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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
OA/ID Number:
91129
Folder ID Number:
91129-004
Folder Title:
Gorbachev -Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
4
1
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Telcon
Re: Phone Call to Gorbachev (9 pp.)
n.d.
(b) (1)
02a. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
1/19/91
(b) (1)
02b. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
1/19/91
(b) (1)
02c. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
03. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
2/18/91
(b)(1)
04a. Note
James A. Baker, III to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)
2/19/91
(b)(1)
04b. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
2/18/91
(b)(1)
04c. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
2/18/91
(b) (1)
05. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush
2/18/91
(b)(1)
8
[Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)
06a. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush
2/13/91
(b) (1)
[EUR/SOV Translation] (1 pp.)
06b. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush
2/13/91
(b)(1)
[Russian] (2 pp.)
Page 1 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1087
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
07a. Cable
From Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft, Re: Message to
2/15/91
(b)(1)
S
General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [151210Z Feb 91] [FOIA
RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
07b. Cable
From White House, Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to
2/15/91
(b)(1)
S
Ambassador Matlock from General Scowcroft [150120Z Feb 91]
[FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)
07c. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
2/14/91
(b)(1)
07d. Memo
Richard N. Haass/Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft
2/14/91
(b)(1)
TS
Re: Response to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)
07e. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
2/14/91
(b)(1)
TS
Re: Response to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)
07f. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
2/14/91
(b) (1)
07g. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush
2/13/91
(b)(1)
[EUR/SOV Translation] (1 pp.)
07h. Letter
President Gorbachev to President Bush
2/13/91
(b)(1)
8
[Russian] (2 pp.)
07i. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
2/14/91
(b)(1)
07j. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Page 2 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1087
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
08. Cable
Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA
2/11/91
(b)(1)
S
EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
09. Cable
Re: CFE Letter from President Bush to President Gorbachev (3
2/13/91
(b)(1)
pp.)
10a. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
2/9/91
(b)(1)
10b. Cable
From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z
2/9/91
(b)(1)
S
Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)
10c. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
2/8/91
(b)(1)
TS
Re: Letter to Gorbachev (1 pp.)
10d. Memo
John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft
2/6/91
(b)(1)
Re: Proposed CFE Letter (1 pp.)
11. Draft Letter
To President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
12. Cable
From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z
2/9/91
(b)(1)
S
Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)
13a. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
2/9/91
(b)(1)
13b. Cable
From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z
2/9/91
(b)(1)
S
Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)
Page 3 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1087
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
13c. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
2/8/91
(b)(1)
Re: Letter to Gorbachev on CFE (1 pp.)
13d. Memo
John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft
2/6/91
(b)(1)
S
Re: Proposed CFE Letter (1 pp.)
14. Letter
President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)
2/9/91
(b)(1)
15. Cable
From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z
2/9/91
(b)(1)
S
Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)
16. Cable
Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA
2/11/91
(b)(1)
S
EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
17. Cable
Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA
2/11/91
(b)(1)
S
EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
18. Cable
From White House, Re: Message to Marshal Akhromeyev [FOIA
2/7/91
(b)(1)
C
EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
19a. Cable
Charles Powell to General Scowcroft
1/31/91
(b)(1)
C
Re: Message to the President from the Prime Minister (1 pp.)
19b. Letter
King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Page 4 of 4
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1087
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
File
Phone call to Gorbachev
Secretary Baker Hello
The President was trying to reach you and I tried to reach Sasha
-- we could not, he asked that I give the message that he wanted
to give to you.
I am calling you from his office -- he has gone to another
engagement.
Had he been able to talk to you, he wanted to say the following.
We know you are making an intensive and useful effort as we have
said publicly.
And we recognize that Iraq's position has changed. But Saddam is
now blowing up Kuwait's oil production and refining capabilities
-- in fact he seems to have adopted a "scorched earth" policy.
It seems he is taking advantage of the talks with you to destroy
Kuwait and play for time. Much of this seems to have been
started earlier today. We do not believe that the world can wait
and let him do this. So we will be proposing a procedure by
which we can avert a ground campaign and bring the war to an end.
In effect, this builds on what you have done.
When the President was unable to reach you, he went ahead with a
press statement that has just been concluded. I will not repeat
that since it will be available to you. Except to say that it
provides for a 24 hour waiting period before there would be the
initiation of any ground campaign. The President said publicly
that he would be releasing a detailed statement on what we think
is required by way of Iraqi withdrawal in order to avert a ground
campaign.
This statement has not yet been released and I would like to
summarize it for you.
It says in the operative part of the statement:
In a final effort to obtain Iraqi compliance with the will of the
international community -- the United States after consulting
with the government of Kuwait and our other coalition partners
declares that a ground campaign will not be initiated against
Iraqi forces if prior to 12:00 U.N. time, Saturday Feb 23, Iraq
publicly accepts the following terms and communicates that to the
United Nations: The terms are as follows:
Begin a large scale withdrawal from Kuwait by 12:00 U.N. time,
Saturday Feb. 23.
Complete military withdrawal from Kuwait in one week.
Given the fact that Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait in a matter
of hours, anything more than a week would not meet the full terms
of the U.N. Resolution.
Within the first forty-eight hours remove all forces from Kuwait
City to allow for the prompt return of the legitimate government
of Kuwait and remove its forces from prepared defenses along the
Saudi-Kuwait and Saudi-Iraq border. From Bub'iyan and Warbah and
from Kuwait's Rumayllah oil field.
Within the one week specified above return all forces to their
positions of August 1 in accordance with 660.
In cooperation with the ICRC release all POWs and third country
civilians being held against their will.
Return the remains of deceased and killed coalition servicemen.
This action to commence immediately with the initiation of the
withdrawal and to be completed within 48 hours.
Remove all explosives and booby-traps including those on Kuwaiti
oil installations. (As an aside, I may say that it may already
be too late for that.) And designate Iraqi military liaison
officers to work with Kuwaiti personnel on the operational
details of withdrawal to include the provision of information on
land or sea mines.
Cease combat air patrols over Iraq and Kuwait except for
transport flights carrying withdrawing troops. And allow
coaltion aircraft exclusive control over and use of Kuwaiti
airspace.
Cease all actions against Kuwaiti citizens and property and
release all Kuwaiti detainees.
U.S. and coalition partners reiterate that their forces will not
attack retreating Iraqi forces. And will exercise restraint as
long as withdrawal proceeds in accordance with the above
guidelines and there are no attacks on other countries.
Mr. President, in the beginning of this statement which I did not
read there is a statement that the conditions in the Iraqi offer
to you must be eliminated. This means the statement that there
must be a recision of all other U.N. resolutions. And the
suggestion that there should be a lifting of economic sanctions
in exchange for partial withdrawal. President Bush has arrived
back while I have been reading this to you and wants to talk with
you.
The President Mikhail, I am anxious to get your reaction. Jim
tells me he has read you the entire statement. But I must tell
you I can't believe that Tariq Aziz knew what Saddam was going to
2
do to these oil fields. The photographs from the air are
absolutely unbelievable they are so devastating. I am so glad to
have this conversation and sorry we couldn't get the call through
before I made the public statement. The details of what Jim has
read to you have not been made public yet. But Marlin Fitzwater
will be announcing it very soon. What is the state of play on
your end? Thanks for trying hard once again.
Gorbachev O.K. thanks and hello to you. I was away because I had
to attend a big political rally in the Kremlin Palace for Army
Day and I really was not in a position to leave that gathering
because all the T.V. cameras were there and I had 6000 people
there.
The President We are both slaves to the T.V. that's why I had to
go ahead with my statement.
Gorbachev So there is no misunderstanding. Now on substance.
I listened very carefully to what Jim has been reading out to me
and I have several questions. The way I understand it, what we
did over the past 24 hours in agreeing with Iraq and what is
submitted to Saddam is not acceptable to participants in the
coalition. I wish to recall once again, exactly what I mean.
And this is how the problem looks and we are awaiting a reply
from Saddam.
(1) Iraq agrees to fully comply with the terms of the U.N.
Resolution in other words to immediately and unconditionally
withdraw all of its troops to their positions prior to August 1.
That is quoted from the U.N. resolution.
The resolution does not mention Kuwait but we incorporated it
into our first point.
(2) The withdrawal of troops is to begin the day following the
ceasefire and cessation of hostilities in the air, sea and
ground.
(3) The withdrawal of troops is to be completed within 21 days --
including Kuwait city within the first four days.
JIm mentioned that it took a short time for Iraq to send in its
troops -- to be true to reality -- he was building that group for
seven months.
Now Iraq first demanded a three-four month period then he said he
would need six weeks but we pressed for a twenty-one day period
and we said if we agreed to that time frame it might still be an
unacceptable condition for the U.S. and the coalition.
(4) After the completion of withdrawals from Kuwait the motives
behind the other U.N. Resolutions will have run their course and
will no longer be necessary.
3
This is not a precondition this is just for the U.N. Security
Council to be seized with the issue and to take appropriate
decisions.
(5) All POWs will be released and repatriated within 3 days of
the cessation of hostilities. This has even tougher language
than your proposal.
(6) Confirmation, verification and monitioring will be carried
out by observers and/or by a peacekeeping force to be decided by
the U.N. Security Council.
I wish to express my initial reaction to what I heard from Jim.
But I must put to you and to myself the following question.
Where does our priority lie in putting a final touch on this
settlement is it a political approach or the continuation of
military operations and the escalation to ground operations.
Now, I saw my role in cooperation with you in trying to find a
political solution, as trying to protect the U.S. servicemen and
peaceful Iraqi civilians from the suffering that may befall them.
If you share this understanding then our task is to find a
solution that is tough but also implementable.
From this point of view the demands that troops be withdrawn in 1
week would be impossible to comply with and would open the way
for continuation of the military course. Now of course it would
be different if you see this political option of settlement as
unacceptable. But if on the basis of what we have been able to
accomplish here, though we are waiting for a reply from Saddam
Hussein, and also on the basis of what you have suggested -- if
we could combine them for the Security Council into a joint U.S.-
Soviet approach. That would be very important solution if we
could do that -- I will pass on to something else.
In the Security Council we could promptly consider the whole
complex of a joint plan based on what the two of us have said --
we would have a joint thing that we could consider in the U.N.
Security Council.
Especially since if we use political language on the need to
withdraw troops from Kuwait city within four days there is a
convergence between us and also on the POWs.
What matters most is that by acting in this way we could show
that as in the first instance, now at the very end we are acting
together and have used all possible means including the first
phase of military activity and now have succeeded in making Iraq
backtrack and comply with the U.N. resolution. This would have
taught a lesson to all others and this will be a new reality that
all potential and likely aggressors would have to reckon with.
Also by acting in this way we would avert the sliding into a
difficult and dangerous phase.
4
I would say that this would be a major victory. The world at
large and Americans would give due course to your actions and
also to our activities. And in light of the steady cooperation
of the the two of us and our other partners this would be
indicative of the current state of our relations. This would
indicate that the two Presidents while remaining true to their
principles never forgot that the highest principle is the
preservation of human life.
If we accept that approach we may not get 100% support but there
is every likelihood we could get 80-90% support. Therefore now
that we have a very good shot at a political solution, I wish
that we could avoid the situation sliding into a difficult phase
and you and I should not squander the opportunity before us. I
think we should not succumb to pressure and grow jittery. I want
to be frank, we are feeling pressure in this country and I know
there is pressure from others -- some would push us toward what
we don't want to do. If we manage to turn events in the
direction I have described, it would be an achievement that would
last for sometime to come.
So much for my line of argument. I am sorry I have been so
emotional and used charged language.
The President. First I have to question. I am correct in saying
that Saddam has not agreed to your six points?
Gorbachev. Tariq Aziz said that he was certain the President
would support the six points but he had to transmit them
personally. This is understandable jsut as Bessmertnykh or Baker
cannot consent without the President.
The President. Do you have a time when he is supposed to come
back to you?
Gorbachev. He said immediately. This reply could come anytime.
Aziz has stayed in Moscow and he is using the lines of
communication we offered him. He has a man in our Embassy in
Baghdad.
The President. Thanks for that clarification. We and those that
I have consulted with and that Jim has consulted and our military
are absolutely convinced he can withdraw in one week. Our
initial proposal was 96 hours. He can get out if he is serious
about it. We think he can get out in one week -- we have a
difference there.
Now on the broad philosophical approach you have outlined for me.
I expect that you have people in your country that suggest you
are too close with the United States. That is particularly true
because of the good relationship with Iraq that you have had over
the years and we understand that. Similarly, we have elements in
this country who suggest we are staying too close to the center
5
in the Soviet Union. We won't depart from that. But we have
elements -- crossing liberal and conservative lines --here who
take a different view than Jim and I do.
In spite of that we continue to make clear that we support your
role and value your role and believe you are making a
contribution. I mean it right from my heart and so does Jim. We
view, and I would be glad to say this publicly, what you have
tried to do as politically courageous given your long
relationship (with Iraq), your standing as a superpower and your
ethnic groups' sentiment.
I don't want to see us pull apart even though we have profound
differences at this moment on this particular question.
Let me tell you what is driving our view. It is not just the
U.S. -- it is a unanimous coalition view. First, I don't trust
Saddam Hussein. Second, what he said yesterday is totally
incompatible with not only what we are asking but what you asked.
He is trying to restore himself in terms of the Arab world to the
prestige of the status quo ante. What he has done and has done
today does not merit that kind of restoration in our view. He
knows that you have been working hard to bring a peaceful
solution here. But what he is trying to do is to wiggle around
and try to find time -- he has made time too short to go back to
some kind of combination approach. I felt strongly about that
after I stayed awake last night thinking about your suggestions
and knowing that you have brought him much further than anyone
could have thought after his speech.
But very candidly, he is taking advantage of this time and, I
think, of your good-faith to destroy Kuwait. Get your people to
show you photographs of what he has done to Kuwait this morning.
About 9:00 this morning, our intelligence people brought me
pictures and showed me the pictures from yesterday and the one
from today and there is the blackest fire covering almost all of
Kuwait you have ever seen in your life. This is the entire city
I mean. And he did it after you were dealing with Tariq Aziz in
good faith. And yesterday he fired a bunch of SCUD missiles
again. So please understand, I have a lot of young soldiers over
there and you and I have talked enough that I hope you know that
I share your values on human life that you so eloquently outlined
to me. But Mikhail do you know the whole time this propaganda
was going on about civilian life -- that we worried about and
didn't target-- do you know up to 200 young people 15-20 years
old were killed and mutilated and the breasts cut off of the
young women. That is the kind of man that we are up against. I
know this is a report of the Emir of Kuwait.
Let me reassure you that I have not changed my view on human
life. I dread sending young men and women into battle and
because of our position -- the forces of the coaltion. And I
know that what I am going to ask will put you in a difficult
position. I would understand it if you simply said "Geroge I
6
cannot do it." I want you to tell Aziz that the hand-writing is
on the wall. It is not just the U.S. -- it is the rest of this
coaltion and that we must have compliance with our proposal now.
This is a serious proposal. He has not responded to your
proposal. We have waited and waited and waited. We have been
patient. We need an answer now. There are deadlines here and
after what he has done in Kuwait -- we cannot yield. This
proposal is deadly serious.
