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Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]
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Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]
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Brent Scowcroft Papers
Desert Shield and Desert Storm Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
OA/ID Number:
91146
Folder ID Number:
91146-002
Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
3
6
4
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01a. Memo
Timothy E. Deal to Robert M. Gates
1/7/91
(b)(1)
$
Re: Burdensharing in Gulf Crisis (3 pp.)
01b. Letter
To Dick Thornburgh
1/2/91
(b)(1)
Re: steps being taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1
pp.)
01c. Report
Re: Threat Assessment - United States (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
01d. Report
Re: Resources Being Applied/Contingency Plans: (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
01e. Report
Re: Chemical/Biological Counterrorism Matters (2 pp.)
n.d.
(1)
01f. Report
Re: FBI Needs/Requests (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
01g. Report
Re: Threat Warning System (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
02. Memo
Timothy E. Deal to Robert M. Gates
1/7/91
(b)(1)
/
Re: Burdensharing in Gulf Crisis (3 pp.)
03a. Telcon
Re: Telephone Cnversation with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir
1/7/91
(b)(1)
(3 pp.)
Page 1 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1215
OA/ID Number:
91146-002
Date Closed:
6/22/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
03b. Memo
Richard N. Haass to William F. Sittmann
1/7/91
(b)(1)
&
Re: Memorandum of Telephone Call with Prime Minister Shamir,
January 7, 1991 (1 pp.)
04a. Letter
President Bush to Secretary General Manfred Woerner
1/8/91
(b)(1)
Re: Thank you so much for your kind letter (1 pp.)
04b. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
1/4/91
(b)(1)
Re: Letter from the President to NATO Secretary General
Woerner Regarding Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)
04c. Memo
Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft
12/28/90
(b)(1)
Re: Letter from the President to NATO Secretary General
Woerner Regarding Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)
04d. Memo
J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft
12/20/90
(b)(1)
f
Re: Draft Reply to Letter from NATO Secretary General Woerner
to the President (1 pp.)
04e. Memo
Charles Jackson to William Sittmann
12/17/90
(b)(1)
Re: Alerting NSCS on Presidential Correspondence (1 pp.)
04f. Letter
M. Worner to President Bush
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: I regret. (1 pp.)
04g. Handwritten
M. Worner to President Bush
12/4/90
(b)(1)
Letter
Re: I regret.
(3 pp.)
Page 2 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1215
OA/ID Number:
91146-002
Date Closed:
6/22/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
05a. Profile Sheet
Scowcroft to Baker, J
1/8/91
(b)(1)
Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)
$
05b. Cable
Re: Cable for Secretary Baker (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
05c. Cable
Re: Message to Secretary of State James Baker from General
n.d.
(b)(1)
$
Scowcroft (2 pp.)
Page 3 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]
Pinksheet Number:
cap1215
OA/ID Number:
91146-002
Date Closed:
6/22/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
CONF IDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9100125
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 91 12
TO: GATES
CHRON FILE
FROM: DEAL
DOC DATE: 07 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
2
UAE
JAPAN
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: BURDENSHARING IN GULF CRISIS
ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
DUE DATE: 10 JAN 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: DEAL
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DEAL
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/22/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSGLM
CLOSED BY: NSMEM
DOC 1 OF 1
CONF IDENTIAL
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
R LOG # 0125
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG Ae A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
X Ken Hill
1
K
I
Bill Sittmann
2
300
W
Bob Gates
3
8
Brent Scowcroft
X
38
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
5
APNSA/Has Seen
H
NSC Secretariat
6
W/R
or
A = Action
I = Information
D-s Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
0125
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
January 7, 1991
Natl Sec Advisor
has seen
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES
PO
FROM:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL
SUBJECT:
Burdensharing in Gulf Crisis
This supplements my comments to you by phone Saturday regarding
allied burdensharing in the Gulf Crisis.
As I said then, I believe Secretary Brady's data on foreign
contributions to Desert Shield are incomplete and somewhat
misleading. The problem is getting accurate data from DOD, which
has been reluctant to share information on this subject with
other agencies.
Here is the latest data that we have from DOD and Treasury on
Desert Shield and financial assistance to the Front Line states:
Desert Shield: Contributions by Allies in CY 1990
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)
Total
Total
Commitments
Disbursements
Saudi Arabia
1.8
1.2
Kuwait
2.5
2.5
UAE
1.0
0.6
Japan
2.0¹
0.5
Germany
1.1
0.3
Korea
0.1
---
Total
8.52
5.2
Eliminating the Japanese contributions to other forces in the
Gulf, the correct figures for Desert Shield for CY 1990 are:
Commitments, $8.2 billion; disbursements to date, $5.2 billion.
Disbursements for Saudi Arabia, Japan and Germany have lagged
commitments for the following reasons:
1 Includes $267 million for other multinational forces
2 Includes Japan's contribution of $267 million for other
multinational forces
DECLASSIFIED
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 13526
Declassify on: OADR
2010-08-MR
Es 10/5/15
CONFIDENTIAL
2
-- Saudi Arabia: The $1.2 billion in disbursements does
not include host nation support for December, which DOD must yet
evaluate. Also, Secretary Baker and Wolfowitz allegedly obtained
a commitment from the Saudis for $1.05 billion for en route
travel expenses in connection with the second deployment. For
some reason, State has been sitting on an instructions cable to
Riyadh requesting these funds. When obtained, they will be added
either to the CY 1990 or CY 1991 contributions.
-- Germany and Japan: Both have committed large amount of
in-kind and lift support which are either in the pipeline or
subject to further negotiations (what Germany has offered in the
way of in-kind material reportedly is of questionable utility,
and cash payments may be sought instead).
