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428080613
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The President's Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, March 20, 1990
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428080613
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document
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The President's Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, March 20, 1990
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collections
Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Telcon Files
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1990-03-20
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1990
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CONFIDENTIAL
2168
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMCON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
The President's Telephone Call to Chancellor
Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of
Germany (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse (Interpreter)
DATE, TIME
March 20, 1990, 8:31 - 8:59 a.m. EST
AND PLACE:
Oval Office
The President initiated the call at 8:31 a.m. (U)
The President: Helmut, how are you? I called to congratulate
you. You're a hell of a campaigner! (U)
Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for the congratulations. It was a
hard, tough time, but it was worth it. You have to bear in mind
that these people [in the GDR] are in a very difficult time. The
last free elections were 50 years ago. Since 1961, when the Wall
went up, there have been virtually no communications with the
world outside. The parties lack everything -- staff, experience,
everything. They have to start from scratch. And there is even
more work ahead. The most difficult problem is the lack of an
experienced staff. That means twice the work for me. But I am
very happy with the results. (U)
George, the most important thing for you in Washington is that
before the elections everyone predicted that everyone would vote
on the Left, but the results proved them wrong. The workers
voted for us. If we act reasonably, in five years or so the
country will have a good. economy. The results are very important
for the NATO question as well. I will now find totally different
support than if the Left had won. So I am happy. Thank you
very, very sincerely for all your help. I remember with deep
gratitude the letter you sent before my trip to Moscow, and also
Secretary Baker's help in Moscow. (f)
The President: We're very proud of you. Some press reports here
say the Socialists in the GDR are adopting the position that this
is all because of Helmut Kohl and are trying to take away the
victory from the people. Let me just make a couple of comments
about the border and the upcoming visit by Mazowiecki. (L)
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
Declassify on: OADR
PER E.O. 12958,
By
81
NARA, Date 5/17/99
AS AMENDED
5/17/99 99-0393-F
SONFIDENTIAL
2
Chancellor Kohl: Yes, I would like to hear them. When is he
coming? (¢)
The President: He'll be here tomorrow. There will be a big
state dinner. There will be great interest here. I want to be
sure we are on the same wavelength. He may well ask for a larger
Polish role in the Two Plus Four process. That is why I wanted
to talk with you. On the border issue, I will repeat what I said
in our joint press conference: "The U.S. respects the provisions
of the Helsinki Final Act regarding the inviolability of current
borders in Europe. And the U.S. formally recognizes the current
German-Polish border. " I feel compelled to repeat that with this
man here.
(d)
Chancellor Kohl: George, that is fine. I completely agree. (U)
The President: I will remind him of your initiative, which will
lead to a treaty, fixing the current border, between a future
all-German government and Poland. I will tell him that you have
repeatedly assured me -- and that I believe you -- that the
current GDR-Polish border should be the permanent German-Polish
border. (f)
On Two Plus Four, I will tell him that I am pleased at the March
14 decision to invite Poland to its deliberations when the issue
of Polish borders is discussed. I will remind him that we see
the Two Plus Four as a process to deal with Four Power rights and
responsibilities in Berlin and Germany as a whole -- not as a
forum to decide the future of European security or to debate
Germany's membership in NATO. If he asks, I will say that we
will not support Warsaw as a site for any Two Plus Four talks,
reminding him that members of the Two Plus Four agreed March 14
that talks would be held alternately in the FRG and the GDR. I
will offer him intensified bilateral discussions as Two Plus Four
proceeds, but I will not agree to any expanding of the Polish
role in the Two Plus Four process, on the grounds that while Two
Plus Four may discuss other security issues -- discuss them
decisions will be made in other forums. I'm thinking of CFE,
where Poland will have a voice. (C)
I know I can assure him we are sensitive to Polish concerns, but
I will do SO in such a way that your position is not undermined.
I want to stop here. I have a few other points I'd like to make,
but I want to be sure that what I have said is compatible with
your position. (f)
Chancellor Kohl: George, the first thing: I'm very grateful for
the spirit of friendship in all that you have said. Everything
you have said is absolutely okay with me. I agree with
everything you have said concerning Two Plus Four. ()
The President: Let me add a couple of remarks on Two Plus Four.
