Control costs--and their
variability among emission sources--are also critical to the cost savings from
economic incentive schemes. If the cost per ton is similar for most technologies,
there will be few savings in compliance costs. In contrast, if costs differ greatly--
n/e/r/a
Distribution of CO2 Emissions From
Various Sectors of U.S. Economy
Residential (11.0%)
Transportation (28.4%)
Commercial (7.0%)
n/e/r/a
-34-
Industrial (22.5%)
Electric Utilities (31.1%)
EXHIBIT 10
Source: Steinberg, et al., 1984.
-35-
EXHIBIT 11
COMPARISON OF TOTAL EMISSIONS
FROM ALTERNATIVE COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS
Pollutant
SO₂
NOₓ
CO2
(tons/year)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Conventional Coal Plant
104,000
16,000
3,270,000
Coal Plant With Scrubber
15,500
16,000
3,531,600
Combined Cycle Conversion
0
1,500
1,188,042
Note: The figures are for 500 Mw base load units.
Source: American Gas Association 1989.
n/e/r/a
-36-
and if mandatory controls tend not to require the most cost-effective controls--
adopting an economic incentive scheme can produce large overall savings.
Variations in control costs are also critical to other efficiency and
distributional effects. Variations in the cost per ton of control alternatives within
a single source (e.g., a given power plant) determine whether a company would gain
from use of the bubble policy. Variations in cost per ton among firms within a
single source category (e.g., all coal-fired power plants) determine not just the
overall gains from economic incentives but also who wins and who loses. Variations
in cost per ton over time--due to changes in control technology or costs--determine
the quantitative importance of the dynamic efficiency advantages of economic
incentives.
C. Illustration: Controlling CO2 Emissions from Electric Power Plants
Quantifying potential cost savings and other effects of economic
incentives requires that on assemble information on all potential control options,
even if they would not necessarily be considered in setting mandatory controls. To
illustrate the range of information, consider the alternatives for reducing CO2
emissions from fossil-fueled power plants.
1. Removal of CO2 Stack Emissions
This option would include conventional, "bolt-on" controls to reduce the
CO2 emitted from stack gases. For example, scrubber technology is available to
reduce CO2 emissions, although the costs are currently estimated to be high. A
second technology is bubbling stack gases into algal ponds; a prototype of this
technology is currently being tested in Hawaii (Phillips et al. 1986).
2. Increased Fossil Fuel Burning Efficiency
A number of fossil-fired technologies are being developed which burn fuel
n/e/r/a
-37-
more efficiently and thereby generate fewer CO2 emissions per unit of output.
Exhibit 12 provides a summary of some of these technologies.
3. Increased End-Use Efficiency
Pollution from power plants can be decreased by reducing the demand for
power. Concern for greenhouse gases might therefore prompt regulators to require
that utilities "invest" in conservation programs to reduce CO2 emissions, as they
have done in order to reduce the need for new power plants. However, as Joskow
(1988) points out, "negawatt" programs to encourage conservation--such as those
proposed by Amory Lovins (1981) and others in which utilities would pay firms or
individuals to conserve energy--are likely to be inefficient means of reducing energy
use. Although the cost of controlling CO2 emissions should be taken into account
in a utility's conservation policy, these costs should only be one factor influencing
a utility's conservation policy.
Note that costly regulations will themselves lead to some reduction in
energy use. Since utilities will pass most of their costs on to electricity customers
in higher rates, controls will lead to less electricity use.
4. Alternative Energy Sources
Like the oil shocks of the 1970's, concern for greenhouse gases has
generated interest in alternative fuels. Among the alternatives mentioned are
nuclear, solar, fuel cells, and geothermal. None of these energy sources contributes
to greenhouse gases. However, as with conservation, emissions of greenhouse gases
is simply one factor to be considered in evaluating the cost-effectiveness of
alternative energy technologies.
5. Shift in Fuel Use from Coal to Natural Gas
Natural gas-fired plants have greater efficiency than coal--measured in
terms of Btus per kilowatt-hour (kWh)--and thus they produce fewer CO2 emissions
n/e/r/a
-38-
per unit of output than coal-fired plants. (See Exhibit 12.) Thus, one option for a
utility to lower CO2 emissions is to shift fuel use from coal to natural gas.
6. Reforestation and Other Mitigation Strategies
Utilities may also reduce CO2 emissions elsewhere if they could obtain
credits that offset their own emissions. One option is to contribute to efforts to
prevent deforestation, another significant source of greenhouse gas buildup. When
forests are leveled and the trees burned or left to rot, the carbon in the biomass is
released as CO2 (Electric Power Research Institute 1986). Conversely, growing
plants absorb CO2 from the air and through photosynthesis, fix the carbon in their
tissues. Thus, any efforts to prevent deforestation and encourage reforestation
would reduce the greenhouse effect. (Such offsets might also apply to other
greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide or methane; there is evidence that changes
in fertilizer formulations or agricultural practices might reduce the emissions of
these gases. (See Electric Power Research Institute 1988.)
The potential for an offset of this sort was illustrated recently by the
agreement of Applied Energy Systems to contribute $2 million to the cost of
planting 52 million trees in South America. This commitment was designed to offset
partially the approximately 15 million tons of CO2 that will be emitted by the
utility's Connecticut plan over its lifetime. (The offer implies a willingness to pay
about $0.50 per ton of CO2. Based upon a reported tree-planting cost of $16.40,
the total cost would be approximately $4 per ton of CO2 reduced.)
D. Characteristics of Policy Alternatives
Policy approaches will have to be specified in some detail in order to
develop empirical estimates of their advantages and disadvantages. Consider the
elements of an emissions tax that would have to be specified:
n/e/r/a
-39-
EXHIBIT 12
Page 1 of 2
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS
Power Plant
CO2
Development
Heat Rates¹
Emissions²
Status3
(bTU/kWh)
(kG of c/kWh)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Conventional Gas Combined
Cycle (liquid/gas fuel)
8,394
232
mature
Coal-Conventional
FGD wet supercritical,
bituminous
9.660
250
mature
FGD wet supercritical,
subbituminous
9,730
261
mature
Coal-Advanced
Advanced Pulverized Coal
With FGD
8,570
234
demo
Atmospheric Fluidized Bed
Combustion
10,000
252
pilot
Pressurized Fluidized Bed
Combustion
8,980
227
lab
Integrated Gasification
Combined Cycle
9,280
234
demo
Coal Refining
NA
low
lab
Gas-Advanced
Advanced Gas Combined
Cycle (liquid/gas fuel)
8,140
158
pilot
Inter-Cooled Steam
Injected Gas Turbine
7,262
102
pilot
Nuclear
10.530
none
mature
Fuel Cell
8.300
90
demo
n/e/r/a
-40-
EXHIBIT 12
Page 2 of 2
Sources and Notes:
¹Net heat rates are average annual values taken from Electric Power Research
Institute, December 1986.
2CO₂ emissions are preliminary estimates based on descriptions presented in U.S.
Congress 1985, discussions with industry experts, and K. Yeager and Stephen B.
Baruch (1987), pp. 471-502. Note that a recent American Gas Association report
indicates a substantial reduction in absolute tons of CO2 by converting from
conventional coal to combined cycle generation. See Exhibit 11.
³Development status refers to how close the technology is to commercial
availability. Lab indicates that the technology has not been built at any scale.
Pilot indicates a small scale plant has been constructed. Demonstration indicates
that a full scale plant has been constructed. Mature indicates that five or more
plants are operating commercially.
n/e/r/a
-41-
Level of the tax;
Cutoff before the tax is imposed;
Calculation of credits; and
Allowance for changes over time.
1. Level and Structure of Tax
In theory, an emissions tax could be set on the basis of marginal
damages. Indeed, this criterion was suggested by Senator Max Baucus of Montana
in the Senate debate on the Climate Control Protection Act, when he suggested that
policy options should include "a carbon dioxide emission tax to reflect damage to
our climate in the price of energy." However, calculating marginal damages from
greenhouse gases would be extraordinarily difficult. Thus, it seems likely that the
tax would be set to encourage particular technology or a specific cutback in
emissions.
The structure of the tax will also affect the efficiency and distributional
effects. Will the tax be based upon the absolute level of emissions from each plant,
or upon the emissions per unit of output or input? The latter alternative accounts
for the wide range in plant sizes--and thus reduces distributional effects--but
compromises the efficiency of the tax because it does not provide the correct
incentives to reduce emissions by reducing outputs or inputs.
2. Cutoff for Tax
Setting a cutoff level of allowable emissions is critical to reducing
potential income transfers. This element is likely to be highly controversial.
Certainly some will argue that the tax should be designed to collect revenue that
could be used to reduce the federal deficit, and thus, there will be debate over the
level of the cutoff.
n/e/r/a
-42-
But the structure of the cutoff will also be controversial. Should the
cutoff be set as a percent of current emissions, as an absolute number of tons per
plant, or as tons per Btu? Different utilities will gain and lose depending upon
which cutoff criteria is adopted, and thus there will be disagreement on the
"fairness" of the alternatives.
3. Credits
The effects of the tax also depend upon the offsets that might be
credited in calculating the tax. Will alternatives such as the reforestation credits
proposed by Applied Energy Services be permitted under the emission tax approach?
In theory, allowing utilities credits for any reductions should lead to the
least cost means of achieving emissions reductions. In practice, it may be difficult
to verify and administer a program that is so flexible.
4. Changes Over Time
Given the enormous uncertainty and the international nature of the global
warming problem, it seems likely that any regulatory program will change over time.
Firms often have to hit a moving regulatory target and make adjustments
accordingly. Similar adjustments will be made for uncertain tax or permit programs.
For example, if the tax is likely to change, it may not be sensible to invest in
longer-term alternatives even if they promise to be the least expensive responses to
the current tax.
D. Political Considerations
Although most empirical case studies emphasize economics, it is important
to take into account political realities as well. At the very least, the political
reaction to economic incentive schemes will influence their administrative costs.
The tax approach must overcome its characterization as a "license to pollute."
Some studies have suggested that the public considers the tax approach
n/e/r/a
-43-
inappropriate for environmental protection, regardless of its economic efficiency
advantages (Kelman, 1981).
The political winds appear to be changing. As discussed above, there
have been a number of indications that economic incentive strategies will be more
easily accepted, including political support from widely different perspectives,
increased interest of environmental groups, and increasing empirical evidence of the
potential cost savings. Perhaps the most persuasive indication of political
acceptability is the introduction of a CO2 tax in Senate deliberations on global
warming. The EPA also appears to be supportive; a recent EPA draft report to
Congress recommends pricing as "the most effective short-term means of reducing
emissions gases that contribute to the greenhouse effect or global warming."
(reported in Electric Utility Weekly March 20, 1989.)
V. CONCLUSIONS
Several conclusions emerge from this analysis of policy approaches for
controlling greenhouse gases. These include the following:
(1) Theory and the available empirical case studies suggest that economic
incentive schemes can lower the overall costs of meeting environmental objectives,
provide greater incentives for technological advances, and reduce the brinkmanship
and litigation that often characterize the regulatory process. On the other hand,
because they are novel, the economic incentives might be more costly to implement.
(2) Not all firms would gain. Firms and industries likely to save on
compliance costs are those with high control costs and high ability to pass costs on
to customers, since they are hard hit by mandatory controls.
(3) With regard to the choice between taxes and marketable permits,
theory and the case studies suggest that taxes have lower administrative costs but
provide less assurance that emission targets will be met.
n/e/r/a
-44-
(4) Theory and case studies show that economic incentive schemes might
generate enormous transfers to the government--in the form of tax payments or
payments for emission permits--which can overwhelm the overall compliance cost
savings.
(5) These large transfers can be reduced, but only at the expense of
increased complexity and administrative costs.
(6) An empirical study is needed to evaluate fully the advantages and
disadvantages of using economic incentives. Such a study would also be necessary
to assess the net effect on a firm's or an industry's costs, taking into account both
compliance costs and transfer payments.
(7) An empirical study of policy approaches would require the following
key information: (a) inventory of greenhouse gas emissions; (b) technological
options and costs of controlling greenhouse gases for each source; (c) variations in
costs among individual emitters (e.g., utility plants); (d) prospects for technological
advances; and (e) specific characteristics of each alternative strategy.
n/e/r/a
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abrahamson, Dean Edwin, ed. The Challenge of Global Warming. Washington,
D.C.: Island Press, 1989.
Ackerman, Bruce and William Hassler. Clean Coal/Dirty Air. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1981.
American Gas Association. "An Evaluation of Alternative Control Strategies to
Remove Sulfur Dioxide, Nitrogen Oxides and Carbon Dioxide at Existing
Large Coal-Fired Facilities." EA 1989-1, January 13, 1989.
Anderson, Frederick R., et al. Environmental Improvement Through Economic
Incentives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977.
Barrett, Scott A. The Use of Market Mechanisms in the Regulation of Air
Pollution. Prepared for The UK Centre for Economic and Environmental
Development, National Economic Research Associates, Inc., January 1986.
Baumol, William J. and Wallace E. Oates. The Theory of Environmental Policy.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975.
Crandall, Robert W. Controlling Industrial Pollution The Economics and
Politics of Clean Air. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983.
David, Martin, et al. "Marketable Effluent Permits for the Control of
Phosphorous Effluent in Lake Michigan." Water Resources Research (16
April 1980): 263-270.
Drayton, William Jr. Comment on "Regulatory Strategies for Pollution Control."
In Approaches for Controlling Air Pollution, ed., Ann Friedlaender,
231-239. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1978.
TM
Electric Power Research Institute. TAG -- Technical Assessment Guide,
Vol. 1: Energy Supply - 1986. Palo Alto: EPRI, December 1986.
Electric Utility Weekly. "EPA Draft: Pricing and Regulation of Fuels Could
Cut Global Warming." (20 March 1989): 15.
EPRI Journal. "Energy Use and Climate Change." (July 1988): 11.
EPRI Journal. "The Politics of Climate." (June 1988): 5-15.
Freeman, A. Myrick, III, et al. The Economics of Environmental Policy. New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973.
Hahn, Robert W. and Gordon L. Hester. "Where Did All the Markets Go? An
Analysis of EPA's Trading Program." Yale Journal on Regulation
6 (Winter 1989): 109-154.
n/e/r/a
-2-
Hahn, Robert W. and Roger G. Noll. "Designing a Market for Tradable
Emissions Permits." In Reform of Environmental Regulation, ed.,
Wesley A. Magat, 119-146. Cambridge, MA: Ballanger, 1982.
Harrison, David, Jr. "The Regulation of Aircraft Noise." In Incentives for
Environmental Protection, ed., Thomas C. Schelling, 41-143. Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 1983.
. Who Pays for Clean Air. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1975.
Harrison, David, Jr. and A. Nichols. "Benefit-Based Flexibility in
Environmental Regulation." Discussion paper, Energy and Environmental
Policy Center, Harvard University, April 1983.
Harrison, David, Jr. and Paul R. Portney. "Making Ready for the Clean Air
Act." Regulation (March/April 1981): 24-31.
Harrison, David, Jr. and Paul R. Portney. "Who Loses from Reform of
Environmental Regulation." In Reform of Environmental Regulation, ed.,
Wesley A. Magot, 147-149. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982.
ICF Resources Incorporated. Economic, Environmental, and Coal Market
Impacts of SO₂ Emissions Trading Under Alternative Acid Rain Control
Proposals. Prepared for Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, March 1989.
Joskow, Paul L. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives,
March 31, and May 11, 1988.
Kelman, Stephen J. "Economists and the Environmental Muddle." Public
Interest 64 (Summer 1981): 106-123.
Kneese, Allen V. and Charles L. Schultze. Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy.
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975.
Lave, Lester B. The Strategy of Social Regulation. Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1981.
Lave, L. B. "The Greenouse Effect: What Government Actions Are Needed?"
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 7 (3) (1988): 460-470.
Lovins, Amory, et al. Least-Cost Energy: Solving the CO₂ Problem. Andover,
MA: Brick House Publishing, 1981.
Melnick, R. Shep. Regulation and the Courts. Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institute, 1983.
Mills, Edwin S. and Lawrence J. White. "Government Policies Toward
Automotive Emissions Control." In Approaches for Controlling Air
Pollution, ed., Ann Friedlaender, 348-409. Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 1978.
n/e/r/a
-3-
Mintzer, Irving M. "Our Changing Atmosphere: Energy Policies, Air Pollution
and Global Warming." Paper presented at the World Conference on The
Changing Atmosphere -- Implications for Global Security, Toronto,
June 27-30, 1988.
. A Matter of Degrees: The Potential for Controlling the Greenhouse
Effect. Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, April 1987.
Moomaw, William R. Proposed Near-Term Congressional Options for
Responding to Global Climate Change. Washington, D.C.: World Resources
Institute, September 1988.
Nichols, Albert L. Targeting Economic Incentives for Environmental
Protection. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1984.
.
"The Regulation of Airborne Benzene." In Incentives for
Environmental Protection, ed., Thomas C. Schelling, 145-213. Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 1983.
Nordhaus, W. "How Fast Should We Graze the Global Commons?" American
Economic Review 72 (1982): 242-246.
Palmer, et al. Economic Implications of Regulating Chlorofluorocarbon
Emissions, From Nonaerosol Applications. Prepared for the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Santa Monica: Rand, June 1980.
Palmer, Adele R., and Timothy H. Quinn. Allocating Chloroflurocarbon Permits:
Who Gains, Who Loses, and What is the Cost? Report R-2806-EPA, Santa
Monica: Rand, July 1981.
Passell, Peter. "Private Incentives As Pollution Curb." The New York Times
(19 October 1988): D2.
Perl, Lewis J., and Frederick C. Dunbar. "Cost Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Air Quality Regulations." American Economic Review
72 (May 1982): 208-213.
Philips, V., et al. "Remediation of Global Greenhouse Warming." Testimony
Before the House Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agricultural
Research, and Environment and the House Subcommittee on Science,
Research and Technology Joint Hearings on Technologies for Remediating
Global Warming, June 29, 1988.
Plott, C. R., and V. L. Smith. "An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange
Institutions." Review of Economics and Statistics 45 (February 1978):
133-153.
Rose-Ackerman, S. "Effluent Charges: A Critique." Canadian Journal of
Economics 6 (1973): 512-518.
n/e/r/a
-4-
Schelling, T. "Climatic Change: Implications For Welfare and Policy." In
Changing Climate, Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee, National
Research Council. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1983.
Schneider, Stephen H. "The Greenhouse Effect: What We Can or Should Do
About It." Paper presented at the First North American Conference on
Preparing for Climate Change: A Cooperative Approach, Washington,
D.C., October 27-29, 1987.
South Coast Air Quality Management District. "Proposed Rule 1135-Emissions
of Nitrogen Oxides from Electric Power Generating Boilers." El Monte,
California, May 26, 1988.
Starr, Chauncey. "Global Climate Change and the Electric Power Industry."
Paper presented at the National Climate Program Office Strategic
Planning Seminar, Washington, D.C., January 5, 1988 (Revised July 1988).
Stavins, et al. Project 88 Harnessing Market Forces To Protect Our
Environment: Initiatives For The New President. Washington, D.C.,
October 1988.
Terkla, David. "The Efficiency Value of Effluent Tax Revenues." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 2 (1984): 107-123.
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. New Electric Power
Technologies: Problems and Prospects for the 1990's. Washington, D.C.:
GPO, July 1985.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Emission Trading Policy Statement. 51
Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,830 (1986).
