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Meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, May 31, 1990
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428080725
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Meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, May 31, 1990
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Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE
PER E.O. 13526
WASHINGTON
2011-0841-MR
6/18/13
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President Gorbachev
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
President Gorbachev
Anatoliy Chernyayev, Aide to the General
Secretary
DATE, TIME
May 31, 1990, 10:54 - 12:45 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Oval Office
The President: Welcome. We can open with anything you wish. We
want this meeting to be seen as successful. We will try hard for
a sense of success to present to the outside world. One more
thing: we have this meeting, then expanded meetings, then Camp
David, with you and me, then Baker and Shevardnadze. I think the
private sessions will be most remunerative. There should be no
press and no leaks. That is how I see it unfolding. (S)
President Gorbachev: My sincere greetings. It is good to be
here in the White House. I am not a diplomat -- you have studied
me -- I have no intention of becoming one. I believe the current
time is such that we need to understand each other and to develop
policies with respect to each other, and to others, which are
predictable. I share your approach to this meeting. It should
have a positive result. I am sure we can achieve that. (8)
I think our colleagues can complete the reviewing work. Our
mission is to complete the philosophical discussion on issues we
discussed even in 1987 and then at Malta. We said in the former
meeting that if you were elected we would want to continue the
work begun with President Reagan, and we took a further step at
Governor's Island. Then, I believe we did the right thing at
Malta by not waiting for a formal meeting. ($)
I would like to salute you. After Malta, events were developing,
and they could have gone differently without Malta and the
understandings we reached there. The processes continue, putting
an even heavier load on us. That makes this meeting even more
important. Let me make several points to begin our philosophical
exchange. I think you agree that the center of world politics is
the Soviet Union. What happens there is of monumental importance
for you and the world. I value the positions you have stuck to.
I know it is not easy, as it is not easy for me.
While giving credit to our predecessors, we have to accept that
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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2
we have a special task at this watershed in history. We cannot
avoid that responsibility. The fact that we are using all forms
of dialogue is appropriate. Let me outline the first point of my
thoughts; these have not changed basically since the Reagan
period.
($)
First, since we are in a radically new phase of our relations, we
need a radically different view of, and approach to, each other.
You may or may not agree, but the confrontation we got into after
World War II wasted our time and energy, while others -- the
former vanquished -- were moving ahead. Now they (the
vanquished) are behaving very arrogantly. Japan's empire is now
extending to you, to us, and to Western Europe. Germany likewise
is a very powerful center in Europe and areas around Europe.
Even countries like China and India in the developing world are
moving. The world is changing in dramatic ways. The U.S. alone,
despite its power, can not lead the world by itself. Playing
"cards" against each other is not the way to go. (S)
What kind of country would each like the other to be? We don't
want a weaker U.S. with infringed interests -- this would create
instability -- and in U.S. political circles it is gradually
becoming popular to see a stronger but democratic Soviet Union
developing. Perestroika is how we hope to make that happen. We
are moving toward a Soviet Union that is progressive, dynamic,
free and turned toward the outside world and the U.S. If you
analyze our statements and our initiative, you will see that we
are not trying to infringe upon U.S. interests, especially
security. ($)
This is our choice, and we are trying to get all sectors of
Soviet society to accept this. It is not easy, but we are making
progress. As a result, the image of the U.S. as a hostile and
aggressive power is fading. But, realistically -- I must be
honest -- every day I get reports; there are many in the Soviet
Union telling me the U.S. is continuing to move and is trying to
take advantage of perestroika to seek unilateral advantage. That
is not surprising; you must have the same kind of people.
The President: Why do your people think this way in a period of
budget cuts and so forth? (S)
President Gorbachev: Public opinion as a whole is supportive and
backs our policy. But at the same time some signal vigilance and
are suspicious, for example war veterans, the military, and also
the military/industrial complex. On balance, most want a good
relationship and are for expanding cooperation. I believe our
policy will be getting more and more support, but our people will
follow very closely the steps taken by the U.S., especially in
the security field. Let me conclude on this first point. I
think we should build on what we have started, keep it going, and
accelerate it. People in the Soviet Union will judge your policy
by your attitudes towards perestroika and towards trade and
finance. (S)
The most harmful thing right now as our system is moving to open
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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3
up is that there is not fair play. That could lead to a
reversion to old ways, a sliding back from the ambitious policies
we want to pursue. I say this because some in your press say
that Gorbachev is weak and you should press your advantage. I am
glad you have taken a firm policy line in favor of better
relations and support of perestroika. That was in the U.S.
interest, but I want you to know we appreciate it and I am sure
the world does as well. As we take steps in various areas that
will stimulate more contact and a better interrelationship, I
have told international business that those who are with us now
will be remembered, and those who stayed on the sidelines will
lose out in the long run. ($)
This is a central point in my observations. All other points are
subsidiary, so I would like to re-emphasize it. There is a
regrouping in the world, and U.S. -Soviet relations are vital in
this process -- the question is, can we cooperate? When we do,
people feel better, except for fears of condominium; but when we
quarrel, people worry. Our conduct thus far has avoided the
condominium idea. We cannot freeze our relations, however; we
must move forward or we will fall behind. ($)
The President: I am most worried that we will not have enough
time. This is fascinating. We need time, because under these
philosophical points lie many specific issues.
($)
There is a significant change in U.S. attitudes toward the Soviet
Union, although there is emerging suspicion. I was looking at
some polls; they show strong personal support of you. This is
partly because of the way you personally interact, but also
because you have done things which only recently would have been
impossible for Americans to contemplate. (S)
You wondered at Governors Island whether there were elements that
wanted perestroika to fail. I said that, if so, it was very much
a minority view; it is even more so today. We do have elements,
in my party, who are still suspicious and don't want to deal from
equality and mutual respect. They are a small minority. We do
not intend, either directly or indirectly, to play "cards"
against you: China, India, etc. That is offensive to me, and I
will not engage in it. Our people are probably not sufficiently
sensitive, for example, to Soviet losses in World War II. ($)
As we wrestle with arms control, not only have I become more
sensitive to that issue, but all my people have as well. We are
attuned to that driving point for the Soviet Union, the fact that
so many lost their lives. I wanted to get that comment on the
table before we get -- inevitably -- to Germany, so you would
know that I am sensitive to that historical fact. (8)
We do not want winners and losers. I wrote into my arrival
comments the disproportionate responsibility that the Americans
and the Soviets have for world structure. We respect the
standing of the Soviet Union. Yes, you have problems, but you
should understand that as long as I am in this office there will
be no attempt to downgrade the position which the Soviet Union
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
4
rightly occupies. You must believe my sincerity on this point as
we get into detailed issues. You gave me that map at Malta with
the blue flags. I asked the CIA to see how accurate your
intelligence was. They gave you high marks. (S)
President Gorbachev: I am sure your data on us is even better,
because your technology is better.
($)
The President: But you get it all from Congress. (S)
President Gorbachev: Not all.
($)
The President: I told Brent that we have to convince you that
these flags don't mean that we are trying to surround, to
encircle the Soviet Union. Some of it we can do by words; some
must be by actions. The U.S. has not been a historic threat to
the Soviet Union, nor vice versa. Problems arose only when the
Cold War developed. ($)
I would like to go back to your first point. Obviously our
commitment to democracy and freedom is well known. As we adhere
to those principles, we are not trying to complicate life for the
Soviet Union. ($)
There are several problems we need to discuss, here or in a
bigger meeting -- however you wish. Germany heads the list of
difficult questions. CFE is very important, and maybe we can
make progress. I understand you have hangups there which tie
into the German problem. We don't want a Soviet Union that is
threatened by any power. We may have very different ideas about
the future of Germany. Will they return to their old ways, or
have they learned and paid their dues? I am of the latter view.
I think that, after 40 years, Germany is different now. But I
wouldn't want to see a Soviet Union threatened by some new force.
Nor do I want to single out Germany in a way which threatens to
make history repeat itself. ($)
The last point I would make is that I am respectful of the
internal affairs of another country, and I know the Lithuanian
problem is extraordinarily difficult. We are looking at your
economic reforms to see how they will help cooperation and deepen
our relationship. Gorbachev has 70% approval in U.S. opinion
polls because Americans are saluting what you are doing. We want
these trends to continue we relate to all that -- but that is
entirely your business.
We visualize a Soviet Union which does not seek regional gains.
If you see us doing things like putting in a radical Afghan
regime which seems to be against your interests, that is bad.
The same is true for us with respect to Cuba.