The data on commitments and disbursements for assistance to the
Front Line states are more clear cut:
Ffinancial Assistance to Front Line States and Others in FY 1990-91
(Billions in U.S. Dollars)
Estimated Needs
Commitments
Disbursements
Egypt
3.4
4.0
2.4
Turkey
5.9
2.3
0.8
Jordan
4.3
0.5
0.2
Others
4.0
0.2
East Europe
1.0
Total
14.6
10.9
3.6
On the question of the Saudi windfall from higher oil prices,
Treasury has estimated a $14.8 billion gain in 1990, which is in
the mid-range of Embassy Riyadh projections. The Embassy has,
however, estimated that the Saudis have made major outlays for
their defense and for aid and that actual expenditures far exceed
any windfall profits. The Embassy's figures are as follows:
Saudi Expenditure Commitments in Connection with
Gulf Crisis through November 1990
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)
Defense
18.3
Saudi Mobilization and Support
1.8
Third Country Military Support
2.9
New Arms and Equipment Contracts
13.6
Aid
6.0
Increased Oil Production (incremental
1.7
operating and capital costs)
Refugees
0.6
Civil Defense
0.3
Other
3.0
Total
29.9
CONFIDENTIAL
COVERSEMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
3
As directed by the Informal Steering Group, we are preparing a
press statement with data about allied contributions for Desert
Shield and the Front Line states.
CC:
Richard Haass
David Gompert
Karl Jackson
CONFIDENTIAL
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
JUSTITY AMERICA OM4 SEQUITURE USON OF
#
TO: The President
Attached find an update
on FBI anti-terrorism
measures responding to any
Iraqi threat.
We
R.L.T.
1/3/91
(SECRET material attached.)
Copies to: Hon. John Sununu
Hon. Edith Holiday
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 3, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCQWCROFT
FROM:
EDE HOLIDAY MA
SUBJECT:
The Attached Report on Anti-Terrorism
The Attorney General has asked me to convey to the President the
attached report on anti-terrorism measures undertaken in response
to the Iraq crisis. For most routine matters I send Cabinet
correspondence directly to the President through the Staff
Secretary, but I thought you may prefer to see this item first
and convey it to the President through the NSC.
Attachment
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of the Director
Washington. D.C. 20535
January 2, 1991
Honorable Dick Thornburgh
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
The attached material reflects the steps being taken by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to insure a proper level of
readiness in connection with the current Iraqi crisis. The
materials include threat assessment information as well as an
assessment of the possible areas from which terrorist attacks may
come. Also included is information on the pro-active steps being
taken by the FBI to increase our ability to respond promptly to any
situation.
If you require a briefing on this material, please do not
hesitate to contact me at your earliest convenience.
Sincerely, Bill
/
William S. Sessions
Director
Enclosure
1 - Honorable William P. Barr (Enclosure)
Deputy Attorney General
(SECRET Material Attached)
FBI, CO.
SECRET
THIS IS A COVER SHEET
FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
ALL INDIVIDUALS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT
IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED
DOCUMENT MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE
ORDER(S), STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By
NARA, Date
(This cover sheet is unclassified.)
SECRET
STANDARD FORM 704 (8-85)
704-101
Prescribed by GSA/ISOO
NSN 7540-01-213-7902
32 CFR 2003
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01c. Report
Re: Threat Assessment - United States (3 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
Chronological Files
By Es
On 7/21/22
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]
Date Closed:
6/22/2009
OA/ID Number:
91146-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2010-0869-MR (500.02)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 8/3/2015
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
GEORGE 500.02 H.W. BUSH
SECRET
2010
auplicate of
#501.01
THREAT ASSESSMENT - UNITED STATES:
RESIDENTIAL
FBI THREAT ASSESSMENT:
The FBI has not seen any specific planning for
domestic terrorist operations from within the
official diplomatic presence. Further, no specific
planning has been seen within the Iraqi Ba'ath
Party Organization or student/religious groups. No
information of terrorist planning has come to our
attention as the result of interviews currently
being conducted within the Iraqi student community.
This situation could change quickly in the event of
war.
FBI technical, physical and human source coverage
of traditional terrorist groups has not developed
information relating to specific planning for
domestic terrorist operations. However,
intelligence information from abroad indicates
that threats from such groups in Europe and South
American countries have surfaced. These groups
have well developed infrastructures within the
United States which have the capability of
planning and executing terrorist operations in the
event of war.
Given the current situation in the Middle East, the
resulting terrorist threat would be in three separate and
distinct areas:
(1) IRAOI PRESENCE IN THE U.S.: Through official
diplomatic presence at the Iragi Embassy and the
Iragi United Nations Mission, Iragi Ba'ath Party
Organization, and other student/religious groups-
intelligence gathering and possible planning for
terrorist activity.
Since the beginning of this current crisis, the
official Iraqi presence in the United States has
been significantly reduced.
The Iraqi Embassy in Washington, D.C., has been
reduced from a complement of 64 diplomats and
administrative staff to a current complement of 19.
Current plans under consideration by DOS would
further reduce this complement to five (on or about
January 12-14, 1991).
The Iraqi Mission to the United Nations has
maintained the same complement of 21 diplomatic
and administrative staff.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0865-MR
SECRET
Es 8/3/15
SECRET
1.4(c); 1.4(d)
(2)
TRADITIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS WHICH MAY
SUPPORT IRAQ:
O Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
1.4(c); 1.4(d)
O Hizballah
|1.4(c); 1.4(d)
O Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
1.4(c); 1.4(d)
O Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP)
1,4(c); 1.4(d)
O PRTP-EPB-Macheteros
- Approximately 80-100 members in U.S.
- (Domestic-Puerto Rican) - 1 FFI (Group)
- Predominantly located in Puerto Rico, possibly
a small presence in New York
O Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP)
- Approximately 50 members in U.S.
- (Domestic-U.S.) - 1 FFI (Group)
- Largest concentration in Los Angeles, some in
Chicago
SECRET
SECRET
(3) INDIVIDUAL ZEALOT (ACTING INDEPENDENTLY) : Any
individual with such conviction to commit an act
without direction from Iraq. (example: 11/27/90
arrest of Jamal Warrayat in Newark for threatening
U.S. officials and conspiring to attack U.S.
military bases in the U.S. in support of the Iraqi
cause.