Yeager, Hurt E. and Stephen B. Baruch. "Environmental Issues Affecting Coal
Technology: A Perspective on U.S. Trends." Annual Review of Energy
12 (1987): 471-502.
n/e/r/a
THE
and
and and OF
STATE
KS
THE
STATE
K
THE
CANADA
SENT BY:Xerox Telecopier 7020 ; 6-14-89 ; 16:09
2023955730;# 76
Sunuru distributed 6/23 RS
Curs
Hansen vs. the World on
and the greenhouse effect. The third was
that in our climate model, by the lare 1980s
MSB
and early 1990s, there's already a noticeable
increase in the frequency of drought. De-
the Greenhouse Threat
spite all the criticism, I wouldn't change any
of these."
His colleagues certainly wish he would.
sure
Scientists like the attention the greenhouse effect is getting on
What really bothers them is not that they
believe Hansen is demonstrably wrong, but
Capitol Hill, but they shun the reputedly unscientific way their
that he fails to hedge his conclusions with
colleague James Hansen went about getting that attention
the appropriate qualifiers that reflect the
imprecise science of climate modeling.
Hansen's critics start with his statement
Hansen's colleagues are taking pleasure in
that he has 99% confidence in the reality of
Amherst, Massachusetts
SCIENTISTS GATHERING at the Workshop
the federal bureaucracy's meddling in scien-
the global warming trend. At the workshop,
on Greenhousc-Gas-Induced Climatic
tific testimony illustrates the resentment
as he already had in the New York Times,
Change here in early May were waiting in
these climatologists feel toward their now
statistician Andrew Solow of Woods Hole
vain for their unofficial guest of honor to
famous colleague.
Oceanographic Institution picked on the
appear. James Hansen, climate modeler and
But there's an irony: had it not been for
few quantitative facts involved. Hansen had
leading scientific spokesman for the green-
Hansen and his fame, few in public office,
said in last year's testimony that 1987 had
house effect. was in Washington testifying
been so hot, so much warmer than the
to Congress, again.
average of the previous 30 years, that its
Last summer, Hansen made the headlines
warmth had only a 1% chance of being a
of virtually every major newspaper, carried
random quirk of the climare system.
his message onto the nerwork news shows
"That's not a test for the greenhouse in
and irked practically everyone in the
any way," Solow told the workshop. The
field when, in the midst of a drought, he
year "1987 should be assessed against previ-
told Congress that the greenhouse warming
ous data. The kcy thing is logic, and I think
is here. It was this sort of unconditional
there's a logical problem here." When statis-
claim from Hansen and his group that had
cician Solow calculated how unusual 1987
prompted this meeting. The greenhouse
had been, he found that it did not stand
community was determined to set the record
much above an underlying upward rend,
straight with hard facts, but now, even as
giving a confidence of just 70% that it was
they got their meeting under way, Hansen
an exceptional year. To statisticians, that is
was at it once more on Capitol Hill.
Wide World
practically no confidence at all.
This time Harisen was in Washington to
Climatologist Tom Wigley of the Univer-
stress that climate models had become reli-
sity of East Anglia, though critical, was
able enough to conclude that rapid strength-
more sympathetic. "I think his 99% confi-
thing of the greenhouse effect would lead to
"It's just a logical
dence is not justified theoretically. But he's
"drought intensification at most middle-
just saying that, relative to 1958, there's
and low-latitude land areas." But the Office
conclusion that the
been a warming." In his enthusiasm for
of Management and Budget (OMB), in its
greenhouse is here."
proper statistical analysis, Wigley was argu-
role as monitor of federal policy statements,
ing, Solow had removed the trend that
was not buying Hansen's views outright.
-James Hansen
Hansen was trying to point out.
Over his objections, it attached a caveat to
Wigley's sympathetic point of view might
Hansen's written testimony-". these
and certainly not the public itself, would
have some merit, responded Solow, but
changes should be viewed as estimates from
have paid much attention to a problem that
"this kind of giving a result and not telling
evolving computer models and not as reli-
everyone at Amherst agrees threatens social
the whole story, that's what I'm criticizing."
able predictions."
and economic disruption around the globe.
If many of Hansen's colleagues find his
When Hansen complained, he touched
After all, experts had been hemming and
first point about the warming trend regret-
off a furor in Washington among the politi-
hawing for a decade on the likely magnitude
table, they view his second-that the warm-
cians but not among the greenhouse scien-
of the problem, and hardly anyone had
ing could, with "high confidence," be linked
tists in Amherst. "I can't say I agree with
listened. Then came Hansen. Now green-
to the greenhouse effect-as unforgivable.
censorship," observed Rick Katz, who stud-
house scientists have the attention they have
None of the select greenhouse researchers at
is climate change impacts at the National
wanted but for reasons they think unsound.
the meeting could agree with him. "Taken
Center for Atmospheric Research in Boul-
By day two of the workshop, Hansen had
together, his statements have given people
der, "but it scems OMB has better people
appeared and, in an interview with Science,
the feeling the greenhouse effect has been
angle." than I thoughr. I'd have to agree with their
recalled his testimony on that sweltering day
derected with certitude," says Michael Schle-
in Washington in the midst of last summer's
singer, himself a modeler at Oregon State
So Hansen, who is director of NASA's
drought. "I said three things. The first was
University. "Our current understanding
Goddard Institute of Space Studies in New
that I believed the earth was gerting warmer
does not support that. Confidence in detec-
York City, was once again at loggerheads
and I could say that with 99% confidence.
tion [of the greenhouse] is now down near
with his colleagues in the climate communi-
The second was that with 3 high degree of
zero."
ty over how to speak to outsiders. That
confidence we could associate the warming
Hansen's third point-that "the green-
JUNE 1989
RESEARCH NEWS 10+1
SENT BY:Xerox Telecopier 7020 ; 6-14-89 ; 16:10
2023955730;# 8
house effect will [cause] certain changes in
climate variability such as the intensity of
Greenhouse Models VS. Reality
droughts and storms"-clicits a less vituper-
ative response. Climate modeler Stephen
Climatologists may have a gut feeling that the greenhouse effect is heating up the
Schneider of the National Center for Atmo-
earth, but they have not been close to proving it. Enter a new generation of
spheric Research in Boulder reflects the
greenhouse computer models that are giving scientists some hope that the grossest
views of others at the meeting, who would
features of the future greenhouse world are being simulated correctly. But the view
only speak privately, when he observes that
ahead promises to be a myopic one for years to come.
"where Jim has had some problems with his
The new models, which were described at the Amherst workshop, behave more like
friends, and I count myself as one, is when
the real world than carlier. models in two ways. They transfer heat from the
he savs that the location of specific areas of
atmosphere into the deep sea and carry it in surface warers toward the poles, all in
drought in his model are robust. I can't
currents that can vary in response to climate change. At best, earlier models had only
make the case as strongly as Jim does,"
analogs to surface currents that could not change as climate changed. And while
Schneider contends, because model particu-
earlier models yielded only a single snapshot of the climate expected toward the
lars such as how the oceans are simulated
middle of the next century when greenhouse gases will have doubled, the new models
could make a difference.
simulate the effects of gradual, rather than instantancous, increases of greenhouse
"He's not running a realistic ocean," says
gases. This will allow researchers to test the new models against what has actually
Schneider. "You don't really know what it's
happened in past decades, as well as to project continuous future climate changes.
going to do. But he's probably right any-
The greenhouse worlds of the new models have some aspects in common with
way. The odds are better than 50:50 that the
those of the old ones, though. In both types of models, the world indeed gets warmer,
drought areas are robust."
and the continents also tend to warm faster than oceans. In addition, the new models
Despite their sharpness, these criticisms
produce similarities to the real world not seen before. For example, in the model that
do not reflect on Hansen's research abilities,
is nin by. Warren Washington and. Gerald Meehl of the National Center for
rather they tend to revolve around the inter-
Atmospheric Research (NCAR), the lower atmosphere warms over North America
pretation of climate models. "Jim is not the
and Europe as it cools over the North Atlantic and the North Pacific. David Karoly of
villain that people make him out to be," says
Princeron University recently reported that this has actually happened in recent
Schneider. "He's a state-of-the-art climate
decades, And both this NCAR model and the new model developed by Syukuro
modeler. Jim got bad press that was partly
Manabe and his colleagues at the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) in
deserved and partly envy of other scientists
Princeton generate rudimentary El Niños-something previous models could never
who resent the way he went to Congress.
do.
The problem I have is that he has more
Analysis of these model results is only just beginning, but the reassuring similarities
confidence in his tools than I do."
between them are arrended by some disturbing inconsistencies. A relatively greater
The primary tool in the greenhouse game
warming at high latitudes is not so evident in the new models. But the real shocker
is the general circulation model (GCM) of
was the weird behavior of the GFDL model run by Manabe. Its Northern
the climate system. Like its cousin that
Hemisphere behaved much 39 in earlier models, but after a few decades of modest
forecasts the daily weather. the climate
warming, its Southern Hemisphere began to cool "This is a big surprise," said
GCM cranks through equations that calcu-
Manabe. A strong cooling of the ocean around Antarctica seems to be the immediate
late the behavior of climate as greenhouse
cause. "We really don't understand how the ocean behaves," he added.
gases increase. Unlike weather forccasting
While modelers are thinking about the new results, other researchers are using both
models. a climate GCM must include a
old and new model results to look for the greenhouse effect in recent climate data. The
simulated occan whose behavior-such as
approach favored at the meeting, called fingerprinting, involves comparing the few
the way it carries heat around the globe-
reliable aspects of greenhouse climates with recent climate trends. The closer the
bears a reasonable resemblance to that of the
match between model prediction and recent observations, the more likely that the
real ocean. Last year Hansen was the first to
greenhouse warming is here. Assuming the model predictions are correct, studies
publish the results of a GCM that has any
presented at the workshop show that any intensification of the greenhouse is not yet
kind of a realistic ocean and that also is
detectable above the background of natural climatic noise. Indeed, there was every
driven by realistically increasing greenhouse
indication that detection of the greenhouse signal using statistically based fingerprint
gases. That work provided the best guess up
approaches is perhaps 10 years or more away.
until then of how climate might be respond-
Rigorous, objective detection of the greenhouse may be a ways off, but hints of a
ing now and how it will respond in the next
greenhouse-like climate change nevertheless continue to accumulate (Science, 5
few decades.
February 1988, p. 559). As reported at the meeting, a new srudy has confirmed the
= Despite the relative sophistication of
previously noted contrast between warming near the surface and cooling of the
Hansen's model, other modelers remain un-
stratosphere. The observed pattern of enhanced precipiration reminiscent of the
convinced because they feel Hansen gives
greenhouse was extended to the Soviet Union. And the amount of water vapor over
short shrift to the remaining shortcomings
the tropics was shown to have increased in recent decades, as would be expected. In
of even newer, more realistic models. "They
addition, as reported in the 19 May issue of Science by W. R. Peltier and A. M.
[Hansen's group] have been coupling their
Tushingham of the University of Toronto, global sea level seems to have risen
aunospheric model to a pretty hokey
2.4 = 0.90 millimeters per year this century, even after allowing for vertical move-
ocean," says Schneider, "we all have. But
ments of the land.
you have to have less confidence because of
How many such hints it would take, combined with the certainty of an eventual
that."
greenhouse warming of some magnitude, to convince most climatologists that the
Other uncertainties lessen confidence as
greenhouse has arrived cannot be rigorously determined.
R.A.K.
well. Researchers must have some idea of
the degree to which climare is being
1042
SCIENCE, VOL. 244
SENT BY:Xerox Telecopier 7020 ; 6-14-89 ; 16:11 ;
2023955730:# 9
changed by forces other than greenhouse
What gives Hansen high confidence when
Amherst workshop offered neither, only a
gases: For example, volcanic dust in the
others hesitate to make any claim is 3 variety
large dose of uncertainty. On the last day,
stratosphere probably cools Earth, changes
of supporting evidence. The globe has
the 40 participants who stayed to the end
in solar activity may change the climate, and
warmed slightly during the past 100 years.
gathered en masse to put the finishing
climate surely meanders a bit from one state
His model roughly tracks the warming of
touches to a press release. They argued over
to another with no prompting whatever.
the past 30 years. And analyses of polar ice
just about everything except this passage: "It
All the climatic variability generated by
cores suggest that a reduction of the green-
is tempting to attribute [the 0.5°C warming
these natural forces generates noise in the
house effect due to a reduction in atmo-
of the past 100 years] to the increase in
climatic record that, Hansen's critics would
spheric carbon dioxide contributed to the
greenhouse gases. Because of the natural
argue, has drowned out the poorly known
chill of the last ice age 18,000 years ago.
variation of temperature, however, such an
greenhouse warming signal. "The variability
"The one thing that has the greatest im-
attribution cannot now be made with any
of climate from decade to decade is mon-
pact on my thinking," says Hansen, "is the
degree of confidence."
strous," said Tim P. Barnett, an oceanogra-
increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide from
Like it or not, the greenhouse community
pher at Scripps Institution of Oceanogra-
280 parts per million in the 19th century to
has a spokesman who is not following the
phy. "To say that we've seen the greenhouse
its present 350 parts per million. It's just
consensus script coming out of Amherst.
signal is ridiculous. It's going to be a diffi-
inconceivable that that is not affecting our
"What bothers a lot of us," said modeler
cult problem."
climate. There's no model that would not
Alan Robock of the University of Maryland,
The detection problem is one that may
say it's affecting it right now."
is that we have a scientist telling Congress
take decades to solve. Barnett and Schlesing-
"Ir's just a logical, well-reasoned conclu-
chings we are reluctant to say ourselves."
er have their own approach, an objective,
sion that the greenhouse is here now," he
"Jim Hansen has crawled out on a limb,"
statistical test. Through the latest results, it
says. "I think there are a lot of people who
said Danny Harvey of the University of
has found no signal.
agree the warming is probably due to the
Toronto. "A continuing warming over the
Hansen was in no position to argue. He
greenhouse effect, but they are waiting to
next 10 years might not occur." The centu-
arrived at the 5-day meeting a day late and
see."
ry-long warming has not been continuous.
left 3 days early. "That is his habit," noted
There's no arguing with Hansen on that
"If the warming didn't happen, policy deci-
workshop organizer Schlesinger. "He
point. Stanley Grotch, who has been moni-
sions could be derailed."
comes, gives his talk, and he leaves." Even
toring the performance of the greenhouse
Curiously enough. while researchers wor-
while present, his quiet, retiring manner
models from Lawrence Livermore National
ry about the possible down side of the
puts him in the background. These habits
Laboratory, guessed that "if there were a
greenhouse's newfound popularity, they are
secret ballot at this
still awaiting the benefits from Hansen's
meeting on the ques-
confident testimony. Currently about a doz-
tion, most people
en people run the four U.S. and one British
would say the green.
greenhouse GCMs considered state of the
house warming is prob-
art. Time on supercomputers to run green-
ably there."
house simulations is scarce, and most mod-
Schneider, who was
elers often have to scrounge time wherever
not in Amherst for the
they can find it. Hansen ran his transient
meeting but usually tes-
model nights and weekends on his institute's
tifies to Congress
1975-vintage Amdahl computer-a relic of
alongside Hansen, is
the dark ages of supercomputing.
one of those scarce
"It's getting done at a rate that will take
greenhouse researchers
25 years to get it right," says Schneider. "I'm
who do not need a se-
hoping we can get the modeling of regional
cret ballot to express
greenhouse changes right before they actual-
their gut feelings. "We
ly happen. What's depressing is that we
need 10 or 20 years to
aren't seeing more resources."
get an absolutely clear
Will a rapidly changing climate leave re-
One of James Hansen's many critics. Michael Schlesinger nins
signal. I'll be surprised
searchers forever fiddling with their models,
computer greenhouse models 100, but he does not share Hansen's "high
if it doesn't happen, but
still waiting for a consensus detecrion of the
confidence" that the greenhouse is here.
how do you assign a
greenhouse? Hansen thinks so. "Pm confi-
probability to some-
have not encouraged mutual understanding.
dent that we're going to see new global
thing when you have no objective means of
Neither did the audience's polite reticence
records, but it may not be this year. It may
during Hansen's talk, which contrasted with
doing so? You base it on physical inruition
be in a few years. I think these issues will go
and then state your assumptions. By my
por shots from many quarters during his
away in the next few years as the earth gets
absence. Not that Hansen is unaware of his
intuitive reasoning, the greenhouse signal
warmer. There will be no sudden change,
Colleagues' complaints. Last fall, in his lone
has been detected at an 80% probability. My
there will be those who don't agree, but as
confrontation with his critics, Hansen en-
faith is based on the principle of heat trap-
soon as the man in the street notices, it
dured what One observer described as get-
ping by greenhouse gases and the billions of
won't matter. If the model is correct, the
Jun-Hansen session" at a climate workshop
observations that support it. All that objec-
increased frequency of drought will be evi-
in Washington. Hansen, as is his style, was
tive stuff rests on assumptions. The future is
dent in the 1990s, the early 1990s if there is
inperturbed. "When we're at this level of
not based on statistics, it's based on physics.
no large volcanic eruption" to cool the
signal to noise, anyone can disagree with
Objectivity is overplayed."
climate. If Hansen is right, an exceptional
me. I don't argue with that."
Obviously, certitude sells on Capitol Hill,
trust in physical intuition may have won the
intuition less so. As a group, those at the
day.
RICHARD A. KERR
JUNE 1989
RESEARCH NEWS 1043
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500
Unite
April 12, 1989
chy
Dear Linda:
I have enclosed CEA's comments on EPA's recent draft
of "Policy Options for Stabilizing Global Climate Change". This
report represents a substantial work effort. You are to be
congratulated on its successful completion. We found many of the
data and tables informative and useful.
The primary weakness of the document is that it fails to
consider the costs of the policy options that are addressed. It
leaves the reader with the incorrect impression that there is a
"free lunch" out there. This is a serious oversight. I
understand that Bob Hahn has discussed this issue with you and
Dick Morgenstern. Unfortunately, such a glaring omission cannot
be remedied adequately in the short term. I strongly urge you to
appropriately caveat this document and to provide a more balanced
treatment of policy options in subsequent documents on this very
sensitive issue.
Our detailed comments have two main thrusts. First, the
analysis of market-based options needs to be improved. Second,
the treatment of risk and cost as they relate to investment in
energy conservation and energy-efficiency research is not
adequate. Addressing these two issues would substantially
improve the document.
If you would care to discuss our comments or related issues,
please feel free to contact Dr. Robert Hahn. We are anxious to
assist you in this important endeavor.
Sincerely,
Hom
Thomas G. Moore
Member
Ms. Linda Fisher
Assistant Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation
Room 1013 West Tower
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington D.C. 20460
CC: Terry Davies
Council of Economic Advisers' Comments on
"Policy Options for Stabilizing Global Climate"
We offer the following observations:
1. We are encouraged by your discussion of the primary role that
markets can play when prices of fossil fuels, CFCs and forest
and agriculture products reflect true social cost.
Nonetheless, the analysis could benefit from a more complete
analysis the entire range of market-based options. Mechanisms
such as the auction or sale of emission permits can be useful
in significantly reducing activities that have negative
externalities, while still maintaining the efficient use of
the remaining resources. These mechanisms can be used to
address "problems" with inelastic demand (VIII-18),
particularly if the amount of permits are reduced very
gradually over time. Hence, your conclusions that there are
practical limitations to the use of markets (VIII-18) is
overstated.
2. Your concern for the equitable outcome of the policies is well
taken (ES-66). However, your arguments that a market approach
will not allow an equitable outcome again shows a narrow
interpretation of the scope of these mechanisms. When
policies that encourage greater efficiency have the side
effect of redistributing wealth, they can be coupled with
other programs that redistribute in the opposite direction.
