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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Chronological Files
Subseries:
OA/ID Number:
91148
Folder ID Number:
91148-007
Folder Title:
Other (October - December 1989)
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
48
6
6
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
10/23/89
(b)(1)
&
Re: Telephone Calls in Support of Lebanon Agreement (1 pp.)
01b. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Pope
n.d.
(b)(1)
John Paul II (1 pp.)
01c. Handwritten
Re: Presidential Phone Calls - Mitterrand (2 pp.)
10/23
(b)(1)
Notes
01d. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with
10/23
(b)(1)
President Mitterrand (1 pp.)
01e. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with King
10/23
(b)(1)
Fahd (1 pp.)
01f. Memo
C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft
10/23/89
(b)(1)
&
Re: Presidential Phone Calls in Support of Lebanon Agreement
(1 pp.)
02a. Memo
From Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft, Re: MiGs in Cuba
11/13/89
(b)(1)
S
[FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
02b. Talking Points Re: Soviet Delivery of MIG-29 to Cuba (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
8
Page 1 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Other (October - December 1989)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1238
OA/ID Number:
91148-007
Date Closed:
7/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
03a. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversations with King
n.d.
(b)(1)
Hussein (2 pp.)
03b. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
11/14/89
(b)(1)
Re: Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan (1 pp.)
03c. Talking Points Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversations with King
n.d.
(b)(1)
Hussein (2 pp.)
03d. Memo
C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft
11/13/89
(b)(1)
Re: Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan (1 pp.)
04a. Summary
Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (2 pp.)
11/25/89
(b)(1)
04b. Letter
Anthony Acland to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)
11/15/89
(b)(1)
$
04c. Message
Re: Text of a Message from eh Right Honorable Margaret
11/15/89
(b)(1
f
Thatcher (2 pp.)
04d. Letter
Ambassador Gerhard Herder to Joseph V. Reed (2 pp.)
11/13/89
(b)(1)
04e. Letter
Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush
11/89
(b)(1)
Re: Courtesy Translation (2 pp.)
04f. Letter
Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush
11/89
(b)(1)
Re: [German] (3 pp.)
Page 2 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Other (October - December 1989)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1238
OA/ID Number:
91148-007
Date Closed:
7/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
04g. Cable
Re: Letter from Belize Prime Minister to President Bush on
11/14/89
(b)(1)
C
Nicaragua (2 pp.)
04h. Letter
Chancellor Kohl to President Bush
11/3/89
(b)(1)
Re: Translation (2 pp.)
04i. Letter
Chancellor Kohl to President Bush
11/3/89
(b)(1)
Re: [German] (3 pp.)
05. Telcon
Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)
11/15/89
(b)(1)
06. Memo
Robert M. Gates to Richard Kerr
11/24/89
(b)(1)
Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)
07a. Memo
G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy
11/30/89
(b)(1)
Re: Three Presidential Messages (1 pp.)
07b. Message
Re: Text of Letter to Syrian President Assad (from President
n.d.
(b)(1)
Bush) (1 pp.)
07c. Message
Re: Text of Letter to Lebanese President Hraoui (from President
n.d.
(b)(1)
Bush) (1 pp.)
07d. Message
Re: Text of Letter to French President Mitterrand (from President
n.d.
(b)(1)
Bush) (1 pp.)
07e. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
11/30/89
(b)(1)
Re: Messages.. (1 pp.)
Page 3 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Other (October - December 1989)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1238
OA/ID Number:
91148-007
Date Closed:
7/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
07f. Memo
Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft
11/30/89
(b)(1)
Re: Three Presidential Messages (1 pp.)
08. Memo
Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft
11/28/89
(b)(1)
Re: NATO Wise Men's Group: Implementation
Recommendations (2 pp.)
09a. Memo
G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy
n.d.
(b)
Re: The President's Telephone Calls to NATO Leaders,
November 25-27, 1989 (1 pp.)
09b. Telcon
Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Wilfried
11/25/89
(b)(1
Martens of Belgium (1 pp.)
09c. Telcon
Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ruud
11/25/89
(b)(1)
f
Lubbers of the Netherlands (2 pp.)
09d. Telcon
Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Felipe
11/25/89
(b)(1)
Gonzalez of Spain (2 pp.)
09e. Telcon
Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Poul
11/26/89
(b)(1)
/
Schlueter of Denmark (2 pp.)
09f. Telcon
Re: The President's Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of
11/26/89
(b)(1)
Turkey (2 pp.)
09g. Telcon
Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Cavaco
11/27/89
(b)(1)
/
Silva of Portugal (2 pp.)
Page 4 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Other (October - December 1989)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1238
OA/ID Number:
91148-007
Date Closed:
7/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
09h. Telcon
Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Xenofon
11/27/89
(b)(1)
Zolotas of Greece (1 pp.)
09i. Telcon
Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Jan P. Syse
11/27/89
(b)(1)
of Norway (2 pp.)
09j. Telcon
Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Steingrimur
11/27/89
(b)(1)
Hermannsson of Iceland (2 pp.)
09k. Telcon
Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Jacques
11/27/89
(b)(1)
Santer of Luxembourg (1 pp.)
10. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
12/6/89
(b)(1)
/
Re: Thatcher and Europe (3 pp.)
11a. Memo
C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft
12/22/89
(b)(1)
S
Re: Lebanon -- Working to Avert New Fighting (2 pp.)
11b. Proposal
Brent Scowcroft to Joseph W. Hagin, II
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: Schedule Proposal (2 pp.)
11c. Handwritten
Philip [Hughes] to Brent [Scowcroft]/Bob [Gates] (1 pp.)
12/22
(b)(1)
Note
Page 5 of 5
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Other (October - December 1989)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1238
OA/ID Number:
91148-007
Date Closed:
7/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF-IDENTIAL
8459
CHRON FILE
THE WHITE HOUSE
NOTED
WASHINGTON
ACTION
1989 OCT 23 PM 2: 29
October 23, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
Telephone Calls in Support of Lebanon Agreement
Purpose
To make telephone calls to the Pope, President Mitterrand, and
King Fahd to show support of the Lebanon agreement.
Background
Lebanon's Deputies reached an agreement this weekend on a
national reconciliation charter. Formal announcement will be
tomorrow, October 24, but already General Aoun and others are :
reacting negatively.
The Lebanon agreement is an historic occasion, the necessary
first step toward bringing lasting peace to Lebanon. But it is
bound to be tenuous. It will need our support, both publicly and
with General Aoun and the Syrians. In addition, the Deputies
have been under great pressure from competing Lebanese factions;
our public and private support for their decision could help to
insulate them from reprisals.
We plan to release a White House Statement of support for the
Lebanese agreement today October 23. In addition, we believe it
would be useful for you to telephone Pope John Paul II and
President Mitterrand to encourage them to voice public support as
well. Both the Pope and President Mitterrand also have influence
with Aoun, and we believe you should seek their help with him.
Finally, we believe a congratulatory call to King Fahd is
appropriate; in that call, you could mention the necessity for
Syria to live up to its part of the agreement.
Points to be made are attached at Tabs A, B, and C.
RECOMMENDATION
That you use the points to be made at Tabs A, B, and C to the
Pope, President Mitterrand, and King Fahd, respectively.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
DECLASSIFIED
Tab A
Points to be Made to The Pope
PER E.O. 13526
Tab B
Points to be Made to President Mitterrand
2010-0764-MR
Tab C
Points to be Made to King Fahd
mum 4/18/2016
CONFIDENTIAL
CC: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR
The Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
POPE JOHN PAUL II
-- Your Holiness, I am calling you to ask your advice and help
on Lebanon, where I am convinced a real opportunity exists
now for peace.
--
The Lebanese Parliamentarians have reached an agreement in
Saudi Arabia on national reconciliation.
-- This is truly an historic occasion. For once the Lebanese
are talking, not shooting.
--
There have been a lot of pressures on these men, but they
have shown courage.
--
This may be Lebanon's last hope. It is not totally perfect,
I admit, but it needs our public and private support.
--
The alternative is more civil war, more death, more tragedy.
- - I urge you to give public support to the process launched by
this agreement.
-- Furthermore, I ask you also to speak to the Maronite
Patriarch to ask him to show his support for this peaceful
path.
--
Finally, I ask your help with General Aoun. I know he
listens to you, and would respect your appeal to give the
national reconciliation process a chance to work.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0764-MR
Min 4/18/2016
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
Calls
(
DATE:
10.23
TIME: 610
incoming/outgoing
WITH:
Millerand
SUBJECT:
Hope Am Not Oppoze'
asquesed
I And not perfect but
"eovns us meded thin"
He doesn't always listen to me.
I proposed him an "additional
guarantee - would have
liked 5 pum unker Sec.Coud
quarantee agreement.
FOLLOW
UP:
might is not commer Aain
" population u Beimt
France told him med not
go along with his A retural
will approach him again
but hill be intrasigent
If have additional guarantee
increases chare of sverso- -
toworrow (over)
sures has already
raised the with TAB - -
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENT
DECLASSIFIED
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
PER E.O. 13526
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
2010- 0764-MR
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
610 bd.23-
min 4/18/2016
--
Mr. President, I am calling you as part of our continuing
cooperation on Lebanon, where I am convinced a real
opportunity exists now for peace.
-- The Lebanese Parliamentarians have reached an agreement in
Saudi Arabia on national reconciliation.
--
This is truly an historic occasion. For once the Lebanese
are talking, not shooting.
--
There have been a lot of pressures on these men, but they
have shown courage.
-- This may be Lebanon's last hope. It is not totally perfect,
I admit, but it needs our support.
--
The alternative is more civil war, more death, more tragedy.
--
I urge you to give public support to the process launched by
this agreement.
France has a key role to play. General Aoun listens to you,
and would respect your appeal to give the national
reconciliation process a chance to work.
--
I have also spoken to the Pope and we will be issuing a
statement of support for the Lebanon agreement. I hope
we can work together to asure its success.
I understand that you might be free to get together in early
December; that's an excellent idea and I hope to be able to
work out the scheduling soon.
I've proposed
Non in Spain 1 good went F.Gonzales.
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
40t him
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
5 Oct-23
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING FAHD
Your Majesty, allow me to congratulate you on the historic
achievement at Taif.
The Lebanese deputies would not have been able to reach this
you persisten
agreement without your leadership and strength.
You have done a great service to Lebanon, to the Arabs, and
to humanity.
I am prepared to declare our support for the Taif results;
would it be better to wait for the formal announcement or to.
siff-problem - 15years.
go ahead with a statement now
I know you have worked hard to convince Syria to play a
responsible role. I hope you will continue to do so.
I (plan to) (have) spoken with President Mitterrand and the
Pope to lend their support to this agreement and more
importantly to urge Aoun to do so.
If there is anything else we can do in this regard, please
let me know.
Thank
Agreement unamone - except for 3 people
meat at L
will continue
will never
/
Appro survive sups
give up-
2
CONF IDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0764-MR
mm 4/18/2016
CONFIDENT
CONFIDENTIAL
8459
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 23, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
RICHARD N. HAASS
FROM:
C. DAVID WELCH
SUBJECT:
Presidential Phone Calls in Support of Lebanon
Agreement
The Lebanese Deputies meeting in Taif, Saudi Arabia, have reached
an agreement on national reconciliation for Lebanon. Although
formal announcement of the agreement will not come until tomorrow
(October 24), Aoun and others are reacting already. The Saudis
have approached us to ask for a public statement of support. We
need to declare our support and encourage others to do so.