I will send this statement to you instantly and, of course, my
request is that you support our position after trying hard for a
more reasonable position from you point of view but one that for
the reasons I have given, we cannot go along with it now. If you
can't support it, we would appreciate your not opposing it. We
have not lost our senses and know the importance of the Soviet
Union in all of this. Whatever happens in the next few days, I
want to keep all doors open with you and with your country. We
will never change from the view that you have a critically
important role -- it is your neighborhood and some of them are
your friends. We recognize Soviet interests in the area. I want
to get our forces out of there just as soon as possible. I know
how the Iranians and others feel. I want them out as soon as
possible. I want to continue to stay in touch. Please examine
what we have proposed. If you can encourage his adoption of this
that is the best -- and at this point -- only way -- to save the
lives you and I both want to.
That is my appeal. I know you want to think about it. We will
send the proposal on and welcome your views.
Gorbachev. I got it all and I want to make a brief comment or
two.
First, in practice we have the same assessment of Hussein.
I think that his fate has been foreshadowed. Far be it from us
to try to white wash him or try and save him or to raise his
prestige. You and I are compelled to deal with him because on
the other side he is the only realistic figure there.
Second, I am not talking about Hussein or the methods he has
employed over the last few hours -- I am talking about the
possibility of taking advantage of the accomplishments we have
behind us given the burden of the entire operation that rests
with you and the tremendous contributions we have both made. I
am talking about trying to attain the goals we both seek by
turning things in a political direction. By doing so we could
avoid great tragedy -- that is the central point and the main
concern. And that is the main merit of this approach.
Third, you have requested that we relay your demands to Tariz
Aziz and the Iraqi leadership. If you can very rapidly send them
to us, we will convey them to him. We will also describe your
approach and position to him. But my final suggestion is as
follows -- that we tentatively decide:
7
We and you should come out with a joint initiative to convene the
U.N. Security Council meeting in order to consider this package
of demands. There would certainly be a lot of pressure in that
meeting to take advantage and formalize what we get out of that
meeting in a document. It would be a good thing if we got the
best possible results. It would be just as good if we got an
intermediate result that would satisfy both of us. As before we
will continue to give priority to our relationship with the
United States. And of course the responsibility we bear before
the international community and our peoples is to resolve the
conflict and to accomplish the goals we set out before while
avoiding a tragedy.
The President. The problem is we have heard nothing out of
Saddam Hussein. That is essential before we implement this
through the U.N. We have resolutions and a mandate under 678
through the U.N. He is stalling and ducking and sending Jordan
and the PLO and Yemen in to stall and give his side. We have a
mandate and we have to have a positive reply from him. But
having spelled out the U.S. proposal, we cannot hold off. I will
discuss this with Jim and with Scowcroft and others and let you
know my reaction. But this is my first reaction.
Gorbachev. George, we did get a reaction from Hussein and his
agreement to withdraw troops. We don't believe everything is
satisfactory in his position. We made our position tougher. Now
we need to hear from him again.
The President. You have brought him along on delinkage and a
concept of withdrawal but it falls far short of the unconditional
withdrawal called for in the resolution. Let us talk about that
here. Before I hang up I want to make one further point.
Life goes on and I want to assure you we are pushing our people
on the arms control proposals. I wrote you recently on CFE and
naval infantry. I urge your personal attention to that because
no matter what happens here -- common ground there would be very
good. I have not lost my interest in moving forward with START -
- I want to personally assure you of that.
Thank you for the time. I am sorry for what might be difference
but the relationship is too important and it is not going to fall
apart over Iraq.
Gorbachev. Good George. I am saying good by. I want you to
know that I have given instructions to my people to look into the
matter you just mentioned. One more word on Iraq -- we must give
some serious thought to the way the position is developing and
where detail and substance the two positions coincide. Logic
would prompt that we decide in favor of one option -- building on
what we have done to try to avert a tragic turn in the situation.
Best regards to your family.
8
The President. Thank you and to Raisa. We need to do this more
often in these difficult times.
9
COPY
CLASSIFIED FACSIMILE COVERSHEET
SECRET
(CLASSIFICATION)
URGENT
EYES ONly
General Scowcroft
456-2255
NSC
To:
Officer
Office Phone Number
Bureau/Agency
S
From: The Secretary
Officer
Office Phone Number
Office Symbo!
Secure Facsimile Number:
395-1206
Number of Pages Excluding Coversheet:
3
S/S-O Approving Officer:
flo, office NSC
Date/Time of Transmission: 2/19/91
Rennis
way this P
Transmitted By:
is
Remarks: URGENT! EYES ONLY GENERAL SCOWCROFT
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09
Transmit Replies To 202/647-6434 & Alert Recipient Via Telephone
Hander to Societ
Charge by Baker n
SECRET 1-19-91
Dear Mikhail:
I have now had more time to reflect on your letter
reporting on the talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz, and
I want to share my views with you.
My initial reaction noted several basic problems with
your proposal. First, it sets the stage for negotiating the
timing and modalities of a withdrawal, a negotiation contrary
to the clear demand of UNSC Resolution 660 for immediate
withdrawal. I said that anything longer than ninety-six
hours would not meet the test of immediacy. Second, your
proposal does not insist upon Iraqi compliance with all the
relevant UNSC resolutions, as demanded in Resolution 678.
And, third, there is no mention of the exchange of POWs or
release of third country nationals held against their will.
Mikhail, I do appreciate your efforts, but I worry that
perhaps incompleteness and ambiguities in your proposal may
give heart to Saddam Hussein that he can somehow escape the
consequences of his actions and obtain an unclear outcome,
which he can exploit politically. Accordingly, I want to
convey to you amplification of my earlier points.
Specifically:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0855-MR MR
31 8/8/13
- 2 -
-- There can be no ceasefire before a massive Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait begins and no formal
cessation of the overall state of hostilities until
that withdrawal is completed. That withdrawal must
-SECRET
be completed within ninety-six hours. Any other
arrangements would risk the lives of coalition
forces. We will not attack withdrawing Iraqi
troops, but any Iraqi breach of the agreements
respecting withdrawal would bring instant and sharp
response.
-- The exchange of prisoners of war must be completed
within twenty-four hours of the initiation of the
withdrawal.
- Finally, the Iraqis must understand that any use of
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would bring
not only a devastating coalition response, but would
affect the coalition's treatment of Iraq after the
war.
The joint efforts of many nations, including the
Soviet Union, have brought us to the threshold of an historic
rebuff to an aggressor. We must not allow that aggressor now
to salvage political gain or the basis of future aggression
through negotiation or divisive tactics.
Consequently, until all of these conditions are accepted,
coalition military operations will continue as planned.
George Bush
1/19/91 (1030)
gates version
Dear Mikhail:
I have now had more time to reflect on your letter reporting
on the talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz, and I want to
share my views with you.
My initial reaction noted several basic problems with your
proposal. First, it sets the stage for negotiating the timing
and modalities of a withdrawal, a negotiation contrary to the
clear demand of UNSC Resolution 660 for immediate withdrawal. I
said that anything longer than ninety-six hours would not meet
the test of immediacy. Second, your proposal does not insist
upon Iraqi compliance with all the relevant UNSC resolutions, as
demanded in Resolution 678. And, third, there is no mention of
the exchange of POWs or release of third country nationals held
against their will.
Mikhail, I do appreciate your efforts, but I worry that
incompleteness and ambiguities in your proposal may give heart to
Saddam Hussein that he can somehow escape the consequences of his
actions and obtain an unclear outcome, which he can exploit
politically. Accordingly, I want to convey to you amplification
of my earlier points. Specifically:
-- There can be no ceasefire before a massive Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait begins [and no cessation of overall
hostilities until that withdrawal is completed]. That withdrawal
must be completed within ninety-six hours. Any other
arrangements would risk the lives of coalition forces. We will
2
not attack retreating Iraqi troops, but any Iraqi breach of the
conditions would bring instant resumption of hostilities.
-- The exchange of prisoners of war must be completed within
twenty-four hours of the initiation of the withdrawal.
OUT
-- All Iraqi SCUD missile attacks must cease simultaneously
with the beginning of the withdrawal.
-- Finally, the Iraqis must understand that any use of
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would bring not only a
devastating coalition response, but would ensure war crimes
prosecutions once the war is over.
Any Iraqi response must fully accept the conditions I have
described if it is to be satisfactory to the United States and
our coalition partners. Should the Iraqis accept the conditions
I have described, the coalition would be prepared to talk
directly with them regarding their implementation. Until all of
these conditions are accepted, allied military operations will
continue as planned.
The joint efforts of many nations, including the Soviet
Union, have brought us to the threshold of a historic rebuff to
an aggressor. We must not allow that aggressor now to salvage
political gain or the basis of future aggression through
negotiation or divisive tactics.
CLASSIFIED FACSIMILE COVERSHEET
SECRET
(CLASSIFICATION)
URGENT
EYES ONly
To:
General Scowcroft
456-2255
NSC
Gates
Office Phone Number
Bureau/Agency
From: The Secretary
S
Officer
Office Phone Number
Office Symbol
C"
Secure Facsimile Number:
395-1206
Number of Pages Excluding Coversheet:
3
S/S-O Approving Officer: SD More sy
Date/Time of Transmission: 2/19/91
Transmitted By:
BP
Remarks: URGENT! EYES ONLY - GENERAL SCOWCROFT
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 4/14/09
Transmit Replies To 202/647-6434 & Alert Recipient Via Telephone
EYES ONly
SECRET
Dear Mikhail:
I have now had more time to reflect on your letter
reporting on the talks with Iragi Foreign Minister Aziz, and
I want to share my views with you.
My initial reaction noted several basic problems with
your proposal. First, it sets the stage for negotiating the
timing and modalities of a withdrawal, a negotiation contrary
to the clear demand of UNSC Resolution 660 for immediate
withdrawal. I said that anything longer than ninety-six
hours would not meet the test of immediacy. Second, your
proposal does not insist upon Iraqi compliance with all the
relevant UNSC resolutions, as demanded in Resolution 678.
And, third, there is no mention of the exchange of POWs or
release of third country nationals held against their will.
Mikhail, I do appreciate your efforts, but I worry that
perhaps incompleteness and ambiguities in your proposal may
give heart to Saddam Hussein that he can somehow escape the
consequences of his actions and obtain an unclear outcome,
which he can exploit politically. Accordingly, I want to
convey to you amplification of my earlier points.
Specifically:
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0855-MR
3r 8/8/13
- 2 -
-- There can be no ceasefire before a massive Iraqi
deleted bracketten
withdrawal from Kuwait begins and no formal
cessation of the overall state of hostilities until
that withdrawal is completed. That withdrawal must
SECRET
be completed within ninety-six hours. Any other
arrangements would risk the lives of coalition
forces. We will not attack withdrawing Iraqi
troops, but any Iraqi breach of the agreements
respecting withdrawal would bring instant and sharp
response.
-- The exchange of prisoners of war must be completed
within twenty-four hours of the initiation of the
withdrawal.
-- Finally, the Iraqis must understand that any use of
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would bring
not only a devastating coalition response, but would
affect the coalition's treatment of Iraq after the
war.
>next para deleted
The joint efforts of many nations, including the
Soviet Union, have brought us to the threshold of an historic
rebuff to an aggressor. We must not allow that aggressor now
to salvage political gain or the basis of future aggression
through negotiation or divisive tactics.
Consequently, until all of these conditions are accepted,
coalition military operations will continue as planned.
George Bush
Hand delivered
Dear Mr. President:
to Societ Charge
by State 2/18/91
Thank you very much for your report on your meeting with
Tariq Aziz. I appreciate the full briefing and the effort
you are making.
I agree with your emphasis on unconditional withdrawal, the
importance of no linkage of Iraqi withdrawal to any other
issue, and the urgency of an Iraqi response to you. While I
very much want to see the war end, I am also wary of
Saddam's effort to get something for agreeing to withdrawal,
which the international community called for over six months
ago.
In that regard, I worry about your proposal from several
standpoints. First, there seems to be room for Iraq to
negotiate the timeframe for withdrawal. For our part, we
are not willing to negotiate the period for Iraq's getting
out of Kuwait. UNSC Resolution 660 says it must be
"immediate." It took Iraqi forces only a very short time to
get in, and we will not accept any period for withdrawal
that exceeds ninety-six hours. Anything longer than
ninety-six hours wouldn't meet the test of immediacy.
Second, all of us have said many times that all of the
Security Council resolutions that we collectively adopted
should be fully implemented, including obligations relating
to compensation. Your proposal, as I read it, does not
appear to refer to the implementation of any Security
Council resolution that deals with issues other than
withdrawal.
- 2 -
Third, while you mentioned in your letter on the Primakov
visit that POW's were raised with the Iraqis, there is no
mention in your proposal of the exchange of POW's -- or of
the release of third-country nationals being held against
their will (like the CBS camera crew).
Mikhail, let me say more generally that I remain strongly
convinced that we must create the conditions for a very
different kind of Middle East -- one whose peace and
security depend on reconciliation, arms reductions, and the
elimination of weapons of mass destruction. That will not
be possible if Saddam can retain disproportionate military
power and go back to business-as-usual. Our task is to
ensure that the outcome of this war sets the stage for a
more peaceful and secure future in the Middle East.
I know that is a future we both desire. Both the outcome of
this war and its aftermath will determine if we get there.
We will want to consult closely together on the substance
and the process of moving toward that goal. From my
standpoint, I believe we have to be careful not to embrace a
process or format for discussions that creates an impediment
to progress, not a catalyst. While the United Nations
certainly has a role to play, we should think carefully
before embracing the UN as the sole or immediate forum for
discussions of the broad complex of Middle East issues.
- 3 -
With respect to your suggestion about military action, I
must repeat that our military strategy will be shaped by
concerns for the well-being of the coalition's military
forces.
I will be interested to hear from you regarding Iraq's
response. However, I do not intend to engage in any
negotiation, of the principles of the UN resolutions and any
response therefore must fully address the concerns I've
mentioned above if it is to be satisfactory to the United
States. Let me say again that I appreciate your efforts.
Sincerely,
George Bush
His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev,
President of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow.
United States Department of State
The Secretary
2/19/91
NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: JABIII MABILL
This is what we communicated Destrict
to the Soviets last night.
bog the (Nowor)
hospitities stop
fin Memo
3 24/5"
wearny
Hand delivered
Dear Mr. President:
to Societ Charge
by State 2/18/91
Thank you very much for your report on your meeting with
Tariq Aziz. I appreciate the full briefing and the effort
you are making.
I agree with your emphasis on unconditional withdrawal, the
importance of no linkage of Iraqi withdrawal to any other
issue, and the urgency of an Iraqi response to you. While I
very much want to see the war end, I am also wary of
Saddam's effort to get something for agreeing to withdrawal,
which the international community called for over six months
ago.
In that regard, I worry about your proposal from several
standpoints. First, there seems to be room for Iraq to
negotiate the timeframe for withdrawal. For our part, we
are not willing to negotiate the period for Iraq's getting
out of Kuwait. UNSC Resolution 660 says it must be
"immediate." It took Iraqi forces only a very short time to
get in, and we will not accept any period for withdrawal
that exceeds ninety-six hours. Anything longer than
ninety-six hours wouldn't meet the test of immediacy.
Second, all of us have said many times that all of the
Security Council resolutions that we collectively adopted
should be fully implemented, including obligations relating
to compensation. Your proposal, as I read it, does not
appear to refer to the implementation of any Security
Council resolution that deals with issues other than
withdrawal.