Moreover, it is generally possible to design programs in such
a way as to preserve neutrality if that is an objective.
3. Another criticism of the market approach is that consumers
tend to under-invest in energy efficient technologies (VIII-
19). Your response to the list of responsible factors such
as limited information and access to capital is to regulate
through efficiency standards. This is but one of many
approaches that can be used, and is often not terribly
efficient.
Further, your analysis suggests that consumers have chosen
the wrong discount rate for calculating investments in energy
efficient appliances. It may simply be they view the risks
or uncertainties of such investments as significantly higher,
and hence use a higher implicit discount rate.
4.
On a larger scale, we encounter the same difficulty with your
heavy reliance on research into more energy efficient
technologies. Implicit in your discussion is the assumption
that the government must take the lead in the engineering
research. However, you give no indication of the inherent
risks of such research or the means of evaluating when such
research is justified. It should be the case for those new
technologies that are licensable that, once market prices of
energy reflect true social costs, the market incentives will
2
be enough to encourage the optimal level of research. It is
only when the benefits of the research are non-appropriable
that the government has a role.
5.
You have many excellent figures and tables. We would suggest
that Figure 10 of the ES be graphed on an absolute scale (CO₂
equivalents of each country) rather than on a relative scale
(percent contribution of each country). It would also be
helpful if you could combine that data with Figure 3 of the
ES and Figure 4-1 to develop a series of tables that would
provide the projected emissions by type crossed with the
countries or regions of origin over time. This would help us
to identify regional impacts of various policy options. A
similar table showing country or regional breakdown of Figure
15 in the ES would be helpful.
6.
The discussion of population trends in chapter IV is very
good. However, we see little follow-through to the policy
discussion. Although this is a sensitive subject, we feel
that since it is a fundamental driving force behind increases
in greenhouse gases, a thorough policy document should deal
with the subject.
7.
On page 23 of the ES, the discussion of increases in methane
does not indicate by what date the concentrations increase by
factors of 2 and 2.6 for the SCW and the RCW, respectively.
8.
You may have placed too much emphasis on technical solutions,
and particularly on renewable energy. For example, your
discussion of biomass substitutes (VII-137), and particularly
of biogas and gasification gives no indication of the extreme
sensitivity of these systems and their inherent unreliability.
Similarly, your rather hopeful evaluation of solar
photovoltaics (VII-150) gives no indication of the toxic waste
by-products that arise from the manufacture of PVCs. This is
extremely important in light of conclusions such as that at
ES-59, regarding technical options and the use of renewable
resources for gaining 25% of the reduction in global warming.
9.
In general, you tend to project a sense that the best policy
response is to increase efficiency in the use of energy.
However, you give very little indication that gains in
efficiency are generally had at some cost -- when we decrease
energy as a factor of production, we generally increase some
other factor (s). These factors carry a cost, whether it is
in terms of increased labor, increased research expenditures,
or losses of convenience and services. On page 88 of the ES,
you state that one of the most effective options to reduce
commitments to greenhouse warming is applying already
attractive energy-efficient technologies, but you have done
little to examine why those technologies have not already been
3
used. It may not be simply an information problem. There may
be unrecognized costs inherent in these technologies.
10. Your use of displays such as Figure 5-21 are disturbing
because they seem to imply a preferred level of each policy
option. For example, Figure 9 in the ES would seem to imply
that increasing the availability of biomass can do much more
to decrease greenhouse gas emissions than improvements in the
efficiency of cars or buildings. In fact, the relative
contributions of each option should be determined by examining
the marginal cost per unit of emissions reduction for each
mechanism. You have done little or nothing to examine the
relative cost effectiveness of the various options and have
failed to highlight the importance of that omission.
11. Although you correctly point out the importance of
participation of the LDCs in any limitation effort (ES-40),
you have not addressed the question of their incentives to
become involved in international efforts. Their bargaining
position is a strong one, and they may be able to make the
situation very difficult for the developed countries.
12. On page 86 of the ES you state that "Although delaying action
would allow time to increase knowledge of risks and refine the
choice of policies, it could reduce the effectiveness of
policy responses." An alternative statement could be
"Although taking action now may be politically attractive and
may increase the effectiveness of those policies chosen, by
delaying commitment to certain types of policies we can refine
our choices, reduce uncertainty and assure that our actions
are warranted."
13. On VIII-5 we suggest the last sentence read "
can therefore
be implemented in a manner that is consistent with
"
14. On VIII-9, your analysis of energy demand responses to price
is somewhat confusing. You state that had the pre-1973
energy demand/GNP rate continued, U.S. energy demand would
have doubled between 1973 and 1985, implying that GNP doubled
during that time. But then you state that the economy
increased by only 40%. The figures don't square. Further your
statement that energy efficiency improvements save the U.S.
economy $160 billion annually is misleading. It saves that
in energy costs, but those savings are had at some other cost.
Will
RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
of the
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
FIRST MEETING
Climite
WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 30 - February 1, 1989
INF /3
1/26/89
PROVISIONAL LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
This List is based on information received as of noon,
Thursday, January 26, 1989. PLEASE REPORT ANY CHANGES OR
CORRECTIONS TO THE CONVERENCE INFORMATION CENTER NO LATER
THAN Noon Tuesday, January 31, 1989
considered
RSWG Participants List
A. OFFICIAL
Core Member Governments (* = Principal Contact)
AUSTRALIA
* Mr. Barry Jones
Assistant Secretary, Productivity and Research
Department of Primary Industries and Energy
Ms. Christina Bee
Acting First Assistant Secretary
Conservation Division
Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment,
Tourism and Territories
Mr. Bob Alderson
Assistant Secretary
National Energy Strategy Branch
Department of Primary Industries and Energy
Mr. Brian Babington
First Secretary
UN Office
New York
BRAZIL
Suely Carvalhos
Director of Air Programs
Environment Ministry
Antonio Rocha Magalhaes
Secretario Extraordinario
Ceara State Government
CANADA
* Howard Ferguson
Assistant Deputy Minister
Atmospheric Environment Service
Environment Canada
Alan Beesley, alternate head OF delegation
Special Advisor for Environment
Department of External Affairs
Robert Rochon
Director
Legal Operations Division
Department of External Affairs
Mr. Adrian de Hoog
Director
Energy and Environment Division
Department OF External Affairs
Dr. J. McTaggart-Cowan
Director
Environmental Affairs
Energy, Mines and Resources
Mr. Brian Emmett
Director General
Energy Strategy and
International Affairs Branch
Department of Energy, Mines and
Resources
Mr. Hans Martin
Senior Advisor
AES
Environment Canada
CHINA
* Mr. Luo Jiban
State Meterological Agency
Mr. Ren Chenhai
Mrs. Chen Guofan
State Meteorological Agency
FRANCE
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
Mr. Reinhardt Frepper
Meteorological Service
Albert-Einstein-Strasse
42-44-46, 1561 Potsdam, GDR
INDIA
*Dr. A. C. Ray, Additional Secretary
Ministry of Environment and Forests
JAPAN
Prof. Yoichi Kaya
Professor, Faculty of Engineering
Tokyo University
Mr. Yukio Ishiumi
Director, Environmental Protection Division
Ministry of International Trade and Industry
Industrial Location and Enivronmental Protection Bureau
Mr. Toshikazu Inui
Deputy Director
Energy Policy Planning Division
Director-General's Secretariat
Agency of Natural Resources and Energy
Ministry of International Trade & Industry
Mr. Masayoshi Karasawa
Director
Stratospheric Protection Office
Planning Division
Air Quality Bureau
Environmnetal Agency
Mr. Hideto Mitamura
Director
Energy Resources Division
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Yasuhiro Shimizu
Second Secretary (Environment)
Embassy of Japan
MALTA
* Professor David J. Attard LL. D. Phil. (Oxon.)
Personal Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Chairman of Advisory Committee on Climate Change
Hugh Taylor-East, A.C.I.B
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Pallazo Parisio, Valetta
NETHERLANDS
* Dr. Pier Vellinga
Coordinator for National Climate Programs
Ministry of Housing, Area Planning and Environment (VROM)
Dr. B. Metz
Embassy of the Netherlands
NORWAY
* Mr. Per Bakken
Climate Change Coordinator
Ministry of the Environment Postboks 8013 DEP
SAUDI ARABIA
* Dr. Abdulbar Bin Abdullah Al-Gain
President of Meteorological and Environmental
Protection Administration
Vice-Chairman of Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change
SUDAN
Dr. Fadlalla El Kider El Sayem
Meteorological Department
SWEDEN
*Prof. B. Bolin
IPCC Chairman
Stockholm University
* Mr. Lars Bjorkbom
Director of International Section
Ministry of Environment and Energy
Stockholm
Mr. Harald Sandberg
First Secretary
Embassy of Sweden
UNITED KINGDOM
* Dr. David Fisk (not coming to RSWG)
Chief Scientist
Department of the Environment
Romney House
Neil Sanders
Head, Air Quality Division
Department of the Environment
John Moss
Department of Energy
Lindsay Mitchell
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Douglas Yarrow
Science Attache
British Embassy
USSR
Eugene A. Konygin
State Committee for Environmental Protection (GOSKOMPRIRODA)
Prof. Yuriy Sedunov
First Deputy Chairman
State Committee for Hydrometeorology (GOSKOMHYDROMET)
Dr. Yuriy Ye. Kazakov
Deputy Chief, International Department
State Committee for Hydrometeorology (Goskomgidromet)
ZIMBABWE
* Mrs. R.P. Karimanzira
Deputy Director, Forecasting Branch
Department of Meteorological Servicesd
P.O. Box 150
U.S. GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Frederick M. Bernthal
Assistant Secretary for Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
William A. Nitze
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Environment, Health and Natural Resources
John P. Ferriter
Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Energy and Resources
Sandra Vogelgesang
Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Organizations
Suzanne Butcher
Acting Director, Office of Environmental Protection
Tel: (202) 647-9312 Fax: (202) 647-5947
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Linda Fisher
Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning and Evaluation
Scott Hajost
Acting Associate Administrator for International Activities
Richard Morgenstern
Director, Office of Policy Analysis
382-4034
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Dr. John Clarke
Executive Director, Climate Issue Response Group
586-8948
Richard Williamson
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
George Doumani
Director, Office of Technology Policy
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Orville Bentley
Assistant Secretary
Norton D. Strommen, Ph.D.
Chief Meteorologist
World Agricultural Outlook Board
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
Indur M. Goklany
Senior Policy Analyst
Office of Program Analysis
343-4951
Grant Mydland
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for
Fish, Wildlife and Parks
343-5914
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Michael T. Kelley
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Basic Industries
International Trade Administration
377-0614
J. R. Spradley
Counsellor 377-3567 to the Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
John Cohrssen
395-3742
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
Dr. Thomas G. Moore
395-5046
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
David M. Gibbons
Deputy Associate Director for Natural Resources
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
Dr. Beverly Berger
Assistant Director for Life Sciences
US TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
R. A. Reinstein
Director, Energy and Natural Resources
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Ray Love, Counselor
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
John Doyle
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Army Civil Works
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Richard Broun
Director, Office of Environment and Energy
Room 7254
451 7th Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20410
TREASURY
David Malpass
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Developing Nations
NASA
Dr. Robert Watson
Other Governments
BULGARIA
Christo Mermerski
Agricultural Counselor
Embassy of Bulgaria
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Dr. Kubler
Ministry of Economics
Herr MR Dietrich Kupfer
Ministry of the Environment
Frau Dr. Edda Mueller MR'in
Ministry of the Environment
Prof. Dr. Klaus Heinloth
University of Bonn
Anne Ruth Herkes
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
FINLAND
Mr. Kari Kourilehto
Director General
Ministry of Environment
Mrs. Maija Pietarinen
Chief Inspector
Ministry of Environment
Mr. Veikko Marttila
General Secretary
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
JAMAICA
Mr. Calvin Gray
Head, Climate Branch
Meteorological Service
NEPAL
Dr. Adhikary
Permanent Representative of NEPAL
NEW ZEALAND
John Gilbert, Deputy Secretary
Ministry for the Environment
PERU
Representative from
Embassy of Peru
Washington, D.C.
POLAND
Prof. Stefan Reichhart
Scientific Secretary
Institute of Meterology and
Water Management
Warsaw
PORTUGAL
Luis Lorvao
Embassy of Portugal
SENEGAL (tentative)
Assistant to Bakary Kante, Director
Office of Environemnt
Ministry for Protection of Nature
SOUTH AFRICA
Mr. Cyril G. Haid
Counselor for Science and Technology
Embassy of South Africa
SPAIN
Antonio Pou
Environmental Affairs
Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism
Madrid
Alberto Lines Escardo
Sobdirector General De Climatologia y Aplicaciones
National Meterological Institute
SUDAN
Dr. Fadlalla El Kider El Sayem
Meteorological Department
SWITZERLAND
Dr. Pascale Morand Francis
Federal Office of Environmental Protection
YUGOSLAVIA
Liliana Milojevic
First Secretary (Science, Technology and Economic)
Embassy of Yugoslavia
B. SPECIAL (Intergovernmental Organizations)
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
* Mr. Peter Stief-Tauch (not coming to RSWG)
Division Head, Monitoring of Air Pollution
Directorate General for Environment, Consumer Protection
and Nuclear Safety (DG XI)
Mr. Horgen Henningsen
Director for Protection of Water and Air and Conservation
Directorate General for Environment, Consumer Protection
and Nuclear Safety
Commission of the European Communities
200, rue de la Loi
1050 Brussels, Belgium
Peter Faross
Directorate General for Energy
Heinz Hilbrecht
First Secretary (Energy, Environment and Transport)
Delegation of the Commission of the European Community
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Mr. F. Niehaus, Head
Reliability and Risk Assessment
Division of Nuclear Safety
EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY
Mr. Ian Pryke
Head, Washington Office
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
* Connie Smyser
Principal Administration
OECD
* Mr. Paul Stolpman
Head of Pollution Control Divisdion
Environment Directorate, OECD
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Charles L. Perry
United Nations Development Program
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM
* Mr. Peter Usher
Global Environment Monitoring System
Atmosphere Program Officer
Prof. G. T. Goodman, Advisor to UNEP
Beijer Institute
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences
UNESCO
Dr. Bernd von Droste
Secretary, UNESCO/MAB
Paris
U.N. FOOD AND AGRIUCLTURE ORGANIZATION
Dr. Jean-Paul Lanly
Assistant Director General
Forestry Department
Mr. Roger Sorenson
Head, Washington Office
WORLD BANK
Prof. Dr. Erik Arrhenius
Principal Advisor, Science & Technology
Dr. Kenneth Piddington
Director, Environment Department
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
Rep from Pan American Health Organization
WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION
Dr. Victor G. Boldirev
Director, World Climate Program
C. OBSERVERS
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Dr. Stan Carth
AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION
Mr. Dennis Stolte
AMERICAN FORESTRY ASSOCIATION
Mr. Neil Sampson
AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION
Louis Aboud
Phyllis Levine
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
Mr. Jim Vail
CLIMATE INSTITUTE
John Topping, President
CONSERVATION FOUNDATION
William Reilly, President
Richard Benedick
Senior Fellow
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE
Mr. Robert A. Beck
Director, Clean Air, Fossil Fuels, and Natural Resources
Mr. Fred I. Denny
Vice President
Environment, Fossil Fuels,
and Power Production
ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS RESOURCE COUNCIL
John P. Hughes, Director
Technical Affairs
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Mr. Gene G. Mannella
Director, Washington Office
ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY STUDY INSTITUTE
John Clark
Carol Werner
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND
Michael Oppenheimer
Joe Goffman
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE
Richard Mott
Staff Attorney
FONDAZIONE SAN PAOLO DI TORINO
Dr. Gastone Chingari
IIT Research Institute
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
Liz Cook
Director of Ozone Campaign
GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Eric Fersht
Ms. Peg Stevenson
Mr. Erik Johnson
Greenpeace United States
INDUSTRY SECTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON ENERGY FOR TRADE POLICY MATTERS
Raymond F. Bragg, Jr.
Chairman, ISAC (Energy)
Federal Strategies, Inc.
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
Kristine Hall
Mgr. Government Programs
Health, Safety and Environment
IBM Corporation
Nina Kogan
Manager, Environmental Affairs
U.S. Council for International Business
Thomas Lambrix
Director, Government Relations
Donald D. McCollister
Director, International Regulatory Affairs
Health and Environmental Sciences
Dow Chemical Company
Alexander Trowbridge
President, National Association of Manufacturers
IPIECA
Mr. S. Hope, Executive Secretary
International Petroleum Industry
Environmental Conservation Association
MOTOR VEHICLES MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. John W. Shiller
Emissions Planning Associate
Environmental and Safety Engineering Staff
The Ford Motor Company
Assist
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE
Rob Coppock
Senior Program Officer
National Research Council
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSERVATION DISTRICTS
Mr. Steve Meyers
National Association of Conservation Districts
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
The Honorable Ashley Brown
Commissioner of the Ohio Public Utilities Commission
Ms. Linda Bisson
Commissioner, New Hampshire
Public Utilities Commission
Mr. Charles D. Gray
Assistant General Counsel, NARUC
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE DEPARTMENTS OF AGRICULTURE
Mr. Robert Omato
National Association of State Departments
of Agriculture
NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY
Brooks Yeager
Vice President, Government Relations
National Audubon Society
NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION
Mr. Thomas Altmeyer
Senior Vice President of
Government Affairs
Diane Moody
Senior Economist
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
Thomas Stoel (also representing the Environment Liaison Centre,
David Wirth
Nairobi, Kenya)
Richard Ayers
David Doniger
Natural Resources Defense Council
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE
Dr. Norman J. Rosenberg, Director
Climate Resources Program
WOODS HOLE RESEARCH CENTER
Dr. Kilaparti Ramakrishna
Senior Associate
International Environmental Law
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE
James Gustave Speth, President
William Moomaw
Rafe Pomerance
Irving Mintzer
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE
Christopher Flavin
Nicholas Lenssen
U.S. CONGRESS
Susan Andross
Staff Consultant
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Leslie Black
Professional Staff Member
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
United States Senate
Kerry Bolognese
Staff Consultant
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Harry Broadman
Chief Economist
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Ronald Cooper
Professional Staff Member
Committee on Environment and Public Works
United States Senate
Penny Dalton
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate
David Finnegan
Counsel
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
Anne Georges
Legislative Assistant
Office of the Honorable David Obey
House of Representatives
Teresa Gorman
Professional Staff Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
Katharine Kimball
Associate Counsel
Committee on Environment and Public Works
United States Senate
Mark Murray
Staff Assistant
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export
Financing and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Robert Palmer
Staff Director
Subcommittee on International Scientific
Cooperation
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
House of Representatives
Michael Rodemeyer
Staff Director
Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture
Research and Environment
House of Representatives
Steven Shimberg
Associate Counsel
Committee on Environment and Public Works
United States Senate
Curtis Stanford
Technical Consultant
Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture
Research and Environment
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
House of Representatives
F
UNITED STATES
will
AGENCY
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460
PROTECTION
OFFICE OF
Clinto
POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Organization of the IPCC Response Strategy Workgroup
(RSWG)
FROM:
Richard D. Morgenstern, Director
RDM
Office of Policy Analysis
TO:
IPCC Interagency Workgroup
The RSWG will soon be adopting a workplan that will require
the completion of a number of resource intensive analytic tasks
over the next few years. A question has arisen concerning the
best organizational structure for completing this work and a
solution was proposed in a January 20 memorandum from John
Clarke to the IPCC Working Group (attached). There are two
major problems with the organizational structure suggested in
that memo:
1. It calls for the creation of a U.S. staffed Secre-
tariat to perform the work of the RSWG. This defeats
the main purpose of the IPCC which is to develop an
international consensus on the scope of the global
climate change problem and potential responses to
it. By excluding or effectively limiting the role
of other countries from the process of generating work
products, the proposed structure will lead foreign
governments to feel less of a "sense of ownership"
of the RSWG's work.