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01d. Report
Re: Resources Being Applied/Contingency Plans: (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]
Date Closed:
6/22/2009
OA/ID Number:
91146-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECRET
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL COUNTERTERRORISM MATTERS:
The FBI has developed a Chemical/Biological Incident
Response Plan which provides a graduated response to a
chemical/biological-related incident which occurs
within the U.S., utilizing Department of Defense and
internal FBI resources, in conjunction with other
Federal agencies. The plan is designed to enable FBIHQ
to provide assistance to all FBI Field Divisions.
The implementation of the plan includes:
- Assessment of the threat.
- Provision of technical advice to the field.
- Deployment of technical personnel and
resources to the scene.
- Marshalling of appropriate health and safety
resources.
o The FBI has developed a relationship with personnel
from various agencies specially trained in
chemical/biological warfare agents, to assist the FBI
in evaluating the credibility of a
chemical/biological threat.
This Chemical/Biological Credibility Assessment Team
is coordinated by the FBI. The team assesses each
threat on the basis of its operational, technical,
and behavioral aspects.
The behavioral assessment of a chemical/biological
threat is addressed by the Special Operations and
Research Unit, Training Division. This unit has
established a network of contract psychologists and
other specialists to assist in this endeavor.
The operational and technical assessments are
conducted by the following components, at the
direction of the FBI: U.S. Medical Institute for
Infectious Diseases; the Armed Forces Medical
Intelligence Center; the Foreign Science Technology
Center; the U.S. Army Chemical Research Development
and Engineering Center; and the U.S. Army Technical
Escort Unit. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) also provide assistance.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0865-MR
Es 8/3/15
SECRET
Operational assistance to the FBI is provided by the
EPA, HHS, the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit and the
U.S. Medical Institute for Infectious Diseases.
The FBI provided a briefing to select members of the
White House staff outlining the FBI's
Chemical/Biological Incident Response Plan on
11/19/90.
A conference was sponsored by the FBI on 12/17/90,
at FBIHQ, during which available technical support
and capabilities were reviewed. The purpose of this
conference was to further develop and refine the
incident response plan. Participants included the
Department of Defense, HHS, EPA, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S.
Secret Service.
The relationship between law enforcement and
consequence crisis management is both dynamic and
evolving. Any lead agency designation for
consequence management should demand proper
coordination and communication among the various
Federal agencies involved.
SECRET
SECRET
FBI Needs/Requests:
1. Availability of adequate (C-141) transportation for HRT
deployment inside the United States.
2. Continued availability of DOD support for FBI's
chemical/biological response program.
3.
Continued discussion to ensure proper coordination
between law enforcement and consequence management in a
chemical/biological response plan.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010
2010-0865-MR
Es 8/3/15
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01g. Report
Re: Threat Warning System (2 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Document Partially Declassified
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
Chronological Files
By Es
On 7/21/22
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]
Date Closed:
6/22/2009
OA/ID Number:
91146-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2010-0869-MR (500.06)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 8/3/2015
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
ORGE 500.06 H.W. BUSH
2010
MR
#501.05
SECRET
PRESIDENTIAL
LIBRARY
THREAT WARNING SYSTEM:
Since the onset of the Iraqi crisis, the following threat
advisories have been disseminated:
DATE
SUMMARY
1.4(c); 1.4(d)
8/25/90
9/26/90
Alert for U.S. Government buildings and
compounds in Washington, D.C. Two instances of
official Iraqi vehicles approaching entrances
to secure U.S. compounds under pretext of being
lost and needing directions.
10/30/90
Official U.S. Iraqi presence: 14 diplomats in
1.4(c); 1.4(d)
Washington, D.C., 23 in New York City.
1.4(c); 1.4(d)
11/28/90
Conflicting information from Iraq to U.S. -based
Iraqi diplomats resulting in some discontent.
No uniform support for Hussein within the
diplomatic corps. Jewish Defense League leader
Meir Kahane assassinated in New York City
11/5/90 - no Iraqi connection, but illustration
of potential for Muslim radicals to act
independently.
12/20/90
Jamal Warrayat arrested in Newark 11/27/90 for
threatening U.S. officials and conspiring to
destroy/injure military bases allegedly on
behalf of Iraq. while Warrayat had been in
contact with Iraqi officials, it appears that
he was acting on his own.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0865-MR
Es 8/3/5
SECRET
12/28/90 1.4(c); 1.4(d)
SECRET
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/22/09
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9100125
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 91 12
TO: GATES
CHRON FILE
FROM: DEAL
DOC DATE: 07 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
UAE
JAPAN
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: BURDENSHARING IN GULF CRISIS
ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN
DUE DATE: 10 JAN 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: DEAL
LOGREF:
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By Cap NARA, Datecl22/09
COMMENTS:
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Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
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Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
91 91FEB7 All 57
27.2/7
NSC Secretariat
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CONFIDENTIAL
0125
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
OBELOAR
January 7, 1991
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES
FROM:
TIMOTHY E. DEAL
SUBJECT:
Burdensharing in Gulf Crisis
This supplements my comments to you by phone Saturday regarding
allied burdensharing in the Gulf Crisis.
As I said then, I believe Secretary Brady's data on foreign
contributions to Desert Shield are incomplete and somewhat
misleading. The problem is getting accurate data from DOD, which
has been reluctant to share information on this subject with
other agencies.
Here is the latest data that we have from DOD and Treasury on
Desert Shield and financial assistance to the Front Line states:
Desert Shield: Contributions by Allies in CY 1990
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)
Total
Total
Commitments
Disbursements
Saudi Arabia
1.8
1.2
Kuwait
2.5
2.5
UAE
1.0
0.6
Japan
2.0¹
0.5
Germany
1.1
0.3
Korea
0.1
---
Total
8.52
5.2
Eliminating the Japanese contributions to other forces in the
Gulf, the correct figures for Desert Shield for CY 1990 are:
Commitments, $8.2 billion; disbursements to date, $5.2 billion.