- 2 -
Third, while you mentioned in your letter on the Primakov
visit that POW's were raised with the Iraqis, there is no
mention in your proposal of the exchange of POW's -- or of
the release of third-country nationals being held against
their will (like the CBS camera crew).
Mikhail, let me say more generally that I remain strongly
convinced that we must create the conditions for a very
different kind of Middle East -- one whose peace and
security depend on reconciliation, arms reductions, and the
elimination of weapons of mass destruction. That will not
be possible if Saddam can retain disproportionate military
power and go back to business-as-usual. Our task is to
ensure that the outcome of this war sets the stage for a
more peaceful and secure future in the Middle East.
I know that is a future we both desire. Both the outcome of
this war and its aftermath will determine if we get there.
We will want to consult closely together on the substance
and the process of moving toward that goal. From my
standpoint, I believe we have to be careful not to embrace a
process or format for discussions that creates an impediment
to progress, not a catalyst. While the United Nations
certainly has a role to play, we should think carefully
before embracing the UN as the sole or immediate forum for
discussions of the broad complex of Middle East issues.
- 3 -
With respect to your suggestion about military action, I
must repeat that our military strategy will be shaped by
concerns for the well-being of the coalition's military
forces.
I will be interested to hear from you regarding Iraq's
response. However, I do not intend to engage in any
negotiations of the principles of the UN resolutions and any
response therefore must fully address the concerns I've
mentioned above if it is to be satisfactory to the United
States. Let me say again that I appreciate your efforts.
Sincerely,
George Bush
His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev,
President of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow.
22:26
Dear Mikhail:
Retypek P 33D
by see att'st Sociez And 2/18/91 Charge'
by State
Thank you very much for your report on your meeting with
Tariq Aziz. I appreciate the full briefing and the effort
you are making.
I agree with your emphasis on unconditional withdrawal, the
importance of no linkage of Iraqi withdrawal to any other
issue, and the urgency of an Iraqi response to you. While I
very much want to see the war end, I am also wary of
Saddam's effort to get something for agreeing to withdrawal,
which the international community called for over 6 months
ago.
In that regard, I worry about your proposal from several
standpoints. First, there seems to be room for Iraq to
negotiate the timeframe for withdrawal. For our part, we
are not willing to negotiate the period for Iraq's getting
out of Kuwait. UNSC Resolution 660 says it must be
"immediate." It took Iraqi forces only a very short time to
get in, and we will not accept any period for withdrawal
that exceeds ninety-six hours. Anything longer than
ninety-six hours wouldn't meet the test of immediacy.
Second, all of us have said many times that all of the
Security Council resolutions that we collectively adopted
should be fully implemented. Your proposal, as I read it,
does not appear to refer to the implementation of any
Security Council resolution that deals with issues other
than withdrawal.
- 2 -
Third, while you mentioned in your letter on the Primakov
visit that POW's were raised with the Iraqis, there is no
mention in your proposal of the exchange of POW's -- or of
the release of third-country nationals being held against
their will (like the CBS camera crew).
Mikhail, let me say more generally that I remain strongly
convinced that we must create the conditions for a very
different kind of Middle East -- one whose peace and
security depend on reconciliation, arms reductions, and the
elimination of weapons of mass destruction. That will not
be possible if Saddam can retain disproportionate military
power and go back to business-as-usual. Our task is to
ensure that the outcome of this war sets the stage for a
more peaceful and secure future in the Middle East.
I know that is a future we both desire. Both the outcome of
this war and its aftermath will determine if we get there.
We will want to consult closely together on the substance
and the process of moving toward that goal. From my
standpoint, I believe we have to be careful not to embrace a
process or format for discussions that creates an impediment
to progress, not a catalyst. While the U.N. certainly has a
role to play, we should think carefully before embracing the
U.N. as the sole or immediate forum for discussions of the
broad complex of Middle East issues.
- 3 -
With respect to your suggestion about military action, I
must repeat that our military strategy will be shaped by
concerns for the well-being of the coalition's military
forces.
I will be interested to hear from you regarding Iraq's
response. Let me say again that I appreciate your
efforts.
Sincerely,
George Bush
His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev,
President of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow.
(insert) However, I do not intend to engage in any negotiations
of the principles of the UN resolutions and any response,
therefore, must fully address the concerns I have
mentioned above if it is to be satisfactory to the
United States.
03/03/00
20:54
OC/OP/SSD/VIP
P.01
Hand delivered
to Baker 2/18/91
Unofficial translation
Dear Mr. President,
As we agreed, I am informing you on the visit of
Tariq Aziz to Moscow and the results of our talks with
him (he was accompanied by Deputy Premier Hammadi).
After I asked a straightforward question: What is
it that you are bringing with you? - the rather difficult
conversation that lasted about three hours took on a
businesslike nature.
I told them that I consider the statement by the
Revolutionary Command Council as a step toward seeking
a political settlement. But in order to advance this
process, any "linkage" of troops withdrawal with
preconditions should be excluded. I noted in passing
that the statement did not contain the word "Kuwait".
Aziz's reaction was that this, somehow, goes without
saying. But if so, said I, then why this state had not
been mentioned after all?..
In the course of the discussions concerning the
conditions put forward in the statement of the Revolutionary
Command Council, the Iraqis were forced to clarify that
the statement talked not about the terms of a pullout,
but, as it were, about some "program" for a settlement.
I asked a direct question: Could one look upon this
"program" as a "reminder" of the existence of the problems
mentioned, rather than to believe that without their
solution there would be no withdrawal from Kuwait? The
Iraqis' clarifications suggested that the "program" was
designed for a negotiating political process.
DECLASSIFIED
His Excellency
George BUSH
PER E.O. 13526
President of the
2011-0855-MR
United States of America
Washington, D.C.
3r 8/8/13
- 1 -
CLUNE:
03/03/00
20:56
OC/OP/SSD/VIP
P.01
Tariq Aziz said that he was sent here to listen
to recommendations about "how to initiate the peace process
which would result in a worthy and honorable peace".
I proposed this plan:
- Iraq would declare its troops withdrawal from
Kuwait (precisely from Kuwait, and not in general);
- it would announce a specific date for the complete
withdrawal, this time-frame being as short as possible;
- it would begin the actual withdrawal of its troops
on the next day after the termination of hostilities;
- the pullout from Kuwait would not be tied to any
conditions, except one: a guarantee that the troops being
withdrawn would not be attacked, that they would not
be "shot in the back", and that there would be no resumption
of hostilities.
In contrast to our previous contacts with
representatives of the Iraqi leadership, this time our
proposals were not met with "resentful" objections. Our
interlocutors began to ask additional questions as to
whether the Security Council resolutions that imposed
a blockade on Iraq would be rescinded; whether the American
and other troops of the military coalition would stay
in the region following the settlement of the Persian
Gulf conflict; how would the Palestinian issue, the Lebanon
problem and the Middle East problem in general be resolved
in the future; what was the Soviet attitude to the right
of Iraq to assure an appropriate access to the sea; and
what guarantees there were that the Middle East problem
would not again be shelved, etc.
My response was: All those problems pertaining to
the second stage could be raised and discussed after
Iraq had unconditionally withdrawn from Kuwait, after
the war was over. Aziz and Hammadi were told in the
strongest possible terms that attempts to "link", as
does the Revolutionary Command Council statement, the
liberation of Kuwait and the termination of hostilities
- 2 -
03/03/00
20:58
OC/OP/SSD/VIP
P.01
SECRET
with a direct resolution of all or any of those problems
were unacceptable and unrealistic.
I told Aziz that once Iraq began its troops withdrawal,
the Soviet Union would propose convening a special meeting
of the UN Security Council to address the issue of
guarantees of this withdrawal and of non-resumption of
hostilities.
In keeping with its well-known position of principle,
the USSR will also insist on getting the United Nations
to vigorously tackle the whole range of issues involved
in the Middle East settlement, including the establishment
of a regional security system on which there already
exist a number of various projects, including and that
is particularly important those that originate with
Arab states themselves. This process is not an easy one
but there is understanding in the world community that
the conflict in the Middle East should, at last, be resolved
on a just basis, primarily through agreement between
the states of the region and with the help of the United
Nations.
I warned my interlocutors that the time factor was
now of enormous consequence, and that if the lives of
their countrymen and the future of Iraq were dear to
them, they should act fast.
Thus, the nature of these discussions shows that
the Iraqis have not rejected our proposals outright,
but have taken them as a subject for serious consideration.
However, the final response can, of course, be provided
by Iraq only after Aziz has reported the "Gorbachev plan",
as he called it, to President Hussein and all members
of the Iraqi leadership.
I consider it necessary to add that I personally
and all my comrades who were present at the conversation
have formed the impression that both the fact of the
Revolutionary Command Council statement, the
"clarifications" brought by Aziz, and the reaction to
- 3 -
03/03/00
21:01
OC/OP/SSD/VIP
P.01
SECRET
our arguments and proposals are indicative of a beginning
of a certain shift in the understanding of realities
by Hussein and his team.
Aziz promised to send a reply very shortly.
It seems to me that this should be taken into account
in conducting the military operations in the next few
days. Let me note, incidentally, that in various contexts
the Iraqis emphasized that Bagdad had been subjected
to particularly harsh strength precisely at the time
when the personal representative of the USSR President
was staying there.
Practical interests make it desirable that the
substance of this information remain confidential for
the time being.
I will inform you about Hussein's reply in a timely
manner.
Sincerely,
M.GORBACHEV
- 4 -
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
February 14, 1991
TO:
NSC - General Scowcroft
FROM: S/S - Stape Roy Stope
SUBJECT: Translation of Gorbachev Letter
Attached is an EUR/SOV translation of
the Gorbachev letter which the Secretary
asked me to send you on an eyes only
basis.
We will be sending over a proposed
response very shortly.
Attachment:
February 13, 1991 Gorbachev letter
and translation
EUR/SOV Translation
SECRET
Moscow, February 13, 1991
Dear George:
I want to inform you about the results of the trip to
Baghdad of my personal representative, Ye. M. Primakov.
Our representative devoted his meeting with S. Hussein to
the task of convincing the Iraqi leadership to comply with the
resolutions of the Security Council. On our side it was clearly
stated that, in the circumstances that have developed, the
matter can only be dealt with in the following manner: the
leadership of Iraq must announce its readiness to withdraw its
forces from Kuwait and simultaneously specify the period during
which they will be withdrawn. A ceasefire can only take place
after such an announcement. Immediately following the
ceasefire, the withdrawal of Iraqi troops must begin without
fail and without delay. In this regard, it was underscored
that it is necessary to renounce in full the shelling of Israel.
Based on the assessment of our representative, his
discussion with the President of Iraq brought to light several
hopeful points. On this occasion, S. Hussein displayed a more
concrete interest than previously in the conditions that would
have to accompany the withdrawal of forces from Kuwait --
indeed, not denying such a possibility. S. Hussein expressed
himself in favor of a continuation of the dialogue.
We gave our agreement to this. It is envisaged that, to
this end, a special representative of the President of Iraq
will come to Moscow at the end of this week or the beginning of
next week. It will most likely be the Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. Aziz.
It is, of course, difficult to predict the outcome of the
discussions in Moscow. However, if there is even the slightest
chance of emerging with an appropriate political outcome and of
averting further bloodshed, then this chance should be seized.
I think you will agree, in considering the circumstances, that
it would not be desirable to conduct any massive ground
operations, if they are being planned, during the period of the
Moscow talks. For our part we will, of course, not allow this
dialogue to be used by the Iraqis to buy time, if that appears
to be their intention.
We will inform you at once about the results of the talks
with the special representative of the President of Iraq.
I also want to inform you that, in his discussion with
T. Aziz, Ye. M. Primakov raised in a firm manner the question
of captured pilots.
With respect,
M. Gorbachev
DECLASSIFIED
His Excellency
PER E.O. 12958,
Mr. George Bush
President of the United States of America
AS AMENDED
Washington
1999-0304-F/1
SECRET
09/04/2007 MM
SECRET
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явно He отрицая такую возможность. C. Хусейн высказался 3a про-
должение диалога.
Мы дали Ha это согласие. Имеется B виду, что C этой целью
B MocKBy прибудет B конце этой - начале будущей недели специаль-
ный представитель президента Ирака. Им будет, cKopee BceΓo,
заместитель премьер-министра, министр иностранных дел T. Азиз.
Трудно, конечно, предсказать исход бесед B MocKBe. Однако,
если есть хотя бы малейший шанс выйти Ha соответствуюцую поли-
тическую развязку и предствратить TeM самым дальнейшее
Ero Превосходительству
Γ-Hy Джорджу БУШУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Γ. Вашингтон
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
SECRET
1999-0304/F/1
03/03/2010 MM
SECRET
2.
кровопролитие, TO им следует воспользоваться. Думаю, Вы CO мной
согласитесь, что C учетом этих обстоятельств проведение каких-
либо массированных наземных операций, если таковые планируются,
было бы Ha период Московских переговоров нежелательно. Co своей
стороны мы, разумеется, He допустим, чтобы этот диалог был
использован иракцами для выигрыша времени, если y них проявятся
такие намерения.
Мы cpa3y же проинформируем Bac об итогах переговоров CO
специальным представителем президента Ирака.
Хочу также сообщить, что B беседе C T. Азизом E.M. Примаков
B нажимной форме поставил вопрос O пленных летчиках.
C уважением,
ГОРБАЧЕВ
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
07a. Cable
From Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft, Re: Message to
2/15/91
(b)(1)
S
General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [151210Z Feb 91]
[FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM
on 5/27/2016
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0855-MR(506)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 1/23/2014
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
MMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 506 JBRARY
PAGE 01 OF 02
SCOWCROFT, GATES, SDO
PRT: FLORENCE
PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS SECRET
DTG 151210Z FEB 91
FM
1.4(c)
MOSCOW
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
TO WHITE HOUSE
PER E.O. 13526
2011- 0855-MR
1.4(c)
SECRET EYES ONLY
1/23/2014 MM
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
1. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CHERNYAYEV TODAY.
CHERNYAYEV SAID HE WOULD SEND IT TO GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY, BUT
EXPRESSED SOME DISAPPOINTMENT THAT NO COMMITMENT COULD BE MADE
REGARDING GROUND ACTIONS. HE ASKED IF THE PRESIDENT WAS AWARE
THAT THEY WERE NOT ASKING FOR TIME TO "NEGOTIATE" BUT ONLY TO
RECEIVE SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REPLY TO PRIMAKOV'S PROPOSAL. TARIQ
AZIZ, HE SAID, WOULD ARRIVE SUNDAY THE 17TH AND WOULD MEET
GORBACHEV ON MONDAY.
2. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS SURE THE PRESIDENT HAD GIVEN THOUGHTFUL
ATTENTION TO GORBACHEV'S REQUEST, BUT I ALSO WAS SURE THAT THEY
COULD UNDERSTAND THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO ALLOW MILITARY
PLANNING TO BE AFFECTED BY A HOPE. WHICH COULD WELL PROVE TO BE
MISPLACED, THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN IS NOW PREPARED TO DO SOMETHING
WHICH HE HAS REFUSED TO DO FOR OVER SIX MONTHS.