2. It calls for the staffing of a new organization within
the U.S. to conduct RSWG work, and coordinate the parti-
cipation of U.S. agencies. The problem is that no new
organization can hope to even come close to replicating
the expertise now present in existing government agencies.
This means that such a staff will have to rely extensively
on executive agency support to generate work products and
will serve largely a coordinating function. If this is
be its primary role, other structures (as suggested below)
could fulfill this function more effectively and without
the creation of a new bureaucracy.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
To ensure that foreign governments feel a sense of ownership
of RSWG products, it is crucial that the Expert Groups actively
invite the participation of and/or assign responsibility to
other governments for the preparation of work products. In many
cases, this will highlight differences in opinion on various topics
and allow a consensus to emerge, or alternatively, allow key
differences in points of view to be discovered. For example, all
countries may be invited to submit assessments of future CO2
emissions from electricity generation. While not all countries
may choose to do so, the assessments from those that do may differ
in many respects and those differences would be discussed at future
meetings. Alternatively, the Expert Groups may choose to divide
responsiblilty for different tasks to different countries.
Assessments for one technology might be undertaken by one country
while another might be undertaken by a different country. In any
case, this process is more likely to lead to an international
consensus than one dominated by the U.S.
The administrative functions of each expert group should be
carried out by the expert group chairman. If they are unable to
carry out such function, the U.S. should be prepared to step in.
As to how to organize U.S. participation in the RSWG, no new
bureaucracy is needed. We have already organized a DPC working
group to coordinate domestic policy development. The reservoir of
expertise on this subject is now and will remain in individual
agencies. To coordinate the participation of agencies in the RSWG,
however, it would be useful to create a standing RSWG Coordinating
Council, chaired by the Department of State, and consisting of EPA,
DOE, USDA, DOC, and DOI. Membership would be at the office
director level. The Council would initially oversee the
development of a U.S. workplan. This would involve identifying
specific tasks and making assignments. The Council would also
oversee and approve the official submission of U.S. products to the
RSWG. Obviously, if disagreements cannot be resolved at the
Coordinating Council, they will be resolved at higher levels in the
Executive. Admini-strative functions for the coordination of RSWG
activities should be carried out by State.
Attachment
DATE: 1/20/89
MEMO TO: IPCC INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP
SUBJECT: ORGANIZATION OF THE IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGY WORKING GROUP
FROM: J. CLARKE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR/ DOE CLIMATE ACTIVITIES
BACKGROUND: In its inaugural meeting the IPCC decided to organize three
working group to accomplish its tasks in the most efficient and expeditious
manner. A core group of countries was identified for each working group in
order to provide for a manageable and effective group composition.
However, each working group was to obtain the best possible expertise, on a
world wide basis, in order to achieve a comprehensive and globally balanced
product.
The Terms of Reference state that "Working Group III should consider, inter
alia, forecasting and assessment of future emissions of greenhouse gases,
impacts of changing technology, sources and sinks, adaptation to climate
change, strategies to control or reduce emissions and other human activities
that may have an impact on climate (e.g. deforestation, changing land use) and
their social and economic implications, and legal matters." All Working
Groups "should build on past international and national assessments
and draw fully on the expertise of existing international scientific bodies."
Finally, "they should coordinate their work as far as practicable."
On 1/17/89 the U.S. IPCC interagency working group discussed options for the
organization of RSWG to accomplish this mission. Members of the group
described the sophisticated modeling and technical analysis that must be
performed to arrive at global agreement on emission scenarios. The
organizational challenge of obtaining the contributions of a broad cross
section of nations, international organizations and NGOs was pointed out. The
work involved in reconciling and incorporating this global input was also
recognized. Finally, the effort required to obtain agreement on both the
scenarios and their inherent uncertainties was noted. Considering the
complexities involved and the need for immediate RSWG actions to supply
emissions scenarios to the other working groups, there was substantial
agreement on the need for a Secretariat to support the Chair in organizing the
work of RSWG. There was also considerable support for the idea that the U.S.,
as Chair of the RSWG, should supply that Secretariat. It was agreed to further
develop the Secretariat concept for presentation at the Jan. 30 - Feb. 1
meeting.
1
DISCUSSION: The concept of a Secretariat to coordinate the work of
international bodies is well established. In the present circumstances,
where a great deal of work must be done and coordinated with many nations,
international organizations and the other IPCC working groups, it is
essential. Considering the limited time chosen by the IPCC for its work and
the need for the RSWG to supply the initial emissions scenarios to the other
working groups, it would be inefficient and very difficult to organize an
international secretariat in the time available. It would be appropriate
for the U.S., as Chair of the RSWG, to volunteer to provide a Secretariat. If
the other members of RSWG accept the division of the group's work into the
four topical areas as proposed by the Chair, the U.S. would need to provide
five essentially full time people for the Secretariat: an Executive Secretary
and one Topical Secretary in each area.
This Secretariat would work under the supervision of the Chair to carry out
the work plan as adopted by the RSWG, soliciting contributions from all
appropriate national bodies and international organizations. The Executive
Secretary would be responsible for assuring the development of uniform
methodologies by the Topical Secretaries and for coordinating RSWG activities
with the other IPCC groups. The Topical Secretaries would establish
methodologies, integrate contributions, identify, and seek to eliminate, gaps
and uncertainties in each topical area. The Secretariat as a whole would work
to present the RSWG with a comprehensive and globally balanced product for
review and adoption.
The function of RSWG, supported by a strong Secretariat, would be focused on
setting directions, reviewing the product of the Secretariat and considering
overall response strategies. The five Vice Chairmen could be involved in a
direct way by assigning responsibility for organizing independent
international reviews of the product of the Secretariat in the topical areas.
The correspondence between the number of Vice Chairs and the number
of topical areas for review would be exact if the Industry/Energy topical area
were split into separate topical areas. The division makes technical sense
if the Industry topic is understood as referring to response strategies of
non-energy industries. This division would require a fifth Topical Secretary.
The other core members would be involved by their participation in RSWG
decisions as well as by identifying relevant national capabilities and
arranging the participation of their national organizations in the RSWG work.
The attached diagram illustrates the functional arrangement.
The U.S. would have to agree to provide the individuals to staff the
Secretariat. These individuals would also require additional staff support
from their agencies. Since the U.S. possesses a great deal of the world's
capability to carry out the work of the RSWG, the individuals assigned to the
Secretariat would spend much of their time arranging for and coordinating
input from the U.S. If the individual U.S. agencies divide the responsibility
of providing U.S. support for RSWG in the topical areas and supply a Topical
Secretary in these same areas, the individuals assigned to the Secretariat
could also provide interagency coordination for this U.S. support.
2
RECOMMENDATION: The U.S. should propose to provide a Secretariat for the
RSWG. The Secretariat should be provided by the U.S. agencies responsible for
providing U.S. technical input to RSWG. The group of agency representatives
assigned to the Secretariat should also constitute the interagency mechanism
to provide the domestic coordination of this U.S. input.
3
IPCC
RESPONSE STRATEGIES
WORKING GROUP
CHAIR
VICE - CHAIRS
INDEPENDENT
SECRETARIAT
INTERNATIONAL
REVIEWS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ENERGY
ENERGY
VICE - CHAIR
TOPICAL SECRETARY
INDUSTRY
INDUSTRY
VICE - CHAIR
TOPICAL SECRETARY
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
VICE - CHAIR
TOPICAL SECRETARY
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
VICE - CHAIR
TOPICAL SECRETARY
NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS
NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS
VICE - CHAIR
TOPICAL SECRETARY
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE IPCC RESPONSE
STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
4
EXAMPLE
EPA
DOE
USDA
DOI
DOC
EXPERT GROUP A
TASK I
Subtask 1
Subtask 2
TASK II
EXPERT GROUP B
TASK I
EXAMPLE
US
CANADA
NETHERLANDS
SWEDEN
JAPAN
EXPERT GROUP A
TASK I
Subtask 1
Subtask 2
TASK II
EXPERT GROUP B
TASK I
EXPERT GROUP MEETING
ON
war
METHODOLOGIES AND ANALYTICAL TOOLS
(Under the Auspices of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)
3
CENTRE DES CONFERENCES INTERNATIONALES
19 avenue Kléber, Paris 16ème
10th-11th April, 1989
SPONSORING ORGANISATIONS
This expert group meeting is organised under the auspices of the
Sub-Group on Energy and Industry of the Response Strategy Working Group
(RSWG), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which was set up by
the World Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations Environment
Programme.
PURPOSE
The purpose of the expert group is to foster an international consensus
on the appropriate methodologies and analytical tools for assessing policy
options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and their rate of accumulation
in the atmosphere. The expert group is also to examine which analytical
methods are most appropriate for assessing the social and economic
implications of these policy options in a national, regional and international
context. Part of the expert group's work includes the identification of
limitations and gaps in analytical tools.
The expert group will advise the Sub-Group on Energy and Industry on the
selection
us development of analysis tools for use by the Sub-Group when
it subsequently identifies, analyses and considers policy options for
national, regional and international responses. The objective of this expert
meeting is to examine, discuss and formulate which methodologies, approaches
and analytical tools would be most appropriate for use in a decision analysis
framework but it is not to present and debate specific technology and policy
options or strategies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
3727D/23.3.89
- 2 -
PARTICIPATION
In addition to invited speakers, the meeting will be attended by
representatives of "core" or designated countries of the Response Strategy
Working Group, countries and international organisations which are members of
the Sub-Group on Energy and Industry and other "observing" countries under the
auspices of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Time will be set
aside during the meeting not only for questions and answers but also for all
participants to actively participate in the proceedings.
PRELIMINARY AGENDA
Invited speakers, and other participants, will be asked to discuss and
examine the following topics:
I.
Introduction
o
Progress report by the United States and Netherlands on the
development and specification of long term greenhouse gas emission
scenarios, including a discussion of:
- methodology and assumptions;
- data requirements;
- preliminary results.
Scope and general conceptual approach and analytical framework for
assessing (i) the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, and
(ii) the social and economic effects on national, regional and
international levels of policy response measures.
2.
Analytical Tools for Assessing Impact on Greenhouse Gas Emission Levels
Techniques for assessing reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
associated with policy response measures.
(a) Modelling Approaches
- models that are available for use in assessing policy options
to deal with the possibility of climatic change;
- data requirements, availability, level of disaggregation,
regional differences and reliability;
- assumptions and uncertainties;
- limits and gaps in modelling techniques;
- criteria for selecting modelling techniques, and assessment of
usefulness in policy formulation.
3727D/23.3.89
- 3 -
(b) Other Techniques
- concepts, approaches and tools - differentiated on the basis of
policy options (including timing of implementation) to deal
with the possibility of climate change;
- range and type of policies and which tools would be most
appropriate to assess them;
- data requirements, availability, regional differences, and
reliability;
- assumptions and their importance;
- assumptions of and gaps in analytical tools;
- criteria and parameters for comparison, evaluation and/or
selection of analytical tools;
- their usefulness and reliability for policy formulation.
3.
Analytical Methods for Assessing Social and Economic
Effects of Response Measures
Techniques for assessing and estimating the social and economic
effects (other than the impact on emissions levels discussed under
item 2) associated with implementation of policy options for the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
(a) Modelling Approaches
See Item 2(a).
(b) Other Techniques
See Item 2(b).
4.
Other Business
o
Usefulness and limitations in single analytical tool approaches;
Research institutes and other organisations which perform analysis;
o
Available data and basic input parameters.
3727D/23.3.89
- 4 -
TENTATIVE LIST OF INVITED SPEAKERS
C. O. Wene
Chalmers University of Technology,
A Methodology for Evaluating
Göteberg, Sweden
Policies to Control Greenhouse
Gas Emissions from the Technical
Energy System
Y. Smeers
Center for Operations Research
Potential of Global Energy Models
University of Louvain, Belgium
for Assessing Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Policies: the Case of
the EFOM Model
H. L. Schmid
Federal Energy Office
Swiss Energy Scenarios:
Berne, Switzerland
Methodology, Models and CO₂
Emissions
R. Kappel
Center for Economic Research,
Economic Development, Energy
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
Consumption and CO₂ Emissions:
Zurich, Switzerland
Simulation Model for China
A. Voss
University of Stuttgart,
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: The
Federal Republic of Germany
key for the identification of
efficient response strategies to
the climate issue Conceptual
approach and modelling tools
P. Okken
Energy Study Centre
The Greenhouse Effect:Uncertainty
Netherlands Energy Research Foundation,
Dilemma of Science and Policy
Patten, Netherlands
R. J. Swart
National Institute of Public Health
Co-presenter with Dr. Okken (as
and Environment Protection
above) and also Progress Report
Bilthoven, Netherlands
on Development of Emission
Scenarios for RSWG
I. Mintzer
World Resources Institute
An Analytical Tool: Model
Washington D.C.
of Warming Commitment
N. Kouvaritakis
International Energy Agency,
Exploring the Robustness of Policy
Paris
Measures: An Approach
3727D/23.3.89
- 5 -
R. W. Shaw
International Institute for Applied
Under discussion
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg
Austria
W. Sassin
KFA, Jülich, Germany
Decision Under Uncertainty: A Frame
for Evaluating various Contri-
butions to Climatic Change and
Related Response Strategies
M. Miyata
The Energy Data and Modelling Center
Under discussion
Institute of Energy Economics,
Tokyo, Japan
J. Darmstadter
Resources for the Future
Measuring Economic and Social
Washington D.C.
Costs
G. Horton
UK Department of Energy
Quantifying the Costs of
London, United Kingdom
Emissions Reductions:
A Modelling Approach
M. P. Valette
Directorate of Science, Research
Economic Implications for Growth
and Development
and Trade: An Approach
EEC, Brussels, Belgium
R. Hoffman
Faculty of Environmental Studies,
Design Approach to Socio-Economic
University of Waterloo, Canada
Modelling
Other speakers from the United States, Japan and other countries will also
give presentations (e.g., on Progress in Developing Emission Scenarios and
Edmonds-Reilly model).
ORGANISATIONAL DETAILS
Meeting will be co-chaired by Japan and China.
Morning sessions will start at 9:00 a.m. and end at approximately
1:00 p.m. Afternoon sessions will start at 2:30 p.m. and end at approximately
6:00 p.m.
3727D/23.3.89
- 6 -
English will be the official language. There will be no simultaneous
translation.
Could participants, who have not as yet done so, notify the Delegation
of Japan to the OECD - Mr. H. Ogawa, Tel: (1) 47 66 02 22 - or the contact
mentioned below of their planned attendance.
All travel and hotel arrangements must be made directly by
participants. All visitors to France, other than nationals of the European
Communities and of Switzerland, are advised of the necessity to obtain visas
for entry into France.
Correspondence should be addressed to:
Dr. George Kowalski,
Head, Energy Economic Analysis Division
International Energy Agency
2 rue André Pascal
75775 PARIS CEDEX 16
Tel: (33 1) 45 24 94 80
Tlx: 630 190 ENERG A
Fax: (33 1) 45 24 99 88
3727D/23.3.89
Gwe Bub Halm acopy
F.
Memorandum
&
U.S. Department
of Transportation
Research and
Special Programs
Administration
Climb
Global
Date
Reply to Attn. of:
INFORMATION: DOT Comments on EPA Draft
Subject
(Feb. 21, 1989) Report to Congress On "Policy
Options for Stabilizing Global Climate"
S. Fred Singer
From
spud Sin
Chief Scientist
To The Files
To:
This Draft Report was briefed by EPA and distributed at the
Domestic Policy Council Meeting held on March 7, 1989.
We have reviewed the Report and offer the attached comments.
We commend EPA for presenting a variety of policy options for
slowing down the buildup of "greenhouse" gases in the
atmosphere; but the Report could be strengthened by certain
additions and by spelling out more clearly the assumptions
underlying the scenarios used.
Of major interest to DOT is the policy option #3 (on p. 34 of
the Executive Summary) relating to improved efficiency of
automobiles. Cost-effective technological approaches may
exist to this extremely important issue.
Attachment
#
Scientific Basis For Global Warming Is Uncertain
The Report follows the mainstream of current scientific
opinion regarding the enhanced greenhouse effect, predicting a
~ 3°C global warming corresponding to a doubling of CO₂ and
other greenhouse gases. But an informed minority view holds
otherwise: Since there is not yet a sure greenhouse signal in
the global temperature record, a negative atmospheric
"feedback" may be operating, which cancels much of the
expected warming; a likely candidate is increased cloudiness
that reduces the amount of solar radiation reaching the
earth's surface.
The Report should discuss this matter fully and inform
Congress of the basic scientific uncertainty before
recommending or even delineating policy options. In other
words, there may not be a problem.
In this connection, it is significant that the Report
anticipates a warming of ~ 1°C by the year 2000. This is a
huge increase that cannot be missed and would make itself
evident within a few years--in other words, before any major
policy initiative can be launched.
Scientific Assumptions Entering The Scenarios Are Questionable
1.
Much, if not most, of the CH4 and N₂O gases have
natural sources and cannot be influenced by human
intervention. This point bears full discussion.
2.
About half of the CO2 emitted in fossil fuel burning
appears to be immediately absorbed by the ocean. The
biosphere represents another sink that could increase as
CO₂ concentration grows.
3.
The Report implicitly assumes that CFC substitutes have
no greenhouse effects. That is highly unlikely to be
the case.
Discussion of Policy Strategies Is Incomplete
1.
We note with interest that option #3 (Improved
Transportation Efficiency) is about as or more
effective than either CFC Phase Out, Energy Emissions
Fee, Emission Controls, or the Promotion of either
Natural Gas, Nuclear Power or Solar Technologies. (See
attached p.34.)
2.
We should note, however, that the size of the impact of
individual policy strategies depends crucially on the
assumptions involved. For example, the reason that
Promotion of Nuclear has about the same impact as Solar
is that nuclear is assumed to go from 15 percent of
electric power generation up to 17 percent, whereas
solar (photovoltaic?) is assumed to go from 0 percent
to 17 percent.
Recommendations For Making The Report More Effective
To make the Report more realistic and useful, it should be
expanded in three respects:
1.
The scientific base and assumptions should be more
fully presented, as discussed above.
2.
The cost (both direct and the wider macro impact)
should be stated for each policy option. We eventually
require an incremental (i.e. marginal) cost-benefit
analysis comparing various degrees of the policy
options by their impact and cost.
3.
The political and international dimensions cannot be
neglected and may ultimately be determinative.
On the one hand, the options cited will impact on
various domestic constituencies in the fields of
transportation, energy supply, agriculture, and so on.
On the other hand, the options, to be effective,
require international agreements, some of which may be
difficult to achieve.
Conclusion: A Cost-Effective Technological Approach
It seems to us that some of the policy options may be
premature in view of the uncertain scientific base, while
others may be prudent to carry out even if the scientific base
did not exist.
For example: If, by technology advance, we could
substantially increase the energy efficiency of the internal
combustion engine (ICE), at the same time decreasing polluting
emissions, we would achieve simultaneously a number of
worthwhile objectives. Based on recent laboratory results,
such technology advance may indeed be achievable and should
become commercially attractive if carried out as a long-term
development program by an industry consortium, under
appropriate governmental auspices.
The DOT would be willing to develop such an initiative, in
cooperation with other government departments and appropriate
private-sector organizations.
