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China: Non-Tiananmen (January-April 1990)
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China: Non-Tiananmen (January-April 1990)
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Brent Scowcroft Papers
China Chronological Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
China Chronological Files
Subseries:
Non-Tiananmen Files
OA/ID Number:
91134
Folder ID Number:
91134-003
Folder Title:
China: Non-Tiananmen (January - April 1990)
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
4
6
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Memo
Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft
1/30/90
(b)(1)
Re: World Bank Loans to China (1 pp.)
02a. Memo
Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft
1/4/90
(b)(1)
Re: Kaifu Letter and Japanese Non-Paper on China (1 pp.)
02b. Memo
From Brent Scowcroft to POTUS, Re: Letter from Prime Minister
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Kaifu on Japan-China Relations [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2
pp.)
02c. Letter
Prime Minister Kaifu to President Bush (3 pp.)
1/4/90
(b)(1)
02d. Non-Paper
Re: Policy Toward China (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
03a. Memo
Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft
1/31/90
(b)(1)
Re: Your Meeting Today with Chinese Ambassador Zhu Qizhen
(1 pp.)
03b. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Chinese Ambassador
n.d.
(b)(1)
Zhu Qizhen (2 pp.)
04a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
2/8/90
(1)
Re: U.S. -China Relations: Roadmap for the Weeks Ahead (2
pp.)
Page 1 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
China Chronological Files
Subseries:
Non-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China: Non-Tiananmen (January - April 1990)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1115
OA/ID Number:
91134-003
Date Closed:
5/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
04b. Memo
Diane G. Ross to Distribution List
2/8/90
(b)(1)
/
Re: Action Taken 2/8 (1 pp.)
04c. Memo
Douglas Paal Brent Scowcroft
2/5/90
(b) (1)
Re: Roadmap on China Policy for the Weeks Ahead (1 pp.)
05a. Memo
Meg Lundsager to Brent Scowcroft
4/5/90
(b) (1)
Re: Letter to Secretary Brady on G-7 Consensus on World Bank
Lending to China (1 pp.)
05b. Draft Letter
Brent Scowcroft to Nicholas F. Brady (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
06a. Memo
Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft
4/9/90
Re: China -- Game Plan for MFN (1 pp.)
06b. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: China -- Game Plan for MFN (5 pp.)
06c. Memo
Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft
4/2/90
(b)(1)
8
Re: China -- Game Plan for MFN (1 pp.)
06d. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
n.d.
(b)(1)
$
8
Re: China -- Game Plan for MFN (6 pp.)
Page 2 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
China Chronological Files
Subseries:
Non-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China: Non-Tiananmen (January - April 1990)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1115
OA/ID Number:
91134-003
Date Closed:
5/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
CUN! IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
0736
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
CHRON FILE
January 30, 1990
4
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
Nati Sec Advisor
has seen
FROM:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL
SUBJECT:
World Bank Loans to China
David Mulford told me this morning that World Bank Executive
Directors (EDs) of the G-7 met last night to consider their
reaction to Barber Conable's plan to bring both the earthquake
and agricultural loans for China before the World Bank board in
mid-February. You will recall the interagency understanding that
the U.S. would support the earthquake loan at the mid-February
meeting and probably also give our approval to the agricultural
loan if it were not brought before the board until the end of
February. Despite requests to Conable that he proceed with
caution, Conable circulated loan documents for both the
earthquake and agricultural loans on January 26.
The G-7 EDs propose to tell Conable tomorrow (January 31) that
their governments will vote no on the agricultural loan if he
brings it before the board now. They hope in this way to force
Conable to withdraw temporarily the agricultural loan from
consideration, since the combined vote of the G-7 would be enough
to block it, and in the process give Conable a message that he
cannot act with impunity on matters of major political and
economic concern to the major creditors.
Mulford would like your concurrence to join the other G-7 members
in taking the position outlined above. He is contacting Bob
Zoellick as well to ensure that State backs this approach.
I recommend that we support the proposed G-7 approach.
Concurrence by: Douglas D Paat
RECOMMENDATION:
That you authorize me to inform Mulford that you concur in the
proposed G-7 approach to approve the earthquake loan but vote no
on the agricultural loan if brought before the board in mid-
February.
Approve
Disapprove hat the others
do it.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
2000-0116-F13
El 3/22/10
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 0736
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG AC A/O
SEQUENCE TO
Dep Exec
0
HAS W SEEN
DISPOSITION
1
4
Philip Hughes
Bob Gates
APNSA Has Seen
Brent Scowcroft
3
Philip Hughes
she
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
4
2
NSC Secretariat
5
2
X = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9000070
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 04 JAN 90 14
TO: SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
FROM: JACKSON
DOC DATE: 04 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: JAPAN
CHINA PR
HS
74
PERSONS: KAIFU, TOSHIKI
SUBJECT: KAIFU LTR & JAPANESE NON PAPER RE CHINA
ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM
DUE DATE: 08 JAN 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: JACKSON
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
JACKSON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSAMM
CLOSED BY: NSAMM
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
CECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
0070
nov paper.
January 4, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
no with AD
the
FROM:
DPIKARI KARL D. JACKSON
SUBJECT:
Kaifu Letter and Japanese Non-Paper on China
This morning Ambassador Murata delivered a letter for the
President from Prime Minister Kaifu. He left a classified
non-paper on Japan-China relations. He also requested a meeting
with you to discuss this issue.