Disbursements for Saudi Arabia, Japan and Germany have lagged
commitments for the following reasons:
¹Includes $267 million for other multinational forces
²Includes Japan's contribution of $267 million for other
multinational forces
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 13526
Declassify on: OADR
20100869-MR
Es 10/5/15
CONFIDENTIAL
2
-- Saudi Arabia: The $1.2 billion in disbursements does
not include host nation support for December, which DOD must yet
evaluate. Also, Secretary Baker and Wolfowitz allegedly obtained
a commitment from the Saudis for $1.05 billion for en route
travel expenses in connection with the second deployment. For
some reason, State has been sitting on an instructions cable to
Riyadh requesting these funds. When obtained, they will be added
either to the CY 1990 or CY 1991 contributions.
-- Germany and Japan: Both have committed large amount of
in-kind and lift support which are either in the pipeline or
subject to further negotiations (what Germany has offered in the
way of in-kind material reportedly is of questionable utility,
and cash payments may be sought instead).
The data on commitments and disbursements for assistance to the
Front Line states are more clear cut:
Ffinancial Assistance to Front Line States and Others in FY 1990-91
(Billions in U.S. Dollars)
Estimated Needs
Commitments
Disbursements
Egypt
3.4
4.0
2.4
Turkey
5.9
2.3
0.8
Jordan
4.3
0.5
0.2
Others
---
4.0
0.2
East Europe
1.0
---
---
Total
14.6
10.9
3.6
On the question of the Saudi windfall from higher oil prices,
Treasury has estimated a $14.8 billion gain in 1990, which is in
the mid-range of Embassy Riyadh projections. The Embassy has,
however, estimated that the Saudis have made major outlays for
their defense and for aid and that actual expenditures far exceed
any windfall profits. The Embassy's figures are as follows:
Saudi Expenditure Commitments in Connection with
Gulf Crisis through November 1990
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)
Defense
18.3
Saudi Mobilization and Support
1.8
Third Country Military Support
2.9
New Arms and Equipment Contracts
13.6
Aid
6.0
Increased Oil Production (incremental
1.7
operating and capital costs)
Refugees
0.6
Civil Defense
0.3
Other
3.0
Total
29.9
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
As directed by the Informal Steering Group, we are preparing a
press statement with data about allied contributions for Desert
Shield and the Front Line states.
CC:
Richard Haass
David Gompert
Karl Jackson
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9100126
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 91 12
TO: WINSTON, C
CHRON FILE
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 07 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
PUBLIC STATEMENTS
WH REFERRAL
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: VIDEO ADDRESS TO COMMUNITY OF NATIONS AGAINST IRAQI AGGRESSION
ACTION: GATES SGD WH REFERRAL
DUE DATE: 10 JAN 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: HAASS
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#
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2
W
3
Bob Gates
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Situation: Room
il
91 JAN 7 35 P 2 : 35
West Wing Desk
4
my
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CLOSE HOLD
Document No. 0126
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
DATE: 1/7/90
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 4:00 TODAY
VIDEO ADDRESS TO THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS UNITED AGAINST
IRAQI AGGRESSION
SUBJECT:
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
ROGICH
CARD
UNTERMEYER
CICCONI
ROGERS
DEMAREST
WINSTON
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
HOLIDAY
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 4:00 TODAY, with a copy to my office. Sorry
for the short turnaround. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
January 7, 1991
Memo to Chriss Winston
The NSC concurs with changes as ndicated.
Brent Rach Scowcroft
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
CLOSE HOLD
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
McGroarty/Dooley
91 JAN-7 PH12: 02
January 7, 1991
11:30 a.m.
[COALITION]
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS:
VIDEO ADDRESS TO THE COMMUNITY OF
NATIONS UNITED AGAINST IRAQI AGGRESSION
More than five months ago, in the early morning hours of
August 2nd, Iraqi forces rolled south, and the rape of Kuwait
unprovsked
began. That A invasion was more than an attack on Kuwait -- more
brutal
than the ^ unproveked occupation of a tiny nation that posed no
threat to its large and powerful neighbor. It was an assault on
the very notion of international order. //
countries
My purpose in speaking to you -- the people of nations
united against this assault -- is to share with you my view of
the aims and objectives that must guide us in the challenging
days ahead. //
From the center of the crisis in the Middle East, to people
comtries
and nations on every continent -- to the families with loved ones
held hostage, to the many millions sure to suffer at the hands of
one man with a stranglehold on the world's economic lifeline --
Iraq's aggression has caused untold suffering, hardship and
uncertainty. 11
more than
In the five months since August 2nd, Iraqi troops have
carried out a systematic campaign of terror on the people of
agreement menand women
Kuwait. Unspeakable atrocities A -- and among the maimed and
murdered, even innocent children. //
more than
In the five months since August 2nd, Iraq's action has
imposed economic strains on nations large and small -- among
them, some of the world's newest democracies at the very moment
they are most vulnerable.
And yet, Iraq's aggression did not go unchallenged. //
In the five months since August 2nd, the world has witnessed
the emergence of an unprecedented coalition against aggression.
In the United Nations, Iraq's outlaw act has met a chorus of
condemnation in 12 Resolutions with the overwhelming support of
the Security Council. At this moment, forces from 28 nations --
and Anterican
rich and poor, Arab and Muslim, European, Asian and African
stand side by side in the Gulf, determined that Saddam's
aggression will not stand. //
We are now entering the most critical period of this crisis.
For the past five months, Saddam has held the world and the norms
of civilized conduct in contempt. In the next five days, Iraq
arrives at a deadline that spells the limit of the civilized
world's patience. //
Let me be clear about the upcoming deadline. January 15 is
not a date certain for the onset of armed conflict -- it is a
deadline for Saddam Hussein to choose to choose peace was over
The purpose of declaring this deadline was to give Saddam
fair warning: withdraw from Kuwait, without condition and
without delay or face -- any time on or after that date a
coalition ready and willing to employ "all means necessary" to
enforce the will of the United Nations. //
Every one of us, each day of this crisis, has held out hope
for a peaceful solution. Even now, as the deadline draws near,
we continue to seek a way to end this crisis without further
conflict. That is why, back on November 30, I offered to have
Secretary Baker travel to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein.