For this purpose, we suggest that the White House issue a brief
statement of support. Second, we suggest that the President
telephone the Pope and President Mitterrand to encourage them to
declare publicly their support and to urge General Aoun to
moderate his opposition. The President should also call King
Fahd to congratulate him on the success of the Arab League's
efforts and, particularly, Saudi Arabia's pivotal contribution.
The State Department concurs in these suggestions; State will
also be issuing a supportive statement. State has sent demarches
to several key foreign capitals over the weekend to elicit their
support as well.
Concurrence by: Adrian Basora
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize Philip Hughes to send the memorandum at Tab II
to Cicconi forwarding the White House Statement.
Approve
Disapprove
That you sign the memorandum to the President (Tab I) covering
points to be made for the telephone calls to the Pope, President
Mitterrand, and King Fahd.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A
Points to be Made to the Pope
Tab B
Points to be Made to President Mitterrand
Tab C
Points to be Made to King Fahd
Tab II
Hughes/Cicconi Memorandum
Tab A
White House Statement
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
4/18/2016
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
8459
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES CICCONI
FROM:
G. PHILIP HUGHES
SUBJECT:
Suggested White House Statement on Lebanon
Attached at Tab A is a suggested White House Statement on Lebanon
which we would like to release now, given that Lebanon's
Parliamentarians reached an agreement on national reconciliation.
Attachment
Tab A
White House Statement
CC: Marlin Fitzwater
Roman Popadiuk
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
The President welcomes the news that the conference of Lebanese
Parliamentarians in Taif, Saudi Arabia, has resulted in an
agreement for national reconciliation in Lebanon. We commend the
Arab League's Tripartite Committee for its important role in
facilitating this agreement. The President congratulates the
Lebanese Deputies for their courage and statesmanship, which have
yielded an extraordinary opportunity to bring lasting peace to
Lebanon. This is the first step toward restoration of a
sovereign, unified, and independent Lebanon, free of all foreign
forces. The President calls upon all concerned in Lebanon and in.
the international community to join the United States in
supporting the process of peace and reconciliation launched by
the Taif agreement.
# # #
SECRET
RECORD ID: 8909100
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 13 NOV 89 11
TO: SCOWCOFT
CHRON FILE
FROM: RICE
DOC DATE: 13 NOV 89
BLACKWILL
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: CUBA
USSR
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: MIGS IN CUBA
ACTION: OBE PER SCOWCROFT
DUE DATE: 16 NOV 89
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: RICE
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCIF:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSJRP
CLOSED BY: NSJRP
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02a. Memo
From Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft, Re: MiGs in
11/13/89
(b)(1)
S
Cuba [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Document Partially Declassified
Series:
Chronological Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Subseries:
By Mm
on 12/27/21
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Other (October - December 1989)
Date Closed:
7/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
91148-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2011-2630-MR(508)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 8/23/2017
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL
SECRET
CHRON
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 13, 1989
ACTION
PRESIDENTIAL
501
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
BUSH
LIBRARY
THROUGH:
ROBERT BLACKWILL
P3
2010-0764-MR
FROM:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE cn
SUBJECT:
MiGs in Cuba
The National Intelligence Daily (NID) will carry the report of
the Soviet MiG deliveries to Cuba on Tuesday. We have been
preparing an Administration response should that report become
known.
The CIA and INR (we are told that DIA agrees) believe that Moscow
views the MiG 29 as a logical, progressive upgrade of Cuba's air
defenses rather than as an increased threat to US security. The
CIA estimates that the deal for these aircraft was struck three
or so years ago. We have known about it for several years. The
MiG 29's range is similar to that of the MiG 23 though the 29 can
carry the more advanced AA-10 missile.
1.4(c)
the AA-10 is not slated for delivery to Cuba. The net
intelligence assessment is that the MiG 29 does not significantly
upgrade Cuba's air defense capabilities or pose an increased
offensive threat to the U.S. or other countries in the region.
The question of violation of the series of agreements on nuclear
weapons in Cuba -- the last of which was Cienfuegos -- is more
difficult to answer. The MiG 29, like its predecessor MiG 23, is
assumed to be dual capable.
1.4(c)
When MiG 23s were delivered to Castro in 1978, we
accepted the Soviet's verbal assurances that the planes were not
nuclear capable. We did not seek agreement that no further
upgrade of the MiG 23 would take place but did tell the Soviets
that we believed that a sharp increase in the numbers of these
aircraft would constitute a threat to U.S. security. Cuba's
inventory of MiG 23s gradually increased and the U.S. did not
protest. We also said that we would watch to see if the plane
was used in a ground-attack role: The Cubans have used it only as
an air defense interceptor in exercises.
SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
2011-2630-MR
8/23/2017 MM
SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL
SECRET
All of that said, the Soviets continue to modernize, needlessly,
the Cuban armed forces. We need to answer the political question
of how to handle the delivery this time. Should the question
arise, we could voice our dissatisfaction strongly, noting that
this is one of several indications that "new thinking" has not
penetrated Soviet regional policy. This would fit well in the
context of our continuing demarches to the Soviets that their
exports of advanced fighter aircraft to clients are
destabilizing. The Cubans, in particular, have no neighbors who
have a fighter-interceptor capability approximating that of the
MiG 29. We could tell the Soviets that, given the state of U.S.-
Soviet relations, we expected them to show restraint in the
matter of advanced arms sales to Cuba. In our private demarche
we may also want to demand that they not increase the numbers of
MiG 29s further.
We understand Secretary Baker wants to refer to the MiG problem
in his letter to Shevardnadze on Central America which would be
sent soon. We could also consider a demarche to Dubinin.
Finally, we may want a "preemptive" announcement of the discovery
of the MiGs and the steps that we have taken, rather than waiting
for the story to leak.
The Defense Department has been consulted and agrees with the
suggested approach in the attached press guidance. The State
Department agrees in principle but does not want to give this
issue much visibility. We assume that State would be opposed to
an Administration initiated announcement.
Draft press guidance is at Tab I.
R3 Gr Bl
Bill Pryce concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you discuss this matter with Secretary Baker and review the
attached press guidance.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Draft press guidance
SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL
SECRET
SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL
SECRET
SOVIET DELIVERY OF MIG-29 TO CUBA
Q. Can you confirm reports that the Soviets have delivered MiG 29
aircraft to Cuba?
A. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE RECENTLY DELIVERED MIG 29
AIRCRAFT TO CUBA. WE HAVE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE CONSIDER THE
DELIVERY OF MIG 29 AIRCRAFT TO CUBA TO BE OUT OF STEP WITH THE
GENERALLY POSITIVE STATE OF U.S.- - SOVIET RELATIONS. IT IS
ANOTHER INDICATION THAT SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN REGIONAL POLICY IS NOT
ALWAYS INFORMED BY "NEW THINKING."
THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE SOVIETS TO CONTINUE TO UPGRADE AND
MODERNIZE THE CUBAN AIRFORCES GIVEN THE SITUATION IN THE REGION:
CUBA'S NEIGHBORS HAVE NO SUCH CAPABILITIES AND THE UNITED STATES
POSES NO THREAT TO CUBA.
Q. How many aircraft have been delivered?
A. I CANNOT GO INTO THAT LEVEL OF DETAIL.
Q. Have you asked the Soviets to stop the deliveries?
A. YES.
Q. What will you do if they don't?
A. I'M NOT GOING TO GET INTO HYPOTHETICALS.
Q. Are these aircraft nuclear capable? Do the Cubans have
nuclear weapons?
A. CUBA CURRENTLY HAS SEVERAL AIRCRAFT IN ITS INVENTORY WITH A
THEORETICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE,
WHATSOEVER, THAT CUBA HAS OR WILL HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
Q. Is this an upgrade of Cuba's offensive capability?
A. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MODERNIZATION OF CUBA'S AIRFORCE
AND WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION'S CONTINUING COMMITMENT
TO UPGRADE CUBA'S CAPABILITY IN SPITE OF THE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.
SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 13526
2011-2630-MR
SECRET
8/23/2017 mm
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 8908957
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 07 NOV 89 08
TO: PRESIDENT
CHRON FILE
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 14 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: JORDAN
TELCALL
PERSONS: HUSSEIN I
SUBJECT: PROPOSED TELEPHONE CALL TO KING HUSSEIN
1
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES
DUE DATE: 10 NOV 89
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: WELCH
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCIF:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
GANTT
WELCH
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMEN
CLOSED BY: NSMDC
DOC 4 OF 4
UNCLASSIFIED
CHRON FILE
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING HUSSEIN
-- Your Majesty, I just wanted to call to wish you a very Happy
Birthday.
-- I would also like to add my congratulations on Jordan's
parliamentary elections last week.
-- I recall when you mentioned that you were taking some
difficult decisions.to improve Jordan's economic situation
and to broaden political participation.
-- As I told you then, I think these are truly statesmanlike
decisions and are a mark of your strength and leadership.
-- On another matter, I wanted to let you know that I am
pressing ahead in the peace process. Jim Baker has been
=
working hard with the Israelis and Egyptians, as we have
informed you through our Ambassador. I am seeing Prime
Minister Shamir tomorrow.
--
I think there may be a chance here for a Palestinian-Israeli
dialogue to get started, but it will take some give on both
sides. I appreciate your support with the Palestinians.
-- I had a good chat with your brother, His Royal Highness
Prince Hasan, when he was here in September.
-- Again, my congratulations to you on your birthday and to
your people on the elections.
-- Please convey our best wishes to Queen Noor and to your
family.
(TO BE USED IF NEEDED)
-- We are optimistic that Congress will approve an
additional $20 million in FMS for Jordan for FY 1990.
It is not yet certain, but I believe our efforts and my
phone calls are likely to pay off. We should know any
day now.
8957
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 14, 1989
FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan
DATE:
November 14, 1989
PURPOSE:
To congratulate King Hussein on his birthday
(November 14) and Jordan's Parliamentary
elections (November 8), the first elections
in Jordan in over 22 years. Hussein moved to
broaden political participation after riots
last spring, in parallel with serious
economic austerity measures. Hussein was
undoubtedly disappointed by the election
results, since an unexpectedly high number of
Muslim fundamentalists were chosen. Hussein
would welcome your support, particularly in
view of the election's mixed results.
SECURE OR OPEN:
Open Line Call
INTERPRETER:
None Required
PHONE NUMBER:
To be provided
CONTACT PERSON:
To be provided
SUGGESTED TIMES:
7:30 a.m. - 2:00 p.m., November 9, 1989
TIME DIFFERENCE:
+7 hours
TOPICS OF
1. Wish King Hussein Happy Birthday.
DISCUSSION:
2. Express your congratulations for the
successful Parliamentary elections in Jordan.
3. Compliment the King on his courageous
decisions in the political and economic
spheres.
4. Mention the peace process, including your
desire for his continued support with the
Palestinians.
5. Convey warm regards to King Hussein and
his family, recalling his brother, Crown
Prince Hasan's visit in September.