Attachment
Policy Options for Stabilizing Global Climate - Review Draft
Executive Summary
STABILIZING POLICY STRATEGIES:
DECREASE IN EQUILIBRIUM WARMING COMMITMENT
Percent Reduction Relative to RCW Scenario
1. CFC Phaseout
2050
2. Reforestation b
3. Improved Transportation
c
2100
Efficiency
4. Other Efficiency Gains d
5. Energy Emissions Fee
6. Promote Natural Gas f
g
7. Emission Controls
8. Solar Technologies h
9. Commercialized Blomass
10. Agriculture, Landfills,
J
and Cement
11. Promote Nuclear
k
X
Power
45%
RCWP (Simultaneous
65%
Implementation of 1-11)
o
5
10
15
20
25
Percent
Figure 8. The impact of individual measures on the equilibrium warming commitment in the RCW
scenario. The simultaneous implementation of all the measures represents the RCWP scenario.
DRAFT - DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE
34
February 21, 1989
EXPERT GROUP MEETING
ComE
ON
METHODOLOGIES AND ANALYTICAL TOOLS
Ken
(Under the Auspices of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)
And
CENTRE DES CONFERENCES INTERNATIONALES
19 Avenue Kléber, Paris 16ème
Wnits.
10th-11th April, 1989
your
Climite
SPONSORING ORGANISATIONS
This expert group meeting is being organised under the auspices of the
Sub-Group on Energy and Industry of the Response Strategy Working Group
(RSWG), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which was set up by
the World Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations Environment
Programme.
PURPOSE
The purpose of the expert group is to foster an international consensus
on the appropriate methodologies and analytical tools for assessing policy
options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and their rate of accumulation
in the atmosphere. The expert group will also examine which analytical
methods are most appropriate for assessing the social and economic
implications of these policy options in a national, regional and international
context. Part of the expert group's work will be to identify limitations and
gaps in analytical tools.
The expert group will advise the Sub-Group on Energy and Industry on the
selection and/or development of analysis tools for use by the Sub-Group when
it subsequently identifies, analyses and considers policy options for
national, regional and international responses. The objective of this expert
meeting is to examine, discuss and formulate which methodologies, approaches
and analytical tools would be most appropriate for use in a decision analysis
framework but it is not to present and debate specific technology and policy
options or strategies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
3727D/7.03.89
- 2 -
PRELIMINARY AGENDA
Invited speakers, and other participants, will be asked to discuss and
examine the following topics:
1.
Introduction
Overview of the link between scientific models on climate change
and the development and specification of long term greenhouse gas
emission scenarios on the one hand, and the work of the expert
group on the other hand, including a discussion of:
- methodology and assumptions;
- data requirements;
- preliminary results.
Scope and general conceptual approach and analytical framework for
assessing (i) the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, and
(ii) the social and economic effects on national, regional and
international levels of policy response measures.
2.
Analytical Tools for Assessing Impact on Greenhouse Gas Emission Levels
Techniques for assessing reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
associated with policy response measures.
(a) Modelling Approaches
- models that are available for use in assessing policy options
to deal with the possibility of climatic change;
/
- data requirements, availability, level of disaggregation,
regional differences and reliability;
- assumptions and uncertainties;
- limits and gaps in modelling techniques;
- criteria for selecting modelling techniques, and assessment of
usefulness in policy formulation.
(b) Other Techniques
- concepts, approaches and tools - differentiated on the basis of
policy options (including timing of implementation) - to deal
with the possibility of climate change;
- range and type of policies and which tools would be most
appropriate to assess them;
- data requirements, availability, regional differences, and
reliability;
- assumptions and their importance;
3727D/7.03.89
- 3 -
- assumptions of and gaps in analytical tools;
- criteria and parameters for comparison, evaluation and/or
selection of analytical tools;
- their usefulness and reliability for policy formulation.
3.
Analytical Methods for Assessing Social and Economic
Effects of Response Measures
Techniques for assessing and estimating the social and economic
effects (other than the impact on emissions levels discussed under
item 2) associated with implementation of policy options for the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
(a) Modelling Approaches
See Item 2(a).
(b) Other Techniques
See Item 2(b).
4.
Other Business
Usefulness and limitations in single analytical tool approaches;
Research institutes and other organisations which perform analysis;
Available data and basic input parameters.
ORGANISATION
Meeting will be co-chaired by:
Co-Chairman from Japan
Co-Chairman from Canada or China
(tc be nominated)
(to be nominated)
Correspondence should be addressed to:
Dr. George Kowalski,
Head, Energy Economic Analysis Division
International Energy Agency
2 rue André Pascal
75775 PARIS CEDEX 16
Tel: (33 1) 45 24 94 80
Tlx: 630 190 ENERG A
Fax: (33 1) 45 24 99 88
3727D/7.03.89
United States Department of State
W with
Bureau of Oceans and International
resul
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520
February 23, 1989
Note to RSWG participants:
Attached for your information is a list of principal RSWG
contacts for the 17 core member governments and a list of those
who will coordinate U.S. Government participation in RSWG and
its subgroups. In both cases, we have listed a single contact
point to facilitate communication, but we fully understand that
many agencies in each of our governments will contribute to the
work of RSWG. Please let me know if there are any changes or
corrections to be made.
Amorp
Andrew D. Sens, Director
Office of Environmental Protection
U.S. Government RSWG Coordinators:
RSWG Overall and Steering Committee:
William A. Nitze
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Environment, Health and Natural Resources
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 200520
Tel: (202) 647-2232
Telefax: (202) 647-5947
Energy and Industry:
John Clarke
Executive Director, Climate Issue Response Group
Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20585
Tel: (301) 586-9770
Telefax: (301) 586-4120
Agriculture, Forests, and Other:
Gary Evans
Deputy Administrator
U.S. Department of Agriculture
National Program Staff
Bldg. 005, Room 125
Beltsville, Maryland 20705
Tel: (301) 344-3084
Telefax: (301) 344-3191
Coastal Zone Management:
J.R. Spradley
Counsellor to the Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere
U.S. Department of Commerce
Room 5804
Washington, D.C. 20230
Tel: (202) 377-3567
Resource Use and Management:
Indur Goklany
Program Analyst
Office of Program Analysis
Department of Interior
18th and C Streets, N.W.
Mail Stop 4412
Washington, D.C. 20240
Tel: (202) 343-2151
Telefax: (202) 289-4714
RSWG Principal Contacts
Barry Jones
Assistant Secretary, Productivity and Research
Department of Primary Industries and Energy
Policy Development Division
Edmund Barton Building
Barton A.C.T. 2600
Canberra, Australia
Tel: (BH) (062) 72 5811
(AH) (062) 31 4979
Telex: AA 62188
Fascmille: (062) 72 5926
Antonio Rocha Magalhaes
Secretario Extraordinario
Ceara State Government
Edif. Carioca, Sala 702, SCS
70325 - Brasilia, DF, Brazil
Tel: 005561-2242313
Telex: 61-1375
Howard Ferguson
Assistant Deputy Minister
Atmospheric Environment Service
Environment Canada
4905 Dufferin Street
Downsview, Ontario Canada
Luo Jibin
Deputy Administrator
State Meterological Agency
46 Bac Road
Beijing, China
Jean Claude Oppeneau
Director of the Technical Division of the
Secretariat of State for Environment
14 Boulevard du General Leclerc
92524 Neuilly s/Seine
France
Reinhardt Fretter
Meteorologischer Dienst der DDR
Albert - Einstein - Str. 42-46
DDR - 1561 Potsdam
German Democratic Republic
Tel: 3160
Telex: 15273 MDLPD DD
Dr. A. C. Ray, Additional Secretary
Ministry of Environment and Forests
Lodi Road
New Delhi, India 110003
Telex:. Newdelhi 360591
-2-
Makoto Tujimoto
Director, Social Cooperation Division
United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2-2-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyodaku, Tokyo 100, Japan
Tel: 03-580-3311
Prof. David J. Attard
Personal Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Chairman, Advisory Committee on Climate Change
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Merchants Street
Valletta, Malta
Tel: Pers. 925 (356) 314861
Telex: Pers. 925 (LEGIS)
Telefax: (356) 227822
Dr. Pier Vellinga
Coordinator for National Climate Programs
Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment (VROM)
P.O. Box 450
2260 MB Leidschendam
Netherlands
Tel: 31-70-209367 Ext. 2125
Telefax: 31-70-201s5s
Telex: 32362 VROM NL
Per M. Bakken
Co-ordinator, Air Pollution
International Department
Ministry of Environment
Myntgata
P.O. Box 8013 DEP
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
N-0030 Oslo 1 - Norway
Tel: +472345985
Telex: 21480
Telefax: 472349561
Dr. A. A. Al Gain
President of MEP
P. O. Box 1358
Jeddah, 21431
Saudi Arabia
Tel: 966-2-651-8676
966-2-651-2312
966-2-651-8887
Lars Bjorkbom
Assistant Under Secretary, International Affairs
Ministry of Environment and Energy
S - 10333 Stockholm, Sweden
-3-
David Fisk
Department of the Environment
Room B3.62
Romney House
43 Marsham Street
London U.K. SW1P 3PY UK
Tel: 01 276 8300
Telex: 22221 DOEMAR G
Telefax: 01 276 8501
William A. Nitze
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Environment, Health and Natural Resources
Department of State
Washington, D.C. USA 20520
Tel: (202) 647-2232
Telefax: (202) 647-5947
Eugene A. Konygin
USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection
(GOSKOMPRIRODA)
103007, Nejdanova Street 11,
Moscow, USSR
Tel: 229-21-58
R. P. Karimanzira
Deputy Director, Operations
Box BE 150
Belvedere
Harare, Zimbabwe
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
Tel: 721056
Telefax: 733156
Telex: 4460
RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
of the
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
FIRST MEETING
WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 30 - February 1, 1989
2/10/89
RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
(WORKING GROUP III)
of the
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING
WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 30 - February 1, 1989
2/10/89 1430 #0020A
1. ORGANIZATION OF THE SESSION
Opening of the Session
The first session of Working Group III (hereinafter
referred to as Response Strategies Working Group or RSWG) of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was held
at the Department of State, Washington, D.C. from January 31
to February 1, 1989. It was opened at 9:30 a.m. on January 30
by its Chairman, Dr. Frederick M. Bernthal, U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs.
The list of participants is at Annex I.
Dr. Bernthal introduced Secretary of State James A. Baker,
III, citing his important role in placing environmental
concerns on the agenda of economic institutions as Treasury
Secretary and noting that he had made clear that global
climate change and other environmental issues will receive
high priority in the U.S. foreign policy agenda.
Secretary Baker applauded the recognition of environmental
problems as a transnational issue. He declared that the time
has come for political action, stating that the problem is not
merely a scientific one, but rather a diplomatic one involving
when and where to take action. He then made four points:
first, that we cannot wait to resolve all uncertainties before
acting; second, that we should focus immediately on steps
which are justified for other reasons, including reduction of
CFC emissions, greater energy efficiency, and reforestation;
third, that global solutions should be as specific and
cost-effective as possible; and fourth, that solutions must
reconcile the requirements for both economic development and a
safe environment. He concluded by stating that progress
generally results when common interests are joined to a common
understanding, and declared that the present meeting will play
a crucial role in generating that common understanding.
Dr. Bernthal then introduced Professor Bert Bolin,
Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
declaring him to be one of the world's most renowned
atmospheric scientists.
- 2 -
Professor Bolin, in his introductory statement, pointed
out that we do not know how rapidly climate change may occur,
or what form it may take. Policy, he said, will concern both
adaptation to and limitation of climatic change. He then
reviewed the causative factors underlying the increase of
greenhouse gases, stating that, because of the destructive
influence fo chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) on the ozone layer,
urgent action is needed to develop more stringent measures to
reduce CFC emissions.
He also discussed the need to stop deforestation and to
undertake more research into the role of methane. The
reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, he said, would mean a
major modification of the world's energy supply system, given
the preponderant position of fossil fuels among energy
sources. He stated that nuclear power could be used during a
transition period, but that a long-term solution would involve
a significant role for renewable energy sources. In
conclusion, he urged that an analysis of overall policy
problems not be delayed pending more detailed analysis of the
scientific problems involved.
Adoption of the Agenda
The Chairman outlined the provisional agenda and,
following an initial discussion of the organization of RSWG
activities, the agenda was adopted.
2. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORKING GROUP
The United States outlined a proposal for organization of
the RSWG's work, including sectoral subgroups and phases of
activity. A general discussion of the U.S. proposal and the
organization and work program followed, focusing on the need
to organize work in the most efficient manner, to establish
clear priorities, carefully delineate subgroups' duties, and
recognize environmental and resource differences among
nations. Statements concerning national views, policies and
activities relating to the climate change issue were made by
representatives of several countries.
The Chairman proposed formation of a small group to
prepare a draft outline for organization of the RSWG's work
for consideration by plenary on January 31. The group,
consisting of Professor Bolin (chair) and representatives of
Australia, China, the Netherlands, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom,
United States and Zimbabwe, proposed a structure and
guidelines reflecting comments by many delegations in the
plenary discussion. Following further discussion on January
31, the proposal was revised and approved (Annex II, pp. 1-3).
-3-
3. REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP I
Mr. Neil Sanders of the United Kingdom presented a summary
of the Report of Working Group I (Science). He stated that
fifty scientists from twenty countries had met and identified
lead authors for each subject area. Working Group I requests
that Working Group III provide projections for three scenarios
of emissions of CO₂ (fossil fuels and deforestation),
methane (population, rice, cattle, landfill, fossil fuel
extraction), N2O (fertilizer, energy), CFCs, CO and NOx.
4. VIEWS AND ACTIVITIES OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
A panel of representatives of five nongovernmental and
intergovernmental organizations (International Chamber of
Commerce, World Resources Institute, Food and Agriculture
Organization, International Energy Agency, and U.N.
Environment Program) discussed ongoing and planned climate
change activities. Representatives of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the
World Meteorological Organization commented on their
organizations' activities and capabilities. (Annex III)
5. WORKPLAN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP
The RSWG established a Steering Committee and four
subgroups.
The Bureau and, by invitation, heads of delegation of core
member countries and of subgroup cochairs, and representatives
of the IPCC secretariat, UNEP and WMO will comprise the
Steering Committee. The Steering Committee will provide
overall coordination and direction of the work of the RSWG.
It was agreed that the Steering Committee would undertake two
initial tasks: (A) The development of emissions scenarios and
(B) the development of a strategy for considering
implementation mechanisms. Both tasks are described more
fully in Annex II (pp. 21-24).
The plenary agreed to the Bureau's proposal for the
following subgroup cochairs:
a. Energy and Industry - Japan and Canada or China
b. Agriculture, Forestry and Other - Federal Republic of
Germany and Zimbabwe
C. Coastal Zone Management - New Zealand and the
Netherlands
d. Resource Use and Management - France and India, and
China or Canada
-4-
The first two subgroups will focus on limitation
strategies. strategies and the second two will focus on adaptation
activities. welcome to participate in and contribute to subgroup
International and nongovernmental organizations are
amended, by the plenary.
meetings of the subgroups and the Bureau and approved, as in
The initial RSWG workplan (Annex II) was developed
6. OTHER BUSINESS
The RSWG decided to await the results of the IPCC
date meeting and (February 6-7, 1989 in Geneva) before designating Bureau the
place of its next session.
7. CLOSURE OF THE SESSION
on The first meeting of the 1 IPCC 89. RSWG was adjourned at 2:30 p.m.
Wednesday, February
2/6/89 #0041A 1600
Annex I
Participants List
CORE MEMBER GOVERNMENTS (* = Principal RSWG Contact)
AUSTRALIA
* Barry Jones
Assistant Secretary, Productivity and Research
Department of Primary Industries and Energy
Policy Development Division
Edmund Barton Building
Barton A. C. T. 2600
Canberra, Australia
Tel: (BH) (062) 72 5811
(AH) (062) 31 4979
Telex: AA 62188
Facsimile: (062) 72 5926
Christina Bee
Assistant Secretary
Marine & Co-ordination Branch
Conservation Division
Department of Arts, Sport, Environment
Tourism & Territories
Camberra City, A.C.T.2601
Tel: (062) 74 1406
Fax: (062)
Robert R. Alderson
Assistant Secretary
National Energy Strategy
Energy Policy and Programs Division
Department of Primary
Industries & Energy
Canberra A.C.T.2600
Tel: (062) 72 5569
Fax: (062) 73 1232
-2-
Brian Babington
First Secretary
Australian Permanent Mission to the United Nations
885 Second Ave (16th Floor)
New York, N.Y. 10017
Tel: (1-212) 421-6910
BRAZIL
Antonio Rocha Magalhaes
Secretario Extraordinario
Cera State Government
Edif. Carioca, Sala 702, SCS
70325 - Brasilia, DF, Brasil
Tel: 005561-2242313
Telex: 61-1375
Joao Luiz De B. Pereira-Pinto
Science & Technology Attache
Brazilian Embassy
3006 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
Tele: (202) 745-2750
,
CANADA
* Howard Ferguson
Assistant Deputy Minister
Atmospheric Environment Service
Environment Canada
4905 Dufferin Street
Downsview, Ontario
Canada M3H 5T4
Alan Beesley
Special Advisor for Environment
Department of External Affairs
Special Advisor for Environment
Department of External Affairs
-3-
Robert Rochon
Director, Legal Operations Division
Department of External Affairs
Adriaan de Hoog
Director, Energy and Environment Division
Department of External Affairs
Lester B. Pearson Building
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ontario, KLA 0G2
Tel: (613) 992-6026
J. McTaggart-Cowan
Director, Environmental Affairs
Energy, Mines and Resources
580 Booth Street
Ottawa, Ontario KLA 0E4
Tel: (613) 996-7669
Fax: (613) 996-6484
Brian Emmett
Director General
Energy Strategy Branch
Energy Policy, Programs and Conservation Sector
(address, etc. same as Mr. McTaggart-Cowan)
Hans Martin
Senior Advisor
Atmospheric and Environmental Service
Environment Canada
4905 Dufferin Street
Downsview, Ontario
Canada, M3H5T4
Ross Glasgow
Embassy of Canada
CHINA
* Luo Jibin, Deputy Administrator
State Meterological Agency
46 Bac Road
Beijing, China
-4-
Ren Zhen Hai
Director/Researcher
Institute of Atmospheric Environment Research
Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences
Beiyuan Beijing, China P.O. 100012
Tel: 421-5561 EXT 354
Cable: 1064 Beijing
Chen Guofan
State Meteorological Agency
Luo Xu
Counsellor of the People's Republic of
China to the UN
Li Changshing
Senior Science Adviser
National Environmental Protection Agency of China
Li Zheng
Third Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China
FRANCE
Jean Claude Oppeneau
Director of the Technical Division of the
Secretariat of State for Environment
14 Boulevard du General Leclerc
92524 Neuilly s/Seine
France
Alain Chappe
Science Attache
Embassy of France
M. Bernon
Science Attache
Embassy of France
4101 Reservoir Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007-2176
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
* Reinhardt Fretter
Meteorologischer Dienst der DDR
Albert - Einstein - Str. 42-46
DDR - 1561 Potsdam
Tel: 3160
Telex: 15273 MDLPD DD
-5-
INDIA
* Dr. A. C. Ray, Additional Secretary
Ministry of Environment and Forests
Lodi Road
New Delhi, India 110003
Tel: Newdelhi 360591
JAPAN
Prof. Yoichi Kaya
Professor, Faculty of Engineering
Tokyo University
Yukio Ishiumi
Director, Environmental Protection Division,
Industrial Location and Environmental Protection Bureau
Ministry of International Trade and Industry
1-3-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyodaku, Tokyo 100, Japa
Tel: 03-501-1679
Fax: 81-3-501-1787
Toshikazu Inui
Deputy Director
Energy Policy Planning Division
Director - General's Secretariat
Agency of Natural Resources and Energy
Ministry of International Trade & Industry
Masayoshi Karasawa
Director
Stratospheric Protection Office
Planning Division
Air Quality Bureau
Environmental Agency
Hideto Mitamura
Director
Energy Resources Division
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2-2-1 Kasumigo Seki, Chiyodaku, Tokyo
- -6-
Yasuhiro Shimizu
Environmental Attache
Embassy of Japan
2520 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
Tel: (202) 939-6725
Fax: (202) 939-6788
MALTA
S. Stellini
Ambassador to Washington
Embassy of the Republic of Malta
2017 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
H. Taylor-East
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Pallazo Parisio
Merchants Street
Valetta, Malta
Tel: 226740
Telex: 1497 MINFA !
