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428079847
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Meeting with King Hussein I of Jordan, February 23, 1989
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428079847
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Meeting with King Hussein I of Jordan, February 23, 1989
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Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Memcon Files
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Jordan
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1989-02-23
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1989
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
11. Memcon
Re: Memorandum of Conversation (5 pp.)
2/23/89
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Document Partially Declassified
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
(Copy of Document Follows)
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
By
Col
(NLGB) on 10/6/10
Series:
Presidential Correspondence
Subseries:
Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 1/24/89 - 2/25/89
Date Closed:
1/23/2009
OA/ID Number:
91107-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
2000-0429-F(9)
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
Released in Part
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
8/21/2009
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
2149
GRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
APPRESIDENTIAL
SECRET w/
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
WASHINGTON
HSNE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with King Hussein I of Jordan
PARTICIPANTS:
U.S.
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
James A. Kelly, NSC, Notetaker
Jordan
King Hussein I
Field Marshal Zaid bin-Shaker, Chief of the
Royal Court
DATE, TIME
February 23, 1989, 7:55 p.m. - 8:25 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Ambassador's Residence, Tokyo, Japan
The President warmly welcomed King Hussein and opened by saying
he was looking forward to seeing him in the United States at his
convenience, and that their governments had been talking about
spring. He then asked King Hussein to give his opinion of events
in the region.
/
King Hussein said that there were opportunities which had not
been seen in the past. There was a feeling of new direction and
amazing potential. He complimented the President's knowledge of
the region, but reminded him that it was the most volatile and
dangerous part of the earth. He commented on the uprising in the
occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza and the repression
that had resulted. He said as a result the Palestinians for the
first time had an identity and voice. As a result of the PLO
meeting the American requirements, the dialogue that has been
established makes the time right, said the King, for an
international conference on the Middle East. (S)
He continued, noting that the Middle East bridges Africa and
Asia, and that there is a threat of nuclear war. Other kinds of
weapons of vast destruction are widely held in the region. He
said that policies too often in the past had been hostage to
extremists. At this time, the King said, sixty percent of
Israelis support a dialogue with the PLO, and no solution is
possible without the Palestinians. The King said that we do not
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need new initiatives. He said that if too much time is taken,
extremists on both sides will seek greater advantage. (S)
The President said that there were some steps taken by the King
which had generated wide applause, and that he was interested in
receiving his advice. Concerning Yasser Arafat, it was
significant that he had met America's minimum requirements before
the dialogue began. The President asked if the King felt Arafat
was able to control the PLO. He asked further to what extent
Arafat was endangered by radical elements? (S)
King Hussein replied that the radical elements are very small.
The King continued that Arafat was a symbol for the majority of
Palestinians and that all, in some respects, support him. Arafat
does not exert complete control over the PLO, but he remains the
principal figure. Hussein noted that Israeli election plans were
trying to cause divisions among the Palestinians and he expressed
the view that if the PLO and local leaders are not encouraged to
continue, the results will be that unknown, more radical persons
will move in. (S)
The President noted that perhaps the process had been helped by
Jordan's disengagement. (C)
King Hussein replied that the Palestinians want identity, that
they have wanted this for seventy years, but that recent events
provide some promise. There is a danger but everyone is ready
now, he said. (c)
President Bush asked King Hussein about the Rabin plan for
elections. (et
King Hussein said yes, he was familiar with it. (U)
The President asked if he understood the Rabin plan to say that
the Israelis would agree to talk to whoever wins the elections,
including members of the PLO.
(C)
King Hussein said that this election plan would take too long.
Moreover, in his view it separates the Palestinians in the
occupied territories and outside. The PLO, he stated, comprises
both of these groups. (S)
Governor Sununu asked the King when he felt a conference should
occur. (U)
King Hussein answered this year. (U)
Secretary Baker interjected that he had found a sense of support
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in Europe for an international conference. There would be some
problems in structuring such an event. One view was that if a
conference were too quickly called, it may preempt certain good
opportunities. He explained that the King needed to consider
Israel's position now, including the recent tough American human
rights report, the U.S. dialogue with the PLO, and the uncertain
political situation since the election, including the narrow
margin now held by Likud. Secretary Baker said we agree
opportunities that did not exist before are in place, but we do
not know what kind. Would an international conference led by the
five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council be
best now, or be more likely to succeed after proper tilling of
the ground?
(S)
King Hussein said the U.S. must hear from all parties. He said
he believes strongly that this year is the time, and that the
process should not be dragged out.