Date of Submission:
Action:
Attachment
Tab A
Points to be Made
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING HUSSEIN
-- Your Majesty, I just wanted to call to wish you a very Happy
Birthday.
-- I would also like to add my congratulations on Jordan's
parliamentary elections last week.
-- I recall when you mentioned that you were taking some
difficult decisions to improve Jordan's economic situation
and to broaden political participation.
-- As I told you then, I think these are truly statesmanlike
decisions and are a mark of your strength and leadership.
-- On another matter, I wanted to let you know that I am
pressing ahead in the peace process. Jim Baker has been
working hard with the Israelis and Egyptians, as we have
informed you through our Ambassador. I am seeing Prime
Minister Shamir tomorrow.
-- I think there may be a chance here for a Palestinian-Israeli
dialogue to get started, but it will take some give on both
sides. I appreciate your support with the Palestinians.
-- I had a good chat with your brother, His Royal Highness
Prince Hasan, when he was here in September.
-- Again, my congratulations to you on your birthday and to
your people on the elections.
-- Please convey our best wishes to Queen Noor and to your
family.
(TO BE USED IF NEEDED)
-- We are optimistic that Congress will approve an
additional $20 million in FMS for Jordan for FY 1990.
It is not yet certain, but I believe our efforts and my
phone calls are likely to pay off. We should know any
day now.
8957
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 13, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
RICHARD N. HAASS
FROM:
C. DAVID WELCH
SUBJECT:
Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan
Attached is a proposal for the President to call King Hussein of
Jordan on Tuesday, November 14, to congratulate him on his
birthday and Jordan's Parliamentary elections, the first
elections in Jordan in over 22 years. A revived Parliament is a
central feature of Jordan's effort to enhance public
participation in government. Hussein made the decision to hold
elections after riots last spring; he would welcome our support,
particularly in view of the results which brought in an
unexpectedly high number of fundamentalists.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Telephone Call proposal to the President at
Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I
Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A
Points to be Made
CONF IDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 8909277
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 17 NOV 89 12
TO: SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
FROM: VAN ERON
DOC DATE: 17 NOV 89
HUGHES
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: HS
GREAT BRITAIN
GERMANY DR
GERMANY F R
BELIZE
USSR
:
PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET
GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
KRENZ, EGON
KOHL, HELMUT
SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY SINCE 15 NOV
ACTION: PRES NOTED SUMMARY OF LTR
DUE DATE: 21 NOV 89
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCIF:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
VAN ERON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMDC
CLOSED BY: NSMDC
DOC 1 OF 1
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 8909277
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 SCOWCROFT
Z 89111720 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
001
X 89112810 PRES NOTED SUMMARY OF LTR
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 7
PER E.O. 13526
Heads of State Correspondence Summary
min 4/19/2016
Prime Minister Thatcher Letter to President Gorbachev
November 15, 1989
Prime Minister Thatcher sends you a copy of her letter to
Gorbachev. She attributes great credit, for the historic events
in East Germany, to his policies of Glasnost and democratization.
She states that "the firmest basis for stability in the long-term
is thorough-going reform in East Germany - including free
elections with a multi-party system and complete freedom of
movement
"
She also emphasizes to him that neither the UK,
nor any other Western country, has any intention of intervening
in the GDR or acting in any manner which might be destructive to
GDR or USSR security interests.
She informs Gorbachev that the UK is ready to enter into contacts
with Soviet representatives in Berlin, as he had suggested, and
that the contacts which have already taken place have proved
useful. In conclusion, she reiterates that the UK remains
committed to the 1971 Berlin quadripartite agreement.
Chairman Krenz of the German Democratic Republic November 13, 1989
Chairman Krenz thanks you for your congratulatory message upon
his election as Chairman. He is pleased by your willingness to
develop stronger and more constructive relations and feels that
this is a positive trend and will lend itself to safeguarding
peace and stability in Europe.
Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany November 9, 1989
Chancellor Kohl draws your attention to the need to conclude the
IMF quota review before the end of 1989. He believes that a two
thirds increase of IMF funds should sufficiently meet present
commitments, such as, aid for Poland and the debt recovery
strategy of the Brady Plan. He hopes that you will agree to a
substantial increase in quotas and thereby help to ensure the
leading industrial nations' role of safeguarding the stability
of world economic growth.
Prime Minister Price of Belize November 7, 1989
Prime Minister Price shares your concern over Ortega's suspension
of a ceasefire with the Nicaraguan Resistance. In response, he
has directed his foreign minister to write an appeal to his
Nicaraguan counterpart urging him to restore the ceasefire and to
allow the upcoming elections to take place. Price appreciates
your continued interest in the peace and development of Latin
America.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany - November 3, 1989
Chancellor Kohl wishes to underscore several points, concerning
common environmental objectives, prior to the next world economic
summit. He states that protection of the Earth's atmosphere is a
global challenge and that international environmental research
should be coordinated and increased. He also stresses the need
to conclude global agreements which will help eliminate or
contain the danger resulting from climatic changes. He strongly
proposes that an international convention on the Earth's climate
be held.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
UK CONFIDENTIAL
9144
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008
TELEPHONE : (202) 462-1340
FROM THE AMBASSADOR
The Honorable
15 November 1989
Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
National Security Council
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington DC 20506
Den Brent,
You may be interested to see the text of a message
from Mrs Thatcher to President Gorbachev which our
Ambassador in Moscow is delivering today, 16 November. It
responds to the message from Mr Gorbachev which Ambassador
Zamyatin delivered to Mrs Thatcher late on 10 November,
about which Charles Powell spoke to you on the telephone at
the time. The message takes account of the co-ordination
meeting in Bonn on 14 November.
I am also sending the text of the message to Secretary
Baker.
Sincerely
Antoing
Antony Acland
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0803-MR
2/3/2010 MM
UK CONFIDENTIAL
9144
DECLASSIFIED
TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
PER E.O. 13526
2008-0803-MR 2008.
MARGARET THATCHER FRS MP TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
7/30/2010 MM
DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1989
BEGINS
Thank you for your message conveyed to me on 10 November
by Ambassador Zamyatin. Historic events are taking place
and I share your view that developments in East Germany are
encouraging. The lifting of travel restrictions for GDR
citizens is most particularly welcome.
The events in Berlin over the weekend have made a great
impression on public opinion in Britain and in other Western
countries. I have been struck by the good sense of all
concerned and their readiness to work together. Very great
credit is due to your policies of Glasnost and democratisation,
and I have paid sincere tribute to your
role in my public statements.
I agree with you that the speed with which these changes
are taking place carries its own risks of instability. I have
publicly underlined the need to proceed in an orderly way which
preserves stability and to take a measured view of the way ahead.
As I told your Ambassador, the firmest basis for stability in the
longer-term is thorough-going reform in East Germany - including
free elections with a multi-party system and complete freedom of
movement, so that there is genuine democracy and an economic
system which can support it.
UK CONFIDENTIAL
There is no repeat no intention on the part of any
Western country to intervene in the GDR or to act in a way
which might damage GDR or Soviet security interests. I am
confident that Britain's allies and partners share this
view. West Germany's leaders have been at pains to stress
the importance of a step-by-step approach to change in the
GDR and the need to avoid destabilising the wider European
situation: and Chancellor Kohl has assured me of this
personally when we spoke on the telephone.
We are very ready to enter into contacts with
representatives of the Soviet Union in Berlin, as you
suggest. The contacts which have already taken place
between British officials in Berlin and the Soviet Embassy
have proved useful and I hope that they will continue. Our
Ambassador in Bonn is ready to meet the Soviet Ambassador
to the GDR at any time. In this connection, the British
Government remain committed to the quadripartite agreement
on Berlin of 1971 and attach importance to the provision by
which the four governments concerned will strive to promote
the elimination of tension and the prevention of complications.
I very much hope that you and I can remain in regular
contact about these issues.
ENDS
S/S 8926542
9242
The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the German Democratic Republic
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington. D.C. 20036
(202) 232-3134
The Honorable
Joseph V. Reed, Jr.
Chief of Protocol
Department of State
Washington, D.C.
November 13, 1989
Dear Mr. Reed,
I permit myself to transmit to you the text of a reply
telegram to the President of the United States of America,
George Bush, requesting you to forward it to the addressee:
"The President of the
United States of America
George Bush
I thank you cordially for the felicitations on the occasion
of my election as Chairman of the Council of State of the
German Democratic Republic.
I am certain that the changes and reforms underway in the
German Democratic Republic and the willingness you have
expressed for developing stronger and more constructive
relations will provide good prerequisites for lending a
new quality to the dialogue and cooperation between our
two states.
2
This will be a valuable contribution the German Democratic
Republic and the United States of America can make to pro-
moting the positive trends in the world and to safeguarding
peace and stability in Europa.
Egon Krenz
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and
Chairman of the Council of State of the
German Democratic Republic"
Please accept, Dear Mr. Reed, the assurances of my
highest consideration.
Sincerely,
Jade
Dr. Gerhard Herder
9320
Courtesy Translation
The Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor
Bonn, November 1989
Dear George,
following my letter of 6 November concerning aid for Poland to
help stabilize that country, I wish today to draw your attention
to the following aspect as well.
The aid programme for Poland again emphasizes the central role
which the International Monetary Fund has to play in coping with
the payment difficulties of its member countries. It is important
that this institution should continue to have sufficient funds of
its own. At the present time, therefore, it is essential that the
current review of IMF quotas should be brought to a successful
conclusion.
Already at our economic summit in July we both welcomed the
decision to conclude this review before the end of 1989. We should
do everything possible to ensure that this decision is implemented
on time.
His Excellency
Mr. George H.W. Bush
President of the United States of America
2
At the recent annual meeting of the International Monetary
Fund in Washington, Mr. Camdessus recommended that the quotas be
doubled. Such an extensive increase in the IMF's funds may not be
absolutely essential, but my Government, too, thinks a substantial
increase - of about two thirds - is necessary, not least because
it would also enable the IMF to meet the requirements of the
enhanced debt strategy proposed by Secretary Brady.
I therefore very much hope, George, that the United States,
too, can now agree to a substantial increase in quotas. By taking
such a step the leading industrial countries would be clearly
indicating that they are playing their part in ensuring the stable
development of the world economy.
Sincerely,
(sgd) Helmut Kohl
9320
EMBASSY
OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
WASHINGTON. D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to transmit to you the following message from
Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl:
Bonn, den 9. November 1989
Lieber George,
im Anschluss an meinen Brief vom 6. November 1989 zur Frage
einer Stabilisierungshilfe für Polen möchte ich Ihre
Aufmerksamkeit heute noch auf folgende Angelegenheit lenken.
Die Hilfsaktion für Polen macht erneut die zentrale Rolle
deutlich, die der Internationale Währungsfonds bei der Bewältigung
von Zahlungsschwierigkeiten seiner Mitgliedsländer zu spielen hat.
Es ist wichtig, dass diese Institution auch weiterhin über
angemessene Eigenmittel verfügt. Einem erfolgreichen Abschluss der
laufenden Überprüfung der IWF-Quoten kommt daher im gegenwärtigen
Zeitpunkt besondere Bedeutung zu.