At Tab A you will find a Memorandum to the President transmitting
the letter and non-paper, which are attached at Tab B. It
recommends that we go back to Kaifu immediately to restrain Japan
from getting out in front of us on economic normalization.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you forward Prime Minister Kaifu's letter to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
That you agree to meet with Ambassador Murata as soon as
possible, to urge the Japanese not to move at this time.
Approve
Disapprove
7/1/12
AM
Attachments
11:00
Tab A
Memorandum to the President
Tab B
Letter to the President w/non-paper
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
2009-1152-MR
5/21/2014 MM
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02b. Memo
From Brent Scowcroft to POTUS, Re: Letter from Prime
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Minister Kaifu on Japan-China Relations [FOIA restrictions
redacted] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
China Chronological Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
By MM
on 3/13/2023
Non-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China: Non-Tiananmen (January April 1990)
Date Closed:
5/1/2009
OA/ID Number:
91134-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2009-1152-MR(505.01)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 4/26/2016
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
0070
WASHINGTON
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 505.01 LIBRARY
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Letter from Prime Minister Kaifu on Japan-China
Relations
Purpose
To alert you to Japan's intention to move toward economic
normalization with China in the near term.
Background
Ambassador Murata delivered the Prime Minister's letter to the
State Department this morning. The letter itself describes his
forthcoming trip to Europe, expresses his concern that Japan has
"yet to witness meaningful manifestations of its [Soviet] 'new
thinking' in the Asia-Pacific region," and outlines Kaifu's views
on the need to improve relations with China.
Significantly, China is the only subject of the non-paper, and it
3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)
.
Japan will
invite State Counselor and Minister of the State Planning
Commission Zou Jiahua to visit Japan in January. While
refraining from offering new projects, the GOJ will send its
Director General of the Economic Cooperation Bureau to China in
mid-January to elicit "positive signals from China." GOJ will
begin "very preliminary work" on the Third Series of Yen Loans,
and also embark on consultations regarding grant aid in February.
In delivering the letter to Under Secretary Kimmitt, Ambassador
Murata indicated that Japan would consider World Bank loans to
China on a case-by-case basis, but believed that we should
consider re-opening the World Bank to China for loans targeted on
basic human needs.
RECOMMENDATION
That we forward a non-paper back to Japan endorsing Kaifu's long-
term goals, but indicating that sending officials to China to
discuss Yen loans and grant aid this month would take the
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1152-MR
SEVART
mm 4/26/2016
SECRET
2
pressure off at precisely the time when China might be making
meaningful concessions that would allow the U.S. and Japan to
respond simultaneously and in a positive manner. The non-paper
should also mention the danger to U.S.-Japan relations implied by
Japan getting out in front of the U.S. with regard to normalizing
economic relations; such moves would inevitably receive negative
coverage in the U.S. press. Instead, quiet but close
consultation should take place between the U.S. and Japan
(through the Scowcroft-Murata channel) to insure simultaneity in
economic normalization with China.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET
EMBASSY OF JAPAN
WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 4, 1990
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to transmit to you, enclosed here-
with, a letter from Mr. Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister
of Japan.
Allow me to extend my warmest regards.
Respectfully yours,
Ryohei Murata
Ambassador of Japan
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02c. Letter
Prime Minister Kaifu to President Bush (3 pp.)
1/4/90
(b)(1)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
China Chronological Files
Subseries:
Non-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China: Non-Tiananmen (January - April 1990)
Date Closed:
5/1/2009
OA/ID Number:
91134-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02d. Non-Paper
Re: Policy Toward China (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
China Chronological Files
Subseries:
Non-Tiananmen Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
China: Non-Tiananmen (January - April 1990)
Date Closed:
5/1/2009
OA/ID Number:
91134-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECRET
4
SECRET
792
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
January 31, 1990
CHRON FILE
Nati Sec Advisor
ACTION
DECLASSIFIED
has seen
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
PER E.O. 13526
THROUGH:
KARL JACKSON
KDJ
2010-2785-MR
3r 10/10/12
FROM:
DOUGLAS PAAL
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting Today with Chinese Ambassador Zhu
Qizhen
I learned informally that Zhu is calling on you under
instructions. He will discuss where we are now and what is to be
done next in U.S.-China relations. The message is said to be
"quite encouraging." Given our recent experience, you might want
to keep your enthusiasm for this meeting in check until we hear
what he has.
Naturally, it will be appropriate to reiterate our desire to see
Fang released, especially with the upcoming report to Congress on
human rights in China and U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting on
the same subject. I will work separately with State to get new
instructions on Fang to Jim Lilley, so that he can take the new
material from Fang to the Chinese. It is our turn to respond to
their stiffened conditions for release.
Zhu may ask whether the President plans a signing statement for
the State Department Authorization Bill. He would probably like
something said to distance the President from the sanctions. I
do not know your thinking on this. If there is to be a
statement, my idea would be to have the President express his
appreciation to the Congress for the flexibility given him in the
"national interest" waiver authority, and nothing more.
I recommend that you hear Zhu out, then foreshadow some of the
problem areas immediately ahead, urge Fang's early release and
broader measures of leniency, and bring up the need for China to
join the next Perm Five meeting on Cambodia, which Beijing seems
to be trying to avoid. Points to be made are at Tab A.
RECOMMENDATION
That you use the points to be made at Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab A
Points to be made
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
0792
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
CHINESE AMBASSADOR ZHU QIZHEN
--
I recognize that the Chinese side is eager to see greater
movement in the World Bank and toward normalization of our
relations.
--
We have taken steps fully in keeping with our
representations to you on your package proposal last
December. I believe more comprehensive movement by China on
the release of detainees and data concerning those arrested
and imprisoned will facilitate more comprehensive movement
by the World Bank.
