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Hills (USTR) (1990)
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Hills (USTR) (1990)
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Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
John Sununu Cabinet Agencies Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
1998-0004-F[1]
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Cabinet Agencies Files
OA/ID Number:
29188
Folder ID Number:
29188-005
Folder Title:
Hills (USTR) (1990)
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
25
6
5
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
December 13, 1990
The Honorable Newt Gingrich
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Newt:
I read press reports of your speech to the New York Board of
Trade, Textiles Section. One sentence leaped out at me:
"We've got to recognize that a new world is
emerging and we've got to insist that U.S. trade
negotiators start with the premise that the world
is not the important market -- America is."
We negotiators cannot overlook the fact that in recent years
40% of America's GNP growth and 75% of the growth in our overall
production of goods -- both manufactured and agricultural -- have
come from our exports, not from sales here at home. Producers of
manufactured goods and agricultural products must export nearly
one third of their output to prosper, and that share is growing.
Even in the textile sector, the annual growth of overseas
shipments is far in excess of the rate of growth for domestic
shipments. If our entrepreneurs were to look only to the U.S.
market, substantial numbers of them would go into bankruptcy.
The sentence you used that I liked a lot, "Policies that
made sense 10 years, no longer make sense," shows me we are on
the same wave length.
We should talk about what we can do to increase U.S.
prosperity in this decade. Perhaps one day you would permit me
to take you to lunch.
Meanwhile, warm wishes for a happy and healthy holiday
season.
Sincerely
bcc: Governor Sununu
Roger Porter
Cara Carla A. Hills
Ron Sorini
Mary Tinsley
WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1990
GINGRICH VOWS FIGHT
FOR QUOTA BILL IN '91
NEW YORK - Members of Congress who led the textile
industry's fight for quota legislation this year will be back in
Washington in January to try once again, Rep. Newt Gingrich
(R., Ga.) vowed Monday.
Gingrich addressed a luncheon meeting of the New York
Board of Trade's textile section at the New York Hilton here,
where be was named Textile Man of the Year.
He urged some 150 industry executives not be become
frustrated over the lawmakers' failure to override vetoes during
the past three years, saying, "Sometimes it takes a while to
create major change."
Gingrich said there are three main reasons the industry
should try again to get a textile trade bill passed next year:
persistence pays off; the debate over tariffs continues to wax
hot, and the world is changing and so are its major markets.
"Policies that made sense 10 years ago no longer make
sense. You've got to design new strategies to apply to changing
Europe and Far Eastern economic systems," he declared.
"We've got to recognize that a new world is emerging and
we've got to insist that U.S. trade negotiators start with the
premise that the world is not the important market - America
is" be said.
"I want to encourage you to come back strong in January
prepared to fight and stand tough. You are not going to change
a great nation without a collision," be concluded.
- MARVIN KLAPPER
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01a. Memo
From Carla Hills to POTUS
1/16/90
(b)(1)
C
Re: Trade Impact of the New Japanese Import Promotion
Program (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Hills (USTR) (1990)
Date Closed:
12/13/2004
OA/ID Number:
29188-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:
1998-0004-F[1]
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
2005-0426-S
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
THE UNITED STATES TRADE THE PRESIDENTIVES SEEN
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
JAN - 2 1990
know
all
Carla
Tong
of
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
moAl
welps
FROM:
Carla A. Hills
CAST
IX
N
SUBJECT:
New Japanese Import Promotion Program
Summary
On December 28, the Japanese government announced cabinet
approval of a broad program of tax and other incentives to
stimulate imports of manufactured goods into Japan. The program
will go into effect on April 1, 1990, subject to expected
approval by the Diet. The Japanese portray the plan as a
"historic shift in the direction of becoming an import
superpower.' It reflects strong and persistent pressure on Japan
to increase its manufactured imports (which, although rising in
recent years, continue to be far smaller relative to income than
those of other industrialized countries). It is, in effect, an
"affirmative action" plan intended to offset, in part, the
effects of Japan's promotion of exports and protection of its
domestic market from foreign imports. We believe the program
represents an honest effort and deserves credit, but we do not
know whether it will change Japanese import patterns. Therefore,
we believe we should adopt an approach of "wait and see" the
results. We intend to give the program credit but to note that
it does not substitute for elimination of market access barriers.
Analysis
The main elements of the program are:
Tax incentives to manufacturers for incremental
purchases of covered imports (most zero-tariff imports
of manufactured goods -- approximately 50% of total
Japanese imports).
Tax incentives to wholesalers and retailers for
incremental purchases of covered imports.