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
2
Bereits auf unserem Wirtschaftsgipfeltreffer
im Juli dieses Jahres haben wir gemeinsam den Be-
schluss begrüsst, diese Überprüfung vor Ende 1989
abzuschliessen. Wir sollten alles tun, damit dieser
Beschluss termingemäss in die Tat umgesetzt werden
kann.
Auf der jüngsten Jahresversammlung des Inter-
nationalen Währungsfonds in Washington hat Herr
Camdessus eine Verdoppelung der Quoten befürwortet.
Eine derart umfangreiche Erweiterung der Mittel des
Internationalen Währungsfonds mag nicht unbedingt
notwendig sein. Aber auch meine Regierung hält eine
substantielle Erhöhung seiner Mittel um etwa zwei
Drittel - für erforderlich, nicht zuletzt auch, da-
mit der IWF den Anforderungen der von Secretary
Brady vorgeschlagenen gestärkten Schuldenstrategie
gerecht werden kann.
Ich würde es daher, lieber George, sehr be-
grüssen, wenn nunmehr auch die USA einer erhebli-
chen Quotenerhöhung zustimmen könnten. Die führen-
den Industrieländer würden dadurch sichtbar zum
Ausdruck bringen, dass sie ihrer Verantwortung für
eine stabile Entwicklung der Weltwirtschaft gerecht
werden.
Mit freundlichen Grüssen
Ihr
3
A courtesy translation is attached.
Respectfully yours,
Kal Th Paschke
Karl-Th. Paschke
Minister
Washington, D.C., November 16, 1989
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04g. Cable
Re: Letter from Belize Prime Minister to President Bush on
11/14/89
(b)(1)
C
Nicaragua (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Other (October - December 1989)
Date Closed:
7/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
91148-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
9321
Translation
The Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor
Bonn, 3 November 1989
Dear George,
In accordance with our agreement to seek closer coordination of our coun-
tries' activities in implementing the declaration on environmental problems
issued at the Paris Economic Summit, one of my aides, Baldur Wagner, had
meetings with EPA Administrator William Reilly, White House environment and
scientific advisors Michael Deland and David Bromley, and senior State
Department and Department of Energy officials.
Those discussions have reaffirmed our governments' basic agreement on
common environmental objectives. I would stress in this context our common
conviction that protection of the earth's atmosphere is a global challenge to
all nations which calls for a convention on the world's climate with the
broadest possible international participation.
With preparations for the next world economic summit in your country now
beginning, I wish to underscore the following points:
-
The summit nations, together with the countries of Eastern Europe as
major sources of aerosol emissions, have a special responsibility towards
His Excellency
Mr George Bush,
President of the United States
of America,
Washington, D.C.
- 2 -
the international community to take the earliest possible steps
to protect the earth's atmosphere.
-
We must intensify our research into climatic interactions and especially
improve coordination. Considering the magnitude of the threat and its
grave and unforeseeable implications for large sections of the earth's
population, we cannot hold back counter-measures until we have
absolute scientific certainty about the fundamental causes of those
interactions and about future developments. It might then be too late.
-
We should as soon as possible conclude international agreements which
specifically require all concerned to play their part in eliminating or
containing the danger emanating from climatic changes. In this the
highly developed Western industrial countries should lead the way.
I am not unaware that the necessary fundamental energy policy changes
presuppose an adjustment process which poses a formidable challenge to our
national economies. It is difficult for any government to convince the people
that changes of habit are essential in many spheres of life. But our highly
developed industrial countries, with their liberal, efficient and flexible
economic systems, are in the best position to undergo this process of adjust-
ment without asking too great a sacrifice of the people.
Trusting in the efficiency of our national economies, we should therefore
seek to bring about a convention on the earth's climate as soon as possible
without insisting on the prior clarification of all details. In view of the
magnitude of the global threat we should summon up this courage.
As you know, EPA Administrator William Reilly will be visiting me on 8 No-
vember and I shall take the opportunity to set out the German standpoint
once more.
The Federal Government will also be presenting its position in the prepara-
tory papers for the next world economic summit, in the hope that an agree-
ment on the crucial question of a convention can be reached at the summit
meeting in your country.
Sincerely,
(sgd) Helmut Kohl
9321
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
Bonn, den 3. November 1989
DER BUNDESKANZLER
Seiner Exzellenz
dem Präsidenten der
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
Herrn George Bush
Washington D.C.
Lieber George,
entsprechend unserer Absprache, die Aktivitäten unserer Länder zur
Umsetzung der Umwelterklärung des Weltwirtschaftsgipfels von Paris
enger miteinander abzustimmen, hat mein Mitarbeiter Ministerial-
direktor Baldur Wagner Gespräche mit dem EPA-Administrator William
Reilly, mit den Umwelt- und Wissenschaftsberatern des Weißen Hauses
Michael Deland und David Bromley, sowie mit führenden Mitarbeitern
des State Department und des Department of Energy geführt.
Bei diesen Gesprächen hat sich erneut bestätigt, daß zwischen unse-
ren Regierungen hinsichtlich der gemeinsam anzustrebenden umweltpoli-
tischen Ziele grundsätzliche Einigkeit besteht. Hervorheben will ich
hierbei insbesondere unserere gemeinsame Überzeugung, daß der Schutz
der Erdatmosphäre eine globale Herausforderung für alle Staaten
dieser Erde darstellt, die den Abschluß einer Weltklimakonvention
unter möglichst breiter internationaler Beteiligung erfordert.
Im Hinblick auf die beginnende Vorbereitung für den nächsten
Weltwirtschaftsgipfel in Ihrem Land möchte ich hervorheben:
Die Gipfelländer tragen gegenüber der Völkergemeinschaft
zusammen mit den Ländern Osteuropas als bedeutende Verursacher
der Emission von Treibgasen besondere Verantwortung, so bald wie
möglich Schritte zum Schutz der Erdatmosphäre zu ergreifen.
2
Wir müssen unsere Anstrengungen zur Erforschung der klimatischen
Zusammenhänge intensivieren und insbesondere besser koordinieren.
Angesichts der Größe der Bedrohung und der unabsehbaren, existen-
tiellen Auswirkungen für große Teile der Erdbevölkerung können
wir es uns jedoch nicht erlauben, mit Gegenmaßnahmen so lange zu
warten, bis wir letzte wissenschaftliche Gewißheit über die ur-
sächlichen Zusammenhänge und die zukünftige Entwicklung erreicht
haben. Dann könnte es schon zu spät sein.
Wir scllten möglichst bald zu internationalen Vereinbarungen
kommen, die für alle Beteiligten konkrete Verpflichtungen ent-
halten, ihren Beitrag zur Abwendung oder Begrenzung der drohenden
Gefahren der Klimaveränderungen zu erbringen. Dabei sollten die
hochentwickelten westlichen Industrieländer eine Vorreiterrolle
übernehmen.
Ich verkenne nicht, daß die dafür notwendige grundlegende energie-
politische Umstrukturierung einen Anpassungsprozeß erfordert, der
unsere Volkswirtschaften vor große Herausforderungen stellt. Für
jede Regierung ist es schwer, ihrer Bevölkerung klar zu machen, daß
in einer Vielzahl von Lebensbereichen Änderungen der Gewohnheiten
unumgänglich werden. Jedoch sind wir in unseren hochentwickelten
Industrieländern mit ihren freien, leistungsfähigen und flexiblen
Wirtschaftssystemen am ehesten in der Lage, diesen Anpassungsprozeß
ohne zu große Opfer für die Bevölkerung zu durchlaufen.
Im Vertrauen auf diese Leistungsfähigkeit unserer Volkswirtschaften
sollten wir deshalb möglichst bald eine konkrete internationale
Weltklimakonvention erarbeiten und diese nicht davon abhängig
machen, daß zur Umsetzung bereits alle Details geklärt sind.
Angesichts der Größe der globalen Bedrohung sollten wir diesen Mut
aufbringen.
Wie Sie wissen, werde ich den Administrator der EPA, Herrn William
Reilly, am 8. November 1989 zu einem Gespräch empfangen und ihm bei
dieser Gelegenheit nochmals die deutsche Position erläutern.
3
Die Bundesregierung wird ihre Position auch in die Vorbereitungs-
papiere für den nächsten Weltwirtschaftsgipfel einbringen in der
Hoffnung, daß in der entscheidenden Frage der Vereinbarung einer
Weltklimakonvention auf dem Gipfel in Ihrem Lande ein Erfolg erzielt
wird.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen
1)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
9277
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 17, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
G. PHILIP HUGHES
FROM:
GEORGE VAN ERON Bimfon
SUBJECT:
Heads of State Correspondence
Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State
correspondence materials received by the Secretariat
since Wednesday, November 15th.
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward the attached summary (Tab I) to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Summary for the President
Tab A
Thatcher to Gorbachev Letter
Tab B
Krenz - GDR
Tab C
Kohl FRG
Tab D
Price - Belize
Tab E
Kohl - FRG
DECLASSIFIED
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By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09
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8957 ADD ON
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 17, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
1
SUBJECT:
President's Phone Call to King Hussein of Jordan
Please distribute a copy of the attached memorandum of telephone
conversation between the President and King Hussein of Jordan to
the appropriate regional Deputy Assistant and our
Ambassador in Jordan on a NODIS basis.
G. Willing
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
8957AO
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan
PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein of Jordan
Notetaker: C. David Welch
DATE, TIME
November 15, 1989, 9:11 - 9:14am EST
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President initiated the call.
The President: Your Majesty, how are you?
King Hussein: Very fine, sir. Good to hear your voice.
The President: I wanted to call to wish you a very happy
birthday.
King Hussein: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I appreciate
that.
The President: I would also like to add my congratulations on
your bringing off Jordan's parliamentary elections last week.
That was a good thing.
King Hussein: Thank you. We are very proud of the elections.
This is a new phase in Jordan. It will also be a good example to
others.
The President: You have made some tough economic and political
decisions. These are very statesmanlike. On another matter,
I'll be seeing Shamir today. We're not letting up on the peace
process. Jim Baker has been working very hard. We've tried to
keep your Ambassador informed; I hope we've done that. I hope
that we can get an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue started, but it
will require some give on both sides. We will keep pressing,
because we can serve as a catalyst.
King Hussein: I'm really very glad to hear that. We count on
your efforts and pray for your success.
The President: We are staying firm on the Baker five points.
The Israelis may be coming to realize that but we will know more
in a few hours.
King Hussein: Our hopes are high. Noor sends her love and very
best to you and Barbara.
2
The President: Thank you. We send our regards to you. Are you
in Aqaba? How's the weather there?
King Hussein: Great -- hopefully, we will get you here again
soon.
The President: I would like that. Again, best wishes and hope
to talk to you again soon.
-- End of Conversation --
8957AO
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 15, 1989
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
THROUGH:
RICHARD N. HAASS
ml
FROM:
C. DAVID WELCH M
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
King Hussein of Jordan
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Stapleton Roy forwarding a
copy of subject memorandum of telephone conversation (original at
Tab A) to State for appropriate dissemination.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at
Tab A for record purposes and sign the memo at Tab I transmitting
a copy of the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation.