Fax: 227822
representing *Prof. David J. Attard
Personal Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Chairman, Advisory Committee on Climate Change
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Merchants Street
Valletta, Malta
Tel: Pers. (356) 314861
Telex: Pers. 925 (LEGIS)
Telex: 1497 MINFA
Fax: (356)227822
-7-
R. Sarsero
Embassy of the Republic of Malta
NETHERLANDS
* Dr. Pier Vellinga
Coordinator for National Climate Programs
Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment (VROM)
P.O. Box 450
2260 MB Leidschendam
Tel: 31-70-209367 Ext. 2125
Fax: 31-70-201S5S
Telex: 32362 VROM NL
Dr. Bert Metz
Attache for Health and Environmental Protection
Royal Netherlands Embassy
4200 Linnean Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
Tel: (202) 2445300
NORWAY
* Per M. Bakken
Co-ordinator, Air Pollution
International Department
Ministry of Environment
Myntgata 2
P.O. Box 8013 DEP
N-0030 Oslo 1 - Norway
Tel: +472345985
Telex: 21480 env n
Telefax: 472349561
Jens Eikaas
First Secretary, Economic Affairs
The Royal Norwegian Embassy
2720 34th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
Tel: (202) 333-6000
-8- -
SAUDI ARABIA
Sameer A. Bukhari
1855 Athens Street #104
Boulder, Colorado 80302
Tel: (303) 497-6054
Fax: (303) 497-6951
representing *Dr. A. A. Al Gain
President of MEPA
P.O. Box 1358
Jeddah, 21431
Saudi Arabia
Tele: 966-2-651-8676
966-2-651-2312
966-2-651-8887
Rihab Massoud
Embassy of Saudi Arabia
SWEDEN
* Prof. B. Bolin
IPCC Chairman
Stockholm University
Tele: 46-8-16-24-01
Fax: 46-8-15-71-85
* Lars Bjorkbom
Assistant Under Secretary, International Affairs
Ministry of Environment and Energy
S - 10333 Stockholm, Sweden
Harald N. E. Sandberg
First Secretary
Swedish Embassy
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
Tel: (202) 944-5600
Fax: (202) 342-1319
-9- -
UNITED KINGDOM
Neil Sanders
Head, Air Quality Division
Department of the Environment
Room B3.62
Romney House
43 Marsham Street
LONDON SW1P 3PY UK
Tel: 01 276 8300
Telex: 22221 DOEMAR G
Fax: 01 276 8501
John Moss
Deputy Head of International Unit
Department of Energy
Lindsay Mitchell
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Douglas Yarrow
Science Attache
British Embassy
USSR
Eugene A. Konygin
USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection
(GOSKOMPRIRODA)
103007, Nejdanova Street 11,
Moscow, USSR
Tel: 229-21-58
Prof. Yuriy Sedunov
First Deputy Chairman
USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology (GOSKOMHYDROMET)
Pavlik Morozov Street, 12
123376, Moscow, USSR
Tel: 252-30-67
Dr. Yuriy Ye. Kazakov
Deputy Chief, International Department
USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology (GOSKOMGIDROMET)
-10-
ZIMBABWE
* R. P. Karimanzira
Deputy Director, Operations
Box BE 150
Belvedere
Harare, Zimbabwe
Tel: 721056
Fax: 733156
Telex: 4460
UNITED STATES
Department of State
Frederick M. Bernthal
Assistant Secretary for Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
William A. Nitze
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Environment, Health and Natural Resources
Tel: (202) 647-2232
John P. Ferriter
Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Energy and Resources (EB/ERP)
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Tel: (202) 647-1498
Sandra Vogelgesang
Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Organizations
Suzanne Butcher
Deputy Director, Office of Environmental Protection
OES/ENV, Room 4325
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Tel: (202) 647-9312
Fax: (202) 647-5947
-11-
Environmental Protection Agency
Linda Fisher
Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning and Evaluation
Scott Hajost
Acting Associate Administrator for International Activities
Richard Morgenstern
Director, Office of Policy Analysis
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
Tel: (202) 382-4034
Department of Energy
Dr. John Clarke
Executive Director, Climate Issue Response Group
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20585
Tel: (301) 586-5430
Richard Williamson
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20585
Tel: (202) 5865493
George Doumani
Director, Office of Technology Policy
PE-10
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20585
Tel: (202) 586-5388
(202) 586-5618
-12-
Department of Agriculture
Orville Bentley
Assistant Secretary
Norton D. Strommen, Ph.D.
Chief Meteorologist
World Agricultural Outlook Board
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Room 5133 S. Building
Washington, D.C. 20200 or 20250
Department of Interior
Indur M. Goklany
Senior Policy Analyst
Office of Program Analysis
MS 4412
18th & C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20420
Grant Mydland
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for
Fish, Wildlife and Parks
Department of Interior
18th & C Streets, N.W. #3143
Washington, D.C. 20240
Tel: (202) 343-5914
Department of Commerce
Michael T. Kelley
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Basic Industries
International Trade Administration
J. R. Spradley
Counsellor to the Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere
U.S. Department of Commerce
Room 5804
Washington, D.C. 20230
Tel: (202) 377-3567
-13-
Council on Environmental Quality
John Cohrssen
Council of Economic Advisors
Dr. Thomas G. Moore
c/o Kenneth Richards
Old Executive Office Building, Room 330
Washington, D.C. 20500
Office of Management and Budget
David M. Gibbons
Deputy Associate Director for Natural Resources
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Dr. Beverly Berger
Assistant Director for Life Sciences
U.S. Trade Representative
R. A. Reinstein
Director, Energy and Natural Resources
Agency for International Development
Ray Love, Counselor
Department of Defense
John Doyle
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
Civil Works
Treasury
David Malpass
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Developing Nations
-14-
OTHER GOVERNMENTS
ARGENTINA
Monica Peralta Ramos
Minister
Science and Technology Attache
Embassy of Argentina
1600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009
Tel: (202) 939-6400
(202) 939-6421
BULGARIA
Christo Mermerski
Agricultural Counselor
Embassy of Bulgaria
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Dr. P. Zazazal
Science Secretary of the Czechoslovakia Embassy
3900 Linnean Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
DENMARK
Jorgan Hartnack
Head, International Cooperation on
Environmental Matters
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asiatisk Plads, 1448 Copenhagen, Denmark
Tel: 45-1-920326
-15-
FINLAND
Kari Kourilehto
Director General
Ministry of the Environment
P.O. Box 399
SF - 00121 Helsinki, Finland
Tel: +358 O 1991410
Telefax: +358 0 1991499
Telex: 123717 ymin sf
Maija Pietarinen
Chief Inspector
Ministry of the Environment
P.O. Box 399
SF - 00121 Helsinki, Finland
Telex: 123717 ymin st
Telefax: 358 O lgg1399
Veikko Marttila
General Secretary
Council for Natural Resources
Ministry of Agriculture, and Forestry
Hallituskatu 3 A
00170 Helsinki, Finland
Tele: 160 3334
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
Dr. Kubler
Ministry of Economics
Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft
Villemombler Str. 76
5300 Bonn 1
Tel: (02 28 ) 615-3844
Fax: (02 28 ) 615-4436
Telex: 8 86747
Herr Dietrich Kupfer
Ministry of the Environment
Bundesministerium fur Umwelt,
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
Bernkasteler StraBe 8
5300 Bonn 2
Tel: (02 28) 305-2310
-16-
Frau Dr. Edda Mueller MR'in
Ministry of the Environment
Bundesministerium fur Umwelt
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
Bernkasteler StraBe 8
5300 Bonn 2
Tel: (02 28) 305-2350
Prof. Dr. Klaus Heinloth
University of Bonn
Anne Ruth Herkes
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
KOREA
Byun Woo Lee, PhD
Korea Meteorological Service
1 Song wol-dong, Chongno-gu, Seoul
Republic of Korea
Tel: 02-737-0011
Jung Seung Shin
First Secretary
Korean Embassy
2370 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
Tel: (202) 939-5648
NEPAL
Dr. Sharad P. Adhikary
Director General
Department of Hydrology & Meteorology
P.O. Box 406, Kathmander, Nepal
Tel: 213017
Telex: 2312 JASROT NP
NEW ZEALAND
John Gilbert, Deputy Secretary
Ministry for the Environment
84 Boulcott Street, P.O. Box 10362
Wellington, New Zealand
Tel: (04) 734-090
Fax: (04) 710-195
-17-
POLAND
Dr. Stefan Reichhart
Scientific Secretary
Institute of Meterology and Water Management
Podiesna 61
01-673 Warsaw, Poland
Tel: 352813
Telex: PL 814331
PORTUGAL
Luis Lorvao
Embassy of Portugal
2125 Kalorama Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
Tel: (202) 328-8610
SOUTH AFRICA
Cyril Hide
Science Office
Embassy of South Africa
4801 Massachusetts Avenue, S.E.
Suite 350
Washington, D.C. 20016
SPAIN
Antonio Pou
Environmental Affairs
Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism
Po. De La Castellana 67
28071 Madrid, Spain
Telefax: 1-2530716
1-5352010
Telex: MOPU 22325
Alberto Lines Escardo
Sobdirector General De Climatologia y Aplicaciones
National Meterological Institute
M.T.T.C.
Apartado 285
Madrid, Spain
Tel: 91-5819872
91-2438545
-18-
SRI LANKA
Edwin Kularatna
Attache
Embassy of Sri Lanka
2148 Wyoming Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
Tel: (202) 483-4025
SWITZERLAND
Dr. Pascale Morand Francis
Federal Office of Environmental, Forest and Landscape
International Affairs
Hallwylsonsse 4
3003 Bern, Switzerland
Tel: +41 31 61 6862
Tel: +41 31 61 9243
Fax: +41 31 61 9981
YUGOSLAVIA
Liliana Milojevic Borovcanin
First Secretary (Science, Technology and Economic)
Embassy of SFR Yugoslavia
2410 California Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
Tel: (202) 462-6566
-19-
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Peter Faross
Division for Energy Policy
Directorate-General for Energy (DG-XVII)
Rue de la Loi 200
B-1409 Brussels
Belgium
Jorgen Henningsen
Director for Protection of Water and Air and Conservation
Directorate General for Environment, Consumer Protection
and Nuclear Safety
Asiatisk Platz, 1448 Copenhagen
Denmark
Tel: 1-92 03 26
Heinz Hilbrecht
First Secretary (Energy, Environment and Transport)
Washington, D.C.
Delegation of the Commíssion of the European Community
EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY
Ian Pryke
Head, Washington Office
955 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W.
Suite 7800
Washington, D.C. 20024
Tel: (202) 488-4158
Fax: (202) 488-4930
Telemail: ESA IPRYKE
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
Dr. Jean-Paul Lanly
Director, Forest Resources Division
Forestry Department
Via delle Terme di Caracalla
00100 Rome, Italy
Tel: (6)57971
Telex: 610181FA0I
Telefax: g-011-39-6-6799563
-20-
Roger Sorenson
Head, Washington Office
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)
F. Niehaus, Head
Reliability and Risk Assessment
Division of Nuclear Safety
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
* Connie Smyser
Principal Administration
2 Rue Andre Pascal
75775 Paris CODEX 16
France
Tel: 45-24-99-66
Fax: 45-24-99-66
Telex: ENERG A 620190 F
IPCC
Dr. Narasimhan Sundarafaman
41 Secretary, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Avenue Giuseppe-Motta
1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland
Tel: 022-34-64-00
OECD
* Paul Stolpman
Head of Pollution Control Division
Environment Directorate
2 Rue Andre Pascal
75775 Paris Codex 16
France
Tel: 45-02-76-25
Fax: 45-24-78-76
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Charles L. Perry
Director, Washington Office
-21-
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM
* Peter Usher
Global Environment Monitoring System
Atmosphere Program Officer
GEMS/PAC, Room S-138
UNEP
P.O. Box 30552
Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: 254-2-520600
Telefax: 254-2-520711
Prof. Gordon T. Goodman, Advisor to UNEP
Beijer Institute
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences
Box 50005, S-10405
Stockholm, Sweden
Tele: +468-160490
Telex: 17073 royacads, Cable: Royacad
UNESCO
Dr. Bernd von Droste
Secretary, UNESCO/MAB
WORLD BANK
Prof. Erik Arrhenius
Principal Adviser, Science and Technology,
Sector Policy and Research, Room S-5045
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433
Tel: (202) 473-3285
Telefax: (202) 477-0644
WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION
Dr. Victor G. Boldirev
Director, World Climate Programme Department
41, Ave. Giuseppe - Motta
Ch - 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland
Tel: (22) 346400
Telex: 23260
Cable: Meteomond Geneva
-22-
C. OBSERVERS
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
Jim Vail
CLIMATE INSTITUTE
John Topping, President
CONSERVATION FOUNDATION
William Reilly, President
Richard Benedick
Senior Fellow
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE
Robert A. Beck
Director, Clean Air, Fossil Fuels, and Natural Resources
ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS RESOURCE COUNCIL
John P. Hughes, Director
Technical Affairs
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Gene G. Mannella
Director, Washington Office
ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY STUDY INSTITUTE
Jon Clark
Carol Werner
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND
Joe Goffman
-23-
-
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE
Richard Mott
Staff Attorney
FONDAZIONE SAN PAOLO DI TORINO
Dr. Gastone Chingari
Research Institute (IITRI)
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
Liz Cook
GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL
Eric Fersht
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Robert Winters
INDUSTRY SECTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON ENERGY FOR TRADE POLICY MATTERS
Raymond F. Bragg, Jr., Chairman
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
Alexander Trowbridge
President, National Association of Manufacturers
Kevin J. Fay
Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy
Kristine Hall
Mgr. Government Programs
Health, Safety and Environment
IBM Corporation
Nina Kogan
Manager, Environmental Affairs
U.S. Council for International Business
=34-
Thomas Lambrix
Director, Government Relations
Phillips Petroleum Company
Donald D. McCollister
Director, International Regulatory Affairs
Health and Environmental Sciences
Dow Chemical Company
Jana Oakley
Assistant Vice-President
National Association of Manufacturers
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC UNIONS
Mary M. Treichel
Assistant to the Foreign Secretary
National Academy of Sciences
INTERNATIONAL GAS UNION
Louis Aboud
JOHNS HOPKINS F.P.I
Carol Rendall
IIASA
Roderick Shaw
Project Leader, Transboundary Air Pollution Project
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
Tel: (O 2236) 71521*0
Telex: 079137 iiasa a
Telefax: (0 2236) 71313
IPIECA
S. Hope, Executive Secretary
International Petroleum Industry
Environmental Conservation Association
-25-
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Jon F. Bartholic
MOTOR VEHICLES MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
John W. Shiller
Emissions Planning Associate
Environmental and Safety Engineering Staff
The Ford Motor Company
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE
Ruth de Fries
Rob Coppock
Senior Program Officer
National Research Council
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS
Theresa Pugh
Director, Environmental Quality
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
Linda Bisson
Commissioner, New Hampshire
Public Utilities Commission
The Honorable Ashley Brown
Commissioner of the Ohio Public Utilities Commission
Charles D. Gray
Assistant General Counsel, NARUC
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE DEPARTMENTS OF AGRICULTURE
Robert Amato
National Association of State Departments
of Agriculture
-26-
NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION
Thomas Altmeyer
Senior Vice President of
Government Affairs
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
Thomas Stoel (also representing the Environment Liaison Centre)
OES ADVISORY PANEL
Dr. Joseph Dukert
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE
Dr. Norman J. Rosenberg, Director
Climate Resources Program
1616 P Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
Susan Moya
Manager Energy and Natural Resource
Tia Armstrong
Associate Manager of Environmental Policy
WOODS HOLE RESEARCH CENTER
Dr. George Woodwell
President
Dr. Kilaparti Ramakrishna
Senior Associate
International Environmental Law
-27-
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE
James Gustave Speth, President
Irving Mintzer
William Moomaw
Rafe Pomerance
1735 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Tel: (202) 638-6300
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE
Christopher Flavin
Nicholas Lenssen
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND
Konrad von Moltke
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Susan Andross
Staff Consultant
Committee on Foreign Affairs
David Finnegan
Counsel
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
Anne Georges
Legislative Assistant
Office of the Honorable David Obey
House of Representatives
Teresa Gorman
Professional Staff Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce
Mark Murray
Staff Assistant
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export
Financing and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
-28-
Robert Palmer
Staff Director
Subcommittee on International Scientific
Cooperation
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Michael Rodemeyer
Staff Director
Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture
Research and Environment
Curtis Stanford
Technical Consultant
Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture
Research and Environment
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
U.S. SENATE
Ronald Cooper
Professional Staff Member
Committee on Environment and Public Works
Jim Phippard
Professional Staff Member
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry
Steven Shimberg
Associate Counsel
Committee on Environment and Public Works
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Rolf Nilsson
Teresa Spisak
2/10/89 1430
Annex II
Structure for conducting the work of
the IPCC Working Group on Response Strategies (RSWG)
IPCC WG III on response strategies should rely on:
IPCC WG I to provide the scientific basis for the analysis, and
IPCC WG II to describe the likely impacts of climate change.
on global, and certainly on regional and local, scale are uncertain
Present knowledge about possible ongoing and future climate changes
and precise strategy options on a national level can only be
distinguish between
developed gradually. In order to progress optimally WG III should
preliminary few in several, regards, but which should be specific in
a) a short term (18 months) workplan which will be general and
priority areas and delineate future options in broad terms, and a
b) an intermediate and long term workplan, which will
for collection and analysis of sufficient data to evaluate possible provide
changes occur.
response options and provide a useful information base as climatic
Goals for the WG
- Define policy options for national, regional and international
actions, including proposals for short term actions.
- Provide estimates of consequences, costs and benefits.
- Set priorities.
the - Define implementation mechanisms and in so doing analyze carefully
implications for nations in different states of development.
-2-
RSWG Structure
STEERING COMMITTEE*
Limitation
Adaptation
Energy
Agriculture,
Coastal
Resource
and
Forestry
Zone
Use and
Industry**
and Other
Management
Management ***
* Initial tasks:
a.
Develop emissions scenarios, taking into account population
and economic growth in different regions
b. Develop strategy for considering implementation mechanisms
** Including transportation
*** Including unmanaged ecosystems
-3-
Guidelines to Subgroups
Recognize the different economic and geographic circumstances of
nations (e.g., developed, developing).
Seek cost-effective options, including quantitative and
considerations. qualitative evaluation of social, environmental and economic
Define priority short- to medium-term options (including
non-climate actions that can help) and long-term options.
Use available information and work done elsewhere.
Address implementation. institutional and attitudinal impediments to
Structure activities at national, regional and international
levels, e.g.:
National: List of áctions individual nations can address,
information exchange.