-- I reiterate that even with the President's success with his
veto of the Pelosi Bill -- which was politically very costly
-- it is important that our people in Beijing make progress
soon on the release of the Fang Lizhi family.
-- You are surely aware of our requirement to report to
Congress soon on the human rights situation in China. You
must also be aware of the upcoming United Nations human
rights meeting. Fang's release will undoubtedly help offset
the impact of these two coming events.
--
Next month we will also face important discussions with you
on the FMS programs. This is an extremely sensitive area in
which to move in the current atmosphere. More comprehensive
efforts by China and the release of the Fang family will
affect this atmosphere.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
SECRET
2010-2785-MR
3r 10/10/12
SECRET
SECRET
2
-- We will soon send Ambassador Lilley to talk again with
Vice Foreign Minister Liu and urge rapid movement.
--
(If asked about a signing statement) We do not plan a
statement now; the President has established his
position on China policy. Further attention to it in
connection with this bill will not help. Nonetheless,
I will take what you have to say into consideration.
-- Cambodia I hope Vice Foreign Minister Xu will be able
to join Perm Five discussions in New York on February 5
- 6 or 6 - 7. Attention continues to build in this
country on the need for progress toward a settlement.
It will not help if China is perceived as obstructing
progress.
SECRET
SECRET
:
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
21.
LOG # 0792
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG E4. A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
/
Dep Exec
w
A
Philip Hughes
1
Brent Scowtroft
E.
90 JAN31 Pl 36
APTO
Bob Gates
3
4
N
Philip Hughes
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
5
N
NSC Secretariat
4
Ab
= Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
Scowcroft lmtg w
zhu, 1/31, 4.30
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9000898
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 05 FEB 90 08
TO: PRESIDENT
CHRON FILE
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 08 FEB 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: CHINA PR
USSR
4
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: US / CHINA RELATIONS / ROADMAP FOR WEEKS AHEAD
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES
DUE DATE: 08 FEB 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PAAL
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DEAL
DYKE
JACKSON
PAAL
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMEN
CLOSED BY: NSAMM
DOC 2 OF 2
SECRET
SECRET
NOTED
SECRET
THE PRESIDENT
HAS
But
0898
SEEN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
February 8, paper 1990
good
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
approach
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
U.S. -China Relations: Roadmap for the Weeks Ahead
It is becoming increasingly clear that the progress we hoped to
set in train with my visit to Beijing in December was delayed and
limited by China's reaction to the fall of Ceausescu. It is
likely to be further delayed and limited by heightened factional
infighting during the run-up to China's National People's
Congress (NPC) in March. The events in Moscow this week will
cause China to brace even more.
Since we gave ammunition to China's reformers for good relations
with us through my visit, your actions on Ex-Im and the
satellites, and -- most importantly -- defeat of the Pelosi Bill
óverride, the Chinese response to our demands has been modest.
Li Peng and the dogmatic faction have successfully used fear of
internal unrest and traditional xenophobia to force compromises
that produced minimal Chinese action and maximum demands on us.
Now that the Chinese leadership has entered the period leading up
to formal consideration of personnel changes (this does not
necessarily mean there will be significant changes in the end),
the prospect of moderate Chinese behavior is reduced until after
the NPC. Deng Xiaoping cannot be expected to expend his
political capital on foreign policy niceties when he is fighting
to rescue his legacy and reputation. The nasty Chinese
statements prior to the Pelosi vote and just after the Senate
passed the State Authorization Bill sanctions are signs of the
times. They should be viewed primarily as for domestic
consumption.
How should we behave? For the next six weeks or so, we should
take a step back from China-related issues. In view of earlier
commitments, we will need to insure that World Bank lending for
basic human needs slowly resumes. This is a gesture
proportionate to China S very limited relaxation of martial law
and grant of leniency. I will also recommend that you endorse a
statement at the time you sign the State Authorization Bill,
arguing general Yy against Congress' practice of legislating
sanctions. Such a statement will respond minimally to China's
request for a signing statement separating the Administration
from the sanctions.
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
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At the same time, we need to take actions that help to discipline
U.S. -China relations. Simply put, Li Peng and those Chinese who
apparently believe that they can take a tough stance and we will
come crawling back need to know that this is not the case. Their
adversaries will want us to teach this lesson.
Your decision to order the divestiture of Mamco, the release of a
strong but straightforward human rights report, and a U.S. vote
with the consensus resolution in the U.N. on human rights in
China will demonstrate to the hardliners that the U.S. is not
desperate to restore relations, and that we have our
requirements, too.
One additional step we will be considering is how to respond to
Taiwan's application to join the GATT. On economic grounds,
Taiwan deserves to be in the organization. We probably can find
a means of acquiescing to a GATT consensus that Taiwan join,
while adhering to our commitments in the three communiques with
China. Congress is moving to support this. A small signal at
the end of the month that the U.S. will join the consensus would
be a sharp reminder to Beijing of its increasing isolation and
the need to accommodate us. I am not asking you to endorse this
option yet, however, because the details need close review
beforehand.
This overall approach should help to rebuild support in this
country for a constructive China policy. It should also help us
as we prepare to enter another very tough round of talks on the
FMS "Peace Pearl" program at the end of February.
Naturally, gratuitous shots at the Chinese are not called for and
could have some negative effect on the politics there prior to
the NPC. But a low-key, steady approach that shows we have our
limits yet are willing to push ahead in a measured way should
work to the advantage of better U.S.-China relations in the long
run.
