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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2019-1493-S
2019-1493-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
IF Transition Files
OA/ID Number:
99017
Folder ID Number:
99017-003
Folder Title:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
V
0
0
0
O
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Memorandum
For Grant Green From: Paul Schott Stevens
9/10/87
(b)(1)
S
Re: Request for Access to NSCID 1 and NSDD 207 (1 pp.)
02. Memorandum
For Paul Schott Stevens From: Nancy Menan
8/28/87
(b)(1)
Re: Request for Access (1 pp.)
03. Letter
For Mr Green From: Steven Garfinkel
7/6/87
(b)(1)
C
Re: Advisory Notice (3 pp.)
04. Memorandum
For Christopher Hicks From: Robert Kimmitt
4/1/85
(b)(1)
C
Re: Security (1 pp.)
05. Paper
Re: US Intelligence Community Physical Security Standards (10
n.d.
(b)(1)
pp.)
06. Memorandum
For Edward Wilson From: Paul Thompson
11/1/84
(b)(1)
C
Re: Security Requirements (1 pp.)
07. Memorandum
For Security Officer From: Technical Security Division
1/18/84
(b)(1)
C
Re: Security Survey (3 pp.)
08. Memorandum
For John Brady From: Mary Dix
9/26/84
(b)(1)
C
Re: Justification of Sole Source Procurement (1 pp.)
09. Form
Procurement File Copy (1 pp.)
9/26/84
(b)(1)
Page 1 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Pinksheet Number:
MB14496
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2019-1493-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
10. Memorandum For Paul Thompson
3/7/85
(b)(1)
Re: Status of Security Upgrade (2 pp.)
11.
Memorandum
For Distribution list
3/27/87
(b)(1)
Re: Promulgation of Policy re Visa Applications for Personnel
Assigned to the USSR (2 pp.)
12.
Memorandum
For Robert McFarlane From: Paula Dobriansky
12/10/85
(b)(1)
S
Re: Imposition of Travel Restrictions (2 pp.)
13. Memorandum
For Robert McFarlane From: Nicholas Platt
12/2/85
(b)(1)
S
Re: Imposition of Travel Restrictions (1 pp.)
14. Paper
Re: NSDD 196 - Counterintelligence/Countermeasure
11/1/85
(b)(1)
S
Implementation Task Force (5 pp.)
Page 2 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Pinksheet Number:
MB14496
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2019-1493-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
PUBLIC LAW 100-202
H.J. Res. 395
One hundredth Congress of the Anited States of America
AT THE FIRST SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the sixth day of January,
one thousand nine hundred and eighty-seven
Joint Resolution
OFFICE or THE FEDERAL REGISTER
Making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year
1988, and for other purposes.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
EMPLOYEE DISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS
630. No funds appropriated in this resolution or any other act
CLUI
for fiscal year 1988 may be used to implement or enforce the
agreements in Standard Forms 189 and 4193 of the Government or
any other nondisclosure policy, form or agreement if such
policy, form or agreement:
(1) concerns information other than that specifically
marked as classified; or, unmarked but known by the employee to
be classified; or, unclassified but known by the employee to be
in the process of a classification determination;
(2) contains the term 'classifiable';
(3) directly or indirectly obstructs, by requirement of
prior written authorization, limitation of authorized
disclosure, or otherwise, the right of any individual to
petition or communicate with Members of Congress in a secure
manner as provided by the rules and procedures of the
Congress;
(4) interferes with the right of the Congress to obtain
executive branch information in a secure manner as provided by
the rules and procedures of the Congress:
(5) imposes any obligations or invokes any remedies
inconsistent with statutory law!
Provided, that nothing in this section shall affect the
111
enforcement of those aspects of such nondisclosure policy, form
or agreement that do not fall within subsections (1)-(5)
above. of this Section
9155
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
December 17, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR STEVEN GARFINKEL
Director
Information Security Oversight Office
SUBJECT:
NSC Staff Answers to Representative Sikorski's
Questions Submitted to ISOO Regarding SF 189
Enclosed is a copy of our modified answers to Representative
Sikorski's questions regarding SF 189. You will note that we
have changed our answers to questions II.3 and III.4.
As I indicated in our earlier conversation, only ISOO's answers
should be provided to Representative Sikorski.
Rostow
Assistant to the President
and Legal Adviser
Attachment
NSC ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS REGARDING STANDARD FORM 189
I.
Basis and Need for Nondisclosure Agreements
Question 6: Who in the National Security Council (NSC) authored
SF 189? Who in the NSC reviewed and approved the nondisclosure
agreement? Who in the Department of Justice reviewed the form
before and since its release?
Answer:
The National Security Council (NSC) staff was not the author of
SF 189.
National Security Advisor William P. Clark approved SF 189 for
the President on August 10, 1983.
II. Implementation of SF 189
Question 2: How many employees without security clearances have
signed SF 189? What was the legal authority to require
signatures by employees without security clearances? Is this
practice still continuing?
Answer:
None.
Question 3: Were Oliver North, Fawn Hall, or William Casey at
any time required to sign a nondisclosure agreement? If not, why
not? If so, what agreement, and what enforcement actions have
been taken, or investigations opened, to hold Messrs. Casey and
North and Ms. Hall, accountable for their potential violations of
the nondisclosure agreement they signed?
Answer:
LtCol Oliver North and Ms. Fawn Hall signed Standard Form 189s,
Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreements, and Form 4193s,
Sensitive Compartmental Information Nondisclosure Agreements.
LtCol North has been reassigned to the U.S. Marine Corps and
Ms. Hall has been reassigned to the Department of Defense.
Activities of LtCol North currently are under investigation by
Independent Counsel Walsh.
Question 6: What retraining has the Administration initiated to
correspond with all the recent clarifications? Has the
retraining been consistently implemented for all agencies and
employees covered by SF 189?
Answer:
The NSC has not initiated retraining with respect to SF 189.
2
Question 7: If there has been no retraining to teach civil
servants the impact of the new "clarifying" rules and
modifications for SF 189, is any planned? Under what
circumstances would additional training be necessary?
Answer:
SF 189 has not created any problems for the NSC staff that merit
retraining.
Question 9: Please describe fully the procedures to implement
section 1.6 (a) of E.O. 12356, under which employees may challenge
the status of information that they believe has been improperly
classified in order to conceal illegality or other misconduct.
NSC staff members may challenge the status of information they
believe has been improperly classified in order to conceal
illegality or other misconduct by bringing the information to the
attention of the NSC Executive Secretary for classification
review under Executive Order 12356. Any allegations of
illegality or misconduct would also be brought to the attention
of the NSC Legal Adviser and other appropriate authorities as
warranted.
Question 10: How many challenges of allegedly improper
classifications have been filed under section 1.6 (a) of
E.O. 12356? How many classification decisions have been upheld
and how many have been reversed? What is the range and average
times to make decisions under section 1.6 (a) ?
Answer:
None.
III. Flow of Information to Congress
Question 4: Who determines whether Members of Congress or any
other potential recipient has a "need to know" classifiable
information and what written criteria or guidelines are applied
to make this determination? (Please identify all individuals in
all covered agencies, by office name and individual name and
title, who have this responsibility.)
Answer:
The policy of this Administration is to comply with Congressional
requests for information, including classified information, to
the fullest extent consistent with the constitutional and
statutory obligations of the Executive branch.
3
VI. Effect on Employees
Question 4: How many employees have been denied security
clearances due in whole or in part to their failure to sign
SF 189?
Answer:
None.
Question 5: How many employees have been put on an ineligible
list for promotions due in whole or in part to their failure to
sign SF 189?
Answer:
None.
VII. Employee Rights
Question 1: What is the range of due process rights for employees
at various agencies who face disciplinary action, revocation of
security clearance or denial of security clearance for failing to
sign SF 189? Please provide legal citations for the appropriate
regulations at each covered agency as well as the procedures
available for the employee to challenge these three potential
consequences.
Answer:
The NSC complies with the relevant provisions, when applicable,
of 5 U.S.C. Chapter 75 and 5 C.F.R. Part 752.
Question 1A: Please provide the same information for an employee
charged with violating SF 189.
Answer:
The NSC complies with the relevant provisions, when applicable,
of 5 U.S.C. Chapter 75 and 5 C.F.R. Part' 752.
X. Classification Guide
Question 3: What is the procedure by which users of the
Classification Guides may challenge security classifications
reflected in the guides?
Answer:
Users of the classification guides may challenge security
classifications reflected in the guides by bringing the matter to
the attention of the NSC Executive Secretary and the Senior
Director for Information Policy/Security Review.
4
Question 4: Who is the final authority on the proper
interpretation and application of a Classification Guide?
Answer:
The NSC Executive Secretary, in consultation with the Senior
Director for Information Policy/Security Review and NSC Legal
Adviser.
8776 add-on
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
December 15, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR STEVEN GARFINKEL
Director
Information Security Oversight Office
SUBJECT:
SF 189
Attached is a copy of recent correspondence between Lieutenant
General Colin L. Powell and Senator Charles E. Grassley regarding
Standard Form 189. Consistent with General Powell's letter,
the NSC concurs in ISOO's publication in the Federal Register of
the additional clarification of the term "classifiable
information."
Paul Achott Atter
Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Colin Powell Letter to Senator Grassley
CHRON FILE
THE WHITE HOUSE
8776
WASHINGTON
December 3, 1987
Dear Senator Grassley:
This letter is to inform you that the Information Security
Oversight Office (ISOO) will be publishing in the Federal
Register a further clarification of the term "classifiable
information" as used in Standard Form 189, "Classified
Information Nondisclosure Agreement."
As you know, the term was first used in Standard Form 189 in
September 1983. On August 3 and 11, 1987, ISOO published
definitions of the term "classifiable information" in the Federal
Register in an attempt to clarify its meaning and make clear that
the term applies to a very narrow class of information.
Subsequently, at a Post Office and Civil Service Subcommittee
hearing on October 15, 1987, you and others in Congress expressed
concern about the use of the term "classifiable information." In
response to your concerns, representatives of ISOO and the NSC
staff met with members of Senator Proxmire's, Senator DeConcini's
and your staff in an effort to explore a mutually agreeable
formulation.
In this meeting, your staff was provided with a draft of the
revised definition, which had been drawn up to reflect changes
suggested by your office and in order to satisfy your concerns
regarding the use of the term "classifiable information." These
changes were derived from Mr. Carlucci's earlier correspondence
regarding SF 189; Mr. Carlucci had tried unsuccessfully to reach
you by phone to discuss this matter, including the specific
clarifying language ISOO will be publishing and including on the
Form.
I hope that the clarification ISOO will provide satisfies your
concerns regarding SF 189.
Sincerely,
Colin L. Powell
Acting Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
DRAFT
BILLING CODE 6820 KC
INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE
32 CFR Part 2003
National Security Information
Standard Forms
AGENCY: Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO)
ACTION: Final Rule.
SUMMARY: This is an amendment to 32 CFR S 2003.20. In recent
months, questions have been raised about the intended scope of
the term "classifiable information," a term that has been used in
the Standard Form 189, "Classified Information Nondisclosure
Agreement," since it was first issued in September 1983. On
August 3 and 11, 1987, ISOO published definitions of the term
"classifiable information" in the Federal Register. These
definitions were designed to clarify the meaning of this term and
to demonstrate that it applies to a very narrow class of
information. Subsequently, it has become evident that further
clarification is desirable for purposes of alleviating concern
and dispelling confusion about the actual scope of the
nondisclosure obligation in regard to such information. Relevant
explanatory information circulated by ISOO since August 1987 has
proved useful in further clarifying the intended reach of the
term "classifiable information." As a result, ISOO has
determined that it would be desirable to amend its published
definition to incorporate such further explanation. The revised
DRAFT
definition does not change the substance of the term
"classifiable information" in each executed nondisclosure
agreement, but may, nevertheless, prove useful to a better
understanding by affected employees of their nondisclosure
obligations. While ISOO will include this definition in future
reprints of the Standard Form 189, it is intended to apply to all
editions of the Form.
EFFECTIVE DATE: Upon Publication.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Steven Garfinkel, Director, ISOO.
Telephone: (202) 535-7251
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This amendment to 32 CFR Part
2003 is issued pursuant to Section 5.2(b) (7) of Executive
Order 12356.
List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 2003
Classified information, Executive orders, Information,
National security information, Security information.
32 CFR Part 2003 is amended as follows:
PART 2003 -- NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION - STANDARD FORMS
1. The authority citation for 32 CFR Part 2003 continues to
read:
AUTHORITY: Sec. 5.2(b) (7) of E.O. 12356.
2
DRAFT
Subpart B - - Prescribed Forms
2. Section 2003.20 (h) (1) is revised to read as follows:
(h) * # *
(1) (1) As used in paragraph 1 of SF 189, the term
"classifiable information" refers to two categories of
information only: (a) unmarked classified information,
including oral communications; and (b) unclassified
information that meets the standards for classification and
is in the process of a classification determination.
"Classifiable information" does not refer to currently
unclassified information that may be subject to possible
classification at some future date, but is not currently in
the process of a classification determination. Therefore,
the only circumstances under which a party to SF 189 might
violate its terms by disclosing unclassified information are
when a party knows, or reasonably should know, that such
information is in the process of a classification
determination and requires interim protection as provided in
Section 1.1(c) of Executive Order 12356 or any other statute
or Executive order that requires interim protection for
certain unclassified information while a classification
determination is pending.
3
DRAFT
(11) A party to SF 189 may be liable for disclosing
"classifiable information" only if: (a) he or she knows that
the unmarked information is classified, or meets the
standards for classification and is in the process of a
classification determination, whether the unauthorized
disclosure is willful or negligent; or (b) he or she should
know that the unmarked information is classified, or meets
the standards for classification and is in the process of a
classification determination, in which case the unauthorized
disclosure is negligent. In no instance could a party to
SF 189 be liable for violating its nondisclosure provisions
by disclosing unmarked information when, at the time of the
disclosure, there was no basis to suggest, other than pure
speculation, that the information was classified or in the
process of a classification determination.
Dated:
Steven Garfinkel
Director, Information
Security Oversight Office
4
8776 add-on
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
December 10, 1987
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS
FROM:
^NICHOLAS ROSTOW
SUBJECT:
SF 189
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Steve Garfinkel,
Director of Information Security Oversight Office. Your
memorandum forwards a copy of General Powell's letter to Senator
Grassley announcing our intention to publish in the Federal
Register a further clarification of the term "classifiable
information" as used in Standard Form 189. In connection with
General Powell's letter, your memorandum directs Mr. Garfinkel to
initiate this publication.
notavailable
Dave Matthews concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve PM
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I - Stevens Memorandum to Garfinkel
Tab A - Powell Letter to Grassley, December 3, 1987
5445
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 10, 1987
Dear Mr. Holmes:
In response to your letter of July 14, 1987, I am forwarding to
you a copy of the unclassified National Security Council
Intelligence Directive 1, dated February 17, 1972, and entitled
"Basic Duties and Responsibilities. "
We will be happy to provide the NSDD for your review, subject to
the following conditions:
--
We request certification that the staff member holds the
requisite security clearance.
The document will be available at the NSC for your staff to
review. If you wish to read the document personally, I will
arrange to have a staff officer meet with you for that
purpose.
No copy of the document may be made.
:
Any notes taken concerning the document must be handled as
classified information and reviewed by the NSC staff prior
to transmittal.
Portions of any resulting report citing classified NSC
material should be submitted to the NSC staff for review
prior to publication.
Please call Brenda Reger at 395-3736 to arrange a time to review
the document.
Additionally, D. Barry Kelly, of the NSC staff, would be pleased
to provide briefings on request. If you are interested in
receiving a briefing, please contact Alison Fortier, Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director of Legislative
Affairs, to make arrangements. Her phone number is 395-4682.
Sincerely,
Grant S. Green, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Attachment: NSCID 1
The Honorable Sven E. Holmes
Staff Director and General Counsel
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Washington, DC 20510-6475
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01. Memorandum
For Grant Green From: Paul Schott Stevens
9/10/87
(b)(1)
S
Re: Request for Access to NSCID 1 and NSDD 207 (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA, CHAIRMAN
5445
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMAN
LLOYD BENTSEN, TEXAS
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DELAWARE
SAM NUNN, GEORGIA
ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA
CHIC HECHT, NEVADA
DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA
JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA
United States Senate
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475
SVEN E. HOLMES, STAFF DIRECTOR/GENERAL COUNSEL
JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK
July 14, 1987
Mr. Grant S. Green, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Mr. Green:
It is requested that the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence be provided a copy of:
NSCID 1
NSDD 207
Sincerel
Sven Erik Holmes
Staff Director
SEH:cb
5445
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 28, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS
FROM:
NANCY V. MENAN
SUBJECT:
SSCI Request for Access to NSDD 207
I do not concur on this action for the following reasons:
Past practice has been to accept requests for access to NSDDs from
either the committee chairman OR the staff director. Therefore, a
response from us requiring a request from the SSCI chairman might
easily be viewed as a convenient change in practice.
Of note, although the original version of the NSDD is TOP SECRET, a
sanitized version, downgraded to SECRET, was done in response to a
FEMA request in April, 1986. The number and title together are now
SECRET, not TS.
I have no objection to a briefing nor access to the SECRET version
of NSDD 207 subject to our standard procedures.
Package rewriten to reflect
The above
for
6324
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Dix
September 1, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR RHETT DAWSON
FROM:
GRANT GREEN G
SUBJECT:
NSC Security/Space
As a result of findings and the recommendations made by the Tower
Board, the National Security Council is taking steps to upgrade
overall security within the organization. In addition to
improving personnel security awareness and procedures, major
steps will be required to upgrade physical security --
particularly that associated with the preservation and
maintenance of classified documents. The latter includes
sensitive/restricted intelligence material and Presidential
records as well as all other documents related to the enhancement
and continuity of national security records management.
The first major project to be undertaken will be the renovation
of the Secretariat which occupies Rooms 377 to 387 in the OEOB.
The volume of the documents that the Secretariat controls,
dictates that we must maintain an "open storage" configuration in
the storage vault area (Room 377). The security condition of
this space has been marginal for many years. However, with
renovation, the area can be upgraded to meet established
security/intelligence community standards. Specific improvements
will include reinforcing one wall with hardened steel plate,
installing a bank vault door, manproofing the windows, and
improving access control hardware. In addition, another portion
of the Secretariat must be reconfigured into a special "limited
access" facility. This modification -- required to enhance the
administrative processing and storage of sensitive files
relocated from other staff offices -- will also require special
security treatment to ensure compartmentation and access control.
The above requirements represent an additional investment in
dollars, space and people. In that the present configuration of
the Secretariat does not include adequate space to accommodate
the new files and additional staff, there appear to be two
alternatives: (1) Double-deck a relatively small area within the
Secretariat or (2) identify additional space in the Old Executive
Office Building which would meet, or could be upgraded, to
security standards.
I would appreciate your thoughts on the above.
5818
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 10, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR STEVEN GARFINKEL
Director, Information Security Oversight Office
SUBJECT:
Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement
We recommend that you take the following actions pertinent to the
Standard Form 189, "Classified Information Nondisclosure Agree-
ment,' and Standard Form 189-A, "Classified Information Non-
disclosure Agreement (Industrial/Commercial/Non-Government) "
These changes are intended solely to clarify what some have
called ambiguities. They are consistent with the Administra-
tion's interpretation of these provisions and have no substantive
impact upon the terms of the nondisclosure agreements.
(1) That you amend 32 CFR Part 2003, "National Security
Information; Standard Forms":
(a) To provide a definition of the term "classifiable"
as it appears in paragraph 1 of the SF 189 that is
consistent with the definition that your office
has used in its written explanations of the term;
(b) To clarify that the first sentence of paragraph 7
of the SF 189 refers to classified information
exclusively;
(c) To clarify that the third and fourth sentences of
paragraph 7 of the SF 189 and SF 189-A refer to
classified materials exclusively;
(d) To clarify that the third sentence of paragraph 7
of the SF 189 and SF 189-A should read:
"
materials which have or may come into my
possession
"
(2) That upon the publication of these clarifications in
the Federal Register, you notify each affected agency
of them; and
(3) That upon the reprinting of the SF 189 and SF 189-A,
the clarifications outlined in paragraphs (1) (b), (c)
and (d), above, be reflected in the language of the
forms.
Grant S. Green, St.
Executive Secretary
5818
Information Security Oversight Office
Washington, DC 20405
GENERAL survices
ADMINISTRATION
July 14, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: David Major
National Security Council
FROM:
Steven Garfinkel Steve Garfiched
Director, Information Security Oversight Office
SUBJECT:
Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement
I enclose for your information correspondence to and from
the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) regarding the
Standard Form 189, "Classified Information Nondisclosure Agree-
ment," that has ensued since we submitted on July 2, a draft
response to Chairman Sikorski's letter to Mr. Carlucci dated
June 24. I especially call to the NSC's attention the corre-
spondence from Chairwoman Schroeder of the Subcommittee on Civil
Service. It is my understanding that Mr. Sikorski has indicated
his interest in holding joint hearings with her on the SF 189.
It is clear from Mrs. Schroeder's letter of July 13, that she is
not particularly inclined to make a major issue of this one-man
controversy. She seems prepared to drop the matter if ISOO takes
the regulatory steps that we proposed in my letter to her of
July 13, and suggested in our draft response to Mr. Sikorski.
Under these circumstances, I believe that it is critical
that we act promptly and affirmatively to help defuse this issue
by making the non-substantive regulatory clarifications that we
have proposed. I also believe that it would be most beneficial
if the direction to ISOO to proceed with these regulatory changes
comes from the NSC. To that end, I enclose a draft of a memo-
randum from the Staff Secretary to me requesting this action and
copies of the SF 189 and 189-A.
Enclosures
Information Security Oversight Office
Washington, DC 20405
SIMITM MARCH
July 10, 1987
Dear Mr. Kolesnik:
This follows up on our telephone conversation yesterday
afternoon about the Standard Form 189, "Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreement." I appreciate the opportunity to
express directly the views of the Information Security Oversight
Office (ISOO), which is responsible for issuing and overseeing
executive branch implementation of the nondisclosure agreement,
rather than being "quoted" by third parties. I also appreciate
from our conversation that our goals are largely the same, even
if we do not yet agree on how to achieve them. As I note below,
however, I believe that there are reasonable, alternative means
of resolving these differences that do not require the suspension
of the SF 189.
The executive branch requires the execution of this
nondisclosure agreement for two reasons. First, it alerts
employees of the trust that is placed in them by providing them
access to classified information and of their responsibilities to
protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. Second,
it states in standard, written terms the nature of that trust and
those responsibilities, so if that trust is violated, the United
States will be in a far better position to enforce the agreement.
The terms of the SF 189 are less stringent than those of
other nondisclosure agreements which the Federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, have consistently validated. Four
years ago, when its language was first drafted, constitutional
experts at the Department of Justice reviewed every provision.
Before it was issued, several committees of Congress and
representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union and other
public interest organizations scrutinized the form. No legal
action against the nondisclosure agreement resulted. Since then,
approximately two million civilian and military personnel,
including our top officials, have signed the SF 189, and
thousands more are being signed each day. This has been
accomplished with a minimal amount of controversy and disruption.
-2-
As an enclosure, I address in greater detail the three
issues for which you requested ISOO's- point of view: the meaning
of the term "classifiable" as used in paragraph 1 of the SF 189,
and why it is not used in the SF 189-A, the nondisclosure
agreement designed for Government contractor employees and other
non-Government personnel; the absence of the modifier,
"classified," before the word "information" in the first sentence
of paragraph 7 of the SF 189, although it appears in the same
provision of the SF 189-A; and the relationship of the SF 189 to
the so-called "whistleblower" statute, 5 U.S.C. § 2302.
While a few persons have suggested that there are conflicts
or discrepancies within these provisions, I believe that, at
worst, there are ambiguities that can be resolved far less dras-
tically than through the suspension of the SF 189. For example,
under Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information,"
ISOO issues directives or regulations that have Government-wide
application. ISOO could issue a regulatory provision that states
explicitly that "information" in paragraph 7 of the SF 189 refers
exclusively to "classified information. Further, ISOO could
include within this regulation a definition of "classifiable"
that would express authoritatively the limits of its application.
On the other hand, suspending the SF 189 would unnecessarily
void four years and millions upon millions of dollars of effort.
It would halt a worthwhile program a few steps short of its
completion. Finally, it would send out a most regrettable
message: that the unlawful disclosure of our nation's secrets is
lesser threat than a few semantic ambiguities in a lawful
agreement designed to help prevent these disclosures.
I also enclose a copy of ISOO's most recent Report to the
President. It provides an overview of what ISOO is and what it
does. It also includes at Appendix B, page 35, a progress chart,
as of the end of FY 1986, on agency by agency implementation of
the SF 189. This chart reflects that 70% of the agencies had
achieved 100% implementation by that time. Since then, we are
much closer to achieving 100% compliance in every agency.
Sincerely,
(signed)
Cheven
Carfinkel
Steven Garfinkel
Director
Mr. Kris Kolesnik
Office of Senator Charles E. Grassley
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Enclosures
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, COLORADO. CHAIRWOMAN
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ. NEW YORK
CHARLES PASHAYAN, JR., CALIFORNIA
WILL AM-(BILL) CLAY, MISSOURI
FRANK HORTON. NEW YORK
U.S. Douse of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
9
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE
122 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
RECEIVED
Bashington, DC 20515
July 6, 1987
Z
TELEPHONE (202) 225-4025
Mr. Steven Garfinckel
Director
Information Security Oversight Office
General Services Administration
Washington, D. C. 20405
Dear Mr. Garfinckel:
As you know, the Subcommittee on Civil Service devoted
considerable attention in 1983 and 1984 to examining
Administration efforts to strengthen secrecy agreements
following the issuance of National Security Decision
Directive 84. As a result of discussions with
Administration officials, the Administration clarified its
intention with regard to pre-publication review and non-
disclosure.
I was, therefore, shocked to read the attached letter
signed by Congressman Sikorski and quoting you extensively.
What you are quoted as saying is in direct conflict with my
understanding of the way our discussions ended.
On page 2, you are quoted as saying that "classifiable"
information "could be anything." As I remember our
discussions a few years ago, the purpose of this provision
was to tell the Federal worker that information which he or
she should know is classified, but which through clerical
error is not SO marked, should not be disclosed. Any
broader interpretation is intolerable.
On the bottom of page 2, the Sikorski letter says that you
would not direct agencies to amend paragraph 7 of Standard
Form 189 to add the qualifier "classified". Is this true?
I do not understand why you would resist making such a
change since the clear intent of the words is to apply to
classified information only.
On page 4, the letter states that you suggested that SF-189
could be used as a basis for pre-publication review. The
agreement struck on this issue was quite clear and it is
reflected in Justice Department regulations. Only those
non-disclosure agreements which contain explicit pre-
Mr. Steven Garfinckel
July 6, 1987
Page Two
publication review requirements may be used to mandate pre-
publication review. Is this not your understanding of the
law on this?
I hope you were misquoted in the Sikorski letter. The
Subcommittee on Civil Service worked with the National
Security Council in 1982 and 1983 to limit pre-publication
review to non-disclosure agreements related to Sensitive
Compartmented Information. While the new wording of
Standard Form 189 is clearly overbroad and vague, it should
not be interpreted to permit prosecution in the case of
information not known to the employee to be classified.
And clearly, nothing in Standard Form 189 contemplates a
pre-publication review requirement. I urge you to utilize
this opportunity to set the record straight on Standard
Form 189 and the circumstances under which a prosecution
for its violation would be considered.
Pat With kind regards,
Sincerely Ichnolder
PATRICIA SCHROEDER
Chairwoman
enc.
"CLASSIFIABLE" INFORMATION
"Classifiable" refers to information that meets all the
tests for classified information under Executive Order 12356,
"National Security Information," but which, as a result of
negligence, time constraints, error, lack of opportunity or
oversight, has not been marked as classified information. A
person would violate the agreement if he disclosed without
authorization information that he knew, or reasonably should have
known, was classified, although it had not yet been marked as
such. For example, a person attending a classified meeting
should reasonably know that his unmarked notes of that meeting
may not be disclosed to a person who doesn't have a clearance and
a "need-to-know" that information.