(C)
President Bush asked how would the conference have to be shaped
to meet Jordanian requirements. (U)
King Hussein said the five permanent members of the UNSC would
lead the dialogue without imposing solutions. UN Resolution 242
would be the heart of the basis for resolving the Palestinian
problem, and establishing peace to all parties of the conflict.
Direct negotiations would be the basis.
(e)
Marshal bin-Shaker then commented that he had taken the liberty,
because the President's time was so short, to prepare a complete
analysis of the situation. He said there would be much in this
analysis of which the President was unaware. The analysis
(attachment) includes three documents: A Chronology of Jordanian
Efforts for Peace; U.S. Commitments and Positions in a Peace
Settlement; and a Personal Letter for the President from King
Hussein.
(5)
The President promised to look at these documents and to treat
them with appropriate confidentiality. (U)
Secretary Baker asked the King to comment on the kind of problems
that he would see in a Palestinian confederation arrangement.
(c)
King Hussein said there would be none immediately because that
would be the final status. He believed the Palestinians will
seek something like this because relations now are quite
unstable. People are weary, he said, because there has been no
progress. His country, in particular, with the longest borders
in the area, longer than those of the West Bank and Gaza, as well
as the inhabitants of those regions must have their say. 1BT
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Secretary Baker asked again if there were direct negotiations,
would a confederation be acceptable? (C)
President Hussein answered affirmatively. But he asked how to
get Israel to enter into direct negotiations. Hussein said the
Israeli public is ready. He added that in the Jewish American
community many persons are also anxious to see this kind of
progress.
(S)
The President said that Hussein is right, public opinion in
Israel is changing, and our dialogue with the PLO has not been so
badly received. (S)
Secretary Baker asked the exact nature of the Israeli poll that
the King had referred to. TCT
King Hussein said sixty-four percent had favored direct
negotiations with the PLO. (S)
General Scowcroft asked that if the U.S. uses all of its
influence with the Israelis to bring about a meeting, what
influence would the U.S. have left to pursue a solution? This
was why the international conference must be approached
carefully. (S)
Governor Sununu commented that hesitancy on the conference is in
part because few have an adequate sense of where the conference
will go. He raised the prospect of possible pre-conference
packaging, noting that a strong, clear road map will help
hesitant participants to be more assured. ICT
King Hussein said things like that had been tried in the past,
and that they have been tried directly with Israel. The United
Nations Security Council five permanent representatives provide
the modern weight of world opinion. They should not propose a
solution, and neither should they exercise a veto against a
particular solution. But the five could act as guarantors for UN
Resolution 242. 1ST
General Scowcroft asked what participants Hussein envisioned? (U)
King Hussein named Israel, Palestinians, U.S., Syria, Lebanon (he
said Lebanon would need to be somehow included), and Egypt. He
continued that Syria would be present. Shevardnadze had told him
on the night he left Amman that Syria will be available for this
conference. He said that the Soviet position had changed and had
become quite constructive. 18t
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Marshal bin-Shaker added that Shevardnadze sounded as though he
had become pro-American. If there was a conference, the Soviet
Union would definitely restore full relations with Israel. 1ST
President Bush said we will try to assess the situation
carefully. (U)
King Hussein, turning to Iran and Iraq, said his hopes had not
been high, and that there was just a cease-fire at this
particular time. He commented that the work of the UN Secretary-
General had been helpful. NOW the recent Khomeini comments on
Rushdie had set these relations back further and European
countries were breaking relations. It is very hard to talk sense
in such a situation. In the Gulf, he noted, things were much
more quiet.
1ST
(S)
President Bush mentioned that American concern continues for
hostages in the Middle East, and he observed that a small number
of the so-called Dawa prisoners had been released in Kuwait. 151 (S)
King Hussein responded that
(b)(1)
ne was working to combat
terrorism wherever it would be possible, but that he feared that
the problem would remain for a long time. 1st
President Bush thanked him. The President then asked about the
health of Queen Noor and the king responded that she was well and
traveling in Europe at this time. (U)
Kino Hussein said that he had high hopes for the next four years,
that he hoped to get the President to visit Jordan sometime. (U)
President Bush ended the meeting by commenting on his review of
relations with the Soviet Union. It would be clear that the U.S.
is not stalling, the President said, and we are looking at places
the U.S. can be productive, and can be a catalyst to smooth the
process. The President welcomed the King's assessment on the
Middle East, but he said we have not sorted out how far we should
go. The figures of Israeli support for PLO dialogue were not
surprising. There is a moment of history at hand. The meeting
concluded in collegial fashion. 10t
Attachment:
Tab A
Document provided by King Hussein (U)
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