3. CHERNYAYEV THEN ASKED WHAT SORT OF MESSAGE FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN
WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, SUPPOSE HE SAYS HE WILL LEAVE
SECRET
MEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
KUWAIT AND WILL START WITHDRAWING IN TEN DAYS? I TOLD HIM THAT
I COULD NOT ANSWER HIS QUESTION OFFICIALLY BUT WOULD SAY THAT IT
SEEMED HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT WE COULD ACCEPT A MERE PROMISE TO DO
SOMETHING IN THE FUTURE. AS SECRETARY BAKER HAD POINTED OUT TO
CHETVERIKOV WEDNESDAY. THERE MUST BE IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE STEPS.
4. CHERNYAYEV THEN ASKED IF THEY COULD RECEIVE, BEFORE GORBACHEV'S
MEETING WITH AZIZ MONDAY. AN INDICATION FROM US OF WHAT SORT OF ANSWER
FROM THE IRAQI'S WE WOULD FIND ACCEPTABLE. I UNDERTOOK TO RELAY HIS
QUESTIONS, AND CHERNYAYEV SAID HE WOULD SEE ME MONDAY MORNING IF WE
SHOULD HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER TO CONVEY TO GORBACHEV BEFORE HIS
MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ.
5. COMMENT I WOULD APPRECIATE ADVICE ON THE POINT CHERNYAYEV RAISED,
IF YOU CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE TO BE MORE CONCRETE WITH THE SOVIETS.
WARM REGARDS.
JACK MATLOCK
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
=0659
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
07b. Cable
From White House, Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to
2/15/91
(b)(1)
S
Ambassador Matlock from General Scowcroft [150120Z Feb
91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
By MM
on 5/27/2016
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0855-MR(506.01)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 1/23/2014
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 506.01 LIBRARY
PAGE 01 OF 03
PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SIT: NSFEG FILE
1.4(c)
SIT
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<DTG> 150120Z FEB 91
FM WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
1.4(c)
TO
MOSCOW
2011-0855.MR
1/23/2014 MM
S E € R E
1.4(c)
EYES ONLY
0000
DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EYES ONLY IN A SEALED ENVELOPE TO
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MIKHAIL:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER CONCERNING YEVGENY PRIMAKOV'S VISIT TO
BAGHDAD. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE TOGETHER WITH MANY OTHER NATIONS
SOUGHT FOR OVER SIX MONTHS SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS.
I AM APPRECIATIVE OF THE FACT THAT WE CONTINUE TOGETHER TO SEEK
THAT COMPLIANCE. THUS I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU ABOUT
THE RESULTS OF FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.
HOWEVER, WITH RESPECT TO YOUR COMMENT ABOUT GROUND OPERATIONS, I
CANNOT MAKE REPRESENTATIONS OR PROMISES ABOUT CHANGES IN STRATEGY
OR PAUSES OF ANY KIND IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR BASED UPON HOPES
THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL FINALLY DO WHAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY HAS
CALLED ON HIM TO DO FOR OVER SIX MONTHS. WE WOULD BE CONCERNED THAT
SADDAM WILL SEEK A PAUSE NOT TO FACILITATE WITHDRAWAL, BUT TO AVOID
WITHDRAWAL-- INDEED, TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF HIM AND TO BUILD
PRESSURE ON THE COALITION NOT TO RESUME MILITARY ACTION. THUS, THE
TIMING OF A GROUND CAMPAIGN MUST BE SHAPED BY THE DICTATES OF
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 03
MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE SAFETY OF THE COALITION'S MANPOWER.
LET ME ALSO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE TO YOU PERSONALLY
THAT EVERYTHING WE ARE DOING MILITARILY IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH
THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. OUR GOAL. AND ONE I KNOW
YOU SHARE. REMAINS THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT, NOT THE DESTRUCTION OF
IRAQ. INDEED, THE COALITION IS GOING TO EXTRAORDINARY LENGTHS- AT
TIMES, EVEN TO THE POINT OF ENDANGERING COALITION PERSONNEL-- TO
AVOID INJURY TO CIVILIANS AND NON-MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.
INCIDENTALLY, WE HAVE INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE BUNKER
TARGETED ON WEDNESDAY WAS INDEED A PROPER MILITARY TARGET. WE
MOURN THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIFE BUT THE BLAME GOES TO SADDAM
HUSSEIN.
I AM PARTICULARLY APPRECIATIVE THAT MR. PRIMAKOV RAISED WITH
SADDAM HUSSEIN THE MATTER OF OUR CAPTURED PILOTS. AS YOU KNOW,
WE WERE PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO INFORM YOU RECENTLY OF THE RELEASE
OF THREE OF YOUR OFFICERS BY THE EPLF.
JIM BAKER TELLS ME THAT IN A CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT WITH
MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH, HE WAS TOLD THAT YOU ARE MOVING
ENERGETICALLY TO ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS IN MY RECENT LETTER
CONCERNING CFE. THAT IS PARTICULARLY GOOD NEWS BECAUSE WE FEEL
THAT MUCH IS DEPENDENT UPON RESOLVING THESE ISSUES QUICKLY.
THEIR RESOLUTION, I THINK, WOULD DO MUCH TO RESTORE CREDIBILITY
TO THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN US AND WOULD AT LEAST PUT A START
AGREEMENT BACK WITHIN REACH, SOMETHING WE BOTH WANT.
WITH WARM REGARDS AND BEST WISHES,
SINCERELY,
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 03 OF 03
GEORGE BUSH
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV.
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, MOSCOW
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
#0050
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 14, 1991
Dear Mikhail:
Thank you for your letter concerning Yevgeny
Primakov's visit to Baghdad. As you know, we
have together with many other nations sought for
over six months Saddam Hussein's full and
unconditional compliance with the objectives of
the United Nations resolutions. I am
appreciative of the fact that we continue
together to seek that compliance. Thus I will
look forward to hearing from you about the
results of Foreign Minister Aziz's visit to
Moscow.
However, with respect to your comment about
ground operations, I cannot make representations
or promises about changes in strategy or pauses
of any kind in the conduct of the war based upon
hopes that Saddam Hussein will finally do what
the world community has called on him to do for
over six months. We would be concerned that
Saddam will seek a pause not to facilitate
withdrawal, but to avoid withdrawal--indeed, to
take the pressure off him and to build pressure
on the coalition not to resume military action.
Thus, the timing of a ground campaign must be
shaped by the dictates of military strategy and
the safety of the coalition's manpower.
Let me also use this opportunity to reiterate to
you personally that everything we are doing
militarily is fully consistent with the
resolutions of the Security Council. Our goal,
and one I know you share, remains the liberation
of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq. Indeed,
the coalition is going to extraordinary lengths
--at times, even to the point of endangering
coalition personnel to avoid injury to
civilians and non-military installations.
2
Incidentally, we have incontrovertible evidence
that the bunker targeted on Wednesday was indeed
a proper military target. We mourn the loss of
innocent life but the blame goes to Saddam
Hussein.
I am particularly appreciative that Mr. Primakov
raised with Saddam Hussein the matter of our
captured pilots. As you know, we were pleased
to be able to inform you recently of the release
of three of your officers by the EPLF.
Jim Baker tells me that in a conversation last
night with Minister Bessmertnykh, he was told
that you are moving energetically to address the
questions in my recent letter concerning CFE.
That is particularly good news because we feel
that much is dependent upon resolving these
issues quickly. Their resolution, I think,
would do much to restore credibility to the
dialogue between us and would at least put a
START agreement back within reach, something we
both want.
With warm regards and best wishes,
Sincerely,
Got
His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev,
President of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
07d. Memo
Richard N. Haass/Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft
2/14/91
(b)(1)
TS
Re: Response to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
LIMITED ACCESS
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WITHOUT SPECIFIC
PERMISSION
WASHINGTON
1152
2-14-91
DOWNGRADED FROM
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
TOP SECRET TO SECRET
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
1999-0304-F/1
FROM:
05/10/2001 JGP
SUBJECT:
Response to President Gorbachev
Purpose
To respond to President Gorbachev's letter on the Gulf.
Background
You have received a letter from President Gorbachev reporting on
the meetings of Yevgenyi Primakov in Baghdad. The letter states
that Saddam did not reject a sequence in which there would be a
ceasefire in response to an announcement of Iraq's intention to
withdraw on an unspecified timetable. Tariq Aziz will visit
Moscow at the end of this week or early next week to continue
these discussions. Gorbachev asks the coalition to delay ground
action at least until the Soviet talks with Tariq Aziz in Moscow
are completed. He also notes that Primakov raised the issue of
the treatment of captured coalition pilots.
Your response thanks Gorbachev for his efforts to convince Saddam
to comply with the resolutions but notes that the timing of the
ground campaign must be determined by military factors. It also
reiterates the theme that our actions fall within the mandate of
the Security Council resolutions.
Lastly, your letter thanks him for Soviet efforts on behalf of
our pilots and anticipates his response to your recent message on
CFE.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter to President Gorbachev at Tab A.
Attachments
Tab A
Response to President Gorbachev
Tab B
Letter from President Gorbachev
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
TOP SECRET
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1 03/03/2010 MM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 14, 1991
Dear Mikhail:
Thank you for your letter concerning Yevgeny
Primakov's visit to Baghdad. As you know, we
have together with many other nations sought for
over six months Saddam Hussein's full and
unconditional compliance with the objectives of
the United Nations resolutions. I am
appreciative of the fact that we continue
together to seek that compliance. Thus I will
look forward to hearing from you about the
results of Foreign Minister Aziz's visit to
Moscow.
However, with respect to your comment about
ground operations, I cannot make representations
or promises about changes in strategy or pauses
of any kind in the conduct of the war based upon
hopes that Saddam Hussein will finally do what
the world community has called on him to do for
over six months. We would be concerned that
Saddam will seek a pause not to facilitate
withdrawal, but to avoid withdrawal--indeed, to
take the pressure off him and to build pressure
on the coalition not to resume military action.
Thus, the timing of a ground campaign must be
shaped by the dictates of military strategy and
the safety of the coalition's manpower.
Let me also use this opportunity to reiterate to
you personally that everything we are doing
militarily is fully consistent with the
resolutions of the Security Council. Our goal,
and one I know you share, remains the liberation
of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq. Indeed,
the coalition is going to extraordinary lengths
--at times, even to the point of endangering
coalition personnel--to avoid injury to
civilians and non-military installations.
2
Incidentally, we have incontrovertible evidence
that the bunker targeted on Wednesday was indeed
a proper military target. We mourn the loss of
innocent life but the blame goes to Saddam
Hussein.
I am particularly appreciative that Mr. Primakov
raised with Saddam Hussein the matter of our
captured pilots. As you know, we were pleased
to be able to inform you recently of the release
of three of your officers by the EPLF.
Jim Baker tells me that in a conversation last
night with Minister Bessmertnykh, he was told
that you are moving energetically to address the
questions in my recent letter concerning CFE.
That is particularly good news because we feel
that much is dependent upon resolving these
issues quickly. Their resolution, I think,
would do much to restore credibility to the
dialogue between us and would at least put a
START agreement back within reach, something we
both want.
With warm regards and best wishes,
Sincerely,
Got
His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev,
President of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow
EUR/SOV Translation
SECRET
Moscow, February 13, 1991
Dear George:
I want to inform you about the results of the trip to
Baghdad of my personal representative, Ye. M. Primakov.
Our representative devoted his meeting with S. Hussein to
the task of convincing the Iraqi leadership to comply with the
resolutions of the Security Council. On our side it was clearly
stated that, in the circumstances that have developed, the
matter can only be dealt with in the following manner: the
leadership of Iraq must announce its readiness to withdraw its
forces from Kuwait and simultaneously specify the period during
which they will be withdrawn. A ceasefire can only take place
after such an announcement. Immediately following the
ceasefire, the withdrawal of Iraqi troops must begin without
fail and without delay. In this regard, it was underscored
that it is necessary to renounce in full the shelling of Israel.
Based on the assessment of our representative, his
discussion with the President of Iraq brought to light several
hopeful points. On this occasion, S. Hussein displayed a more
concrete interest than previously in the conditions that would
have to accompany the withdrawal of forces from Kuwait --
indeed, not denying such a possibility. S. Hussein expressed
himself in favor of a continuation of the dialogue.
We gave our agreement to this. It is envisaged that, to
this end, a special representative of the President of Iraq
will come to Moscow at the end of this week or the beginning of
next week. It will most likely be the Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. Aziz.
It is, of course, difficult to predict the outcome of the
discussions in Moscow. However, if there is even the slightest
chance of emerging with an appropriate political outcome and of
averting further bloodshed, then this chance should be seized.
I think you will agree, in considering the circumstances, that
it would not be desirable to conduct any massive ground
operations, if they are being planned, during the period of the
Moscow talks. For our part we will, of course, not allow this
dialogue to be used by the Iraqis to buy time, if that appears
to be their intention.
We will inform you at once about the results of the talks
with the special representative of the President of Iraq.
I also want to inform you that, in his discussion with
T. Aziz, Ye. M. Primakov raised in a firm manner the question
of captured pilots.
With respect,
M. Gorbachev
His Excellency
Mr. George Bush
DECLASSIFIED
President of the United States of America
PER E.O. 12958,
Washington
SECRET
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
09/04/2007 MM
SECRET
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
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уважением,
FORMALLE
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 14, 1991
Dear Mikhail:
Thank you for your letter concerning Yevgeny
Primakov's visit to Baghdad. As you know, we
have together with many other nations sought for
over six months Saddam Hussein's full and
unconditional compliance with the objectives of
the United Nations resolutions. I am
appreciative of the fact that we continue
together to seek that compliance. Thus I will
look forward to hearing from you about the
results of Foreign Minister Aziz's visit to
Moscow.
However, with respect to your comment about
ground operations, I cannot make representations
or promises about changes in strategy or pauses
of any kind in the conduct of the war based upon
hopes that Saddam Hussein will finally do what
the world community has called on him to do for
over six months. We would be concerned that
Saddam will seek a pause not to facilitate
withdrawal, but to avoid withdrawal--indeed, to
take the pressure off him and to build pressure
on the coalition not to resume military action.
Thus, the timing of a ground campaign must be
shaped by the dictates of military strategy and
the safety of the coalition's manpower.
Let me also use this opportunity to reiterate to
you personally that everything we are doing
militarily is fully consistent with the
resolutions of the Security Council. Our goal,
and one I know you share, remains the liberation
of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq. Indeed,
the coalition is going to extraordinary lengths
--at times, even to the point of endangering
coalition personnel--to avoid injury to
civilians and non-military installations.
2
Incidentally, we have incontrovertible evidence
that the bunker targeted on Wednesday was indeed
a proper military target. We mourn the loss of
innocent life but the blame goes to Saddam
Hussein.
I am particularly appreciative that Mr. Primakov
raised with Saddam Hussein the matter of our
captured pilots. As you know, we were pleased
to be able to inform you recently of the release
of three of your officers by the EPLF.
Jim Baker tells me that in a conversation last
night with Minister Bessmertnykh, he was told
that you are moving energetically to address the
questions in my recent letter concerning CFE.
That is particularly good news because we feel
that much is dependent upon resolving these
issues quickly. Their resolution, I think,
would do much to restore credibility to the
dialogue between us and would at least put a
START agreement back within reach, something we
both want.