/
That is why, even after Saddam failed to respond -- failed to
find time to meet on any of the 15 days we put forward -- I
invited Iraq's foreign minister to meet with Secretary Baker in
Geneva just a few days from now. //
on wednesd Ranuary 9.
In Geneva, we will be guided by the will of the world
community -- expressed in those 12 UN resolutions I mentioned a
moment ago. // I didn't send Secretary Baker to Geneva to
compromise -- or to offer concessions. This meeting offers
and possibly to from chance
Saddam Hussein one final A before the UN deadline to resolve
by peaceful means the crisis he has created. //
Saddam may seek to split the coalition -- to exploit our
sincere desire for peace to secure for himself the spoils of war.
He
1 will
I know that pressures are now building to provide Saddam
fail-
some means of saving face -- or to accept a withdrawal that is
just
as
less than unconditional. The danger in this course should be
y
has
clear to all. The price of peace now on Saddam's terms will be
fails
in the future.
for
paid many times over A in greater sacrifice and suffering.
ms
the
Saddam's power will only grow -- along with his appetite for more
five
conquest. The next conflict will find him stronger still --
month
perhaps in possession even of nuclear weapons -- and far more
difficult to defeat.
That is why we simply cannot accept anything less than full
compliance with the UN dictates: Iraq's complete and
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. //
we all
share.
I began by saying that Iraq's action was more than an attack
usall, on
of
on one nation -- it is an assault on the international order. We
who have witnessed in this past year an end to the long years of
Cold War and conflict -- we who have seen so much positive change
-- stand now at a critical moment, one that will shape the world
we live in for years, even decades, to come.
The key now in meeting this challenge is for this remarkable
coalition to remain steadfast and strong. If we remain in the
days ahead nations united against aggression, we will turn back
not only the actions of an ambitious dictator -- we will as
partners step forward toward a world of peace. //
Thank you, and may God bless all of you.
# # #
CLOSE HOLD
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DOCUMENT
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SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:
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CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9100140
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DOC DATE: 07 JAN 91
2.
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: ISRAEL
TELCON
CHRON FILE
IRAQ
KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF
PERSONS: SHAMIR, YITZHAK
SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PM SHAMIR RE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION / JAN 7
ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM
DUE DATE: 10 JAN 91
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
0140
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with Israeli Prime
Minister Shamir
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Prime Minister Shamir
Notetaker: John Montgomery
DATE, TIME
January 7, 1991, 1500 - 1510 EDT
AND PLACE:
the White House
The President: Mr. Prime Minister, How are you?
PM Shamir: I am fine and happy to hear your voice.
The President: I thought our meeting in December was quite good
and I want to keep up the communication. There are a couple
things about the Gulf Crisis that I would like to raise with you.
First, when Jim Baker sees Tariq Aziz in Geneva, he will be very
straight. Everything is exactly as we have made public: Iraq
must leave Kuwait, or face catastrophe. There will be no behind
the scenes negotiations, no deals, no face-saving, and no
linkage. That is the underline or main spring of our policy.
There is no hidden agenda, no secret emissaries. I also said
publicly that we do not plan any follow-up meeting in Baghdad
with Saddam himself. We are also being very direct with our
European partners. We are cautioning them against diplomacy that
could encourage Saddam to believe there are splits in the
coalition. What the EC said officially is quite good. We don't
want any appearances of splits in a diverse coalition. As this
moves down the track, many are looking or hope for a peaceful
solution. I think what [Luxembourg Foreign Minister] Poos said
is very good.
I also would like to ask your agreement to receive Larry
Eagleburger on a very quiet mission to talk to you about where I
see things going. Larry is very close to me. He was at my house
last night and that is what we talked about. His points will be
specific and from me. This would be a continuation of the
private conversation you and I had during your visit. If it is
agreeable to you, I will ask Ambassador Brown to set up this very
important meeting.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CONFIDENTIAL
2000-0429-F
8/12/2009 MM
CONFIEL
CONF IDENTIAL
2
PM Shamir: Thank you. I know him. If he has your confidence, I
will be very happy to receive him and talk with him.
The President: Yes he does. He will reflect my personal views;
I consider this a confidence building mission. He is a very good
man to do it. Please consider him a personal emissary.
PM Shamir: Will you be sending him soon? In the next few days?
The President: Yes, before the weekend.
PM Shamir: I will receive him at any moment and be happy to
listen and to understand your views better.
The President: Wonderful, we also want to hear your views,
anything you say will be important. [Deputy Secretary]
Eagleburger will be in contact with me before he comes.
PM Shamir: Will Larry Eagleburger's visit be made public?
The President: I hope not, but it is up to you. It would be
better if it were kept quiet. It should be a private meeting,
but if word gets out, at least the subject matter should be kept
confidential. The visit is not a secret mission, but would be
better if it were kept a quiet mission.
PM Shamir: Good. I may have something else to convey to you.
The President: Okay. Ambassador Brown will know about the
visit.
PM Shamir: OK. Very good. Thank you.
The President: As I said to you before, Israel has conducted
itself with great restraint and that has helped to hold together
a disparate coalition.
PM Shamir: We are maintaining a steady course.
The President: I respect that. [Deputy Secretary] Eagleburger
will talk with [Ambassador] Brown who will be in touch with your
appointment people to set up the meeting.
PM Shamir: I want to wish you a happy new year.
The President: Thank you and I hope you had happy holidays.
PM Shamir: I admire your strong positions in these hard times.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIA.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
3
The President: Don't be diverted by what's going on in Congress,
there is strong support throughout the country for our position.
Thank you for receiving [Deputy Secretary] Eagleburger.
PM Shamir: Thank you for the phone call.
The President: Thank you and good bye.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTING
COM IDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
CONF IDENTIAL
0140
January 7, 1991
NOTED
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
FROM:
RICHARD N. HAASS a
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Telephone Call with Prime Minister
Shamir, January 7, 1991
Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation for the
President's telephone call to Prime Minister Shamir January 7,
1991.