Attachments
Tab I
Hughes Memo to Roy
Tab A
Memo of Telephone Conversation
CONFIDENTIAL
CHRON FILE
CONF IDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
9482
WASHINGTON
November 24, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD KERR
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
Study of Abortion Practices in China (
This is to confirm our telephone conversation earlier this week
in which I requested a thorough study of abortion practices in
China, particularly with respect to the use of involuntary
abortion as a family planning measure.
(c)
This should be a thorough examination drawing on whatever sources
are available to the agency. We would appreciate having the
study by December 15.
Robert RobertmSates M. Gates
Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
CC: David Miller
Karl Jackson
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
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AS AMENDED
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3/31/2010 MM
CHRUN FILE
SECRET
9652
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 30, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Lebanon: Three Presidential Messages (Ø)
Attached for transmission to Embassy Paris is a letter from the
President to President Mitterrand. The text of this message
should be delivered as soon as possible, making it clear that it
was received from the White House as a letter from the President.
The cable should go as NODIS, NIACT Immediate, with an
information copy to Damascus. Also attached are letters from the
President to President Assad of Syria and President Hraoui of
Lebanon, which should be cabled to Damascus only as NODIS, NIACT
Immediate. In delivering these messages it should also be made
clear that they were received from the White House as letters
from the President. There will be no signed originals. (8)
G. Walk Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
Attachments
Presidential Messages
DECLASSIFIED
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TEXT OF LETTER TO SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD
Dear Mr. President:
I wanted to share some of my thoughts about the Lebanon situation
as I prepare to set off for Malta. In the spirit of my earlier
message to you, I would like you to know exactly of my personal
views. I believe this will contribute to the communication and
understanding that are necessary as you and I work to strengthen
our broader relations.
Mr. President, the Taif agreement brought for Lebanon a real hope
for national reconciliation, peace, and unity. Its opponents
will not be able to halt this historic development by actions
such as Rene Moawad's murder.
I stand with the new President of Lebanon in his efforts to unify
his nation and begin the process of healing. I have called upon
all Lebanese to support him. General Aoun remains an obstacle
that I am working to overcome.
I am convinced, Mr. President, that the only way to do this is to
preserve and strengthen the vitality and consensus behind the
government of President Hraoui. A resort to military action
would divide Lebanon further and damage the national
reconciliation process, perhaps irretrievably. We are trying
every means to overcome General Aoun's opposition, but force,
particularly if Syria is involved, will only give him undeserved
legitimacy and added strength.
I respect your support for the Taif agreement. Together we can
realize its promise of peace and unity for the people of Lebanon.
More bloodshed will not help.
In closing, let me add that I have conveyed similar points to our
colleague President Hraoui, for I believe that he represents the
best hope for Lebanon to move out of its darkness.
Sincerely,
4
TEXT OF LETTER TO LEBANESE PRESIDENT HRAOUI
Dear Mr. President:
I am about to depart for Malta, but wanted to take a moment to
write you about my growing concern over developments in your
country.
You know from my earlier letter upon your election, as well as
our public statements and John Kelly's telephone conversation,
that the United States stands behind you and your government as
the constitutionally elected, legal authority in Lebanon. My
position of support and respect for you is being conveyed to all
concerned.
We believe your leadership offers the best hope for fulfillment
of the promise of the Taif process of national reconciliation and
unity. I am aware of the difficulties posed by General Aoun's
opposition, but I am deeply concerned that a non-violent solution
be pursued by the Lebanese people themselves as we seek to
overcome these problems. It is my belief that military
intervention would be a serious mistake, especially if associated
with your name, for it would only reduce the chances of
attracting support to your new government and further polarize
Lebanon.
Mr. President, I admire your courage and determination to help
Lebanon and its people. Our prayers are with you.
Sincerely,
by
TEXT OF LETTER TO FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
Dear Francois:
I wanted to take a moment to follow up on our telephone call of
November 30 and our discussion of Lebanon. I have communicated
with President Hraoui and President Assad, enjoining both to
avoid a resort to violence to overcome the opposition of General
Aoun. I agree that force is not the solution, and I told
President Hraoui that his name should not be associated with such
a decision. It would be a tragedy that would only detract from
his legitimacy and deepen Lebanon's divisions.
I also would like to continue our moves in concert. General Aoun
should not take any hint from any of our actions that his
position can continue. He should, in the interests of the nation
he claims to protect, step aside in favor of those who support
peaceful change and unity. On this point, France and the United
States must remain as one.
I very much look forward to continuing our conversations when we
see each other in Brussels and then again in the Caribbean. This
latter occasion should give us a wonderful opportunity to confer
without the usual distractions. With best regards,
Sincerely,
SECRET
SECRET
9652
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 30, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT B
SUBJECT:
Messages on Lebanon
Following on your phone conversation with Mitterrand, we have
prepared messages from you to both Syrian President Assad (Tab A)
and Lebanese President Hraoui urging that everything be done to
avoid a new round of fighting in Beirut. The message to Hraoui
(Tab B) will be your second in a week, coming just a few days
after your congratulatory note. The communication to Assad will
also only be your second formal written message to him; as a
result, we have drafted it so that Lebanon is placed in a
somewhat larger context.
These messages from you complement energetic diplomacy,
including: demarches in recent days to Syria, the Vatican,
Paris, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, and Baghdad; a phone call from John
Kelly to Hraoui; and numerous public statements by State and
ourselves expressing support for Hraoui and calling for calm.
Malta will also be an opportunity for you to raise Lebanon with
the Soviets, who remain Syria's principal benefactor.
We have prepared a third message (Tab C) as well, in this case to
Mitterrand. The objective is to let him know what we are doing
to discourage violence and to express support for French efforts
to isolate Aoun. This latter theme is essential in light of the
fact that some of what the French are doing is being viewed as
implicitly supporting the General in his obstinacy.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the texts at Tab A-C.
Attachments
Tab A
Message to President Assad
Tab B
Message to President Hraoui
Tab C
Message to President Mitterrand
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0766-MR
SECRET
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SECRET
SECRET
9652
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
November 30, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
RICHARD N. HAASS
D
SUBJECT:
Lebanon: Three Presidential Messages
Pursuant to Bob Gates' instructions, David and I have prepared
messages from the President to both Assad and Hraoui urging that
everything be done to avoid any new outbreak of fighting in
Beirut. In addition, we have prepared a third message to
Mitterrand that would follow-up on the President's phone call and
set the record straight about what we are doing and what we would
like the French to do.
Concurrence by: Bob Hutchings RHfor
State Department (NEA/PDAS Jock Covey) RHP
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
Attachment
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A
Assad Message
Tab B
Hraoui Message
Tab C
Mitterrand Message
DECLASSIFIED
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Es 12/18/15
CHRON FILE
SECRET
10405
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
DECLASSIFIED
Non-log
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0766-MR
mm 2/25/2016
November 28, 1989
beep This
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT BLACKWILL
posible still A
FROM:
PHILIP ZELIKOW 2
SUBJECT:
NATO Wise Men's Group: Implementation
Recommendations
Implementation of a possible initiative to create a "Wise Men's
Group" to study the future role of the North Atlantic Alliance
would entail four preliminary steps:
First, we would need to decide on what we hope the mandate for
the Group would be. We recommend against an open-ended mandate
on the 'future of the Alliance,' which could engender just the
kind of self-doubt and angst that dominated the runup for the May
NATO Summit and that were successfully (if temporarily) put to
rest. The Group could, instead, profitably examine what goals
and strategy the Alliance could set for itself to protect and
encourage the peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe.
Second, we would need to reflect on the composition of the Group.
Whether made up of three (as in the 1956 Committee of Three on
non-military cooperation in NATO) or five (as with the group that
prepared the studies leading to the 1967 Harmel Report), the
number should be small and the individuals selected, all from
outside of government, should command wide respect. We should
have a short list in mind. Some candidates are: Lord
Carrington, Henry Kissinger, Helmut Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing,
Giovanni Spadolini, Henri Simonet, Johan Holst, and Ernst van der
Beugel.
Third, we would need to consider what we hope the Group's
conclusions would be. Some likely conclusions might be:
(a) The continued need for an organized Atlantic community and
the forward commitment of the U.S. in Europe;
(b) A stronger political agenda for the Alliance, centered on
encouragement of democratic change within Europe and
coordination of Western views on transnational and regional
problems;
(c) New consultative structures within NATO and between NATO and
other states and other international organizations, perhaps
including the Warsaw Pact;
(d) Consideration of alternative force postures and correlative
arms control positions that maintain a credible and
SECRET
SECRET
2
effective deterrent, including nuclear forces, in a
sustainable force structure that adapts to fundamental
political changes in Europe.
Fourth, we would need to prepare a letter for the President's
approval that he would send to Allies this week so that he does
not surprise them at NATO. The letter would outline his ideas,
and ask his colleagues to be prepared to consider this initiative
in Brussels on December 4. If NATO leaders endorsed the idea,
the general concept could be announced on December 4, with a more
formal mandate set at the NAC Ministerial later in December. The
Group could be asked to report its conclusions to the next NAC
Ministerial in May (in Scotland).
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize us to proceed in implementing this initiative
with the steps outlined above.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 8909709
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 01 DEC 89 13
TO: HUGHES
CHRON FILE
FROM: HUTCHINGS
DOC DATE: 04 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: NATO
TELCALL
BELGIUM
NETHERLANDS
SPAIN
DENMARK
:
PERSONS: MARTENS, WILFRIED A
LUBBERS, RUUD
GONZALEZ, FELIPE
SCHLUTER, POUL
SUBJECT: PRES MEMCONS TO NATO LEADERS ON 25 - 27 NOV
ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES
DUE DATE: 05 DEC 89
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS
LOGREF: 8909504
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSRLG
CLOSED BY: NSLMS
DOC 1 OF 1
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
9709
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CHDON FILE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
December 4, 1989
ACTION
NOTED
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
FROM:
ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RIH
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Calls to NATO Leaders,
November 25-27, 1989
At Tabs A through J are Memoranda of Telephone Conversations for
the President's telephone calls to Prime Minister Martens
(Belgium), PM Lubbers (Netherlands), PM Gonzalez (Spain), PM
Schlueter (Denmark), President Ozal (Turkey), PM Cavaco Silva
(Portugal), PM Zolotas (Greece), PM Syse (Norway), PM Hermannsson
(Iceland), and PM Santer (Luxembourg) The memorandum at Tab I
transmits the MEMCONS to State.
AAB
Adrian Basora concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That the Memoranda of Telephone Conversations at Tabs A through J
be filed for the record.
Approve
Disapprove
That you sign the memo at Tab I which transmits the Memoranda of
Telephone Conversations to State.
Attachments
Tab I
Hughes Memorandum for Roy
Tab A
Memorandum of Conversation with Martens
Tab B
Memorandum of Conversation with Lubbers
Tab C
Memorandum of Conversation with Gonzalez
Tab D
Memorandum of Conversation with Schlueter
Tab E
Memorandum of Conversation with Ozal
Tab F
Memorandum of Conversation with Cavaco Silva
Tab G
Memorandum of Conversation with Zolotas
Tab H
Memorandum of Conversation with Syse
Tab I
Memorandum of Conversation with Hermannsson
Tab J
Memorandum of Conversation with Santer
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CUM IDENTIAL
CONE IDENTIAL
9709
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Calls to NATO Leaders,
November 25-27, 1989 (U)
Distribution of the attached Memoranda of Telephone Conversations
must be handled via NODIS channels and at the Deputy Assistant
Secretary (DAS) level.