"Classifiable" information, as defined above, has long been
a particular concern of the Intelligence Community. This term or
similar terms have appeared in nondisclosure agreements used by
intelligence agencies for many years preceding its inclusion in
the SF 189. In testimony before a Senate subcommittee studying
National Security Decision Directive 84, which mandated the
creation of a standardized classified information nondisclosure
agreement, former CIA Director William Colby alluded to the fact
that raw intelligence data are often unmarked as classified when
they are first received. The collection of raw intelligence
often occurs in circumstances that do not permit the formalities
of classification markings. Nevertheless, this intelligence
often involves some of the most sensitive information within the
Government, such as the names of intelligence sources.
Also, with respect to the term "classifiable," the question
has been raised about a person being sanctioned for violating the
nondisclosure agreement by disclosing information that was
clearly unclassified at the time of disclosure, but was
classified subsequent to the disclosure. In almost every
hypothetical fact pattern, the prior disclosure would not be a
violation of the SF 189. However, it is possible to construct a
hypothetical in which it may be. For example, suppose an
employee has been informed by his supervisor, who is not an
authorized original classifier, that particular unclassified
information has been referred to an original classifier for
classification action. If the information is classified as a
result of this referral, the employee would very likely violate
the agreement should he disclose it without authorization in the
interim. Because we can hypothesize fact patterns such as this,
we cannot state conclusively that the disclosure of unclassified
information would never amount to a violation of the SF 189.
CLARITY OF LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE SF 189
The first line of paragraph 7 of the SF 189 reads: "I
understand that all information to which I may obtain access by
signing this form is now and will forever remain the property of
the United States Government." The SF 189-A* includes the word
"classified" before the word "information." It has been sug-
gested by a few persons that the SF 189, therefore, imposes a
much broader standard.
To the contrary, the first sentences of both agreements mean
precisely the same thing, and refer only to classified infor-
mation. Information to which someone "may obtain access by
signing [the SF 1891" is, by definition, classified information.
As further stated in the first sentence of the agreement:
"
I hereby accept the obligations contained in this
Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to
classified information." [Emphasis added.] The drafters of the
SF 189 did not include the word "classified" in the first
sentence of paragraph 7 because they believed it to be redundant.
The information referenced in paragraph 7 could only be
classified information.
When the SF 189-A was being drafted, the Department of
Defense (DoD) requested that the word "classified" be inserted
before the word "information" in paragraph 7, notwithstanding its
redundancy. DoD sought its inclusion in order to preclude any
possibility whatsoever of misunderstanding. Although ISOO
initially objected on the basis that its inclusion was unneces-
sary, it eventually conceded to DOD's request, believing that no
harm could result from a simple redundancy. Since reading the
forms SF 189 and SF 189-A in tandem has led some to the incorrect
suggestion that paragraph 7 of the SF 189 refers to more than
just "classified information," ISOO probably should not have made
this concession.
*The SF 189-A is the classified information nondisclosure
agreement form composed and issued three years after the SF 189
as an adaptation for non-Government employees such as contractor
personnel.
2
CLARITY OF LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE SF 189
The first line of paragraph 7 of the SF 189 reads: "I
understand that all information to which I may obtain access by
signing this form is now and will forever remain the property of
the United States Government." The SF 189-A, composed over three
years later, includes the word "classified" before the word
"information." It has been suggested by a few persons that the
SF 189, therefore, imposes a much broader standard.
To the contrary, the first sentences of both agreements mean
precisely the same thing, and refer only to classified infor-
mation. Information to which someone "may obtain access by
signing [the SF 1891" is, by definition, classified information.
As further stated in the first sentence of the agreement:
"
I hereby accept the obligations contained in this
Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to
classified information." [Emphasis added. ] The drafters of the
SF 189 did not include the word "classified" in the first
sentence of paragraph 7 because they believed it to be redundant.
The information referenced in paragraph 7 could only be
classified information.
When the SF 189-A was being drafted, the DoD requested that
the word "classified" be inserted before the word "information"
in paragraph 7, notwithstanding its redundancy. DoD sought its
inclusion in order to preclude any possibility whatsoever of
misunderstanding. Although ISOO initially objected on the basis
that its inclusion was unnecessary, it eventually conceded to its
inclusion believing that no harm could result from a simple
redundancy. Since reading the forms SF 189 and SF 189-A in
tandem has led some to the incorrect suggestion that paragraph 7
of the SF 189 refers to more than just "classified information,"
ISOO probably should not have made this concession.
The third sentence of paragraph 7 reads in part: "I agree
that I shall return all materials which have, or may have, come
into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such
access
For the same reasons addressed above, it is clear
that "all materials," by definition, refers only to "classified"
materials. It is far less clear what is meant by the phrase, "or
may have. The current language of this phrase was suggested by
the Department of Justice after the interagency drafting group
had completed its work on what was to become the SF 189. A
detailed review of the records also reveals that the Department
suggested slightly different, but far clearer language for the
comparable provision of a standardized Sensitive Compartmented
Information Nondisclosure Agreement that was later withdrawn by
3
the White House: "I agree that I shall return all materials which
have or may come into my possession or for which I am responsible
because of such access " It now appears that Justice
intended that the phrase "may have come" should actually have
read "may come" in what was to become the SF 189 as well.
At worst, these phrases are simply troublesome ambiguities.
They can be clarified by modifying the ISOO regulation
implementing the SF 189 and SF 189-A, or by ISOO issuing a
clarification letter to all agencies.
4
CONFLICT WITH "WHISTLEBLOWER" STATUTES
The SF 189 does not conflict with the so-called
"whistleblower" statutes (5 U.S.C. § 2302). These statutes
specifically do not protect persons who disclose classified
information without authorization. The reference in these
statutes to information "specifically required by Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the
conduct of foreign affairs" is without question a reference to
the contemporary Executive order on national security
information, which is now E.O. 12356. In turn, SF 189 defines
classified information as "information that is either classified
or classifiable under the standards of Executive Order 12356, or
under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the
unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of
national security."
In addition, E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.6 (a) specifically prohibits
classification "in order to conceal violations of law,
inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment
to a person, organization, or agency; to restrain competition; or
to prevent or delay the release of information that does not
require protection in the interest of national security." This
provision was included in the Executive order to help prevent the
classification of information that would most likely be the
concern of whistleblowers.
Finally, there are remedies available to whistleblowers that
don't require the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information. Each agency has designated officials to whom
challenges to classification may be addressed or to whom a
disclosure of classified information is authorized. For example,
within the Department of Defense employees are now required to
challenge the classification of information that they believe is
not properly classified. Special procedures have been
established to expedite decisions on these challenges.
The viability of the security classification system depends
entirely upon the commitment of cleared persons to protect
national security information. If anyone could change an
unauthorized disclosure to an authorized disclosure simply by
claiming to be a "whistleblower," there would be no system at all
to protect the nation's secrets.
5
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
Agreement Between
and the United States
(Name Printed or Typed)
1. Intending to be legally bound, 1 hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to classified
information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is information that is either classified or classifiable under the standards of Executive Order
12356, or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security. I
understand and accept that by being granted access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States
Government.
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information, including the pro-
cedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and
that I understand these procedures.
3. I have been advised and am aware that direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified informa-
tion by me could cause irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge
such information unless 1 have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it or I have
been given prior written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) last
granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
4. I have been advised and am aware that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal from any
position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; and the termination of my employment or other relationships with the Departments or
Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have been advised and am aware that any unauthorized disclosure of classified
information by me may constitute a violation or violations of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and
952, Title 18, United States Code, the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States Code, and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protec-
tion Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory
violation.
5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result or may result from any
disclosure, publication, or revelation not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including, but not limited to, applica-
tion for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agreement.
7. I understand that all information to which I may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will forever remain the property of the United
States Government. I do not now, nor will I ever, possess any right, interest, title, or claim whatsoever to such information. I agree that I shall return all
materials which have, or may have, come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such access, upon demand by an authorized repre-
sentative of the United States Government or upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship with the Department or Agency that last
granted me a security clearance. If I do not return such materials upon request, I understand that this may be a violation of Section 793, Title 18, United
ates Code, a United States criminal law.
Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I understand that all conditions and obliga-
ons imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access to classified information, and at all times thereafter.
9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all other provisions of this
Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
10. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered to my satisfaction. 1 acknowledge that the briefing officer has
made available to me Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of Title 18, United States Code, Section 783(b) of Title 50, United States Code, the Intelli-
gence Identities Protection Act of 1982, and Executive Order 12356, so that I may read them at this time, if I so choose.
11. I make this Agreement without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SIGNATURE
DATE
SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (See
notice below)
ORGANIZATION
The execution of this Agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who, on behalf of the United States Govern-
ment, agreed to its terms and accepted it as a prior condition of authorizing access to classified information.
WITNESS AND ACCEPTANCE:
SIGNATURE
DATE
ORGANIZATION
TICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies Inform Individuals, at the time Information is solicited from them, whether the
closure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such Information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the Information. You are hereby
advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Account Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to Identify you pre-
cisely when it is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the Information indicated above or 2) determine that your access to the information
Indicated has terminated. Although disclosure of your SSN is not mandatory, your failure to do so may Impede the processing of such certifications or
determinations.
STANDARD FORM 189 (8-83)
Prescribed by GSA/ISOO
32CFR 2003; E.O. 12356
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
Agreement Between
and the United States
(Name Printed or Typed)
1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to classified
information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is information that is either classified or classifiable under the standards of Executive Order
12356, or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security. I
understand and accept that by being granted access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States
Government.
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information, including the pro-
cedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and
that I understand these procedures.
3. I have been advised and am aware that direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified informa-
tion by me could cause irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge
such information unless I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it or I have
been given prior written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) last
granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
4. I have been advised and am aware that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal from any
position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; and the termination of my employment or other relationships with the Departments or
Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have been advised and am aware that any unauthorized disclosure of classified
information by me may constitute a violation or violations of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and
952, Title 18, United States Code, the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States Code, and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protec-
tion Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory
violation.
5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result or may result from any
disclosure, publication, or revelation not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including, but not limited to, applica-
tion for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agreement.
7. I understand that all information to which I may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will forever remain the property of the United
States Government. I do not now, nor will I ever, possess any right, interest, title, or claim whatsoever to such information. I agree that I shall return all
materials which have, or may have, come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such access, upon demand by an authorized repre-
sentative of the United States Government or upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship with the Department or Agency that last
granted me a security clearance. If I do not return such materials upon request, I understand that this may be a violation of Section 793, Title 18, United
Code, a United States criminal law.
Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I understand that all conditions and obliga-
ns imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access to classified information, and at all times thereafter.
9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all other provisions of this
Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
10. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered to my satisfaction. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has
made available to me Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of Title 18, United States Code, Section 783(b) of Title 50, United States Code, the Intelli-
gence Identities Protection Act of 1982, and Executive Order 12356, so that I may read them at this time, if I so choose.
11. I make this Agreement without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SIGNATURE
DATE
SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (See
notice below)
ORGANIZATION
The execution of this Agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who, on behalf of the United States Govern-
ment, agreed to its terms and accepted it as a prior condition of authorizing access to classified information.
WITNESS AND ACCEPTANCE:
SIGNATURE
DATE
ORGANIZATION
FICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies Inform Individuals, at the time Information is solicited from them, whether the
losure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such Information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the Information. You are hereby
advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Account Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to Identify you pre-
cisely when it is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the Information indicated above or 2) determine that your access to the information
Indicated has terminated. Although disclosure of your SSN Is not mandatory, your failure to do so may Impede the processing of such certifications or
determinations.
STANDARD FORM 189 (8-83)
Prescribed by GSA/ISOO
32CFR 2003; E.O. 12356
OMB NO. 3090-0230
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
(INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL/NON-GOVERNMENT)
AGREEMENT BETWEEN
AND THE UNITED STATES
(Name of Individual Type or print)
1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my
being granted access to classified information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is information that is
classified under the standards of Executive Order 12356, or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits
the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security. I understand and accept that by being
granted access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States Govern-
ment.
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classi-
fied information, including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate
disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.
3. I have been advised and am aware that direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negli-
gent handling of classified information by me could cause irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to
advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge such information unless I have officially verified
that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it or I have been given prior
written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or
Agency) responsible for the classification of the information that such disclosure is permitted. I further understand that
I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
4. I have been advised and am aware that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security
clearances I hold and removal from any position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances. In addition, I
have been advised and am aware that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a viola-
n, or violations, of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, and 798, Title 18,
lited States Code, and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in
this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.
5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted,
will result or may result from any disclosure, publication, or revelation not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement in-
cluding, but not limited to, application for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agree-
ment.
7. I understand that all classified information to which I may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will
forever remain the property of the United States Government. I do not now, nor will I ever, possess any right, interest,
title, or claim whatsoever to such information. I agree that I shall return all materials which have, or may have, come
into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such access, upon demand by an authorized representative
of the United States Government or upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship that requires access to
classified information. If I do not return such materials upon request, I understand that this may be a violation of Sec-
tion 793, Title 18, United States Code, a United States criminal law.
8. Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I under-
stand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access
to classified information, and at all times thereafter.
9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unen-
ceable, all other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
(Continue on reverse)
NSN 7540-01-237-2597
189-201
STANDARD FORM 189-A (6-86)
Prescribed by GSA/ISOO
32 CFR 2003; E.O. 12356
OMB NO. 3090-0230
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
(INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL/NON-GOVERNMENT)
N AGREEMENT BETWEEN
AND THE UNITED STATES
(Name of Individual Type or print)
1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my
being granted access to classified information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is information that is
classified under the standards of Executive Order 12356, or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits
the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security. I understand and accept that by being
granted access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States Govern-
ment.
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classi-
fied information, including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate
disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.
3. I have been advised and am aware that direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negli-
gent handling of classified information by me could cause irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to
advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge such information unless I have officially verified
that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it or I have been given prior
written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or
Agency) responsible for the classification of the information that such disclosure is permitted. I further understand that
I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
4. I have been advised and am aware that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security
clearances I hold and removal from any position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances. In addition, I
have been advised and am aware that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a viola-
n, or violations, of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, and 798, Title 18,
ited States Code, and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in
this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.
5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted,
will result or may result from any disclosure, publication, or revelation not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement in-
cluding, but not limited to, application for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agree-
ment.
7. I understand that all classified information to which I may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will
forever remain the property of the United States Government. I do not now, nor will I ever, possess any right, interest,
title, or claim whatsoever to such information. I agree that I shall return all materials which have, or may have, come
into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such access, upon demand by an authorized representative
of the United States Government or upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship that requires access to
classified information. If I do not return such materials upon request, I understand that this may be a violation of Sec-
tion 793, Title 18, United States Code, a United States criminal law.
8. Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I under-
stand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access
to classified information, and at all times thereafter.
9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unen-
forceable, all other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
(Continue on reverse)
NSN 7540-01-237-2597
189-201
STANDARD FORM 189-A (6-86)
Prescribed by GSA/ISOO
32 CFR 2003; E.O. 12356
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
936
July 23, 1987
Dear Congressman Sikorski:
Thank you for your letter of June 24, in which you express
some concerns about the Standard Form 189, "Classified
Information Nondisclosure Agreement. Please be assured that
we appreciate your viewpoint and have considered your recom-
mendations carefully. However, we are convinced that this
nondisclosure agreement fulfills a very important national
security purpose and that it deprives no one of rights
guaranteed under the Constitution and laws of the United
States. As an enclosure to this letter, we address your
major concerns in greater detail.
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) Number 84 estab-
lished the requirement that "all persons with authorized
access to classified information shall be required to sign a
nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access." The
request for execution of this nondisclosure agreement is for
two reasons. First, it alerts employees to the trust that is
placed in them by providing them access to classified informa-
tion and of their responsibilities to protect that information
from unauthorized disclosure. Second, it states in standard,
written terms the nature of that trust and those responsibili-
ties, so that if that trust is violated, the United States
will be in a far better position to enforce the agreement.
The terms of the SF-189 are less stringent than those of other
nondisclosure agreements which the Federal courts, including
the Supreme Court, have consistently validated. Four years
ago, when its language was first drafted, constitutional
experts at the Department of Justice reviewed every provision.
Before it was issued, several committees of Congress and
representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union and
other public interest organizations scrutinized the form. No
legal action against the nondisclosure agreement resulted.
Since then, approximately two million civilian and military
personnel, including our top officials, have signed the
SF-189, and thousands more are being signed each day. This
has been accomplished with a minimal amount of controversy and
disruption.
As a result of your letter, we are asking the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) to issue to all
agencies an instruction that clarifies some of the ambiguous
language in paragraph 7 of the SF-189. The ISOO Director and
his staff have been available to respond to questions and
concerns about the SF-189 since its inception. He would be
happy to meet with you or your staff at your convenience to
discuss your concerns.
Sincerely,
Thank Clailein
Frank C. Carlucci
Enclosures
The Honorable Gerry Sikorski
Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, COLORADO, CHAIRWOMAN
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ. NEW YORK CHARLES PASHAYAN, JR., CALIFORNIA
WILLIAM (BILL) CLAY, MISSOURI
FRANK HORTON. NEW YORK
U.S. house of Representatibes
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE
122 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
Mashington. DC 20515
July 13, 1987
TELEPHONE (202) 225-4025
Mr. Steven Garfinkel
Director
Information Security Oversight Office
Washington, D.C. 20405
Dear Mr. Garfinkel:
Thank you for your letter of today clarifying the intention
behind the Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement,
Standard Form 189.
Attached to your letter were three enclosures: one defining
the term "classifiable information; another explaining the
language differences between SF 189, for Federal employees,
and SF 189-A, for contract employees; and another stating
that pre-publication review is not required under SF-189.
These enclosures interpret SF 189 in a manner consistent
with my understanding of the intention of the form.
Your letter states that the ambiguities in SF 189 can be
remedied through a directive issued by your office. I urge
you to issue such a directive containing the same
interpretations as are contained in the enclosures to your
letter. While I agree with you that it would not be
prudent to attempt to get two million employees to execute
new forms without the ambiguous language, I recommend that
a new form be issued to be signed by new employees. If
these recommendations were adopted, new employees would
sign a new nondisclosure agreement which is clear as to
what is covered. Pre-existing employees would be subject
to existing form SF 189, as clarified by the regulations
which you said your office could issue.
I truly appreciate your efforts to clarify the meaning of
the Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement. Please
inform me as to what steps you take as a result of this.
With kind regards,
Sincerely yours,
Pat Achoeder
PATRICIA SCHROEDER
Chairwoman
Information Security Oversight Office
Washington, DC 20405
July 13, 1987
Dear Madam Chairwoman:
Thank you for your letter of July 6, concerning the Standard
Form 189, "Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement." I
very much appreciate the opportunity to express directly the
views of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), which
is responsible for issuing and overseeing executive branch imple-
mentation of the nondisclosure agreement, rather than being
"quoted" by third parties. Pleased be assured that your under-
standing of the issues that you raise from Chairman Sikorski's
letter remain as we understood them when the Subcommittee on
Civil Service reviewed the SF 189 in 1983. I address these
issues as an attachment to this letter.
Since we last discussed the SF 189, approximately two
million civilian and military personnel have executed it, and
thousands more are signing the agreement each day. As of the end
of FY 1986, 70% of the agencies that create or handle national
security information reported 100% compliance with the require-
ment to have all cleared personnel sign either the SF 189 or an
alternative nondisclosure agreement approved by the National
Security Council. Since then, we are much closer to achieving
100% compliance in every agency. We have accomplished this
mammoth task with a minimal amount of controversy and disruption.
-2-
While a few persons have suggested that there are conflicts
or discrepancies within certain provisions of the SF 189, I
believe that, at worst, there are ambiguities that can be
resolved rather easily. For example, under Executive Order
12356, "National Security Information," ISOO issues directives or
regulations that have Government-wide application. ISOO could
issue a regulatory provision that states explicitly that
"information" in paragraph 7 of the SF 189 refers exclusively to
"classified information." Further, ISOO could include within
this regulation a definition of "classifiable" that would express
authoritatively the limits of its application.
On the other hand, taking a drastic step such as suspending
the SF 189 would unnecessarily void four years and millions upon
millions of dollars of effort. It would halt a worthwhile
program a few steps short of its completion. Finally, it would
send out a most regrettable message: that the unlawful disclosure
of our nation's secrets is a lesser threat than a few semantic
ambiguities in a lawful agreement designed to help prevent these
disclosures.
I look forward to working with you and your staff to seek
reasonable solutions to any problems that may exist within the
nondisclosure agreement program.
Sincerely,
(signed) Steven Garfinkel
Steven Garfinkel
Director
The Honorable
Patricia Schroeder
Chairwoman
Subcommittee on Civil Service
Committee on Post Office
and Civil Service
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Enclosures
"CLASSIFIABLE" INFORMATION
"Classifiable" refers to information that meets all the
tests for classified information under Executive Order 12356,
"National Security Information," but which, as a result of
negligence, time constraints, error, lack of opportunity or
oversight, has not been marked as classified information. A
person would violate the agreement if he disclosed without
authorization information that he knew, or reasonably should have
known, was classified, although it had not yet been marked as
such. For example, a person attending a classified meeting
should reasonably know that his unmarked notes of that meeting
may not be disclosed to a person who doesn't have a clearance and
a "need-to-know" that information.
"Classifiable" information, as defined above, has long been
a particular concern of the Intelligence Community. This term or
similar terms have appeared in nondisclosure agreements used by
intelligence agencies for many years preceding its inclusion in
the SF 189. In testimony before a Senate subcommittee studying
National Security Decision Directive 84, which mandated the
creation of a standardized classified information nondisclosure
agreement, former CIA Director William Colby alluded to the fact
that raw intelligence data are often unmarked as classified when
they are first received. The collection of raw intelligence
often occurs in circumstances that do not permit the formalities
of classification markings. Nevertheless, this intelligence
often involves some of the most sensitive information within the
Government, such as the names of intelligence sources.
Also, with respect to the term "classifiable," the question
has been raised about a person being sanctioned for violating the
nondisclosure agreement by disclosing information that was
clearly unclassified at the time of disclosure, but was
classified subsequent to the disclosure. In almost every
hypothetical fact pattern, the prior disclosure would not be a
violation of the SF 189. However, it is possible to construct a
hypothetical in which it may be. For example, suppose an
employee has been informed by his supervisor, who is not an
authorized original classifier, that particular unclassified
information has been referred to an original classifier for
classification action. If the information is classified as a
result of this referral, the employee would very likely violate
the agreement should he disclose it without authorization in the
interim. Because we can hypothesize fact patterns such as this,
we cannot state conclusively that the disclosure of unclassified
information would never amount to a violation of the SF 189.
At the suggestion of the Department of Defense (DoD), the
SF 189-A was developed three years after the issuance of the
SF 189 to facilitate the execution of nondisclosure agreements
among non-Government personnel who require access to classified
information. The DOD implements the Defense Industrial Security
Program (DISP), which establishes standards for and oversees the
maintenance of classified information within industry, both for
the DOD itself and for approximately 18 other executive branch
agencies that subscribe to the DISP. In drafting the SF 189-A,
ISOO sought to revise only those provisions in which the
differences between the respective standing of Government and
contractor employees, vis-a-vis classified information, warranted
modifications. For example, ISOO excluded from the SF 189-A a
reference to a criminal statute that listed only Government
employees as potential violators.
The reference to "classifiable" information in paragraph 1
of the SF 189 was omitted from the SF 189-A because contractors
do not have the authority to classify information originally.
All contractor classification actions should result from
instructions provided explicitly by an authorized original
classifier from within the contracting agency. It is the
Government's responsibility to designate, as explicitly as
possible, what information is classified and what information is
not classified in the performance of a classified contract. As
the DoD suggested to ISOO, contractor employees could very
reasonably object to the inclusion of the word "classifiable"
because it suggests discretion where no discretion exists, i.e.,
the classification of information by industry.
Although ISOO still had some reservations about deleting the
term "classifiable" from the SF 189-A, another important factor
ultimately led to its decision to do SO. As noted above, concern
over "classifiable" information is most prominent within the
Intelligence Community. Contractor employees of both the Central
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency are required
to sign nondisclosure agreements that are more stringent than
either the SF 189 or the SF 189-A, and these agreements contain
references to "classifiable" information or similar terms that go
beyond the mere reference to "classified information." This fact
convinced ISOO that it was reasonable to delete the term "clas-
sifiable" from the SF 189-A, and the Department of Justice, in an
enforceability review of the draft form, concurred.
2
The third sentence of paragraph 7 reads in part: "I agree
that I shall return all materials which have, or may have, come
into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such
access
" For the same reasons addressed above, it is clear
that "all materials," by definition, refers only to "classified"
materials. It is far less clear what is meant by the phrase, "or
may have. The current language of this phrase was suggested by
the Department of Justice after the interagency drafting group
had completed its work on what was to become the SF 189. A
detailed review of the records also reveals that the Department
suggested slightly different, but far clearer language for. the
comparable provision of a standardized Sensitive Compartmented
Information Nondisclosure Agreement that was later withdrawn by
the White House: "I agree that I shall return all materials which
have or may come into my possession or for which I am responsible
because of such access It now appears that Justice
intended that the phrase "may have come" should actually have
read "may come" in what was to become the SF 189 as well.
At worst, these phrases are simply troublesome ambiguities.
They can be clarified by modifying the ISOO regulation
implementing the SF 189 and SF 189-A, or by ISOO issuing a
clarification letter to all agencies.
3
PREPUBLICATION REVIEW
The SF 189 contains no requirement for prepublication
review. This omission resulted from the specific design of its
drafters, since NSDD-84 was silent on the inclusion or non-
inclusion of a prepublication review provision for this
nondisclosure agreement.
The ability of the Government to seek injunctive relief to
prevent the publication of classified information is not an
implied imposition of a blanket prepublication requirement. It
is ludicrous to suggest that the Government, if it is aware that
an employee or former employee is about to disclose classified
information, should not consider every lawful means to protect
the nation's security. However, the possibility of infrequently
seeking injunctive relief in no practical or even theoretical
sense equates to mandatory prepublication review for every
publication of every signer of the SF 189.
4
5818
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
ACTION
August 10, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN, JR.
FROM:
BARRY KELLY
SUBJECT:
Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement
Attached at Tab I is a draft response which was prepared by
Steven Garfinkel (Tab II), from you to himself as Director,
Information Security Oversight Office.
By letter dated June 24, 1987, Congressman Gerry Sikorski wrote
Frank Carlucci expressing concern regarding implementation of
NSDD 84 requiring all civil servants to sign a Classified
Information Nondisclosure Agreement (SF 189), parts of which his
committee found to contain "ambiguities and inconsistencies, as
well as vague and questionable terms." A response was approved
by Frank Carlucci (Tab III), clarifying the issues raised by
Congressman Sikorski. We have learned that Sikorski has
indicated his interest in holding joint hearings with Chairwoman
Patricia Schroeder of the Subcommittee on Civil Service, who
shared some of Sikorski's concerns about SF 189.
By letter (Tab IV) dated July 13, 1987, Chairwoman Schroeder
makes clear that she is prepared to drop this matter if ISOO
takes the regulatory steps, i.e., the submission of a directive
to make non-substantive regulatory clarifications as were
proposed in Steven Garfinkel's letter to her dated July 13, 1987,
(Tab V) and suggested in their draft response to Congressman
Sikorski.
Under these circumstances, Garfinkel believes that it is critical
that we act promptly and affirmatively to help defuse this issue
by making the non-substantive regulatory clarifications that we
have proposed. He further believes that it would be beneficial
if the recommendation to ISOO to proceed with these regulatory
changes comes from the NSC. We agree with Garfinkel.
Brenda Reger, Paul PM Stevens and Alison Fortier concur.
LLS
ABF
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the draft response to Garfinkel at Tab I.
Approve
6
Disapprove
Attachments
Prepared by. ofen John F. Lewis
Tab I
Memo to Garfinkel
Tab II
Incoming from Garfinkel
Tab III
Carlucci's Letter to Sikorski
Tab IV
Schroeder's Letter to Garfinkel
Tab V
Garfinkel's Letter to Schroeder
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
03. Letter
For Mr Green From: Steven Garfinkel
7/6/87
(b)(1)
C
Re: Advisory Notice (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
UNCLASSIFIED
Proposed Change to ISOO Directive No. 1
§ 2001.43 Storage
*
*
*
(a) Minimum requirements for physical barriers.