SECRET
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
08-Feb-1990 15:47 EDT
CONF IDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM:
Diane G. Ross
(ROSSDG)
SUBJECT:
Action Taken 2/8
Florence called down to let us know that the General has taken action
on the following items:
1) #0898 - ROADMAP ON CHINA POLICY FOR WEEKS AHEAD
The General has given this package to the President
2) #0731 - BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING USSR SHIPMENT OS MIG-29S
The General has noted with the following comment: "O.K."
3) #0504 - PROPOSED SECDEF VISIT TO POLAND & SOVIET UNION IN JULY/CROSSHATCH
The General has disapproved the recommendation.
The originals will be forwarded upon the General's return. That's it for
now folks!
Distribution:
FOR: Entell Ford
(FORD)
FOR: Anita J. Craig
( CRAIG )
FOR: Carol D. Mitchell
( MITCHELL )
CC: Barbara Browne
( BROWNE )
CC: Brenda I. Hilliard
( HILLIARD )
CC: Wendy E. Gray
( GRAY )
CC: Diane G. Ross
( ROSSDG )
CC: Cathy Millison
( MILLISON )
CC: G. Philip Hughes
( HUGHES )
CC: William F. Sittmann
( SITTMANN )
CC: : Florence E. Gantt
( GANTT )
CC: Diane L. Edwards
( EDWARDS )
CC: Wilma G. Hall
( HALL )
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0116-F13
81 12/13/06
SECRET
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0898
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
February 5, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
KARL JACKSON R&J
FROM:
DOUGLAS PAAL AIR
SUBJECT:
Roadmap on China Policy for the Weeks Ahead
At Tab I is an information memorandum for the President setting
forth an approach to China policy through the ups and downs in
U.S. -China relations we should expect through the end of March.
Concurrence by: Apral, Doke.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I
Scowcroft/President memo
DECLASSIFIED
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PER E.O. 12958,
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AS AMENDED
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OI 12/13/06
СПКОМ TILE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2611
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
4
April 5, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL D
Done
Nati Sec Advisor
FROM:
MEG LUNDSAGERM ML
has seen
SUBJECT:
Letter to Secretary Brady on G-7 Consensus on
World Bank Lending to China
Attached at Tab A is a letter for your signature to Secretary
Brady, asking him to raise World Bank lending to China at his G-7
Ministerial meeting this Saturday. Indications are that several
G-7 countries are wavering in their commitment to limit World
Bank lending solely to basic human needs (BHN). Secretary
Brady's meeting presents an excellent opportunity to renew that
G-7 consensus.
We should send this letter to Secretary Brady by noon Thursday.
He is leaving later that afternoon for Paris.
Concurrence by: Doug Paal If
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter to Secretary Brady at Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
Letter to Secretary Brady
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CONFIDENTIAL
2000-1204-F
or 3/22/10
COM IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Nick:
As you know, the G-7 countries have been successful to date in
limiting World Bank lending to China to loans which address basic
human needs (BHN). That consensus may now be wavering, and I
would like to ask that you raise this issue at your Ministerial
meeting on Saturday, in order to reaffirm G-7 unity on this
important issue.
My fear that we may be Losing that consensus stems from several
recent developments. World Bank President Conable has told the
press and Hill staffers that the Bank will soon resume normal
lending to China. A senior Chinese finance official told State
Department officials that Conable down-played the importance of
BHN criteria for China during a recent meeting in Washington.
Also, the EC Ambassador to Beijing told U.S. officials that EC
attitudes on Chinese sanctions are softening. He expected Italy
to push for economic normalization with China when it assumes the
EC Presidency in July.
()
In addition, a UK foreign affairs fficial told the State
Department that the UK was also interested in "getting back to
business with China" because of Hong Kong concerns. Finally,
World Bank Senior Vice President Qureshi is now in China and
meeting with the top Chinese leadership. The Chinese can be
expected to try to impress Qureshi with glowing reports of their
economic achievements and strong statements about China's
commitment to policy reform, despite recent indications that the
Chinese are exercising even more control over economic activity.
()
For reasons with which you are very familiar, I believe we should
maintain our G-7 consensus on limiting Bank lending strictly to
BHN loans. World Bank lending is presently our most important
leverage for prodding China towards political and economic
reforms. As you know, if we lose just one G-7 member, we lose
our 51% vote needed to block non-BHN loans at the Bank. And as
House Foreign Operations Subcommittee Chairman David Obey said to
you, Congress would find it impossible to go forward with
International Development Association (IDA) funding if the World
Bank group resumes normal lending to China.
(e)
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Nick, I know you share all these concerns. I hope that this
weekend you will be able to reaffirm the G-7 commitment to our
strategy for pursuing political and economic reform in China.
Sincerely,
Brent Scowcroft
The Honorable Nicholas F. Brady
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D.C. 20220
CONF IDENTIAL
COM
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9002505
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 02 APR 90 09
$4
TO: SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
FROM: PAAL
DOC DATE: 09 APR 90
JACKSON
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: CHINA PR
INTL TRADE
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: CHINA - GAME PLAN FOR MFN
ACTION: NOTED BY GATES W/ COMMENT
DUE DATE: 05 APR 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PAAL
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
JACKSON
PAAL
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/1/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSEF
CLOSED BY: NSJRP
DOC 2 OF 2
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2505 Redo
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 9, 1990
CHRON
FILE
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
KARL JACKSON KDJ
FROM:
DOUGLAS PAAD
SUBJECT:
China -- Game Plan for MFN
At Tab I is an information memorandum for the President that goes
into considerable detail on the impending issue of a waiver for
China to continue receiving the benefits of MFN. I think that
the President's personal exposure on China policy merits taking a
close look at the downside risks regarding MFN. It will not be
pleasant reading.