RECOMMENDATION
That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record. Approve Vul
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I
Memorandum of Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
ByMM NARA, Date 11/22/2013
CONFIDENTIAL
National Security Council
The White House
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91 JAN 8 A9. 39 A9:39
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
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24.1/8
NEW
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 8, 1991
Dear Manfred:
Thank you so much for your kind letter.
This past year has been a triumphant one for the
Alliance. Much of this success is directly
attributable to your superb leadership: in
strategy, in tactics, and in articulating our
goals and achievements.
As we enter the New Year, we will face difficult
decisions about peace and war. I want to assure
you personally of my deep desire to resolve the
Gulf crisis without bloodshed, but also of my
deep commitment that Iraq's aggression cannot
stand. I particularly appreciated your recent
leadership in securing approval for the ACE
Mobile Force deployment to Turkey.
I hope you found time to rest and enjoy the
holiday season. Barbara joins me in sending you
and your family best wishes for the New Year.
Sincerely,
SBC
The Honorable
Dr. Manfred Woerner
Secretary General of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization
Brussels
9842
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 4, 1991
ACTION
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT Rg for R8 for
SUBJECT:
Letter from the President to NATO Secretary
General Woerner Regarding Gulf Crisis
Purpose
To reply to a letter from NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.
Background
On December 4, 1990, Secretary General Woerner sent you a
handwritten letter expressing the feeling that, although you had
not had the chance to meet for several months, you were
constantly in his thoughts. He also sent you his best wishes for
the New Year both for you and for your family.
Your letter to Woerner personally assures him of your commitment
that Iraq's aggression cannot stand and praises his recent
leadership in securing NATO approval of the ACE Mobile Force
deployment to Turkey. Woerner was especially helpful with Kohl.
Since Woerner penned his letter to you, and he is such a good
friend, you might want to consider a handwritten reply drawing on
the proposed text at Tab A.
RECOMMENDATION
That you send a letter to Secretary General Woerner as attached
at Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
Draft reply to Woerner
Tab B
Letter from Woerner
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
9842
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
December 28, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
DAVID GOMPERT
FROM:
PHILIP ZELIKOW
SUBJECT:
Letter from the President to NATO Secretary
General Woerner Regarding Gulf Crisis
On December 4, 1990, Secretary General Woerner wrote to the
President regarding the Gulf Crisis. Attached at Tab A is a
proposed response. Your memorandum to the President transmitting
the letter is at Tab I.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President which is at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Letter to the President
Tab A
Letter to Woerner
Tab B
Letter from Woerner
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
9842
December 20, 1990
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Draft Reply to Letter from NATO Secretary General
Woerner to the President
The attached draft is a response to NATO Secretary General
Manfred Woerner's personal letter to the President.
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Tab 1 - Draft Presidential Response to NATO Secretary
General Woerner
Tab 2 - Incoming Correspondence from Secretary General
Woerner
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
2010-0870-MR
DECL: OADR
Es 7/7/15
54
S/S 9026226
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
December 17, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House
SUBJECT:
Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence
Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Bush
from SYG Worner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
which is transmitted for your information.
This correspondence was received in the Information Resources
Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on Lec. 17, 1990.
A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.
J.For
Information Resources Management Section
Executive Secretariat
647-2991
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04f. Letter
M. Worner to President Bush
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: I regret..
(1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]
Date Closed:
6/22/2009
OA/ID Number:
91146-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04g. Handwritten
M. Worner to President Bush
12/4/90
(b)(1)
Letter
Re: I regret
(3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]
Date Closed:
6/22/2009
OA/ID Number:
91146-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9100179
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 08 JAN 91 19
TO: FOLEY, THOMAS S
ET AL
CHRON FILE
FROM: PRESIDENT
DOC DATE: 08 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:
2
KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
CO
IRAQ
KUWAIT
UN
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: PRES LTRS TO CONGRESSMEN FOLEY / MITCHELL / DOLE & MICHEL RE GULF
CRISIS
ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES
DUE DATE: 11 JAN 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: NONE
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMEM
CLOSED BY: NSMEM
DOC 1 OF 1
UNCLASSIFIED
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 0179
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
/
27.1/8
$
NSC Secretariat
28
2
Marilf
Log FRP
-
A = Action
1a Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS WWD / Sceretaria
Pls put in system for
Record pus poses Yo not
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: there already
CHRON FILE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 8, 1991
Dear Mr. Speaker:
The current situation in the Persian Gulf,
brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and
subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait,
threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation
also threatens the peace. It would, however,
greatly enhance the chances for peace if
Congress were now to go on record supporting the
position adopted by the UN Security Council on
twelve separate occasions. Such an action would
underline that the United States stands with the
international community and on the side of law
and decency; it also would help dispel any
belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's
leaders that the United States lacks the
necessary unity to act decisively in response to
Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.
Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's
Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have
been most constructive if he could have
presented the Iraqi government a Resolution
passed by both houses of Congress supporting the
UN position and in particular Security Council
Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently
stated my desire for such a Resolution.
Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for
Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for
peace and safeguard this country's vital
interests.
I therefore request that the House of
Representatives and the Senate adopt a
Resolution stating that Congress supports the
use of all necessary means to implement UN
2
Security Council Resolution 678. Such action
would send the clearest possible message to
Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without
condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less
would only encourage Iraqi intransigence;
anything else would risk detracting from the
international coalition arrayed against Iraq's
aggression.
Mr. Speaker, I am determined to do whatever is
necessary to protect America's security. I ask
Congress to join with me in this task. I can
think of no better way than for Congress to
express its support for the President at this
critical time. This truly is the last best
chance for peace.
Sincerely,
GoBl
The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 8, 1991
Dear Senator Mitchell:
The current situation in the Persian Gulf,
brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and
subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait,
threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation
also threatens the peace. It would, however,
greatly enhance the chances for peace if
Congress were now to go on record supporting the
position adopted by the UN Security Council on
twelve separate occasions. Such an action would
underline that the United States stands with the
international community and on the side of law
and decency; it also would help dispel any
belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's
leaders that the United States lacks the
necessary unity to act decisively in response to
Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.
Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's
Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have
been most constructive if he could have
presented the Iraqi government a Resolution
passed by both houses of Congress supporting the
UN position and in particular Security Council
Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently
stated my desire for such a Resolution.
Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for
Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for
peace and safeguard this country's vital
interests.
I therefore request that the House of
Representatives and the Senate adopt a
Resolution stating that Congress supports the
use of all necessary means to implement UN
2
Security Council Resolution 678. Such action
would send the clearest possible message to
Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without
condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less
would only encourage Iraqi intransigence;
anything else would risk detracting from the
international coalition arrayed against Iraq's
aggression.
I am determined to do whatever is necessary to
protect America's security. I ask Congress to
join with me in this task. I can think of no
better way than for Congress to express its
support for the President at this critical time.
This truly is the last best chance for peace.
Sincerely,
CyBal
Senator George Mitchell
Senate Majority Leader
S221 Capitol
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 8, 1991
Dear Senator Dole:
The current situation in the Persian Gulf,
brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and
subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait,
threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation
also threatens the peace. It would, however,
greatly enhance the chances for peace if
Congress were now to go on record supporting the
position adopted by the UN Security Council on
twelve separate occasions. Such an action would/
underline that the United States stands with the
international community and on the side of law
and decency; it also would help dispel any
belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's
leaders that the United States lacks the
necessary unity to act decisively in response to
Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.
Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's
Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have
been most constructive if he could have
presented the Iraqi government a Resolution
passed by both houses of Congress supporting the
UN position and in particular Security Council
Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently
stated my desire for such a Resolution.
Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for
Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for
peace and safeguard this country's vital
interests.
I therefore request that the House of
Representatives and the Senate adopt a
Resolution stating that Congress supports the
use of all necessary means to implement UN
2
Security Council Resolution 678. Such action
would send the clearest possible message to
Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without
condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less
would only encourage Iraqi intransigence;
anything else would risk detracting from the
international coalition arrayed against Iraq's
aggression.
I am determined to do whatever is necessary to
protect America's security. I ask Congress to
join with me in this task. I can think of no
better way than for Congress to express its
support for the President at this critical time.
This truly is the last best chance for peace.
Sincerely,
CyBl Bl
Senator Robert Dole
Senate Republican Leader
S230 Capitol
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 8, 1991
Dear Congressman Michel:
The current situation in the Persian Gulf,
brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and
subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait,
threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation
also threatens the peace. It would, however,
greatly enhance the chances for peace if
Congress were now to go on record supporting the
position adopted by the UN Security Council on
twelve separate occasions. Such an action would
underline that the United States stands with the
international community and on the side of law
and decency; it also would help dispel any
belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's
leaders that the United States lacks the
necessary unity to act decisively in response to
Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.
Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's
Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have
been most constructive if he could have
presented the Iraqi government a Resolution
passed by both houses of Congress supporting the
UN position and in particular Security Council
Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently
stated my desire for such a Resolution.
Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for
Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for
peace and safeguard this country's vital
interests.
I therefore request that the House of
Representatives and the Senate adopt a
Resolution stating that Congress supports the
use of all necessary means to implement UN
2
Security Council Resolution 678. Such action
would send the clearest possible message to
Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without
condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less
would only encourage Iraqi intransigence;
anything else would risk detracting from the
international coalition arrayed against Iraq's
aggression.
I am determined to do whatever is necessary to
protect America's security. I ask Congress to
join with me in this task. I can think of no
better way than for Congress to express its
support for the President at this critical time.
This truly is the last best chance for peace.
Sincerely,
GBl
Representative Robert Michel
House Republican Leader
H232 Capitol
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9100155
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 08 JAN 91 13
TO: BAKER, J
CHRON FILE
2.
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 08 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: TURKEY
GERMANY
NETHERLANDS
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: CABLE RE PATRIOTS FOR TURKEY
ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES
DUE DATE: 11 JAN 91
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: NONE
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMEM
CLOSED BY: NSMEM
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0870MR
Es 7/7/15
National Security Council
The White House
CHRON
FILE
0155
PROOFED BY:
LOG #
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG SA A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
27.1/8
NSC Secretariat
/
Log FRP
A = Action
I information
D = Dispatch
R Retain
N
= No further Action
CC:
VP
Pl?
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
91JAMB
16
Cable Sit vice
wh Situation Room
Fm: Philip Zelikow
To: Secrety Bsken
1/7/90
Privary Out Message
Lenais
west wing
Capy
No cover sheet Encloded
:
SDO MALICK
7 JAN 91 2200
0155
SECRET/NODIS
CABLE FOR SECRETARY BAKER, VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS
SUBJECT:
Patriots for Turkey
($)
1.
In parallel with your letter to Genscher on this subject, I
previewed with the Kohl's national security advisor, Peter
Hartmann, our proposal to respond to Turkey's request for
Patriot with two American, two Dutch, and two German
batteries, all with crews. While Hartmann appreciated the
prior consultations on this matter, which were lacking in
the case of the ACE mobile force, he predicted that this
would be an even more difficult decision for Germany. His
reasoning was that the German crews could be exposed to
hostilities once deployed without any subsequent opportunity
for Germany to take a decision to engage them, as provided
for by Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Logically
and politically, this would probably require the government
to seek Bundestag approval for the Patriot deployment. He
predicted difficulty with Genscher and strong opposition
from the SPD and elements of the press. (S)
2.
Hartmann understood the reasons for the Turkish request and
acknowledged that somehow the U.S. and its allies had to
give a favorable response. He asked about the possibility
of Germany providing units to the United States which we in
turn would deploy with our crews to Turkey. We pointed out
that it would be hard to explain why American and Dutch
crews should go but German crews should not. (S)
3.
It is important that we decide with the Germans very soon
how to handle this so that we can guide the Turks. I would
hope that you can resolve it directly with the Chancellor.