(1) Top Secret. Top Secret information shall be
stored in a GSA-approved security container with
an approved, built-in, three-position, dial-type
changeable combination lock; in a vault protected
by an alarm system and response force; or in other
types of storage facilities that meet the standards
for Top Secret established under the provisions of
§ 2001.41. For Top Secret information stored
outside the United States, one or more of the
following supplementary controls is required:
(i) the area that houses the security container
or vault shall be subject to the continuous
protection of quard or duty personnel; (ii) guard
or duty personnel shall inspect the security
container or vault at least once every two hours;
or (iii) the security container or vault shall be
controlled by an alarm system to which a force will
respond in person within 15 minutes. In addition,
heads of agencies shall prescribe those supplementary
controls deemed necessary to restrict unauthorized
access to areas in which such information is stored.
UNCLASSIFIED
4935
BARBARA BOXER
307 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
6TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA
(202) 225-5161
DISTRICT OFFICES:
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
450 GOLDEN GATE AVENUE
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102
(415) 626-6943
MMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
88 BELVEDERE STREET
SAN RAFAEL, CA 94901
SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN,
Congress of the United States
(415) 457-7272
YOUTH, AND FAMILIES
421 STARR AVENUE
house of Representatives
VALLEJO, CA 94590
(707) 552-0720
WHIP AT LARGE
Washington, DC 20515
SONOMA
(707) 763-6033
June 23, 1987
Mr. Grant S. Green, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Mr. Green:
I am requesting a copy of of National Security Decision
Directive 197 and the cover memo that accompanied it. I understand
the directive was signed in November, 1985 and part of it had to do
with requiring federal employees to report any contacts with persons
from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Communist China and numerous
other "countries of concern."
I would also like any documents that may have been issued by the
National Security Council that may further explain and clarify the
precise meaning and parameters of the directive. I am interested in
this because I have received a letter from a union representing
federal employees of the Treasury Department in my district, who are
concerned that they will be held responsible for reporting all and
any contacts, including contacts with relatives, with the public as
part of their day to day business, and even contacts with employees
of restaurants who are immigrants of those countries.
I look forward to your prempt reply.
Member of Congress
BB:dm
4935
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 4, 1987
Dear Representative Boxer:
In response to your June 23, 1987 letter, I am forwarding to you
a copy of National Security Decision Directive 197, entitled
"Reporting Hostile Contacts and Security Awareness."
I note your concerns about the alleged possible impact on
Treasury Department employees and would encourage you to contact
the Department directly on that matter. I understand that
Mr. Larry B. Sheafe, Director, Office of Security, Department of
Treasury (Telephone 343-0260) is in a position to provide further
details in this regard.
Sincerely,
Attachments
CC: Executive Secretary,
Department of Treasury
The Honorable Barbara Boxer
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
UNCLASSIFIED
November 1, 1985
REPORTING HOSTILE CONTACTS AND SECURITY AWARENESS
In addition to measures presently in place to provide for
physical, information and personnel security against the
hostile intelligence threat, the provisions of this directive
will enhance overall government efforts to protect against
illegal or unauthorized acquisition by hostile intelligence
services interest. of information and technology vital to our national
Many agencies, particularly those directly involved in the
United States intelligence effort, foreign affairs and military
matters, have well-developed programs designed to maintain a
high level of security awareness and to examine relationships
of their employees with foreign nationals. Agencies whose
primary mission requires that they maintain classified or
otherwise sensitive information, while attractive targets for
hostile foreign interests, are by no means the only agencies
which are vulnerable to the loss of information or technology
which may be critical to the ability of the United States to
protect itself.
Responsibility for Security
Each department or agency of the US Government shall establish
procedures which will:
-
Create and maintain a formalized security awareness
program designed to ensure a high level of awareness among its
employees of the potential threat to its propriety, sensitive
and classified information from foreign sources, whether overt
or covert. This program must include a periodic formal brief-
ing of the threat posed by hostile intelligence services.
-
Provide for the reporting, under defined circum-
stances, of employee contacts with nationals of certain foreign
countries or political entities as hereafter specified.
The nature and extent of this program will be commensurate with
the potential for foreign interest in not only the classified
information holdings of the department or agency, but also in
its technological or other sensitive activities. The program
should be tailored to meet the particular functions of the
agency or department and the vulnerability of certain categories
eclassitied/Released on 1/15/86
Released
under provisions of E.O. 12356
Full Text of
by D. Reger, National
curity Counci!
UNCLASSIFIED
NSDD 197
of employees who, through either their job functions or access
to classified or sensitive information or technology, invite
targeting or exploitation by foreign intelligence services.
The program should be designed SO as not to intrude into the
privacy of employees or into their freedom of association.
Reporting of Hostile Contacts
Each department or agency shall establish procedures which
require its employees to report certain contacts.
-
These procedures will require reporting of all
contacts with individuals of any nationality, either within or
which: outside the scope of the employee's official activities, in
Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to
classified or otherwise sensitive information.
The employee is concerned that he or she may be
the target of an attempted exploitation by a foreign entity.
-
The procedures will also require reporting of any
contacts with nationals of the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc
countries as well as other specific foreign countries or
foreign political entities, which are determined by the depart-
ment or agency in coordination with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as being of particular relevance to its security
concerns. In implementing this procedure, the security officer
or designated official of the department or agency will review
and evaluate the reported information in accordance with the
standards for reporting. The designation of particular coun-
tries as being of greater concern will provide a basis for the
security officer or designated official to judge the relative
importance of a particular contact. Any facts or circumstances
of a reported contact with a hostile country which appear to
(1) indicate an attempt or intention to obtain unauthorized
access to proprietary, sensitive and classified information,
(2) which appear to offer a reasonable potential for such, or
(3) indicate the possibility of continued professional or
personal contacts, shall be reported promptly by the respon-
sible department or agency to the FBI in the case of employees
located in the United States and to the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) in the case of employees located overseas. The
CIA in turn will inform the FBI as appropriate.
Other Intelligence or Investigative Interests
Nothing in this directive is intended to modify the authority
and responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence or
the Central Intelligence Agency for counterintelligence abroad,
nor does it in any way change existing procedures or agreements
between CIA and the Department of State and other U.S. agencies
UNCLASSITIED
UNCLASSIMED
regarding the reporting of hostile contacts outside the U.S.
Neither does it preclude interagency agreements or directives
affecting the relationship between the FBI and other intelli-
gence or investigative agencies regarding their responsibility
for personnel, physical or document security or their terri-
torial jurisdiction.
Review of Procedures
The head of each agency or department will provide à copy of
its Security Awareness program and its procedures for reporting
hostile contacts to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs for review by December 1, 1985.
UNCLASSIFIED
3866
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 21, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR NSC STAFF
FROM:
GRANT S. GREEN
S
SUBJECT:
Security Survey
In support of the National Security Advisor's goal of improving
security within the NSC, the position of Director of Security
Programs has been established under the Directorate of
Information Policy and Security Review. The person selected to
fill the position is Dorrance P. Howland who joined us last week.
The Director of Security will be conducting an in-depth security
survey of the NSC. Our physical, personnel and technical
security procedures will be examined, and where necessary,
recommendations will be made, and corrective action implemented.
Also, a system of documenting security procedures will be
established.
Frank strongly supports the need for this action. We believe the
NSC should not only provide our staff with the necessary guidance
to establish a sense of confidence that our actions are
consistent with good security, but should serve as a model for
others within the national security community. I request your
cooperation in these efforts to improve the security posture of
the NSC.
MORANDUM
1002 Add-on
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 25, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISTOPHER HICKS
FROM:
W. ROBERT PEARSON
WRP
SUBJECT:
Additional Information Reference the Installation
of Cipher Locks
Per a telephone conversation on April 16, 1985, the following
information responds to your further questions concerning our
memorandum of April 1.
Cost for Restoration of Doorways (Removal of Cipher Locks)
$230 per doorway
$5,980 for 26 doorways
control. Entrances * where staffing could possibly ensure constant access
Suite 351
Suite 365
Suite 368
Suite 392
* We are concerned that eliminating cipher locks from these four
doorways is a risky way to proceed, but would be happy to work
with you on any of these questions. We believe the Secret
Service has made it clear that this type of access control
would not be acceptable to them when PROFS is installed.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04. Memorandum
For Christopher Hicks From: Robert Kimmitt
4/1/85
(b)(1)
C
Re: Security (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
05. Paper
Re: US Intelligence Community Physical Security Standards
n.d.
(b)(1)
(10 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
06. Memorandum
For Edward Wilson From: Paul Thompson
11/1/84
(b)(1)
C
Re: Security Requirements (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
07. Memorandum
For Security Officer From: Technical Security Division
1/18/84
(b)(1)
C
Re: Security Survey (3 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
Contract NS4C02
Page 12 of 12
Optional (Continued)
( ) Government-Furnished Property (Short Form)
52.245-04
( 1 Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature-Alternate I
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature-Alternate II
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature-Alternate III
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature-Alternate IV
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Noncamplex Nature-Alternate V
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Complex Nature
52.246-18
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Complex Nature-Alternate I
52.246-18
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Complex Nature-Alternate II
52.246-18
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Complex Nature-Alternate III
52.246-18
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Complex Nature-Alternate IV
52.246-18
( ) Warranty of Systems and Equipment under Performance
52.246-19
Specifications or Design Criteria
( ) Warranty of Systems and Equipment under Performance
52.246-19
Specifications or Design Criteria-Alternate I
( ) Warranty of Systems and Equipment under Performance
52.246-19
Specifications or Design Criteria-Alternate II
( ) Warranty of Systems and Equipment under Performance
52.246-19
Specifications or Design Criteria-Alternate III
( ) Limitation of Liability
52.246-33
(REMAINDER OF PAGE NOT USED.)
contract NS4C02
Page 11 of 12
SECTION I - CONTRACT CLAUSES (CONTINUED)
( ) Report of Shipment (REPSHIP)
52.242-12
52.243-07
( ) Notification of Changes
( ) Subcontracts Under Fixed-Price Contracts
52.244-01
( ) Subcontracts Under Fixed-Price Contracts-Alternate I
52.244-01
( ) Competition in Subcontracting
52.244-05
52.245-01
( ) Property Records
( ) Government Property (Fixed-Price Contracts)
52.245-02
( ) Government Property (Fixed-Price Contracts). -
52.245-02
Alternate I
52.245-09
( ) Use and Charges
52.245-17
( ) Special Tooling
( ) Special Tooling-Alternate I
52.245-17
52.245-18
( ) Special Test Eauipment
( ) Government Property Furnished "As Is"
52.245-19
( ) Limitation of Liability
52.246-23
( ) Limitation of Liability-High-Value Items
52.246-24
( ) Limitation of Liability-High-Value Items-Alternate I
52.246-24
( ) Commercial Bill of Lading Notations
52.247-01
( ) Preference for U.S.-Flag Air Carriers
52.247-63
( ) Preference for Privately Owned U.S.-Flag Commercial
52.247-64
Vessels
( ) Preference for Privately Owned U.S.-Flag Commercial
52.247-64
Vessels-Alternate I
52.248-01
( ) Value Engineering
( ) Value Engineering-Altermate I
52.248-01
( ) Value Engineering-Alternate II
52.248-01
( ) Value Engineering-Altemate III
52.248-01
( ) Termination for Convenience of the Government
52.249-01
(Fixed-Price) (Short-Term)
(X) Termination for Convenience of the Government
52.249-02
(Fixed-Price)
( ) Termination for Convenience of the Government
52.249-02
(Fixed-Price)-Alternate I
(X) Default (Fixed-Price Supply and Service)
52.249-08
( ) Indemnification Under Public Law 85-804
52.250-01
52.251-01
( ) Government Supply Sources
( ) Government Supply Sources-Alternate I
52.251-01
Optional
( ) Economic Price Adjustment-Labor and Material
52.216-04
( ) Incentive Subcontracting Program for Small and
52.219-10
Disadvantaged Business Concerns
52.232-17
( ) Interest
52.243-06
( ) Change Order Accounting
CL Subcontracts Under Fixed-Price Contracts
52.244-01
CL Subcontracts Under Fixed-Price Contracts-Alternate I
52.244-01
Contract NS4C02
Pag: 10 of 12
SECTION I - CONTRACT CLAUSES (CONTINUED)
( ) Affirmative Action for Handicapped Workers-Altermate I
52.222-36
(x) Clean Air and Water
52.223-02
( ) Hazardous Material Identification and Material Safety
52.223-03
Data
( ) Privacy Act Notification
52.224-01
( ) Privacy Act
52.224-02
( ) Buy American Act-Supplies
52.225-03
( ) Balance of Payments Program
52.225-07
( ) Buy American Act-Trade Agreements Act-Balance of
52.225-09
Payments Program
( ) Duty-Free Entry
52.225-10
( ) Certain Comunist Areas
52.225-11
( ) Bid Guarantee
52.228-01
( ) Additional Bond Security
52.228-02
( ) Insurance-Work on a Government Installation
52.228-05
(X) Federal, State, and Local Taxes
52.229-03
() Federal, State, and Local Taxes (Noncompetive
52.229-04
Contract)
( ) Taxes-Contracts Performed in U.S. Possessions or
52.229-05
Puerto Rico
( ) Taxes-Foreign Fixed-Price Contracts
52.229-06
( ) Taxes-Fixed-Price Contracts with Foreign Governments
52.229-07
( ) Cost Accounting Standards
52.230-03
( ) Administration of Cost Accounting Standards
52.230-04
( ) Disclosure and Consistency of Cost Accounting Practices
52.230-05
( ) Consistency in Cost Accounting Practices
52.230-06
( ) Payments
52.232-01
( ) Discounts for Prompt Payment
52.232-08
( ) Limitation on Withholding of Payments
52.232-09
( ) Extras
52.232-11
( ) Progress Payments
52.232-16
( ) Progress Payments-Alternate I
52.232-16
( ) Interest
52.232-17
( / Availability of Funds
52.232-18
( ) Assignment of Claims
52.232-23
( ) Assignment of Claims-Alternate I
52.232-23
( ) Prohibition of Assignment of Claims
52.232-24
(X) Disputes
52.233-01
( ) Disputes-Alternate I
52.233-01
(x) Protection of Government Buildings, Equipment, and
52.237-02
Vegetation
( ) Notice of Intent to Disallow Costs
52.242-01
( ) Production Progress Reports
52.242-02
( ) F.o.b. Origin-Government Bills of Lading or Prepaid
52.242-10
Postage
( ) F.o.b. Origin-Goverment Bills of Lading or Indicia Mail 52.242-11
( ) Advance Payments
52,232-12
() Advance Payments-Alternate I
52.232-12
( ) Advance Payments-Alternate III
52.232-12
( ) Advance Payments-Alternate IV
52.232-12
Contract NS4C02
Page 9 12
SECTION I CONTRACT CLAUSES (CONTINUED)
( ) Subcontractor Cost or Pricing Data
52.215-24
( ) Subcontractor Cost or Pricing Data--Modifications
52.215-25
( ) Facilities Capital Cost of Money
52.215-30
( [ Waiver of Facilities Capital Cost of Money
52.215-31
( ) Price Redetermination-Prospective
52.216-05
( ) Price Redetemination-Retrcactive
52.216-06
( ) Incentive Price Revision-Firm Target
52.216-16
( ) Incentive Price Revision-Firm Target-Alternate I
52.216-16
( ) Incentive Price Revision-Successive Targets
52.216-17
( ) Incentive Price Revision-Successive Targets--
52.216-17
Alternate I
( L Execution and Commencement of Work
52.216-23
CL Limitation of Government Liability
52.216-24
CL Contract Definitization
52.216-25
€ I Contract Definitization-Alternate I
52.216-25
( ) Limitation of Price and Contractor Obligations
52.217-01
CL Cancellation of Items
52.217-02
CL Cancellation of Items-Alternate I
52.217-02
CL Option for Increased Quantity
52.217-06
CL Option for Increased Quantity-Separately Priced
52.217-07
Line Item
CL Notice of Total Small Business-Labor Surplus
52.219-05
Area Set-Aside
( ≤ Notice of Total Small Business Set-Aside
52.219-06
CL Notice of Partial Small Business Set-Aside
52.219-07
X Utilization of Small Business Concerns and Small
52.219-08
Disadvantaged Business Concerns
CL Small Business and Small Disadvantaged Business
52.219-09
Subcontracting Plan
( ) Small Business and Small Disadvantaged Business
52.219-09
Subcontracting Plan-Alternate I
(X). Utilization of Women-Owned Small Businesses
52.219-13
X Preference for Labor Surplus Area Concerns
52.220-01
( ): Notice of Total Labor Surplus Area Set-Aside
52.220-02
(x) Luilization of Labor Surplus Area Concerns
52.220-03
( ) Labor Surplus Area Subcontracting Program
52.220-04
CL Notice to the Government of Labor Disputes
52.222-01
X Convict Labor
52.222-03
( ) Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards-Overtime
52.222-04
Compensation+-General
( ) Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards-Overtine
52.222-05
Compensation-Firefighters and Fireguards
( ). Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act
52.222-20
(x) Equal Opportunity
52.222-26
( ) Equal Opportunity-+Alternate I
52.222-26
( ) Equal Opportunity Preaward Clearance of Subcontracts
52.222-28
() Notification of Visa Dental
52.222-29
(X) Affirmative Action for Special Disabled and
52.222-35
Vietnam Era Veterans
( ) Affirmative Action for Special Disabled and
52.222-35
Vietnam Era Veterans-Alternate I
(X) Affirmative Action for Handicapped Workers
52.222-36
Contract NS4C02
Page 8 of 12
SECTION I - CONTRACT CLAUSES
I-1 CONTRACT CLAUSES FOR FIXED-PRICE SUPPLY CONTRACTS
The following contract clauses (indicated by an "X" in the left hand column)
are hereby incorporated by reference, with the same force and effect as if
they were given in full text. Upon request, the Contracting Officer will
make their full text available.
Title
FAR Citation*
(X) Definitions
52.202-01
(X) Covenant Against Contingent Fees
52.203-05
(X) Changes-Fixed-Price
52.243-01
(x) Officials Not to Benefit
52.203-01
(x) Gratuities
52.203-03
( ) Approval of Contract
52.204-01
( ) Security Requirements
52.204-02
( ) Right of First Refusal of Employment
52.207-03
( ) Required Sources for Jewel Bearings and Related Items
52.208-01
( ) First Article Approval-Contractor Testing
52.209-03
( ) First Article Approval-Contractor Testing-
52.209-03
Alternate I
( ) First Article Approval-Contractor Testing-
52.209-03
Alternate II
( ) First Article Approval-Government Testing
52.209-04
( ) First Article Approval-Government Testing-
52.209-04
Alternate I
( ) First Article Approval-Government Testing-
52.209-04
Alternate II
( ) New Material
52.210-05
( ) Used or Reconditioned Material, Residual Inventory,
52.210-07
and Former Government Surplus Property
( ) Priorities, Allocations, and Allotments
52.212-08
( ) Fast Payment Procedure
52-213-01
( ) Audit-Formal Advertising
52.214-26
( ) Price Reduction for Defective Cost or Pricing Data-
52.214-27
Modifications-Formal Advertising
( ) Subcontractor Cost or Pricing Data-Modifications-
52.214-28
Formal Advertising
( ) Examination of Records by Comptroller General
52.215-01
( ) Audit-Negotiation
52.215-02
( ) Changes or Additions to Make-or-Buy Program
52.215-21
( ) Changes or Additions to Make-or-Buy Program-
52.215-21
Alternate I
( ) Changes or Additions to Make-or-Buy Program-
52.215-21
Alternate II
( ) Price Reduction for Defective Cost or Pricing Data
52.215-22
( ) Price Reduction for Defective Cost or Pricing Data-
52.215-23
Modifications
*"FAR Citation" refers to the Federal Acquistion Regulation (48 CFR-
Chapter 1).
Contract NS4C02
Page 7 of 12
CTION H - SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS
NTRACT ORDER OF PRECEDENCE
In the event of an inconsistency between the provisions of this contract, the
inconsistency shall be resolved by giving precedence in the following order: (a) the
Schedule (excluding the Specifications) ; (b) Terms and Conditions of the Solicitation,
if any; (c) General Provisions; (d) other provisions of the contract, when attached
or incorporated by reference; (e) the Specifications; and (f) such portions of the
Contractor's Technical Proposal as may be incorporated into the contract.
(REMAINDER OF PAGE NOT USED.)
Contract NS4C02
Page 6 of 12
SECTION G - CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA (CONTINUED)
Executive Office of the President
National Security Council
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Rm. 397, CEOB
Washington, D.C. 20500
ATTN: Mary Dix
Phone:
(202) 395- 6868
Each invoice must include:
A. Contract number
B. Description of product or service
provided
C. Serial Numbers of Machines (if
applicable)
D. Unit Prices of each item
E. Total amount of invoice
F.
Payment terms
G. Name, title, phone number and
complete mailing address of
responsible official to whom
payment is to be sent.
(REMAINDER OF PAGE NOT USED)
Contract NS4C02
Page 5 of 12
SECTION G - CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION (CONTINUED)
No new work assignments, which would require the employment
of additional personnel, or which would increase or de-
crease the estimated costs or period of performance, or
affect any provision of this contract, may be made without
approval of the Contracting Officer. Program and work
modifications will, however, be expected as essential to
the conduct of an effective information management program,
responsible to changing needs of management and staff
in a dynamic work environment. Such modifications will
be accommodated by adjustments in existing programs,
mutually agreed upon by the Contracting Officer's Technical
Representative (COTR) and the Contractor. Work to be per-
formed under this contract shall be subject to the
technical direction of the COTR.
If, in the opinion of the contractor, any instruction
or direction issued by the COTR is not provided for in
any of the clauses of the contract, the contractor
shall not proceed but shall notify the Contracting
Officer in writing within five (5) working days after
the receipt of any such instruction or direction and
shall request the Contracting Officer to modify the
contract accordingly. Upon receiving such notification
from the contractor, the Contracting Officer shall
issue an appropriate contract modification or advise
the contractor in writing that, in his/her opinion, the
technical direction is within the scope of this clause
and does not constitute a change under the Changes Clause
of the contract. The contractor shall thereupon proceed
immediately with the direction given.
A fcs lure of the parties to agree upon the nature of the
instruction or direction or upon the contract action to be
taken with respect thereto shall be subject to the pro-
vision of the contract clause entitled "Disputes."
G.4
AYMENT
In return for satisfactory performance and compliance with
the terms and conditions of this contract, the Government
will pay the Contractor upon submission by the Contractor
of an invoice in an criginal and two copies. Invoices
should be sent to the following address for certification
prior to payment:
Contract NS4C02
Page 4 of 12
SECTION G - CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA ( CONTINUED)
(4) performing technical inspections and acceptances
required by this contract; and (5) assisting the
Contractor in the resolution of technical problems
encountered during performance. The Contracting
Officer is responsible for directing or negotiating
any changes in the terms, conditions, or amounts cited
in the contract.
d. For guidance from the COTR to the Contractor to be
valid, it must: (1) be consistent with the descrip-
tion of the work set forth in the contract; (2) not
constitute new assignments of work or change to the
expressed terms, conditions, or specifications
incorporated into this contract; (3) not constitute a
basis for an extension to the period of performance
or contract delivery schedule; (4) not constitute a
basis for any increase in the contract cost.
e. On all matters that pertain to the contract terms the
Contractor must communicate with the Contracting
Officer. Whenever, in the opinion of the Contractor,
the COTR requests effort outside the scope of this
contract, the Contractor should so advise the COTR.
If the COTR persists and there still exists a dis-
agreement as to the proper contractual coverage, the
Contracting Officer should be notified immediately,
preferably in writing if time permits. Proceeding
with work without proper contractual coverage could
result in non-payment or necessitate the submittal
of costly claims under the contract.
f. The COTR may be changed by the Government at any time
without prior notice to the Contractor. Written
notice to the Contractor will be given by the
Contracting Officer to effect any change in COTR (s).
G.3. TECHNICAL DIRECTION
Technical Direction, as used herein, will be the overseeing
of the Contractor and its staff to insure compliance with
all of the items in the contract. It will include
elaboration of the Specifications (Section C) by filling
in details or otherwise completing the general description
of work set forth by the contract schedule.
Contract NS4C02
Page 3 of 12
SECTION G - CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION
G.1 CONTRACTUAL INFORMATION
Contractual interpretation and assistance may be obtained
by contacting:
Executive Office of the President
Office of Administration
Procurement and Contracts
Room 498, OEOB
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
ATTN: Nancy Roth
Phone: (202) 395-3314
G.2 CONTRACTING OFFICER'S TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE
a. The Contracting Officer hereby designates the below
named individual as the COTR:
Name:
Mary Dix
Address:
Executive Office of the President
National Security Council
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Room 397, CEOB
Washington, D.C. 20500
Phone:
(202) 395-6868
b. The COTR is responsible for administering the
performance of work under this contract. In no
event, however, will any understanding, agreement,
modification, change order, or other matter deviating
from the terms of this contract be effective or bind-
ing upon the Government unless formalized by proper
contractual documents executed by the Contracting
Officer prior to completion of the contract.
C. The COTR is responsible for: (1) monitoring the
Contractor's technical progress, including the
surveillance and assessment of performance and
recommending to the Contracting Officer changes in
requirements; (2) interpreting the scope of work;
(3) performing technical evaluation as required;
Contract NS4CL?
Page 2 of 12
SECTION B - SUPPLIES SERVICES AND PRICES
The Contractor shall install a permissive entry device on 26 main
entrances of National Security Offices
Codetronics model 1999 with key override
(26 each at $2,700.00 each)
TOTAL COST $70,200.00
Remote access capability and associated
electrical requirements
(26 each at $300.00 each)
TOTAL
$7,800.00
TOTAL COST -
$78,000.00
SECTION C - SPECIFICATIONS
(NOT APPLICABLE)
SECTION D - PACKAGING AND MARKING
(NOT APPLICABLE)
SECTION E - INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE
This section incorporates the following contract clauses by
reference, with the same force and effect as if they were
given in full text. Upon request, the Contracting Officer
will make their full text available.
TITLE
FAR CITATION*
Inspection of Supplies -
Fixed Price
52.246-02
Inspection of Services -
Fixed Price
52.246-04
*FAR Citation refers to the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(48 CFR, Chapter 1)
SECTION F - DELIVERIES AND PERFORMANCE
The Contractor shall deliver and install the entry devices within eight (8)
months after contract award at the installations indicated by Mary Dix of
the National Security Council.
Control #003-0006
NSC
RATING
PAGE OF PAGES
AWARD/CONTRAC.
1. CERTIFIED FOR NATIONAL DEF. SE
1
12
UNDER BOSA REG. 2 AND/OR OMS REG. 1
2. CONTRACT (Proc. (not Ident.) NO.
3. EFFECTIVE DATE
4. REQUISITION/PURCHASE REQUEST/PROJECT NO.
NS4C02
9/26/84
RNS306
JED BY
6. ADMINISTERED BY (If other than Item 51
CODE
CODE
Executive Office of the President
Ofc. of Admin., Admin. Operations Div.,
Procurement and Contracts, Rm. 498, CEOBO
Washington, D.C. 20500
ATTN: Nancy Roth, (202) 395-3314
7. NAME AND ADDRESS OF CONTRACTOR (No., street, city, county, State and ZIP Code)
8. DELIVERY
FOB ORIGIN
OTHER (See below)
X
9. DISCOUNT FOR PROMPT PAYMENT
Suburban Contractors, Inc.
8456 Tyco Road
Vienna, VA 22180
Net - 30 days
10. SUBMIT INVOICES
ITEM
(4 copies unless other
wise specified) TO THE
Par. G-4
CODE
FACILITY CODE
ADDRESS SHOWN IN:
11. SHIP TO/MARK FOR
12. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY
CODE
Executive Ofc. of the President, Ofc. of Ad
National Security Council
min., Financial Mgmt. Div., 726 Jackson Pl.,
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Rm. 397
N.W., Rm. 4005, NEOB, Washington, D.C. 2050C
OEOB, Washington, D.C. 20500
14. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA
13. THIS
A. ADVERTISED
ACQUISITION
B. NEGOTIATED PURSUANT TO:
94 $21,060.00
(Firm fixed
WAS: (Check
appL box(s))
X
10 USC 2304(a)( 10
41 USC 252(c)( )
1142000 OC: 76 $58,940.00
price)
15A. ITEM NO.