Clearly, the "responsible" course to take is to continue MFN in
China, and the President will want to do so, but the attendant
political costs are equally clear. They may be small, with luck.
They may also be on the order of the Pelosi fight, if we are not
so lucky. The Washington Post and New Republic are already
drawing lines in the sand over MFN.
Concurrences by DPAY orginia A. Lampley, DRIVER cholas A. Rostow Deter Tim
Deal Dogor Peter Rodman
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the information memorandum to the President at
Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Scowcroft/President Memorandum
Tab II
4/2/90 Staff Submission - 2505
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0116-F/2
Bunt memo should tell the what MFN? the we chinese President and exartly to 8 they we to
3r 8/14/07
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
INFORMATION
AS AMENDED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
2000-0116-F/2
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
32 8/14/07
SUBJECT:
China -- Game Plan for MFN
An ugly confrontation with Congress and Beijing awaits us over
waiver of Jackson-Vanik for China. We need to move early to
signal to China and to the American public your strong commitment
to human rights in China before human rights activists and
political opponents seize the lead. This is an opportunity for
us to move from defense to offense domestically on China issues,
while maximizing incentives for China to take steps in the right
direction.
The predicament. Draft legislation in both houses -- now stalled
-- may give the Congress the means for a fast-track joint
resolution of disapproval by the time the China waiver goes
forward. To continue MFN, the waiver must be sent to the Hill by
June 3, the anniversary of Tiananmen.
Good estimates of how the Congress will vote are not yet
available; it is too early for them to focus on it. Most
staffers say a majority in both houses will be eager to humiliate
our China policy, but they probably lack the two-thirds necessary
to override a veto of a joint resolution of disapproval. They
hope to have it both ways: humiliation of the policy and the
trade benefits of MFN with China.
The best way to proceed is to take the offensive vs. both the
Chinese and Congress, by taking a position that, under present
circumstances, you cannot recommend extending MFN for China.
This will anger the Chinese, but force them to face the issue of
better relations squarely. It will leave defense of MFN to
Congress and the business community.
The Chinese. There are early signs that the Chinese want to help
prevent loss of MFN. Chinese steps so far have been small (Peace
Corps and Fulbright implementation) and politically useless.
Beijing may be willing to do more; we need to encourage much
more.
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
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Internal leadership tensions and common fear of the masses will
lead to compromise efforts to placate you. Beijing will
undoubtedly try to delay any actions they may "promise" to take.
For example, one PRC Embassy official has suggested that you
recommend continuing MFN just before the due date of June 3. The
argument goes that China will carry out what we ask for after the
June 3-4 Tiananmen anniversary, and before Congress votes. This
may be Beijing's intention, and it may also be a trick. The risk
of another battle royal with Congress is too great to follow this
approach.
China must face the choice at some point. Either accommodate
the people and world opinion and risk downfall, or retreat into
greater isolation. The latter tendency is already strong, and
doctrinaire leaders will welcome a rupture with the U.S., perhaps
believing they can get what little they think they need from the
rest of the world.
A key point on which public debate here over MFN will turn is
whether to retaliate and squeeze China for its human rights
offenses and bad international behavior or work to strengthen the
forces of economic growth and reform. Over the next two months,
anniversaries and dissident tactics will continue to have the
regime seized with fright and ruthlessly determined to crush
dissent. Therefore, it will be important not to get ourselves
into defending China's record or otherwise get put on the
defensive over what happens in China. In fact, we will want to
be seen as actively interested in the human rights of the Chinese
people and working against irresponsible Chinese behavior abroad.
Why MFN for China? The primary case to make for MFN for China
is economic. Two-way trade last year was $17.8 billion, of which
U.S. exports were $5.8 billion. If MFN is lost, China will
retaliate against every American exporter who has competition on
the world market. (The U.S. is the only country with MFN
legislation like Jackson-Vanik.) Foreign Minister Qian has also
threatened major "retrogression," probably meaning at least
downgrading relations to the charge level. (Of course, the flip
side of the trade figures is that loss of MFN should remove the
$7-8 billion trade deficit from the U.S. account.)
CIA calculates that loss of MFN would cost China significantly
more than $2.5 billion in export earnings immediately, and the
Chinese would seek to impose a similar cost on U.S. exporters.
Beijing has increasingly centralized trade authority since
Tiananmen, so it has the tools. Loss of MFN would probably
strengthen the voice of hardliners who seek further
recentralization. This could make eventual restoration of
reforms and opening to the outside world all the more difficult.
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Joint ventures in China, such as Beijing Jeep, will have
exorbitant duties imposed on equipment needed to operate the
ventures; they will fail. Our competitors in trade and
investment will be the immediate beneficiaries.
Moreover, the extremity of the consequences of withdrawal of MFN
will tempt the G-7 to break ranks on other issues such as the
current limits on World Bank lending to China. Our human rights
legislation will not permit us to vote for the loans, but with
any G-7 country voting for World Bank lending, the loans may go
through. If they do, Congressman Obey has threatened to withhold
IDA replenishment, which in turn will lower the U.S. voting share
below the current 15.5% and lead to loss of a U.S. veto on
certain matters concerning the Bank.
A second reason for MFN is Hong Kong. Loss of MFN would threaten
to rupture many of the economic links through the colony.