(C)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
Chancellor Kohl: Just a few remarks: if you think it useful, if
you want to reassure Mazowiecki, you can report to him that we
have discussed the issue extensively on the phone and at Camp
David. Please tell him I want to help him be successful, but I
also have to be sure I am successful with my policies in my own
country. I don't usually say that publicly, but the election
results also have a bearing on these questions. I am firmly
determined to accept the Oder-Neisse border. I am not hiding
anything from here; there is no secrecy. (C)
It is true this is a bitter burden of history, but now is the
time to settle the issue definitely for the future. An all-
German government and parliament must, under international law,
make the final settlement. I understand the Poles. They want to
know what will occur from now until then, because I don't know
how long it will take -- perhaps one year, perhaps two years.
This was the idea, which has become easier now after the
elections. The GDR parliament and ours will have the same
majority.
(Φ)
The President: Now that the GDR elections are over, how soon do
you see a new GDR parliament and government able to adopt with
you a common declaration on the Polish border? (Q)
Chancellor Kohl: At the latest, May or June, our parliament and
theirs could take steps. (C)
The President: That would be very reassuring. (U)
Chancellor Kohl: This is the earliest I could enter into a
commitment. If you like, I could explain the timetable. They
will need until mid-April to set up parliament. There is a legal
time frame. Then the government can take office, and there are
also the Easter holidays. Very quickly the government will have
to take a number of priority decisions. They will need to take
them if they want to be into the Deutsche Mark system by mid-
year. They also have to take basic decisions regarding the
social market economy; that will be mid-May. So I see that
government in a position to act by the last two weeks of May, or
perhaps the last week of May. (C)
My idea is to pass declarations at the same time in the GDR and
the FRG. Then the governments of the GDR and the FRG would both
write letters to Mazowiecki. For example, I could write to
Mazowiecki and would convey the decision and confirm once again
that I recognize him as Prime Minister. Let me make a further
remark, which I am not making publicly: I am ready and willing
to agree on an eventual text with Mazowiecki. That is
something I am not able to make public, but it may be useful to
you. So until June, he can have all these assurances. (L)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
The President: I would only say that the sooner there can be
some of these assurances, the better. The Soviets seem to be
trying to stir up trouble on this border issue. Once the two
parliaments have acted and the results are conveyed to the Poles,
it will reduce the pressures on this issue enormously. (f)
Chancellor Kohl: George, just to make clear: what I said is a
promise I can keep. (C)
The President: But you cannot communicate that to Poland -- the
idea of a text? (d)
Chancellor Kohl: Yes, yes. That's possible. I wanted to wait
until you had seen Mazowiecki before doing anything on that. (&)
The President: Should I mention this to Mazowiecki or not? I
want to do whatever you want on this. (f)
Chancellor Kohl: If you think it would be useful, and if he does
not make it public -- and reassures you that he will not -- then
tell him I would like to proceed in that direction. (f)
The President: Good. Helmut, I heard you were magnificent at
NATO in Brussels -- a command performance. I also appreciate
your Government's willingness to join us in briefing NATO after
the Two Plus Four meeting. Above all, your firm stand on a
united Germany remaining a full member of NATO is great. The
idea is even gaining acceptance among the East Europeans. I
noticed the positive comments by Havel, for example. You
mentioned last time that NATO membership would be an important
issue in the FRG. We need to continue holding firm. This is
vitally important for European security and stability and for the
U.S.
(Ø)
Chancellor Kohl: This, after all, is the main issue with the
Poles. I want to get along well with them. The Polish Foreign
Minister, whom I consider a very intelligent and able man,
recently said he, too, wanted Germany to remain a member of NATO.
This will also be of benefit to his country. But it is
necessary, all the more necessary, that we all come to a mutually
satisfactory settlement. It would be very beneficial if
Mazowiecki could help me. I would like to help him, too. (d)
The President: We will do our best, and then debrief after the
meetings. Then I'll be meeting with Thatcher and Mitterrand and
will want to stay in close touch with you. (L)
Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. I think together we will
make it successful. (d)
-- End of Conversation --
CONFIDENTIAL