15B. SUPPLIES/SERVICES
15C. QUANTITY
15D. UNIT
15E. UNIT PRICE
15F. AMOUNT
(See Section - Page 2)
15G. TOTAL AMOUNT OF CONTRACT
$78,000.00
16. TABLE OF CONTENTS
()
SEC.
DESCRIPTION
PAGE(S)
$
SEC.
DESCRIPTION
PAGE(S)
PART I THE SCHEDULE
PART II CONTRACT C: AUSES
8
X
A
SOLICITATION/CONTRACT FORM
1
X
1
CONTRACT CLAUSES
X
B
SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS
2
PART 111- LIST OF DOCUMENTS. EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACH. N
C
DESCRIPTION/SPECS./WORK STATEMENT
N/A
J
LIST OF ATTACHMENTS
D
PACKAGING AND MARKING
N/A
PART IV - REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS N/A
E
INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE
2
X
K
REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND
X
F
2
OTHER STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS
DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE
G
CONTR ACT ADMINISTRATION DATA
3
L
INSTRS., CONDS.. AND NOTICES TO OFFER
H
SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS
7
M
EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD
X
CONTRACTING OFFICER WILL COMPLETE ITEM 17 OR 18 AS APPLICABLE
17.
X
CONTRACTOR'S NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT (Contractor is re-
18.
AWARD (Contractor is not required to sign this document.) You
quired to sign this document and return four copies to issuing office.)
offer on Solicitation Number
Contractor agrees to furnish and deliver all Items or perform all the services set
including the additions or changes made by you which additions or change
forth or otherwise Identified above and on any continuation sheets for the
are set forth in full above, is hereby accepted as to the items listed above and
consideration stated herein. The rights and obligations of the parties to this
on any continuation sheets. This award consummates the contract which con
contract shall be subject to and governed by the following documents: (a) this
sists of the following documents: (a) the Government's solicitation and you
award/contract, (b) the solicitation, If any, and (c) such provisions. representa-
offer, and (b) this award/contract. NO further contractual document is neces
tions, certifications, and specifications, as are attached or Incorporated by
sary.
reference herein. (A ttachments are listed herein.)
19A. NAME AND TITLE OF SIGNER (Type or print)
20A. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER
DENNIS DUPUIS U.P.
NANCY
C.
ROTH
98. NAME OF CONTRACTOR
19C DATE SIGNED
208.
tom
UNIREDSTATES Signature of OF Contracting AMERICA Officer) Roth
20C. DATE SIGNED
BY
BY
9/26/84
(Signature or person authorised to sign)
NSN 7540-01-182-8059
25-106
STANDARD FORM 26 (REV. 10-8:
GSA
SOLE SOURCE JUSTIFICATION AND RECOMMENDATION
Suburban Contractors, Inc. is an eminently well qualified firm to
undertake this project. They have done extensive work in this area and have
the necessary cleared personnèl to accomplish the task in this controlled
security environment. Moreover, the nature of the work is of such a
sensitive nature that disclosing plans and concepts to the general public is
not in the best interest of National security. Recommend no other
contractor be brought into competition for this project and Suburban
Contractors, Inc. be given the task on an expeditious basis.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 26, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN P. BRADY
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS DIVISION
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION
FROM:
MARY A. DIX May a. D.X
SUBJECT:
Waiver of Notification in the Commerce
Business Daily
In addition to being required for security purposes, the need for
the procurement and installation of permissive entry devices by
the National Security Council is of such urgency that the
interests of the Government would be adversely affected if the
time requirement for advance notice were complied with.
Hence, having determined that advance notice is neither
appropriate nor reasonable, publication of the intended
procurement action in the Commerce Business Daily should be
waived pursuant with sections (e) (1) (A), (B), and (H) of Public
Law 98-72.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
PER NSC WAIVER, #2017-03
By MB NARA, Date 9/4/19
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
08. Memorandum
For John Brady From: Mary Dix
9/26/84
(b)(1)
C
Re: Justification of Sole Source Procurement (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
09. Form
Procurement File Copy (1 pp.)
9/26/84
(b)(1)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
MEMORANDUM
fill copy
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
October 5, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN F. W. ROGERS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
BOL
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Installation of Permissive Entry Devices
The U.S. Secret Service has recently completed a survey of NSC
offices and has provided recommendations that ensure full
compliance with standards set forth in National Security Council
and Director of Central Intelligence Directives pertaining to
the safeguarding of Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence. On
their instructions we are required to install a permissive entry
device on the entrances of the NSC offices.
As we are aware of the historical significance of the Old
Executive Office Building, we would appreciate the coordination
of this effort with your office.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 30, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN P. BRADY
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS DIVISION,
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION
*
FROM:
MARY A. DIX
Mary Mary a. D:-
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
SUBJECT:
Installation of Permissive Entry Devices
As per your request, the following is a list of the 26 doorways
requiring cipher locks (permissive entry devices) :
300
302
348
351
361
361½
365
368
372
373
374
374-A
375
376-A
376
380
382
386
389
391
392
395
397
477
479
487
Also, accompanying this memorandum is the actual device that will
be installed inside the doorways. Wherever possible. the entry
devi' es will be installed in the same manner as the ore on Room
DEOB. By following this installation procedule, the overall
physical view of the corridors will not be effected unless one
faces an individual doorway and examines the inner wall.
Please notify me when you have completed your review of the
attached permissive entry device.
Thank you.
Contract NS4C02
Page 12 of 12
Optional (Continued)
( ) Government-Furnished Property (Short Form)
52.245-04
( 1 Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature-Alternate I
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature-Alternate II
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature-Alternate III
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature-Alternate IV
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature-Alternate V
52.246-17
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Complex Nature
52.246-18
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Complex Nature-Alternate E
52.246-18
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Complex Nature-Alternate II
52.246-18
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Complex Nature-Alternate III
52.246-18
( ) Warranty of Supplies of a Complex Nature-Alternate IV
52.246-18
( ) Warranty of Systems and Equipment under Performance
52.246-19
Specifications or Design Criteria
( ) Warranty of Systems and Equipment under Performance
52.246-19
Specifications or Design Criteria-Alternate I
( ) Warranty of Systems and Equipment under Performance
52.246-19
Specifications or Design Criteria-Alternate II
( ) Warranty of Systems and Equipment under Performance
52.246-19
Specifications or Design Criteria-Alternate III
( ) Limitation of Liability
52.246-33
(REMAINDER OF PAGE NOT USED.)
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
10. Memorandum
For Paul Thompson
3/7/85
(b)(1)
Re: Status of Security Upgrade (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
CONFIDENTIAL
C.F.
CONFIDENTIAL
2115
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
506326
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
DECLASSIFIED
F0008-03
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
March 27, 1987
By SS NARA, Date 9/13/24
C0165
FE
FGOIL
MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST ACDA,eval
FG00612
SUBJECT:
Promulgation of Policy re Visa Applications for
Personnel Assigned to the USSR (U)
OBJECTIVE: To establish a means of regulating and monitoring all
Soviet visa applications made by U.S. Government personnel who
are being sent on permanent assignment to U.S. diplomatic missions
in the USSR (Moscow and Leningrad). (¢)
HISTORY/SETTING: Currently, all agencies independently submit
visa applications for their personnel to the Soviet Embassy. The
USSR has imposed a personnel ceiling on our diplomatic missions
on the basis of the number of Soviet visas which have been issued
for permanent staff as opposed to presence in country. These
measures taken by the Soviet Union on October 22, 1986, which
limit the number of employees permitted at the American Embassy
in Moscow to 225 and at our Consulate General in Leningrad to 26,
require the following action. (¢)
POLICY: To ensure that visas are issued in a timely fashion and
are issued to those individuals most needed by our missions in
the USSR and to verify the number of visas issued by the Soviets
-- visa submissions must be regulated by a central authority.
The Department of State will serve as the central point for
regulating Soviet visa applications and will coordinate appli-
cations under the ceiling to ensure that basic U.S. Government
objectives are met. This procedure will have no impact on each
agency's procedures for selecting persons for assignment to
Moscow or Leningrad. It would not go into effect until an
individual who has been assigned to a permanent position in
Moscow or Leningrad reaches the point when he should apply for a
Soviet visa. (d)
ACTIONS/IMPLEMENTATION: All Executive Branch agencies should
henceforth process requests for Soviet visas for their personnel
through the Office of Soviet Union Affairs of the Department of
State. Passports, completed Soviet visa application forms and
G
0
P
V
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR
165C#870215
from ORM
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
one picture (which is essential for the visa application) for all
personnel and their dependents should be sent to EUR/SOV,
Room 4225 (telephone: 647-8956 or 647-0670). (¢)
The Department of State will coordinate submissions with
Embassy Moscow and will submit the visa applications for U.S.
personnel assigned to permanent positions to the Soviet Embassy
in Washington. The passport and visa application should be
accompanied by the name and telephone number of a contact person
for use by EUR/SOV, should any questions arise. (d)
Individuals already assigned outside the United States and who do
not intend to return to the U.S. before departing for assignment
in the USSR should, by message, seek authority from EUR/SOV to
apply for a Soviet visa from Soviet posts abroad. Upon receipt
of State Department authorization, those individuals may apply
for a visa directly to a Soviet post convenient to them. No
application will be submitted to a Soviet post prior to receipt
of a message authorizing such application. (&)
Should disagreements which cannot otherwise be resolved arise
between Executive Branch agencies and the Department of State
pursuant to this Directive, they should be referred to the Office
of Soviet and European Affairs, National Security Council for
review. (U)
Grant S. Green, Jr
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1002
ACTION
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
March 12, 1985
FROM CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT KIMMITT
THRU:
BOB PEARSON WRP
SIGNED
FROM:
MARY DIX Mary
SUBJECT:
Cipher Locks
Attached for your review and signature is a memorandum to
Christopher Hicks requesting approval of installation of cipher
locks outside NSC offices.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the attached memorandum/packet for forwarding to
the Office of Administration.
APPROVE K
DISAPPROVE
Attachment
Memo to OA
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 13526, By MB SEC NARA, 3.4 (b), Date September 9/4/19 11, 2006
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
12. Memorandum
For Robert McFarlane From: Paula Dobriansky
12/10/85
(b)(1)
S
Re: Imposition of Travel Restrictions (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
13. Memorandum
For Robert McFarlane From: Nicholas Platt
12/2/85
(b)(1)
S
Re: Imposition of Travel Restrictions (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR-Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
14. Paper
Re: NSDD 196 - Counterintelligence/Countermeasure
11/1/85
(b)(1)
S
Implementation Task Force (5 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
H-Files
Subseries:
Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
NSC Procedural Manual - Binder 1 [3]
Date Closed:
9/4/2019
OA/ID Number:
99017-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2019-1493-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
0435
national SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
January 18, 1984
Dear Senator Wilson:
Thank you for your inquiry concerning National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD) 84 and related initiatives to safeguard national
security information.
Executive Order 12356 on "National Security Information" defines
the types of information that may and may not be classified and
limits the authority to make such determinations to authorized
classifiers. Once that determination is made, all Federal
employees who have chosen to work in positions involving national
security information have the responsibility to protect properly
classified information. The President reminded employees of this
obligation in a letter dated August 30, 1983, which refers to the
directive (NSDD 84) on safeguarding national security information.
We have received numerous requests for information on this
subject, and our staff has put together the attached information
package.
It is hoped that the enclosed materials will provide the basis
for a better understanding of the purposes of NSDD 84 and related
initiatives to safeguard national security information.
Sincerely,
B S. Reger
Brenda
Director
Office of Information Policy
and Security Review
Attachments
The Honorable Pete Wilson
11000 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 11221
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Attention: Mr. Don Ediger
UNULHOOM ILD
March II, 1983
Safecuarding National Security Information
As stated in Executive Order 12356, only that information whose
disclosure would harm the national security interests of the
United States may be classified. Every effort should be made to
declassify information that no longer requires protection in the
interest of national security.
At the same time, however, safeguarding against unlawful disclosures
of properly classified information is a matter of grave concern
and high priority for this Administration. In addition to the
requirements set forth in Executive Order 12356, and based on the
recommendations contained in the interdepartmental report
forwarded by the Attorney General, I direct the following:
1. Each agency of the Executive Branch that originates
or handles classified information shall adopt internal procedures
to safeguard against unlawful disclosures of classified
information. Such procedures shall at a minimum provide as
follows:
All persons with authorized access to classified
information a. shall be required to sign a nondisclosure
agreement as a condition of access. This requirement may
be implemented prospectively by agencies for which the
administrative burden of compliance would otherwise be
excessive.
b. All persons with authorized access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI) shall be required to sign
a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access to SCI
and other classified information. All such agreements
must include a provision for prepublication review to
assure deletion of SCI and other classified information.
All agreements required in paragraphs l.a. and
1.b. C. must be in a form determined by the Department of
Justice to be enforceable in a civil action brought by
the United States. The Director, Information Security
Oversight Office (ISOO), shall develop standardized
forms that satisfy these requirements.
contacts d. between media representatives and agency personnel,
Appropriate policies shall be adopted to govern
so as to reduce the opportunity for negligent or deliberate
disclosures of classified information. All persons with
authorized access to classified information shall be
clearly apprised of the agency's policies in this regard.
UNPI ACCIEIEN
Full Text of
handles the reporting and investigation of unauthorized disclosures that: of
2. classified information shall adopt internal procedures to
Each agency of the Executive branch that originates or
govern such information. Such procedures shall at a minimum provide
All such disclosures that the agency considers to
be seriously a. damaging to its mission and responsibilities
shall be evaluated to ascertain the nature of the information
disclosed and the extent to which it had been disseminated.
b. The agency shall conduct a preliminary internal
investigation prior to or concurrently with seeking
investigative assistance from other agencies.
C. The agency shall maintain records of disclosures
SO evaluated and investigated.
d. Agencies in the possession of classified information
originating with another agency shall cooperate with the
originating agency by conducting internal investigations of
the unauthorized disclosure of such information.
Persons determined by the agency to have knowingly
made e. such disclosures or to have refused cooperation with
investigations of such unauthorized disclosures will be denied
further access to classified information and subjected to
other administrative sanctions as appropriate.
Unauthorized disclosures of classified information shall
be reported 3. to the Department of Justice and the Information
Security Oversight Office, as required by statute and Executive
orders. The Department of Justice shall continue to review
reported unauthorized disclosures of classified information to
determine whether FBI investigation is warranted. Interested
departments and agencies shall be consulted in developing criteria should
for evaluating such matters and in determining which cases
receive investigative priority. The FBI is authorized to
investigate such matters as constitute potential violations of
federal criminal law, even though administrative sanctions may be
sought instead of criminal prosecution.
preclude 4. interagency agreements between FBI and other criminal
Nothing in this directive is intended to modify or
conducting investigations within their own agencies or departments.
investigative agencies regarding their responsibility for
The Office of Personnel Management and all departments
and agencies 5. with employees having access to classified information
are directed to revise existing regulations and policies, as
necessary, so that employees may be required to submit to polygraph
xaminations, when appropriate, in the course of investigations of
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. As a minimum,
such regulations shall permit an agency to decide that appropriate
adverse consequences will follow an employee's refusal to cooperate
with a polygraph examination that is limited in scope to the
circumstances of the unauthorized disclosure under investigation.
Agency regulations may provide that only the head of the agency,
br his delegate, is empowered to order- an employee to submit to
a
not be relied upon to the exclusion of other information obtained
polygraph examination. Results of polygraph examinations should
during investigations.
6. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director,
Office of Personnel Management, is requested to establish an
interdepartmental group to study the federal personnel security
program and recommend appropriate revisions in existing Executive
orders, regulations, and guidelines.
meils.
SCIEN
Embargoed for Conclusion of Background Briefing
Held March 11, 1983, at the Department of Justice
Fact Sheet
Presidential Directive on
Safeguarding National Security Information
Background
-- Unlawful disclosures of classified information damage national
security by providing valuable information to our adversaries,
by hampering the ability of our intelligence agencies to
function effectively, and by impairing the conduct of American
foreign policy.
-- The President has issued a directive requiring that additional
steps be taken to protect against unlawful disclosures of
classified information.
-- This directive is based on the recommendations of an inter-
departmental group convened by the Attorney General.
Scope of Directive
-- The directive deals only with disclosures of classified
information.
-
By Executive Order, the only information that can be classi-
fied is information which "reasonably could be expected to
cause damage to the national security" if released without
proper authorization. (E.O. 12356 § 1.1(a)(3).)
-- The Executive Order also prohibits the use of classification
to conceal violations of law, inefficiency or administrative
error, or to prevent an embarrassment to a government agency
or employee. (E.O. 12356 S 1.6(a).)
Summary of Provisions
-- The directive imposes additional restrictions upon government
employees who are entrusted with access to classified infor-
mation, and upon government agencies that originate or handle
classified information.
-- More employees will be required to sign
nondisclosure agreements, including
provisions for prepublication review, such
as were approved by the Supreme Court in
United States V. Snepp (1980).
Agencies will be required to adopt
policies concerning contacts between
classified information, SO as to reduce
journalists and persons with access to
opportunities for unlawful disclosures.
However, no particular policies are
mandated in the directive.
-- Agencies will be required to adopt new
procedures so that unlawful disclosures of
classified information will be reported
and analyzed more efficiently.
-- directive establishes a new approach to investigating
The unlawful disclosures to replace the past practice of treating
such matters as purely criminal investigations.
- Although unauthorized disclosures of
classified information potentially violate
a number of criminal statutes, there has
never been a successful prosecution.
There are a number of practical barriers
to successful criminal prosecution in
most of these cases.
- This directive clarifies FBI's authority to
investigate unlawful disclosures of
classified information, even though it is
anticipated that a successful investigation
will lead to administrative sanctions (such
as demotion or dismissal) rather than
criminal prosecution.
-- All agencies with employees having access to
classified information will be required to
assure that their policies permit
use of polygraph examinations under
carefully defined circumstances. The
polygraph is already used on a regular
basis by our largest intelligence
agencies. The directive provides for a
government-wide policy regarding use of this
greater degree of consistency in
investigative technique.
- The use of the polygraph in any particular
case will be subject to the discretion of an
employee's agency head.
-- There will be no change in the current
practice of targeting investigations at
employees who are suspected of unlawfully
disclosing classified information, rather
than at journalists who publish it.
-3-
-- The directive provides that employees found
by their agency head to have knowingly
disclosed classified information without
authorization or to have refused
cooperation with investigations will be
subject to mandatory administrative
sanctions to include, as a minimum, denial
of further access to classified
information. Existing procedural safeguards
for personnel actions involving federal
employees remain unchanged.
Expected Results
-- This directive is not expected to eliminate all unlawful
disclosures of classified information.
-- The directive is designed to improve the effectiveness of our
present program and, over time, to reduce the frequency and
seriousness of unlawful disclosures of classified informa-
tion.
-- The directive also emphasizes that government employees who
are entrusted with classified information have a fiduciary
duty to safeguard that information from unauthorized dis-
closure.
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
August 30, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
SUBJECT:
Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information
Recent unauthorized disclosures of classified information
concerning our diplomatic, military, and intelligence activities
threaten our ability to carry out national security policy.
I have issued a directive detailing procedures to curb these
disclosures and to streamline procedures for investigating them.
However, unauthorized disclosures are so harmful to our
national security that I wish to underscore to each of you
the seriousness with which I view them.
The unauthorized disclosure of our Nation's classified informa-
tion by those entrusted with its protection is improper,
unethical, and plain wrong. This kind of unauthorized disclosure
is more than a so-called "leak"--it is illegal. The Attorney
General has been asked to investigate a number of recent
disclosures of classified information. Let me make it clear
that we intend to take appropriate administrative action against
any Federal employee found to have engaged in unauthorized
disclosure of classified information, regardless of rank or
position. Where circumstances warrant, cases will also be
referred for criminal prosecution.
The American people have placed a special trust and confidence
in each of us to protect their property with which we are
entrusted, including classified information. They expect us
to protect fully the national security secrets used to protect
them in a dangerous and difficult world. All of us have
taken an oath faithfully to discharge our duties as public
servants, an oath that is violated when unauthorized disclosures
of classified information are made.
Secrecy in national security matters is a necessity in this
world. Each of us, as we carry out our individual duties,
recognizes that certain matters require confidentiality. We
must be able to carry out diplomacy with friends and foes on
a confidential basis; peace often quite literally depends on
it--and this includes our efforts to reduce the threat of
nuclear war.
We must also be able to protect our military forces from
present or potential adversaries. From the time of the Founding
Fathers, we have accepted the need to protect military secrets.
Nuclear dangers, terrorism, and aggression similarly demand
2
that we must be able to gather intelligence information
about these dangers--and our sources of this information
must be protected if we are to continue to receive it. Even
in peacetime, lives depend on our ability to keep certain
matters secret.
As public servants, we have no legitimate excuse for resorting
to these unauthorized disclosures. There are other means
available to express ourselves:
-- We make every effort to keep the Congress and the
people informed about national security policies
and actions. Only a fraction of information
concerning national security policy must be
classified.
-- We have mechanisms for presenting alternative
views and opinions within our government.
-- Established procedures exist for declassifying
material and for downgrading information that may
be overclassified.
-- Workable procedures also exist for reporting wrong-
doing or illegalities, both to the appropriate
Executive Branch offices and to the Congress.
Finally, each of us has the right to leave our position of
trust and criticize our government and its policies, if that
is what our conscience dictates. What we do not have is the
right to damage our country by giving away its necessary secrets.
We are as a Nation an open and trusting people, with a proud
tradition of free speech, robust debate, and the right to
disagree strongly over all national policies. No one would
ever want to change that. But we are also a mature and
disciplined people who understand the need for responsible
action. As servants of the people, we in the Federal Government
must understand the duty we have to those who place their
trust in us. I ask each of you to join me in redoubling our
efforts to protect that trust.
Ronald Reagan
Tuesday
April 6, 1982
Part IV
The President
Executive Order 12356-
National Security Information
14874
Federal Register
Presidential Documents
Vol. 47, No. 68
Tuesday, April 8, 1982
le 3-
Executive Order 12356 of April 2, 1982
The President
National Security Information
TABLE OF CONTENTS
/FR
Page]
Preamble
[14874]
Part 1. Original Classification
1.1
Classification Levels
[14874]
1.2
Classification Authority
14874
1.3
Classification Categories
[14875
1.4
Duration of Classification
[14878]
1.5
Identification and Markings
[14877]
1.6
Limitations on Classification
[14877]
Part 2. Derivative Classification
2.1
Use of Derivative Classification
[14878]
2.2
Classification Guides
[14878]
Part 3. Declassification and Downgrading
3.1
Declassification Authority
[14878]
3.2
Transferred Information
14879
3.3
Systematic Review for Declassification
(14879)
3.4
Mandatory Review for Declassification
[14879]
Part 4. Safeguarding
4.1
General Restrictions on Access
[14880]
4.2
Special Access Programs
14881
4.3
Access by Historical Researchers and Former Presidential Appointees
[14881
Part 5. Implementation and Review
5.1
Policy Direction
[14881]
5.2
Information Security Oversight Office
14881
5.3
General Responsibilities
[14882]
5.4
Sanctions
[14882]
Part 6. General Provisions
6.1
Definitions
[14883]
6.2
General
[14883]
This Order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and
safeguarding national security information. It recognizes that it is essential
that the public be informed concerning the activities of its Government, but
that the interests of the United States and its citizens require that certain
information concerning the national defense and foreign relations be protected
against unauthorized disclosure. Information may not be classified under this
Order unless its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to
the national security.
NOW, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws
of the United States of America. it is hereby ordered as follows:
Part 1
Original Classification
Section 1.1 Classification Levels.
(a) National security information (hereinafter "classified information") shall
be classified at one of the following three levels:
(1) "Top Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure
of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage
to the national security.
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 66 / Tuesday, April 6, 1982 / Presidential Documents
(2) "Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of
which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national
security.
(3) "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure
of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national
security.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used to
identify classified information.
(c) If there is reasonable doubt about the need to classify information, it shall
be safeguarded as if it were classified pending a determination by an original
classification authority, who shall make this determination within thirty (30),
days. If there is reasonable doubt about the appropriate level of classification,
it shall be safeguarded at the higher level of classification pending a determi-
nation by an original classification authority, who shall make this determina-
tion within thirty (30) days.
Sec. 1.2 Classification Authority.
(a) Top Secret. The authority to classify information originally as Top Secret
may be exercised only by:
(1) the President;
(2) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the Federal
Register. and
(3) officials delegated this authority pursuant to Section 1.2(d).
(b) Secret. The authority to classify information originally as Secret may be
exercised only. by:
(1) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the Federal
Register;
(2) officials with original Top Secret classification authority; and
(3) officials delegated such authority pursuant to Section 1.2(d).
(c) Confidential. The authority to classify information originally as Confiden-
tial may be exercised only by:
(1) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the Federal
Register;
(2) officials with original Top Secret or Secret classification authority; and
(3) officials delegated such authority pursuant to Section 1.2(d).
(d) Delegation of Original Classification Authority.
(1) Delegations of original classification authority shall be limited to the
minimum required to administer this Order. Agency heads are responsible for
ensuring that designated subordinate officials have a demonstrable and con-
tinuing need to exercise this authority.
(2) Original Top Secret classification authority may be delegated only by the
President: an agency head or official designated pursuant to Section 1.2(a)(2);
and the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1), provided that official
has been delegated original Top Secret classification authority by the agency
head.
(3) Original Secret classification authority may be delegated only by the
President; an agency head or official designated pursuant to Sections 1.2(a)(2)
and 1.2(b)(1); an official with original Top Secret classification authority; and
the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1), provided that official has
been delegated original Secret classification authority by the agency head.
(4) Original Confidential classification authority may be delegated only by the
President: an agency head or official designated pursuant to Sections 1.2(a)(2),
1.2(b)(1) and 1.2(c)(1); an official with original Top Secret classification author-
14876
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 66 / Tuesday, April 6, 1982 / Presidential Documents
ity: and the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1), provided that
official has been delegated original classification authority by the agency
head.
(5) Each delegation of original classification authority shall be in writing and
the authority shall not be redelegated except as provided in this Order. It shall
identify the official delegated the authority by name or position title. Delegat-
ed classification authority includes the authority to classify information at the
level granted and lower levels of classification.
(e) Exceptional Cases. When an employee, contractor. licensee, or grantee of
an agency that does not have original classification authority originates
information believed by that person to require classification, the information
shall be protected in a manner consistent with this Order and its implementing
directives. The information shall be transmitted promptly as provided under
this Order or its implementing directives to the agency that has appropriate
subject matter interest and classification authority with respect to this infor-
mation. That agency shall decide within thirty (30) days whether to elassify
this information. If it is not clear which agency has classification responsibili-
ty for this information, it shall be sent to the Director of the Information
Security Oversight Office. The Director shall determine the agency having
primary subject matter interest and forward the information, with appropriate
recommendations, to that agency for a classification determination.
Sec. 1.3 Classification Categories.
(a) Information shall be considered for classification if it concerns:
(1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
(2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or
plans relating to the national security;
(3) foreign government information;
(4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources
or methods;
(5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
(6) scientific, technological. or economic matters relating to the national
security;
(7) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or
facilities;
(8) cryptology;
(9) a confidential source; or
(10) other categories of information that are related to the national security
and that require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by
the President or by agency heads or other officials who have been delegated
original classification authority by the President. Any determination made
under this subsection shall be reported promptly to the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office.
(b) Information that is determined to concern one or more of the categories in
Section 1.3(a) shall be classified when an original classification authority also
determines that its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the context of
other information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the
national security.
(c) Unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information, the identity of
a confidential foreign source, or intelligence sources or methods is presumed
to cause damage to the national security.
(d) Information classified in accordance with Section 1.3 shall not be declassi-
fied automatically as a result of any unofficial publication or inadvertent or
unauthorized disclosure in the United States or abroad of identical or similar
information.
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 66 / Tuesday, April 6, 1982 / Presidential Documents
14877
Sec. 1.4 Duration of Classification.