With warm regards and best wishes,
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev,
President of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
WHSR
TRansmit axch'd
tonight
PRIVACY CHANEL PRIVACY CHANNEL
EYES ONLY- Brokshound
Deliver in sealed
enexlope EO to
Amh Mothock
Return our to me
toniGHT.
74
DP
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mikhail:
Thank you for your letter concerning Yevgeny
Primakov's visit to Baghdad. As you know, we
have together with many other nations sought for
over six months Saddam Hussein's full and
unconditional compliance with the objectives of
the United Nations resolutions. I am
appreciative of the fact that we continue
together to seek that compliance. Thus I will
look forward to hearing from you about the
results of Foreign Minister Aziz's visit to
Moscow.
However, with respect to your comment about
ground operations, I cannot make representations
or promises about changes in strategy or pauses
of any kind in the conduct of the war based upon
hopes that Saddam Hussein will finally do what
the world community has called on him to do for
over six months. We would be concerned that
Saddam will seek a pause not to facilitate
withdrawal, but to avoid withdrawal--indeed, to
take the pressure off him and to build pressure
on the coalition not to resume military action.
Thus, the timing of a ground campaign must be
shaped by the dictates of military strategy and
the safety of the coalition's manpower.
Let me also use this opportunity to reiterate to
you personally that everything we are doing
militarily is fully consistent with the
resolutions of the Security Council. Our goal,
and one I know you share, remains the liberation
of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq. Indeed,
the coalition is going to extraordinary lengths
--at times, even to the point of endangering
coalition personnel--to avoid injury to
civilians and non-military installations.
2
Incidentally, we have incontrovertible evidence
that the bunker targeted on Wednesday was indeed
a proper military target. We mourn the loss of
innocent life but the blame goes to Saddam
Hussein.
I am particularly appreciative that Mr. Primakov
raised with Saddam Hussein the matter of our
captured pilots. As you know, we were pleased
to be able to inform you recently of the release
of three of your officers by the EPLF.
Jim Baker tells me that in a conversation last
night with Minister Bessmertnykh, he was told
that you are moving energetically to address the
questions in my recent letter concerning CFE.
That is particularly good news because we feel
that much is dependent upon resolving these
issues quickly. Their resolution, I think,
would do much to restore credibility to the
dialogue between us and would at least put a
START agreement back within reach, something we
both want.
With warm regards and best wishes,
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev,
President of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
08. Cable
Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA
2/11/91
(b)(1)
S
EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM
on 2/17/2015
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0856-MR(507)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 12/17/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
<DIST>
PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<OSRI>
(b)(1)
<DTG> 111302Z FEB 91
(b)(1)
<TO>TO THE WHITE HOUSE
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 507 JERARY
<TEXT>ZEM
S ECRET 111302Z FEB 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS
PLEASE PASS TO BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE WHITE HOUSE
O 111250Z FEB 91 ZYH ZFF-1/4
FM (b)(1) MOSCOW
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
ZEM
SECRETEYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
I CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CHERNYAYEV TODAY.
AFTER SUMMARIZING THE MAIN POINTS, I ADDED THAT WHEN THE SUBJECT
WAS MENTIONED BRIEFLY DURING MY MEETING WITH GORBACHEV I HAD
THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD NOT FOCUSED ON IT. IF THAT WAS THE
CASE, THEN IT IS CLEARLY NECESSARY FOR HIM TO DO so.
CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT BESSMERTNYKH HAD REPORTED ON HIS
CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND THAT GORBACHEV HAD FORMED A
GROUP TO STUDY THE MATTER URGENTLY AND REPORT BACK TO HIM.
CHERNYAYEV HIMSELF IS A MEMBER OF THAT GROUP. WHEN THE GROUP
REPORTS, GORBACHEV WILL BE ABLE TO REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER.
I POINTED OUT THAT THE FEBRUARY 17 DEADLINE IS FAST
APPROACHING AND IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO BRING THE
SOVIET POSITION IN LINE WITH THE TREATY BY THEN. CHERNYAYEV
SAID THAT THE GROUP WOULD FINISH ITS WORK "SOON." AT ONE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
POINT, WHEN I SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION SEEMED TO BE ACTING
PER E.O. 13526
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISION OF THE TREATY, CHERNYAYEV SAID,
2011-0856-MR
"NOT THE SOVIET UNION - JUST SOME SOVIET GENERALS.'
12/17/2013 MM
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
#0574
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0574 <TOR> 910211082555 MSG000287569555
<DIST>
SIT: WHSR DUP PRIVACY_IN
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<OSRI>
(b)(1)
<DTG> 101255Z FEB 91
<ORIG>FM (b)(1) MOSCOW
<TO>TO THE WHITE HOUSE
<TEXT>ZEM
S ECRET 101255Z FEB 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
EYES ONLY FROM JACK MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
BRENT:
WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RAISE ANYONE AT CHERNAYEV'S OFFICE TODAY
(FEBRUARY 10), TO ARRANGE FOR DELIVERY OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER
TO GORBACHEV ON CFE. WE WILL WORK TO DELIVER IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
ON MONDAY.
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
#0547
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0547 <TOR> 910210084558 MSG000287484357
<DIST>
SIT: PRES MSGS WILSONH
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<OSRI> RUEHC <DTG> 130246Z FEB 91
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC
<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUFHMB/USMISSION USVIENNA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHGV/USDEL NST GENEVA PRIORITY 0000
<SUBJ> CFE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT
-
GORBACHEV
<TEXT>BT
SECRET STATE 046712
NODIS
USVIENNA FOR CFE-WOOLSEY ONLY; NST GENEVA FOR BURT ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OPDC, UR, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CFE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT
-
GORBACHEV
1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PARAGRAPH 3 CONTAINS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT
BUSH TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV CONCERNING CFE. EMBASSY IS
REQUESTED TO DELIVER ASAP. THE SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL
FOLLOW BY POUCH. NOTE: IN THE PARAGRAPH BEGINNING WITH
THE PHRASE "LET ME EMPHASIZE " THE WORD "BEFORE" IN
THE LAST SENTENCE OF THIS PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE UNDERLINED.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
FEBRUARY 9, 1991
DEAR MIKHAIL:
JIM BAKER AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR
DISCUSSIONS ABOUT CFE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH
DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. I WANTED TO
WRITE YOU PERSONALLY WITH MY VIEWS.
I MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED
BY WHAT JIM BAKER AND I HEARD FROM FOREIGN MINISTER
BESSMERTNYKH. HE REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES
TO 1NS1ST THAT GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT HELD BY CERTAIN
UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY, COASTAL DEFENSE, AND
STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE LIMITS OF
THE CFE TREATY. ON THAT BASIS, HE WANTED TO EXPLORE
POSSIBLE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD ALLOW THE EXCLUSIONS
CLAIMED BY THE SOVIET UNION. JIM TOLD HIM WE SIMPLY
CANNOT DO THAT.
I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME TO THE
CONCLUSION THAT EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THAT HELD BY NAVAL
INFANTRY IS EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. NONE OF THE TWENTY-
ONE OTHER SIGNATORIES SHARES THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION
IN PART BECAUSE BOTH THE TREATY TEXT AND THE NEGOTIATING
RECORD ARE so CLEAR ABOUT WHAT IS COVERED BY AND EXCLUDED
FROM CFE LIMITS. THUS, ALL OF THE SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT
THE SOVIET UNION--UNDERSTAND THAT ARTICLE III OF THE CFE
TREATY APPLIES TO THE KINDS OF UNITS AND EQUIPMENT THAT
THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES TO EXCLUDE. AND, ACCORDINGLY, ALL
OF THE SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--HAVE
REPORTED ALL SUCH EQUIPMENT THEY HOLD so THAT IT WOULD BE
DECLASSIFIED
SUBJECT TO CFE TREATY LIMITS.
PER E.O. 13526
I MUST TELL YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT ANY
APPROACH THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A REDEFINITION OF THE
2011-0856-MR
ES 6/6/13
OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS THAT ALL THE PARTIES ASSUMED
WHEN THEY SIGNED THE CFE TREATY. I BELIEVE THAT THE
OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES HOLD A SIMILAR POSITION.
LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER SIGNATORY SEEKING UNILATERAL
ADVANTAGE NOR OF TRYING TO EXPLOIT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES.
I HOPE THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER IN WHICH WE ADDRESSED
SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT, WHICH
REQUIRED US TO REOPEN AN AGREEMENT REACHED BY OUR FOREIGN
MINISTERS IN NEW YORK WOULD PUT ANY SUCH SUSPICIONS TO
REST. WE DID THAT EVEN THOUGH OUR ALLIES WERE NEITHER
EASY TO CONVINCE NOR PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH OUR ASKING
THEM TO GO ALONG WITH A REVISED APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS,
IN THAT CASE WE WERE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS A
PROBLEM PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS RAISED BEFORE THE TREATY
WAS SIGNED. INDEED I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET
UNION DID NOT STATE ITS POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF
UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY WHEN IT HAD EVERY
OPPORTUNITY TO DO so BEFORE THE CFE TREATY WAS SIGNED,
PARTICULARLY WHEN IT SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED FOR OTHER
EXCLUSIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.
I ASO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THE SOVIET
UNION TO MAKE LARGE AND ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO REACH
THE EQUAL CEILINGS THAT WERE AGREED, AND I DO NOT
UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU MAY FACE IN MEETING
THESE COMMITMENTS. YET I CANNOT AGREE TO REWRITE THE CFE
AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT, MUCH LESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD
CHANGE THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE SIGNATORIES UNDERTOOK.
THIS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT DETERMINES HOW MUCH
CONFIDENCE WE CAN PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND COMMITMENTS
THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY. BASICALLY, MIKHAIL
IT IS A MATTER OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. THAT IS WHY I
WILL NOT SUBMIT THE CFE TREATY TO THE U.S. SENATE FOR
RATIFICATION UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECTIFIED THIS
SITUATION. FRANKLY, I CANNOT DO so AND STILL HOFE TO
ACHIEVE RATIFICATION.
YOU AND I HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT THE CFE TREATY IS ONE OF
THE PRINCIPAL PILLARS OF THE NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE IN
EUROPE THAT WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD. IT SYMBOLIZES THE
END OF A GENERATION OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND
COMPETITION AND THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION.
ALL OF THAT COULD BE PUT IN JEOPARDY, HOWEVER, IF WE ARE
UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE OR ADDRESS
SATISFACTORILY DATA DISCREPANCIES AND THE LESS PRESSING
ISSUE OF THE LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
EAST O THE URALS. THE TREATY-MANDATED PERIOD FOR
CORRECTING CFE DATA ENDS ON FEBRUARY 17. I HOPE WE CAN
PUT THESE MATTERS BEHIND US BY THAT TIME.
I AM CONVEYING MY CONCERNS IN THIS DIRECT AND FORTHRIGHT
MANNER BECAUSE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE. WE STAND AT A
CROSSROADS NOT JUST FOR CFE BUT FOR THE ENTIRE ARMS
CONTROL PROCESS. WE EITHER CAN MOVE FORWARD WITH
AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, OR SEE OUR LONG AND HARD EFFORTS
STALL. I KNOW NEITHER OF US WANTS THAT. I URGE YOU TO
HELP US MOVE DOWN THE RIGHT PATH.
SINCERELY,
/S/
GEORGE BUSH
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
END TEXT. BAKER
BT
#6712
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 6712 <TOR> 910213093541 MSG000287746541
TOP SECRET
RECORD ID: 9100944
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 06 FEB 91 16
TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
FROM: PRESIDENT
DOC DATE: 09 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: USSR
ARMS CONTROL
CFE
TREATIES
LIMITED ACCESS
PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
SUBJECT: LTR FM PRES TO GORBACHEV RE CFE
ACTION: FOR DISPATCH
DUE DATE: 09 FEB 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: STATE
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
STATE
GORDON
KANTER
NSC CHRON
RICE
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY IRM
DATE 2/11
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSEF
CLOSED BY: NSGLM
DOC 3 OF 3
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET.
RECORD ID: 9100944
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001
Z 91020810 PRES APPROVED LTR
001
X 91020810 CABLE SENT VIA WH SIT ROOM
001 SITTMANN
Z 91021110 FOR SIGNATURE
002 PRESIDENT
Z 91021110 FOR SIGNATURE
003
X 91020918 PRES SGD LTR
003 STATE
X 91021118 FOR DISPATCH
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
February 11, 1991
MR. PRESIDENT:
I understand you approved
this letter to be cabled
on Saturday. This original
will follow.
Thank you.
Print
Phillip D. Brady
FAX'd to Pres
@ Camp David
2/8/91
6:24 p.m.
Limi ted ACCESS
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 0944
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG for A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
of Bill Sittmann
I
w
Review
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat
y
91 FEBII P4: 01 P4:01
2
JAM 2/11 X
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
Date 2/11/20
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
2/9/91
LIMITED ACCESS
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 0944
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
/
Ken Hill
H
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
91 FEB A10 35
31FEB 7
2
A. 2/11
DN
NSC Secretariat
B A= Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9100944
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
DATE 09 FEB 91
SUBJECT: LTR FM PRES TO GORBACHEV RE CFE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
ROY, J
2/11/91
11:04
CAbalmes
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
COPY: 1
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9100944
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
DATE 09 FEB 91
SUBJECT: LTR FM PRES TO GORBACHEV RE CFE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
ROY, J
2/11/91
11:04
CAtalmes
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
COPY: 1
2201 C STREET, NW
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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
TOP SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ID 9100944
REFERRAL
DATE: 11 FEB 91
MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J
STATE SECRETARIAT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
SOURCE: PRESIDENT
DATE: 09 FEB 91
SUBJ: LTR FM PRES TO GORBACHEV RE CFE
REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH
DUEDATE: 11 FEB 91
COMMENT:
DR
Magridy
FOR
GEORGE VAN ERON
DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 9, 1991
Dear Mikhail:
Jim Baker and I have reviewed the results of our
discussions about CFE with Foreign Minister
Bessmertnykh during his visit to Washington last
week. I wanted to write you personally with my
views.
I must tell you in all candor that I am deeply
troubled by what Jim Baker and I heard from
Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. He reported that
the Soviet side continues to insist that ground
force equipment held by certain units such as
naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic
rocket forces is not subject to the limits of
the CFE Treaty. On that basis, he wanted to
explore possible compromises that would allow
the exclusions claimed by the Soviet Union.
Jim told him we simply cannot do that.
I do not understand how the Soviet Union has
come to the conclusion that equipment such as
that held by naval infantry is excluded from CFE
limits. None of the twenty-one other
signatories shares the Soviet interpretation, in
part because both the treaty text and the
negotiating record are so clear about what is
covered by and excluded from CFE limits. Thus,
all of the signatories- except the Soviet Union--
understand that Article III of the CFE Treaty
applies to the kinds of units and equipment that
the Soviet side wishes to exclude. And,
accordingly, all of the signatories--except the
Soviet Union--have reported all such equipment
they hold so that it would be subject to CFE
Treaty limits.
2
I must tell you that the United States cannot
accept any approach that would amount to a
redefinition of the obligations and commitments
that all the parties assumed when they signed
the CFE Treaty. I believe that the other twenty
signatories hold a similar position.