Unemployment will climb dangerously in South China, and
substantially in Hong Kong, where $5.5 billion of Chinese goods
are reexported. U.S. investors in Hong Kong are already seeking
legislative help to restore confidence among their Hong Kong
white-collar employees; loss of MFN will wipe out any such
effort.
Concerns about the future of Hong Kong should help to sustain
China's MFN. Congressmen Solarz and Porter, for example, take a
strong interest in both human rights in China and Hong Kong's
future. Importers in Solarz's district have complained when he
has threatened MFN.
The third argument is human rights and the well-being of the
people of China. Since you first articulated your sanctions
against China, you have insisted on trying not to hurt ordinary
Chinese people, on keeping a line out to those with an interest
in opening and reform. You will be questioned on how to
reconcile your desire to avoiding hurting the Chinese people with
not supporting MFN. One answer is to throw back the question by
asking how can you help the people of China when your efforts on
behalf of the relationship are taken by Beijing as endorsement of
its current behavior.
The opponents of MFN. The China-watching community in the U.S.
has been traumatized by the repression since Tiananmen. They are
hurt, angry and vengeful as a group. Like many ordinary
Americans and Chinese students here, they believe the collapse of
the Chinese regime is just a shove away, a la East Europe.
Frankly, many are also outraged by their perception of the two
trips to China last year and the Pelosi veto. They believe,
paradoxically, that the Administration should be made to squirm
over MFN, yet you should not be so "irresponsible" as to let a
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4
resolution of disapproval stand. There are a few exceptions,
especially in Washington and among those with policy experience.
(The Chinese-American community is also traumatized, but not for
the first time, and so is much more inclined to favor continued
MFN. Many Chinese-Americans, of course, also have business
interests in China, but their human rights interests are no less
genuine.)
Human rights activists have energy to spare following the
developments in the Soviet Union and East Europe. China has
rapidly become the test case for many as to how this
Administration stands on human rights. They particularly like
China because it is easy to make the Administration look bad.
Naturally, adversaries on the Hill will exploit this to the
extent their constituents permit.
What to do? First, the Chinese will need to be told quietly that
under present circumstances, you cannot recommend that MFN be
retained. We should not go pubic with this for a week, as
Beijing will be somewhat more responsive if it is not publicly
backed into a corner at the outset.
We also need to get you on record as much as possible favoring
advancement of the human rights of the Chinese people. A speech
on Asia which touches on the subject would help. China also
needs to hear you speak firmly on proliferation of missiles.
As outrages occur during the spring anniversary season in China,
we should modestly escalate our rhetoric of condemnation. This
will run against instinct, but even the Chinese will understand
(though not agree) if they see the rhetoric protecting the
policy.
If Congressional support for MFN manifests itself, when the
waiver is sent to the Hill, its text will require close attention
to the human rights potential of continued MFN and the costs of
its loss. Critics will point to new restrictions on study abroad
imposed since the Pelosi veto to embarrass you and to block MFN,
on the narrow Jackson-Vanik grounds of restrictions on
emigration. There is potentially some flexibility on this point
-- based on compulsory national service precedents -- but not
much, and the Chinese should be pressed to change the
regulations.
More importantly, we need to jolt allies of the MFN in the
business community to carry on a campaign in the Congress. So
far, business people appear reluctant to take up China with their
senior management, let alone with Congress, but for some
companies the numbers in the China trade are very large.
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Options. In the end, your options boil down to the following:
--
Threaten to let MFN lapse. You could blame China for the
chill in relations. China will be reluctant to respond as
fully as is necessary, but pressure will build for China to
recognize the realities of the situation. You will be
criticized for "irresponsibility" by the business community
and some foreign policy observers and modestly praised for
yielding to the human rights activists, but you have a
chance at generating support for your management of China
policy.
--
Send the MFN waiver, but not fight for it. Say it is up to
Congress to decide. This may amount to turning China policy
over to the legislative branch, if we are not successful
beforehand in getting the Hill to decide to support MFN.
--
Prepare for another fight over your right to conduct foreign
policy by signalling an intention to veto. Given the way
China has reneged on the scorecard of positive steps since
the Pelosi veto fight, we will need maximum help from the
business community, which of course will be reluctant to be
seen publicly trying to stay in China.
For the time being, we are publicly characterizing you as not
having addressed the issue yet. In talks with trade groups, my
staff has found that business people become energized when they
hear that your veto of a resolution of disapproval is not
guaranteed.
SECRET
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National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY: MEN
LOG # 2505
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG As A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann
1
E
4
r
Bob Gates
&
Brent Scoweroft
M
Bill Sittmanh
E.
Situation Room
E
West Wine Desk
90 APR 4 P2. 52
4
NSC Secretariat
Paal
5
FPA
A = Action
I Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N
= No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
Memo Fn P Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS Thina- - Game Plane
for MFN
Epen Seed has diskette
SECRET
SECRET
2505
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506
April 2, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
KARL JACKSON KDJ
FROM:
DOUGLAS PAAL
SUBJECT:
China -- Game Plan for MFN
At Tab I is an information memorandum for the President that goes
into considerable detail on the impending issue of a waiver for
China to continue receiving the benefits of MFN. I think that
the President's personal exposure on China policy merits taking a
close look at the downside risks regarding MFN. It will not be
pleasant reading.
Clearly, the "responsible" course to take is to continue MFN in
China, and the President will want to do so, but the attendant
political costs are equally clear. They may be small, with luck.
They may also be on the order of the Pelosi fight, if we are not
so lucky. The Washington Post and New Republic are already
drawing lines in the sand over MFN.
The memorandum does not ask the President to endorse any specific
action. It is intended in part to evoke any guidance, however,
that he may want to direct. State is moving on a parallel track,
and will take longer to produce more concrete recommendations.
DL
Concurrences by: Virginia A. Lampley,
Nicholas
Rostow, Tim
Deal, Peter Rodman
MM
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the information memorandum to the President at
Tab I.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000 0116-F/2
31 8/14/07
SECRET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
INFORMATION
PER E.O. 12958,
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
AS AMENDED
2000-0116-F/2
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
3r 8/14/07
SUBJECT:
China -- Game Plan for MFN
An ugly confrontation with Congress potentially awaits us over
waiver of Jackson-Vanik for China. We need to move early to make
the case for MFN for China to key Congressional leaders before
human rights activists and political opponents seize the lead on
this issue. We will need allies in the business community to
help.
The predicament. Draft legislation in both houses--now stalled--
may give the Congress the means for a fast-track joint resolution
of disapproval by the time the China waiver goes forward. To
continue MFN, the waiver must be sent to the Hill by June 3, the
anniversary of Tiananmen.
Good estimates of how the Congress will vote are not yet
available; it is too early for them to focus on it. Some
staffers suggest there is no real appetite to deny MFN. (MFN was
not included in the omnibus China sanctions bill.) Others say a
majority in both houses will be eager to humiliate our China
policy, but they probably lack the two-thirds necessary to
override a veto of a joint resolution of disapproval.
The worst case scenario would be:
-- Your waiver, followed by vigorous, emotional denunciation of
any dealings with the Chinese regime.
--
A joint resolution of disapproval, with considerable
moralizing on the floor and in the press.
-- A veto and floor fight, followed by an override and a
strong, damaging Chinese reaction.
-- Alternatively, your veto is sustained, with more editorials
and cartoons about "kowtowing" to China, and yet your
critics' constituents lose no China business.
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
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2
The best case scenario would be:
Early, reasoned consultations with the Congress, especially
leaders representing constituencies with trade and
investment in China.
Testimony by the business community, as well as opposing
testimony by human rights groups and academics, as a result
of which there would be no leading to a joint resolution of
disapproval.
It seems to me the obvious way to proceed is to try for the best
case outcome, but be guided carefully by the potential for the
worst case. It is highly likely that the adversarial Democratic
leadership will not be able to resist scoring points off the
China policy in any event.
The Chinese. We can count on Beijing being no help whatsoever in
approaching MFN. It would be of some benefit if the Chinese
simply stay silent during the run-up to the MFN vote, but that
will not happen. Congressional statements and the media will
bait the current leaders in China. Some doctrinaire leaders may
actually hope for a rupture of this sort in our relations as they
try to guide China back to the misty past. Missile sales, the
Khmer Rouge, Rabta -- all these will hurt. On balance, however,
responsible Chinese will recognize the calamity inherent in loss
of MFN, although they lack the freedom internally to be helpful.
A key point on which debate over MFN will turn is whether to
retaliate and squeeze China for its human rights offenses and bad
international behavior or work to strengthen the forces of
economic growth and reform. Over the next two months,
anniversaries and dissident tactics will continue to have the
regime seized with fright and ruthlessly determined to crush
dissent. Therefore, it will be important not to get ourselves
into defending China's record or otherwise get put on the
defensive over what happens in China. In fact, we will want to
be seen as actively interested in the human rights of the Chinese
people and working against irresponsible Chinese behavior abroad.
We will also want to be reticent in describing the damage that
loss of MFN would cause the Chinese regime. A combination of
abuses in China and Beijing's fulminations against the U.S. could
lead to increased sentiment to use MFN to punish China. Most
observers already believe you are overly concerned for the
Chinese leadership and they could portray concern about the
downside as unwarranted deference to Deng and company.
Finally on the Chinese, they have adopted a smug pose, saying
that in the end you will veto a resolution of disapproval. The
Ambassador here heard that from former President Nixon. In
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meetings, the Embassy's officers laugh at and belittle our
efforts to take this issue seriously. Nonetheless, other
behavior belies this bluff. Key trade officials are concerned,
yet feel helpless. Li Peng resorts to threats.
Why MFN for China? The primary case to make for MFN for China
is economic. Two-way trade last year was $17.8 billion, of which
U.S. exports were $5.8 billion. If MFN is lost, China will
retaliate against every American exporter who has competition on
the world market. (The U.S. is the only country with MFN
legislation like Jackson-Vanik.) The record is clear on China's
willingness and capacity to retaliate; Foreign Minister Qian has
threatened "retrogression," probably meaning at least
downgrading relations to the charge level, and in 1983, when we
had a textile dispute, China cut off grain purchases from the
U.S.
CIA calculates that loss of MFN would cost China significantly
more than $2.5 billion in export earnings immediately, and the
Chinese would seek to impose a similar cost on U.S. exporters.
Beijing has increasingly centralized trade authority since
Tiananmen, so it has the tools. Loss of MFN would probably
strengthen the voice of hardliners who seek further
recentralization. This could make eventual restoration of
reforms and opening to the outside world all the more difficult.
Joint ventures in China, such as Beijing Jeep, will have
exorbitant duties imposed on equipment needed to operate the
ventures; they will fail. Our competitors in trade and
investment will be the immediate beneficiaries.
Moreover, the extremity of the consequences of withdrawal of MFN
will tempt the G-7 to break ranks on other issues such as the
current limits on World Bank lending to China. Our human rights
legislation will not permit us to vote for the loans, but with
any G-7 country voting for World Bank lending, the loans may go
through. If they do, Congressman Obey has threatened to withhold
IDA replenishment, which in turn will lower the U.S. voting share
below the current 15.5% and lead to loss of a U.S. veto on
certain matters concerning the Bank.