G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
Attachments
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Martens of Belgium
Tab B
Memorandum of Telephone Corversation with Prime
Minister Lubbers of the Netherlands
Tab C
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Gonzalez of Spain
Tab D
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Schlueter of Denmark
Tab E
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President
Ozal of Turkey
Tab F
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal
Tab G
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Zolotas of Greece
Tab H
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Syse of Norway
Tab I
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Hermannsson of Iceland
Tab J
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Santer of Luxembourg
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
AS AMENDED
1999-0273-F
9/8/2009 MM
CONF IDENTIAL
CONI IDENTIAL
9709
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Call to Prime
Minister Wilfried Martens of Belgium (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME
November 25, 1989, 7:46 - 7:50 a.m. EST
AND PLACE:
Camp David
The President initiated the call. (U)
The President: How are you, sir? (U)
Prime Minister Martens: Very fine. I had a Party meeting this
morning. I apologize for being late to receive your call. (U)
The President: I just wanted to tell you that Manfred Woerner
has invited me to come to Brussels December 4 to report on my
meetings with Gorbachev. I have accepted. This is a good chance
to get together. I look forward to seeing you and hope we have
time for a brief chat. I am anxious to get the opinions of
friends before I go. Do you have any thoughts for me? (U)
Prime Minister Martens: No. We had a good meeting Saturday in
Paris. We are all agreed that the Allies must consult closely.
Chancellor Kohl assured us that he will defend Germany's strong
role in the EC and NATO. I have no doubt that you will defend
our position in your meetings with Gorbachev. In Belgium, we see
no difficulties.
(
The President: It will be an important meeting, and very timely.
There will be no surprises or deals. I was intrigued with
Belgium's idea of a "second tier" closely associated with the EC
which would give Poland and Hungary, and perhaps other East
European countries, the chance to move closer to the Community.
This is something to discuss with Gorbachev.
(c)
Prime Minister Martens: The U.S. role is very important,
especially with Poland and Hungary. Chancellor Kohl also
mentioned your involvement. In Paris, we agreed that we should
help only those countries that accept free elections.
The President: It is interesting that now Czechoslovakia is
beginning to move. Only Romania is swimming against the tide. I
just wanted to check in with you. I believe in close
consultations. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
DECLASSIFIED
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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0273-F
2/20/9 M.M
CUNI IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
9709
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Call to Prime
Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME
November 25, 1989, 7:52 - 8:00 a.m. EST
AND PLACE:
Camp David
The President initiated the call. (U)
The President: How are you? (U)
Prime Minister Lubbers: Fine. It is good to hear your voice.
(U)
The President: I am just calling to tell you I am off to Malta
soon and that I will be going to Brussels afterwards. I wanted
to get your advice. (U)
Prime Minister Lubbers: We had a good meeting with our European
colleagues in Paris. The atmosphere was very positive.
Gorbachev is in favor of development toward democracy in central
and eastern Europe. I have a feeling we should not be talking
about national boundaries, which should be respected. We should
also avoid talk of the German problem. Everyone agrees with
that. And we should respect the maintenance of NATO and the
Warsaw Pact.
The President: I understand. It is a sensitive point.
Prime Minister Lubbers: We can work together in the economic
field with Eastern Europe. There are certain forms of
association, including trade and special privileges. This is
very important, George. To the extent that capital from other
countries goes there with the possibility to export to the
European market, it will be more attractive to investors. The
IMF is moving to certain conclusions in this regard. Finally, we
should be ready with credits and aid in the wintertime. You
asked my advice. Make this a European project for Gorbachev and
you.
()
The President: I think we can move in that direction. It is
understandable that we not project the German Question, but at
some point one of these countries will say we do not want to be
in the Pact.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0273-F
3/30/2009 MM
oum
IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
- 2 -
Prime Minister Lubbers: I don't expect that to happen soon.
There may be a chance for a Finnish pattern, but this is not a
point for us to raise. Poland and Hungary need to know that for
stronger economic cooperation and even integration with the EC,
they do not have to leave the Pact. I talked with President
Mitterrand two days ago. We believe it is better not to accept
Austria as a full member but rather with some form of
association. This would show that the same is possible also for
Eastern Europe. It is in the interest of the West to sustain
Gorbachev in his liberalization. I don't see much advantage in
East European countries leaving the Warsaw Pact. If they do,
they should go a way different from Western Europe, perhaps like
Finland or Austria. It is their right to decide, but we should
let them know that all forms of cooperation are possible even
without their leaving the Warsaw Pact.
(
The President: We cannot be publicly positioned as opposing
their leaving the Warsaw Pact.
(e)
Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes. (U)
The President: These are interesting times, aren't they? (U)
Prime Minister Lubbers: Absolutely. (U)
The President: Congratulations on forming your new government.
Are you happy with it? (U)
Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes. It is a new situation, though.
(U)
The President: Will you be able to go to Brussels? (U)
Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, of course. I will see you there.
(U)
-- End of Conversation --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Call to Prime
Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME
November 25, 1989, 8:30 - 8:37 a.m. EST
AND PLACE:
Camp David
The President initiated the call. (U)
The President: Good morning, or rather afternoon. I wanted to
see if you had any words of wisdom as I go to meet with
Gorbachev. (U)
Prime Minister Gonzalez: Many thanks. It is going to be
difficult. Probably the best way to help him -- to get him to
let us help him -- is not to insist on the elimination of the two
pacts.
The President: Good point. (U)
Prime Minister Gonzalez: All of the policy problems, defense
agreements, and border problems can go backwards if the alliances
are not maintained.
The President: I agree. The problem is that at some point one
or more of the East European states may decide on their own that
they want out.
Prime Minister Gonzalez: I am sure that will happen eventually.
But we need to hold off, to gain time, gain four or five years,
until disarmament negotiations are further along.
The President: That would be a good idea. It would make it
easier for Gorbachev to move forward.
Prime Minister Gonzalez: Exactly. (U)
The President: I am going over to debrief at Brussels on
December 4 at the invitation of Manfred Woerner. I hope to see
you there. (U)
Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes. I probably will be making my
inaugural speech on that very day. If that does not happen, I
will go. Otherwise, if I must be here, I will send my foreign
minister instead.
(
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The President: I understand. If you cannot come and would like
me to send someone to see you and give you our impressions, I
would be glad to do that.
)
Prime Minister Gonzalez: I would be very grateful. I would
appreciate that. (U)
The President: If you have any other ideas before Malta, I would
welcome your advice. (U)
Prime Minister Gonzalez: Thank you. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
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9709
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Call to Prime
Minister Poul Schlueter of Denmark (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Poul Schlueter, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME
November 26, 1989, 8:03 - 8:08 EST
AND PLACE:
Camp David
The President initiated the call. (U)
The President: How are you? (U)
Prime Minister Schlueter: Fine. It is nice of you to call. (U)
The President: I am just checking in. I have checked in with
our other Allies, and wanted to know if you had any thoughts
before I leave for my meetings with Gorbachev. (U)
Prime Minister Schlueter: The twelve in the Common Market had a
very good meeting with President Mitterrand in Paris Sunday. We
sent a signal that we know our obligations and will meet them.
We agreed that the timing of your meeting with Gorbachev is
excellent.
The President: Yes. (U)
Prime Minister Schlueter: Is the prime purpose to be weapons
reductions? (U)
The President: I am not sure about that. We have made it clear
that this is not an arms control meeting per se. We have a
multilateral framework and would need to consult with our Allies.
()
Prime Minister Schlueter: But no detailed negotiations? (U)
The President: No. We will also talk on the economic side. I
can hear from him what his expectations are. I also want to find
out what his limits of tolerance are.
(C)
Prime Minister Schlueter: Yes. This will be important. It is a
big concern that the Soviet economy is so lagging. (U)
The President: Do you have any thoughts about changes in
Germany? (U)
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Prime Minister Schlueter: At Paris, Chancellor Kohl stressed
that reunification is not a matter that needs to be dealt with
now, and that Germany will remain 100 per cent in NATO and the
EC. This is irreversible, he said.
The President: I just wanted to check in. How is your beautiful
bride? (U)
Prime Minister Schlueter: Fine. It has been very pleasant here.
We have just been hunting in Jutland. (U)
The President: Give her our love. (U)
Prime Minister Schlueter: We shall meet on December 4. (U)
The President: Good. I will look forward to it. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
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2009 - 0693-MR
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ses 6/20/11
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Call to President
Turgut Ozal of Turkey (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME
November 27, 1989, 12:09 - 12:13 p.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President initiated the call. (U)
The President: How are you? I am calling about the Malta
meeting. I wondered if you had any concerns or words of
consultation or advice. I wanted to touch base with all of the
NATO allies and assure you that there would be no deals made over
your heads at Malta. I also wanted to get advice, especially
from you, since you are so geographically close to the Soviet
Union. (d)
Prime Minister Ozal: I would say to be careful and cautious, but
also try to help the Soviet economy and democratization in
Eastern Europe. (C)
The President: I think that is good advice. I just had a
meeting with Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of our Federal Reserve
Board. On the economic side, it is my intention to try to help,
but real reforms are needed. (d)
Prime Minister Ozal: The situation is similar to our efforts in
the 1980s. We had friends' help, but we made our own efforts.
(d)
The President: Arms control will be for a summit and after
consultation with our allies. He may bring it up, but I will say
I need to consult with my allies. (U)
Prime Minister Ozal: I agree. (U)
The President: I wanted to touch base with you and other allies.
There is a kind of euphoria now. We do want to help and are
prepared to make suggestions. (U)
Prime Minister Ozal: I am sure they need help, but they should
accept that Marxism is dead. (c)
The President: We'll be in Brussels at the invitation of Manfred
Woerner to discuss Malta with our allies. (U)
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Prime Minister Ozal: Our Prime Minister will be there. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
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PER E.O. 13526
2012-1479- MR
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
5/27/2016 MM
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Call to Prime
Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Anibal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME
November 27, 1989, 12:16 - 12:34 p.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President initiated the call. (U)
The President: Anibal, how are you? (U)
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Fine. How is your family? (U)
The President: Fine. I am calling to get advice from an old
friend about my Malta meeting. (U)
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: It is a very important one. (U)
The President: There will be no surprises to our allies and no
deals. I will be ready to talk with him on a wide array of
economic things. I want perestroika to succeed, as you do.
(U)
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: It is important that the allies be
united to achieve good results in disarmament and other fields.
We agreed on that in Paris. (U)
The President: That is good to hear. I heard that from other
allies. I appreciate that the allies are meeting. I wanted your
ideas. (U)
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: There should be economic reforms,
not just political changes such as election laws and
liberalization. Without structural adjustment, I think they will
not succeed. We Portuguese understand. We had a totalitarian
takeover attempt. We had to make many changes to put market
mechanisms in place, adopt constitutional changes, and revise the
banking system. We support the changes in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, but we should not destabilize the alliances. The
EC also agreed that we should not weaken transatlantic ties.