Let me emphasize that this is not a question of
the United States or any other signatory seeking
unilateral advantage nor of trying to exploit
Soviet difficulties. I hope that the
constructive manner in which we addressed Soviet
concerns about the Kiev military district, which
required us to reopen an agreement reached by
our foreign ministers in New York, would put any
such suspicions to rest. We did that even
though our allies were neither easy to convince
nor particularly pleased with our asking them to
go along with a revised approach. Nevertheless,
in that case, we were able to work together to
address a problem precisely because it was
raised before the treaty was signed. Indeed, I
cannot understand why the Soviet Union did not
state its position on the treatment of units
such as naval infantry when it had every
opportunity to do so before the CFE Treaty was
signed, particularly when it successfully argued
for other exclusions during the negotiations.
I also recognize that the CFE Treaty requires
the Soviet Union to make large and asymmetrical
reductions to reach the equal ceilings that were
agreed, and I do not underestimate the
difficulties you may face in meeting these
commitments. Yet I cannot agree to rewrite the
CFE agreement after the fact, much less in a way
that would change the obligations that the
signatories undertook. This is a matter of
principle that determines how much confidence we
can place in negotiations and commitments that
directly affect our security. Basically,
Mikhail, it is a matter of trust and
credibility. That is why I will not submit the
CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification
until the Soviet Union has rectified this
situation. Frankly, I cannot do so and still
hope to achieve ratification.
3
You and I have often said that the CFE Treaty is
one of the principal pillars of the new security
structure in Europe that we are trying to build.
It symbolizes the end of a generation of
military confrontation and competition and the
beginning of a new era of cooperation. All of
that could be put in jeopardy, however, if we
are unable to resolve the naval infantry issue
or address satisfactorily data discrepancies and
the less pressing issue of the large-scale
movement of military equipment east of the
Urals. The treaty-mandated period for
correcting CFE data ends on February 17. I hope
we can put these matters behind us by that time.
I am conveying my concerns in this direct and
forthright manner because of what is at stake.
We stand at a crossroads, not just for CFE but
for the entire arms control process. We either
can move forward with agreements that enhance
our mutual security and international stability,
or see our long and hard efforts stall. I know
neither of us wants that. I urge you to help us
move down the right path.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
10b. Cable
From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev
2/9/91
(b)(1)
S
[091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED]
(4 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM
on 6/1/2016
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0856-MR(511)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 9/22/2014
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
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financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
MMEDIATE
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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PRT COMM OLEARY SIGLER
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DTG, 091910Z FEB 91
FM WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
1.4(c)
TO
MOSCOW
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0856-MR
9/22/2014 MM
SECRET
EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
SECTION 01 OF 02
PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK EYES ONLY
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV. IF UNAVAILABLE, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK MAY DELIVER TO
CHERNAYEV.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MIKHAIL:
JIM BAKER AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT
CFE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH DURING HIS VISIT TO
WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. I WANTED TO WRITE YOU PERSONALLY WITH MY
VIEWS.
I MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED BY WHAT
JIM BAKER AND I HEARD FROM FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH. HE
REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT GROUND
FORCE EQUIPMENT HELD BY CERTAIN UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY.
COASTAL DEFENSE. AND STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
LIMITS OF THE CFE TREATY. ON THAT BASIS, HE WANTED TO EXPLORE
SECRET
MMED!ATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 04
POSSIBLE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD ALLOW THE EXCLUSIONS CLAIMED BY
THE SOVIET UNION. JIM TOLD HIM WE SIMPLY CANNOT DO THAT
I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME TO THE
CONCLUSION THAT EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THAT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY IS
EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. NONE OF THE TWENTY-ONE OTHER
SIGNATORIES SHARES THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION IN PART BECAUSE BOTH
THE TREATY TEXT AND THE NEGOTIATING RECORD ARE SO CLEAR ABOUT WHAT
IS COVERED BY AND EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. THUS, ALL OF THE
SIGNATORIES-- EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION- UNDERSTAND THAT ARTICLE 111
OF THE CFE TREATY APPLIES TO THE KINDS OF UNITS AND EQUIPMENT THAT
THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES TO EXCLUDE. AND, ACCORDINGLY, ALL OF THE
SIGNATORIES- EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION- HAVE REPORTED ALL SUCH
EQUIPMENT THEY HOLD SO THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CFE TREATY
LIMITS.
I MUST TELL YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT ANY APPROACH
THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A REDEFINITION OF THE OBLIGATIONS AND
COMMITMENTS THAT ALL THE PARTIES ASSUMED WHEN THEY SIGNED THE CFE
TREATY. I BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES HOLD A SIMLIAR
POSITION.
LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OR ANY OTHER SIGNATORY SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE NOR OF TRYING
TO EXPLOIT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES. I HOPE THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE
MANNER IN WHICH WE ADDRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIEV
MILITARY DISTRICT, WHICH REQUIRED US TO REOPEN AN AGREEMENT
REACHED BY OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK, WOULD PUT ANY SUCH
SUSPICIONS TO REST. WE DID THAT EVEN THOUGH OUR ALLIES WERE
NEITHER EASY TO CONVINCE NOR PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH OUR ASKING
THEM TO GO ALONG WITH A REVISED APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, IN THAT
CASE. WE WERE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS A PROBLEM
PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS RAISED BEFORE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED.
INDEED, I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT STATE
ITS POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 03 OF 04
WHEN IT HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO BEFORE THE CFE TREATY WAS
SIGNED PARTICULARLY WHEN IT SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED FOR OTHER
EXCLUSIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.
I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THE SOVIET UNION
TO MAKE LARGE AND ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE EQUAL
CEILINGS THAT WERE AGREED. AND I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE
DIFFICULTIES YOU MAY FACE IN MEETING THESE COMMITMENTS. YET I
CANNOT AGREE TO REWRITE THE CFE AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT, MUCH
LESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD CHANGE THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE
SIGNATORIES UNDERTOOK. THIS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT
DETERMINES HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE WE CAN PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND
COMMITMENTS THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY. BASICALLY,
MIKHAIL. IT IS A MATTER OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. THAT IS WHY I
WILL NOT SUBMIT THE CFE TREATY TO THE U.S. SENATE FOR
RATIFICATION UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECTIFIED THIS SITUATION.
FRANKLY. I CANNOT DO SO AND STILL HOPE TO ACHIEVE RATIFICATION.
YOU AND I HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT THE CFE TREATY IS ONE OF THE
PRINCIPAL PILLARS OF THE NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE THAT
WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD. IT SYMBOLIZES THE END OF A GENERATION
OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND COMPETITION AND THE BEGINNING OF
A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION. ALL OF THAT COULD BE PUT IN
JEOPARDY, HOWEVER. IF WE ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL
INFANTRY ISSUE OR ADDRESS SATISFACTORILY DATA DISCREPANCIES AND
THE LESS PRESSING ISSUE OF THE LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS. THE TREATY-MANDATED PERIOD FOR
CORRECTING CFE DATA ENDS ON FEBRUARY 17. I HOPE WE CAN PUT
THESE MATTERS BEHIND US BY THAT TIME.
I AM CONVEYING MY CONCERNS IN THIS DIRECT AND FORTHRIGHT MANNER
BECAUSE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE. WE STAND AT A CROSSROADS. NOT
JUST FOR CFE BUT FOR THE ENTIRE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. WE
EITHER CAN MOVE FORWARD WITH AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, OR SEE OUR LONG AND HARD
EFFORTS STALL. I KNOW NEITHER OF US WANTS THAT. I URGE YOU TO
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 04 OF 04
HELP US MOVE DOWN THE RIGHT PATH
SINCERELY.
GEORGE BUSH
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
=0012
ZEM
SECRET
EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
FINAL SECTION OF 02
MOSCOW
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
#0013
SECRET
FYI: A letter to Gorbachev was faxed to the President on Friday nite. He
approved the letter - therefore a cable was sent out from him over the weekend.
The original letter came down from Florence this AM - she said we need to check
the cable to see how it was signed (Lonnie said he would do that) along with
giving to Brady's office for the President to sign the original letter or have
it signed on the machine.
I will doublecheck with Fran to make sure she is aware of this.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
0944
LIMITED ACCESS
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
WASHINGTON
91
FEB
11
AM 10:
31
February 8, 1991
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
Letter to Gorbachev on CFE
Purpose
To send a personal letter from you to President Gorbachev urging
him to take the steps necessary to resolve a serious problem with
the CFE Treaty. Unless resolved, we will not be able to send the
treaty forward for ratification.
Background
The Soviets have thus far been unwilling to address a major
problem that has arisen since signature of the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. In short, they would exclude from
the treaty several divisions of "naval infantry," thus avoiding
the treaty-mandated destruction of the equipment associated with
such units. This amounts to an attempt to redefine obligations
and commitments after treaty signature.
We have expressed our concerns about this problem to the Soviets
consistently and at many levels. Jim Baker has raised it
directly with Bessmertnykh. It seems clear that the problem
cannot be solved by the Foreign Ministry: Bessmertnykh made
clear to Jim that a letter from you to Gorbachev is needed to
help resolve the issues within the Soviet Union.
At Tab A is a proposed letter that lays out the problem, tells
Gorbachev that failure to resolve this matter puts in jeopardy
the progress made in rebuilding the security structure in Europe,
and urges he resolve the problem before the February 17 deadline
for correcting CFE data mandated by the treaty.
Recommendation
That you sign the letter to President Gorbachev at Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
Letter to President Gorbachev
&
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 13526
TOP SECRET
2011-0856-MR
ES 3/15/13
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
0944
LIMITED ACCESS
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
February 6, 1991
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
GR
COR
THROUGH:
ARNOLD KANTER/CONDOLEEZZA RICE
FROM:
JOHN GORDON
6
SUBJECT:
Proposed CFE Letter
Per our discussions, at Tab A is the proposed letter from the
President to President Gorbachev on CFE. The proposed letter has
been reviewed by Secretary Baker.
Concurrence by: David Gompert 20s
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I proposing
a letter on CFE to Gorbachev.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A
Proposed Letter to Gorbachev
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0856-MR
TOP SECRET
ES 3/15/13
2/7
New page 1+3
Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Mckhail:
Dear Mr. Presi dent:
Jim Baker and I have reviewed the results of our
discussions about CFE with Foreign Minister
Bessmertnykh during his visit to Washington last
week. I wanted to write you personally with my
views.
I must tell you in all candor that I am deeply
troubled by what Jim Baker and I heard from
Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. He reported that
the Soviet side continues to insist that ground
force equipment held by certain units such as
naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic
rocket forces is not subject to the limits of
the CFE Treaty. On that basis, he wanted to
explore possible compromises that would allow
the exclusions claimed by the Soviet Union.
Jim told him we simply cannot do that.
I do not understand how the Soviet Union has
come to the conclusion that equipment such as
that held by naval infantry is excluded from CFE
limits. None of the twenty-one other
signatories shares the Soviet interpretation, in
part because both the treaty text and the
negotiating record are so clear about what is
covered by and excluded from CFE limits. Thus,
all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--
understand that Article III of the CFE Treaty
applies to the kinds of units and equipment that
the Soviet side wishes to exclude. And,
accordingly, all of the signatories--except the
Soviet Union--have reported all such equipment
they hold SO that it would be subject to CFE
Treaty limits.
2
I must tell you that the United States cannot
accept any approach that would amount to a
redefinition of the obligations and commitments
that all the parties assumed when they signed
the CFE Treaty. I believe that the other twenty
signatories hold a similar position.
Let me emphasize that this is not a question of
the United States or any other signatory seeking
unilateral advantage nor of trying to exploit
Soviet difficulties. I hope that the
constructive manner in which we addressed Soviet
concerns about the Kiev military district, which
required us to reopen an agreement reached by
our foreign ministers in New York, would put any
such suspicions to rest. We did that even
though our allies were neither easy to convince
nor particularly pleased with our asking them to
go along with a revised approach. Nevertheless,
in that case, we were able to work together to
address a problem precisely because it was
raised before the treaty was signed. Indeed, I
cannot understand why the Soviet Union did not
state its position on the treatment of units
such as naval infantry when it had every
opportunity to do so before the CFE Treaty was
signed, particularly when it successfully argued
for other exclusions during the negotiations.
I also recognize that the CFE Treaty requires
the Soviet Union to make large and asymmetrical
reductions to reach the equal ceilings that were
agreed, and I do not underestimate the
difficulties you may face in meeting these
commitments. Yet I cannot agree to rewrite the
CFE agreement after the fact, much less in a way
that would change the obligations that the
signatories undertook. This is a matter of
principle that determines how much confidence we
can place in negotiations and commitments that
directly affect our security That is why I
will not submit the CFE Treaty to the U.S.
Senate for ratification until the Soviet Union
has rectified this situation. Frankly, I cannot
do so and still hope to achieve ratification.
Basically milkhaid, it is
ce credibility. matter of trust and
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
12. Cable
From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev
2/9/91
(b)(1)
S
[091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED]
(3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
By MM
on 6/1/2016
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0856-MR(511)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 9/22/2014
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
<DIST>
PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY OUT RICE SIT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<OSRI> 1.4(c)
<DTG> 091910Z FEB 91
<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENTIAL
1.4(c)
<TO>TO
MOSCOW
<TEXT>ZEM
BUSH
LIBRARY
SECRET EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
SECTION 01 OF 02
PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK EYES ONLY
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV. IF UNAVAILABLE, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK MAY DELIVER TO
CHERNAYEV.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
BEGIN TEXT:
2011-0856-MR
9/22/2014 MM
DEAR MIKHAIL:
JIM BAKER AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT
CFE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH DURING HIS VISIT TO
WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. I WANTED TO WRITE YOU PERSONALLY WITH MY
VIEWS.
I MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED BY WHAT
JIM BAKER AND I HEARD FROM FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH. HE
REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT GROUND
FORCE EQUIPMENT HELD BY CERTAIN UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY,
COASTAL DEFENSE, AND STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
LIMITS OF THE CFE TREATY. ON THAT BASIS, HE WANTED TO EXPLORE
POSSIBLE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD ALLOW THE EXCLUSIONS CLAIMED BY
THE SOVIET UNION. JIM TOLD HIM WE SIMPLY CANNOT DO THAT.
I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME TO THE
CONCLUSION THAT EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THAT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY IS
EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. NONE OF THE TWENTY-ONE OTHER
SIGNATORIES SHARES THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION, IN PART BECAUSE BOTH
THE TREATY TEXT AND THE NEGOTIATING RECORD ARE SO CLEAR ABOUT WHAT
IS COVERED BY AND EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. THUS, ALL OF THE
SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--UNDERSTAND THAT ARTICLE III
OF THE CFE TREATY APPLIES TO THE KINDS OF UNITS AND EQUIPMENT THAT
THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES TO EXCLUDE. AND, ACCORDINGLY, ALL OF THE
SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--HAVE REPORTED ALL SUCH
EQUIPMENT THEY HOLD SO THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CFE TREATY
LIMITS.
I MUST TELL YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT ANY APPROACH
THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A REDEFINITION OF THE OBLIGATIONS AND
COMMITMENTS THAT ALL THE PARTIES ASSUMED WHEN THEY SIGNED THE CFE
TREATY. I BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES HOLD A SIMLIAR
POSITION.
LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OR ANY OTHER SIGNATORY SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE NOR OF TRYING
TO EXPLOIT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES. I HOPE THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE
MANNER IN WHICH WE ADDRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIEV
MILITARY DISTRICT, WHICH REQUIRED US TO REOPEN AN AGREEMENT
REACHED BY OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK, WOULD PUT ANY SUCH
SUSPICIONS TO REST. WE DID THAT EVEN THOUGH OUR ALLIES WERE
NEITHER EASY TO CONVINCE NOR PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH OUR ASKING
THEM TO GO ALONG WITH A REVISED APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, IN THAT
CASE, WE WERE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS A PROBLEM
PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS RAISED BEFORE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED.
INDEED, I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT STATE
ITS POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY
WHEN IT HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO BEFORE THE CFE TREATY WAS
SIGNED, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED FOR OTHER
EXCLUSIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.
I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THE SOVIET UNION
TO MAKE LARGE AND ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE EQUAL
CEILINGS THAT WERE AGREED, AND I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE
DIFFICULTIES YOU MAY FACE IN MEETING THESE COMMITMENTS. YET I
CANNOT AGREE TO REWRITE THE CFE AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT, MUCH
LESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD CHANGE THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE
SIGNATORIES UNDERTOOK. THIS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT
DETERMINES HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE WE CAN PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND
COMMITMENTS THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY. BASICALLY,
MIKHAIL, IT IS A MATTER OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. THAT IS WHY I
WILL NOT SUBMIT THE CFE TREATY TO THE U.S. SENATE FOR
RATIFICATION UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECTIFIED THIS SITUATION.
FRANKLY, I CANNOT DO so AND STILL HOPE TO ACHIEVE RATIFICATION.
YOU AND I HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT THE CFE TREATY IS ONE OF THE
PRINCIPAL PILLARS OF THE NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE THAT
WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD. IT SYMBOLIZES THE END OF A GENERATION
OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND COMPETITION AND THE BEGINNING OF
A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION. ALL OF THAT COULD BE PUT IN
JEOPARDY, HOWEVER, IF WE ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL
INFANTRY ISSUE OR ADDRESS SATISFACTORILY DATA DISCREPANCIES AND
THE LESS PRESSING ISSUE OF THE LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS. THE TREATY-MANDATED PERIOD FOR
CORRECTING CFE DATA ENDS ON FEBRUARY 17. I HOPE WE CAN PUT
THESE MATTERS BEHIND US BY THAT TIME.
I AM CONVEYING MY CONCERNS IN THIS DIRECT AND FORTHRIGHT MANNER
BECAUSE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE. WE STAND AT A CROSSROADS, NOT
JUST FOR CFE BUT FOR THE ENTIRE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. WE
EITHER CAN MOVE FORWARD WITH AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, OR SEE OUR LONG AND HARD
EFFORTS STALL. I KNOW NEITHER OF US WANTS THAT. I URGE YOU TO
HELP US MOVE DOWN THE RIGHT PATH.
SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
#0012
ZEM
SECRET EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
FINAL SECTION OF 02
MOSCOW
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
#0013
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0012 <TOR> 910209175721 MSG000287431041
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0013 <TOR> 910209175734 MSG000287431054
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 9, 1991
Dear Mikhail:
Jim Baker and I have reviewed the results of our
discussions about CFE with Foreign Minister
Bessmertnykh during his visit to Washington last
week. I wanted to write you personally with my
views.
I must tell you in all candor that I am deeply
troubled by what Jim Baker and I heard from
Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. He reported that
the Soviet side continues to insist that ground
force equipment held by certain units such as
naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic
rocket forces is not subject to the limits of
the CFE Treaty. On that basis, he wanted to
explore possible compromises that would allow
the exclusions claimed by the Soviet Union.
Jim told him we simply cannot do that.
I do not understand how the Soviet Union has
come to the conclusion that equipment such as
that held by naval infantry is excluded from CFE
limits. None of the twenty-one other
signatories shares the Soviet interpretation, in
part because both the treaty text and the
negotiating record are so clear about what is
covered by and excluded from CFE limits. Thus,
all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--
understand that Article III of the CFE Treaty
applies to the kinds of units and equipment that
the Soviet side wishes to exclude. And,
accordingly, all of the signatories--except the
Soviet Union--have reported all such equipment
they hold so that it would be subject to CFE
Treaty limits.
2
I must tell you that the United States cannot
accept any approach that would amount to a
redefinition of the obligations and commitments
that all the parties assumed when they signed
the CFE Treaty. I believe that the other twenty
signatories hold a similar position.
Let me emphasize that this is not a question of
the United States or any other signatory seeking
unilateral advantage nor of trying to exploit
Soviet difficulties. I hope that the
constructive manner in which we addressed Soviet
concerns about the Kiev military district, which
required us to reopen an agreement reached by
our foreign ministers in New York, would put any
such suspicions to rest. We did that even
though our allies were neither easy to convince
nor particularly pleased with our asking them to
go along with a revised approach. Nevertheless,
in that case, we were able to work together to
address a problem precisely because it was
raised before the treaty was signed. Indeed, I
cannot understand why the Soviet Union did not
state its position on the treatment of units
such as naval infantry when it had every
opportunity to do so before the CFE Treaty was
signed, particularly when it successfully argued
for other exclusions during the negotiations.
I also recognize that the CFE Treaty requires
the Soviet Union to make large and asymmetrical
reductions to reach the equal ceilings that were
agreed, and I do not underestimate the
difficulties you may face in meeting these
commitments. Yet I cannot agree to rewrite the
CFE agreement after the fact, much less in a way
that would change the obligations that the
signatories undertook. This is a matter of
principle that determines how much confidence we
can place in negotiations and commitments that
directly affect our security. Basically,
Mikhail, it is a matter of trust and
credibility. That is why I will not submit the
CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification
until the Soviet Union has rectified this
situation. Frankly, I cannot do so and still
hope to achieve ratification.
3
You and I have often said that the CFE Treaty is
one of the principal pillars of the new security
structure in Europe that we are trying to build.
It symbolizes the end of a generation of
military confrontation and competition and the
beginning of a new era of cooperation. All of
that could be put in jeopardy, however, if we
are unable to resolve the naval infantry issue
or address satisfactorily data discrepancies and
the less pressing issue of the large-scale
movement of military equipment east of the
Urals. The treaty-mandated period for
correcting CFE data ends on February 17. I hope
we can put these matters behind us by that time.
I am conveying my concerns in this direct and
forthright manner because of what is at stake.
We stand at a crossroads, not just for CFE but
for the entire arms control process. We either
can move forward with agreements that enhance
our mutual security and international stability,
or see our long and hard efforts stall. I know
neither of us wants that. I urge you to help us
move down the right path.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
13b. Cable
From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev
2/9/91
(b)(1)
S
[091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED]
(4 pp.)
Collection:
Document Partially Declassified
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
(Copy of Document Follows)
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By MM
on 6/1/2016
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0856-MR(511)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 9/22/2014
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
MEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 512.01 UBRARY
PAGE 01 OF P 4
PRT COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT. PRIVACY_OUT
PREC. IMMEDIATE <CLAS SECRET
DTG, 091910Z FEB 91
FM WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
1.4(c)
TO
MOSCOW
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0856-MR
9/22/2014 MM
SECRET
EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
SECTION 01 OF 02
PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK EYES ONLY
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV. IF UNAVAILABLE, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK MAY DELIVER TO
CHERNAYEV.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MIKHAIL:
JIM BAKER AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT
CFE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH DURING HIS VISIT TO
WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. I WANTED TO WRITE YOU PERSONALLY WITH MY
VIEWS.
I MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED BY WHAT
JIM BAKER AND I HEARD FROM FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH. HE
REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT GROUND
FORCE EQUIPMENT HELD BY CERTAIN UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY.
COASTAL DEFENSE. AND STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
LIMITS OF THE CFE TREATY. ON THAT BASIS, HE WANTED TO EXPLORE
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 04
POSSIBLE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD ALLOW THE EXCLUSIONS CLAIMED BY
THE SOVIET UNION. JIM TOLD HIM WE SIMPLY CANNOT DO THAT.
I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME TO THE
CONCLUSION THAT EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THAT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY IS
EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. NONE OF THE TWENTY-ONE OTHER
SIGNATORIES SHARES THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION. IN PART BECAUSE BOTH
THE TREATY TEXT AND THE NEGOTIATING RECORD ARE SO CLEAR ABOUT WHAT
IS COVERED BY AND EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. THUS, ALL OF THE
SIGNATORIES- EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION- UNDERSTAND THAT ARTICLE 111
OF THE CFE TREATY APPLIES TO THE KINDS OF UNITS AND EQUIPMENT THAT
THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES TO EXCLUDE. AND, ACCORDINGLY, ALL OF THE
SIGNATORIES- EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION-- HAVE REPORTED ALL SUCH
EQUIPMENT THEY HOLD S0 THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CFE TREATY
LIMITS.
I MUST TELL YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT ANY APPROACH
THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A REDEFINITION OF THE OBLIGATIONS AND
COMMITMENTS THAT ALL THE PARTIES ASSUMED WHEN THEY SIGNED THE CFE
TREATY. I BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES HOLD A SIMLIAR
POSITION.
LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OR ANY OTHER SIGNATORY SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE NOR OF TRYING
TO EXPLOIT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES. I HOPE THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE
MANNER IN WHICH WE ADDRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIEV
MILITARY DISTRICT, WHICH REQUIRED US TO REOPEN AN AGREEMENT
REACHED BY OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK. WOULD PUT ANY SUCH
SUSPICIONS TO REST. WE DID THAT EVEN THOUGH OUR ALLIES WERE
NEITHER EASY TO CONVINCE NOR PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH OUR ASKING
THEM TO GO ALONG WITH A REVISED APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, IN THAT
CASE. WE WERE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS A PROBLEM
PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS RAISED BEFORE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED.
INDEED, I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT STATE
ITS POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 03 OF 04
WHEN IT HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO BEFORE THE CFE TREATY WAS
SIGNED PARTICULARLY WHEN IT SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED FOR OTHER
EXCLUSIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.
I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THE SOVIET UNION
TO MAKE LARGE AND ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE EQUAL
CEILINGS THAT WERE AGREED. AND I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE
DIFFICULTIES YOU MAY FACE IN MEETING THESE COMMITMENTS. YET I
CANNOT AGREE TO REWRITE THE CFE AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT, MUCH
LESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD CHANGE THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE
SIGNATORIES UNDERTOOK. THIS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT
DETERMINES HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE WE CAN PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND
COMMITMENTS THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY. BASICALLY,
MIKHAIL. IT IS A MATTER OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. THAT IS WHY I
WILL NOT SUBMIT THE CFE TREATY TO THE U.S. SENATE FOR
RATIFICATION UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECTIFIED THIS SITUATION.
FRANKLY. I CANNOT DO SO AND STILL HOPE TO ACHIEVE RATIFICATION.
YOU AND I HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT THE CFE TREATY IS ONE OF THE
PRINCIPAL PILLARS OF THE NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE THAT
WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD. IT SYMBOLIZES THE END OF A GENERATION
OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND COMPETITION AND THE BEGINNING OF
A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION. ALL OF THAT COULD BE PUT IN
JEOPARDY, HOWEVER. IF WE ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL
INFANTRY ISSUE OR ADDRESS SATISFACTORILY DATA DISCREPANCIES AND
THE LESS PRESSING ISSUE OF THE LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS. THE TREATY-MANDATED PERIOD FOR
CORRECTING CFE DATA ENDS ON FEBRUARY 17. I HOPE WE CAN PUT
THESE MATTERS BEHIND US BY THAT TIME.
I AM CONVEYING MY CONCERNS IN THIS DIRECT AND FORTHRIGHT MANNER
BECAUSE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE. WE STAND AT A CROSSROADS, NOT
JUST FOR CFE BUT FOR THE ENTIRE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. WE
EITHER CAN MOVE FORWARD WITH AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, OR SEE OUR LONG AND HARD
EFFORTS STALL. I KNOW NEITHER OF US WANTS THAT. I URGE YOU TO
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 04 OF 04
HELP US MOVE DOWN THE RIGHT PATH
SINCERELY.
GEORGE BUSH
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
=0012
ZEM
SECRET
EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
FINAL SECTION OF 02
MOSCOW
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
=0013
SECRET
FYI: A letter to Gorbachev was faxed to the President on Friday nite. He
approved the letter - therefore a cable was sent out from him over the weekend.
The original letter came down from Florence this AM - she said we need to check
the cable to see how it was signed (Lonnie said he would do that) along with
giving to Brady's office for the President to sign the original letter or have
it signed on the machine.
I will doublecheck with Fran to make sure she is aware of this.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
0944
LIMITED ACCESS
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
WASHINGTON
91
FEB
11
AM10:31
February 8, 1991
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
Letter to Gorbachev on CFE
Purpose
To send a personal letter from you to President Gorbachev urging
him to take the steps necessary to resolve a serious problem with
the CFE Treaty. Unless resolved, we will not be able to send the
treaty forward for ratification.
Background
The Soviets have thus far been unwilling to address a major
problem that has arisen since signature of the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. In short, they would exclude from
the treaty several divisions of "naval infantry," thus avoiding
the treaty-mandated destruction of the equipment associated with
such units. This amounts to an attempt to redefine obligations
and commitments after treaty signature.
We have expressed our concerns about this problem to the Soviets
consistently and at many levels. Jim Baker has raised it
directly with Bessmertnykh. It seems clear that the problem
cannot be solved by the Foreign Ministry: Bessmertnykh made
clear to Jim that a letter from you to Gorbachev is needed to
help resolve the issues within the Soviet Union.
At Tab A is a proposed letter that lays out the problem, tells
Gorbachev that failure to resolve this matter puts in jeopardy
the progress made in rebuilding the security structure in Europe,
and urges he resolve the problem before the February 17 deadline
for correcting CFE data mandated by the treaty.
Recommendation
That you sign the letter to President Gorbachev at Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
Letter to President Gorbachev
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
TOP SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
PER DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
TOP SECRET
291-0856-MR
ES 3/15/13
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
0944
LIMITED ACCESS
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
February 6, 1991
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
GR
COR
THROUGH:
ARNOLD KANTER/CONDOLEEZZA RICE
FROM:
JOHN GORDON G
SUBJECT:
Proposed CFE Letter
Per our discussions, at Tab A is the proposed letter from the
President to President Gorbachev on CFE. The proposed letter has
been reviewed by Secretary Baker.
Concurrence by: David Gompert
y
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I proposing
a letter on CFE to Gorbachev.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A
Proposed Letter to Gorbachev
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0856-MR
TOP SECRET
ES 6/6/13
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 9, 1991
Dear Mikhail:
Jim Baker and I have reviewed the results of our
discussions about CFE with Foreign Minister
Bessmertnykh during his visit to Washington last
week. I wanted to write you personally with my
views.
I must tell you in all candor that I am deeply
troubled by what Jim Baker and I heard from
Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. He reported that
the Soviet side continues to insist that ground
force equipment held by certain units such as
naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic
rocket forces is not subject to the limits of
the CFE Treaty. On that basis, he wanted to
explore possible compromises that would allow
the exclusions claimed by the Soviet Union.