In deciding how hard we wish to press the Germans on this,
we should bear some other factors in mind. First, the
deeper we involve the Germans militarily the greater the
pressures -- largely self-generated -- for Germany to pursue
or encourage further diplomatic initiatives toward Iraq.
Second, as you know, we are about to ask Kohl also to agree
to make Germany's strategic petroleum reserve available in
the event of hostilities. Third, there are a number of
other requests (e.g. for financial contributions,
may
transportation for Patriot, and other air defense systems)
which are going to be presented to Germany. (S)
4.
If after pressing Kohl you determine that the only way to
get a positive and prompt German decision is by accepting
German units without German crews, I would support this as a
fallback. It would need to be understood that the units
would be turned over first to us and eventually be turned
over to the Turks at no cost. Because the Germans evidently
SECRET/NODIS
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0870 9s 717115
SECRET/NODIS
2
have modified their units, manning them with Americans would
cause a delay in deployment of about two weeks while the
Germans trained our people on their systems. Nevertheless,
this course of action strikes me as preferable to a strictly
U.S./Dutch response.
and
5.
We have not discussed this with DOD 1 You may wish to get
reaction from Steve Hadley and Howard Graves in your party.
($)
Brent Scowcroft
SECRET/NODIS
01 01
00 00 SSSS
AA ZYUW VAX218
WHITE HOUSE
CABINET OFFICE LONDON
SECRET VIA CABINET CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES
BAKER FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
DECLASSIFIED
-
PER E.O. 13526
-
2010-0870-MR
SUBJECT: PATRIOTS FOR TURKEY (S)
Es 717115
-
-
1. IN PARALLEL WITH YOUR LETTER TO GENSCHER ON THIS SUBJECT, I
PREVIEWED WITH KOHL'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, PETER HARTMANN,
OUR PROPOSAL TO RESPOND TO TURKEY'S REQUEST FOR PATRIOT WITH TWO
AMERICAN, TWO DUTCH, AND TWO GERMAN BATTERIES, ALL WITH CREWS.
WHILE HARTMANN APPRECIATED THE PRIOR CONSULTATIONS ON THIS MATTER,
WHICH WERE LACKING IN THE CASE OF THE ACE MOBILE FORCE, HE
PREDICTED THAT THIS WOULD BE AN EVEN MORE DIFFICULT
DECISION FOR GERMANY. HIS REASONING WAS THAT THE GERMAN CREWS
COULD BE EXPOSED TO HOSTILITIES ONCE DEPLOYED WITHOUT ANY
SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITY FOR GERMANY TO TAKE A DECISION TO ENGAGE
THEM, AS PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE V OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.
LOGICALLY AND POLITICALLY, THIS WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE THE
GOVERNMENT TO SEEK BUNDESTAG APPROVAL FOR THE PATRIOT DEPLOYMENT.
HE PREDICTED DIFFICULTY WITH GENSCHER AND STRONG OPPOSITION
FROM THE SPD AND ELEMENTS OF THE PRESS. ($)
-
2. HARTMANN UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR THE TURKISH REQUEST AND
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOMEHOW THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES HAD TO GIVE A
FAVORABLE RESPONSE. HE ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF GERMANY
PROVIDING UNITS TO THE UNITED STATES WHICH WE IN TURN WOULD DEPLOY
WITH OUR CREWS TO TURKEY. WE POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE HARD TO
EXPLAIN WHY AMERICAN AND DUTCH CREWS SHOULD GO BUT GERMAN CREWS
SHOULD NOT. (8)
-
3. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE DECIDE WITH THE GERMANS VERY SOON HOW
TO HANDLE THIS so THAT WE CAN GUIDE THE TURKS. I WOULD HOPE THAT
YOU CAN RESOLVE IT DIRECTLY WITH THE CHANCELLOR. IN DECIDING HOW
HARD WE WISH TO PRESS THE GERMANS ON THIS, WE SHOULD BEAR SOME
OTHER FACTORS IN MIND. FIRST, THE DEEPER WE INVOLVE THE GERMANS
MILITARILY THE GREATER THE PRESSURES -- LARGELY SELF-GENERATED --
FOR GERMANY TO PURSUE OR ENCOURAGE FURTHER DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES
TOWARD IRAQ. SECOND, AS YOU MAY KNOW, WE ARE ABOUT TO ASK KOHL
ALSO TO AGREE TO MAKE GERMANY'S STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE
AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES. THIRD, THERE ARE A NUMBER
OF OTHER REQUESTS (E.G. FOR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS, TRANSPORTATION
FOR PATRIOT, AND OTHER AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS WHICH ARE GOING TO BE
PRESENTED TO GERMANY. ($)
-
4. IF YOU DETERMINE THAT THE ONLY WAY TO GET A POSITIVE AND PROMPT
GERMAN DECISION IS BY ACCEPTING GERMAN UNITS WITHOUT GERMAN CREWS,
I WOULD SUPPORT THIS AS A FALLBACK. IT WOULD NEED TO BE UNDERSTOOD
THAT THE UNITS WOULD BE TURNED OVER FIRST TO US AND EVENTUALLY BE
TURNED OVER TO THE TURKS AT NO COST. BECAUSE THE GERMANS EVIDENTLY
HAVE MODIFIED THEIR UNITS, MANNING THEM WITH AMERICANS WOULD CAUSE
A DELAY IN DEPLOYMENT OF ABOUT TWO WEEKS WHILE THE GERMANS TRAINED
OUR PEOPLE ON THEIR SYSTEMS. NEVERTHELESS, THIS COURSE OF ACTION
STRIKES ME AS PREFERABLE TO A STRICTLY U.S. /DUTCH RESPONSE. (S)
-
5. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH DOD AND YOU MAY WISH TO GET
REACTION FROM STEVE HADLEY AND HOWARD GRAVES IN YOUR PARTY.
(S)
-
BRENT SCOWCROFT
-
-
END TEXT.
DECLAS: OADR
#0000