Regional: Regional conferences (e.g., Pacific island states).
International: Energy R&D
Energy efficiency
Assistance to developing countries.
Resources
It is important to acquire the necessary resources to get work going
during the periods between RSWG meetings.
- Nations, regional economic integration organizations, and
intergovernmental organizations will be asked to second experts and
other resources to make it possible to organize working parties
which will provide the input to further RSWG meetings.
- Nongovernmental organizations will be invited, when appropriate,
to contribute to the work on specific tasks as defined by the RSWG.
-4-
2/2 0915 0016A
Subgroup Membership*
ENERGY AND INDUSTRY
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND OTHER
Japan (cochair)
Fed. Rep. of Germany (cochair)
China (cochair?)
Zimbabwe (cochair)
Canada (cochair?)
Canada
Australia
USA
Netherlands
UK
Federal Rep. of Germany
Norway
Spain
China
Saudi Arabia
Japan
USSR
Brazil
GDR
Finland
France
U.K.
E.C.
U.S.A.
UNESCO
Switzerland
FAO
Sweden
Norway
WRI
Denmark
Korea
Finland
Brazil
E.C.
Beijer
IEA/OECD
WRI
IAEA
IIASA
COASTAL ZONE
RESOURCE USE AND
MANAGEMENT
MANAGEMENT
Netherlands (cochair)
India (cochair)
New Zealand (cochair)
France (cochair)
Spain
Canada (cochair?)
Australia
China (cochair?)
UK
UK
Canada
Nepal
US
Switzerland
India
US
EC
China
Japan
UNESCO
Japan
Brazil
FAO
USSR
EC
Saudi Arabia
RFF
UNESCO
FAO
* Subgroups are open to additional membership. Governments
and organizations which wish to contribute to the work of a
group should advise the secretariat and subgroup cochairs.
-5-
2/1/89 1605 0032A
SUBGROUP ON ENERGY AND INDUSTRY
Scope:
The Energy and Industry subgroup will define policy options for
national, regional and international responses to the possibility of
climate changes from greenhouse gas emissions produced by energy
production, conversion and use. The subgroup will consider energy
uses in the industrial, transportation and residential sectors that
produce CO2 CH4, N₂O and other gases which contribute to the
greenhouse effect. It will define technology and policy options to
attempt to reduce emissions of these gases to a level consistent
with or below the emission scenarios defined by the Steering
Committee. The subgroup will seek to identify options which can be
adequately analyzed and proposed for consideration by the RSWG
within 18 months, as well as options that can be developed on a
longer timeframe. These options will be analyzed to determine their
economic, social and emission reduction effects on national,
regional and international levels. In order to facilitate its work,
the subgroup will attempt to develop an international consensus on
the appropriate analytical tools to be used. Emphasis will be on
selecting simple, pragmatic approaches.
Methodology:
The subgroup will begin by utilizing the products of past analysis,
as well as the ongoing efforts of national and international bodies.
Task 1: Review past and current work related to technology and
energy policies for both developed and developing countries which
could reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. Identify options for
further study. Place special emphasis on:
O Identifying options with regional and international as
well as national applicability.
Identifying information gaps which impede the development or
analysis of new options.
Task 2: Select appropriate analytical tools to determine the
social, economic and emission reduction effects of technological and
policy options.
Task 3: Categorize the options by the timing of their potential
application.
Options that could be adequately analyzed and proposed for
consideration by the RSWG within 18 months.
Options that require longer term development.
- 6 -
Task 4: Analyze nearer term options for their social, economic and
emission reduction consequences.
O Prepare report on the nearer term options for the RSWG.
Task 5: Prepare plan to create, or further develop and analyze,
longer term options based on the information developed in Task 1.
Schedule:
Experts meeting on selection and/or development
of analysis tools:
April, 1989
0 Select useful tools for Working Group efforts.
0 Identify limitations or gaps in capability (regional or
other).
Complete survey of past and current work. Issue reports: May 1, 1989
Organize Subgroup Meeting:
Mid May, 1989
Review and synthesize reports.
Review Steering Committee emission scenarios.
Identify short and long term options.
Identify gaps in information base.
Review UNEP Study.
Adopt common analytical tools for next phase.
Prepare next phase work plan.
Work Assignments:
Organize experts meeting on selection
and/or development of analytical tools.
IEA (tentative)
Prepare reports on past and ongoing
Australia, FRG,
work relevant to workgroup tasks.
Japan, USA, IEA, UNEP
Prepare report on UNEP study
UNEP
- -7-
RSWG SUBGROUP ON ENERGY AND INDUSTRY
1989
1990
F
M A MJJASONDJFMAMJJ
Review Current
Work
Select Options
to be studied
* IEA meeting
Select
analytical
tools
Categorize Options
** Subgroup Meeting
Analyze nearer term options,
prepare report
Prepare plan on longer
term options
- 8 -
2/1/89 1&15 0026A
SUBGROUP ON AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND OTHER
Initial Work Plan (May 1989)
The mandate of the subgroup is to deal with issues
related to limitation of greenhouse gas emissions created by
human activities other than production or use of energy or
activities. industrial activities, such as deforestation and agricultural
The subgroup agreed on the matrix below. This matrix
lists the various sources of emissions, as well as the
substances relevant to climate change. The Chair of the
subgroup will send this matrix to members of the subgroup,
who will be invited to comment. In addition, each member
country will prepare a report on its national activities
related to management of food production, development of crop
varieties, forestry management techniques and programs to
limit deforestration or promote reforestation.
Members are invited to submit their contributions to the
chair of the subgroup by 1st April 1989 as a basis for a
subgroup meeting which will take place in May 1989.
At this session in May 1989, the subgroup will discuss
national comments and reports as a basis for one or more
reports to the RSWG. For the various topics addressed,
members may be nominated to undertake drafting assignments.
The subgroup will forward a report on short term actions
to the RSWG in time for preparation of an IPCC report to the
Second World Climate Conference.
From these first results, a long term plan will evolve.
MATRIX
GASES
CO2
CH4
N2O
CFC
QUANTITY
SOURCE
% G.E.
DEFOREST
X
1.4+0.7Gt/ycu
15
REFOREST
(X)
Possible remedial
--
action
LIVESTOCK
X
RICE PADDIES
75+35 Miot/year
1
X
FERTILIZER
70+30 Miot/year
1
X
SOLID WASTE
0.8+0.2 Miot/year
1
X
BIOMASS
40+20 Miot/year
1
X
MICROGRG/
70+40 Miot/year
1
X
FOOD CHAIN
OTHER
- 9 -
RSWG SUBGROUP ON AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND OTHER
1989
F
M
A
M
J
Questionaire
Draft Reports
to Subgroup
* Subgroup Meeting: 9-10 May
Draft Report for IPCC-2
-10-
2/1/89 1725 0024A
SUBGROUP ON COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
Approach
The approach to the work will be:
(1) Work will be limited to consideration of coastal
zones;
(2) Areas of concern will relate to prediction of likely
changes that will occur in the coastal zone which are
identified by IPCC Working Groups I and II; and
(3) Initially, adaptation to sea level change impacts
together with other likely changes such as changes in
storm tracks and major currents will be the major
focus in the program.
Program Outline
By March 1989
Draft workplan of activities to complete a report to
Workgroup III by June 1990. [New Zealand, Netherlands]
By May 1989
Inventory of information available from governments,
institutions and nongovernmental organizations on
technologies and practices and other relevant activities.
[United States]
Paper on strategic overview of coastal areas and
activities at risk and available adaptive options.
[United States] (These areas include: coastal
ecosystems, urban development, fisheries, salt water
intrusion, ports and infrastructure, human health and
safety, and recreation.)
Final workplan of activities. [New Zealand, Netherlands]
Meeting of Coastal Zone Management Subgroup in Geneva at
WGIII meeting.
By November 1989
Conduct workshops on technologies and practices in both
Southern and Northern Hemispheres.
- 11 -
By May 1990
Draft report on costs and consequences of adaptive options.
By June 1990
Report to RSWG. (Report will identify work to be
undertaken by 1992 and beyond.)
- 12 -
RSWG SUBGROUP ON COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT
1989
1990
F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J
Co-chairs Complete Draft Work Plan
and Circulate to Subgroup Members.
O
8-9 May 1989: Subgroup Meeting in
Geneva: (Inventory of Existing Work
(USA), Strategic Overview Paper (USA)
O
Technical Workshop
Draft Report
Report
to RSWG
-13-
2/1/89 1725 0025A
SUBGROUP ON RESOURCE USE AND MANAGEMENT
Broad areas of work to be covered by this subgroup in the
long term are:
(1) Land resources
(2) Water resources
(3) Air and atmosphere
Specific areas of work are:
(1) Agriculture
(2) Fisheries
(3) Animal husbandry
(4) Forests
(5) Wildlife
(6) Biological diversity including preservation of
species, national parks, and biosphere reserves
(7) Other ecosystems (e.g., marine ecosystems,
Alpine and Arctic ecosystems, estuaries)
(8) Water resources (including droughts, floods)
Short Term Workplan:
(1) By March 31, 1989, the following designated
countries will produce a 2-10 page summary identifying
adaptive technologies and practices that could be used in the
event of climate change to either reduce the potential
negative impacts or to take advantage of possible positive
impacts:
(1) Water resources: US and Nepal
(2) Forestry: Brazil, India and UK
(3) Agriculture: China, Brazil, US, India and France
(4) Fisheries: China, Japan and Canada
(5) Animal husbandry: Australia
(6) Salinization and desertification: France and Saudi
Arabia
-14-
As guidance for preparation of these summaries it should
be noted that they would eventually (i.e., after May, 1989) be
expanded into short papers for the Interim Report which would:
-- Describe the strategies;
-- Address their effectiveness, and social, economic and
environmental consequences;
-- Address legal, institutional, financial and other
hurdles to adoption of strategies;
-- Address methods of overcoming these hurdles; and
-- Discuss their applicability to various
nations/regions in terms of a number of factors
including level of economic development.
(2) By March 31, 1989, each participating country will
produce a list of completed and ongoing studies relevant to
of response the strategies. These lists should include a description
a discussion of methods and results (if completed).
study, schedule for completion (if it is ongoing), and
Schedule:
The following process and schedule was agreed upon:
will the respective countries by 31st March, 1989. These
(1) The papers identified above are to be prepared by
be posted by the respective countries addressed papers to all
the other member countries of the sub-group within this period.
(2) The receiving members will provide comments on the
papers by April 22, 1989.
(3) The subgroup will meet in May 1989 to discuss these
papers and work out the future work plan.
RSWG SUBGROUP ON RESOURCE USE AND
MANAGEMENT
F
M
A
M
Papers Prepared,
Mailed by 31 Mar
Comments In
by 22 Apr
Subgroup
Meeting
- 15 -
2/10/89 1430 0028A
STEERING COMMITTEE TASK A:
DEVELOPMENT OF EMISSIONS SCENARIOS
The RSWG Steering Committee has tasked the U.S. and the
Netherlands with developing preliminary net emissions profiles
for three scenarios. These three initial scenarios are not
forecasts of possible development outcomes or of likely policy
options. Additional scenarios will be considered as possible
policy responses are developed. The chosen initial scenarios
are: (1) CO₂ concentration equivalent doubling of
pre-industrial levels of greenhouse gases by approximately
2030; (2) doubling by approximately 2060; and (3) doubling by
approximately 2090 and stable thereafter. These profiles will
be broken down gas by gas and source category by source
category in accordance with the attached table prepared by
IPCC Working Group I. The two countries will jointly develop
these preliminary emissions profiles as soon as possible,
culminating their discussion at a meeting in early April 1989
in the Netherlands attended by a member of the scientific
secretariat of Working Group I. This meeting will produce a
set of agreed emissions profiles for the three scenarios
described above and will immediately furnish them to Working
Groups I and II and the Working Group III subgroups for use in
their respective work plans. The profiles will then be
presented for discussion at the Spring meeting of Working
Group III. It is intended that these emissions profiles will
be continually refined through an iterative process involving
all three working groups.
- 16 -
INTERACTION WITH IPCC WORKING GROUP 3
Workins Group 1 requests the following information from WG3.
Projections of:
1. CO, san-made emissions: 3 scenarios only
a. fossil fuel;
b. deforestation (gigatonnes/year)
2. For methane:
a. Population
b. Rice production (by region)
C. Cattle population
d. Landfill and fossil fuel extraction
3. N.O emissions:
&. Fertilizer usage
b. Energy system production by type of combustion
4. Emissions of CFCs and replacements
5. CO and NOx emissions
WG3 These requirements will be conveyed to the Washington of
discussed at the IPCC Bureau meeting on 6 February.
(30/31 January 1989) by the UK delegate and will also meeting be
-17-
2/1/89 1725 0029A
STEERING COMMITTEE TASK B:
DEVELOP STRATEGY FOR CONSIDERING IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS
A strategy for identifying implementation mechanisms,
their costs and effectiveness, would include consideration of:
Public Education and Information
Develop national, regional and international strategies
for creating and improving educational programs and public
awareness campaigns on the global climate change issue. Such
programs would aim at overcoming cultural and other
impediments to identifying and implementing appropriate
response strategies for limiting climate change and adapting
to potential impacts.
Legal and Institutional Measures
Examine existing legal processes and institutional
mechanisms to determine how they may be used to implement
options to limit or adapt to climate change.
Consider new legal processes and institutional mechanisms
that could be used to implement options to limit or adapt to
climate change.
Consider a policy of providing incentives for nations to
undertake unilateral or bilateral actions to limit climate
change.
Technical Assistance
National, regional and international technical assistance
and cooperation programs to provide assistance to developing
nations on adaptation and limitation measures (e.g.,
development of benign and/or less harmful energy sources),
including the training necessary for their implementation.
Private and public sector institutions in all countries are
encouraged to focus their R&D on developing technologies to
support limitation and adaptation measures.
Financial & Economic Measures
Incentives (including the removal of disincentives) to
encourage developed and developing countries to implement
include: limitation and adaptation strategies. These incentives might
-18-
At the regional and international level:
- review of bilateral and multilateral development
programs to minimize their adverse impact on climate
change;
- restructuring of international debt of developing
countries;
- new aid initatives; and
- examination of appropriate incentive and disincentive
measures, including market incentives, with particular
attention to trade implications.
At the national level:
- reviewing national foreign aid programs to minimize
their adverse impact on climate change; and
- examination of appropriate incentive and disincentive
measures, including market incentives.
- 19 -
2/1/89 1725 0031A
Summary of Short Term (18 Month) Work Plan
for the Working Group As a Whole
1. Develop and distribute preliminary emissions scenarios.
2. Refine strategy for considering implementation mechanisms.
3. Carry out short term work plans of four subgroups,
including preparation of more detailed work plans and reports
on national activities and short term measures.
4. Prepare initial reports of subgroups and integrate those
reports into a report of the working group as a whole.
5. As part of 4. above, develop longer term workplans for
subgroups and the working group as a whole.
Annex III
VIEWS AND ACTIVITIES
OF NONGOVERNMENTAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
The representative of the International Chamber of
Commerce expressed support for the multilateral approach taken
by IPCC. He pointed out that his organization is focusing on
the CFC problem, and urged that IPCC give first priority to
determining whether increases in greenhouse gases lead to
global warming.
The representative of the World Resources Institute stated
that it is unnecessary and foolish to delay action pending
complete scientific information. He urged establishment of
priorities for the near-term reduction of emissions, including
the phaseout of CFC's, the establishment of carbon dioxide
reduction targets, and a campaign to halt deforestation
combined with debt relief for affected developing countries.
The representative of the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization described FAO agricultural and rural development
activities related to climate change issues. He stated that
his organization was coordinating implementation of the
Tropical Forestry Action Plan, a joint effort of tropical
countries and the donor community aiming at reducing
deforestation, and is undertaking a new global assessment of
tropical forest resources which should be useful in global
climate change modeling.
The representative of the International Energy Agency
(IEA) noted the organization's strong interest in climate
change because of its implications for energy policy. She
stated that IEA is cooperating with the OECD Environment
Committee on projects concerning the energy dimension of
climate change and the environmental implications of long-term
energy demand. The IEA is also generating a study of the
impact of environmental concerns on energy security.
The representative of the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP)
stated that his organization has responsibility for
coordinating an effective global response to climate change
through monitoring, development of policy options,
facilitation of dialogue between scientists and policy-makers,
dissemination of public information, and coordination of
international studies. UNEP, he stated, has also undertaken a
study of the full range of policy responses. He stated that
response measures should be decided upon by 1995.
-2-
At the end of these presentations the representative of
Unesco gave an overview of intergovernmental. research related
to climate change carried out by the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission (IOC), the Intergovernmental
Hydrological Programme (IHP) and by the Man and the Biosphere
Programme (MAB).
The represenative of the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) stated that for many years WMO has been dealing with the
evaluation of climate and is the lead agency in implementation
of the World Climate Programme (WCP). He noted that WMO
cooperates with other international agencies, particularly
with UNEP and the International Council of Scientific Unions
and is determined to enhance its activities with respect to
climate change issues through the WCP and other WMO scientific
and technical programmes and by supporting all areas of
activities of the WMO/UNEP IPCC.
REPRODUC ED AT GOVI RNMENT EXPENSE
WG-1
WE. 2
W6.3
U.K.
U.S.S.R.
U.S.
CORE
STEERING
Scenarios
STEERING
GROUP
COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE
EMISSION
WG I
ESTIMATES
watsonk. u.s sw
u.k.
CLIMATE
FORCING
Boer CAN Rowdlree Zeng u.k PRC Bryon
us
AGRICULTURE
FORESTRY
TRENDS
u.s FR
MODEL
kiehmorcrettc
SIMULATIONS
CANADA
ADAPTIVE
LIMITING
Jap
CLIMATE
N.2.
FORCING
Mitchillabe u.k us us
NATURAL
Canad,
ECOSYSTEMS
NL,
PRC
RESPONSE
Gates To To Kioka ,A
COASTAL
ENERGY
MODEL
ZONE
th u.s u.k
PREDICTIONS
OTHER
INDUSTRY
us
Algeria
RESOURCE
HUMAN
TRENDS
Monsoon
WATER
USE
ACTIVITY
Sahel
RESERVES
MEDIT
GREAT PLaiN
FR, INDIA
FRG
China
-
Zimbabwe
Hasselmana FRE
Schlesinger us
GERLEMANS NL uk
Japan
SWARRICE
CNADA
EneRGY, Urban
PROCESSES
SEA LEVEL
Her 1th
Maleshko ussa
WALKERLATI AVS BRAZ
u.s.