Los
The President: I agree. This is a timely meeting. We started
talking with Gorbachev last summer. I am glad to hear we are
thinking along the same lines. (U)
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Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Will you discuss regional problems?
(U)
The President: Yes. Absolutely. We will talk about
Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and also Angola, which you are very
interested in. (U)
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Yes. I want to talk about this
when I visit in January. (U)
The President: Yes. If you have thoughts about Angola before I
leave for Malta, I would appreciate your personal message. You
could hand it to our Ambassador.
(C)
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Yes. I have been there recently
and talked to President Dos Santos. I think it is time for a
lasting peace. I will see about a personal message, although our
Foreign Minister has come to your State Department. Dos Santos
wants a solution; everyone does. He has a problem in his Party,
but he is in control. He wants a dialogue with Savimbi. (e)
The President: That is encouraging. If you have further
thoughts before Malta, please tell me. I look forward to our
meeting. (U)
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: All the success to your summit. We
in Europe will be following it with great interest. (U)
The President: We will do our best. We won't let you down. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
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9709
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Call to Prime
Minister Xenofon Zolotas of Greece
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Xenofon Zolotas, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME
November 27, 1989, 12:28 - 1230 p.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President initiated the call.
The President: Mr. Prime Minister?
Prime Minister Zolotas: Yes, I am the Prime Minister.
The President: I am pleased to say hello. I am calling about
the upcoming meeting in Malta. I have been touching base with
all of the countries in NATO, in a spirit of full consultation.
I want to assure you there will not be some major arms control
deal that does not have the full approval of NATO. I would
welcome any thoughts you have.
Prime Minister Zolotas: I will be coming to the NATO meeting.
If I have any thoughts I will send them.
The President: I look forward to seeing you December 4 in
Brussels.
Prime Minister Zolotas: I fully understand your position. I am
looking forward to the success of your deliberations with Mr.
Gorbachev. Thank you for your call.
-- End of Conversation --
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Call to Prime
Minister Jan P. Syse of Norway (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Jan P. Syse, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME
November 27, 1989, 12:56 - 1:00 p.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President initiated the call. (U)
The President: Mr. Prime Minister, how are you? (U)
Prime Minister Syse: Fine. How are you? (U)
The President: I am checking with our NATO allies and looking
forward to the Malta meeting. I am going to Brussels December 4
and wonder if you have any words of wisdom. (U)
Prime Minister Syse: Words of wisdom? I don't know about that.
Perhaps some questions. I welcome your idea of going to
Brussels. May I raise one matter of special concern to us?
Gorbachev, in Helsinki, talked about arms control at sea. This
is a dangerous idea. We should not weaken the sea lanes to the
Atlantic. There has been a constant Soviet buildup in the north.
New offensive capabilities are being added. I would ask you to
consider this special question and encourage Gorbachev to start
cutting down naval forces up north as he has done in the Baltic.
()
The President: I will be glad to do it. He has pressed us for
naval reductions, but we are disinclined to do so. You make a
good point of the need for cutting down Soviet forces up north.
I will be glad to raise this point. I look forward to our
meeting on December 4. I think Malta will be a good meeting.
There has been so much euphoria that it may be hard to live up to
that. The meeting is not meant to be a major summit. I want to
hear his views, including on economic issues. I want to help him
and know our allies do, too. It is important to keep the allies
together. ()
Prime Minister Syse: I agree. Also in Eastern Europe it is
important to help. (U)
The President: I look forward to seeing you, and I look forward
to a good Malta meeting. The changes are wonderful in Eastern
Europe, but there is still a need for prudence. I look forward
to seeing you in Brussels. (U)
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Prime Minister Syse: I look forward to meeting you. Thank you
for calling me. (U)
-- End of Conversation --
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9709
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Call to Prime
Minister Steingrimur Hermannsson of
Iceland
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Steingrimur Hermannsson, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME
November 27, 1989, 4:16 - 4:20 p.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President initiated the call.
The President: How are you?
Prime Minister Hermannsson: Fine. It has been a busy period.
The President: I am calling to touch base before my meeting in
Malta. I am calling NATO friends to say there will be no deals
behind the backs of our allies. It will be an open agenda: he
can raise any ideas, and I will raise any. I wanted to ask you
for advice. On December 4 I will be going to Brussels at the
invitation of Manfred Woerner. I hope to see you there.
Prime Minister Hermannsson: It is a good idea. I strongly
support this meeting. I will be in Brussels and look forward to
hearing your report. I have no specific advice. You are on the
right track.
The President: I think SO too. There is some criticism here
that I am not responding to the enormous changes in Eastern
Europe, but I think things are going well. There is no need for
rhetoric. Gorbachev has problems enough at home. We will
discuss arms control in broad terms, but this is not the place
for deals on CFE or START.
Prime Minister Hermannsson: I agree. Things are very promising.
Gorbachev has great problems--more than appear on the surface.
The Western countries should help, but not interfere. I am just
back from a meeting between EFTA and the EB. We agreed to help
the East European countries. Iceland will participate in a small
way in the fund for Poland.
The President: Good. I look forward to seeing you in Brussels
on Monday.
- 2 -
Prime Minister Hermannsson: Thank you. I wish you the best of
luck.
The President: Do you have many fish this summer?
Prime Minister Hermannsson: If you come, I can guarantee you
will catch some.
-- End of Conversation --
9709
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Call to Prime
Minister Jacques Santer of Luxembourg
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Jacques Santer, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME
November 27, 1989, 5:31 - 5:34 p.m. EST
AND PLACE:
The Oval Office
The President initiated the call.
The President: Where are you -- off in Japan? I hope it's not
too early. I am calling in a spirit of consultation about my
upcoming meeting with Gorbachev. First, I have been invited by
Manfred Woerner to debrief at Brussels on December 4, which I'm
happy to do. Second, I would like to have your thoughts or
suggestions. I am calling all the allies.
Prime Minister Santer: This is a very important moment. I back
all of your efforts. It is a very decisive moment in Europe. As
I have said in the EC meeting, we need to support democratization
and help them with their social, economic, and political
difficulties. I support your efforts.
The President: This is encouraging. I am getting good
responses. This not an arms control meeting. There will be no
agenda. Any topic is open for discussion, but Gorbachev must
know there will be no deals without consultations with our
allies. I will discuss his economic problems and also regional
problems. I look forward to debriefing you on Monday in
Brussels.
Prime Minister Santer: Thank you. It is an important moment.
We support you in all your efforts. Best wishes. Good luck.
The President: Thank you. I will see you in Brussels.
-- End of Conversation --
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RECORD ID: 8909790
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RECEIVED: 05 DEC 89 09
TO: PRESIDENT
CHRON FILE
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 06 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
EUROPE
"
PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET
SUBJECT: THATCHER & EUROPE
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES
DUE DATE: 08 DEC 89
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
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By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09
COMMENTS:
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9790 add-on
AS AMENDED
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December 6, 1989
you
Bunt,
To
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
how
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
Hey
SUBJECT:
Thatcher and Europe
know
The British press seized on your renewed endorsement of a more
united Europe to portray you as taking the side of the rest of
Western Europe against the Prime Minister. Your support for
see
European integration is not new, and the media hyperbole
exaggerated the negligible differences on concrete issues. This
episode is a warning of how the bitter debate between Thatcher's
and Delors' visions for Europe can affect our own policy
GAS,
objectives. While we want to avoid a row with Mrs. Thatcher, it
would be helpful if she could be persuaded to play a more
constructive role in the EC, and thus help tightly bind Germany
to the West.
Britain and the EC: The Tory Turnabout
It is ironic that the Conservative Party, which since Macmillan's
time has pushed for closer British ties to the Common Market, is
now stereotyped as opposing integration. The Labour leadership,
on the other hand, historically fearful of ties to the EC, has
begun to sing the Community's praises. This turnabout stems from
the change in the EC's own agenda for the future, set against the
background of British domestic politics.
Mrs. Thatcher has strongly supported EC creation of a free trade
area in Europe. The Conservative Party has long stood for free
trade, with Labour warning against the impact of free trade on
jobs. So the Single Market, with its relaxation of barriers to
free movement of goods, was immensely appealing to the Prime
Minister, and to most of her party. It was the brainchild of her
former Trade Minister, Lord Cockfield. Her support for this goal
was so strong that she joined in accepting the provision of the
Single European Act eliminating a single member's veto power
within the Community, a decision Thatcher now regrets and blames
on Geoffrey Howe's Foreign Office.
Thatcher's difficulty is with integration that goes beyond free
trade. First, she has little use for monetary union which would
create a common central bank and European currency and subject
the British economy to German economic and monetary discipline.
Considering deregulation of the British economy to be among her
historic achievements as Prime Minister, she is also rightly
appalled at the prospect of surrendering control over budgetary
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policy to 'Eurocrats.' As she told her party conference last
year: "We have not worked all these years to free Britain from
the paralysis of socialism only to see it creep in through the
back door of central control and bureaucracy from Brussels."
Beyond economics, however, Thatcher fears the erosion of
Britain's distinctiveness as a nation. In addition to a common
Eurocurrency, Delors wishes to create common laws on worker
rights and participation in industry, consumer protection, public
health, education policy, legal rights for the accused, and other
issues -- all encompassed in the EC's so-called "social
dimension." Thatcher believes she must resist these moves to
protect the essential sovereignty of the United Kingdom. She is
opposing what, in Bruges last September, she called the "folly"
of merging European countries into "some sort of identikit
Europersonality."
Challenges to Thatcher's Position
The Labour Party, meanwhile, has come to welcome EC clashes with
Thatcher's agenda as a substitute for its own inability to block
the Prime Minister's domestic program. Thatcher must also deal
with discontent within her own party. There is broad Tory
support for the Prime Minister's basic approach to the EC. Yet
the party worries that her style, tone, and tactics are giving
the impression that the party is now against British economic
engagement in Europe, a potential liability in the next general
election (in late 1991 or 1992).
These Tory 'wets' believe that London can be more influential in
shaping the EC's agenda as a constructive participant than as, to
borrow Michael Heseltine's metaphor, a man alone in the desert --
sovereign but powerless. They are concerned about the stridency
of her rhetoric, the deliberate adversarial quality of her
dialogue with Delors, and her readiness to cross swords with the
Community on every issue as a matter of principle, even where the
particular proposal (such as one to improve teaching of foreign
languages in secondary schools) would benefit Britain.
In the first-ever formal challenge to Thatcher's party leadership
December 5 (from a long-disgruntled and unpopular backbencher),
60 out of 374 Tory MPs withheld their support through opposition
or abstention, a number large enough to be troubling but no
threat to her leadership position. The Prime Minister can be
expected to reveal more about her attitude toward the future of
the EC this weekend in Strasbourg, at a meeting of Community
leaders.
The Challenge for the United States
Your remarks on the EC in Brussels were the latest in a
consistent series of U.S. statements, beginning with your speech
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at Boston University in May, putting the Administration on the
side of a stronger and more united Europe. (The attached article
from the December 6 Financial Times demonstrates that the quality
European press increasingly understands what you are trying to
do.) The Prime Minister used your call to her on the morning of
December 5 to effectively rebut, in the House of Commons, the
claim that you had had a serious difference with her on the
future of the EC.
