Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
428080683
label
Meeting with Manfred Woerner, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
428080683
contentType
document
title
Meeting with Manfred Woerner, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
citationUrl
collections
Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Memcon Files
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
428080683
levelOfDescription
item
productionDates
day
7
logicalDate
1990-05-07
month
5
year
1990
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
1767ca8ba603f2f8
ocrText
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
3716
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Manfred Woerner, Secretary
General of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
William H. Taft, Permanent Representative to
the North Atlantic Council
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General
W. Robert Pearson, Deputy Assistant Secretary
General
James Cunningham, Director of Private Office
Roland Wegener, Deputy Director Private Office
DATE, TIME
May 7, 1990, 10:05 - 10:45am EST
AND PLACE:
Oval Office
The President: It's good to see you. First, can we talk about
dates for the NATO Summit? (U)
Secretary General Woerner: Thank you. Your speech came at the
right moment. It has made a great impression in Europe. It opened
the way for the success of our Ministerial meetings. We now have
developed the structure for the NATO Summit. As to timing, this
morning at NATO there was general support for holding the Summit
on the 5th and 6th of July. (&)
The President: I want to be flexible. The 4th is our holiday.
But we could leave that night. I could then go from London to
Houston. (U)
Secretary Baker: Chancellor Kohl would like to hold the Summit
after the Soviet Party Congress which begins on July 2.
(C)
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
Declassify on: OADR
AS AMENDED
8/21/2009
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
2
The President: We can sign off on July 5 & 6. Our fallback could
be 15-16 July. Does everyone agree on London as the site,
including the Canadians?
(f)
Secretary General Woerner: No one supported the Canadian proposal.
(f)
The President: How should the substantive discussions go at the
NATO Ministerials? (f)
Secretary General Woerner: We would work at the Summit in July on
the four topics you listed in your speech: NATO's new political
mission, conventional defense and arms control, the role of US
nuclear forces in Europe, and the Alliance's ideas for the future
of the CSCE. We would finalize NATO's views on these subjects.
There should be as many clear statements on these topics as
possible. We should not give a sense that we are studying these
problems, drifting. (C)
The NPG and DPC meetings will review our military strategy. The
Summit should announce our position on the substance of the SNF
arms control negotiating position. There has already been enough
work to prepare our arms control offer. We need to move, after
your speech, to a proposal that would get rid of land-based
missiles and address nuclear artillery. We do not want to use the
Summit to open up questions for six or eight months in which NATO's
role is being challenged.
(c)
I have recently visited France. They want to restrict NATO's
political role. They are in favor of NATO but see limits on NATO's
political cooperation rather than possibilities for improvement.
They want political cooperation to be in the EC. We should not let
the French use the Summit for those ends. Your speech set the
stage. We should reach a Summit Declaration that finishes the
question of why NATO is necessary. NATO should not be questioned
any longer. This can be done. It needs extensive work but it can
be done. (&)
The President: Who did you see in France? (U)
Secretary General Woerner: Foreign Minister Dumas and Defense
Minister Chevenement. They want to restrict NATO to being a
military alliance with no real political decisionmaking role. NATO
for them is an instrument of American influence. We can drag them
along if we don't construct the Summit around what NATO will do in
the future. Now NATO must act.
(C)
The President: I agree. (f)
Secretary General Woerner: The press is now concentrating on TASM.
I said look, we need a nuclear requirements study. I avoided being
pinned down on the TASM issue. The tactical situation is such that
I strongly advise you not to make TASM an issue at this moment.
The German elections would concentrate on that. That would be
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
dangerous.
(f)
After the elections, there is no problem. If we make TASM a
domestic German political issue, it will be like FOTL was a year
ago. We should keep open the TASM issue through study and finalize
the commitment next spring, after we are out of the German
elections. This is my tactical advice. We need to handle this in
an elegant way. The Summit should give a political message,
include an arms control offer, indicate our objectives for CFE II
and for CSCE. That would be a major accomplishment.
(f)
Secretary Baker: And it could point the way for our ongoing review
of military strategy. (f)
The President: President Gorbachev needs to be convinced NATO
isn't dangerous in the new era. That is a big assignment,
especially among his military.
§
Secretary General Woerner: In Soviet eyes, especially from the
military perspective, they see NATO as the enemy. We have to
transmit a new message: NATO is a force for peace and European
security, in cooperation with the Soviet Union. We want a
partnership in a cooperative structure. (f)
Secretary Baker: They are beginning to realize that there could
be no US presence in Europe outside of NATO. And they want that
presence. (f)
The President: The agenda you have outlined is just right. There
is a lot of work to do, but it is damned important. ()
Secretary General Woerner: How did your meeting go with President
Mitterrand? (f)
The President: Good, but maybe he's only telling us things to make
us feel good. Or he may be leaving it to the French bureaucracy,
which only wants to stiff us. We have to keep pressing them.
§
Secretary General Woerner: What do you think about German
unification? (d)
Secretary Baker: My view is that this is the most sensitive issue
for the Soviets, especially in advance of the Party Congress. They
are trying to buy time. They are being schizophrenic: first they
want a package deal, then they say they can accept unity now and
give sovereignty later, which of course is a non-starter. I was
encouraged about what is going to happen because of Allied
solidarity, but not encouraged about the Soviet Union. They have
a real problem there with public opinion. They don't have any
cards, only Four Power rights. They have little leverage, SO
ultimately they will have to come along. (f)
The President: Might we change the name of NATO to reflect a new
mission, to help take heat off the Soviets? It may be cosmetic,
but it might help show the soviets that NATO isn't only military
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
OUN IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
and only hostile.
()
Secretary General Woerner: The name is not as important as the
substance if they believe we are really changing our strategy.
(f)
The President: That too, but names matter; let's think about it.
Maybe that great word "stability" is in there, to take away the
connotation of NATO as an enemy to Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. I hope they come around on this.
()
Secretary Baker: The Poles raised the point with me that if the
Soviet withdrawal from the GDR will be paid for by the Germans, why
shouldn't they pay for withdrawal from Poland too?
()
Secretary General Woerner: The Poles, the Czechs, and the
Hungarians are having trouble explaining why they are in the Warsaw
Pact.
(C)
Secretary Baker: CSCE can help.
()
Secretary General Woerner: We have to persuade the Soviets that
CSCE is a place for them too.
Secretary Baker: The Soviets dropped their demand to synchronize
German unity with progress in the CSCE at the Two Plus Four
meeting, but they will still make the argument that they need a new
European security structure.
()
The President: Our long-range goal is work on the shift from a
confrontational to a cooperative image for NATO.
()
I hope I can get Lithuania solved. It is causing major problems,
and it will cause more if we can't make progress. (2)
Secretary General Woerner: Do the Soviets appreciate how
restrained you have been?
()
The President: I hope so.
(L)
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL