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April 1989 [1]
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April 1989 [1]
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Robert D. Blackwill Chronological Files
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April 1989 [1]
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CHRON FILE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
2927
April 26, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL
RB
FROM:
PHILIP ZELIKOW
SUBJECT:
Letter from U.S. Committee of International
Institute for Strategic Studies
Joseph Fromm, Chairman of The U.S. Committee of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, wrote advising you that Bob
Ellsworth has written an article on "The future of US-European
relations." He attached an advance copy of the article, as it
will appear in the May-June issue of Survival.
A reply acknowledging Mr. Fromm's letter and thanking him
for the copy of Ambassador Ellsworth's article is attached.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter to Fromm at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Letter to Fromm
Tab II
Letter from Fromm
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Fromm:
Thank you for your recent letter regarding
the article in the May-June issue of
Survival, written by our good friend Bob
Ellsworth. The article is timely and its
argument is well put. I believe the
President will be addressing many of the
themes discussed in Bob's article during
the next few months.
Sincerely,
Brent Scowcroft
Mr. Joseph Fromm
Chairman
The U.S. Committee of the
International Institute for
Strategic Studies
1619 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
2927
Pls staff
THE U.S. COMMITTEE
for ack
OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
Chairman
Mr. Joseph Fromm
1619 Masssachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
April 17, 1989
Secretary
Michael I. Sanders, Esq.
1250 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Treasurer
General Brent Scowcroft
Dr. Guido Goldman
5 Bryant Street
Assistant to the President
Cambridge, MA 02138
National Security Council
Trustees
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Dr. William B. Bader
Washington, D.C. 20500
Hon. Richard R. Burt
Hon. Robert F. Ellsworth
Mr. Joseph Fromm
Dear Brent:
Dr. Guido Goldman
Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes
Our mutual friend, Bob Ellsworth, has written a
Mr. Daniel Rose
Michael I. Sanders, Esq.
perceptive article on the future of U.S.-European relations
Mr. Leon Sloss
Hon. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
that I am sure you will find of particular value at this
Dr. William R. Van Cleave
time of far reaching change in the international landscape.
I am enclosing an advance copy of the article that will
appear in the May-June issue of "Survival," the bimonthly
journal of the IISS that reaches some 7,000 political
leaders, journalists and strategic thinkers in the United
States and more than 50 other countries.
Ambassador Ellsworth provides keen insights into the
challenges this country faces as it weighs its response to
the profound changes taking place not only in the Soviet
bloc but also among the industrial democracies and in the
Third World. His prescription for dealing with Soviet-
American relations is especially noteworthy: namely, that
everything in this relationship must be put on the plate--
the Soviets' interest in limiting our military modernization
and gaining access to our credit and trading system versus
our interest in rapid reductions in Soviet military threats
to our security.
With warm regards, I am
Sincerely,
For Chairman Joseph Fromm Sron 861-0953
Enclosure
1619 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 663-5778
The future of US-European
relations
ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
US-European relations for forty years have been organized around the
need to respond to a Soviet threat, and around the desire at the same
time to build a transatlantic system of ever-increasing health and wcalth.
But the world has changed, from both these perspectives, and the
Atlantic Alliance must be changed to deal with the world as it now is.
Technically speaking, the Soviet military threat today is much greater
than it was forty years ago - and this is especially true of the interconti-
nental strategic nuclear threat. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
also maintains a large, powerful and modern conventional and nuclear-
armed force in Central Europe.
But the dazzling, well-tailored Gorbachev has altered the image of the
Soviet Union as presented through the Western media. He is the one,
true, global television anchorman. His charisma, though, is based on
more than media skills. It is based on his courage and his imagination in
leading the Soviet clite to confront their failings and to begin reforms,
both at home and abroad. In order to pursue these reforms further, how-
ever, Gorbachev desperately requires reductions in Soviet military
spending, and a whole new set of relations with Western Europe and the
United States.
With regard to internal Soviet reforms, therefore, one must ask: is
Gorbachev sincere? In the US this is now a question for intense debate,
to which the likely answer is, Yes - for now. But while one cannot judge
how long the impetus for internal reform will continue, beyond a certain
point these reforms could become difficult to reverse. The psychological
force and the political energy of Gorbachev's attacks on virtually all of
Soviet history are rapidly driving the Soviet media and public opinion
into totally unknown territory.
Gorbachev's withdrawal from Afghanistan, his announced and
planned unilateral cut of 50,000 Soviet troops in Eastern Europe accom-
panied by decreases in offensive capabilities, his withdrawal of support
for Cuban forces in Africa, and, possibly, an offer to return the Northern
Territories to Japan - these moves are not meant as a favour to the West.
They save the USSR money, and they buy time for Gorbachev. They
help create an atmosphere in which he may be able to gain greater access
to what he must have: Western (including Japanese) money, markets,
Robert F. Ellsworth is Vice-Chairman of the IISS Council. He is a former US Deputy
Secretary of Defense and is now a Washington-based investor and director of
several companies with operations in the US, Western Europe and Japan.
195
technology and know-how. Continued Soviet sales of lethal weapons to
Libya, and military aid to Nicaragua, however, are counter-productive
to say the least.
Two other big changes in American and European premises since the
early 1950s have taken place. First, many of the Pacific Rim countries
have emerged as economic power-houses, while the West Europeans have
begun to move towards a single market in 1992. They have also begun to
strengthen their common defence effort. And, second, changes in
tropospheric chemistry and pollution of the atmosphere and the oceans
now pose a clear and present danger to the health of nations, even if only
the most conservative assessments of expert authority are accepted. US
President George Bush promised during his election campaign to call an
international conference in the White House on global warming. James
Baker's first substantial role as Secretary of State was as host to a world-
wide conference in the State Department On the environment.
With these changes - worldwide, in the Soviet Union and in Europe -
the very framework for thinking about US-European relations has been
altered. The future will be shaped more by present actions and words,
and those of the next few years, than by all the canonical patterns of
thought and organization of the past forty years. The key question is
whether Americans and Europeans can work more casily and more suc-
cessfully with each other, rather than against each other or with other
powers. The answer will emerge existentially over the years.
Powerful US senators see US-Europcan trade and defence relations as
Washington's most serious foreign-policy problem. Former President
Richard Nixon has written that The new administration should make
Europe its top foreign-policy priority." There are two issues which will
be fundamental in shaping the future of US-European relations. The
first of these is the role of the United States in the security of Europe.
Since 1949 the people of North America and Western Europe have con-
sidered their vital national interests to be served by mutual security
guarantees and a unique US role in the face of a Soviet threat. These
security interests have often served to dampen transatlantic conflicts on
other, less central, issues.
Today, however, the role of the United States in European security has
been brought into question, partly by trade and monetary and burden-
sharing disputes beginning in the late 1970s, but mainly by the Ameri-
can and West European middle-class anti-nuclear movements of the
early and middle 1980s, which culminated in President Ronald Reagan's
rhetoric at Reykjavik advocating the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
The Reagan Administration also accepted, in effect, a Soviet droit de
regard in NATO deployment decisions when it agreed to the double-track
approach to INF deployment and negotiations offering zero American
INF in exchange for zero Soviet SS-20s. Washington never dreamed Mos-
cow would accept this, but Gorbachev did; the rest, as they say, is his-
tory, unfolding according to the law of unintended consequences.
196
Today, these consequences can be seen in the analogous politics of the
Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) - and other - nuclcar modernization pro-
posals. While nuclear deterrence will not stand or fall with a FOTL
deployment, the issue of how the Alliance deals with its commitment to
modcrnize is more complex than simply putting the project to one side,
and aiming to do better next time. A decision to deploy the FOTL does
not have to be made now, but it is necessary to explain that, even under
present conditions, having nuclear weapons is not as dangerous as not
having them. This is a point which has been faced by Western publics in
the past. It needs to be faced again.
Soviet nuclear weapons, including the new version of the SS-18, are
presumably for blackmail, not use - although to be effective for black-
mail, their potential use must be seen to be credible. For a long time to
come, therefore, notwithstanding the strength of the tradition of non-
use, Western nuclear deterrence - both strategic and tactical - will
remain imperative. Pursuing prudent modernization of the West's deter-
rent will not be easy, but it is clearly one of the key issues defining the
future of US-European relations. The outcome of the present moderniz-
ation debate will be shaped by negotiations between the US and West-
ern Europe - with the USSR as a keen observer.
The West should make its position clear: if the USSR wants to curb the
pace of modernization of Western military technology, including
research on missile defence - and have fuller access to the West's credit
and trading system - then it must first reduce its nuclear and conven-
tional threat to Western security. And, as the Alliance's posture is
designed to deter conventional as well as nuclear threats, it follows that
nuclear reductions under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, important
as they are, might have to await agreement on substantial reductions in
the Soviet conventional threat to Western Europe.
The future US role in European security will also be shaped by the
rapid rise of Western Europe as such - as a single market, certainly, but
also as a defence entity with enough political authority to be taken
seriously within Europe as well as elsewhere in the world. The emergence
of a scrious West European defence structure, including a stronger and
better understood out-of-area role, could be the best and highest form of
defence burden-sharing.
The second important issue that will mould US-European relations is
the emerging question of Eastern Europe, and - ultimately - the some-
what more remote question of relations between West and East Ger-
many. If Hungarian Politburo member Imre Pozsgay can refer to East-
em Europe as 'the world's most extreme crisis zone', if the Soviet
Union cannot or will not help those regimes economically or protect
them from domestic upheaval, and if most East Europeans are hoping
for Western help to save their decrepit economics - if those are the cir-
cumstances, then where is the Cold War?
Of course, the Warsaw Pact is still intact, and the Red Army will still
have some 515,000 troops in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary
197
even after the 50,000 troop cut promised last year by Gorbachev at the
UN.² But whether Moscow has 565,000 or 515,000 troops in Eastern
Europe has no effect on its ability to maintain what has becn termed
'ultimate control'. To the extent that the West succeeds in negotiating
substantial further reductions in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, it will
also be to some extent negotiating the questions of ultimate control and
of Germany. As East-West military reductions are pursued, therefore,
the future of Eastern Europe must at some point bc placed on the agenda
for talks with Moscow. The West cannot proceed as if the USSR had no
substantial interests in the 'crisis zone'.
Western views on the future of inner-German relations are mixed. The
Federal Republic's constitution calls for reunification, and President
Richard von Weizsäcker has recently spoken of the need for Germans to be
unapologetic about the goal of reunification. On the other hand, one might
recall Bismarck's warning to the Germans in the mid-1870s that if they did
not conduct themselves with caution and self-restraint, their neighbours
would tear them apart. The tides of history might have to ebb and flow for a
very long time before the damage done by Hitler can be repaired.
For the future of US-European relations it is important to note that
not all in the West have similar objectives towards Eastern Europe, as
the peoples and the regimes of the 'crisis zone' move into the 1990s. The
US is interested in human rights and in the notion of Eastern Europe
being independent. The Federal Republic wants mainly to pave the way
for greater inner-German contacts without creating problems. The
United Kingdom and France are interested in Europe in a somewhat
broader sense (for instance, the UK went to war over Czechoslovakia
and Poland). The West Europeans have a greater geopolitical interest in
Eastern Europe than the US has: the richest part of the world exists next
to an area that is disorganized, in debt and polluted. Yet people on both
sides call themselves Europeans. The Washington role, while important,
will be secondary. Europe is first of all an issue for the Europeans.
In a broad perspective, what then of the future of US-European
relations? The economic and political power of the American/West
European/Japanese international 'system', NATO's robust and steady
military strength, and the geopolitical resistance of America, Western
Europe, Japan and China have, beyond doubt, helped bring the USSR to
the point where it is willing to face the facts of its systemic failure. The
actual moral and economic Soviet crises and the intelligence and leader-
ship abilities of Mikhail Gorbachev have played their parts. Providing
that he continues along present lines both at home and abroad,
Gorbachev, and the East Europeans. should be encouraged to join the
international system which the West has created - but on Western terms
as far as possible, rather than his. It is in the West's interest that the
Gorbachev reforms succeed in lifting the Soviet people from third-world
to first-world status - but not that it helps to create a stronger, more mod-
ern economy in a Soviet Union which is still a nuclear super-power, still
a threat to Western Europe, and still a global adventurer.
198
If the United States and Western Europe could agree on these long-
term perspectives, at first conceptually and then practically, they could
also deal more successfully with the immediate challenges to Western
security. health and wealth: trade protectionism. environmental pol-
lution, and the Soviet military threat that still remains.
Notes
I Richard Nixon. 'American Foreign
2 For excerpts of this speech see
Policy: The Bush Agenda', Foreign Affairs.
Documentation. Survival, voL XXXI. no.
vol. 68, DO. 1. pp. 199 ff.
2, March/April 1989, PP. 171-6.
199
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
20266 Add-on
ACTION
April 3, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL nB
FROM:
ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS
RIH
SUBJECT:
National Security Council Meeting on Western
Europe and Eastern Europe, April 4,
2:45 p.m. - 4:15 p.m., Cabinet Room
Setting
This NSC meeting is to consider the policy issues arising from
the National Security Reviews on Western Europe (NSR 5) and
Eastern Europe (NSR 4).
The President will open the meeting with some introductory
remarks. Your briefing memorandum to the President is attached
at Tab I, with proposed talking points attached at Tab A. The
agenda for the meeting is at Tab.B. After the President's
opening statement, Judge Webster will present a five-minute
assessment of trends affecting U.S. interests in Europe. We
believe he will describe strains in the Alliance security
consensus, movement toward greater West European coordination and
integration, and the major changes underway in Eastern Europe.
He will also describe Gorbachev's impact, though a discussion of
our relations with the Soviet Union will be reserved for
subsequent discussion by the NSC. The President may then ask you
to guide the discussion. You could recapitulate the issues in
this memorandum and then open them, one by one, for discussion
and decision.
Discussion
We are in a period of major change in every dimension of our
postwar European policy -- trans-Atlantic security relations,
U.S. -West European economic relations, and relations with Eastern
Europe -- as well as our relations with the Soviet Union, which
will be discussed later by the NSC. We have proposed twelve
issues calling for discussion, which will be a real chore in the
allotted 90 minutes. (The first issue, intended as a scene
setter, summarizes some of the points made in our earlier
memorandum on East-West relations. The remaining 11 are new.)
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(1) Maintaining Alliance cohesion in changing circumstances.
New developments in Europe, led by the prospect of a diminished
Soviet military threat and a new drive toward West European
economic and political integration, vindicate goals which the
U.S., and NATO, have pursued since the early postwar period. The
overarching problem now is to adapt those goals and keep them
relevant as these changes undermine some of the assumptions on
which our postwar trans-Atlantid policies were founded.
Public opinion polls in Western Europe show continued strong
support for NATO and the U.S. defense commitment, but they also
show declining support for long-standing Alliance positions on
NATO defense spending, arms control issues, and the importance of
retaining a U.S. nuclear deterrent based in Europe. In a new
Europe that is no longer bound together, in the West, by a
clearly perceived Soviet military threat or perhaps, in the East,
by the danger of Soviet military intervention, long-dormant
rivalries and continental conflicts may reemerge. Gorbachev's
actions have led many Europeans (and some Americans) to question
the U.S. leadership role in Europe. We think this US role has
been indispensable to the unprecedented stability of the
international order in Europe since the war. If European leaders
perceive that the U.S. is looking for an opportunity to withdraw
from Europe, they may begin a fundamental reorientation of their
foreign and security policies, with unforeseeable and potentially
dangerous consequences.
(2) Defining the elements of the U.S. and Allied visions for
Europe's future.
The DC on the Political and Security Aspects of U.S.-West
European Relations (NSR 5) urged that a public U.S. and Allied
statement be prepared that outlines such a vision. This vision
could include:
--
the common values, culture, and heritage, amounting to a
"Western experience," shared by the United States and
Europe, including Eastern Europe, but not by the Soviet
Union;
-- U.S. support for greater West European economic and
political integration; and
--
U.S. encouragement of greater West European security
cooperation and assumption of more global responsibilities,
through the Western European Union and other fora.
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preserving American ground and air forces in Europe to
safeguard European security into the next century;
striving to overcome the division of Europe, with Western
assistance to support movement toward political and economic
institutional change in Eastern Europe; and
welcoming reforms in the USSR if they contribute to less
repression at home and less confrontational policies abroad.
A strong reaffirmation that the U.S. military presence is in
Europe for the long term can let our allies know that we are not
looking for Soviet force cuts as a way to release us from an
unwelcome commitment.
(3) Assessing the continuing role of U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe, especially land-based missiles.
We believe, as you know, that there will be an enduring need for
substantial U.S. forces and U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on the
continent, though the numbers might be reduced.
No agency has contested the need for the continuation of a land-
based missile deterrent in Europe. We raise the issue because
achievement of this goal will require a considerable investment
of U.S. resources and high-level attention in the 1990s. We
believe the NSC should have the opportunity to make a deliberate
decision to ratify this requirement. More broadly, a
reaffirmation of the presence in Europe of American nuclear land-
based missiles would reassure those Europeans who feared that
Reykjavik and the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty portended an eventual
U.S. military disengagement from Europe. In SO doing, it would
serve to strengthen U.S. leadership in the transatlantic
partnership.
(4) Commissioning USG studies on preferred outcomes in NATO and
Warsaw Pact force levels and new CSBM initiatives.
The DC agreed that the USG should move now, in the context of the
review of U.S. national security strategy (NSR 12), to study
preferred outcomes in NATO and Warsaw Pact levels beyond the cuts
envisioned in NATO's current CFE proposal. Although OSD and JCS
may prefer a slower pace, we believe there is a pressing need
better to define our long-term conventional arms control goals,
especially since Shevardnadze has already offered a competing
vision of where the Soviets think the CFE negotiations should
eventually lead. The study could lay the groundwork for a
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subsequent NATO effort to identify our future conventional arms
control objectives by the end of this year. Announcing the
commencement of such a NATO study, with the goal of advancing a
less militarized future for Europe, could be part of the outcome
of the NATO summit.
The DC also proposed that the USG make a major effort to develop
new initiatives in CSBMs beyond those contained in NATO's current
proposals. We believe the NSC should endorse that view and
commission a thorough reevaluation of CSBM ideas, both new and
old, to determine their merit in the different political climate
this Administration must face. These two studies have been
commissioned in NSR 12, but it would be useful if you were to
give them a boost in the meeting.
(5) Examining more creative approaches to the burdensharing
issue.
The DC endorsed the idea. This would entail redoubling efforts
outlined in last year's NATO Executive Working Group report,
working within the NATO framework to look at the relative defense
roles, risks, and contributions of individual allies. As you
know, we think that a new initiative in armaments standardization
could also help, especially if it involved a high-visibility
program like Main Battle Tank develópment. Such an initiative
has been considered before, and encountered formidable resistance
from national defense industries (including those in the U.S.) as
well as from advocates of fully independent national production
capabilities in key weapons systems. We believe, though, that
the advantages for our burdensharing effort, and the potential
cost savings, warrant the NSC commissioning such a burdensharing
study.
(6) Encouraging a greater West European global role and deciding
whether to seek to consult more intensely with the European
Community on regional issues.
The DC agreed that the U.S. should encourage a greater West
European role on global problems and initiate direct
consultations between the U.S. and Western Europe on selected
regional issues. There was disagreement, however, on whether
these consultations should occur in the EC framework or in NATO.
We believe the NSC should agree to encourage greater European
assertiveness and attempt to channel it into constructive
cooperation. The USG could start regular political consultations
with the EC on regional problems where we think the Europeans can
make a real contribution. Some may wish to keep these detailed
regional discussions entirely in NATO. As European states take
on greater global responsibilities we can expect disagreements
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about policy direction, greater pressure for consultation on
subjects where we do not think Europeans can be helpful, and
challenges to U.S. leadership in setting the West's global
agenda. However, European interest in a wider international role
may be unstoppable. US acceptance of this trend and active
engagement of the EC -- and, for that matter, the WEU -- could
build a more durable base for a stronger out-of-area contribution
by our allies and a better sense of common interests and joint
responsibilities.
(7) Defining a set of principles and general U.S. approach in
dealing with West European economic and political
integration.
The DC on the Economic Aspects of U.S. -West European Relations
(NSR 5) agreed that the USG needs a set of basic principles to
guide U.S. policy toward the European Community as it moves
toward a unified single market by 1992. The DC agreed that
"1992" is more than a target date or set of regulations; it is
part of a broader process of economic and political integration.
The DC commissioned a separate PCC paper on "European Unity and
the 1992 Program," which proposed such a set of principles.
We believe the NSC should consider these principles for adoption
as the core of U.S. attitudes and approaches:
--
There is no inconsistency between vigorous defense of
specific U.S. interests and support for increased European
unity and the trans-Atlantic partnership.
--
We must pursue a cohesive policy including: support of our
allies' political and economic growth, aggressive
safeguarding of our trade and investment interests, maximum
influence on European regional and transnational policy, and
long-term preservation of the special U.S. -West European
partnership and NATO.
The inevitable trade disputes, in which we must pursue our
interests vigorously, must not be permitted to erode the
essential trans-Atlantic foundation of our global security,
political and economic interests.
-- All OECD countries have a special obligation to ensure
liberal, non-discriminatory trade and investment policies
based on national treatment and right-of-establishment, and
not on sectoral reciprocity.
(8) Deciding on the appropriate USG mechanisms for dealing with
the European Community as it moves to implement the 1992
program.
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The DC also agreed that while existing mechanisms do a good job
of tracking the trade and investment aspects of 1992, the USG
needs to focus greater high-level attention on "1992" and better
integrate our economic, political, and security interests. The
DC tasked the PCC paper to look into these organizational
questions as well. The paper proposed, first, that U.S.-EC trade
and investment issues continue to be coordinated within the
framework of the Economic Policy Council and, second, that a
working group be established under the Europe PCC to keep under
review the security implications of European economic
integration.
Economic agencies, as well as State's Economic Bureau, strongly
resisted any expansion of the NSC's role at the expense of the
EPC. Thus, the PCC paper's third recommendation says only that
"some believe that an organizational framework may be necessary
to bring together the EPC and the NSC on issues of concern to
both i the President might thus create a special cabinet level
"
group
At some point, the President will need to reach a decision on
organizing the USG approach to 1992 -- particularly to define the
competencies of the EPC and the NSC and to establish mechanisms
for improved coordination. We believe "1992" and the broader
process of European integration go well beyond trade and
investment issues; they are eminently a matter of national
security.
(9) Reassessing the U.S. and Allied approach toward Eastern
Europe, beginning with Poland, at a time of major change in
the region.
The strategic importance of central Europe is clear. It is, as
Bill Pfaff wrote in the New Yorker recently, "where the wars come
from." Moreover, instability and repression in Eastern Europe
would have dire consequences for East-West relations and,
arguably, for the course of reform in the Soviet Union itself. A
constructive and forward-looking U.S. approach to a changing
Eastern Europe is crucial to the credibility of U.S. policy there
and to our leadership role in Europe. If we fail to act, our
Allies will do SO in any case -- but in an uncoordinated way,
without the political and economic conditions on which we base
our East European policy.
That the stakes in Eastern Europe are very high is not
controversial; the policy implications of that conclusion are.
Arguments about a consistent global debt policy expose a view
that there are other regions of equal importance, for instance
Latin America, and that Eastern Europe does not deserve special
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treatment. Current U.S. policy assigns greater weight to
economic criteria than political ones in questions of debt
relief, in U.S. sponsorship of countries for membership in
international economic organizations and in extensions of
credits.
NSDD 54 states, "The U.S. extends debt relief only when necessary
as a financial measure to ensure repayment and when the debtor
country embarks on a program of economic and financial
stabilization." The President will need to decide formally if
that should remain the case. The NSC should consider whether the
measures we are now developing for Poland give us a framework for
implementing a new U.S. approach toward Eastern Europe as a
whole.
(10) Revising the policy of "differentiation" in our relations
with East European countries.
In considering NSR 4, the DC supported revision of the terms of
differentiation laid out in NSDD 54. Currently, the U.S.
differentiates among East European countries on the basis of
domestic liberalization and foreign policy independence from
Moscow. There is interagency consensus that we should judge East
European foreign policies on the basis of U.S. interests rather
than solely with reference to Moscow. This would mean making
East European technology theft, support for terrorism, and/or
intelligence activities factors in our differentiation decisions.
(11) Considering whether to seek an arrangement with Moscow on
the future of Eastern Europe.
Despite Jim Baker's public comments on the subject, the DC was
united in the view that seeking an arrangement with Moscow on the
future of Eastern Europe is fraught with danger. This would
betray 44 years of consistent U.S. policy on Eastern Europe. No
Soviet commitment not to intervene in Eastern Europe would mean
anything in the event of a real crisis there. Events in Poland
and Hungary are moving SO fast that Moscow cannot control them
anyway, and we should not be seen as the ones imposing limits on
Eastern Europe's evolution.
Moreover, our Alliance relations would be damaged. The French
would be especially suspicious of U.S.-Soviet condominium, and
the West Germans might seize the opportunity to open their own
dialogue with Moscow on the future of Eastern Europe. The
European press is filled every day with articles on the
"Kissinger plan" -- almost all of them entirely negative.
Finally, seeking such a dialogue, as you could tell from your
meeting last Friday with the Polish Americans, would be domestic
political dynamite. The President should lay this one to rest.
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(12) Specifying the roles of the NATO summit, new U.S.
initiatives, and the President's visits to Rome, Bonn, and
London in our policies toward Western and Eastern Europe.
The DC (on Western Europe; Political and Security Aspects) agreed
that NATO should try to formulate a broad vision for Europe's
future to be embodied in a summit declaration. It also agreed
that the USG should develop new policy initiatives for the
President to use in connection with the summit.
The NATO summit and the President's visits to Rome, Bonn, and
London are major opportunities for the President, and other
Allied leaders, to offer a positive political agenda for the
future of Europe to compete with, and go beyond, Gorbachev's
"common European home." The PCC paper responding to NSR 5
reflects interagency agreement on the need to develop a statement
for the NATO summit, but gives no specific ideas.
The NSC should give a strong impulse to work hard for developing
ideas for a NATO summit declaration, particularly for identifying
substantive initiatives which the President, or Allied leaders,
could announce in connection with the summit and the President's
other visits. An interagency effort to elicit new ideas will
need a strong push from the top, and you need to decide whether
this effort should be run by the NSC Staff or by the State
Department (Bob Kimmitt would be best there). In either case, we
need to get going on the preparations. Whatever you decide in
this case will set a strong precedent for organizing interagency
work to support all future Presidential trips abroad.
RH for RH for
Rx for
Condoleezza Rice, Arnie Kanter, and Tim Deal concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Suggested Talking Points
Tab B
Agenda
Tab C
List of Participants
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20266 Add-on
MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DATE: April 4, 1989
LOCATION: The Cabinet Room
TIME: 2:45 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
I. PURPOSE
Following our overview meeting last Friday, we are now ready
to address the specific policy issues raised in our National
Security Reviews on Western Europe and Eastern Europe.
II. BACKGROUND
The agenda for the meeting is at Tab B. We have identified
12 points for NSC consideration; they proceed from four
major policy issues.
The first issue is maintaining the Alliance security
consensus in changing circumstances. This entails
projecting a vital U.S. and Allied vision of Europe's
future, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the defense of
Europe, assessing the continuing role of U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe, and better defining our long-term
conventional arms control goals.
Agencies agree on the need for a public U.S. and Allied
statement that responds to and transcends Gorbachev's notion
of a "common European home." Our vision, based on
commonality of values rather than geography, should also
include (a) preserving American ground and air forces in
Europe to safeguard European security into the next century,
(b) strongly supporting European integration, including
security cooperation, (c) striving to overcome the division
of Europe, with Western economic assistance to encourage
hopeful changes in Eastern Europe, and (d) welcoming reforms
in the USSR if they contribute to a less repressive and
confrontational Soviet Union.
No agency has contested the need for the continuation of a
land-based missile deterrent in Europe. Because achievement
of this goal will require a considerable investment of U.S.
resources and attention, I believe you should have the
opportunity to make a deliberate decision to ratify this
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requirement. Reaffirmation of the American nuclear
guarantee would reassure those Europeans who worry about an
American nuclear disengagement from Europe. At the same
time, the NSC should move now to commission new USG studies
on the U.S. and Allied positions on conventional arms
reductions, confidence- and security-building measures, and
burdensharing.
The second issue concerns our approach to growing West
European economic and political integration. The Deputies
Committee urged adoption of a set of principles that should
guide U.S. policy toward the European Community as it moves
to create a unified single market in 1992 and, beyond that,
to achieve closer economic and political unity. These
principles should proceed from the conviction that there is
no inherent contradiction between vigorous defense of
specific U.S. interests and support for the goal of
increased European unity.
The NSC also needs to discuss the Administration's internal
approach to "1992" -- particularly to define the
competencies of the Economic Policy Council and the NSC and
to establish mechanisms for improved coordination between
them. Existing mechanisms work well in dealing with the
trade and investment aspects of the 1992 program, but we
need to focus greater high-level attention and better
coordinate our economic, political, and security interests
as European integration proceeds.
The third issue is reassessing the U.S. and Allied
approaches toward Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland, at
a time of major change in the region. Economic assistance
may be the West's most powerful lever in trying to encourage
further liberalization and autonomy in the region. American
financial resources are limited, but our economic and
political engagement is needed both to seize what may be an
historic opportunity in Eastern Europe and to insure a
coordinated Allied approach to the region. As you know, we
are considering a response to Poland, should Solidarity and
the regime reach agreement. Our response will be taken as a
signal throughout Eastern Europe and with our Allies of a
new U.S. approach toward the region.
Currently, the U.S. differentiates among East European
countries on the basis of domestic liberalization and
foreign policy independence from Moscow. There is
interagency consensus that we should judge East European
foreign policies on the basis on U.S. interests rather than
primarily with reference to Moscow.
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The Deputies Committee was united in the view that seeking
an arrangement with Moscow on the future of Eastern Europe
is fraught with unacceptable dangers, including domestic
political ones. We should not enter into any Yalta-like
agreement or understanding with Moscow, nor should the U.S.
be seen as imposing limits on the East European peoples'
right of self-determination.
The fourth issue concerns the role of the NATO summit and
your visits to Rome, Bonn, and London. Your trip to Europe
will be a major opportunity for you to project a U.S. vision
for Europe and lead the Alliance toward a summit declaration
that embraces a shared view of Europe's future.
I suggest you give a strong push at the meeting for agencies
to work hard on developing new initiatives for the NATO
Summit.
III. PARTICIPANTS
List of participants is at Tab C.
IV. PRESS PLAN
No press plan.
V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
You will open the meeting, perhaps using the suggested
talking points at Tab A, and will then turn to me to review
the agenda.
Attachments
Tab A
Suggested Talking Points
Tab B
Agenda
Tab C
List of Participants
Prepared by:
Robert L. Hutchings
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
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20266 Add-on
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
--
The purpose of this NSC meeting is to consider a number of
policy issues concerning our policies toward Europe, West
and East. Our agenda, though formidable, breaks down into
four main areas:
maintaining the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance in
changing circumstances;
confronting the reality of greater West European
economic and political integration;
reassessing our approach to Eastern Europe at a time of
major change in the region; and
defining an agenda for the NATO Summit and my visits to
Rome, Bonn, and London.
--
We face a welcome challenge in Europe: how to deal with
success. Western Europe is moving toward greater unity and
self-confidence; Eastern Europe -- at least parts of Eastern
Europe -- is moving toward liberalizing change and greater
distance from Moscow. And the Soviet Union itself -- which
the National Security Council will consider tomorrow -- is
undergoing changes that may lead to less repression at home
and less confrontational policies abroad.
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--
These changes vindicate our approach to Europe since the
war. They reflect the evolution we have long sought in
Europe. What we need to do now is consider how these
changes affect U.S. interests and how to adapt our policies
to a new Europe. We need to consider, above all, how these
changes affect our role in Europe into the next century.
--
With that as background, let me turn to Brent.
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Participants
The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
Chief of Staff to the President
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Plus representatives from the following departments and agencies:
Department of Commerce
Office of Management and Budget
Central Intelligence Agency
Joint Chiefs of Staff
U.S. Information Agency
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
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20266
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Tuesday, April 4, 1989
Cabinet Room
2:45 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.
WESTERN EUROPE/EASTERN EUROPE
Agenda
I. Introduction
The President
II. Assessment of the Situation
William H. Webster
III. Issues for NSC Consideration
Brent Scowcroft
IV. Discussion
All Participants
V. Summary
Brent Scowcroft
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
20257 Add On
April 1, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. CARNES LORD
CRAIG R. HELSING
Assistant to the Vice
Chief of Staff
President for National
Department of Commerce
Security Affairs
MR. FRANK HODSOLL
MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Associate Director
Executive Secretary
Office of Management and
Department of State
Budget
MS. EMILY L. WALKER
MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury
Central Intelligence Agency
COLONEL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
MR. GARY EDSON
Executive Secretary
Chief of Staff
Department of Defense
U.S. Trade Representative
MS. SUSAN NELSON
CAPTAIN ANTHONY MANESS
Executive Assistant to the
Executive Assistant to the
Secretary
Chairman
Department of Agriculture
Joint Chiefs of Staff
MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Acting Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency
Subject:
Deputies Committee Meeting to Discuss Poland:
Final Paper (8)
Attached at Tab A is the final paper tasked by the March 30
Deputies Committee Meeting on Poland.
(8)
G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Tab A
Final Paper: Poland
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Deliberations of the Interagency Process on Poland
Interagency groups have deliberated on U.S. policy toward East
Europe and specifically Poland. The strong prospect of agreement
in early April at the Roundtable talks in Poland that would bring
a political breakthrough there has made consideration of a U.S.
response an urgent policy issue:
The DC met on March 30 on Poland. The DC rejected a purely
hortatory response and agreed that the U.S. should make an
immediate and substantive public response to successful
conclusion of Roundtable Accords; and remanded consideration of
longer-term responses that would require significant U.S.G.
funding.
The DC considered specific elements of an immediate substantive
response to events in Poland and discussed a number of concrete
measures. There exists agreement over five of the seven elements
of such a response but substantial disagreement over the other
two. None requires significant budgetary outlays.
The DC recommends we begin prompt consultations with our allies
and, as appropriate, with Congress.. G-7 Finance Ministers are
meeting this weekend, and our G-7 partners have stated their
intention to raise economic and financial issues related to
Poland. Treasury will report the results of these exchanges.
Agreed Elements. The DC agreed that consultations with the
allies should begin immediately on the following:
Multilateral steps:
-- 1. Paris Club. The U.S. could indicate to its Allies
willingness to consider substantial rescheduling of
official debt within the Paris Club, once an IMF
standby is negotiated for Poland.
-- 2. IFC. The U.S. could publicly indicate willingness
to support viable private sector loans by the
International Finance Corporation, a World Bank
affiliate.
Unilateral steps:
-- 3. GSP. We could announce intention to seek
legislation to accord Poland Generalized System of
Preferences. GSP eliminates tariffs on a variety of
products.
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-- 4. OPIC. We could announce intention to seek
legislation making Poland eligible for OPIC (Overseas
Private Investment Corporation) insurance. OPIC
provides support for private investment.
Steps 3 and 4 would require legislation and would entail
immediate, informal discussions with key Congressional leaders.
-- 5. Private sector involvement.
O
We could announce intention to negotiate a
government-to-government Small/Private business
agreement to facilitate direct contacts with
Poland's private business sector.
O
We could announce support for expanded training
and exchange programs, targeted at the emerging
private sector.
O
We could signal our support for voluntary private
sector swaps of existing Polish debts for equity
in Polish enterprises, or environmental,
educational or other humanitarian programs.
There remain interagency differences on two significant elements
of a possible response:
-- IMF standby. There is agreement the USG should no
longer block Poland's negotiations with the Fund on
political grounds and that any outcome should be
subject to the usual IMF standards. There is
disagreement on the conditions under which the U.S.
should support formal negotiations between Poland and
the IMF toward a stand-by loan for Poland. Treasury
believes Poland must first establish a track record of
economic reform and stabilization before negotiating a
stand-by. State believes the U.S. should allow Poland
and the IMF to negotiate immediately for a standby.
-- World Bank. The World Bank staff has negotiated
project loans valued at about $250 million but the
Bank's final approval of these loans is subject to
conclusion of an IMF standby program. Treasury is
concerned about overall Polish creditworthiness in the
absence of sound macroeconomic policies by the Polish
government, which would be evidenced by an IMF decision
to grant a standby loan. Treasury believes that to
allow the Bank to go forward without the assurances
that an IMF standby would provide, would signal a major
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shift in U.S. and G-7 efforts to encourage close
coordination between the World Bank and the IMF on
their activities in debtor countries. State believes
the U.S. should indicate willingness to see
economically-viable project loans to Poland proceed on
their merits, on a case-by-case basis, even before
approval of an IMF standby for the Poles.
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20257 Add On
March 31, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
FROM:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE
CR
SUBJECT:
Deputies Committee Meeting to Discuss Poland:
Final Paper
Attached at Tab A is the paper tasked by the March 30 Deputies
Committee Meeting to discuss Poland, for forwarding to the
agencies involved.
Robert Blackwill concurs.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I which forwards the subject
paper.
Approve APL Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A
Final Paper for DC Meeting
on Poland
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
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2888
April 20, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL PB
FROM:
PHILIP ZELIKOW P2
SUBJECT:
Recommended Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl
The President will call Chancellor Kohl Friday morning, April 21,
to encourage the Germans to engage promptly in discussions with
the United States before making a final decision on SNF
modernization and arms control.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Points to be Made
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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WASHINGTON
2888
RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
TO:
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
DATE:
Friday, April 21, 1989
RECOMMENDED BY:
Brent Scowcroft
PURPOSE:
To encourage the Germans to engage
promptly in discussions with the United
States to arrive at an SNF decision.
SECURE OR OPEN:
Open
INTERPRETER:
Gisela Marcuse
PHONE NUMBER:
011 49 228 562 000
CONTACT PERSON:
Mr. Teltschik, 011 49 228 562 000
TIME DIFFERENCE:
+ 5
SUGGESTED TIMES:
8:00 A.M.
TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:
SNF
Date of Submission:
Action:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
03c. Talking
Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
S
points
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
April 1989 [1]
Date Closed:
5/11/2011
OA/ID Number:
30542
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2011-0298-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
chron
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
2894
SECRET
April 20, 1989
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT BLACKWILL
RB
FROM:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR
SUBJECT:
Dates for a possible Presidential visit to Poland
and Hungary
The Germans have informed us in confidence that Chancellor Kohl
has proposed to the Poles that he visit immediately after the
Economic Summit (July 18-21). As you know, we were considering a
Presidential visit to Poland after the Economic Summit which
takes place July 15-16. The Kohl visit now takes away the option
of going to Poland following the summit since the President
should not follow Kohl in Poland. The President could go to
Poland and Hungary before the Summit, perhaps July 12-13. We
still think that a visit to Poland and Hungary during this trip
is a good idea but wanted to bring this potential conflict to
your attention.
Tim to Deal concurs.
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CONF-IDENTIAL
20352
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 27, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB
FROM:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE
So
SUBJECT:
National Security Council Directive on Poland
The memorandum for the President at Tab I forwards an interagency
memorandum which lays out our response to the Polish Roundtable
and asks his formal approval of the measures. This memorandum
will act as the President's formal directive on Poland. Please
note that measure one--the rescheduling of Polish debt--does not
include the line "after an IMF standby has been negotiated" as
did the President's decision memorandum (which is attached at
Tab II). This is consistent with the interagency-approved
statement of measures on which the President's speech is based.
Treasury came back to us and said that they had not intended to
have rescheduling conditional because this would actually change
(toughen) U.S. policy. We have supported several reschedulings
in the absence of an IMF standby in recent years. Treasury and
State want the condition dropped.
Tim TD Deal and Nicholas NR Rostow (who has coordinated the memorandum
with Boyden Gray) concur. George VanEron and Nancy Menan concur.
Treasury and State concur on the language of the proposed NSD.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum for the President attached at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A
Interagency Memorandum
Tab II
President's Decision Memorandum
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20352
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Proposed National Security Directive in Response
to the Polish Roundtable Agreement
Purpose
To approve the proposed Directive at Tab A, implementing your
decisions in response to the Polish Roundtable.
Background
After interagency and allied input, your decisions were made on
April 11. These decisions, and your public statement on April
17, were developed to provide an appropriate U.S. response to
successful completion of the Polish Roundtable and the
relegalization of Solidarity.
Please note that measure one--the rescheduling of Polish debt--
does not include the line "after an IMF standby has been
negotiated" as did your decision memorandum. Treasury came back
to us and said that they had not intended to have rescheduling
conditional because this would actually change (toughen) U.S.
policy. We have supported several reschedulings in the absence
of an IMF standby in recent years. Treasury, as well as State,
want the condition dropped. The proposed Directive reflects this
change and is consistent with the interagency approved statement
of measures on which your April 17 speech was based.
Recommendation
That you sign the proposed Directive at Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
Proposed NSD on the Polish Roundtable Agreement
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
SUBJECT:
Actions to Respond to Polish Roundtable Agreement
(U)
I hereby direct that the eight measures listed below be taken in
response to the Polish Roundtable agreement. (U)
--
The United States will indicate to its Allies willingness to
consider substantial rescheduling of Poland's official debt
within the Paris Club. (e)
--
The United States will inform its allies and IMF management
that the United States supports negotiations between Poland
and the IMF on a stand-by arrangement subject to normal IMF
conditions. (U)
--
The United States will publicly indicate willingness to
support viable private sector loans by the International
Finance Corporation. (U)
--
Legislation will be sought to accord Generalized System of
Preferences to Poland. GSP treatment eliminates tariffs on
a variety of products. (C)
:
Legislation will be sought to make Poland eligible for OPIC
(Overseas Private Investment Corporation) insurance. (&)
Private Sector Involvement
--
The United States will offer to negotiate a government-to-
government Small/Private Business Agreement to facilitate
direct contacts with Poland's private business sector. (C)
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The United States will expand training and exchange
programs, targeted at the emerging private sector, in
Poland. (U)
The United States will signal support for voluntary private
sector swaps of existing Polish debts for equity in Polish
enterprises, or environmental, educational or other
humanitarian programs.
(U)
CONFIDENTIAL
C.Rice C.
SECRET
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
04/1.189
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
2387
1000 APR 10
April 10, 1989
INFORMATION
Signed
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
4-11
SUBJECT:
Conclusion of the Polish Roundtable
The Polish Roundtable concluded successfully April 5. We will
want to respond promptly. You will remember that we sought
allied reaction to a set of measures that we would like to
announce in support of the agreement. The five on which the
agencies agree are:
Multilateral Steps:
1. Paris Club. The U.S. would indicate to its Allies
willingness to consider substantial rescheduling of official
debt within the Paris Club once an IMF standby is negotiated
for Poland.
2. IFC. The U.S. would publicly indicate willingness to
support viable private sector loans by the International
Finance Corporation, a World Bank affiliate.
Unilateral Steps:
3. GSP. We would announce intention to seek legislation to
accord Poland Generalized System of Preferences. GSP
treatment eliminates tariffs on a variety of products.
4. OPIC. We would announce our intention to seek
legislation making Poland eligible for OPIC (Overseas
Private Investment Corporation) insurance. OPIC provides
political risk insurance for private investment.
Steps 3 and 4 would require legislation and we have begun
informal discussions with key Congressional leaders.
--
5. Private sector involvement.
We would announce our intention to negotiate a
government-to-government Small/Private Business
Agreement to facilitate direct contacts with Poland's
private business sector.
SECRET
CC: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR
Chief of Staff
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O 13526
2011 19693 MR
ES 4/26/13
SECRET
SECRET
2
We would announce support for expanded training and
exchange programs, targeted at the emerging private
sector.
We would signal our support for voluntary private
sector swaps of existing Polish debts for equity in
Polish enterprises, or environmental, educational or
other humanitarian programs.
but
Our allies reacted favorably to our approach and to these
specific measures. The EC-member countries made clear that they
are not individually considering GSP-like treatment for Poland
front
because such a decision would fall within the competence of the
EC.
There remain interagency differences on two significant elements
of a possible response.
1. Timing of IMF-Polish negotiations for a Polish standby
loan arrangement. There is agreement that the USG should no
longer block Poland's negotiations with the Fund on
political grounds and that any outcome should be subject to
the usual IMF standards.
State and Treasury disagree on the conditions under which
the U.S. should support formal negotiations between Poland
and the IMF toward a stand-by program for Poland. Treasury
believes Poland must first establish a track record of
économic reform. State believes the U.S. should allow
Poland and the IMF to negótiate immediately for a standby.
In preliminary reaction, allies support the State position,
with the exception of Japan which was non-committal.
2. World Bank. The World Bank has negotiated project loans
for Poland but is withholding final approval of the loans
subject to conclusion of an IMF standby program. State
believes the loans should be approved on a case-by-case
basis on their merits. Treasury believes that to allow the
Bank to go forward without the assurances that an IMF
standby would provide would be a mistake and would signal a
major shift in U.S. efforts to encourage close coordination
between the World Bank and the IMF on their activities in
debtor countries. In preliminary reaction, allies, with the
exception of the FRG and Norway, support the Treasury
position.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
3
The Treasury-State debate stretches back months now with no
change in either position. Jim Baker is ready to move ahead with
both of the disputed measures. The political grounds for moving
ahead are clear. In the final analysis, Poland must negotiate
an agreement with the IMF and must prove to the latter's
satisfaction that it can meet the conditions of an IMF program.
By the same token, the World Bank will only approve project loans
that make economic sense. An IMF standby has nothing to do with
the economic viability of the loans.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
That you approve the five agreed measures.
Approve
Disapprove
2.
That you resolve the State-Treasury dispute over measures
six and seven.
Measure 6 (Timing of Polish-IMF standby negoţiations)
State Option: U.S. should allow negotiations immediately.
Approve
Disapprove
or, alternatively
Treasury Option: Poland must first establish track record
on economic reform.
Approve
Disapprove
Measure 7 (World Bank loans in the absence of an IMF standby
loan agreement for Poland)
State Option: Loans should be approved on their merits on a
case by case basis without reference to IMF
standby.
Approve
Disapprove
or, alternatively
CAP/
Treasury Option: IMF standby should be in place prior to
final approval of loans.
SECRET
Chen
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
1891
April 20, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL
PS
FROM:
BARRY F. LOWENKRON BAL
SUBJECT:
Request To Address British Business Executives
At Tab I is a letter from you from William D. Rogers in which you
agree to meet with a group of prominent British executives to
discuss international economic issues. Rogers' request is at Tab
II. Given the high calibre of the group (list of attendees is at
Tab III), we think a meeting would be a worthwhile opportunity to
discuss such vital issues as U.S. -European economic relations and
the Single European Act.
Tim Deal concurs.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you agree to meet with the group on Monday, May 1 at 2:00
p.m. for thirty minutes.
Approve
Disapprove
That you sign the attached letter to William Rogers at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Letter to William Rogers
Tab II
Incoming Letter
Tab III
List of British Executives
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Bill:
Thank you for your letter inviting me to
meet with a group of British executives.
I agree with your assessment of the
individuals participating in the program;
it is indeed an impressive group.
I
would be happy to meet with them on May
1. My staff will be in touch with your
office to make the necessary
arrangements.
Sincerely,
Brent Scowcroft
The Honorable William D. Rogers
Arnold and Porter
1200 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
LONDON WASHINGTON ASSOCIATES INC.
VISIT TO WASHINGTON DC, APRIL 30th - MAY 3rd 1989
Acceptances as of January 20, 1989
SIR TREVOR HOLDSWORTH - Group Leader
President, Confederation of British Industry
LORD REES-MOGG
Former editor of the London Times
Chairman, London Washington Associates
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM
SIR DAVID PLASTOW
Chairman
Chairman & Chief Executive
Pearson Group plc
Vickers plc
LORD BOARDMAN
MR ROY ROBERTS
Chairman & Chief Executive
Chairman
National Westminster Bank plc
Simon Engineering plc
SIR PETER CAREY
LORD SAINSBURY
Chief Executive
Chairman & Chief Executive
Morgan Grenfell Group plc
J. Sainsbury plc
MR PETER DAVIS
SIR ERIC SHARP
Chairman
Chairman & Chief Executive
Reed International plc
Cable & Wireless plc
MR RICHARD GIORDANO
DR N. BRIAN SMITH
Chairman & Chief Executive
Chairman
BOC Group plc
Metal Box Group plc
SIR PAUL GIROLAMI
PROFESSOR ROLAND SMITH
Chairman
Chairman
Glaxo Holdings plc
British Aerospace plc
THE EARL OF HARROWBY
SIR ROBERT HASLAM
Chairman
Chairman
Dowty Group plc
British Coal Corporation
1
LONDON WASHINGTON ASSOCIATES INC.
VISIT TO WASHINGTON DC, APRIL 30TH - MAY 3RD 1989
Acceptances as of January 20, 1989
Brief biographical and company descriptions.
SIR TREVOR HOLDSWORTH - Group Leader
President, the Confederation of British Industry,
Britain's leading employers organisation.
Sir Trevor is one of Britains most distinguished
industrialists, he is chairman of British Satellite
Broadcasting and a director of Midland Bank, the
Prudential Corporation (Britain's largest life
insurance company) and several other companies. Until
recently he was chairman of GKN, Britains largest
engineering group.
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM
Chairman of the Pearson Group, a diversified company
which includes subsidiaries involved in publishing,
including The Financial Times (Viscount Blakenham is
Chairman of the Financial Times), The Economist, and
Viking Penguin Publishers. Pearsons is also involved
in investment banking through ownership of Lazard
Brothers, and oil and gas industry equipment and
services.
LORD BOARDMAN
Lord Boardman has been Chairman of National Westminster
Bank since May 1983, when he succeeded Mr Robin Leigh-
Pemberton, who became Governor of the Bank of England.
He was member of Parliament between 1967 and 1974, and
held office as Minister for Industry and Chief
Secretary to the Treasury (1972-1974).
National Westminster is the leading bank in the UK.
It is becoming a major regional banking force in the
Northeast US, and since 1987 owns First Jersey National
Corporation.
1
LONDON WASHINGTON ASSOCIATES INC.
SIR PETER CAREY
Chairman, Morgan Grenfell Group plc, one of the UKs
leading merchant banks.
Sir Peter is a former Permanent Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry, he is also a
director of Cable & Wireless plc, NV Philips, Westland
Group plc and non executive Chairman of Dalgety plc.
MR PETER DAVIS
Chief Executive, Reed International plc.
Reed International is one of the UK's leading
international businesses with mainstream activities in
publishing, packaging, paper and paint (turnover $3.5
billion). Reed International has substantial interests
in the US.
MR RICHARD GIORDANO
Chairman & Chief Executive of BOC Group, Britain's
largest producer of industrial gases (turnover in
excess of $3.5 billion). The company has 27 production
facilities in North America.
SIR PAUL GIROLAMI
Chairman, Glaxo Holdings plc, one of Britains largest
pharmaceeutical manufacturers (turnover $3 billion
approx). Glaxo has several production facilities in the
US.
THE EARL OF HARROWBY TD
Chairman, Dowty Group plc, a leading and diversified
engineering group (turnover $1 billion approx). Dowty
has 8 plants in the US where it manufactures aircraft
equipment, electronic controls, hydraulic systems and
components and data communications equipment.
2
LONDON WASHINGTON ASSOCIATES INC.
SIR ROBERT HASLAM
Chairman, British Coal Corporation, a nationalised
company and Britains largest coal producer (turnover $8
billion). Sir Robert is also a Director of the Bank
of England and Unilever.
SIR DAVID PLASTOW
Chairman and Chief Executive, Vickers plc, among
Britains largest engineering companies (turnover $1.5
billion). Products include Rolls Royce automobiles and
the Chieftain tank. In the US Vickers produces medical
equipment, office furniture, printing machinery, marine
equipment, and scientific instruments.
LORD REES-MOGG
Lord Rees-Mogg, is former editor of the London "Times".
He is Chairman of the Arts Council of Great Britain and
the newly formed Broadcasting Standards Council, he is
also a director of a number of companies including
General Electric Company.
Lord Rees-Mogg is Chairman of London Washington
Associates, advisors to British industry on US trade,
economic and political developments and the organisers
of this visit to Washington DC
MR ROY ROBERTS
Chairman of Simon Engineering, one of the largest UK
process plant and engineering companies (turnover $1
billion). In the US, Simon supplies waste water
treatment plants, the oil and gas industry, animal feed
services, and the chemical industry, it has over 11 US
production facilities.
3
LONDON WASHINGTON ASSOCIATES INC.
LORD SAINSBURY
Chairman and Chief Executive, J. Sainsbury plc,
Britain's largest retail food and grocery business
(turnover in excess of $8 billion).
Lord Sainsbury is also Chairman of the Royal Opera
House, Covent Garden.
SIR ERIC SHARP
Chairman & Chief Executive of Cable & Wireless plc, one
of the world's leading international telecommunications
groups which operates in 49 countries (turnover $2
billion). Cable and Wireless have seven US companies.
DR N. BRIAN SMITH
Chairman, MB Group plc. The Metal Box Group is one of
the world's largest manufacturer of containers,
fasteners, and packaging materials ($2 billion). In the
US the group has manufacturing facilities in 16
locations.
PROFESSOR ROLAND SMITH
Chairman, British Aerospace plc, Britain's largest
aircraft manufacturer (turnover $7 billion).
4
recommendation ssory for
of reply for 65
ARNOLD & PORTER
1200 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE, N. W.
Degrature
1891
PARK AVENUE TOWER
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
1700 LINCOLN STREET
65 EAST 55TH STREET
(202) 872-6700
DENVER, COLORADO 80203
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022-3219
CABLE: "ARFOPO"
(303) 863-1000
(212) 750-5050
TELECOPIER: (202) 872-6720
TELEX: 89-2733
cy Horence
WILLIAM D. ROGERS
DIRECT LINE: (202) 872-6915
March 14, 1989
MAR 1 6 1989
General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Brent:
We are writing about a visit to Washington, D.C.
in early May by a prominent group of British business
executives. A list of the delegation is attached. It
is, as you will see, nothing if not distinguished. The
group proposes to meet senior members of the Bush
administration and of Congress to discuss economic
policy. They have set meetings with Alan Greenspan and
Dan Rostenkowski. Others are in the process of being
arranged.
The trip is being coordinated by London
Washington Associates, which provides advice on American
developments for British multinationals. London
Washington Associates works with our firm. It has asked
if we might be of assistance in setting up additional
meetings. We agreed, in the hope that you might enjoy
and benefit from such a meeting. The group has time
available on May 1 and 2.
I hope you agree with me that this group is worth
meeting. I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Dr
William D. Rogers
Enclosure
(List of British Executives)
Chem
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
UNCLASSIFIED W/
2800
CONFIDENTIAL ATCH
April 20, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR PHILIP HUGHES
FROM:
ROBERT HUTCHINGS RIH
SUBJECT:
Agrement: New Danish Ambassador
State has recommended (Tab II) that the President agree to the
appointment of Peter Dyvig as Denmark's Ambassador to the United
States. We have no reason to object to his appointment.
Robert Blackwill concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Tab I memorandum to State, forwarding the
President's approval.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum for J. Stapleton Roy
Tab A
Biography
Tab B
Diplomatic Note Dated
April 6, 1989
Tab II Incoming
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
SS 9/3/25
UNCLASSIFIED W/
CONFIDENTIAL ATCH
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
UNCLASSIFIED WITH
2800
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Agrement: New Ambassador of Denmark
The President has reviewed and concurs in the recommendation of
the Department of State that the appointment of Peter Dyvig as
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Denmark to the
United States would be agreeable to the Government of the United
States. You are requested to inform the Government of Denmark.
G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
Attachments
Tab A
Biography
Tab B
Diplomatic Note Dated
April 6, 1989
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
SS 9/3/25
UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
06c. Report
Government report [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1
n.d.
(b)(1), (b)(3)
C
pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Document Partially Declassified
Office:
National Security Council
(Copy of Document Follows)
Series:
Blackwill, Robert D., Files
By MM
on 3/4/2015
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
April 1989 [1]
Date Closed:
5/11/2011
OA/ID Number:
30542
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2011-0298-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
2012-1569-MR(505)
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date: 10/24/2013
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
PRESIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
505
BUSH
LIBRARY
Proposed New Ambassador: Peter DYVIG
(Phonetic: DOO vig)
DENMARK
One of his country's senior diplomats, Peter Dyvig is
currently Denmark's Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. In the six years prior to his
assuming the London post in 1986, Ambassador Dyvig served in
two of the most senior political affairs positions in the
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Peter Dyvig was born on February 23, 1934. He earned a law
degree from the University of Copenhagen in 1959 and joined the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that year. Except for a 1963-64
sabatical at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies, Dyvig spent his first six years in the
Danish Foreign Service assigned to the Foreign Ministry. From
1965 to 1969 he was assigned to Denmark's NATO mission. He
then returned to the Ministry's political division to handle
West European and North American affairs until 1974, when he
began a two-year assignment as Deputy Chief of Mission at
Denmark's Embassy in Washington.
In 1976 Dyvig again returned to the political division in
Copenhagen as Deputy Under Secretary with the rank of
Ambassador, with subsequent promotions to Under Secretary and
then to Permanent Under Secretary of State in 1983. A
dedicated Atlanticist, Dyvig has worked diligently to keep
Danish security policy in line with those of other Alliance
members -- frequently in the face of ambivalent public opinion
and a sometimes hostile parliament. His 1984 "Dyvig Report, a
comprehensive analysis of Danish security policy for the
1980's, argued strongly that Denmark had to remain a faithful
and reliable participant in the NATO Alliance.
(b)(1); (b)(3)
he
speaks fluent English. Married to the former Karen Moeller,
the Dyvigs have two adult children.
A thorough search of U.S. Government sources reveals no
grounds for objection.
Sources include:
(b)(1); (b)(3)
Danish biography
FBI
CONFIDENTIAL
(DECL OADR)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2012-1569-MR
10/24/2013 MM
royal DANISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
April 6, 1989
Mr. Secretary,
I have the honor to inform You that the Danish Minister
for Foreign Affairs intends to propose to Her Majesty to
appoint Ambassador Peter Pedersen Dyvig as Ambassador Extra-
ordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States effective
from June 1, 1989.
Ambassador Dyvig is at present Ambassador to the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
I beg to enclose an extract of the paragraph in the
Register of the Danish Foreign Office describing his career.
I have been directed to request that You will be good
enough to inform me whether the appointment of Ambassador
Dyvig would be agreeable to the Government of the United
States.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to You,
Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my highest consideration.
The Honorable
James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
S/S 8908426
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520 2800
UNCLASSIFIED
(With CONFIDENTIAL Attachment)
April 18, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT:
Appointment of Peter Dyvig of Denmark as
Ambassador to the United States
The Government of Denmark has inquired whether our
Government agrees to the appointment of Peter Dyvig as
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Denmark to the
United States (TAB 2). A biography of Mr. Dyvig is attached
(TAB 1).
The Department believes from the information available that
Mr. Dyvig will make an excellent Ambassador to the United
States and recommends that the President agree to the proposed
appointment. If he concurs, the Department will inform the
Government of Denmark.
J.Stapleton J. Stapleton Roy Rey
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. Biography.
2. Diplomatic Note of April 6, 1989.
UNCLASSIFIED
(With CONFIDENTIAL Attachment)
Chron
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONF IDENTIAL
2802
April 20, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
FROM:
BARRY F. LOWENKRON BM
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to the Polish-American
Congress
At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Shirley Green requesting her
to send a Presidential message to Edward Moskal, President of the
American Polish Congress. Attached is a suggested draft (Tab A)
and the incoming from the State Department (Tab B).
Bob Blackwill concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the attached memorandum and forward it along with
the State Department's draft letter to Shirley Green.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Hughes Memorandum to Green
Tab A
Draft Presidential Response
Tab B
Incoming
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By It NARA, Date 5/11/11
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONF IDENTIAL
2802
MEMORANDUM FOR SHIRLEY GREEN
FROM:
G. PHILIP HUGHES
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to Polish-American Congress
The National Security Council would appreciate your office
sending a Presidential letter to Edward Moskal, the President of
the Polish-American Congress. A suggested draft, supplied by the
State Department and cleared by the NSC, is at Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
State Department Draft of Presidential Message
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By It
NARA, Date 5/11/11
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR
Dear Mr. Moskal:
I know how pleased you and the Polish American Congress are
at the steps the Polish people have been taking in recent weeks
toward greater freedom and democracy. It was a pleasure seeing
you in Hamtramck on April 17 on such a hopeful occasion.
Despite years of oppression, the Polish people have never
accepted a system imposed from outside. Solidarity has
remained true to its ideals and steadfast in promoting them.
The courage, strength and wisdom of the Polish people have been
rewarded with a success. Because American Polonia has stood
with Solidarity through all the hard years, in a real sense
this is your success too.
The Polish people still face a long, tough road ahead in
their struggle for freedom and prosperity. As I said in
Hamtramck, I want to do what I can to help this brave and
worthy effort. I know you do as well.
The Polish American Congress has made a real contribution
to U.S. policy toward Poland, and never more than in recent
weeks. I wish to thank you for that. I look forward to
continued work with the Polish American Congress in support of
our shared goals of democracy and prosperity for Poland.
With best wishes,
George Bush
Mr. Edward J. Moskal, President,
The Polish American Congress,
1200 North Ashland Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois.
8908344
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
2802
CONFIDENTIAL
April 18, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Presidential Letter to the President of the
Polish American Congress, Edward Moskal
The Polish American Congress, the largest Polish community
organization in the United States, has been strongly supportive
of U.S. policy toward Poland. We have worked closely with PAC
representatives in Washington. In meetings with you and in the
Department last month, PAC President Moskal urged the U.S. to
make a strong, positive response to the Roundtable Agreements
in Poland. He was present at the President's speech on Poland
in Hamtramck, Michigan on April 17. The PAC's continued
support will be important to the President's initiative.
We recommend the President send a short note to PAC
President Moskal. We have prepared a suggested text which
expresses appreciation for the PAC's past support and reaffirms
the Administration's intention to continue working with the
Polish American community in support of the Polish people and
Solidarity.
J. Stapleton Roy Roy
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Suggested note to PAC President Moskal
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2012-1569-MR
7/8/2013 MM
Chem
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
0832
April 20, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
FROM:
ADRIAN BASORA AAB
SUBJECT:
Proclamation of the Convention Between the
Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland (on behalf of the Government
of Bermuda) Relating to the Taxation of Insurance
Enterprises and Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters
Attached at Tab A is the subject proclamation, with a related
exchange of notes, signed at Washington on July 11, 1986.
The Convention entered into force on December 2, 1988.
The Convention is the first tax treaty applicable to Bermuda to
be negotiated between the United States and the United Kingdom.
It is not a comprehensive income tax treaty and is limited to two
issues: the taxation of insurance enterprises and mutual
assistance in tax matters.
Your memorandum to the OMB General Counsel forwarding the
proposed proclamation is attached at Tab I.
Robert lackwill concurs.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to OMB, General Counsel
Tab A
Draft Proclamation
Tab II
Incoming Memorandum from the Department
of State
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
0832
MEMORANDUM FOR ALAN CHARLES RAUL
FROM:
G. PHILIP HUGHES
SUBJECT:
Proclamation of the Convention Between the
Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland (on behalf of the Government
of Bermuda) Relating to the Taxation of Insurance
Enterprises and Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters
Attached for signature by the President is the proclamation of
the Convention Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland (on behalf of the Government of Bermuda)
Relating to the Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and Mutual
Assistance in Tax Matters, with a related exchange of notes,
signed at Washington on July 11, 1986.
The Senate gave its advice and consent on October 22, 1988; and,
on November 28, 1988, the President signed the instrument of
ratification, subject to two reservations. Instruments of
ratification were exchanged at Washington on December 2, 1988.
The Convention entered into force on December 2, 1988.
The Convention is the first tax treaty applicable to Bermuda to
be negotiated between the United States and the United Kingdom.
It is not a comprehensive income tax treaty and is limited to two
issues: the taxation of insurance enterprises and mutual
assistance in tax matters.
Attachment:
Tab A
Proclamation
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
CONSIDERING THAT:
The Convention Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (on behalf of the Government of
Bermuda) Relating to the Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and
Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters, together with an exchange of
notes, was signed at Washington on July 11, 1986, the text of
which is hereto annexed;
The Senate of the United States of America by its
resolution of October 22, 1988, two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring therein, gave its advice and consent to
ratification, subject to the following reservations:
(1) Effective Januarv 1, 1990, said Convention shall not
operate to prevent the imposition by the United States of any
excise taxes on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers,
whether or not such premiums constitute income of an enterprise
of insurance of a Covered Jurisdiction; and
(2) Said Convention shall in no event operate to prevent
the imposition by the United States of any excise taxes on
insurance premiums paid to foreian insurers except with respect
to insurance premiums that either:
(a) constitute income of an enterprise of insurance of
a Covered Jurisdiction carried on by a company in a taxable
year in which the company is a controlled foreign
corporation within the meaning of section 957(a) or (b) of
title 26 of the United States Code as in effect for such
taxable year; or
(b) constitute income of an enterprise of insurance of
a Covered Jurisdiction carried on by a company in a taxable
year in which:
(i) the company is subject to the rules of the
section 953(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
and
(ii) the company is a controlled foreign
corporation within the meaning of section 957(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as modified by
section 953(c) (1) of said Code, and the premiums
constitute related person insurance income within the
meaning of section 953(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986.
The Convention and exchange of notes were ratified by the
President of the United States of America on November 28, 1988,
subject to the said reservations, in pursuance of the advice
and consent of the Senate, and were ratified on the part of the
Government of Bermuda on March 26, 1987.
It is provided in Article 7 of the Convention that the
Convention shall enter into force upon the exchange of
instruments of ratification;
The instruments of ratification of the Convention were
exchanged at Washington on December 2, 1988, and accordingly
the Convention and the exchange of notes, subject to the said
reservations, entered into force on December 2, 1988.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, George Bush, President of the United
States of America, proclaim and make public the Convention,
with a related exchange of notes, subject to the said
reservations, to the end that it be observed and fulfilled with
good faith on and after December 2, 1988, by the United States
of America and by the citizens of the United States of America
and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed this proclamation and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
DONE at the city of Washington
our Lord one thousand
nine hundred eighty-nine
and of the Independence
of the United States of
America the two hundred
thirteenth.
By the President:
Secretary of State
8902875
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
February 14, 1989
0832
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Proclamation of the Convention Between
the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (on behalf
of the Government of Bermuda) Relating to the
Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and Mutual
Assistance in Tax Matters
Attached for signature by the President is the
proclamation of the Convention Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (on behalf of
the Government of Bermuda) Relating to the Taxation of
Insurance Enterprises and Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters,
with a related exchange of notes, signed at Washington on
July 11, 1986.
The Senate gave its advice and consent on October 22,
1988; and, on November 28, 1988, the President signed the
instrument of ratification, subject to two reservations.
Instruments of ratification were exchanged at Washington on
December 2, 1988. The Convention entered into force on
December 2, 1988.
The Convention is the first tax treaty applicable to
Bermuda to be negotiated between the United States and the
United Kingdom. It is not a comprehensive income tax treaty
and is limited to two issues: the taxation of insurance
enterprises and mutual assistance in tax matters.
Miloyn furtsky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Proclamation
U2
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
CONSIDERING THAT:
The Convention Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (on behalf of the Government of
Bermuda) Relating to the Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and
Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters, together with an exchange of
notes, was signed at Washington on July 11, 1986, the text of
which is hereto annexed;
The Senate of the United States of America by its
resolution of October 22, 1988, two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring therein, gave its advice and consent to
ratification, subject to the following reservations:
(1) Effective January 1, 1990, said Convention shall not
operate to prevent the imposition by the United States of any
excise taxes on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers,
whether or not such premiums constitute income of an enterprise
of insurance of a Covered Jurisdiction; and
(2) Said Convention shall in no event operate to prevent
the imposition by the United States of any excise taxes on
insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers except with respect
to insurance premiums that either:
(a) constitute income of an enterprise of insurance of
a Covered Jurisdiction carried on by a company in a taxable
year in which the company is a controlled foreign
corporation within the meaning of section 957(a) or (b) of
title 26 of the United States Code as in effect for such
taxable year; or
(b) constitute income of an enterprise of insurance of
a Covered Jurisdiction carried on by a company in a taxable
year in which:
(i) the company is subject to the rules of the
section 953(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
and
(ii) the company is a controlled foreign
corporation within the meaning of section 957(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as modified by
section 953(c) (1) of said Code, and the premiums
constitute related person insurance income within the
meaning of section 953(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986.
The Convention and exchange of notes were ratified by the
President of the United States of America on November 28, 1988,
subject to the said reservations, in pursuance of the advice
and consent of the Senate, and were ratified on the part of the
Government of Bermuda on March 26, 1987.
It is provided in Article 7 of the Convention that the
Convention shall enter into force upon the exchange of
instruments of ratification:
The instruments of ratification of the Convention were
exchanged at Washington on December 2, 1988, and accordingly
the Convention and the exchange of notes, subject to the said
reservations, entered into force on December 2, 1988.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, George Bush, President of the United
States of America, proclaim and make public the Convention,
with a related exchange of notes, subject to the said
reservations, to the end that it be observed and fulfilled with
good faith on and after December 2, 1988, by the United States
of America and by the citizens of the United States of America
and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed this proclamation and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
DONE at the city of Washington
our Lord one thousand
nine hundred eighty-nine
and of the Independence
of the United States of
America the two hundred
thirteenth.
By the President:
Secretary of State
100TH CONGRESS
2d Session
}
{
EXEC. REPT.
SENATE
100-23
TAX CONVENTION WITH THE UNITED
KINGDOM (ON BEHALF OF BERMUDA)
REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ON
THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND (ON
BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BERMUDA) RELATING TO
THE TAXATION OF INSURANCE ENTERPRISES AND MUTUAL AS-
SISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS, WITH A RELATED EXCHANGE OF
NOTES, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON JULY 11, 1986
SEPTEMBER 22, 1988.-Ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
88-855
WASHINGTON : 1988
CONTENTS
Page
I. PURPOSE
1
II. BACKGROUND
1
III. SUMMARY OF TREATY
2
IV. DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION
2
V. COMMITTEE ACTION
3
VI. COMMITTEE COMMENTS
3
VII. BUDGET IMPACT
10
VIII. EXPLANATION OF TREATY PROVISIONS
11
Article 1. General Definitions
11
Article 2. Residence
12
Article 3. Permanent Establishment
13
Article 4. Taxation of Insurance Enterprises
14
Article 5. Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters
21
Article 6. Confidentiality
21
Article 7. Entry into Force and Termination
22
IX. EXPLANATION OF DIPLOMATIC NOTES
24
X. TEXT OF RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION
29
(III)
Chon
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
0831
4/21/89
April 20, 1989
ACTION
0950
Philip--
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
FROM:
ADRIAN BASORA AAB
we was us this to week Bod
SUBJECT:
Proclamation of the Protocol to the Convention
Between the Government of the United States of
America and the French Republic with Respect to
Taxes on Income and Property of July 28, 1967, as
amended
Attached at Tab A is the subject proclamation, as amended by the
Protocols of October 12, 1970, November 24, 1978 and January 17,
1984, which Protocol and related exchange of notes were signed in
Paris on June 16, 1988 and entered into force on December 29,
1988.
The main purpose of the Protocol is to modify the Convention to
take into account the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
In addition, the Protocol will permit France to exempt U.S.
citizens resident in France from French tax on their U.S. -source
investment income.
Your memorandum to the OMB General Counsel forwarding the
proposed proclamation is attached at Tab I.
Robert Blackwill concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to OMB, General Counsel
Tab A
Draft Proclamation
Tab II
Incoming Memorandum from the Department
of State
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
0831
MEMORANDUM FOR ALAN CHARLES RAUL
FROM:
G. PHILIP HUGHES
SUBJECT:
Proclamation of the Protocol to the Convention
Between the Government of the United States of
America and the French Republic with Respect to
Taxes on Income and Property of July 28, 1967, as
amended
Attached for signature by the President is the proclamation of
the Protocol to the Convention Between the Government of the
United States of America and the French Republic with respect to
Taxes on Income and Property of July 28, 1967, as amended by the
Protocols of October 12, 1970, November 24, 1978 and January 17,
1984, which Protocol and related exchange of notes were signed at
Paris on June 16, 1988.
The Senate gave its advice and consent on October 22, 1988,
subject to an understanding, and the President signed the
instrument of ratification on November 28, 1988. The Contracting
States each gave notification of the completion of its respective
constitutional procedures to bring the Protocol into force. The
Protocol, together with a related exchange of notes, entered into
force on December 29, 1988.
The main purpose of the Protocol is to modify the Convention to
take into account the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
In addition, the Protocol will permit France to exempt U.S.
citizens resident in France from French tax on their U.S. -source
investment income.
Attachment:
Tab A
Proclamation
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
CONSIDERING THAT:
The Protocol to the Convention Between the United States of
America and the French Republic with Respect to Taxes on Income
and Property of July 28, 1967, as amended by the Protocols of
October 12, 1970, November 24, 1978 and January 17, 1984,
together with a related exchange of notes, was signed at Paris
on June 16, 1988, the text of which is hereto annexed;
The Senate of the United States of America by its
resolution of October 22, 1988, two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring therein, gave its advice and consent to
ratification, subject to the following understanding:
That the Treasury Department will effect the
negotiation of a new Protocol in an expeditious
manner with the objective of modifying the
dividend rates specified in paragraph 2 of
Article 9 (Dividends) to deny inappropriate
relief from taxation at source on dividends paid
by Regulated Investment Companies, Real Estate
Investment Trusts, and any other U.S.
corporations that essentially receive conduit
treatment for U.S. income tax purposes.
The Protocol, with a related exchange of notes, subject to
the said understanding, was ratified by the President of the
United States of America on November 28, 1988, in pursuance of
the advice and consent of the Senate;
Each of the Contracting States notified the other
Contracting State in writing, through diplomatic channels, upon
the completion of its respective constitutional procedures to
bring the Protocol into force, and accordingly the Protocol,
with a related exchange of notes, subject to the said
understanding, entered into force on December 29, 1988,
effective in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, George Bush, President of the United
States of America, proclaim and make public the Protocol, with
an exchange of notes, subject to the said understanding, to the
end that it be observed and fulfilled with good faith on and
after December 29, 1988, by the United States of America and by
the citizens of the United States of America and all other
persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed this proclamation and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
DONE at the city of Washington
our Lord one thousand
nine hundred eighty-nine
and of the Independence
of the United States of
America the two hundred
thirteenth.
By the President:
Secretary of State
8902876
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
0831
February 14, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Proclamation of the Protocol to the Convention
Between the Government of the United States of
America and the French Republic with Respect
to Taxes on Income and Property of July 28, 1967,
as amended.
Attached for signature by the President is the proclamation
of the Protocol to the Convention Between the Government of the
United States of America and the French Republic with respect
to Taxes on Income and Property of July 28, 1967, as amended by
the Protocols of October 12, 1970, November 24, 1978 and
January 17, 1984, which Protocol and related exchange of notes
were signed at Paris on June 16, 1988.
The Senate gave its advice and consent on October 22, 1988,
subject to an understanding, and the President signed the
instrument of ratification on November 28, 1988. The
Contracting States each gave notification of the completion of
its respective constitutional procedures to bring the Protocol
into force. The Protocol, together with a related exchange of
notes, entered into force on December 29, 1988.
The main purpose of the Protocol is to modify the
Convention to take into account the provisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. In addition, the Protocol will permit
France to exempt U.S. citizens resident in France from French
tax on their U.S.- - source investment income.
Miloyn Levitiky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Proclamation
12 02
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
CONSIDERING THAT:
The Protocol to the Convention Between the United States of
America and the French Republic with Respect to Taxes on Income
and Property of July 28, 1967, as amended by the Protocols of
October 12, 1970, November 24, 1978 and January 17, 1984,
together with a related exchange of notes, was signed at Paris
on June 16, 1988, the text of which is hereto annexed;
The Senate of the United States of America by its
resolution of October 22, 1988, two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring therein, gave its advice and consent to
ratification, subject to the following understanding:
That the Treasury Department will effect the
negotiation of a new Protocol in an expeditious
manner with the objective of modifying the
dividend rates specified in paragraph 2 of
Article 9 (Dividends) to deny inappropriate
relief from taxation at source on dividends paid
by Regulated Investment Companies, Real Estate
Investment Trusts, and any other U.S.
corporations that essentially receive conduit
treatment for U.S. income tax purposes.
The Protocol, with a related exchange of notes, subject to
the said understanding, was ratified by the President of the
United States of America on November 28, 1988, in pursuance of
the advice and consent of the Senate:
Each of the Contracting States notified the other
Contracting State in writing, through diplomatic channels, upon
the completion of its respective constitutional procedures to
brina the Protocol into force, and accordingly the Protocol,
with a related exchange of notes, subject to the said
understanding, entered into force on December 29, 1988,
effective in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, George Bush, President of the United
States of America, proclaim and make public the Protocol, with
an exchange of notes, subject to the said understanding, to the
end that it be observed and fulfilled with good faith on and
after December 29, 1988, by the United States of America and by
the citizens of the United States of America and all other
persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed this proclamation and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
DONE at the city of Washington
our Lord one thousand
nine hundred eighty-nine
and of the Independence
of the United States of
America the two hundred
thirteenth.
By the President:
Secretary of State
100TH CONGRESS
2d Session
}
SENATE
{
TREATY Doc.
100-21
PROTOCOL TO THE 1967 TAX CONVENTION
WITH FRANCE
MESSAGE
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING
THE PROTOCOL OF JUNE 16, 1988, TOGETHER WITH A RELATED
EXCHANGE OF NOTES, TO THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND PROPERTY OF JULY
28, 1967, AS AMENDED BY THE PROTOCOLS OF OCTOBER 12, 1970,
NOVEMBER 24, 1978 AND JANUARY 17, 1984
AUGUST 1, 1988.-Protocol was read the first time, and together with the
accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
19-118
WASHINGTON : 1988
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
THE WHITE HOUSE, August 1, 1988.
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratifica-
tion, the Protocol to the Convention between the United States of
America and the French Republic with respect to Taxes on Income
and Property of July 28, 1967, as amended by the Protocols of Octo-
ber 12, 1970, November 24, 1978, and January 17, 1984, which Pro-
tocol and related exchange of notes were signed at Paris on June
16, 1988. I also transmit for the information of the Senate the
report of the Department of State with respect thereto.
The main purpose of the Protocol is to modify the Convention to
take into account the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In
addition, the Protocol will permit France to exempt U.S. citizens
resident in France from French tax on their U.S.-source invest-
ment income.
It is most desirable that this Protocol, together with the related
exchange of notes, be considered by the Senate as soon as possible
and that the Senate give advice and consent to ratification.
RONALD REAGAN.
(III)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
2802
CONFIDENTIAL
April 20, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
FROM:
BARRY F. LOWENKRON BM
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to the Polish-American
Congress
At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Shirley Green requesting her
to send a Presidential message to Edward Moskal, President of the
American Polish Congress. Attached is a suggested draft (Tab A)
and the incoming from the State Department (Tab B).
Bob Blackwill concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the attached memorandum and forward it along with
the State Department's draft letter to Shirley Green.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Hughes Memorandum to Green
Tab A
Draft Presidential Response
Tab B
Incoming
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By It NARA, Date 5/11/11
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
2802
MEMORANDUM FOR SHIRLEY GREEN
FROM:
G. PHILIP HUGHES
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to Polish-American Congress
The National Security Council would appreciate your office
sending a Presidential letter to Edward Moskal, the President of
the Polish-American Congress. A suggested draft, supplied by the
State Department and cleared by the NSC, is at Tab A.
Attachment
Tab A
State Department Draft of Presidential Message
Dear Mr. Moskal:
I know how pleased you and the Polish American Congress are
at the steps the Polish people have been taking in recent weeks
toward greater freedom and democracy. It was a pleasure seeing
you in Hamtramck on April 17 on such a hopeful occasion.
Despite years of oppression, the Polish people have never
accepted a system imposed from outside. Solidarity has
remained true to its ideals and steadfast in promoting them.
The courage, strength and wisdom of the Polish people have been
rewarded with a success. Because American Polonia has stood
with Solidarity through all the hard years, in a real sense
this is your success too.
The Polish people still face a long, tough road ahead in
their struggle for freedom and prosperity. As I said in
Hamtramck, I want to do what I can to help this brave and
worthy effort. I know you do as well.
The Polish American Congress has made a real contribution
to U.S. policy toward Poland, and never more than in recent
weeks. I wish to thank you for that. I look forward to
continued work with the Polish American Congress in support of
our shared goals of democracy and prosperity for Poland.
With best wishes,
George Bush
Mr. Edward J. Moskal, President,
The Polish American Congress,
1200 North Ashland Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois.
8908344
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
2802
CONFIDENTIAL
April 18, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Presidential Letter to the President of the
Polish American Congress, Edward Moskal
The Polish American Congress, the largest Polish community
organization in the United States, has been strongly supportive
of U.S. policy toward Poland. We have worked closely with PAC
representatives in Washington. In meetings with you and in the
Department last month, PAC President Moskal urged the U.S. to
make a strong, positive response to the Roundtable Agreements
in Poland. He was present at the President's speech on Poland
in Hamtramck, Michigan on April 17. The PAC's continued
support will be important to the President's initiative.
We recommend the President send a short note to PAC
President Moskal. We have prepared a suggested text which
expresses appreciation for the PAC's past support and reaffirms
the Administration's intention to continue working with the
Polish American community in support of the Polish people and
Solidarity.
J. Stapleton Roy Pay
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Suggested note to PAC President Moskal
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2012-1569- MR
7/8/2013 MM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
2593
April 20, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT
ACX
CKWILL AND DEANE HOFFMANN
LOH
AAB
FROM:
ADRIAN BASORA AND TIM DEAL
SUBJECT:
Invitation to Attend the World Economic Forum on
May 17, 1989
An invitation for you to participate in a meeting of the World
Economic Forum on May 17 is attached at Tab II. You are asked to
discuss East-West relations and U.S. defense spending priorities
with 100 business leaders.
The World Economic Forum is a Swiss-registered foundation which
holds high-level conferences bringing together Ministers, senior
officials, academics and ranking businessmen for discussion of
current international problems. The annual meeting at Davos is
especially well known and regularly attracts U.S. cabinet
officers who carry on substantive discussions with their
counterparts on the margins of the regular meetings.
Given the timing, just before the President's NATO trip, and the
limited relevance of this forum for a statement on defense and
strategic issues, we recommend that you decline.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the letter of regret attached at Tab I.
Approve Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Letter of Regret
Tab II
Incoming
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Ms. Bidwell:
Your invitation to join in the World
Economic Forum's National Meeting
discussions this year is very much
appreciated. Unfortunately, due to an
extremely busy schedule, I will be unable
to attend. May I extend my best wishes
for a successful forum.
Sincerely,
Brent Scowcroft
Ms. Gail Bidwell
Member of the Executive Board
World Economic Forum
53 chemin des Hauts-Crets
1223 Cologny
Geneva, Switzerland
World Economic
Discussion w/you on
Wed, May 17
staff
Forum (Gail Bidwell)
strategic considerations of
(afternoon)
you
East-West relations & US
recommed
defense-spending priorities
Yes
No
Lion
in DC.
FORC
Per General Scowcroft,
please provide information
on this forum/group and
your recommendation re
Paul Smy be
accept/regret.
Geneva
Dona
4122-360.843
Invitation to join the World Economic Forum's N:
Washington D.C. 17-18 May 1989
Dear General Cy Florence
The World Economic Forum will hold its yearly private discussions on the United States
this May in Washington. It will be a particularly important occasion next spring at the beginning
of the new Administration.
It is with particular pleasure that I invite you to join Administration and Congressional
leaders as well as chief executives from the world over at this meeting.
We would be most honoured if you could
The 100 business leaders present would particularly
The discussions would be completely informal and in private; thus, no prepared statement
would be necessary.
I hope your agenda will permit you to join us during the afternoon of the 17th.
With kind regards, I remain
Sincerely yours,
Gail Bidwell
Member Bidnell ofthe Executive Board
WORLD
ECONOMIC
FORUM
THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS
HAVE JOINED DISCUSSIONS AT OUR RECENT MEETINGS
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Attorney-General
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
The US Trade Representative
Senators Lloyd Bentsen, Bill Bradley, Dale Bumpers,
John Danforth, Robert Dole, David Durenberger, Jake Garn,
John Heinz, Nancy Kassebaum, Warren Rudman
Congressmen Don Bonker, Bill Frenzel, Edward Markey, Charles Schumer
Members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Chairmen of the Commissions (SEC, FTC, ITC, etc)
Geneva Meetings
Sectoral academies and
informal gatherings
The foundation's Geneva Meetings are a prac-
In its sectoral academies, the World Economic
tical mechanism for its members to meet, in a
Forum brings together the world's best minds
very private and personalized way in Geneva,
and most important decision-makers in specific
the economic decision-makers of key industri-
economic (sectoral) fields - from business,
alizing countries.
government and academia - in a joint effort to
understand, and possibly shape, the future in a
These one-day meetings are also a systematic
spirit of far-reaching concern and with a sense
opportunity for ministers from developing
of worldwide responsibility.
countries to explain their new economic policies
and measures, and to receive, in a confidential
Members of the foundation benefit from the
and frank way, the reactions of the international
research and feedback from the deliberations
business community.
of all the sectoral academies.
Because the meetings include individual con-
versations with the minister, they are particu-
larly important for the furthering of business
Informal gatherings are distinctive initiatives
projects and partnerships.
of the World Economic Forum. They are usu-
ally held in parallel to the Annual Meeting in
Davos, and bring together a highly select group
of world political/economic leaders to examine
mutual concerns in a "fireside" atmosphere,
in the interest of the world economic com-
munity.
The foundation's non-commercial and impartial
character, and the confidence it is accorded,
have made it a welcome partner in these ini-
tiatives, which have a significant international
impact.
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has seen
April 20, 1989
B
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT BLACKWILL RB
FROM:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR
SUBJECT:
Dates for a possible Presidential visit to Poland
and Hungary
The Germans have informed us in confidence that Chancellor Kohl
has proposed to the Poles that he visit immediately after the
Economic Summit (July 18-21). As you know, we were considering a
Presidential visit to Poland after the Economic Summit which
takes place July 15-16. The Kohl visit now takes away the option
of going to Poland following the summit since the President
8.91
should not follow Kohl in Poland. The President could go to
Poland and Hungary before the Summit, perhaps July 12-13. We
still think that a visit to Poland and Hungary during this trip
is a good idea but wanted to bring this potential conflict to
your attention.
Tim Deal concurs.
Please note the crosshatch attacted at Tabl.
State is recommending that we ask the Germans
to wait until are make adecusion. we don't
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Think That this is appropriate but we should
Declassify
on: OADR give some thought soon to the timing of a Presidential
risit. CR
4/21/89
DECLASSIFIED
@ a 1445
PER E.O. 13526
09-0993-MR
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State Proposed Cable
SECRET
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2009-0993-UA
EUR/EEYIJWSWIHART
Min 10/26/2015
04/19/89 647-4136 WANG 2374A
EUR:RLRIDGWAY
EUR:TUSIMONS, JR.
P:BURTON
S/S:JCOLLINS
NSC:
S/S-O:EREDDICK
C:NBURNS
EUR EUR/EEY
IMMEDIATE BONN
MODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADK
JWS
TAGS: PREL, GE, PL
TUS 88
JC CR
SUBJECT: THE CHANCELLOR'S VISIT TO POLAND
NOX
-
REF: BONN 12326
1. & - ENTIRE TEXT
2. PLEASE TELL TELTSCHIK WE APPRECIATE HIS ADVISING US OF
THE CHANCELLOR'S PROPOSED VISIT TO WARSAW (JULY 15-217.
A PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO POLAND and HUNGARY IN CONJ INCTION
WITH THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION I'd THE
DEPARTMENT BUT NO FORMAL PROPOSAL HAS YET BEEN MADE TO
THE PRESIDENT, THOUGH IF A POSITIVE RECOMMENDATION IS
MADE WE WOULD EXPECT A RAPID WHITE HOUSE DECISION. WE OF
COURSE WISH TO AVOID ANY CONFLICT WITH THE CHANCELLOR.
GIVEN THE SCHEDULING LIMITATIONS SURROUNDING THE ECONOMIC
SUMMIT, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE FRG
IN ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE POLES COULD HOLD OFF
AGREEMENT ON DATES UNTIL THE PRESIDENT HAS CONSIDERED THE
QUESTION. WE WILL LET YOU KNOW OF OUR INTENTIONS IN THIS
REGARD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THROUGH THE SAME CHANNEL. WE
RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTY OF THIS APPROACH FOR THE GERMANS
BUT IF IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO NAIL DOWN DATES
NOW, YY WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT VERY MUCH.
SECRET
SECRET
Blackwill
problem
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
2902
April 20, 1989
&
MEETING WITH SECRETARY CHENEY
DATE: April 21, 1989
d
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 10:15 a.m. - 11:00 a.m.
RH
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT B
Ex
I. PURPOSE
To discuss further budget issues and options with
nk
Secretary Cheney for Strategic Modernization.
II. BACKGROUND
You have had several meetings on this subject recently.
This meeting will allow provide time for further
discussions on this issue.
III. PARTICIPANTS
The President, the Vice President, Secretary Cheney,
Governor Sununu, General Scowcroft and Robert Gates.
IV. PRESS PLAN
White House photographer only.
V. SEQUENCE
Oval Office discussions.
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
UNCLASSIFIED w/
SECRET ATTACHMENT
April 20, 1989
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
ROBERT BLACKWILL
RB
THROUGH:
FROM:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE
CR
SUBJECT:
Draft NSD on the Soviet Union
As promised, this is a rough first-cut at a National Security
Directive on the Soviet Union. We look forward to discussing the
NSD with you Friday morning.
Once we have received your initial comments, we will coordinate
the draft NSD within the NSC staff. We asked the senior
directors to provide contributions on pending Presidential
decisions that impact on U.S. -Soviet relations. We have drawn on
those suggestions in drafting the NSD.
Attachment:
TAB I Draft NSD
UNCLASSIFIED w/
SECRET ATTACHMENT
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SECRET
National Security Directive on U.S.-Soviet Relations
For forty years the United States has committed its power and
will to containment of the military and ideological threat of
Soviet communism. Containment was never an end in itself; it was
a strategy born of the conditions of the postwar world. The
United States recognized that, while Soviet military power was
not the only threat to international stability, it was the most
immediate. The U.S. challenge was to prevent the spread of
Soviet communism long enough to rebuild the economic, political
and social strength of the world's long-standing and new
democracies. Those who crafted the strategy of containment
believed that the Soviet Union, denied the easy course of
external expansion, would ultimately have to face and react to
the internal contradictions of an inefficient, repressive and
inhumane system.
This strategy provided an enduring pillar for the growth of
Western democracy and free enterprise. Many of the goals of
containment have been met. But the military capability of the
Soviet Union has not diminished. Rather, in the last two
decades, the Soviet Union has increased its military power across
the spectrum of capabilities, drawing on that power to conduct a
global foreign policy based on intimidation, subversion and
consistent opposition to Western interests.
A new era may be upon us, one in which we can move beyond
containment to a U.S. policy that actively promotes a
restructuring of the Soviet Union's relationship with the
international system through the demilitarization of Soviet
foreign policy. The U.S.S.R. has signaled its desire for
rapprochement with and integration into the family of nations.
The Soviet leadership has criticized major tenets of its postwar
political-military policy and sounded the need for Soviet new
thinking.
These are words that we can only applaud. But a new relationship
with the international system can neither simply be declared by
Moscow nor can it be granted by others. It must be earned and
reinforced by consistently benign Soviet behavior. We cannot
react to reforms and changes in the Soviet Union that have not
yet taken place. We must challenge the Soviet Union to behave in
accordance with the high standards of conduct that the Soviet
leadership itself has enunciated. American vigilance is
especially important in a period of uncertainty in order to
minimize the inescapable risks associated with change.
We seek fundamental alterations in Soviet military force
structure, institutions and practices which can only be reversed
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at great costs, economically and politically, to the Soviet
Union. The United States will pursue a strategy in concert with
our allies that challenges the Soviet Union step by step, issue
by issue and institution by institution to create the conditions
that will support a sustained and cooperative Soviet relationship
with ourselves, with our allies, and with the international
community. Those conditions include:
A Soviet force posture that is smaller and much less
threatening. The United States believes that the Soviet
Union has legitimate security interests but Soviet military
power is far beyond that needed to defend those interests.
Recognition of the right of self-determination in East-
Central Europe and authoritative renunciation of military
intervention as an instrument of policy--for any reason.
Demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy in other regions
of the world and serious participation in efforts to
ameliorate conflict, including bringing pressure to bear on
Soviet clients who do not recognize the legitimate security
interests of their neighbors.
Participation in cooperative efforts to stop the
proliferation of ballistic missile technology and nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and the spread of terrorism.
Acceptance with the United States and the world community of
responsibility for addressing pressing global problems,
including the international trade in narcotics and dangers
to the environment.
Institutionalization of more democratic internal laws and
human rights practices, as well as the creation of economic
conditions, that will establish a firm Soviet domestic base
for a more productive and cooperative relationship with the
free nations of the world.
The United States will act reciprocally, though not always
symmetrically to build a more cooperative relationship with
Moscow. We do not feel compelled to react to every Soviet
initiative. But we are willing to engage the Soviet Union in
multilateral and bilateral negotiations on all of these matters
and, when appropriate, to take unilateral steps that support U.S.
objectives.
Strategic-Military Policy
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The United States must maintain modern defenses that strengthen
deterrence and enhance the security of our allies and friends.
The United States will seek to protect and sustain its military-
technological advantages. The purpose of our forces is not to
put pressure on a weak Soviet economy or to seek military
superiority. Rather, U.S. policy recognizes the need to provide
a hedge against uncertain longterm developments in the Soviet
Union and to impress upon the Soviet leadership that nothing can
be gained by turning back to a more militaristic course. Most
importantly, American forces are a reliable and credible
guarantee of our safety and of our commitment to the security of
our allies in the face of Soviet forces that, even after
restructuring, will be large and modern.
At the same time, the United States will seek verifiable arms
control agreements with the Soviet Union and its allies that:
Contribute to stability, including where desirable at lower
numerical levels, and encourage restructuring of Soviet
forces to a less threatening force posture.
Increase transparency through confidence building measures
and appropriate contacts between the military officers of
the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, the
Soviet Defense Minister and the Secretary of Defense should
meet annually to exchange information on defense plans.
Political-Diplomatio Policy
Regional Issues
American regional policy has encouraged democratic political
reform and free enterprise. These objectives have been supported
by security cooperation between the United States and its allies
in the regions, aimed both at arresting the encroachment of
Soviet power and at maintaining regional military stability. We
recognize that the solution of regional problem rests importantly
with the indigenous parties to the conflicts and that poverty and
underdevelopment must be addressed in order to promote longterm
stability. But the Soviet Union has inflamed regional tensions
and fueled conflicts, supporting anti-Western political groups
through military assistance, proxy forces and, in some cases,
direct Soviet intervention.
Recently, the Soviet leadership has signaled willingness to turn
to a more cooperative course. I direct that U.S.-Soviet
discussions be resumed at all levels, expert working groups,
SECRET
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Ministerial and when appropriate between myself and President
Gorbachev on regional problems.
The Soviets must take into account interests of our regional
allies who are threatened by Soviet arms shipments and political
support of states that do not recognize the legitimate security
interests of their neighbors. We challenge the Soviet Union to:
Cease arms shipments to Nicaragua, whose armed forces
outnumber the combined armies of all others in Central
America. Moscow should carry out its pledge to cease
attempts to export revolution, and insist that its clients
do the same. We do not recognize symmetry of interests
between the United States and the Soviet Union in Latin
America. The Soviets should know that their behavior in
Central America will affect the U.S. -Soviet relationship as
a whole.
Respect the legitimate security concerns of Israel and other
states of the Middle East by a more restrained military
assistance program to Syria and Libya, and by demonstrating
diplomatically its desire to assist in the peace process.
Demilitarize and return the Northern Territories to Japan as
a manifestation of a new Soviet policy that recognizes the
legitimate interests of Soviet neighbors and seeks to undo
historical wrongs.
Take account of the legitimate security concerns of the
Republic of Korea and to act on the Soviet Union's own
expressed goal of diminishing tensions on the Korean
peninsula by slowing its efforts to modernize the North
Korean armed forces.
Second, we are ready to seek joint, cooperative diplomatic
solutions to ameliorate regional tensions and promote stability.
We ask the Soviet Union to join with us in:
Discussing the problems of stability in the Persian Gulf.
Moving with dispatch to conclude a negotiated settlement to
the situation in Cambodia.
Accelerating work toward the implementation of the accords
on Namibia.
Relieving the human suffering in the Horn of Africa caused
by civil war and famine.
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Cooperating with the United States to explore ways to
contribute to stability in Southern Africa, including the
achievement of national reconciliation in Angola.
Third, we challenge the Soviet Union to join us in addressing the
poverty that contributes to regional instability.
Supporting U.S. efforts to restructure the relief agencies
of the United Nations SO that they are more efficient and
effective. The United States has carried the heaviest
burden of support for UN agencies for forty years.
Promoting the efforts of the United States and the
international economic agencies to encourage privatization
and the institution of free market principles which are
ultimately the basis for economic prosperity in developing
countries.
Transnational
The United States and the Soviet Union have an opportunity to
work together to address some of the pressing problems of the
globe. We share an interest in arresting the proliferation of
chemical, nuclear and biological weapons and ballistic missile
technology and in preventing terrorism; and in slowing the spread
of narcotics. The United States challenges the Soviet Union to
strengthen international regimes and safeguards against these
threats to the security and stability of the international
system. The United States must ensure that joint -Soviet
efforts are in these areas are carefully structured SO that the
security of the United States and its allies is not compromised.
Because of the sensitivity of these issues, I direct the
appropriate interagency committees to develop a detailed plan
stating the boundaries of cooperation with the Soviet Union on
these matters and a strategy for implementation.
U.S. -Soviet discussions should begin at the appropriate level to
explore joint efforts for protection of the environment and for
the establishment of agreed international standards and
safeguards for that purpose. The United States is a leader in
implementing strict national standards against pollution and
disruption of the environment. Because environmental destruction
knows no boundaries, the Soviet Union must address its national
practices and those of its allies if it is to support a claim to
a role in custodianship of the planet. I direct the National
Space Council to examine ways that the United States and the
Soviet Union might jointly use space to conduct research on
threats to the environment.
Economic Relations
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It is incumbent on the Soviet Union to create the domestic
conditions that would support normal economic relations with the
United States. Internally, the Soviet Union has begun to move
toward a less centralized economic system. If those reforms
succeed in creating an environment more congenial to free
enterprise, sufficient to attract private American investment
and/or commerce, the United States government will encourage the
expansion of those ties. Similarly, when the Soviet Union's
internal economic practices are consistent with the principles of
the international economic institutions, the United States will
consider Soviet entry into them.
I direct appropriate agencies to undertake a study of U.S. -Soviet
economic relations and in particular to make recommendations on
the following:
Whether to waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment as a test of
Soviet willingness to sustain significant emigration.
Whether to streamline the COCOM list.
Whether to subsidize trade and extend credits to the Soviet
Union.
Democratization
The United States is encouraged by emerging trends in the
internal process of democratization in the Soviet Union.
Ultimately, we place our hope for a cooperative and peaceful
relationship in the transformation of the Soviet system to one
that is more humane and democratic. Our concern about the
character of the Soviet system is, in many ways, at the heart of
our differences with Moscow. The threat that the Soviet Union
poses to the U.S. is in part a consequence of a system that
denies its people basic political and economic liberties and
pursues an aggrandizing policy abroad, free of democratic
constraints. To the extent that Soviet practices are modified
and institutions are built based on popular will, we may find
that the nature of the threat itself has changed though this
transformation would likely take decades. Where possible, the
United States should promote Western values and ideas within the
Soviet Union, not in the spirit of provocation, but as a means to
lay a firm foundation for a cooperative relationship. We
challenge the Soviet Union to:
Follow-through on commitments that led to our agreement to
the 1991 Moscow human rights conference.
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Increase institutional safeguards for civil, political,
religious and economic liberties.
Create institutions to manage equitably the distribution of
power, provide systemic checks and balances and end the
monopoly of the Communist Party.
Allow free emigration of peoples.
Promote the peaceful evolution of a new relationship between
the peoples of the Soviet Union.
Move toward the establishment of a free economic market,
including decentralized economic decision-making.
Public Diplomacy
The United States should make every effort to clearly and
responsibly communicate our message about U.S. -Soviet relations
at home and abroad. Our goal is a consistent and sustainable
policy toward Moscow. We must present our policy in this light
and stress its comprehensiveness as well as the fact that the
relationship is moving forward on the basis of a long supported
Western agenda to which the Soviet Union is now adapting.
Conclusion
The goal of restructuring the relationship of the Soviet Union to
the international system is as ambitious a task as containment
was in its time. The responsibility for creating the conditions
for the integration of the Soviet Union into the family of
nations lies first and foremost with Moscow. But the United
States will do its part, together with our allies to test Soviet
intentions, and while maintaining our strength, to attempt to
place Soviet relations with the West on a firmer, more
cooperative course than has heretofore been possible in the
postwar era.
SECRET
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CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 8902896
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 20 APR 89 18
TO: PRESIDENT
FROM: KOHL, HELMUT
DOC DATE: 20 APR 89
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: HS
GERMANY FR
BS
been
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: SYMPATHY LTR FM KOHL RE ACCIDENT ON THE IOWA
ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION
DUE DATE: 24 APR 89
STATUS: S
STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCIF:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
HUTCHINGS
BLACKWILL
HUGHES
RODMAN
WORKING
COMMENTS: ORIGINAL GIVEN TO HUGHES/GATES
NFAR RLH
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSTAS
CLOSED BY:
DOC 1 OF 1
DECLASSIFIED
CONF IDENTIAL
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By It NARA, Date 5/11/11
EMBASSY
2896
OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
In the absence of Ambassador Ruhfus I have the honor
to transmit to you the following message from Chancellor
Helmut Kohl:
"Sehr geehrter Herr Praesident, lieber George,
mit grosser Betroffenheit habe ich von dem schweren
Explosionsunglueck auf dem Schlachtschiff "Iowa" erfahren.
Ich spreche Ihnen und den Angehörigen der Toten mein tief-
empfundenes Beileid aus.
Mein Mitgefühl gilt auch den bei diesem Unglück ver-
letzten Soldaten und ihren Familienangehörigen.
In Verbundenheit
Ihr
Helmut Kohl
Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. "
A courtesy translation is attached.
Respectfully yours,
Kaul Th. Parche
Karl Th. Paschke
Minister
Washington, D.C., April 20, 1989
The President
The White House
COURTESY TRANSLATION
Dear Mr. President, dear George:
To my great sorrow I have learnt of the tragic
explosion on the battleship "Iowa". I want to express
to you and the relatives of the perished my deep felt
condolences.
My thoughts are also with the sailors who were
injured in this accident, and their families.
With sympathy,
Sincerely yours,
Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
EMBASSY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20007
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
CONFIDENTIAL
Chan File
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
SYSTEM II
20353
April 21, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
Nati Sec Advisor
has seen
THROUGH:
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL P3
FROM:
BARRY F. LOWENKRON
Bn
SUBJECT:
Additional National Security Reviews
In response to our discussions on the possible need for
additional National Security Reviews, we have considered a range
of topics and have decided to recommend the following:
NATO Southern Flank. The declining political fortunes of both
Turkish Prime Minister Ozal and Greek Prime Minister Papandreou,
coupled with the ever-present Aegean disputes, argue for a fresh
look at our policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Our position
on the Cyprus dispute -- with the unrealistic settlement date of
June 1989 that was set by the two Cypriot leaders -- will be
treated in this larger study as well.
Scandinavia. We need to examine the issues defining the
political-security relationship in NATO's northern flank. These
Their
include: continued Scandinavian interest in an arms control
regime for SLCMs, and in naval arms limitations and confidence
building measures; and the possibility of Gorbachev making a
dramatic security gesture in the north similar to last years'
announcement of unilateral arms reductions. The changing
seid
relationship with Greenland -- an issue where inter-agency debate
already exists -- will be addressed.
There are three additional issues which we feel should be
examined, but that can be folded into existing reviews.
The Economic Dimension of U.S.-Soviet Relations. The tasking for
studies on this issue could be incorporated in the NSD on U.S.
Policy toward the Soviet Union.
Soviet "New Thinking" Toward the United Nations. We would urge
that this topic be fully addressed in any NSR on US policies
toward the United Nations.
Soviet Policy toward the Third World. Because of the myriad
Soviet foreign policy interests and objectives, we do not feel
that this topic can be satisfactorily isolated in an a separate
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NSR. Rather, we would strongly recommend that the Soviet
dimension be factored into all relevant regional reviews
currently underway. There are two studies which we considered,
but decided against recommending for NSRs.
The future of Germany. There are is no shortage of questions that
can be addressed in evaluating the course of German foreign and
domestic policies. However, we rejected the idea of a separate
ok
NSR because of the extreme sensitivity of the topic, and the
damage to our bilateral relationship should the review become
public knowledge. Independent of the NSR process, we will be
forwarding to you our assessment of the issues dominating the
German landscape along with specific policy recommendations.
Canada. Several major bilateral issues have been resolved (e.g.,
ok
passage of the Free Trade Agreement, compromise on the Northwest
Passage Dispute). Our current bilateral agenda will be dominated
by acid rain and FTA implementation -- important issues -- but
not ones that merit a National Security Review.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
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Dep Exec
Philip Hughes
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
89 APR 28 APR 28 Ag: IS
Philip Hughes
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat
1
N
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
NSCS
Pres made call on
22 Apr 89
4/28
AC
This was
forwarded Pres to
PROOFED BY:
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2000
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
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PRS
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$
Philip Hughes
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Brent Scowcroft
Philip Hughes
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NSC Secretariat
/
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A - Action
is
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&
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1 6 I
cc:
VP
Sunumm
COMMENTS
(Dete/Time)
Peed madephe call
4/22/89
Clou out.
NBP
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
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2941 add-on
Natl Sec Advisor
has seen
April 21, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
RB
He
THROUGH:
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER
FROM:
PHILIP ZELIKOW p2
SUBJECT:
Talking Points for the President's Telephone Call
to Prime Minister Thatcher on SNF
Secretary Baker has requested changes in the above-described
talking points. A new set of talking points incorporating his
suggestions is attached at Tab I. At Tab II we have attached a
markup of the old talking points, indicating what has been
changed. We do not think these changes pose a problem.
Recommendation
That you replace the talking points previously furnished to the
President for this phone call with the new points, attached at
Tab I, incorporating Secretary Baker's comments.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I - - New Talking Points for the President's Phone Call
to Prime Minister Thatcher
Tab II - - Markup of Previous Talking Points Indicating
Changes Made by Secretary Baker
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By It NARA Date 5/11/11
SECRET
Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher
--
You know that the German coalition has adopted proposed
concepts on the subject of SNF and that Genscher and
Stoltenberg will come here on Monday to discuss these German
ideas.
--
You have their language, and the substance of these ideas
is, of course, very bad. (The German paper:
--
calls for early SNF negotiations on missiles and
artillery shells;
--
leaves open the possibility of a third zero for all SNF
systems;
--
treats development of the follow-on to Lance as a
purely U.S. decision;
--
postpones any decision on Lance follow-on, including
whether it is necessary at all, until 1992.)
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--
Moreover, we are concerned about the unilateral way in which
the Germans have been proceeding on this issue.
--
In determining the essential elements in a commitment to
modernize the land-based missile force, a pledge to keep
systems up to date where necessary should suffice and
realistically is the most we can probably expect to get --
as it was at Brussels last year.
--
The situation has since deteriorated and, in any event,
specific decisions on deployment can wait until 1991.
--
That notion is consistent with the points your government
has passed to us. We will try to achieve with the Germans
the point that your government suggested, to the effect that
the Alliance should express its support for the continuation
of the necessary development work.
--
I continue to believe that SNF negotiations at this time
would be a grave mistake. Any such negotiations would
depend, among other things, upon concrete results from the
conventional negotiations in Vienna.
SECRET
SECRET
--
We will, of course, inform you of the tenor and results of
our discussions with Genscher and Stoltenberg in order to
prepare you for your own meeting with Kohl.
--
You are an old hand at NATO Summits. This is the opening
Summit of my Administration. I know you agree it must be a
success. We cannot afford to have it dominated by
discussions on SNF. We must have the SNF issue settled well
before then.
SECRET
SECRET
Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher
--
You know that the German coalition has adopted proposed
concepts on the subject of SNF and that Genscher and
Stoltenberg will come here on Monday to discuss these German
ideas.
They:
-- call for early SNF negotiations on missiles and
artillery shells;
-- leave open the possibility of a third zero for all SNF
systems;
-- treat development of the follow-on to Lance as a purely
U.S. decision;
-- postpone any decision on Lance follow-on, including
whether it is necessary at all, until 1992.
)
you have their language, and
--
The substance of these ideas is, of course, very bad
--
Moreover, we are concerned about the unilateral way in which
the Germans have been proceeding on this issue.
SECRET
SECRET
- - The situation has deteriorated since then and, in any event, specific
decisions on deployment can wait until 1991.
--
In determining the essential elements in a commitment to
modernize the land-based missile force, a pledge to keep
where necessary
systems up to date should suffice Specific decisions on
deployment can wait until 1991
and realistically is the most we can
probably expect to get -- as it was
ct Brussels last year.
That notion is consistent with the points your government
try to achieve with the Germans
has passed to us. We will ilso be making ^ the point to the
that your government
to the effect
Germans, as you suggested, that the Alliance should express
its support for the continuation of the necessary
development work.
--
I continue to believe that SNF negotiations at this time
would be a grave mistake. Any such negotiations would
depend, among other things, upon concrete results from the
conventional negotiations in Vienna.
--
We will, of course, inform you of the tenor and results of
our discussions with Genscher and Stoltenberg in order to
prepare you for your own meeting with Kohl.
-- You are an old hand at NATO Summits. This is the opening
Summit of my Administration. I know you agree it must be a
SECRET
SECRET
success. We cannot afford to have it dominated by
discussions on SNF. We must have the SNF issue settled well
before then.
SECRET
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY: REB
LOG #
2941
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
RRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
as
A/O
Donley Bob Perito
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
1
MD
A
Philip Hughes
2
APT
Bob Gates
3
8
Brent Scowcroft
4
Philip Hughes
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
5
CM /20
D
NSC Secretariat
6
N
As Action
I - information
D - Dispatch
R = Retain
N - No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
Thatcher Telephone Call Caprie 22)
(Date/Time)
Nscls
This one not
forwarded to
Pres - see revised
versun
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
2941
April 21, 1989
Nati Sec Advisor
has seen
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT D. BLACRWILL/ARNOLD RB
N3 GANTER
FROM:
PHILIP ZELIKOW p2
SUBJECT:
Recommended Telephone Call to Prime Minister
Thatcher
We have attached talking points (at Tab A) for the President's
call to Prime Minister Thatcher. They have been cleared by
State, OSD, and JCS.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Points to be Made
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
White House Guidelines
Declassify on: OADR
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b). September 11, 2006
By It NARA, Date 5/11/11
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
2941
April 21, 1989
FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT BD
SUBJECT:
Recommended Telephone Call
TO:
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
DATE:
Saturday, April 22, 1989
PURPOSE:
To exchange views on the SNF issue in
light of the planned April 24 visit
of the FRG Foreign and Defense Ministers
to Washington.
SECURE OR OPEN:
Open
INTERPRETER:
None
PHONE NUMBER:
011 44 1 222 8141 (ask for Chequers)
CONTACT PERSON:
Mr. Charles Powell (at Chequers)
TIME DIFFERENCE:
+ 5
SUGGESTED TIMES:
10:30 a.m. - 11:00 a.m. (Washington)
TOPIC OF DISCUSSION:
SNF
Date of Submission:
Action:
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
2012-1569-MR
7/8/2013 MM
SECRET
Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher
-- You know that the German coalition has adopted proposed
concepts on the subject of SNF and that Genscher and
Stoltenberg will come here on Monday to discuss these German
ideas. They:
-- call for early SNF negotiations on missiles and
artillery shells;
-- leave open the possibility of a third zero for all SNF
systems;
-- treat development of the follow-on to Lance as a purely
U.S. decision;
-- postpone any decision on Lance follow-on, including
whether it is necessary at all, until 1992.
--
The substance of these ideas is, of course, very bad.
-- Moreover, we are concerned about the unilateral way in which
the Germans have been proceeding on this issue.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010 -1113- MR
SCS 4/18/11
SECRET
-- In determining the essential elements in a commitment to
modernize the land-based missile force, a pledge to keep
systems up to date should suffice. Specific decisions on
deployment can wait until 1991.
-- That notion is consistent with the points your government
has passed to us. We will also be making the point to the
Germans, as you suggested, that the Alliance should express
its support for the continuation of the necessary
development work.
-- I continue to believe that SNF negotiations at this time
would be a grave mistake. Any such negotiations would
depend, among other things, upon concrete results from the
conventional negotiations in Vienna.
-- We will, of course, inform you of the tenor and results of
our discussions with Genscher and Stoltenberg in order to
prepare you for your own meeting with Kohl.
-- You are an old hand at NATO Summits. This is the opening
Summit of my Administration. I know you agree it must be a
SECRET
SECRET
success. We cannot afford to have it dominated by
discussions on SNF. We must have the SNF issue settled well
before then.
SECRET
BLACKWILL
alson
1905
THE WHITE HOUSE
l
WASHINGTON
April 20, 1989
N
RH
Dear John:
AB
Thank you for your letter reporting on your trip
to Poland and Hungary. Recent events in Poland
mK
bear out your sound judgments on the rapid pace
of change there. As one of the architects of
our successful policy in Eastern Europe, you
should be gratified by all that is taking place.
I remember my trip to Poland and Hungary fondly
and look forward to an opportunity to return
there when the time is right. Thank you for
taking the time to tell me of your trip and to
pass on the regards from General Jaruzelski and
General Secretary Grosz. We are looking into
the prospects of a Walesa visit now.
All the best in your new life an please take the
time to keep me informed of your thinking on
Eastern Europe.
Love to Namey Sincerely, Gr/
The Honorable John C. Whitehead
Chairman
AEA Investors, Inc.
Park Avenue Tower
65 East 55th Street
New York, New York 10022
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 1905
THE WHITE HOUSE
4/20/89
WASHINGTON
April 19, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
10
SUBJECT:
Letter from John Whitehead, Former Deputy
Secretary of State
Purpose
To respond to a letter from John Whitehead, former Deputy
Secretary of State, who has just returned from a trip to Poland
and Hungary.
Background
As you know, John Whitehead visited these countries when he was
in the government and did a great deal to advance our policy of
differentiation. He accompanied you on your trip to Eastern
Europe in 1987.
John comments on the changes in Poland and Hungary and calls them
a triumph for U.S. foreign policy. He also passes regards from
General Jaruzelski and notes that both Jaruzelski and Karoly
Grosz of Hungary hope that you will visit their countries soon.
Finally, he reports that Lech Walesa hopes to visit the United
States in the near future.
A reply from you to John Whitehead is attached at Tab A.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the attached letter.
Attachment
Tab A
Reply for Mr. Whitehead
Tab B
Letter from Mr. Whitehead
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
AEA INVESTORS INC.
JOHN C. WHITEHEAD
PARK AVENUE TOWER
CHAIRMAN
65 EAST 55TH STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022
TELEPHONE: 212/ 644-5900
March 13, 1989
The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Last week Nancy and I visited Poland and Hungary as
part of a Council on Foreign Relations trip. It was my
sixth visit in the last three years, the first unofficial
one, and not your normal honeymoon spot.
The changes taking place in both countries are
dramatic, particularly in Poland. The "Round Tables" are
scheduled to conclude later this month and free parliamen-
tary elections are scheduled for June. The decisions of the
Round Tables have already gone further than anyone believed
possible. They will move the country rapidly toward a
pluralistic democracy and a western-style, free-market
economic system. It represents a complete rejection of the
Soviet system and is the first step in the disintegration of
the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe. We will need to respond
more positively and more tangibly than we have done so far.
If we do, others in Eastern Europe will be encouraged to
follow Poland's lead. What's happening will be a triumph
for the U.S. and our foreign policy.
General Jaruzelski made a special point of sending you
his warm regards. He hopes very much that you will visit
Poland again soon, as does Karoly Grosz in Hungary. Your
visit later this year would give great encouragement to the
reform movement.
As always, I had a long visit also with Lech Walesa and
other Solidarity members. They are winning their peaceful
revolution! Walesa told me confidentially that he plans to
visit the U.S. in September at the invitation of the AFL-
CIO. You may want to consider issuing your own invitation
The Honorable George Bush
March 13, 1989
too. By then, developments in Poland may have been enough
to make it a truly triumphant occasion for him, not unlike
Mrs. Aquino's visit after her election. It is too soon to
think about a Jaruzelski visit, but a quiet visit by Prime
Minister Rakowski in the Fall might well be appropriate.
I hope that an occasional letter like this one is not
out of line. This public service business gets in your
blood and it is very hard to abandon it completely. I am
always at your service.
With warm regards to you both.
Sincerely,
John you C. Whitehead
CC: The Hon. James A. Baker III
The Hon. Brent Scowcroft
1905
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 6, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
ROBERT BLACKWILL
RB
FROM:
CONDOLEEZZA RICE
SUBJECT:
Letter from Former Deputy Secretary of State John
Whitehead Requesting that President Bush Visit
Poland and Hungary
Former Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead has written to the
President requesting that President Bush visit Poland and
Hungary. Mr. Whitehead has just returned from a trip to the two
countries as a member of a Council on Foreign Relations
delegation.
Mr. Whitehead makes several good points about developments in
Hungary and Poland, including the need to differentiate them from
their less reform minded neighbors in Eastern Europe.
The memorandum at Tab I from you to the President tells him of
Mr. Whitehead's letter and forwards a draft reply, at Tab A, for
the President's consideration. The reply thanks Mr. Whitehead
for his letter and tells him that the United States government is
encouraged by events in Poland and Hungary and that we are
looking at ways to express our policy of differentiation toward
them.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
Regista
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A
Reply for Mr. Whitehead
Tab II
Incoming