SINHA IND
OCEAN,
ECOSYSTEMS
sea Lesa
TAN 30-7:45
RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
of the
3
F
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
no
FIRST MEETING
year.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 30 - February 1, 1989
limits
Doc/1
chap
1/26/89
Provisional Agenda
Room
Monday. January 30
Bill Nity
7,45,000 8:30
1105 -Delagation meeting
Registration
647-2232
9:30
Welcome
Opening Remarks by IPCC Chairman
ange
Adoption of Agenda
647-9266
10:15
Introduction to Topics to be considered by RSWG
- Overview
- Food and Fiber
(agriculture, silviculture, aquaculture)
- Natural Resources
(water resources, terrestrial, aquatic)
- Human Settlements
(infrastructure, health)
- Industry
(energy, transportation, mining/manufacturing, other)
- Integration/cross-cutting issues
(e.g., water resources, energy, land use,
population, sea level)
12:00
Lunch
1:30
Remarks by Member Countries (5-10 minutes each)
4:00
Coffee
4:15
Report on Working Group I (Science)
4:30
U.S. Strategy for Global Change Research
4:40
Panel discussion (International Chamber of Commerce,
World Resources Institute, FAO, IEA, UNEP)
6:00
Reception for delegates hosted by Department of State
Tuesday, January 31
9:00
Overview/summary of day 1 discussions, guilelines for
drafting groups
9:30
Group discussions to levelop workplans
12:30
Delegates Lunch at NAS hosted }/ Department ;: Energy
Speaker: Charles DiBona, President,
American Petroleum Institute
2:00
Continue drafting group discussions
Wednesday, February 1
9:00
Plenary Session: Integration and Adoption of Workplan,
discussion of schedule, relationship to other activities
12:30 (or as decided by the group) - Adjourn
#218
OUTLINE OF WORKPLAN FOR DEVELOPING
U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY, FY-1989-1990
Purpose:
To provide a plan, including a series of studies,
to develop and refine an Administration global
climate change policy over the next two and one
half years. This policy will be developed in the
context of current scientific understandings and
uncertainties, consider international
developments, and be consistent with the Global
Climate Protection Act (GCPA) and other
statutory/policy mandates.
The U.S. is working with other nations on the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
to review the international scientific
understanding on climate change and to consider
the need for policy options to adapt to climate
change or to limit emissions affecting climate
change. If needed, the control of emissions
affecting global climate change can only be fully
successful if implemented on a global basis.
Timing:
By November 1988, the DPC will review and approve
the work plan and the position paper for the U.S.
delegation to use at the meeting of the IPCC
sponsored by UNEP and WMO. Subsequent timing of
reports is to be responsive to the DPC or its
successor organization providing options and
supporting analyses that allow the Administration
to meet the Congressional mandate in the GCPA and
to develop policy options for the United States
by the end of CY-1990. These efforts will also
provide available information as needed by the
DPC prior to that report and meet requirements of
the U.S. delegation activities within the IPCC.
At the minimum, annual summary reports will be
provided to the DPC by the end of 1989 and 1990.
Elements:
Review Data
Design Policy Questions
O
Conduct Policy Analysis
Analyze Implementing Mechanisms
O
Develop Options Paper
The work plan and subsequent reporting efforts
will also include a regular review of the gaps
and uncertainties in the knowledge needed for the
development and evaluation of global climate
change policy. This review will be available to
the DPC so that the character and uncertainties
of the knowledge base which exists to support
decisions will be fully understood by those
decision-makers. This review will also be
available to the FCCSET so that its work in
coordinating scientific research on global
climate change will be fully informed about the
information needs of policy developers and policy
makers. The work plan will serve as the basis
for communications to the public and to the
Congress to explain the need for the actions
being taken by the Executive Branch and the
reasons why further actions are premature.
Review
Science Assessment - A plan for assessment of the
Data:
science issues associated with climate change is
being developed by NOAA, NASA, NSF, EPA and DOE
and will be carried out to meet requirements of
the IPCC and the GCPA. A report on the status of
the assessment will be provided by December 1989.
The assessment for the IPCC is scheduled for
completion in December 1990.
Effects Studies - A series of studies to
determine potential impacts of climate change on
U.S. and selected foreign countries, including
impacts on agriculture (e.g., drought), wetlands,
forests, water resources, sea level rise, human
health, biodiversity, infrastructure and trade.
The EPA report to Congress (December 1988) will
be the initial reference document, supplemented
by additional products from other agencies. EPA
and DOE will lead effort with participation by at
least DOI, USDA and NOAA.
Emissions Inventory - A series of studies, to be
conducted by EPA, DOE, and other agencies, to
inventory worldwide sources and project future
trends of principal greenhouse gases, including,
at a minimum, CO2, CFC's, NO and CH₄. These
estimates should consider eñergy sources,
agricultural sources, deforestation and natural
sources. The EPA Report to Congress (December
1988) will be the primary initial reference
document. A subsequent report will be prepared
by DOE and EPA.
Technology Assessment - A series of studies, to
be conducted by DOE (with the assistance of NAS),
EPA, and other agencies, to assess the current
state of research and development activities in
alternative energy sources, including energy
conservation and energy efficiency, nuclear,
solar, and renewable energy sources, and improved
methods of employing fossil fuels. DOE will lead
the interagency effort. Technology assessments
will also be conducted by appropriate agencies in
areas of CFC substitutes and agricultural
practices.
Information Transfer Assessment - The current
status of data and information available to
support public understanding and decision making
will be developed periodically. In each of the
elements described above, the studies and papers
produced will fully describe, in terms useful to
the public, policy analyst and policy maker, the
assumptions, knowledge gaps, and uncertainties
which limit our ability to make the projections
and evaluations needed for making policy
decisions.
Design
Policies for adaptation, emission limiting, and
Policy
other strategies will be considered. Three
Questions:
time periods for policy/technology development
will be addressed:
Near term (until 2000)
Midterm (2000 -2025)
Long term (beyond 2025)
Policies for the U.S., other developed and
developing countries will be identified in
general terms. For the U.S., more quantitative
results will be provided. An array of policies
including those needed to meet a Congressional
requirement (a near term 20 percent reduction in
U.S. CO, emissions and a midterm 50 percent
reduction) will be addressed. A much broader set
of stabilization/ reduction goals with families
of proposed responses will be set out in the
study report. An explicit set of policy issues
relevant to adaptive strategies will also be
identified. Examples of stabilization/adaptive
strategies will include deforestation and
reforestation practices, resource pricing
policies, agricultural policies, CFC emission
reduction steps, trade and credit policies, and
other policies as appropriate. Quantitative
analyses of options will be conducted as
possible. Studies for improving the climate
change information bases and for improved
forecasting capabilities will be undertaken. EPA
and DOE will jointly lead these activities with a
draft set of policy issues.
Conduct
For each policy option for adaptation and
Policy
emission limiting strategies, total costs (for
Analysis:
the set of responses) will be estimated, as well
as the distribution of those costs within the
U.S. society. Various measures of physical
benefits will be estimated, e.g., temperature and
physical effects. To the extent practicable,
costs and benefits measures will be monetized.
Analyses will be conducted by participating
agencies. Where relevant, information developed
by other countries/international organizations
will be considered. The analysis will be done as
an interagency effort led by DOE and EPA with at
least State, DOI, DOC, Treasury, CEA and USTR
participating.
Analyze
Analysis of a variety of implementing mechanisms
Implementing
may be useful as part of U.S. climate change
Mechanisms:
policy. Domestically, mechanisms to facilitate
adaptation will include information
dissemination/technical assistance to public and
private managers involved in the management of
potentially vulnerable resources (e.g., forests,
agriculture, water resources). Financial
incentives/disincentives and the use of targeted
R&D in these areas will also be explored. To
limit emissions, a variety of
incentives/disincentives, (e.g., stimulation of
R&D and of technology modernization, energy and
natural resources pricing, tax mechanisms, energy
efficiency requirements, international aid and
technology transfer) plus targeted R&D will be
considered. Internationally, the requirements
for, the cost, and the feasibility of coordinated
emission reductions will be analyzed. The
limitations of unilaterally undertaking
implementation mechanisms will be included. The
interagency group noted above will be used for
developing this and the subsequent task.
Developing
An options paper of a full set of potential
Options
of potential policy elements--research,
Paper:
technology development, mitigation steps and
emissions stabilization responses--with proposed
implementation elements will be drafted for
discussion by the Domestic Policy Council.
Inasmuchas a significant fraction of the
data/analyses referenced above will still be in
progress, it is anticipated that the process of
developing U.S. policy on global climate issues
will be iterative for several years; hence, this
first effort establishes an initial information
base and sets out follow-on requirements for the
next iterations. Initial policy directions are
likely to be influenced and modified by any
emerging consensus in the science area,
Congressional reaction, the direction of IPCC
activities, technological, economical and other
considerations.
Products
In November 1988, the work plan and the position
paper for the delegation to the IPCC will be
developed. These papers should outline
uncertainties, limitations and gaps in our
present knowledge and research activities plus
outline some initial activities that could be
studied as potential early responses to global
climate change.
A first summary report reflecting all interim
results will be completed by December 1989. This
report will summarize activities, including any
conclusions reached at that time, and relevant
uncertainties.
By the end of 1990, a more detailed report
summarizing all results will be provided to the
DPC. This will include detailed findings on the
understanding of the science, proposals for
adaptation and emissions limiting responses, and
proposed study efforts post 1990.
The attached table provides timing and scope of
the major reports. Updating of these elements
will be done as needed to meet DPC and
Administration requirements.
Interim
Final
Products
Products
1988
1989
1990
Review Workplan
November
Review IPCC
November
Position Papers
Review data
X
X
Design Policy
X
X
Questions
Conduct Policy
X
X
Analysis
Analyze
X
X
Implementing
Mechanism
Prepare Annual
December
December
Report
Develop Options
December
Papers
&
A STATE-OF-THE-SCIENCE REVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
A PROPOSED PLAN
Bob Watson (NASA)
Dan Albritton (NOAA)
12 September 1988
Contents:
AN OUTLINE OF THE DOCUMENT
(A "prediction/uncertainty"-oriented review.)
I. SCOPE
(Goals of the review, rationale for the organization, major research
topics, examples, and key questions.)
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Details within each of the major research topics.)
THE PROCESS OF THE REVIEW PREPARATION
(Document preparation team, interactions, and timetable.)
U.S. AGENCY INTERFACE COMMITTEE
(Agency and organizational scientific representatives who are the
contact points.)
AD HOC U.S. SCIENTIFIC "SCOPING" GROUP
(Small group of U.S. scientists who provided initial comments on the
scope and approach proposed above.)
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC STEERING COMMITTEE
(Group of worldwide scientists who - when approached with a sound
plan, momentum, and a challenging undertaking - will be
willing and interested in providing scientific guidance from an
international perspective.)
Draft, 12 September 1988
STATE-OF-THE-SCIENCE REVIEW ON CLIMATE CHANGE:
AN OUTLINE
Perhaps the best structure for the Review is something resembling (i) the way the
atmosphere works and (ii) the way that the research proceeds; namely:
from cause to effect [i. e., (1) -> (2) -> (4) -> (6) below],
with tests of the understanding of both the individual parts [i. e., (3)]
and the whole [i. e., (5)] to define the uncertainty range in the
predictions.
I. SCOPE AND MAJOR RESEARCH TOPICS
The Review will consist of an introduction and six major parts:
INTRODUCTION; an explanation of the goal of the review. It is the
following:
To produce a set of predicted physical/effects responses (with, of course,
quantified uncertainty bands) that follow from a set of specified climate-
forcing inputs (natural processes and human-caused perturbations, the latter
being simple and generic), calculated based on the current understanding of
climate/effects processes.
(1) THE FORCING FUNCTIONS; i. e., the changing natural and human-
caused inputs (e. g., solar irradiance changes and trace-gas increases) to the climate
system. {What initiates climate changes?}
(2) THE PLANETARY RESPONSE PROCESSES; i. e., the climatic-response
processes (e. g., water-vapor greenhouse feedback and ocean-atmosphere
interactions) that are the" machinery" wherewith the climate system responds to
the changed input. {What is our picture of the working mechanisms?}
(3) THE TESTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM; i. e.,
diagnostics, namely, the process-oriented experiments, calculations, and their
comparisons that evaluate the level of understanding of the structure of the climate
system (e. g., lower-stratospheric warming observed in the tropics after El Chichon
vis-à-vis the predictions of local heating rates based on the calculated amounts of IR
absorbed by sulfuric acid droplets). {What are the indications that the parts of our
picture are realistic?}
2
Draft, 12 September 1988
(4) THE PREDICTED CLIMATIC CHANGES; i. e., prognostics, namely, the
new climate state(s) (i. e., greenhouse warming from IR forcing and surface cooling
from dust forcing) that are predicted to follow from the input forcings in (1) above.
{Based on our picture of the climate mechanisms: What inputs are contributing to
the current climate scene? For selected future climate-input scenarios, what is the
range of climates that may lie ahead?}
(5) THE PAST CLIMATE RECORD; i. e., the long-term record of past
responses (i. e., paleoclimate) to climate forcings, which can be used, within
limitations, to test, retrospectively, the ability to rationalize cause and effect on time
scales of decades to centuries (since we can't wait for the next century of data before
starting such testing of our overall understanding of how the climate machine
works!). (How well do our climate models "predict" the past, since we will likely do
no better in predicting the future?}
(6) THE CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE; i. e.; "effects", namely,
the predicted environmental consequences (e. g., perturbations of sea level and
alteration of agricultural processes) of natural or human-induced climate changes.
{How well do we understand those aspects of climate change that cause Homo
sapiens the most concern?}
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS
The table below gives examples of some of the details that would be in each
major category. There may well have to be more than one chapter for each
category.
(1)
THE FORCING FUNCTIONS
(a)
Anthropogenic
Carbon dioxide
Other radiatively important species
Land use
(b) Natural
Solar irradiance
Volcanoes
(c)
Historical trends
(d)
Future projections and sample scenarios
3
Draft, 12 September 1988
(2)
THE PLANETARY RESPONSE PROCESSES
(a)
Water vapor greenhouse feedback
(b)
Ice-albedo feedback
(c)
Cloud feedback
(d)
Ocean - atmosphere interactions
Global SST - circulation/precipitation
Heat capacity - ocean circulation
(e)
Land (soil/vegetation) - atmosphere interactions
(f)
Stratospheric chemistry and radiation balance
(g)
Tropospheric chemistry and radiation balance
(h)
Aerosol (natural-anthropogenic) - cloud interactions
(i)
Trace-gases and the biosphere: source, sink, and response
(3)
THE DIAGNOSTIC TESTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCESSES
Theory vis-à-vis observations
(a)
Seasonal cycles
(b)
Biennial oscillations
(c) Response to episodic
events
(4)
THE PREDICTED CLIMATIC CHANGES
(a)
The environmentally important response variables
(b)
The nature and variance of natural changes
(c)
Characteristic signatures of human-caused effects
(d)
The present
(e)
The next ten years
(f)
The next century
(5)
THE PAST CLIMATE RECORD
(a)
The direct-measurement epoch
Patterns and trends
(b)
The proxy-data epoch
Methods
Patterns and trends
(c)
Hindcasting: Can we explain the past?
4
Draft, 12 September 1988
(6)
THE CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(a)
Agriculture
Forest
Crops
(b)
Natural ecosystems
Forests
Grasslands
Tundra
Wetlands
(c)
Sea level
(d)
Frequency/magnitude of severe weather
(e)
Ground water
(f)
Human health
(g)
Multiple stresses
Climate/ultraviolet radiation/oxidants/acidity /
5
Draft, 12 September 1988
THE PROCESS OF THE REVIEW PREPARATION
THE DOCUMENT PREPARATION GROUP:
- Two to four review coordinators.
- Chapter chairs and co-chairs (dozens).
- Co-authors (a few hundred).
- Peer reviewers.
- Logistical assistance.
- In all of the above, international in composition.
INTERACTIONS WITH:
1. U.S. Agency Interface Committee.
2. Ad Hoc U.S. Scientific "Scoping" Group (one time only).
3. International Scientific Steering Committee.
PREPARATION TIMETABLE:
- Presentation of the initial concept to the CES
working group on climate. [8 July 1988]
- Discussion of the scope/content with
Group (2). [29 July 1988]
- Presentation of the plan to the DPC working
group on climate. [12 September 1988]
- September: Present the plan to the NAS and the principals
of the CES.
- Early fall: International connections established.
- Late fall: First planning meeting of steering group
and authors.
- 1989: Chapter-preparation meetings.
- Spring 1990: Review.
- Fall 1990: Completion.
o
REPORT:
- Available to all interested.
- Progress briefings to Committee (1), WMO/UNEP
Intergovernmental Panel, et al.
- No interim findings/conclusions/recommendations.
6
Draft, 12 September 1988
U.S. AGENCY INTERFACE COMMITTEE
These individuals provide the contact points with the agencies and other govern-
mental organizations. Generally, there will be one representative from the science
or R & D side of each agency or organization. Members could include:
Science agencies
National Academy of Sciences
National Climate Program Office
Office of Science & Technology Policy
Committee on Earth Sciences
Office of Technology Assessment
Others, as appropriate
7
Draft, 12 September 1988
AD HOC U.S. SCIENTIFIC "SCOPING" GROUP
This small group of U.S. scientists provided early and initial comments on the
scope, content, and approach of the above outline. The selectees were characterized
by (i) being scientific leaders in a balance of climate-related fields, (ii) possible
liaisons with U.S. scientific organizations, and (iii) the willingness to provide
comments and advice on short notice. The members are also likely to be involved
later as authors.
This initial "scoping" process will take place in two parts. The first took place at a
meeting at the NSF on 29 July with Albritton, Watson, and the people listed below.
The second step will be written comments from the group.
Baker
Expertise :
physical oceanographer
Institution :
Joint Oceanographic Institute
Mahlman
Expertise :
general circulation models
Institution :
NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics
Lab
Malone
Expertise :
international institutions
Institution :
Saint Josephs College
Melillo
Expertise:
ecosystem biologist
Institution :
Woods Hole
Mooney
Expertise :
plant physiology
Institution :
Stanford University
Moore
Expertise :
ecosystem modeling
Institution :
University of New Hampshire
Perry
Expertise :
meteorologist
Institution :
National Academy of Sciences
Rosenberg
Expertise :
agriculturist
Institution :
Resources For The Future
8
Draft, 12 September 1988
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC STEERING COMMITTEE
This group of international scientists will provide scientific guidance from the
international perspective. The selectees will be characterized by (i) expertise in
climate-related fields, (ii) international balance, and (iii) liaisons with international
scientific organizations. They are unlikely to be involved later as authors.
The list below is only illustrative, and none on have been contacted in this
regard. Many of the examples were suggested by the Ad Hoc U.S. "Scoping" Group
at the meeting on 29 July 1988.
Alusa
Expertise :
cloud physics
Country :
Kenya
Bolle
Expertise :
land-atmosphere interactions
Country :
Austria
Bolin
Expertise :
carbon cycle
Country :
Sweden
Crutzen
Expertise :
atmospheric chemistry
Country :
FRG
Duick
Expertise :
hydrology
Country :
DDR
Golitsyn
Expertise :
climate modeling
Country :
USSR
Goudriaan
Expertise :
ecosystem modeling
Country :
The Netherlands
Hassleman
Expertise :
oceanography
Country :
FRG
Houghton
Expertise :
meteorology
Country :
United Kingdom
Kondratyev
Expertise :
atmospheric science
Country :
USSR
Landsberg
Expertise :
forestry
Country :
Austria
9
Draft, 12 September 1988
Manabe*
Expertise :
climate modelling
Country :
United States
Matsuno
Expertise :
dynamics
Country :
Japan
McBain
Expertise :
longe-range forecasting
Country :
Canada
McCarthy*
Expertise :
biological oceanography
Country :
United States
Moore*
Expertise :
ecosystem modeling
Country :
United States
Oeschger
Expertise :
ice-core paleoclimatology
Country :
Switzerland
Rodda
Expertise :
hydrology
Country :
United Kingdom
Salati
Expertise :
Amazonia ecoscience
Country :
Brazil
Singh
Expertise :
ecology
Country :
India
Sinha
Expertise :
plant physiology
Country :
India
Swift
Expertise :
soil science
Country :
Zimbabwe
Walker
Expertise :
vegetation
Country :
Australia
Washington*
Expertise :
climate modeling
Country :
United States
Wiin-Nielsen
Expertise :
meteorology
Country :
Denmark
Ye
Expertise :
climate dynamics
Country :
People's Republic of China
* Subject to discussions with NAS.
10