($)
My last point brings us back to the Baltics. To the degree that
we see a commitment to your own principles of self-determination,
we can cooperate. I have tried to conduct myself in a
constrained way because I know you have big problems. But I am
being hit both on my left and on my right by those who say that I
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
5
am subordinating U.S. dedication to principle. I will be honest:
some of Landsbergis' moves could look to you like putting a
finger in your eye. (S)
President Gorbachev: When I have wanted to speak in strong terms
on this issue, I have said that Bush would settle this in 24
hours, because in the U.S. the Constitution is respected. The
pre-perestroika leadership did not have respect for our
Constitution, so the people don't. Now we are moving to become a
people with respect for laws.
(8)
The President: I understand, but you saw Landsbergis equating me
with Chamberlain because I showed too much understanding of your
position. I am getting into too much detail, but I see a world
in which these fundamental principles continue to be worked out
in your country. We need to work together.
(S)
One last point. You mentioned the arrogance of some nations. In
some of our speeches we too may seem that way, although I think
we are not. Many in the U.S. think the Japanese are that way,
but it is in the U.S. and Soviet interest that we work together
with Japan. I have recently come to that point of view, although
in the war I was shot down by the Japanese. What I see is a
Soviet Union which can shed its historic fears, just as the U.S.
is shedding its historic fears of Japan.
This is the end of my speech. I am not sure I have covered your
points well; if not, we can continue.
(gn
President Gorbachev: I welcome this kind of discussion. Let me
take five minutes more. (Continues, despite General Scowcroft's
discouragement.) The phase of perestroika that we are now going
through is probably decisive. Our political system has changed
in a decisive way. In the elected bodies, all the way up, we
have totally new people. Those functions which were the province
of the party are now done by the Supreme Soviets. This is now
formalized in constitutions and in local government statutes.
($)
Looking at our union, we are now in the actual process of
reforming that federation. Now we have adopted measures, which
now means we must implement them. This means more self-
government, etc. I sent a letter to the Council of Federations
to prepare for a discussion of all this, to rebuild our
federation. The difficulties will be fundamental. Different
Republics may have different relationships, but our basic
decision is for a free market economy.
($)
Two thirds of the speakers at the Ryzhkov plan's presentation
were negative, but the next day it was 50-50. Some started to
comment on the positive aspects and on how to improve them. I
was in the country, but thought I should talk to the people. So
I dictated something and then talked simply and directly. I
think people are beginning to understand what it means, the
market. I said that those who work hard and put out quality
products will profit by markets. Others will have to change so
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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6
as not to be left behind. I said, let's organize a market
economy -- so the next day the Supreme Soviet debate was very
different. They even took the notion of a referendum off the
table by a 3-1 margin. They decided that the government and the
parliamentary committees will work on it together for a week and
try to come together. We are not ready yet for a market economy.
We have a centralized economy and we must take account of this as
we move. It seems easy to you. ($)
The President: I see. But it's like being pregnant: you can't do
it half-way. ($)
President Gorbachev: But neither can you have a baby in the
first month. We want to avoid an abortion. We are beginning
with bread because it was so distorted. I am trying to get
people to understand, and it is beginning to work. We need about
two years for the transition. Kendall wants to tell the two of
us how to interact on this. I told him to find a time. (8)
The President: He will be here tonight; I am drinking his
vodka. ($)
President Gorbachev: For us, the decisive issue is the
transition to a market economy. We hope to interact with you at
this moment. ($)
The President: We should talk about the practical end of it.
Jim has described your talk with him. We have differences, but
let's talk about them. (s)
President Gorbachev: We need maneuvering room during this
transition. The sums are not very big, but it is important that
they be available. The U.S. would not need to provide it all,
but you should be supportive. It is important that we not fail
in this effort. ($)
The President: I agree, but you must know about my political
constraints. At the plenary, I will call on you to discuss what
you wish and we will go on from there. I have no surprises.
(s)
President Gorbachev:
Good.
($)
The President: Our Vice President is very well connected to our
right wing. He has had a difficult time with our press, but he
can be very helpful with arms control, etc. I wanted him to be
involved as much as possible for that reason, and I would like to
have him join us for a moment. ($)
(End of one-on-one)
(At the end of the one-on-one discussions, the Vice President
joined the meeting for a few minutes.)
SECRET/SENSITIVE