Elimination of import duties on about 1,300 items,
imports of which are valued at roughly $13 billion.
Intensified import promotion measures, including more
trade missions, government consulting services to
importers, low interest loans for importers and foreign
suppliers to set up distribution facilities.
Expanded low interest loans, at lower rates, to foreign
investors seeking to set up plants in Japan.
The program could cause an increase in U.S. exports to Japan.
While the tariff eliminations will have little effect
on U.S. exports, the tax and other financial incentives
might. According to the internal Japanese government
working paper on the plan, the U.S. supplies 22 percent
of Japan's total manufactured imports but 40 percent of
the manufactured imports covered by the program. With
covered imports from all sources worth $35 billion in
1989, the program aims at producing a rise of at least
$3.5 billion in 1990 global imports, and implicitly of
about $1.4 billion from the U.S.
It constitutes clear recognition by the Japanese
government that manufactured imports will not flow into
the Japanese market without significant import
promotion measures by the government, and therefore
constitutes tacit recognition that "informal" or
structural barriers to imports do exist.
The program sends a message to the Japanese
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers that have
resisted imports, that their government is now backing
up its import promotion rhetoric with tangible,
meaningful incentives. This may encourage Japanese
companies to establish their own import promotion
programs.
While the program may increase the sale of U.S. goods in Japan,
it does not substitute for measures needed to remove barriers to
imports, which we have been addressing in the Structural
Impediments Initiative and in the specific trade issues we have
between us. The tariffs eliminated, for example, failed to
include key U.S. requests on wood products, one of the "super
301" cases.
THE UNITED STATES TRADE THE PRESIDENT THANG SEEN
ny
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20506
THE CHIEF of STAFF
A,
JAN - 2 1990
has seen
Tong
know
all
Carla
at
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Now
welps
FROM:
Carla A. Hills
CAST
before
it
R
New Japanese Import Promotion Program
06-85,
,90
SUBJECT:
Summary
On December 28, the Japanese government announced cabinet
approval of a broad program of tax and other incentives to
stimulate imports of manufactured goods into Japan. The program
will go into effect on April 1, 1990, subject to expected
approval by the Diet. The Japanese portray the plan as a
"historic shift in the direction of becoming an import
superpower." It reflects strong and persistent pressure on Japan
to increase its manufactured imports (which, although rising in
recent years, continue to be far smaller relative to income than
those of other industrialized countries). It is, in effect, an
"affirmative action" plan intended to offset, in part, the
effects of Japan's promotion of exports and protection of its
domestic market from foreign imports. We believe the program
represents an honest effort and deserves credit, but we do not
know whether it will change Japanese import patterns. Therefore,
we believe we should adopt an approach of "wait and see" the
results. We intend to give the program credit but to note that
it does not substitute for elimination of market access barriers.
Analysis
The main elements of the program are:
Tax incentives to manufacturers for incremental
purchases of covered imports (most zero-tariff imports
of manufactured goods -- approximately 50% of total
Japanese imports).
Tax incentives to wholesalers and retailers for
incremental purchases of covered imports.
Elimination of import duties on about 1,300 items,
imports of which are valued at roughly $13 billion.
Intensified import promotion measures, including more
trade missions, government consulting services to
importers, low interest loans for importers and foreign
suppliers to set up distribution facilities.
Expanded low interest loans, at lower rates, to foreign
investors seeking to set up plants in Japan.
The program could cause an increase in U.S. exports to Japan.
While the tariff eliminations will have little effect
on U.S. exports, the tax and other financial incentives
might. According to the internal Japanese government
working paper on the plan, the U.S. supplies 22 percent
of Japan's total manufactured imports but 40 percent of
the manufactured imports covered by the program. With
covered imports from all sources worth $35 billion in
1989, the program aims at producing a rise of at least
$3.5 billion in 1990 global imports, and implicitly of
about $1.4 billion from the U.S.
It constitutes clear recognition by the Japanese
government that manufactured imports will not flow into
the Japanese market without significant import
promotion measures by the government, and therefore
constitutes tacit recognition that "informal" or
structural barriers to imports do exist.
O
The program sends a message to the Japanese
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers that have
resisted imports, that their government is now backing
up its import promotion rhetoric with tangible,
meaningful incentives. This may encourage Japanese
companies to establish their own import promotion
programs.
While the program may increase the sale of U.S. goods in Japan,
it does not substitute for measures needed to remove barriers to
imports, which we have been addressing in the Structural
Impediments Initiative and in the specific trade issues we have
between us. The tariffs eliminated, for example, failed to
include key U.S. requests on wood products, one of the "super
301" cases.