(a) Information shall be classified as long as required by national security
considerations. When it can be determined, a specific date or event for
declassification shall be set by the original classification authority at the time
the information is originally classified.
(b) Automatic declassification determinations under predecessor orders shall
remain valid unless the classification is extended by an authorized official of
the originating agency. These extensions may be by individual documents or
categories of information. The agency shall be responsible for notifying hold-
ers of the information of such extensions.
(c) Information classified under predecessor orders and marked for declassifi-
cation review shall remain classified until reviewed for declassification under
the provisions of this Order.
Sec. 1.5 Identification and Markings.
(a) At the time of original classification, the following information shall be
shown on the face of all classified documents, or clearly associated with other
forms of classified information in a manner appropriate to the medium
involved. unless this information itself would reveal a confidential source or
relationship not otherwise evident in the document or information:
(1) one of the three classification levels defined in Section 1.1;
(2) the identity of the original classification authority if other than the person
whose name appears as the approving or signing official;
(3) the agency and office of origin: and
(4) the date or event for declassification, or the notation "Originating Agency's
Determination Required."
(b) Each classified document shall, by marking or other means, indicate which
portions are classified, with the applicable classification level, and which
portions are not classified. Agency heads may, for good cause, grant and
revoke waivers of this requirement for specified classes of documents or
information. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be
notified of any waivers.
(c) Marking designations implementing the provisions of this Order, including
abbreviations, shall conform to the standards prescribed in implementing
directives issued by the Information Security Oversight Office.
(d) Foreign government information shall either retain its original classifica-
tion or be assigned a United States classification that shall ensure a degree of
protection at least equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the
information.
(e) Information assigned a level of classification under predecessor orders
shall be considered as classified at that level of classification despite the
omission of other required markings. Omitted markings may be inserted on a
document by the officials specified in Section 3.1(b).
Sec. 1.6 Limitations on Classification.
(a) In no case shall information be classified in order to conceal violations of
law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a
person, organization. or agency; to restrain competition; or to prevent or delay
the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of
national security.
(b) Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national
security may not be classified.
(c) The President or an agency head or official designated under Sections
1.2(a)(2), 1.2(b)(1), or 1.2(c)(1) may reclassify information previously declassi-
fied and disclosed if it is determined in writing that (1) the information
requires protection in the interest of national security; and (2) the information
14878
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 66 / Tuesday, April 6, 1982 / Presidential Documents
may reasonably be recovered. These reclassification actions shall be reported
promptly to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.
(d) Information may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received
a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) or the
Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), or the mandatory review provisions of this
Order (Section 3.4) if such classification meets the requirements of this Order
and is accomplished personally and on a document-by-document basis by the
agency head, the deputy agency head, the senior agency official designated
under Section 5.3(a)(1), or an official with original Top Secret classification
authority.
Part 2
Derivative Classification
Sec. 2.1 Use of Derivative Classification.
(a) Derivative classification is (1) the determination that information is in
substance the same as information currently classified, and (2) the application
of the same classification markings. Persons who only reproduce, extract, or
summarize classified information, or who only apply classification markings
derived from source material or as directed by a classification guide, need not
possess original classification authority.
(b) Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall:
(1) observe and respect original classification decisions; and
(2) carry forward to any newly created documents any assigned authorized
markings. The declassification date or event that provides the longest period
of classification shall be used for documents classified on the basis of multiple
sources.
Sec. 2.2 Classification Guides.
(a) Agencies with original classification authority shall prepare classification
guides to facilitate the proper and uniform derivative classification of informa-
tion.
(b) Each guide shall be approved personally and in writing by an official who:
(1) has program or supervisory responsibility over the information or is the
senior agency official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1); and
(2) is authorized to classify information originally at the highest level of
classification prescribed in the guide.
(c) Agency heads may, for good cause, grant and revoke waivers of the
requirement to prepare classification guides for specified classes of documents
or information. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall
be notified of any waivers.
Part 3
Declassification and Downgrading
Sec. 3.1 Declassification Authority.
(a) Information shall be declassified or downgraded as soon as national
security considerations permit. Agencies shall coordinate their review of
classified information with-other agencies that have a direct interest in the
subject matter. Information that continues to meet the classification require-
ments prescribed by Section 1.3 despite the passage of time will continue to be
protected in accordance with this Order.
(b) Information shall be declassified or downgraded by the official who
authorized the original classification, if that official is still serving in the same
position: the originator's successor," a supervisory official of either: or officials
delegated such authority in writing by the agency head or the senior agency
official designated pursuant to Section 5.3(a)(1).
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 66 / Tuesday, April 6, 1982 / Presidential Documents
14879
(c) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office determines that
information is classified in violation of this Order, the Director may require
the information to be declassified by the agency that originated the classifica-
tion. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the National
Security Council. The information shall remain classified, pending a prompt
decision on the appeal:
(d) The provisions of this Section shall also apply to agencies that, under the
terms of this Order, do not have original classification authority, but that had
such authority under predecessor orders.
Sec. 3.2 Transferred Information.
(a) In the case of classified information transferred in conjunction with a
transfer of functions, and not merely for storage purposes, the receiving
agency shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of this
Order.
(b) In the case of classified information that is not officially transferred as
described in Section 3.2(a); but that originated in an agency that has ceased to
exist and for which there is no successor agency, each agency in possession of
such information shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of
this Order. Such information may be declassified or downgraded by the
agency in possession after consultation with any other agency that has an
interest in the subject matter of the information.
(c) Classified information accessioned into the National Archives of the
United States shall be declassified or downgraded by the Archivist of the
United States in accordance with this Order. the directives of the Information
Security Oversight Office, and agency guidelines.
Sec. 3.3 Systematic Review for Declassification.
(a) The Archivist of the United States shall, in accordance with procedures
and timeframes prescribed in the Information Security Oversight Office's
directives implementing this Order, systematically review for declassification
or downgrading (1) classified records accessioned into the National Archives
of the United States, and (2) classified presidential papers or records under
the Archivist's control. Such information shall be reviewed by the Archivist
for declassification or downgrading in accordance with systematic review
guidelines that shall be provided by the head of the agency that originated the
information, or in the case of foreign government information, by the Director
of the Information Security Oversight Office in consultation with interested
agency heads.
(b) Agency heads may conduct internal systematic review programs for
classified information originated by their agencies contained in records deter-
mined by the Archivist to be permanently valuable but that have not been
accessioned into the National Archives of the United States.
(c) After consultation with affected agencies, the Secretary of Defense may
establish special procedures for systematic review for declassification of
classified cryptologic information, and the Director of Central Intelligence may
establish special procedures for systematic review for declassification of
classified information pertaining to intelligence activities (including special
activities), or intelligence sources or methods.
Sec. 3.4. Mandatory Review for Declassification.
(a) Except as provided in Section 3.4(b), all information classified under this
Order or predecessor orders shall be subject to a review for declassification
by the originating agency, if:
(1) the request is made by a United States citizen or permanent resident alien.
a federal agency, or a State or local government; and
(2) the request describes the document or material containing the information
with sufficient specificity to enable the agency to locate it with a reasonable
amount of effort.
14880
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 66 / Tuesday, April 6, 1982 / Presidential Documents
(b) Information originated by a President, the White House Staff, by commit-
tees, commissions, or boards appointed by the President, or others specifically
providing advice and counsel to a President or acting on behalf of a President
is exempted from the provisions of Section 3.4(a). The Archivist of the United
States shall have the authority to review, downgrade and declassify informa-
tion under the control of the Administrator of General Services or the Archi-
vist pursuant to sections 2107, 2107 note, or 2203 of title 44, United States
Code. Review procedures developed by the Archivist shall provide for consul-
tation with agencies having primary subject matter interest and shall be
consistent with the provisions of applicable laws or lawful agreements that
pertain to the respective presidential papers or records. Any decision by the
Archivist may be appealed to the Director of the Information Security Over-
sight Office. Agencies with primary subject matter interest shall be notified
promptly of the Director's decision on such appeals and may further appeal to
the National Security Council. The information shall remain classified pending
a prompt decision on the appeal.
(c) Agencies conducting a mandatory review for declassification shall declas-
sify information no longer requiring protection under this Order. They shall
release this information unless withholding is otherwise authorized under
applicable law.
(d) Agency heads shall develop procedures to process requests for the manda-
tory review of classified information. These procedures shall apply to informa-
tion classified under this or predecessor orders. They shall also provide a
means for administratively appealing a denial of a mandatory review request.
(e) The Secretary of Defense shall develop special procedures for the review
of cryptologic information, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall
develop special procedures for the review of information pertaining to intelli-
gence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or meth-
ods, after consultation with affected agencies. The Archivist shall develop
special procedures for the review of information accessioned into the National
Archives of the United States.
(f) In response to a request for information under the Freedom of Information
Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, or the mandatory review provisions of this Order:
(1) An agency shall refuse to confirm or deny the existence or non-existence of
requested information whenever the fact of its existence or non-existence is
itself classifiable under this Order.
(2) When an agency receives any request for documents in its custody that
were classified by another agency, it shall refer copies of the request and the
requested documents to the originating agency for processing, and may, after
consultation with the originating agency, inform the requester of the referral.
In cases in which the originating agency determines in writing that a response
under Section 3.4(f)(1) is required. the referring agency shall respond to the
requester in accordance with that Section.
Part 4
Safeguarding
Sec. 4.1 General Restrictions on Access.
(a) A person is eligible for access to classified information provided that a
determination of trustworthiness has been made by agency heads or designat-
ed officials and provided that such access is essential to the accomplishment
of lawful and authorized Government purposes.
(b) Controls shall be established by each agency to ensure that classified
information is used, processed, stored, reproduced, transmitted, and destroyed
only under conditions that will provide adequate protection and prevent
access by unauthorized persons.
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 66 / Tuesday, April 6, 1982 / Presidential Documents
14881
(c) Classified information shall not be disseminated outside the executive
branch except under conditions that ensure that the information will be given
protection equivalent to that afforded within the executive branch.
(d) Except as provided by directives issued by the President through the
National Security Council, classified information originating in one agency
may not be disseminated outside any other agency to which it has been made
available without the consent of the originating agency. For purposes of this
Section, the Department of Defense shall be considered one agency.
Sec. 4.2 Special Access Programs.
(a) Agency heads designated pursuant to Section 1.2(a) may create special
access programs to control access, distribution, and protection of particularly
sensitive information classified pursuant to this Order or predecessor orders.
Such programs may be created or continued only at the written direction of
these agency heads. For special access programs pertaining to intelligence
activities (including special activities but not including military operational,
strategic and tactical programs), or intelligence sources or methods, this
function will be exercised by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(b) Each agency head shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for
special access programs. The Director of the Information Security Oversight
Office, consistent with the provisions of Section 5.2(b)(4), shall have non-
delegable access to all such accountings.
Sec. 4.3 Access by Historical Researchers and Former Presidential Ap-
pointees.
(a) The requirement in Section 4.1(a) that access to classified information may
be granted only as is essential to the accomplishment of authorized and lawful
Government purposes may be waived as provided in Section 4.3(b) for persons
who:
(1) are engaged in historical research projects, or
(2) previously have occupied policy-making positions to which they were
appointed by the President.
(b) Waivers under Section 4.3(a) may be granted only if the originating agency:
(1) determines in writing that access is consistent with the interest of national
security;
(2) takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized
disclosure or compromise, and ensures that the information is safeguarded in
a manner consistent with this Order: and
(3) limits the access granted to former presidential appointees to items that the
person originated, reviewed, signed, or received while serving as a presiden-
tial appointee.
Part 5
Implementation and Review
Sec. 5.1 Policy Direction.
(a) The National Security Council shall provide overall policy direction for the
information security program.
(b) The Administrator of General Services shall be responsible for implement-
ing and monitoring the program established pursuant to this Order. The
Administrator shall delegate the implementation and monitorship functions of
this program to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.
Sec. 5.2 Information Security Oversight Office.
(a) The Information Security Oversight Office shall have a full-time Director
appointed by the Administrator of General Services subject to approval by the
President. The Director shall have the authority to appoint a staff for the
Office.
14882
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No.- 66 / Tuesday, April 6, 1982 / Presidential Documents
(b) The Director shall:
(1) develop. in consultation with the agencies, and promulgate, subject to the
approval of the National Security Council, directives for the implementation of
this Order, which shall be binding on the agencies;
(2) oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with this Order and imple-
menting directives;
(3) review all agency implementing regulations and agency guidelines for
systematic declassification review. The Director shall require any regulation
or guideline to be changed if it is not consistent with this Order or implement-
ing directives. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the
National Security Council. The agency regulation or guideline shall remain in
effect pending a prompt decision on the appeal;
(4) have the authority to conduct on-site reviews of the information security
program of each agency that generates or handles classified information and
to require of each agency those reports, information, and other cooperation
that may be necessary to fulfill the Director's responsibilities. If these reports,
inspections, or access to specific categories of classified information would
pose an exceptional national security risk, the affected agency head or the
senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1) may deny access. The Direc-
tor may appeal denials to the National Security Council. The denial of access
shall remain in effect pending a prompt decision on the appeal:
(5) review requests for original classification authority from agencies or offi-
cials not granted original classification authority and, if deemed appropriate,
recommend presidential approval;
(6) consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons
within or outside the Government with respect to the administration of the
information security program;
(7) have the authority to prescribe, after consultation with affected agencies,
standard forms that will promote the implementation of the information
security program;
(8) report at least annually to the President through the National Security
Council on the implementation of this Order: and
(9) have the authority to convene and chair intèragency meetings to discuss
matters pertaining to the information security program.
Sec. 5.3 General Responsibilities.
Agencies that originate or handle classified information shall:
(a) designate a senior agency official to direct and administer its information
security program, which shall include an active oversight and security educa-
tion program to ensure effective implementation of this Order:
(b) promulgate implementing regulations. Any unclassified regulations that
establish agency information security policy shall be published in the Federal
Register to the extent that these regulations affect members of the public;
(c) establish procedures to prevent unnecessary access to classified informa-
tion, including procedures that (i) require that a demonstrable need for access
to classified information is established before initiating administrative clear-
ance procedures, and (ii) ensure that the number of persons granted access to
classified information is limited to the minimum consistent with operational
and security requirements and needs; and
(d) develop special contingency plans for the protection of classified informa-
tion used in or near hostile or potentially hostile areas.
Sec. 5.4 Sanctions.
(a) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office finds that a
violation of this Order or its implementing directives may have occurred. the
Director shall make a report to the head of the agency or to the senior official
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 66 / Tuesday, April 6, 1982 / Presidential Documents
14883
designated under Section 5.3(a)(1) so that corrective steps, if appropriate, may
be taken.
(b) Officers and employees of the United States Government, and its contrac-
tors, licensees, and grantees shall be subject to appropriate sanctions if they:
(1) knowingly, willfully. or negligently disclose to unauthorized persons infor-
mation properly classified under this Order or predecessor orders:
(2) knowingly and willfully classify or continue the classification of informa-
tion in violation of this Order or any implementing directive; or
(3) knowingly and willfully violate any other provision of this Order or
implementing directive.
(c) Sanctions may include reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, termi-
nation of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified infor-
mation, or other sanctions in accordance with applicable law and agency
regulation.
(d) Each agency head or the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1)
shall ensure that appropriate and prompt corrective action is taken whenever
a violation under Section 5.4(b) occurs. Either shall ensure that the Director of
the Information Security Oversight Office is promptly notified whenever a
violation under Section 5.4(b) (1) or (2) occurs.
Part 6
General Provisions
Sec. 6.1 Definitions.
(a) "Agency" has the meaning provided at 5 U.S.C. 552(e).
(b) "Information" means any information or material, regardless of its physical
form or characteristics, that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the
control of the United States Government.
(c) "National security information" means information that has been deter-
mined pursuant to this Order or any predecessor order to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated.
(d) "Foreign government information" means:
(1) information provided by a foreign government or governments, an interna-
tional organization of governments, or any element thereof with the expecta-
tion. expressed or implied, that the information, the source of the information,
or both, are to be held in confidence; or
(2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a
joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments or an interna-
tional organization of governments, or any element thereof. requiring that the
information, the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence.
(e) "National security" means the national defense or foreign relations of the
United States.
(f) "Confidential source" means any individual or organization that has
provided. or that may reasonably be expected to provide, information to the
United States on matters pertaining to the national security with the expecta-
tion, expressed or implied. that the information or relationship, or both, be
held in confidence.
(g) "Original classification" means an initial determination that information
requires, in the interest of national security, protection against unauthorized
disclosure, together with a classification designation signifying the level of
protection required.
Sec. 6.2 General.
(a) Nothing in this Order shall supersede any requirement made by or under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. "Restricted Data" and "Formerly
Restricted Data" shall be handled. protected, classified, downgraded. and
14884
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 66 / Tuesday. April 6, 1982 / Presidential Documents
declassified in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, and regulations issued under that Act.
(b) The Attorney General, upon request by the head of an agency or the
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, shall render an interpre-
tation of this Order with respect to any question arising in the course of its
administration.
(c) Nothing in this Order limits the protection afforded any information by
other provisions of law.
(d) Executive Order No. 12065 of June 28, 1978, as amended, is revoked as of
the effective date of this Order.
(e) This Order shall become effective on August 1. 1982.
Ronald Reagan
THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 2, 1982.
[FR Doc. 82-9320
Filed 4-2-82: 2:52 pm]
Billing code 3195-01-M
Editorial Note: The President's statement of Apr. 2, 1982, on signing Executive Order 12356 is
printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 18, no. 13)
15557
Federal Register
Presidential Documents
Vol. 47, No. 70
Monday. April 12, 1982
Title 3-
Executive Order 12356 of April 2, 1982
The President
National Security Information
Correction
In the April 6, 1982 issue of the Federal Register, there appear on pages 14875,
14876, 14878, 14882 and 14883 incorrect references to "Section 5.3(a)(1)" of
Executive Order 12356 of April 2, 1982. All references on these pages to
"Section 5.3(a)(1)" should read "Section 5.3(a)."
Richard A. Hauser
Deputy Counsel to the President
April 8, 1982.
[FR Doc. 82-10124
Filed 1-9-82: 9:11 am]
Billing code 3195-01-M
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Part VIII
Information Security
Oversight Office
National Security Information
27836
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 123 / Friday, June 25, 1982 / Rules and Regulations
INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT
Sec.
level, the information shall be
2001.22 Derivative identification and
OFFICE
safeguarded at the higher level in
markings.
accordance with Subpart D, pending the
Subpart C-Declassification and
determination about its classification
32 CFR Part 2001
Downgrading
level. Upon the determination of its
ective No. 1]
2001.30 Listing declassification and
classification level. the information shall
downgrading authorities.
be marked as provided in § 2001.5.
National Security Information
2001.31 Systematic review for
declassification.
§ 2001.2 Classification authority.
AGENCY: Information Security Oversight
2001.32 Mandatory review for
Office (ISOO).
(a) Requests for original classification
declassification.
ACTION: Implementing Directive: final
authority [1.2 and 5.2(b)(5)]. A request
2001.33 Assistance to the Department of
rule.
for original classification authority
State.
2001.34 FOIA and Privacy Act requests.
pursuant to section 1.2 of Executive
SUMMARY: The Information Security
Order 12356 (hereinafter "the Order")
Oversight Office is publishing this
Subpart D-Safeguarding
shall include a complete justification for
Directive (final rule) pursuant to section
2001.40 General.
the level of classification authority
5.2(b)(1) of Executive Order 12356,
2001.41 Standards for security equipment.
sought. a description of the information
relating to national security information.
2001.42 Accountability.
that will require original classification,
The National Security Council approved
2001.43
Storage.
2001.44 Transmittal.
and the anticipated frequency of original
this Directive on June 22, 1982. The
2001.45
Special access programs.
classification actions.
Executive order prescribes a uniform
2001.46
Reproduction controls.
(b) Listing classification authorities
information security system: it also
2001.47
Loss or possible compromise.
[1.2]. Agencies shall maintain a current
establishes a monitoring system to
2001.48
Disposition and destruction.
listing of officials delegated original
enhance its effectiveness. This Directive
2001.49
Responsibilities of holders.
classification authority by name.
sets forth guidance to agencies on
2001.50
Emergency planning.
2001.51 Emergency authority.
position, or other identifier. If possible,
original and derivative classification,
this listing shall be unclassified.
downgrading. declassification, and
Subpart E-implementation and Review
(c) Exceptional cases [1.2(e)].
safeguarding of national security
2001.60 Agency regulations.
Information described in section 1.2(e)
information.
2001.61 Security education.
of the Order shall be protected as
EFFECTIVE DATE: August 1. 1982.
2001.62 Oversight.
provided in § 2001.1(b).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Subpart F-General Provisions
Steven Garfinkel, Director, ISOO.
§ 2001.3 Classification categories.
2001.70 Definitions.
Telephone: 202-535-7251.
2001.71 Publication and effective date.
(a) Classification in context of related
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This
Authority: Section 5.2(b)(1), E.O. 12356. 47
information [1.3(b)]. Certain information
Directive is issued pursuant to the
FR 14874, April 6, 1982.
which would otherwise be unclassified
ovisions of section 5.2(b)(1) of
may require classification when
ecutive Order 12356. The purpose of
Subpart A-Original Classification
combined or associated with other
e Directive is to assist in implementing
unclassified or classified information.
the Order: users of the Directive shall
§ 2001.1 Classification levels.
Classification on this basis shall be
refer concurrently to that Order for
(a) Limitations [1.1(b)].¹ Markings
supported by a written explanation that,
guidance.
other than "Top Secret," "Secret," and
at a minimum, shall be maintained with
"Confidential," such as "For Official Use
List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 2001
the file or referenced on the record copy
Only" or "Limited Official Use," shall
of the information.
Archives and records, Authority
not be used to identify national security
delegations. Classified information,
information. No other term or phrase
(b) Unofficial publication or
Executive orders. Freedom of
shall be used in conjunction with these
disclosure [1.3(d)]. Following an
inadvertent or unauthorized publication
information, Information, Intelligence,
markings, such as "Secret Sensitive" or
or disclosure of information identical or
National defense, National security
"Agency Confidential." to identify
similar to information that has been
information, Presidential documents,
national security information. The terms
classified in accordance with the Order
Security information. Security measures.
"Top Secret," "Secret," and
"Confidential" should not be used to
or predecessor orders. the agency of
Title 32 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 2001. is revised to read
identify nonclassified executive branch
primary interest shall determine the
information.
degree of damage to the national
as follows:
(b) Reasonable doubt [1.1(c)]. (1)
security. the need for continued
PART 2001-NATIONAL SECURITY
When there is reasonable doubt about
classification, and. in coordination with
INFORMATION
the need to classify information. the
the agency in which the disclosure
information shall be safeguarded as if it
occurred. what action must be taken to
Subpart A-Original Classification
were "Confidential" information in
prevent similar occurrences.
accordance with Subpart D, pending the
Sec.
$ 2001.4 Duration of classification.
2001.1 Classification levels.
determination about its classification.
Upon the determination of a need for
(a) Information not marked for
2001.2 Classification authority.
classification. the information that is
declassification [1.4]. Information
2001.3 Classification categories.
2001.4 Duration of classification.
classified shall be marked as provided
classified under predecessor orders that
2001.5 Identification and markings.
in § 2001.5.
is not subject to automatic
2001.6 Limitations on classification.
(2) When there is reasonable doubt
declassification shall remain classified
part B-Derivative Classification
about the appropriate classification
until reviewed for declassification.
(b) Authority to extend automatic
2001.20 Use of derivative classification.
1 Bracketed references pertain to related sections
declassification determinations [1.4(b)].
2001.21 Classification guides.
of Executive Order 12356.
The authority to extend the
Federal
Register
/
Vol.
47,
No.
123
/
classification of information subject to
that the potential benefits of portion
(i) For an unclassified transmittal
automatic declassification under
marking are clearly outweighed by the
document:
predecessor orders is limited to those
increased administrative burdens.
"UNCLASSIFIED WHEN CLASSIFIED
officials who have classification
Unless the portion marking requirement
ENCLOSURE IS REMOVED"
authority over the information and are
has been waived as authorized. each
portion of a document, including
(ii) For a classified transmittal
designated in writing to have original
subjects and titles. shall be marked by
document:
classification authority at the level of
the information to remain classified.
placing a parenthetical designation
"UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS
Any decision to extend this
immediately preceding or following the
THIS DOCUMENT IS (classification level of
classification on other than a document-
text to which it applies. The symbols
the transmittal document standing alone)"
by-document basis shall be reported to
"(TS)" for Top Secret, "(S)" for Secret,
(2) "Restricted Data" and "Formerly
the Director of the Information Security
"(C)" for Confidential. and "(U)" for
Restricted Data" [6.2(a)]. "Restricted
Oversight Office.
Unclassified shall be used for this
Data" and "Formerly Restricted Data"
purpose. If the application of
shall be marked in accordance with
$ 2001.5 Identification and markings
parenthetical designations is not
[1.5(a), 1.5(b) and 1.5(c)].
regulations issued under the Atomic
practicable. the document shall contain
A uniform information security system
Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
a statement sufficient to identify the
requires that standard markings be
(3) Intelligence sources or methods
information that is classified and the
applied to national security information.
[1.5(c)]. Documents that contain
level of such classification. and the
Except in extraordinary circumstances
information relating to intelligence
information that is not classified. If all
as provided in section 1.5(a) of the
sources or methods shall include the
portions of a document are classified at
Order, or as indicated herein, the
following marking unless otherwise
the same level, this fact may be
marking of paper documents created
proscribed by the Director of Central
indicated by a statement to that effect. If
after the effective date of the Order
Intelligence:
shall not deviate from the following
a subject or title requires classification,
an unclassified identifier may be applied
"WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE
prescribed formats. These markings
SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED"
to facilitate reference.
shall also be affixed to material other
than paper documents. or the originator
(b) Classification authority. If the
(4) Foreign government information
shall provide holders or recipients of the
original classifier is other than the
[1.5(c)]. Documents that contain foreign
information with written instructions for
signer or approver of the document, the
government information shall include
protecting the information.
identity shall be shown as follows:
either the marking "FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION," or a
(a) Classification level. The markings
"CLASSIFIED BY (identification of original
"Top Secret," "Secret," and
classification authority)"
marking that otherwise indicates that
"Confidential" are used to indicate: that
the information is foreign government
(c) Agency and office of origin. If the
information. If the fact that information
information requires protection as
national security information under the
identity of the originating agency and
is foreign government information must
office is not apparent on the face of a
Order: the highest level of classification
be concealed, the marking shall not be
document it shall be placed below the
contained in a document and the
used and the document shall be marked
"CLASSIFIED BY" line.
classification level of each page and, in
as if it were wholly of U.S. origin.
abbreviated form. each portion of a
(d) Declassification and downgrading
(5) Computer output [1.5(c)].
instructions. Declassification and, as
document.
Documents that are generated as
(1) Overall marking. The highest level
applicable. downgrading instructions
computer output may be marked
of classification of information in a
shall be shown as follows:
automatically by systems software. If
document shall be marked in such a
(1) For information to be declassified
automatic marking is not practicable.
way as to distinguish it clearly from the
automatically on a specific date:
such documents must be marked
informational text. These markings shall
"DECLASSIFY ON: (date)
manually.
appear at the top and bottom of the
(6) Agency prescribed markings
outside of the front cover (if any), on the
(2) For information to be declassified
[1.5(c), 4.2(a). and 5.3(c)J. Officials
title page (if any), on the first page. and
automatically upon occurrence of a
delegated original classification
on the outside of the back cover (if any).
specific event:
authority by the President may prescribe
(2) Page marking. Each interior page
"DECLASSIFY ON: (description of event)"
additional markings to control
of a classified document shall be
reproduction and dissemination.
marked at the top and bottom either
(3) For information not to be
including markings required for special
according to the highest classification of
declassified automatically:
access programs authorized by section
the content of the page. including the
"DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING
4.2(a) of the Order.
designation "Unclassified" when it is
AGENCYS DETERMINATION REQUIRED
(f) Electrically transmitted
applicable, or with the highest overall
or 'OADR''
information (messages) [1.5(c)]. Nationa
classification of the document.
(4) For information to be downgraded
security information that is transmitted
(3) Portion marking. Agency heads
automatically on a specific date or upon
electrically shall be marked as follows:
may waive the portion marking
occurrence of a specific event:
(1) The highest level of classification
requirement for specified classes of
"DOWNGRADE TO (classification level)
shall appear before the first line of text;
documents or information only upon a
ON (date or description of event)"
(2) A "CLASSIFIED BY" line is not
written determination that: (i) There will
be minimal circulation of the specified
(e) Special markings.-(1) Transmittal
required;
documents or information and minimal
documents [1.5(c)]. A transmittal
(3) The duration of classification shal
potential usage of these documents or
document shall indicate on its face the
appear as follows:
information as a source for derivative
highest classification of any information
(i) For information to be declassified
classification determinations; or (ii)
transmitted by it. It shall also include
automatically on a specific date:
there is some other basis to conclude
the following or similar instruction:
"DECL: (date)"
27838
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 123 / Friday. June 25, 1982 / Rules and Regulations
(ii) For information to be declassified
addressed in the report to the Director of
guides for specific classes of documents
upon occurrence of a specific event:
the Information Security Oversight
or information should be based, at a
Office:
minimum, on an evaluation of the
PECL: (description of event)"
(a) The elapsed time following
following factors:
) For information not to be
disclosure;
(1) The ability to segregate and
natically declassified which
(b) The nature and extent of
describe the elements of information:
requires the originating agency's
disclosure;
determination (see also $ 2001.5(d)(3)):
(2) The practicality of producing or
(c) The ability to bring the fact of
disseminating the guide because of the
"DECL: OADR"
reclassification to the attention of
nature of the information;
(iv) For information to be
persons to whom the information was
disclosed:
(3) The anticipated usage of the guide
automatically downgraded:
(d) The ability to prevent further
as a basis for derivative classification;
"DNG (abbreviation of classification level
disclosure; and
and
to which the information is to be downgraded
(e) The ability to retrieve the
(4) The availability of alternative
and date or description of event on which
information voluntarily from persons not
sources for derivatively classifying the
downgrading is to occur)"
authorized access in its reclassified
information in a uniform manner.
(4) Portion marking shall be as
state.
prescribed in $ 2001.5(a)(3);
$ 2001.22 Derivative Identification and
(5) Special markings as prescribed in
Subpart B-Derivative Classification
markings [1.5(c) and 2.1(b)].
§ 2001.5(e) (2), (3), and (4) shall appear
Documents classified derivatively on
after the marking for the highest level of
§ 2001.20 Use of derivative classification
[2.1].
the basis of source documents or
classification. These include:
The application of derivative
classification guides shall bear all
(i) "Restricted Data" and "Formerly
Restricted Data" shall be marked in
classification markings is a
markings prescribed in § 2001,5(a)
accordance with regulations issued
responsibility of those who incorporate,
through (e) as are applicable.
paraphrase, restate, or generate in new
Information for these markings shall be
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
form information that is already
taken from the source document or
amended:
classified, and of those who apply
instructions in the appropriate
(ii) Information concerning
intelligence sources or methods:
markings in accordance with
classification guide.
"WNINTEL," unless proscribed by the
instructions from an authorized original
(a) Classification authority. The
Director of Central Intelligence;
classifier or in accordance with an
authority for classification shall be
(iii) Foreign government information:
authorized classification guide. If a
shown as follows:
"FGL" or a marking that otherwise
person who applies derivative
"CLASSIFIED BY (description of source
indicates that the information is foreign
classification markings believes that the
document or classification guide)"
government information. If the fact that
paraphrasing, restating, or summarizing
ormation is foreign government
of classified information has changed
If a document is classified on the basis
mation must be concealed. the
the level of or removed the basis for
of more than one source document or
king shall not be used and the
classification. that person must consult
classification guide, the authority for
isage shall be marked as if it were
for a determination an appropriate
classification shall be shown as follows:
wholly of U.S. origin.
official of the originating agency or
"CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES"
(6) Paper copies of electrically
office of origin who has the authority to
transmitted messages shall be marked
upgrade, downgrade, or declassify the
In these cases the derivative classifier
as provided in § 2001.5(a) (1) and (2).
information.
shall maintain the identification of each
(g) Changes in classification markings
source with the file or record copy of the
§ 2001.21 Classification guides.
[1.4(b) and 4.1(b)]. When a change is
derivatively classified document. A
made in the duration of classified
(a) General [2.2(a)]. Classification
document derivatively classified on the
information. all holders of record shall
guides shall. at a minimum:
basis of a source document that is
be promptly notified. If practicable,
(1) Identify or categorize the elements
marked "CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE
holders of record shall also be notified
of information to be protected:
of a change in the level of classification.
(2) State which classification level
SOURCES" shall cite the source
Holders shall alter the markings to
applies to each element or category of
document in its "CLASSIFIED BY" line
information: and
rather than the term "MULTIPLE
conform to the change. citing the
authority for it. If the remarking of large
(3) Prescribe declassification
SOURCES."
instructions for each element or
(b) Declassification and downgrading
quantities of information is unduly
burdensome, the holder may attach a
category of information in terms of (i) a
instructions. Dates or events for
period of time, (ii) the occurrence of an
automatic declassification or
change of classification notice to the
storage unit in lieu of the marking action
event, or (iii) a notation that the
downgrading, or the notation
otherwise required. Items withdrawn
information shall not be declassified
"ORIGINATING AGENCY'S
from the collection for purposes other
automatically without the approval of
DETERMINATION REQUIRED" to
than transfer for storage shall be
the originating agency.
indicate that the document is not to be
marked promptly in accordance with the
(b) Requirement for review [2.2(a)].
declassified automatically, shall be
change notice.
Classification guides shall be reviewed
carried forward from the source
at least every two years and updated as
document. or as directed by a
§ 2001.6 Limitations on classification
necessary. Each agency shall
classification guide. and shown on a
6(c)].
maintain a list of its classification
"DECLASSIFY ON" line as follows:
efore reclassifying information as
guides in current use.
vided in section 1.6(c) of the Order,
(c) Waivers [2.2(c)]. An authorized
"DECLASSIFY ON: (date: description of
authorized official shall consider the
official's decision to waive the
event: or ORIGINATING AGENCY'S
following factors, which shall be
requirement to issue classification
DETERMINATION REQUIRED' (OADR))'
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 123 / Friday, June 25, 1982 / Rules and Regulations
27839
Subpart C-Declassification and
activities), or intelligence sources or
Security Oversight Office, specific
Downgrading
methods created after 1945, and
systematic declassification review
information concerning cryptology
guidelines for foreign government
§ 2001.30 Listing declassification and
created after 1945;
information over which the agency head
downgrading authorities [3.1(b)].
(iv) Conduct systematic
has declassification authority. These
Agencies shall maintain a current
declassification reviews of accessioned
guidelines shall be reviewed and
listing of officials delegated
records and presidential papers or
updated every five years unless earlier
declassification or downgrading
records in file series concerning
review is requested by the Archivist.
authority by name. position. or other
intelligence activities (including special
(d) Special procedures. All agency
identifier. If possible. this listing shall be
activities), or intelligence sources or
heads shall be bound by the special
unclassified.
methods created after 1945 and
procedures for systematic review of
cryptology records created after 1945 as
classified cryptologic records and
§ 2001.31 Systematic review for
they become fifty years old;
classified records pertaining to
declassification [3.3].
(v) Establish systematic review
intelligence activities (including special
(a) Permanent records. Systematic
priorities for accessioned records and
activities), or intelligence sources or
review is applicable only to those
presidential papers or records based on
methods issued by the Secretary of
classified records and presidential
the degree of researcher interest and the
Defense and the Director of Central
papers or records that the Archivist of
potential for declassifying a significant
Intelligence, respectively.
the United States, acting under the
portion of the information;
Federal Records Act, has determined to
(vi) Re-review for declassification
$ 2001.32 Mandatory review for
be of sufficient historical or other value
accessioned records and presidential
declassification [3.4].
to warrant permanent retention.
papers or records upon the
(a) U.S. originated information. (1)
(b) Non-permanent records. Non-
determination that the followup review
Each agency head shall publish in the
permanent classified records shall be
will be productive. both in terms of
Federal Register the identity of the
disposed of in accordance with
researcher interest and the potential for
person(s) or office(s) to which
schedules approved by the
declassifying a significant portion of the
mandatory declassification review
Administrator of General Services under
information.
requests may be addressed.
the Records Disposal Act. These
(2) The Archivist may review for
(2) Processing. (i) Requests for
schedules shall provide for the
declassification, with the concurrence of
classified records in the custody of the
continued retention of records subject to
the originating agency, accessioned
originating agency. A valid mandatory
an ongoing mandatory review for
records and presidential papers or
declassification review request need not
declassification request.
records, prior to the timeframes
identify the requested information by
(c) Responsibilities. (1) In meeting
established in paragraphs (c)(1) (iii) and
date or title of the responsive records,
responsibilities assigned by section
(iv) of this section.
but must be of sufficient particularity to
3.3(a) of the Order, the Archivist shall:
(3) Officials delegated original
allow agency personnel to locate the
(i) Establish procedures, in
classification authority by the President
records containing the information
consultation with the Director of the
under the Order or predecessor orders
Information Security Oversight Office,
sought with a reasonable amount of
shall:
for the systematic declassification
(i) Within six months of the effective
effort. Agency responses to mandatory,
declassification review requests shall be
review of permanent classified records
date of the Order issue guidelines for
accessioned into the National Archives
systematic declassification review and,
governed by the amount of search and
and classified presidential papers or
if applicable. for downgrading. These
review time required to process the
records under the Archivist's control;
guidelines shall be developed in
request. In responding to mandatory
consultation with the Archivist and the
declassification review requests,
(ii) Conduct systematic
declassification reviews in accordance
Director of the Information Security
agencies shall either make a prompt
declassification determination and
with guidelines provided by the head of
Oversight Office and be designed to
the agency that originated the
assist the Archivist in the conduct of
notify the requester accordingly. or
information: or. with respect to foreign
inform the requester of the additional
systematic reviews;
government information, in accordance
(ii) Designate experienced personnel
time needed to process the request.
with guidelines provided by the head of
to provide timely assistance to the
Agencies shall make a final
the agency having declassification
Archivist in the systematic review
determination within one year from the
jurisdiction over the information, or. if
date of receipt except in unusual
process;
(iii) Review and update guidelines for
circumstances. When information
no guidelines have been provided. in
accordance with the general guidelines
systematic declassification review and
cannot be declassified in its entirety,
provided by the Director of the
downgrading at least every five years
agencies will make reasonable efforts to
Information Security Oversight Office
unless earlier review is requested by the
release, consistent with other applicable
after coordination with the agencies
Archivist.
law, those declassified portions of the
having declassification authority over
(4) Within six months of the effective
requested information that constitute a
the information: or, with respect to
date of the Order the Director of the
coherent segment. Upon the denial of an
presidential papers or records, in
Information Security Oversight Office
initial request, the agency shall also
accordance with guidelines developed
shall issue. in consultation with the
notify the requester of the right of an
by the Archivist and approved by the
Archivist and the agencies having
administrative appeal. which must be
National Security Council:
declassification authority over the
filed within 60 days of receipt of the
(iii) Conduct systematic
information, general guidelines for the
denial.
declassification reviews of accessioned
systematic declassification review of
(ii) Requests for classified records in
records and presidential papers or
foreign government information. Also
the custody of an agency other than the
records as they become 30 years old.
within six months. agency heads may
originating agency. When an agency
except for file series concerning
issue, in consultation with the Archivist
receives a mandatory declassification
intelligence activities (including special
and the Director of the Information
review request for records in its
27840
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 123 / Friday, June 25, 1982 i Rules and Regulations
possession that were originated by
§ 2001.33 Assistance to the Department of
this information is not jeopardized by
another agency. it shall forward the
State (3.3(b)].
the inventory waiver. Waivers shall be
request to that agency. The forwarding
Heads of agencies should assist the
in writing and be available for review
agency shall include a copy of the
Department of State in its preparation of
by the Information Security Oversight
ords requested together with its
the Foreign Relations of the United
Office.
mmendations for action. Upon
States (FRUS) series by facilitating
(b) Secret and Confidential. Agency
ipt, the originating agency shall
access to appropriate classified material
heads shall prescribe accountability or
process the request in accordance with
in their custody and by expediting
control requirements for Secret and
$ 2001.32(a)(2)(i). Upon request, the
declassification review of documents
Confidential information.
originating agency shall communicate its
proposed for inclusion in the FRUS.
§ 2001.43 Storage [4.1(b)].
declassification determination to the
§ 2001.34 FOIA and Privacy Act requests
Classified information shall be stored
referring agency.
[3.4].
(iii) Appeals of denials of mandatory
only in facilities or under conditions
Agency heads shall process requests
declassification review requests. The
designed to prevent unauthorized
for declassification that are submitted
agency appellate authority shall
persons from gaining access to it.
under the provisions of the Freedom of
normally make a determination within
(a) Minimum requirements for
Information Act, as amended, or the
30 working days following the receipt of
Privacy Act of 1974, in accordance with
physical barriers. (1) Top Secret. Top
an appeal. If additional time is required
Secret information shall be stored in a
the provisions of those Acts.
to make a determination, the agency
GSA-approved security container with
appellate authority shall notify the
Subpart D-Safeguarding
an approved. built-in. three-position.
requester of the additional time needed
dial-type changeable combination lock:
and provide the requester with the
§ 2001.40 General [4.1].
in a vault protected by an alarm system
reason for the extension. The agency
Information classified pursuant to this
and response force; or in other types of
appellate authority shall notify the
Order or predecessor orders shall be
storage facilities that meet the standards
requester in writing of the final
afforded a level of protection against
for Top Secret established under the
determination and of the reasons for any
unauthorized disclosure commensurate
provisions of § 2001.41. In addition,
denial.
with its level of classification. For
heads of agencies shall prescribe those
(b) Foreign government information.
information in special access programs
supplementary controls deemed
Except as provided in this paragraph,
established under the provisions of
necessary to restrict unauthorized
agency heads shall process mandatory
section 4.2 of the Order, the
access to areas in which such
declassification review requests for
safeguarding requirements of Subpart D
information is stored.
classified records containing foreign
may be modified by the agency head
(2) Secret and Confidential. Secret
government information in accordance
responsible for creating the special
and Confidential information shall be
with § 2001.32(a). The agency that
access program as long as the modified
stored in a manner and under the
initially received or classified the
requirements provide appropriate
conditions prescribed for Top Secret
foreign government information shall be
protection for the information.
information. or in a container. vault. or
ponsible for making a
alarmed area that meets the standards
§ 2001.41 Standards for security
assification determination after
equipment (4.1(b) and .1(b)].
for Secret or Confidential information
sultation with concerned agencies. If
The Administrator of General
established under the provisions of
agency receiving the request is not
Services shall, in coordination with
§ 2001.41. Secret and Confidential
the agency that received or classified
agencies originating classified
information may also be stored in a
the foreign government information, it
information. establish and publish
safe-type filing cabinet having a built-
shall refer the request to the appropriate
uniform standards. specifications, and
in. three-position. dial-type changeable
agency for action. Consultation with the
combination lock, or a steel filing
supply schedules for security equipment
foreign originator through appropriate
designed to provide secure storage for
cabinet equipped with a steel lock bar
channels may be necessary prior to final
and to destroy classified information.
secured by a GSA-approved three-
action on the request.
Any agency may establish more
position changeable combination
(c) Cryptologic and intelligence
stringent standards for its own use.
padlock. Heads of agencies shall
information. Mandatory declassification
Whenever new security equipment is
prescribe supplementary controls for
review requests for cryptologic
procured, it shall be in conformance
storage of Secret information in cabinets
information and information concerning
with the standards and specifications
equipped with a steel lock bar. Access
intelligence activities (including special
referred to above and shall. to the
to bulky Secret and Confidential
activities) or intelligence sources or
maximum extent practicable. be of the
material in weapons storage areas.
methods shall be processed solely in
type available through the Federal
strong rooms, closed areas or similar
accordance with special procedures
facilities shall be controlled in
Supply System.
issued by the Secretary of Defense and
accordance with requirements
the Director of Central Intelligence,
§ 2001.42 Accountability [4.1(b)].
established by the appropriate agency
respectively.
(a) Top Secret. Top Secret control
head. At a minimum. such requirements
(d) Fees. In responding to mandatory
officials shall be designated to receive,
shall prescribe the use of key-operated.
declassification review requests for
transmit, and maintain current access
high-security padlocks approved by the
classified records, agency heads may
and accountability records for Top
General Services Administration.
charge fees in accordance with section
Secret information. An inventory of Top
(b) Combinations. (1) Equipment in
483a of title 31. United States Code. The
Secret documents shall be made at least
service. Combinations to dial-type locks
schedules of fees published in the
annually. Agency heads may waive the
shall be changed only by persons having
Federal Register by agencies in
requirement for an annual inventory of
an appropriate security clearance, and
plementation of Executive Order
storage systems containing large
shall be changed whenever such
65 shall remain in effect until they
volumes of Top Secret information upon
equipment is placed in use; whenever a
revised.
a determination that the safeguarding of
person knowing the combination no
Federal Register / VoL 47, No. 123 / Friday, June 25, 1982 / Rules and Regulations
27841
longer requires access to it; whenever a
information may be transmitted within
$ 2001.46 Reproduction controls [4.1(b)].
combination has been subjected to
and between the 50 States, the District
(a) Top Secret documents, except for
possible compromise; whenever the
of Columbia. and the Commonwealth of
the controlled initial distribution of
equipment is taken out of service; or at
Puerto Rico by one of the means
information processed or received
least once every year. Knowledge of
authorized for Top Secret information,
electrically, shall not be reproduced
combinations shall be limited to the
by the U.S. Postal Service registered
without the consent of the originator:
minimum number of persons necessary
mail. or by protective services provided
(b) Unless restricted by the originating
for operating purposes. Records of
by U.S. air or surface commercial
agency, Secret and Confidential
combinations shall be classified no
carriers under such conditions as may
documents may be reproduced to the
lower than the highest level of classified
be prescribed by the head of the agency
extent required by operational needs.
information that is protected by the lock.
concerned.
(c) Reproduced copies of classified
(2) Equipment out of service. When
(2) Other areas. Secret information
documents shall be subject to the same
security equipment is taken out of
may be transmitted from. to, or within
accountability and controls as the
service it shall be inspected to ensure
areas other than those specified in
original documents.
that no classified information remains,
$ 2001.44(c)(1) by one of the means
(d) Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
and the built-in combination lock shall
established for Top Secret information,
section shall not restrict the
be reset to the standard combination 50-
or by U.S. registered mail through
reproduction of documents to facilitate
25-50. Combination padlocks shall be
Military Postal Service facilities
review for declassification.
reset to the standard combination 10-
provided that the information does not
20-30.
at any time pass out of U.S. citizen
§ 2001.47 Loss or possible compromise
(c) Keys. Heads of agencies shall
control and does not pass through a
[4.1(b)].
establish administrative procedures for
foreign postal system. Transmittal
Any person who has knowledge of the
the control and accountability of keys
outside such areas may also be
loss or possible compromise of
and locks whenever key-operated, high-
accomplished under escort of
classified information shall immediately
security padlocks are utilized. The level
appropriately cleared personnel aboard
report the circumstances to an official
of protection provided such keys shall
U.S. Government and U.S. Government
designated for this purpose by the
be equivalent to that afforded the
contract vehicles or aircraft, ships of the
person's agency or organization. The
classified information being protected
United States Navy, civil service
agency that originated the information
by the padlock.
manned U.S. Naval ships, and ships of
shall be notified of the loss or possible
U.S. registry. Operators of vehicles,
compromise so that a damage
§ 2001.44 Transmittal [4.1(b)].
captains or masters of vessels, and
assessment may be conducted and
(a) Preparation and receipting.
pilots of aircraft who are U.S. citizens
appropriate measures taken to negate or
Classified information to be transmitted
and who are appropriately cleared may
minimize any adverse effect of the
outside of a facility shall be enclosed in
be designated as escorts.
compromise. The agency under whose
opaque inner and outer covers. The
(d) Transmittal of Confidential.
cognizance the loss or possible
inner cover shall be a sealed wrapper or
Confidential information shall be
compromise occurred shall initiate an
envelope plainly marked with the
transmitted within and between the 50
inquiry to (a) determine cause, (b) place
assigned classification and addresses of
States, the District of Columbia, the
responsibility, and (c) take corrective
both sender and addressee. The outer
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and U.S.
measures and appropriate
cover shall be sealed and addressed
territories or possessions by one of the
administrative, disciplinary, or legal
with no identification of the
means established for higher
action.
classification of its contents. A receipt
classifications, or by the U.S. Postal
shall be attached to or enclosed in the
Service certified, first class, or express
§ 2001.48 Disposition and destruction
inner cover, except that Confidential
mail service when prescribed by an
[4.1(b)].
information shall require a receipt only
agency head. Outside these areas,
Classified information no longer
if the sender deems it necessary. The
Confidential information shall be
needed in current working files or for
receipt shall identify the sender. the
transmitted only as is authorized for
reference or record purposes shall be
addressee, and the document, but shall
higher classifications.
processed for appropriate disposition in
contain no classified information. It
(e) Hand carrying of classified
accordance with the provisions of
shall be immediately signed by the
information. Agency regulations shall
chapters 21 and 33 of title 44, United
recipient and returned to the sender.
prescribe procedures and appropriate
States Code, which govern disposition of
Any of these wrapping and receipting
restrictions concerning the escort or
Federal records. Classified information
requirements may be waived by agency
hand carrying of classified information,
approved for destruction shall be
heads if conditions provide at least
including the hand carrying of
destroyed in accordance with
equivalent protection to prevent access
classsified information on commercial
procedures and methods prescribed by
by unauthorized persons.
carriers.
the head of the agency. The method of
(b) Transmittal of Top Secret. The
destruction must preclude recognition or
transmittal of Top Secret information
§ 2001.45 Special access programs [1.2(a)
reconstruction of the classified
outside of a facility shall be by
and 4.2(a)].
information or material.
specifically designated personnel, by
Agency heads designated pursuant to
State Department diplomatic pouch. by
section 1.2(a) of the Order may create or
§ 2001.49 Responsibilities of holders
a messenger-courier system authorized
continue a special access program if:
[4.1(b)].
for the purpose, or over authorized
(a) Normal management and
Any person having access to and
secure communications circuits.
safeguarding procedures do not limit
possession of classified information is
(c) Transmittal of Secret. The
access sufficiently; and
responsible for: (a) Protecting it from
transmittal of Secret information shall
(b) the number of persons with access
persons not authorized access to it. to
be effected in the following manner:
is limited to the minimum necessary to
include securing it in approved
(1) The 50 States, the District of
meet the objective of providing extra
equipment or facilities whenever it is
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Secret
protection for the information.
not under the direct supervision of
27842
Federal Register / Vol. 47, No. 123 / Friday, June 25, 1982 / Rules and Regulations
authorized persons; and (b) meeting
education program. The program
(f) Special access program. Any
accountability requirements prescribed
established shall be sufficient to
program imposing "need-to-know" or
by the head of the agency.
familiarize all necessary personnel with
access controls beyond those normally
the provisions of the Order and its
provided for access to Confidential,
01.50 Emergency planning [4.1(b)].
implementing directives and regulations
Secret, or Top Secret information. Such
Agencies shall develop plans for the
and to impress upon them their
a program may include, but is not
protection. removal. or destruction of
individual security responsibilities. The
limited to, special clearance.
classified material in case of fire.
program shall also provide for initial,
adjudication. or investigative
natural disaster. civil disturbance, or
refresher, and termination briefings.
requirements. special designations of
enemy action. These plans shall include
officials authorized to determine "need-
the disposition of classified information
§ 2001.62 Oversight [5.3(a)].
to-know," or special lists of persons
located in foreign countries.
Agency heads shall require that
determined to have a "need-to-know."
periodic formal reviews be made to
(g) Intelligence activity. An activity
§ 2001.51 Emergency authority [4.1(b)].
Those officials delegated original
ensure compliance with the provisions
that an agency within the Intelligence
of the Order and ISOO directives.
Community is authorized to conduct
classification authority by the President
pursuant to Executive Order 12333.
may prescribe by regulation special
Subpart F-General Provisions
(h) Special activity. An activity
provisions for the dissemination,
conducted in support of national foreign
transmittal. destruction. and
$ 2001.70 Definitions [6.1].
policy objectives abroad which is
safeguarding of national security
(a) Original classification authority.
planned and executed so that the role of
information during combat or other
The authority vested in an executive
the United States Government is not
emergency situations which pose an
branch official to make an initial
apparent or acknowledged publicly, and
imminent threat to national security
determination that information requires
functions in support of such activity, but
information.
protection against unauthorized
which is not intended to influence
Subpart E-implementation and
disclosure in the interest of national
United States political processes. public
Review
security.
opinion. policies, or media and does not
(b) Classification guide. A document
include diplomatic activities or the
$ 2001.50 Agency regulations [5.3(b)]
issued by an authorized original
collection and production of intelligence
Each head of an agency shall issue
classifier that prescribes the level of
or related support functions.
regulations in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
classification and appropriate
(i) Unauthorized disclosure. A
552(a) to implement the Order and 32
declassification instructions for
communication or physical transfer of
CFR Part 2001 no later than December
classified information to an
specified information to be classified on
31. 1982 Those portions that affect
a derivative basis.
unauthorized recipient.
members of the public shall include. at a
(c) Originating agency. The agency
§ 2001.71 Publication and effective date
minimum, information relating to the
responsible for the initial determination
[6-2(e)].
gency's mandatory declassification
that particular information is classified.
Part 2001 shall be published in the
riew program and instructions for
(d) Multiple sources. The term used to
Federal Register. It shall become
omitting suggestions or complaints
indicate that a document is derivatively
effective August 1. 1982.
garding the agency's information
classified when it contains classified
Steven Garfinkel,
security program.
information derived from more than one
Director. Information Security Oversight
§ 2001.61 Security education [5.3(a)].
source.
Office.
Each agency that creates or handles
(e) Portion. A segment of a document
June 23. 1982.
national security information is required
for purposes of expressing a unified
[FR Doc. 82-17295 Filed 6-23-82: 10:37 am]
under the Order to establish a security
theme; ordinarily a paragraph.
BILLING CODE 6820-AF-M
SPEND POLICY
U.S. Department of Justice
/
Washington, D.C. 20530
August 25, 1983
Materials Concerning Prepublication Review
1) SCI Nondisclosure Agreement Form
2) Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement Form
3) DOJ Letters on Enforceability of Agreements
4) DOJ Implementing Regulations
AUG 6 4 1000
SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
An Agreement Between
and the United States
(Name-Printed or Typed)
1 2 contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted
1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations
3 access to information known as Sensitive Compartmented Information
4 (SCI). I have been advised and am aware that SCI involves or
5 derives from intelligence sources or methods and is classified or
6 classifiable under the standards of Executive Order 12356 or under
7 other Executive order or statute. I understand and accept that by
8 being granted access to SCI, special confidence and trust shall be
9 placed in me by the United States Government.
1 2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination
2 concerning the nature and protection of SCI, including the procedures
3 to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I
4 contemplate disclosing this information have been approved for
5 access to it, and that I understand these procedures. I understand that
6 I may be required to sign subsequent agreements as a condition of
7 being granted access to different categories of SCI. I further
8 understand that all my obligations under this Agreement continue to
9 exist whether or not I am required to sign such subsequent agreements.
3. I have been advised and am aware that direct or indirect unauthorized
1 2 disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of SCI by
3 me could cause irreparable injury to the United States or could be
4 used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will
5 never divulge such information unless I have officially verified
6 that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States
7 Government to receive it or I have been given prior written notice of
8 authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency
9 (hereinafter Department or Agency) last granting me either a security
10 clearance or an SCI access approval that such disclosure is permitted.
1 4. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and
2 regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified
3 information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is
4 information that is classified under the standards of E.O. 12356, or
5 under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the
6 unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national
7 security.
1 5. In consideration of being granted access to SCI and of being
2 assigned or retained in a position of special confidence and trust
3 requiring access to SCI and other classified information, I hereby
4 agree to submit for security review by the Department or Agency
5 last granting me either a security clearance or an SCI access
6
approval all materials, including works' of fiction, that I contemplate
7
disclosing to any person not authorized to have such information,
AUD
8 or that I have prepared for public disclosure, which contain or
9 purport to contain:
10
(a) any SCI, any description of activities that produce or
11
relate to SCI, or any information derived from SCI;
12
(b) any classified information from intelligence reports
13
or estimates; or
14
(c) any information concerning intelligence activities,
15
sources or methods.
16 I understand and agree that my obligation to submit such information
17 and materials for review applies during the course of my access to
18 SCI and at all times thereafter. However, I am not required to
19 submit for review any such materials that exclusively contain
20 information lawfully obtained by me at a time when I have no employment,
21 contract or other relationship with the United States Government,
22 and which are to be published at such time.
1 6. I agree to make the submissions described in paragraph 5 prior
2 to discussing the information or materials with, or showing them to
3 anyone who is not authorized to have access to such information. I
4 further agree that I will not disclose such information or materials
5 unless I have officially verified that the recipient has been
6 properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it or
7 I have been given written authorization from the Department or
8 Agency last granting me either a security clearance or an SCI
9 access approval that such disclosure is permitted.
1
7. I understand that the purpose of the review described in paragraph 5
2 is to give the United States a reasonable opportunity to determine
3 whether the information or materials submitted pursuant to paragraph 5
4 set forth any SCI or other information that is subject to classification
5 under E.O. 12356 or under any other Executive order or statute that
6 prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest
7 of national security. I further understand that the Department or
8 Agency to which I have submitted materials will act upon them,
9 coordinating with the Intelligence Community or other agencies when
10 appropriate, and substantively respond to me within 30 working days
11 from date of receipt.
1 8. I have been advised and am aware that any breach of this Agreement
2 may result in the termination of any security clearances and SCI
3 access approvals that I may hold; removal from any position of
4 special confidence and trust requiring such clearances or access
5 approvals; and the termination of my employment or other relationships
6 with the Departments or Agencies that granted my security clearances
7 or SCI access approvals. In addition, I have been advised and am
8 aware that any unauthorized disclosure of SCI or other classified
9 information by me may constitute a violation or violations of United
10 States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793,
11 794, 798, and 952, Title 18, United States Code, the provisions
AUG
6
4
12 of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States Code, and the provisions
13 of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I recognize
14 that nothing in this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United
15 States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.
1 9. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties,
2 remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result, or
3 may result from any disclosure, publication, or revelation not
4 consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
1 10. I understand that the United States Government may seek any
2 remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including, but not
3 limited to, application for a court order prohibiting disclosure of
4 information in breach of this Agreement.
1 11. I understand that all information to which I may obtain access
2 by signing this Agreement is now and will forever remain the property
3 of the United States Government. I do not now, nor will I ever,
4 possess any right, interest, title, or claim whatsoever to such
5 information. I agree that I shall return all materials which have
6 or may come into my possession or for which I am responsible
7 because of such access, upon demand by an authorized representative
8 of the United States Government or upon the conclusion of my employment
9 or other relationship with the Department or Agency that last
10 granted me either a security clearance or an SCI access approval.
11 If I do not return such materials upon request, I understand that
12 this may be a violation of Section 793, Title 18, United States
13 Code, a United States criminal law.
1 12. Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized
2 representative of the United States Government, I understand that
3 all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement
4 apply during the time I am granted access to SCI and at all times
5 thereafter.
1 13. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should
2 find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all other
3 provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
1 14. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any,
2 have been answered to my satisfaction. I acknowledge that the
3 briefing officer has made available to me Sections 641, 793, 794,
4 798, and 952 of Title 18, United States Code, Section 783(b) of
5 Title 50, United States Code, the Intelligence Identities Protection
6 Act of 1982, and Executive Order 12356 so that I may read them at
7 this time, if I so choose.
1 15. I make this Agreement without mental reservation or purpose of
2 evasion.
SIGNATURE
DATE
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
ORGANIZATION
(SEE NOTICE BELOW)
1 The execution of this Agreement was witnessed by the undersigned,
2 who, on behalf of the United States Government, agreed to its terms
3 and accepted it as a prior condition of authorizing access to
4
Sensitive Compartmented Information.
WITNESS and ACCEPTANCE:
1 SIGNATURE
DATE
ORGANIZATION
SECURITY BRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I hereby acknowledge that I was briefed on the following SCI Special
Access Program(s)
(Special Access Programs by Initials Only)
Signature of Individual Briefed
Date Briefed
Printed or Typed Name
Social Security Number (See Notice
Organization (Name and Address)
Below)
I certify that the above SCI access (es) were approved in accordance
with relevant SCI procedures and that the briefing presented by me on the
above date was also in accordance therewith.
Signature of Briefing Officer
Printed or Typed Name
Organization (Name and Address)
Social Security Number (See Notice
Below)
SECURITY DEBRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Having been reminded of my continuing obligation to comply with the
terms of this Agreement, I hereby acknowledge that I was debriefed on the
following SCI Special Access Program(s):
(Special Access Programs by Initials Only)
Signature of Individual Debriefed
Date Debriefed
Printed or Typed Name
Social Security Number (See Notice
Organization (Name and Address)
Below)
I certify that the debriefing presented by me on the above date was
in accordance with relevant SCI procedures.
Signature of Debriefing Officer
Printed or Typed Name
Organization (Name and Address)
Social Security Number (See Notice
Below)
1 NOTICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal
2 agencies inform individuals, at the time information is solicited
3 from them, whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by
4 what authority such information is solicited, and what uses will
5 be made of the information. You are hereby advised that authority
6 for soliciting your Social Security Account Number (SSN) is Executive
7 Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to identify you precisely when
8 it is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the information
9 indicated above, 2) determine that your access to the information
10 indicated has terminated, or 3) certify that you have witnessed
11 a briefing or debriefing. Although disclosure of your SSN is not
12 mandatory, your failure to do so may impede the processing of such
13 certifications or determinations.
AUG 2 4 198.
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
An Agreement Between
and the United States
(Name-Printed or Typed)
1 1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations
2 contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted
3 access to classified information. As used in this Agreement, classified
4 information is information that is either classified or classifiable
5 under the standards of Executive Order 12356, or under any other Executive
6 order or statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information
7 in the interest of national security. I understand and accept that
8 by being granted access to classified information, special confidence
9 and trust shall be placed in me by the United States Government.
1 2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination
2 concerning the nature and protection of classified information,
3 including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether
4 other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have
5 been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.
1
3. I have been advised and am aware that direct or indirect unauthorized
2 disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified
3
information by me could cause irreparable injury to the United States
4 or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree
5 that I will never divulge such information unless I have officially
6 verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by the
7 United States Government to receive it or I have been given prior
8 written notice of authorization from the United States Government
9 Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) last granting
10 me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I
11 further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and
12 regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified
13 information.
1 4. I have been advised and am aware that any breach of this Agreement
2 may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal
3 from any position of special confidence and trust requiring such
4 clearances; and the termination of my employment or other relationships
5 with the Departments or Agencies that granted my security clearance or
6 clearances. In addition, I have been advised and am aware that any
7 unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute
8 a violation or violations of United States criminal laws, including
9 the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18,
10 United States Code, the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50,
11 United States Code, and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities
12 Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in this Agreement
13 constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute
14 me for any statutory violation.
1 5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties,
2 remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result or may
3 result from any disclosure, publication, or revelation not consistent
4 with the terms of this Agreement.
1 6. I understand that the United States Government may seek any
2 remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including, but
3 not limited to, application for a court order prohibiting disclosure
4 of information in breach of this Agreement.
1 7. I understand that all information to which I may obtain access
2 by signing this Agreement is now and will forever remain the property
3 of the United States Government. I do not now, nor will I ever,
4 possess any right, interest, title, or claim whatsoever to such
5 information. I agree that I shall return all materials, which have,
6 or may have, come into my possession or for which I am responsible
7 because of such access, upon demand by an authorized representative
8 of the United States Government or upon the conclusion of my employment
9 or other relationship with the Department or Agency that last
10 granted me a security clearance. If I do not return such materials
11 upon request, I understand that this may be a violation of Section 793,
12 Title 18, United States Code, a United States criminal law.
1 8. Unless and until I am released in writing by. an authorized
2 representative of the United States Government, I understand that
3 all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement
4 apply during the time I am granted access to classified information,
5 and at all times thereafter.
1 9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court
2 should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all
3 other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and
4 effect.
1 10. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if
2 any, have been answered to my satisfaction. I acknowledge that
3 the briefing officer has made available to me Sections 641, 793,
4 794, 798, and 952 of Title 18, United States Code, Section 783(b) of
5 Title 50, United States Code, the Intelligence Identities Protection
6 Act of 1982, and Executive Order 12356, so that I may read them
7 at this time, if I so choose.
1 11. I make this Agreement without mental reservation or purpose
2 of evasion.
SIGNATURE
DATE
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
ORGANIZATION
(SEE NOTICE BELOW)
AUS 24 1983
1 The execution of this Agreement was witnessed by the undersigned,
2. who, on behalf of the United States Government, agreed to its terms
3 and accepted it as a prior condition of authorizing access to
4 classified information.
WITNESS and ACCEPTANCE:
SIGNATURE
DATE
ORGANIZATION
1 NOTICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal
2 agencies inform individuals, at the time information is solicited
3 from them, whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what
4 authority such information is solicited, and what uses will be made
5 of the information. You are hereby advised that authority for
6 soliciting your Social Security Account Number (SSN) is Executive
7 Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to identify you precisely when it
8 is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the information
9 indicated above or 2) determine that your access to the information
10 indicated has terminated. Although disclosure of your SSN is not
11 mandatory, your failure to do so may impede the processing of such
12 certifications or determinations.
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530
August 16, 1983
Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20506
Re: NSDD-84 Nondisclosure Agreement Forms
Dear Mr. Kimmitt:
In my letter of July 19, 1983, a copy of which is attached, I
advised Steven Garfinkel that two draft nondisclosure agreements
had been determined by the Department of Justice to be enforceable
in civil litigation brought by the United States. Since then, the
nondisclosure agreements have been revised, and copies of the
final versions are attached to this letter. None of the revisions
affect any of the legal analysis contained in my July 19 letter.
Therefore, we have concluded that each of the final nondisclosure
agreements would be enforceable in accordance with its terms in
civil litigation initiated by the United States.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Richard K. Willard
Richard K. Willard
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Attachments
CC: Steven Garfinkel
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530
July 19, 1983
Mr. Steven Garfinkel
Director, Information Security Oversight Office
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20403
Dear Mr. Garfinkel:
Your letter to the Attorney General dated July 1, 1983,
requests that the Department of Justice review two nondisclosure
agreements drafted pursuant to National Security Decision
Directive 84, entitled "Safeguarding National Security
Information" (referred to herein as NSDD-84), which was signed by
the President on March 11, 1983.
Paragraph l.a. of NSDD-84 requires all persons with
authorized access to classified information to sign a
nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access. Paragraph 1.b.
imposes the same requirement on persons with authorized access to
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and requires, in
addition, that such nondisclosure agreements "include a provision
for prepublication review to assure deletion of SCI and other
classified information." Paragraph l.c. provides that the
agreements required in paragraphs l.a. and 1.b. must be in a form
determined by the Department of Justice to be enforceable in a
civil action brought by the United States.
We understand that the draft agreements transmitted with your
letter were prepared pursuant to the provision in paragraph 1.c.
of NSDD-84 that your office develop standardized forms to satisfy
the requirements of the directive. We also understand that use of
these forms will be mandatory for each agency of the Executive
Branch that originates or handles classified information, unless
the National Security Council grants permission to use an
alternative form of agreement that has been approved by your
office and the Justice Department.
Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement
The essence of the proposed Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreement is an undertaking by the person receiving
access to classified information never to disclose such
-2-
information in an unauthorized manner. This undertaking is
consistent with the provisions of Executive Order 12356, as well
as various statutes and other regulations that prohibit the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information. In addition,
government employees and others who are entrusted with classified
information have a fiduciary obligation to protect it from
unauthorized disclosure. See Snepp V. United States, 444 U.S.
507, 511 n.6, 515 n.ll (1980).
The protection of national security information is a primary
and fundamental constitutional responsibility of the President
that derives from his responsibilities as Chief Executive,
Commander-in-Chief, and the principal instrument of United States
foreign policy. Agreements to preserve the secrecy of classified
information are an appropriate method for the President to
discharge these constitutional responsibilities. United States V.
Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315-16 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972) ; cf. Snepp V. United States, supra, 444 U.S. at
509 n.3 (agreement serves "compelling interest" of Government in
safeguarding national security information). These same cases
also rely upon the statutory authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence to protect "intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure." 50 U.S.C. § 403 (d) (3). However, the
agreements sustained in Marchetti and Snepp were not limited to
information concerning intelligence sources and methods but
included promises never to disclose any classified information.
Therefore, we believe that the President may require the signing
of such agreements as a condition of access to classified
information.
SCI Nondisclosure Agreement
The proposed SCI Nondisclosure Agreement has the same basic
terms as the Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement
discussed above. SCI is a category of classified information that
is subject to special access and handling requirements because it
involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence
sources and methods. The power to require signing such an
agreement as a condition of access to SCI is thus supported by the
statutory authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to
protect intelligence sources and methods, 50 U.S.C. § 403 (d) (3),
as well as the more fundamental constitutional responsibilities of
the President regarding national security.
-3-
The proposed SCI Nondisclosure Agreement includes provisions
for the Government to conduct prepublication review of certain
writings by persons who have signed the agreement. The
prepublication review provisions of the proposed agreement are
similar to the agreement found by the Supreme Court to be
enforceable in Snepp V. United States, supra. See also Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. V. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 992 (1975) ; United States V. Marchetti, supra; Agee V. CIA,
500 F. Supp. 506 (D.D.C. 1980).
The rationale of the above-cited cases supports the inclusion
of prepublication review provisions in agreements that extend
beyond CIA to include other persons with authorized access to SCI.
Neither the statutory authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence nor the constitutional responsibilities of the
President are limited to CIA and its employees. Moreover, a high
degree of trust, which creates a fiduciary obligation on the part
of CIA employees, would also be involved for government officials
outside CIA who are entrusted with equally sensitive information
such as SCI.
Paragraph 5 of the proposed SCI Nondisclosure Agreement
defines the scope of materials required to be submitted for
prepublication review. In certain respects, this provision is
narrower than the agreement at issue in Snepp. As in the Snepp
agreement, however, certain materials must be submitted for review
even if they are not thought to contain classified information.
The Supreme Court in Snepp upheld the validity of such a
requirement. 444 U.S. at 511-13.
Among the categories of materials required in paragraph 5 to
be submitted for prepublication review is "(c) any information
concerning intelligence activities, sources or methods.' " This
category is not limited to classified information as such, but
includes any information that is required to be considered for
classification pursuant to Executive Order 12356, $ (a) (4). We
believe that agencies using the proposed SCI Nondisclosure
Agreement should include in their implementing instructions some
definition of the term "intelligence activities," to include at
least a reference to the definition contained in Executive Order
12333, § 3.4(e).
Once material is submitted for prepublication review, there
is no authority in the proposed agreement for the Government to
delete unclassified information. However, any information that is
-4- - -
subject to classification may be deleted pursuant to paragraph 7,
even if it does not pertain to SCI or other intelligence matters.
See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. V. Colby, supra, 509 F.2d at 1368-69.
Conclusion
We have reviewed the specific provisions of the two draft
agreements transmitted with your letter and have concluded that
each would be enforceable in accordance with its terms in civil
litigation initiated by the United States.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Richard K. Willard
Richard K. Willard
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
Order
DOJ 2620.8
EMPLOYEE OBLIGATIONS TO PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject:
AND SUBMIT TO PREPUBLICATION REVIEW
1.
PURPOSE. The purpose of this order is to explain and clarify
Department of Justice (DOJ) policies concerning implementation
of the prepublication review program.
2.
SCOPE. This order applies to all persons granted access to
classified information in the course of their employment at the
DOJ and DOJ contractors granted such access.
3.
AUTHORITY.
a.
Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information."
b.
National Security Decision Directive-84 entitled
"Safeguarding National Security Information. "
C.
28 C.F.R. 0.75 (p).
4.
POLICY. All persons granted access to classified information
in the course of their employment at the DOJ are required to
safeguard that information from unauthorized disclosure. This
nondisclosure obligation is imposed by statutes, regulations,
access agreements, and the fiduciary relationships of the
persons who are entrusted with classified information in the
performance of their duties. The nondisclosure obligation
continues after DOJ employment terminates.
As an additional means of preventing unlawful disclosures of
classified information, the President has directed that all
persons with authorized access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) be required to sign nondisclosure agree-
ments containing a provision for prepublication review to
assure deletion of SCI and other classified information.
SCI is information that not only is classified for national
security reasons as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, but
also is subject to special access and handling requirements
Distribution:
BUR/H-1
Initiated By: Security Staff
OBD/F-2 OBD/H-1
Justice Management Division
DOJ 2620.8
because it involves or derives from particularly sensitive
intelligence sources and methods.
5.
RESPONSIBILITIES.
a.
The prepublication review provision requires that DOJ
employees granted access to SCI submit certain material
to the Department, whether prepared during or subsequent
to DOJ employment, prior to its publication to provide an
to
opportunity for determining whether an unauthorized
disclosure of SCI or other classified information would
occur as a consequence of its publication.
The obligations not to disclose classified information and
to comply with agreements requiring prepublication review
have been held by the Supreme Court to be enforceable in
civil litigation. Snepp V. United States, 444 U.S. 507
(1980)
b.
It must be recognized at the outset that it is not possible
to anticipate each and every question that may arise. The
Department will endeavor to respond, however, as quickly
as possible to specific inquiries by present and former
employees concerning whether specific materials require
prepublication review. Present and former employees are
invited to discuss their plans for public disclosures of
information that may be subject to these obligations with
authorized Department representatives at an early stage,
or as soon as circumstances indicate these policies must
be considered. All questions concerning these obligations
should be addressed to the Counsel for Intelligence Policy,
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Room 6325, U.S.
Department of Justice, 10th & Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530. The official views of the
Department on whether specific materials require prepubli-
cation review may only be expressed by the Counsel for
Intelligence Policy and persons should not act in reliance
upon the views of other Department personnel.
C.
Employees with access to SCI will be required to sign
agreements providing for prepublication review. Prepubli-
cation review is required only as expressly provided for in
an agreement. However, all persons who have had access to
classified information have an obligation to avoid unauth-
orized disclosures of such information and are subject to
enforcement actions if they disclose classified information
in an unauthorized manner. Therefore, present or former
employees are encouraged voluntarily to submit material for
Page 2
Par 4
DUJ 2040.0
prepublication review if they believe that such material
may contain classified information even if such submission
is not required by a prepublication review agreement. Where
there is any doubt, present and former employees are urged
to err on the side of prepublication review to avoid
unauthorized disclosures and for their own protection.
d.
Present or former employees who have signed agreements
providing for prepublication review are required to submit
any material prepared for disclosure to others that
contains or purports to contain:
(1) any SCI, any description of activities that
produce or relate to SCI, or any information
derived from SCI;
(2) any classified information from intelligence
reports or estimates; or
(3) any information concerning intelligence
activities, sources or methods.
The term "intelligence activities" in paragraph 5.d. (3)
means all activities that agencies within the Intelligence
Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to Executive
Order 12333. However, there is no requirement to submit
for review any materials that exclusively contain infor-
mation lawfully obtained at a time when the author has no
employment, contract, or other relationship with the
United States Government and which are to be published at
such time.
e.
A person's obligation to submit material for prepublication
review remains identical whether such person actually
prepares the material or causes or assists another person,
such as a ghost writer, spouse or friend, or editor in
preparing the material. Material described in paragraph 5.d
must be submitted for prepublication review prior to dis-
cussing it with or showing it to a publisher, co-author, or
any other person who is not authorized to have access to it.
In this regard, it should be noted that a failure to submit
such material for prepublication review constitutes a breach
of the obligation and exposes the author to remedial action
even in cases where the published material does not actually
contain SCI or classified information. See Snepp V. United
States, supra.
Par 5
Page 3
DOJ 2620.8
f.
The requirement to submit information or materials for
prepublication review is not limited to any particular type
of material or disclosure. Written materials include not
only books but all other forms of written materials intended
for public disclosure, such as (but not limited to) news-
paper columns, magazine articles, letters to the editor,
book reviews, pamphlets, and scholarly papers. Because
fictional treatment may convey factual information, fiction
is also covered if it is based upon or reflects information
described in paragraph 5.d.
g.
Oral statements are also included when based upon written
materials, such as an outline of the remarks. There is no
requirement to prepare such material for prior review, how-
ever, unless there is reason to believe in advance that oral
statements may contain SCI or other classified information.
Thus, a person may participate in an oral presentation of
information where there is no opportunity for prior pre-
paration (e.g., news interview, panel discussion) unless
there is reason to believe in advance that such oral
expression may contain SCI or other classified information.
This recognition of the problems with oral representations
does not, of course, exempt present or former employees
from liability for any unauthorized disclosures of SCI or
classified information that may occur in the course of
even extemporaneous oral expressions.
h.
Material that consists solely of personal views, opinions or
judgments and does not contain or imply any statement of
fact that would fall within the description in paragraph 5.d
is not subject to the prepublication review requirement.
For example, public speeches or publication of articles on
such topics as proposed legislation or foreign policy do not
require prepublication review as long as the material does
not directly or implicitly constitute a statement of an
informational nature that falls within paragraph 5.d. Of
course, in some circumstances the expression of "opinion"
may imply facts and thus be of such a character as to
require prior review.
i.
Obviously, the purposes of prepublication review will be
frustrated where the material in question already has been
disseminated to unauthorized persons. Comparison of the
material before and after the review would reveal which
items of classified information, if any, had been deleted
at the Department's request. Consequently, the Department
will consider these obligations to have been breached in any
case, whether or not the written material is subsequently
Page 4
Par 5
DOJ 2620.8
submitted to the Department for prepublication review, where
it already has been circulated to publishers or reviewers or
has otherwise been made available to unauthorized persons.
While the Department reserves the right to review such
material for purposes of mitigating damage that may result
from the disclosure, such action shall not prevent the
United States Government and the Department from pursuing
all appropriate remedies available under law as a conse-
quence of the failure to submit the materials for prior
review and/or any unauthorized disclosure of SCI or
classified information.
j.
Materials submitted for prepublication review will be
reviewed solely for the purpose of identifying and pre-
venting the disclosure of SCI and other classified infor-
mation. This review will be conducted in an impartial
manner without regard to whether the material is critical
or favorable to the Department. No effort will be made to
delete embarrassing or critical statements that are unclas-
sified. Materials submitted to the Office of Intelligence
Policy for review will be disseminated to other persons or
agencies only to the extent necessary to identify classified
information.
k.
The Counsel for Intelligence Policy will respond substan-
tively to prepublication review requests within 30 working
days. Priority shall be given to reviewing speeches, news-
paper articles, and other materials that the author seeks to
publish on an expedited basis. The Counsel's decisions may
be appealed to the Deputy Attorney General, who will
process appeals within 15 working days. The Deputy Attorney
General's decision is final and not subject to further
administrative appeal. Authors who are dissatisfied with
the final administrative decision may obtain judicial review
either by filing an action for declaratory relief or by
giving the Department notice and a reasonable opportunity
(30 working days) to file a civil action seeking a court
order prohibiting disclosure. Of course, until any civil
action is resolved in court, employees remain under an obli-
gation not to disclose or publish information determined by
the Government to be classified.
1.
Nothing in this order should be construed to alter or waive
the Department's authority to seek any remedy available to
it to prohibit or punish the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information.
Par 5
Page 5
DOJ 2620.8
m.
A former DOJ employee who subsequently receives a security
clearance or SCI access approval from another department or
agency is permitted to satisfy any obligation regarding
prepublication review by making submissions to the depart-
ment or agency that last granted the individual either a
security clearance or an SCI access approval.
n.
The obligations described herein as applying to DOJ
employees also apply with equal force to contractors who
are authorized by the Department to have access to SCI or
other classified information.
Mr D. Stawner
WILLIAM D. VAN STAVOREN
Acting Assistant Attorney General
for Administration
Page 6
Par 5
U735
PETE WILSON
COMMITTEES:
CALIFORNIA
ARMED SERVICES
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING
United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
January 10, 1984
Ms. Brenda S. Reger
National Security Council Director
Office of Information Policy
and Security Review
Old Executive Office Building, Room 375
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Ms. Reger:
Could you please send my Los Angeles office a copy of
the following:
National Security Directive: Pre-Publication Review
The address is:
11000 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 11221
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Attn: Mr. Don Ediger
Thank you so much. Your attention to this matter would
be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
PETE WILSON
United States Senator
PW/csr
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 25, 1983
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC STAFF
Bob
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Security
Effective today, Paul Thompson has assumed primary
responsibility for security on the National Security
Council Staff, including investigations, background
checks, and clearances (collateral and compartmented)
Inquiries on these subjects henceforth should be
directed to Paul (extension 3046) rather than Dick
Morris or Kathleen Shanaham.
There have been recent instances of security violations
on the Staff, generally involving the failure to secure
classified material in the evening. Each office's
security procedures should be reviewed to ensure double
checks. whenever possible. Paul Thompson has been asked
to submit a report to me on each future violation, to
include written statements from those involved in the
violation.
We would welcome any suggestions you may have on improving
NSC security, an important task for which we all share
responsibility.
NSC Procedures
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
February 28, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR:
NSC STAFF
Lon
FROM:
RICHARD V. ALLEN
for
SUBJECT:
Contacts with Diplomatic and Official
Representatives of Soviet, East European,
People's Republic of China, and Cuban
Governments in the United States
The following procedures should be observed by NSC Staff
Officers in making contacts within the United States with
diplomatic and other official representatives of subject
governments:
-- In advance of each proposed contact, you should
notify my office as to the purpose you expect to
derive from the contact, and specify the hour,
date and place of the meeting, and furnish a copy
of the memo to the NSC Security Office.
- After the contact has been made, submit a memo to
my office covering any policy matters of substance
that may have been discussed.
Adherence to these procedures will facilitate the coordination
and consideration of matters of national security interest
that may arise in the areas of contact made outside the usual
diplomatic and public channels.
DRAFT
Dear
The President has asked me to respond to your letter about
National Security Decision Directive 84 (NSDD-84).
The President issued NSDD-84 because of serious concern
about the damage to intelligence sources caused by unauthorized
disclosures of classified information. Both anonymous leaks to
the press and unauthorized disclosures in the writings of former
officials have caused losses of sensitive intelligence
information. This has been a problem in past administrations as
well, prompting the congressional intelligence committees to
urge more vigorous action in investigating and prosecuting leak
cases.
Following the adoption of NSDD-84 in March of last year,
however, various Members of Congress expressed concern about two
provisions of the directive: paragraph l(b), which authorized
broader use of prepublication clearance agreements, and
paragraph 5, relating to the use of the polygraph in leak
investigations. Amendments to the State and Defense
Authorization bills were adopted last year barring the
Administration from implementing either of these two proposals
until April 15 of this year.
Rather than resume the legislative debate on the merits of
NSDD-84, the Administration has sought to work cooperatively
with Congress to develop a mutually-acceptable solution to this
problem. For this reason, the two controversial provisions have
been suspended indefinitely.
Unfortunately, the article by Carl Rowan in the April issue
of Reader's Digest contains serious factual inaccuracies about
the President's directive as well as other matters relating to
the protection of classified information. The enclosed fact
sheet should help to set the record straight.
Sincerely,
March 30, 1984
Fact Sheet on Carl Rowan's Article,
"Mr. President, This Isn't Russia.
Reader's Digest, April, 1984, p. 65
Prepublication Review
Rowan says:
The March 1983 directive is absurd because it
would require prepublication review for George
Schultz's memoirs, Jeane Kirkpatrick's foreign
policy speeches as a 1988 Vice-Presidential
candidate, or a letter to the editor by a retired
Marine Commandant.
The facts:
Prepublication review is not a new concept. ^ Henry
Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brezinski, and
Alexander Haig have submitted books and articles
for prepublication review. George Bush was able
to run for Vice-President in 1980, having
previously signed such an agreement as Director of
Central Intelligence.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
A law professor from the University of Texas
believes that prepublication review is forbidden
by the Constitution.