This episode does spotlight Thatcher's need to find more common
ground in her relationships in Western Europe and with the EC.
There is a clear potential for improved UK relations with Western
Europe. Mitterrand is worried about German steps toward
reunification and, following a time-honored pattern, is bound to
welcome closer ties with Britain to help manage a resurgent
Germany. Several West European governments share some of
London's concerns about EC activism in social policy and are also
reluctant to yield new authority to officials in Brussels who are
not democratically accountable.
Since the 1950s, U.S. leaders have relied on NATO and the EC to
anchor Germany firmly in the West. By slowing EC development,
Thatcher weakens that anchor. As you said in Brussels,
"unification should occur in the context of Germany's continued
commitment to NATO and an increasingly integrated European
Community If the major transatlantic problems in the 1990s
are those of political economy rather than the political-military
challenges so familiar in the postwar era, then the EC may be the
best available instrument in the coming decade for the Europeans
to manage the German problem. It would be best all-round if Mrs.
Thatcher took a more constructive attitude toward the EC, seeking
consensus instead of staking out a defiant ideological position.
The Prime Minister may get closer to her own long-term objectives
if, while sticking to her principles, she changes her tone and
tactics, so that Helmut Kohl will not continue to refer to her as
"that woman."
Attachment
Tab A
Article from December 6 Financial Times
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Warm western breeze for Europe
Peter Riddell examines President Bush's transatlantic view
P
RESIDENT
George
tion has decided to take a posi-
other in the debate before the
Europe."
Bush's strong endorse-
tive view of the creation of a
EC's Strasbourg summit this
The US is thinking of
ment of European inte-
single European market, to
month. His view is that the
strengthening the political side
gration, in his speech to Nato
appear in 1992.
form of European integration
of the relationship. This may
leaders in Brussels on Monday,
Second, as the pace of
is for the Europeans to decide.
be through the meetings of the
was the culmination of a grad-
change in eastern Europe has
Where the US differs from
troika (the immediate past,
ual shift in US policy this year.
accelerated, Mr Bush has
Mrs Margaret Thatcher is over
present and future presidents
Transatiantic relations used
increasingly seen the political
the tone of the current British
of the EC, at senior official/
to be uncertain and wary at
value of an integrated Euro-
approach - the apparent lack
political director level) every
times during the Carter and
pean Community as a source of
of enthusiasm for, or rather
six months. However, the US
Reagan presidencies, but Mr
stability in the continent.
the questioning attitude to,
has stressed that this does not
Bush is determined to estab-
integration. Mr. Bush and his
mean that the EC should sup-
lish closer and firmer links.
H
ence his call in Brus-
advisers would like Britain to
plant Nato.
The signs so far are that he is
sels "both for a contin-
take a more positive view, and
There has been a shift In the
succeeding - in terms of
ued, perhaps even
hence have more. influence
balance of the relationship,
mood, if not substance.
intensified, effort of the 12 to
over the details.
with the US being less a com-
Even so, there have been
integrate, and a role for the EC
Mrs Thatcher appeared
manding leader than a leading
misconceptions about what
as a magnet that draws the
taken aback on Monday by Mr
partner. In part, of course, this
this means in practice, both in
forces of reform forward in
Bush's plan for the future of
reflects the domestic budgetary
relation to the form of Euro-
eastern Europe." Last July, at
Europe, and, in particular, by
constraints on the US ability to
pean integration and to future
the seven-country annual eco-
the reference to integration.
act on a large scale overseas.
US relations with Europe.
nomic summit, the US agreed
But talk of British isolation
But Mr Bush and his advis-
Mr Bush is genuinely inter-
to the European Commission
should not be exaggerated, as
ers also accept that the trans-
ested in European issues. The
taking a role in chairing the
Mr Bush made clear on the
atlantic balance has changed,
latest visit is his third to
effort by the Group of 24 to
telephone yesterday to Mrs
with European countries tak-
Europe within six months, and
help Poland and Hungary,
Thatcher.
ing the lead in deciding their
characteristically he has been
about which Mr Bush says he
The other misconception is
own future. This may be
in frequent contact with a wide
was "exceptionally pleased".
that the US is somehow
unavoidable for the US, but Mr
range of European leaders. He
There is uncertainty in
retreating from Europe. While
Bush has not been grudging;
talks to Chancellor Helmut
Europe about what this means.
there are neo-isolationists
he has welcomed the change.
Kohl of West Germany by
One State Department official
among conservative Republi
All this may add up mainly
phone roughly once a week.
closely involved talked of inte-
cans, the administration
to a shift in mood. But it is
Moreover, much to the plea-
gration having a security
remains firmly committed to a
significant. Mr Bush may at
sure of the European Commis-
dimension: "Europe is more
continuing US role in Europe.
times be embarrassingly inar-
sion, Mr Bush has seen Mr
than just trade." The US is con-
This will involve not only
ticulate, and is never likely to
Jacques Delors for bilateral
cerned with the political direc-
maintaining "significant mill-
be regarded as charismatic or
meetings on both his visits to
tion of Europe rather than the
tary forces" but also what Mr.
visionary, as he self-deprecat
Brussels.
form of integration. Mr Bush
Bush has called "a close US
ingly admitted on Monday But
Also, there has been a
has taken no position on, say,
partnership with the EC."
he has succeeded in showing
change of policy to match the
European monetary union and
He referred on Monday/to
European leaders that he
shift of style towards close con-
the social charter.
looking for ways "to improve
understands their concerns
sultation. First, after early
So it is wrong to see Mr
our ties so a new Atlanticism
and shares most of their aspi-
doubts, the Bush administra-
Bush siding with one group or
will pull in harness with a new
rations.
SECRET
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
9790
December 6, 1989
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT BLACKWILL
PB
FROM:
PHILIP ZELIKOW P2
SUBJECT:
Thatcher and Europe
In view of the President's talk with Mrs. Thatcher yesterday
morning, we have prepared an analysis of the Prime Minister's
views on the EC for the President.
Concurrences: Tim Deal and Adrian BasorB
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Memorandum to the President attached at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Article from December 6 Financial Times
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09
SECRET
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
11a. Memo
C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft
12/22/89
(b)(1)
S
Re: Lebanon - -- Working to Avert New Fighting (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Chronological Files
By SCS (NLGB) on 7/8/11
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Other (October - December 1989)
Date Closed:
7/10/2009
OA/ID Number:
91148-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2010-0768-MR
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 3/14/2011
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
SECRET
10314
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL 502 JBRARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
December 22, 1989
ACTION
adversions propetion.
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
see
THROUGH:
RICHARD N. HAASS
FROM:
C. DAVID WELCH
SUBJECT:
Lebanon -- Working to Avert New Fighting
The situation in Lebanon could explode at any moment. The
Syrians have warned us again that their patience is not infinite;
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
Aoun's call for elections on
January 7 for a new Parliament (presumably a truncated body in
the Christian enclave) has created a new deadline for action by
Hraoui and Syria and its allies to avert this deepening of
partition.
In tandem with our diplomacy to bolster Hraoui and the national
reconciliation process, we have urged Syria not to resort to
force. Our demarches bought a respite,
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
At our urging, the Tripartite Committee
has gone through a further round of consultations, but the
Committee has no effectiveness with Aoun.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
not recellary
(b)(1)
In short, we have just about
exhausted the diplomatic strategy set up after Hraoui's election.
We need further momentum, or more bloodshed is all but certain.
why would ince want to do this
In thinking this over with State/NEA, we come up with two ideas:
a trip by Ambassador McCarthy to Lebanon, followed by a visit by
Hraoui here. We would package this as follows: McCarthy would
travel to northern Lebanon to meet Hraoui right before the
January 7 elections; he would convey the President's invitation,
and Hraoui -- who we believe would accept immediately -- would
use the occasion to announce the visit. This news might detract
attention and support for Aoun's psuedo-election and reinforce
Hraoui's stature.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
2010-0768-MR
3r 3/14/11
SECRET
2
(b)(1)
There is a risk that Aoun (or others) could take advantage of
Hraoui's absence to stir up trouble. We believe that risk is
Fordor
manageable, however. In any event, Hraoui is likely to regard
the political benefits of a visit as greater than the risks of
his absence.
We admit we are working with limited tools to keep Lebanon
breathing. A Hraoui visit is the best of only a few, not-so-good
ideas, but we believe it would generate at least some political
momentum for Hraoui. If you agree, then the next step would be
quickly to elicit from the schedulers a proposed date so that
State can begin to plan the other parts of the scenario outlined
above.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the attached schedule proposal for a working visit
by Lebanese President Hraoui in February, with an invitation to
be conveyed before January 6.
Attachment
Tab I
Schedule Proposal for Joe Hagin
SECRET
SECRET
10314
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
TO:
JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Deputy Assistant to
the President for Appointments and
Scheduling
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
REQUEST:
For a working visit by Lebanon's new
President, Elias Hraoui, to discuss the
situation in Lebanon.
PURPOSE:
To strengthen President Hraoui and the
legitimate government of Lebanon and to
promote national reconciliation in
Lebanon.
BACKGROUND:
The political situation in Lebanon is
deadlocked. General Aoun has threatened
to hold elections on January 7 for a new
Parliament, seated in the Christian
enclave. Such elections would deepen
partition and would damage the chances
for national reconciliation. The
potential for further violence is
growing and Syrian patience with a
political track to move Aoun aside is
wearing thin. If an invitation for
Hraoui to visit here were delivered and
publicized prior to January 7, it would
be a big boost to Hraoui and a major
slap at Aoun. It would distract
attention from any elections, thus
reducing the potential for renewed
fighting.
DATE AND TIME:
February, 1990.
DURATION:
One hour.
LOCATION:
Oval Office
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0768-MR
SECRET
SCS 3/14/11
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
PARTICIPANTS:
The President; the Vice President; James
Baker, Secretary of State; John Sununu,
Chief of Staff; Brent Scowcroft,
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs; Robert Gates,
Assistant to the President and Deputy
for National Security Affairs; John
Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asain Affairs;
John McCarthy, U.S. Ambassador to
Lebanon; C. David Welch, Director for
Near East and South Asian Affairs (NSC)
OUTLINE OF EVENTS:
Photo op followed by meeting.
REMARKS REQUIRED:
To be provided by NSC.
MEDIA COVERAGE:
White House Press Pool.
RECOMMENDED BY:
State Department and NSC.
SECRET
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 10314
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG CM A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Dep Exec
1
W
A
Philip Hughes
j
Bob Gates
3
Brent Scowcroft
4
Philip Hughes
Situation Room
E.
West WingDesk
89 89 DEC 22 P4: 25
5
NSC Secretariat
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Sununu
Other
Lebanon's Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
Pres Elico Hraoni
SP
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
12/22
Breat /Boh.
As you know, usually when the President extends
a visit invitation it is for a State (dinnes) N
Official Working (lunch) visit. Thisis more
than Dwid: is asking for, but I thought I'd remind
you that the six month visit schedule I just
sent up to you tasa "vacant" Official Working
Visit slot in February that we could offer to
Hraoui ifyou want (That opening falls a little
early to be used for pre - Summit Alliance consultations) -
On the other hand, you may judge Hracui to be
too nucertain a uroposition to spend a Presidential
lunch on.
Philip