Jim told him we simply cannot do that.
I do not understand how the Soviet Union has
come to the conclusion that equipment such as
that held by naval infantry is excluded from CFE
limits. None of the twenty-one other
signatories shares the Soviet interpretation, in
part because both the treaty text and the
negotiating record are so clear about what is
covered by and excluded from CFE limits. Thus,
all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--
understand that Article III of the CFE Treaty
applies to the kinds of units and equipment that
the Soviet side wishes to exclude. And,
accordingly, all of the signatories--except the
Soviet Union--have reported all such equipment
they hold so that it would be subject to CFE
Treaty limits.
2
I must tell you that the United States cannot
accept any approach that would amount to a
redefinition of the obligations and commitments
that all the parties assumed when they signed
the CFE Treaty. I believe that the other twenty
signatories hold a similar position.
Let me emphasize that this is not a question of
the United States or any other signatory seeking
unilateral advantage nor of trying to exploit
Soviet difficulties. I hope that the
constructive manner in which we addressed Soviet
concerns about the Kiev military district, which
required us to reopen an agreement reached by
our foreign ministers in New York, would put any
such suspicions to rest. We did that even
though our allies were neither easy to convince
nor particularly pleased with our asking them to
go along with a revised approach. Nevertheless,
in that case, we were able to work together to
address a problem precisely because it was
raised before the treaty was signed. Indeed, I
cannot understand why the Soviet Union did not
state its position on the treatment of units
such as naval infantry when it had every
opportunity to do so before the CFE Treaty was
signed, particularly when it successfully argued
for other exclusions during the negotiations.
I also recognize that the CFE Treaty requires
the Soviet Union to make large and asymmetrical
reductions to reach the equal ceilings that were
agreed, and I do not underestimate the
difficulties you may face in meeting these
commitments. Yet I cannot agree to rewrite the
CFE agreement after the fact, much less in a way
that would change the obligations that the
signatories undertook. This is a matter of
principle that determines how much confidence we
can place in negotiations and commitments that
directly affect our security. Basically,
Mikhail, it is a matter of trust and
credibility. That is why I will not submit the
CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification
until the Soviet Union has rectified this
situation. Frankly, I cannot do so and still
hope to achieve ratification.
3
You and I have often said that the CFE Treaty is
one of the principal pillars of the new security
structure in Europe that we are trying to build.
It symbolizes the end of a generation of
military confrontation and competition and the
beginning of a new era of cooperation. All of
that could be put in jeopardy, however, if we
are unable to resolve the naval infantry issue
or address satisfactorily data discrepancies and
the less pressing issue of the large-scale
movement of military equipment east of the
Urals. The treaty-mandated period for
correcting CFE data ends on February 17. I hope
we can put these matters behind us by that time.
I am conveying my concerns in this direct and
forthright manner because of what is at stake.
We stand at a crossroads, not just for CFE but
for the entire arms control process. We either
can move forward with agreements that enhance
our mutual security and international stability,
or see our long and hard efforts stall. I know
neither of us wants that. I urge you to help us
move down the right path.
Sincerely,
15/ 5
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
15. Cable
From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev
2/9/91
(b)(1)
S
[091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED]
(4 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
By MM
on 6/1/2016
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev Sensitive January June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0856-MR(511)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 9/22/2014
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
MMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 514 UBRARY
PAGE 01 OF P 4
PRT COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT. PRIVACY_OUT
PREC. IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
DTG, 091910Z FEB 91
FM WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
1.4(c)
TO
MOSCOW
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0856-MR
9/22/2014 MM
SECRET
EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
SECTION 01 OF 02
PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK EYES ONLY
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV. IF UNAVAILABLE, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK MAY DELIVER TO
CHERNAYEV.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MIKHAIL:
JIM BAKER AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT
CFE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH DURING HIS VISIT TO
WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. I WANTED TO WRITE YOU PERSONALLY WITH MY
VIEWS.
I MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED BY WHAT
JIM BAKER AND I HEARD FROM FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH. HE
REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT GROUND
FORCE EQUIPMENT HELD BY CERTAIN UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY.
COASTAL DEFENSE. AND STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
LIMITS OF THE CFE TREATY. ON THAT BASIS, HE WANTED TO EXPLORE
SECRET
IMMED!ATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 04
POSSIBLE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD ALLOW THE EXCLUSIONS CLAIMED BY
THE SOVIET UNION. JIM TOLD HIM WE SIMPLY CANNOT DO THAT.
I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME TO THE
CONCLUSION THAT EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THAT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY IS
EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. NONE OF THE TWENTY-ONE OTHER
SIGNATORIES SHARES THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION. IN PART BECAUSE BOTH
THE TREATY TEXT AND THE NEGOTIATING RECORD ARE S 0 CLEAR ABOUT WHAT
IS COVERED BY AND EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. THUS, ALL OF THE
SIGNATORIES- EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION- UNDERSTAND THAT ARTICLE 111
OF THE CFE TREATY APPLIES TO THE KINDS OF UNITS AND EQUIPMENT THAT
THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES TO EXCLUDE. AND, ACCORDINGLY, ALL OF THE
SIGNATORIES- EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION- HAVE REPORTED ALL SUCH
EQUIPMENT THEY HOLD S0 THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CFE TREATY
LIMITS.
I MUST TELL YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT ANY APPROACH
THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A REDEFINITION OF THE OBLIGATIONS AND
COMMITMENTS THAT ALL THE PARTIES ASSUMED WHEN THEY SIGNED THE CFE
TREATY. I BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES HOLD A SIMLIAR
POSITION.
LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OR ANY OTHER SIGNATORY SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE NOR OF TRYING
TO EXPLOIT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES. I HOPE THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE
MANNER IN WHICH WE ADDRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIEV
MILITARY DISTRICT, WHICH REQUIRED US TO REOPEN AN AGREEMENT
REACHED BY OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK. WOULD PUT ANY SUCH
SUSPICIONS TO REST. WE DID THAT EVEN THOUGH OUR ALLIES WERE
NEITHER EASY TO CONVINCE NOR PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH OUR ASKING
THEM TO GO ALONG WITH A REVISED APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, IN THAT
CASE. WE WERE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS A PROBLEM
PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS RAISED BEFORE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED.
INDEED, I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT STATE
ITS POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 03 OF 04
WHEN IT HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO BEFORE THE CFE TREATY WAS
SIGNED PARTICULARLY WHEN IT SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED FOR OTHER
EXCLUSIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.
I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THE SOVIET UNION
TO MAKE LARGE AND ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE EQUAL
CEILINGS THAT WERE AGREED. AND I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE
DIFFICULTIES YOU MAY FACE IN MEETING THESE COMMITMENTS. YET I
CANNOT AGREE TO REWRITE THE CFE AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT, MUCH
LESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD CHANGE THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE
SIGNATORIES UNDERTOOK. THIS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT
DETERMINES HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE WE CAN PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND
COMMITMENTS THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY. BASICALLY,
MIKHAIL. IT IS A MATTER OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. THAT IS WHY I
WILL NOT SUBMIT THE CFE TREATY TO THE U.S. SENATE FOR
RATIFICATION UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECTIFIED THIS SITUATION.
FRANKLY. I CANNOT DO SO AND STILL HOPE TO ACHIEVE RATIFICATION.
YOU AND I HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT THE CFE TREATY IS ONE OF THE
PRINCIPAL PILLARS OF THE NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE THAT
WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD. IT SYMBOLIZES THE END OF A GENERATION
OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND COMPETITION AND THE BEGINNING OF
A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION. ALL OF THAT COULD BE PUT IN
JEOPARDY, HOWEVER. IF WE ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL
INFANTRY ISSUE OR ADDRESS SATISFACTORILY DATA DISCREPANCIES AND
THE LESS PRESSING ISSUE OF THE LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS. THE TREATY-MANDATED PERIOD FOR
CORRECTING CFE DATA ENDS ON FEBRUARY 17. I HOPE WE CAN PUT
THESE MATTERS BEHIND US BY THAT TIME.
I AM CONVEYING MY CONCERNS IN THIS DIRECT AND FORTHRIGHT MANNER
BECAUSE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE. WE STAND AT A CROSSROADS, NOT
JUST FOR CFE BUT FOR THE ENTIRE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. WE
EITHER CAN MOVE FORWARD WITH AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, OR SEE OUR LONG AND HARD
EFFORTS STALL. I KNOW NEITHER OF US WANTS THAT. I URGE YOU TO
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 04 OF 94
HELP US MOVE DOWN THE RIGHT PATH
SINCERELY.
GEORGE BUSH
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
=0012
ZEM
SECRET
EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
FINAL SECTION OF 02
MOSCOW
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
=0013
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
16. Cable
Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA
2/11/91
(b)(1)
S
EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
By MM
on 2/17/2015
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0856-MR(507)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 12/17/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL DUP 515 OF JERARY
PAGE 01 OF 02
507
PRT GATES SCOWCROFT
S FILE PRIVACY IN SIT
PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS SECRE T
DTG 111302Z FEB 91
(b)(1)
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
S
E
€
R
E
111302Z FEB 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS
PLEASE PASS TO BRENT SCOWCROFT. ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE WHITE HOUSE
0 111250Z FEB 91 ZYH ZFF-1/4
FM (b)(1) MOSCOW
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
ZEM
SECRET EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
I CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CHERNYAYEV TODAY.
AFTER SUMMARIZING THE MAIN POINTS. I ADDED THAT WHEN THE SUBJECT
WAS MENTIONED BRIEFLY DURING MY MEETING WITH GORBACHEV I HAD
THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD NOT FOCUSED ON IT. IF THAT WAS THE
CASE, THEN IT IS CLEARLY NECESSARY FOR HIM TO DO SO.
CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT BESSMERTNYKH HAD REPORTED ON HIS
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0856-MR
SECRET
12/17/2013 my
MMEDIATE
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND THAT GORBACHEV HAD FORMED A
GROUP TO STUDY THE MATTER URGENTLY AND REPORT BACK TO HIM
CHERNYAYEV HIMSELF IS A MEMBER OF THAT GROUP. WHEN THE GROUP
REPORTS GORBACHEV WILL BE ABLE TO REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT S
LETTER.
I
POINTED OUT THAT THE FEBRUARY 17 DEADLINE IS FAST
APPROACHING AND IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO BRING THE
SOVIET POSITION IN LINE WITH THE TREATY BY THEN. CHERNYAYEV
SAID THAT THE GROUP WOULD FINISH ITS WORK "SOON." " AT ONE
POINT. WHEN I SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION SEEMED TO BE ACTING
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISION OF THE TREATY, CHERNYAYEV SAID,
"NOT THE SOVIET UNION JUST SOME SOVIET GENERALS.
"
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
#0574
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
17. Cable
Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA
2/11/91
(b)(1)
S
EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
By MM
on 2/17/2015
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0856-MR(507)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 12/17/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
<DIST>
PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<OSRI>
(b)(1)
<DTG> 111302Z FEB 91
(b)(1)
PRESIDENTIAL
<TO>TO THE WHITE HOUSE
<TEXT>ZEM
BUSH
DUP OF
LIBRARY
SECRET 111302Z FEB 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS
507
PLEASE PASS TO BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE WHITE HOUSE
O 111250Z FEB 91 ZYH ZFF-1/4
FM (b)(1) MOSCOW
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
ZEM
SECRETEYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
I CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CHERNYAYEV TODAY.
AFTER SUMMARIZING THE MAIN POINTS, I ADDED THAT WHEN THE SUBJECT
WAS MENTIONED BRIEFLY DURING MY MEETING WITH GORBACHEV I HAD
THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD NOT FOCUSED ON IT. IF THAT WAS THE
CASE, THEN IT IS CLEARLY NECESSARY FOR HIM TO DO so.
CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT BESSMERTNYKH HAD REPORTED ON HIS
CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND THAT GORBACHEV HAD FORMED A
GROUP TO STUDY THE MATTER URGENTLY AND REPORT BACK TO HIM.
CHERNYAYEV HIMSELF IS A MEMBER OF THAT GROUP. WHEN THE GROUP
REPORTS, GORBACHEV WILL BE ABLE TO REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER.
I POINTED OUT THAT THE FEBRUARY 17 DEADLINE IS FAST
APPROACHING AND IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO BRING THE
SOVIET POSITION IN LINE WITH THE TREATY BY THEN. CHERNYAYEV
SAID THAT THE GROUP WOULD FINISH ITS WORK "SOON." AT ONE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
POINT, WHEN I SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION SEEMED TO BE ACTING
PER E.O. 13526
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISION OF THE TREATY, CHERNYAYEV SAID,
2011-0856-MR
"NOT THE SOVIET UNION JUST SOME SOVIET GENERALS."
12/17/2013 MM
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
#0574
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0574 <TOR> 910211082555 MSG000287569555
<DIST>
SIT: WHSR_DUP PRIVACY_IN
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET
<OSRI>
(b)(1)
<DTG> 101255Z FEB 91
<ORIG>FM (b)(1) MOSCOW
<TO>TO THE WHITE HOUSE
<TEXT>ZEM
SECRET 101255Z FEB 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
EYES ONLY FROM JACK MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
BRENT:
WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RAISE ANYONE AT CHERNAYEV'S OFFICE TODAY
(FEBRUARY 10), TO ARRANGE FOR DELIVERY OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER
TO GORBACHEV ON CFE. WE WILL WORK TO DELIVER IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
ON MONDAY.
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
#0547
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0547 <TOR> 910210084558 MSG000287484357
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
18. Cable
From White House, Re: Message to Marshal Akhromeyev
2/7/91
(b)(1)
C
[FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By MM
on 2/17/2015
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-0856-MR(517)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 12/17/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
DIATE
CONF DENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 517 JERARY
PPT GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
Sil FILE PRIVACY_OUT SIT
PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS CONFIDENTIAL DTG 0720447 FEB 91
FM WHITE HOUSE
(b)(1)
€ 0 N D E N T A VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK,
EMBASSY MOSCOW FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.
JACK:
PLEASE DELIVER THE MESSAGE BELOW TO MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV WHO I
UNDERSTAND IS HOSPITALIZED IN MOSCOW. THANK YOU.
BEGIN TEXT:
FEBRUARY 7, 1991
DEAR MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV:
I AM SORRY TO HEAR OF YOUR ILLNESS. I WANT TO WISH YOU THE
BEST FOR A VERY QUICK RECOVERY.
THOUGH WE INEVITABLY DO NOT ALWAYS AGREE. I VALUE OUR ASSOCIATION
AND THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT WE HAVE HAD TO EXCHANGE VIEWS IN A
SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND COOPERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU
IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
AGAIN. BEST WISHES FOR A COMPLETE AND RAPID RETURN TO FULL
HEALTH.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0856.MR
CONF IDENT IAL
12/17/2013 my
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
YOURS SINCERELY.
BRENT SCOWCROFT
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
=0161
CONF IDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
19a. Cable
Charles Powell to General Scowcroft
1/31/91
(b)(1)
C
Re: Message to the President from the Prime Minister (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
19b. Letter
King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud to President Gorbachev
n.d.
(b)(1)
(2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:
Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]
Date Closed:
4/16/2009
OA/ID Number:
91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.