A second reason for MFN is Hong Kong. Loss of MFN would threaten
to rupture many of the economic links through the colony.
Unemployment will climb dangerously in South China, and
substantially in Hong Kong, where $5.5 billion of Chinese goods
are reexported. U.S. investors in Hong Kong are already seeking
legislative help to restore confidence among their Hong Kong
white-collar employees; loss of MFN will wipe out any such
effort.
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We should exploit concerns about Hong Kong to sustain China's
MFN. Congressmen Solarz and Porter, for example, take a strong
interest in both human rights in China and Hong Kong's future.
We should acknowledge their former concern, while appealing to
the latter in the case of MFN.
The third argument is human rights and the well-being of the
people of China. Since you first articulated your sanctions
against China, you have insisted on trying not to hurt ordinary
Chinese people, on keeping a line out to those with an interest
in opening and reform. Curiously, Chinese outside China -- such
as the student leadership here -- are far more eager to use every
method, however extreme, to bring down the current regime than
are reformers and students within China. We will need to make
clear that those outside China enjoying the privileges and rights
of the West have no business trying to make life harder for their
brothers in China.
The opponents of MFN. The China-watching community in the U.S.
has been traumatized by the repression since Tiananmen. They are
hurt, angry and vengeful as a group. Like many ordinary
Americans, they believe the collapse of the Chinese regime is
just a shove away, a la East Europe. Frankly, many are also
outraged by their perception of the two trips to China last year
and the Pelosi veto. They believe, paradoxically, that the
Administration should be made to squirm over MFN, yet you should
not be so "irresponsible" as to let a resolution of disapproval
stand. There are a few exceptions, especially in Washington and
among those with policy experience.
(The Chinese-American community is also traumatized, but not for
the first time, and so is much more inclined to favor continued
MFN. Many Chinese-Americans, of course, also have business
interests in China, but their human rights interests are no less
genuine.)
Human rights activists have energy to spare following the
developments in the Soviet Union and East Europe. China has
rapidly become the test case for many as to how this
Administration stands on human rights. They particularly like
China because it is easy to make the Administration look bad.
Naturally, adversaries on the Hill will exploit this to the
extent their constituents and we permit.
What to do? First, we need to get you on record as much as
possible favoring advancement of the human rights of the Chinese
people through engagement. A speech on Asia which touches on the
subject would help. China also needs to hear you speak firmly on
proliferation of missiles.
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Delayed enforced departure of Chinese students will expire at the
end of June. We are already getting pressure to issue an
extension because students are confronting real problems getting
employment and making plans beyond June. You should order the
extension before you are seen to be pressed into doing so, but as
close as possible to the date when you send the MFN waiver to the
Hill. My staff will do more work on this.
As outrages occur during the spring anniversary season in China,
we should modestly escalate our rhetoric of condemnation. This
will run against instinct, but even the Chinese will understand
(though not agree) when they see the rhetoric protecting the
policy.
Thus far, we have kept the Dalai Lama at a distance from the
White House. Now that he is a Nobel prize winner, my staff is
hearing soundings for a visit by this religious leader with you.
We may, after further consideration, want to arrange a meeting,
carefully, to burnish your human rights credentials, while
avoiding the Dalai Lama's political agenda as much as possible.
When the waiver is sent to the Hill, its text will require close
attention to the human rights potential of continued MFN and the
costs of its loss. Critics will point to new restrictions on
study abroad imposed since the Pelosi veto to embarrass you and
to block MFN, on the narrow Jackson-Vanik grounds of restrictions
on emigration. There is potentially some flexibility on this
point--based on compulsory national service precedents--but not
much.
More importantly, we need to enlist allies in the business
community to carry on a quiet campaign in the Congress. So far,
business people appear reluctant to take up China with their
senior management, let alone with Congress, but for some
companies the numbers in the China trade are very large. Our
rhetoric should refer to the economic costs of the loss of MFN,
but it should concentrate on the human rights benefits for the
Chinese people. It is on this political battleground that the
issue will be fought. Congress will not want to address the
economic issues frontally.
One hope is that quiet persuasion on the Hill, plus consultation
and testimony by Administration figures, well in advance of the
due date, will deflect the Congress from a confrontation. My
staff and State are already speaking to trade groups and
investors urging them to make their views clear.
Options, In the end, your options boil down to the following:
Let MFN lapse by not sending a waiver to the Hill. You
could blame China for the chill in relations. China will
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not respond to this type of pressure. You will be
criticized for irresponsibility by the business community
and modestly praised for yielding to the human rights
activists.
Send the MFN waiver, but not fight for it. Say it is up to
Congress to decide. This may amount to turning China policy
over to the legislative branch, if we are not successful
beforehand in persuading the Hill to go along quietly on
MFN.
Prepare for another fight over your right to conduct foreign
policy by signalling an intention to veto. Given the way
China has reneged on the scorecard of positive steps since
the Pelosi veto fight, we will need maximum help from the
business community, which of course will be reluctant to be
seen publicly trying to stay in China.
For the time being, we are characterizing your position as
"keeping your options open." In talks with trade groups, my
staff has found that the business people become energized when
they hear that your veto of a resolution of disapproval is not
guaranteed.
Unless you direct otherwise, we will continue along these lines
to encourage business people to make their views clear. We will
also look for opportunities to strengthen the public perception
of your position on human rights in China and on China's
irresponsible international behavior.
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