The facts:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
CIA's prepublication review requirement in Snepp
V. United States (1980). Mr. Rowan's article does
not even mention this landmark Supreme Court
decision.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
The directive requires submitting to a censor "all
writings on foreign policy or defense," as well as
discussions of intelligence matters.
The facts:
Writings on foreign policy or defense would not
have to be submitted for review, unless they
contain information derived from or relating to
specified intelligence matters.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
This program will allow the Administration in
power to supress the views of former officials who
are critical of its policies.
The facts:
Only classified information can be deleted from
materials that are submitted for review. Judicial
review is provided, and the government must be
able to prove in court that any deleted material
is properly classified.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
Even though prepublication review is supposed to
be completed within 30 days, this clearance
process is so cumbersome as to stifle expert
commentary on critical events from non-government
sources.
The facts:
Last year, CIA's prepublication review board
considered 213 submissions and the average
clearance time was 13 days. Reviews have been
conducted in a matter of hours for authors working
on short deadlines.
*
*
*
FOIA Amendments
Rowan says:
In October 1981 the Administration asked Congress
to "gut" the Freedom of Information Act.
The facts:
The Administration supports two bills to reform
FOIA, neither of which would "gut" the Act. The
general FOIA reform bill is S. 774, which would
(among other things) improve the protection of
information in law enforcement files. The
Administration also supports S. 1324, which would
exempt certain CIA operational files from FOIA.
Both bills have passed the Senate with strong
bipartisan support--indeed, without a dissenting
vote.
*
*
*
Executive Order on Classification
Rowan says:
In April 1982, President Reagan issued a new
Executive Order that "made it almost mandatory for
bureaucrats to put secrecy classifications on more
documents.
"
- 2 -
The facts:
Statistics recently compiled by the Information
Security Oversight Office (ISOO) show that the new
order has not produced an increase in the amount
of classified information. During the first year
that the new order was in effect (FY 1983),
original classification declined by 18%. Total
classification activity (including derivative
classification) increased by only 3%, which is
much lower than 8-10% annual increases during the
last two years of the Carter Administration.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
The new order eliminated the requirement that some
"identifiable potential harm to national
security had to be demonstrated inside the
government before information could be
classified. " (Emphasis in original.)
The facts:
The new order requires that information can be
classified only if its unauthorized disclosure
"reasonably could be expected to cause damage to
the national security. " This order eliminated the
requirement, which was imposed for the first time
in the Carter Administration, that "identifiable
damage" must be shown. Incidentally, this
standard is not one that is applied only inside
the Administration, since under the Freedom of
Information Act all classification decisions are
subject to de novo judicial review.
*
*
*
Rowans says: The new order requires "officials with any doubt
to classify materials at the highest rather than
the lowest possible level of secrecy. If
The facts:
The order says: "If there is reasonable doubt
about the appropriate level of classification, it
shall be safeguarded at the higher level of
classification pending a determination by an
original classification authority, who shall make
this determination within thirty (30) days."
*
*
*
Rowan says:
The new order gives officials the power to
reclassify information that has been made
public, which serves no legitimate purpose.
- 3 -
The facts:
The order allows information to be reclassified
only under a stringent set of circumstances.
The purpose of this provision, which has rarely
been applied, is to permit the government to
countermand an unwise decision to declassify if
the information in question has not been widely
disseminated. Otherwise, declassification
decisions would be irrevocable--regardless of the
resulting harm to national security.
*
*
*
Canadian Films
Rowan says:
In January 1983 the Administration tried to
discredit some films produced by the Canadian
government because they dealt with controversial
environmental issues.
The facts:
Career employees of the Justice Department simply
applied the Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938 to these films, in the same way that this law
had been applied in prior administrations. A
federal judge has recently held the statute
unconstitutional, but his opinion indicated that
Congress had intended the statute to cover films
such as these. (The statute, by the way, does not
restrict dissemination of the films, but merely
requires an identifying label.) )
*
*
*
Polygraphs
Rowan says:
The directive calls for expanded use of lie
detectors. An employee who refused to take a
polygraph test could be disciplined or even
fired.
The facts:
The Administration has taken the position that
employees with civil service protection would not
be fired or demoted for refusing to take a
polygraph test. However, where these employees
deal with highly classified information, they
could be moved to less sensitive positions at the
same salary level. CIA and NSA have used
polygraph examinations as part of their security
program for many years. Consideration has been
given to expanding use of the polygraph to a small
number of additional jobs that are of exceptional
interest to hostile intelligence services. This
- 4 -
is primarily a counter-espionage program rather
than an anti-leak measure.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
The congressional Office of Technology (OTA) says
that "there is no scientific evidence to support
the use of lie detectors for screening large
numbers of people, as in an investigation for
leaks
"
The facts:
Although the OTA study found no scientific
evidence of polygraph validity for large-scale
screening, it did not apply this conclusion
generally to leak investigations. The OTA did
find scientific evidence of polygraph validity in
criminal investigations. In fact, OTA
concluded: "[T]o the extent polygraph use in
unauthorized disclosure investigations is similar
to the way the polygraph is used in criminal
investigations, there is at least some although
far from conclusive scientific basis for polygraph
validity."
*
*
*
Conclusions
Rowan says:
President Reagan, because of "his oft-stated fear
of Communism, " is attempting to impose security
restrictions that "will in fact make America more
and more like Communist regimes he so abhors. "
The facts:
Nothing the President has proposed will change the
fact that this is the most open society, with the
freest press, in the world. Many other
democratic countries--such as Britain and Sweden--
have much stricter official secrecy laws than the
United States. Too much secrecy is obviously bad,
but when it comes to intelligence and military
matters, some secrecy is necessary and indeed
vital to our ability to live in peace and freedom.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
Even though President Reagan has held up on
implementing the most controversial provisions of
NSDD-84, Congress should refuse to compromise on
these issues. Indeed, the Directive should be
completely withdrawn.
- 5 -
The facts:
Most of the Directive's provisions have nothing to
do with prepublication review or polygraphs, and
have not been criticized by Congress. Rowan has
articulated no reason in the world to withdraw
these non-controversial provisions of the
Directive. Congress should act on the
recommendations of its own intelligence committees
(which have criticized the failure to solve leak
cases) and devise a legislative solution to this
problem.
- 6 -
63RD YEAR
Reader's Digest
APRIL 1984
An article a day of enduring significance, in condensed permanent booklet form
Mr. President,
This Isn't Russia
PRESIDENTIAL
The Reagan
Administration's
IF F SECRETARY of State
Directive 84-which
George Shultz ever writes his
features lie-detector
memoirs- telling us how the Unit-
ed States got involved in Lebanon,
tests, secrecy oaths and
say, or why arms-control talks with
censorship for life-would
the Soviet Union went sour-he
threaten the very freedoms
would have to submit his manu-
it seeks to keep secure.
script to a government review
board for approval.
It should be completely
If Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U.S.
withdrawn-for good
Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, were to become a
candidate for Vice President in
CARL T. ROWAN, a Reader's Digest Roving
Editor, is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Ambassador to Finland and Director of
By CARL T. ROWAN
the U.S. Information Agency.
65
READER'S DIGEST
April
1988, she would have to clear her
censorship directive in the history
foreign-policy speeches with a fed-
of the American government:"
eral censor who just might be
The American Civil Liberties
working for an Administration she
Union characterizes it as "a fron-
wants to throw out of office.
tal assault against First Amend-
Or if, a few years from now, the
ment values and, ultimately,
retired Marine who was Comman-
democracy itself."
dant during our years of involve-
"No matter how pure the goal
ment in Lebanon wants to write a
is," sums up Lucas A. Powe, Jr., law
letter to a newspaper spelling out
professor at the University of Tex-
booby traps that ought to be avoid-
as, "there are some means that can-
ed by his successor, a government
not be used consistent with our
censor would have the power to tell
Constitution. A system of prior
him just what he may or may not
censorship is one of those forbidden
say.
means. If the national interest is
Does all this sound absurd?
harmed by disclosure, then punish
Well, it is the real world of Wash-
those who disclose. But do not pun-
ington 1984. Last year President
ish all Americans by subjecting
Reagan issued a highly controver-
thousands of their fellow citizens to
sial order, called Directive 84,
a regime of perpetual censorship."
which among other things would
Broad Pattern. In all fairness,
impose lifetime pre-publication cen-
even the sternest critics of Directive
sorship on federal officials who
84 are not saying that the President
have had access to highly classi-
deliberately wants to impose a
fied information.
White House dictatorship upon
Small wonder, then, that Direc-
this society. All Presidents have in-
tive 84 has aroused a storm of
sisted, quite rightly, that vital na-
protest. "If this directive had been
tional secrets must be kept safe
issued under a liberal, Democratic
from unwarranted disclosure.
government," one of Reagan's own
What critics are saying is that this
senior foreign-policy officials told
President, in his oft-stated fear of
me, "conservative Republicans
Communism, is trying to make
would be crying from the roof-
the United States "more secure"
tops." The American Society of
by infringing upon traditional
Newspaper Editors calls it "peace-
freedoms in ways that will in fact
time censorship of a scope unpar-
make America more and more
alleled in this country since the
like the Communist regimes he so
adoption of the Bill of Rights."
abhors.
Veteran NBC newsman and for-
Concern has been generated not
mer Voice of America Director
solely by Directive 84, but by a
John Chancellor calls the action
broader pattern of more govern-
"the most sweeping and dictatorial
ment secrecy and less public access
66
1984
MR. PRESIDENT, THIS ISN'T RUSSIA
to information vital to informed
with any doubt to classify materials
decision-making in a democracy.
at the highest rather than the lowest
Consider:
possible level of secrecy.
In October 1981 the Adminis-
In addition, government officials
tration asked Congress to gut the
got expanded power to reclassify
Freedom of Information Act
information that had already been
(FOIA). This law, enacted in 1966
made public. What possible good
and strengthened by Congress in
can this do? Its major effect is to
1974 after the Watergate scandals,
discourage journalists and others
gave the American people the right
from trying to get material under
to know what the government was
the FOIA. "Sorry," authorities can
filing about them or doing to them,
say, "that material has just been
their relatives and neighbors. It be-
reclassified 'top secret.'
came a symbol of open and honest
In January 1983 the Adminis-
government in America.
tration tried to discredit films pro-
There is evidence that America's
duced by the National Film Board
enemies, including the Soviet KGB,
of Canada because they dealt with
have used the FOIA to get helpful
such themes as the effects of nucle-
information, and surely some re-
ar war and the impact of acid
finements of the law are called for.
rain. In response, Congressman
But the Reagan Administration-
Jim Leach (R., Iowa) said, "It may be
acting as though it wants to return
too extreme to label this a harbinger
to the excessive secrecy that allowed
of McCarthyism, but it sends a
massive abuses and violations of
chilling message to all Americans,
law by the FBI, CIA and other
especially those deeply concerned
agencies during the 1960s and early
about environmental issues in gen-
1970s-has been trying to limit
eral and about the ultimate envi-
FOIA's scope and make it more
ronmental issue-the survival of the
difficult and expensive for citizens
planet."
to get information.
Along with pre-publication
On April 2, 1982, President
review, Directive 84 calls for ex-
Reagan issued an Executive Order
panded use of lie detectors to check
on Classification that reversed a 30-
on federal employees. Almost half
year trend and made it almost man-
of the federal civilian and military
datory for bureaucrats to put secrecy
work force, some 2.5 million men
classifications on more documents.
and women, along with 1.5 million
The order wiped out the require-
employees of defense contractors,
ment that some identifiable potential
would be required to take poly-
harm to national security had to be
graph examinations in investiga-
demonstrated inside the govern-
tions of unauthorized disclosures.
ment before information could be
In addition, 128,000 workers with
classified, and it ordered officials
access to Sensitive Compartmented
67
READER'S DIGEST
April
Information-the really super se-
The implications of the directive
crets-could be required to take
are mind-boggling. Had such a re-
polygraph tests on a random basis;
quirement been issued by Harry
i.e., not just when leaks are suspect-
Truman, for example, books, arti-
ed, but any time at all. If an employ-
cles and speeches by Dean Acheson,
ee refused to take a lie-detector test,
Douglas MacArthur and George
he or she could be disciplined or
Kennan, to name just a few, would
even fired.
have been subject to pre-publica-
Yet Congress's Office of Tech-
tion review (in some cases by cen-
nology Assessment has reported
sors working for a different
that there is no scientific evidence
Administration). The rule would
to support the use of lie detectors
put journalists who have served in
for screening large numbers of peo-
government-the likes of Bill
ple, as in an investigation for leaks,
Moyers, William Safire, John
and that such use carries a high risk
Chancellor and, yes, Carl Rowan-
of misidentifying many innocent
in the absurd position of having to
people as liars.
get the prior approval of the very
Lifetime Vow. But of all the
people they want to criticize in
steps taken by the Reagan White
their columns or commentaries.
House to block the flow of infor-
Lawyers say the confusion, silli-
mation, the most alarming and out-
ness and unworkability of Direc-
rageous has been its attempt to
tive 84 are manifest in language
extend throughout the Executive
suggesting that a former high offi-
branch the lifetime censorship now
cial using notes for a college lecture,
imposed only on CIA and National
TV appearance or testimony before
Security Agency employees. Direc-
Congress would have to submit
tive 84 would require that any em-
them for censorship. But that offi-
ployee with access to Sensitive
cial could avoid censors and reveal
Compartmented Information must
anything if speaking extemporane-
sign a contract pledging to submit
ously. Another galling bit of irony
for review by a government censor
is that the President, Vice President
all writings on foreign policy and
and members of Congress, the most
defense, or anything that might
active leakers in Washington, would
allude to "intelligence activities,
be exempt from Directive 84 be-
sources or methods," even if the
cause they are elected. So they could
material is not classified. The con-
continue to get rich writing about
tract covers books, novels, maga-
secret data and developments.
zine articles, speeches-virtually
"Powerful Impact." A recent
everything. And it is in force not
survey of five leading newspapers-
only while the person is working
the New York Times, Washington
for the government but also after he
Post, Los Angeles Times, The Wall
or she leaves. It is a lifetime vow.
Street Journal and The Christian Sci-
68
1984,
:
MR. PRESIDENT, THIS ISN'T RUSSIA
ence Monitor-found that those
press the views of opponents and
newspapers published more than
thereby dominate public debate.
300 articles in 1982 written by cur-
Right to Know. Numerous offi-
rent or former government offi-
cials and former officials have testi-
cials, most of which would have
fied that in the last quarter-century
been covered by the pre-publica-
there has been not even a handful of
tion-review requirement had it
nation-threatening leaks. Why,
been in effect at the time. Among
then, has the Reagan Administra-
those whose works would have
tion gone to such extremes?
been affected were four ex-Secre-
"Our government's ability to
taries of State, two former Secretaries
protect vital secrets is not adequate
of Defense, two ex-national securi-
today," says Acting Assistant At-
ty advisers, along with former am-
torney General Richard K. Wil-
bassadors, arms-control specialists
lard, who headed the task force that
and weapons experts. The subjects
recommended the policies of Di-
covered included the MX missile,
rective 84. "In the wake of Water-
U.S. Central American policy, mili-
gate and Vietnam," he told an ABC
tary spending, Soviet intelligence
"Nightline" audience last January,
gathering, the Middle East crisis
"there was a great trend toward
and the situation in Poland.
openness in government-uncover-
"This indicates the powerful im-
ing secrets. But during the seventies
pact the measure could have," says
the pendulum, we think, swung too
Patricia Derian, one-time Assistant
far. We're trying to restore some of
Secretary of State. "The views of
that balance."
these former officials are vital if
Willard doesn't claim that the
reasonable public debate is to take
new rules will halt all leaks, but he
place."
thinks they will "change the atti-
The review board is supposed to
tudes of government officials."
act within 30 days and to remove
And the President himself has said,
only sensitive material. But even if
"With regard to national security,
everything in a particular docu-
we're not doing anything that I
ment is okayed, the clearance pro-
think unfairly imposes a restric-
cedure is so cumbersome and slow
tion on the right of the people to
as to risk making it irrelevant. As a
know."
result, there might have been no
There are many, however, who
immediate expert commentary on
think the new regulations would
such critical topics as last year's
restrict the people's right to know.
invasion of Grenada, the downing
And more: these critics see a pur-
of Korean Flight 007, or Marine
poseful attempt to manage the
deaths in Lebanon-except from of-
news and control the truth, aris-
ficial government sources. This, in
ing out of the Administration's
effect, allows government to sup-
misconceptions about govern-
69
READER'S DIGEST
ment's responsibility in a demo-
directly. Under this bipartisan pres-
cratic society.
sure, the White House announced
President Reagan and the admi-
in mid-February that the President
rals and generals he commands
would hold up implementation of
must accept the fact that the pres-
the most controversial portions of
ence of news people in Lebanon, or
Directive 84-those imposing life-
Grenada, or wherever, is not a gov-
time pre-publication censorship
ernment favor to the press. It is a
and calling for wider use of lie
way of saying to the American
detectors-until he reaches a com-
people: "We in the White House
promise with Congress.
are accountable to you who gave us
But there must be no "compro-
political power. We in the Penta-
mise" that embraces a fundamen-
gon are accountable to you who
tal erosion of freedom. This soci-
gave us military power. You cannot
ety has survived assaults by every
all be in these places to make indi-
conceivable enemy of democracy
vidual judgments as to whether we
without renouncing the liberties
are using those powers wisely.
secured, not just on parchment,
Therefore, we accept a free press as
but in the hearts of generations of
our citizens' eyes and ears.
Americans. No threat of any sort
To prevent President Reagan
ought to make us act like totalitar-
from enforcing Directive 84, Con-
ians in the foolish notion that this
gress voted last October to delay
is how we remain free.
the pre-publication-review provi-
sions for six months, and early this
You CAN HAVE A SAY on this
year began considering legislation
to overturn the directive perma-
critical issue by exercising your
right of free expression. Write
nently. Although the President has
to President Reagan. Urge him
argued that he does not need
to withdraw Directive 84 com-
Congressional approval to enforce
pletely and to forget about ever
his censorship scheme, a growing
implementing anything remote-
number of Republicans and Demo-
ly resembling its most threaten-
crats have insisted that if the
ing sections. Your voice, joined
President did not withdraw it,
by countless other voices, can
Congress should legislate against it
make a difference.
For information on reprints of this article, see page 230.
P
UBLIC NOTICE in the New York Times: "To my lovely wife, M. Thank
you for 50 wonderful years of married life together-except for the
argument we had in 1935 in which you were obviously wrong. Love,
husband M. B."
7°
THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 26, 1984
Digest Editor Resigns
magazine, joined Reader's Digest 27
By DAVID E. SANGER
years ago. He started as a researcher
and then was a writer in the maga-
The editor in chief of Reader's DI
stine's Washington bureau. In 1968, he
gest, Edward T. Thompson, resigned
was made bureau chief.
Friday because of what the company
He moved to the magazine's head-
called "fundamental differences of
quarters in Chappaqua, N.Y., in 1973
editorial philosophy" with the maga-
as an assistant managing editor, and
zine's board of directors.
two years later became a managing
His successor, effective immedi-
editor. He assumed his role as execu-
ately, will be Kenneth O. Gilmore, the
tive editor in May 1982.
magazine's executive editor and vice
Until recently, he was primarily re-
president of the Reader's Digest As-
sponsible for Reader's Digest's inter-
sociation, the privately held parent
national editions, which have a circu-
company of the publication.
lation of about 12 million, compared
A spokesman for the association
with 18 million in the United States,
would not elaborate on the reasons for
Mr. Gilmore said. While super vising
the international
Mons
he
Mr. Thompson's sudden departure,
other than to say that his differences
played a major role in
gazine's
were with "representatives of Lila
publication of "The I
Marder
Acheson Wallace," who owns all of
the Pope," an August
rticle by
the voting shares in the company.
Claire Sterling that that that the
There was no answer yesterday at
Soviet Union was involved in the as-
Mr. Thompson's home in Bedford,
sassination attempt on Pope John
N.Y. The spokesman said that Mr.
Paul II in May 1981.
Thompson, who is 56 years old and
In fact, covert action by the Soviet
has edited the magazine for eight
Union has been a particular interest
of Mr. Gilmore's. In 1962 he co-au-
years, would take early retirement:
thored "The Great Deception," a
Mr. Gilmore, 53, was also elected
book he described yesterday as "tell-
director of the Reader's Digest As-
ing how the Kremlin took Cuba." He
sociation on Friday, and a member
Valso edited two books on the K.G.B.,
its executive committee. Reached
the Soviet Government's intellegence
yesterday at his home in Mt. Kisco,
and internal-security agency, written
N.Y., Mr. Gilmore said that "I think
by John Barron and published by
it will be a tremendous challenge to
Reader's Digest. Mr. Gilmore was
continue to carry on the job of provid-
also the editor of President Ford's
ing our readers here and abroad with
memoir, "A Time to Heal."
the kind of magazine content that en-
Mr. Gilmore graduated from
riches their lives and engenders such
Brown University in 1953. He is a
unwavering loyalty." He declined to
member of the Council on Foreign
discuss the circumstances that led to
Relations in New York and an adviser
Mr. Thompson's resignation.
to the Georgetown University Center
Mr. Gilmore, who said yesterday
for Strategic and International Stud-
that he plans no major changes at the
ies.
ISOO ANNUAL REPORT ON THE INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM
Q.
When issuing E.O. 12356, one of its major purposes was to
improve protection for national security information. You
later issued NSDD-84 because purportedly there were problems
with "leaks" of information. Does this mean that your
executive order has failed in accomplishing its purpose?
A.
The order establishes an overall system for the classification,
declassification, and safeguarding of national security
information. "Leaks" are conscious decisions by individuals
to violate the protective requirements established by this
system. They have been experienced under other executive
orders as well. NSDD-84 was an effort to bring attention to a
continuing problem and to establish procedures to improve
protection of our national security information.
ISOO ANNUAL REPORT ON THE INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM
Q.
This report places great stress on the fact that there was a
decrease in original classification. Why does it seem to
ignore the fact that derivative classification, which is 95
percent of all classification, increased in FY 1983?
A.
Most derivative classification decisions made in FY 1983 are a
result of original classification decisions made in prior
years. Because an original classification action results, on
the average, in 19 derivative actions, it is imperative that
the number of original classifications be limited. Decreased
original classification ultimately results in fewer derivative
classification decisions. The number of original classification
decisions is the most important measurement of an information
security program.
ISOO ANNUAL REPORT ON THE INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM
Q.
There has been a significant decline in the systematic review
program over the past few years. What can be done to speed up
the process by which the public, historians, and the media
learn about the affairs of government?
A.
E.O. 12356 acknowledged that systematic review at the National
Archives and Records Service (NARS) remains the most cost
effective means of declassifying large quantities of records
in greatest demand by researchers. The decrease in systematic
review activity over the past few years is not a result of the
information security system in place. Rather, its decline can
be attributed to two factors. First, the resources available
for systematic review at NARS have shrunk, the result of both
redefined agency priorities and overall budget cuts. Second,
the subject matter of the records that are now being reviewed
is not generally susceptible to the bulk declassification
methods that were easily applied to World War II records. The
President has expressed his support for this effort and has
asked ISOO and responsible government officials to pay particular
attention to this effort.
ISOO ANNUAL REPORT ON THE INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM
Q.
What about the situation (any specific allegation or reference
to a particular case, as for example, the State Department's
shipment of classified records to Lorton Reformatory, or the
National Security Agency's efforts to reclassify information
in the George C. Marshall Library) ?
A.
The report notes such instances among the aggregate figures it
reflects since the Information Security Oversight Office is
responsible for oversight of such matters. Details on specific
cases should be addressed to ISOO or to the agency in question.
THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 26, 1984
Digest Editor Resigns
By DAVID E. SANGER
magazine, joined Reader's Digest 27
years ago. He started as a researcher
and then was a writer in the maga-
The editor in chief of Reader's DI-
wine's Washington bureau. In 1968, he
gest, Edward T. Thompson, resigned
was made bureau chief.
Friday because of what the company
He moved to the magazine's head-
called "fundamental differences of
quarters in Chappaqua, N.Y., in 1973
editorial philosophy" with the maga-
as an assistant managing editor, and
zine's board of directors.
two years later became a managing
His successor, effective immedi-
editor. He assumed his role as execu-
ately, will be Kenneth O. Gilmore, the
tive editor in May 1982.
magazine's executive editor and vice
Until recently, he was primarily re-
president of the Reader's Digest As-
sponsible for Reader's Digest's inter-
sociation, the privately held parent
national editions, which have a circu-
company of the publication.
Nation of about 12 million, compared
A spokesman for the association
with 18 million in the United States,
would not elaborate on the reasons for
Mr. Gilmore said. While supervising
Mr. Thompson's sudden departure,
the international operations he
other than to say that his differences
played a major role in the magazine's
were with "representatives of Lila
publication of so Murder
Acheson Wallace," who owns all of
the Pope," an August 1982 article by
the voting shares in the company.
Claire Sterling that charged that the
There was no answer yesterday at
Soviet Union was involved in the as-
Mr. Thompson's home in Bedford,
sassination attempt on Pope John
N.Y. The spokesman said that Mr.
Paul II in May 1981.
Thompson, who is 56 years old and
In fact, covert action by the Soviet
has edited the magazine for eight
Union has been a particular interest
years, would take early retirement:
of Mr. Gilmore's. In 1962 he co-au-
thored "The Great Deception," a
Mr. Gilmore, 53, was also electedis
book he described yesterday as "tell-
director of the Reader's Digest As-
ing how the Kremlin took Cuba." He
sociation on Friday, and a member
Palso edited two books on the K.G.B.,
its executive committee. Reached
the Soviet Government's intellegence
yesterday at his home in Mt. Kisco,
and internal-security agency, written
N.Y., Mr. Gilmore said that "I think
by John Barron and published by
it will be a tremendous challenge to
Reader's Digest. Mr. Gilmore was
continue to carry on the job of provid-
also the editor of President Ford's
ing our readers here and abroad with
memoir, "A Time to Heal.'
the kind of magazine content that en-
Mr. Gilmore graduated from
riches their lives and engenders such
Brown University in 1953. He is a
unwavering loyalty." He declined to
member of the Council on Foreign
discuss the circumstances that led to
Relations in New York and an adviser
Mr. Thompson's resignation.
to the Georgetown University Center
Mr. Gilmore, who said yesterday
for Strategic and International Stud-
that he plane no major changes at the
ies.
litesting
Fact Sheet on Carl Rowan's Article,
"Mr. President, This Isn't Russia. "
Reader's Digest, April, 1984, p. 65
Prepublication Review
Rowan says:
The March 1983 directive is absurd because it
would have required prepublication review for
George Schultz's memoirs, Jeane Kirkpatrick's
foreign policy speeches as a 1988 Vice-
Presidential candidate, or a letter to the editor
by a retired Marine Commandant.
PPR is not a new concept. among there,
The facts:
Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, and Zbigniew
and
have
Brezinski submitted their memoirs for
prepublication review, prior to promulgation of
this directive George Bush was able to run for
Vice-President in 1980, having previously signed
+/or article
such an agreement as Director of Central
Intelligence.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
A law professor from the University of Texas
believes that prepublication review is forbidden
by the Constitution.
The facts:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
CIA's prepublication review requirement in Snepp
V. United States (1980). It is incredible that
nh. Rowan could writeJa lengthy article on cover
prepublication review without even mentioning this
landmark Supreme Court decision.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
The directive requires submitting to a censor "all
writings on foreign policy or defense," as well as
discussions of intelligence matters.
The facts:
Writings on foreign policy or defense would not
have to be submitted for review, unless they
contain information relating to specified
intelligence matters.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
This program will allow the Administration in
power to supress the views of former officials who
are critical of its policies.
The facts:
Only classified information can be deleted from
materials that are submitted for review. Judicial
review is provided, and the government must be
able to prove in court that
deleted info
to
take out is properly classified.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
Even though prepublication review is supposed to
be completed within 30 days, this clearance
process is so cumbersome as to stifle expert
commentary on critical events from non-government
sources.
The facts:
Last year, CIA's prepublication review board
considered 213 submissions and the average
clearance time was 13 days. Reviews have been
conducted in a matter of hours for authors working
on short deadlines.
*
*
*
FOIA Amendments
Rowan says:
In October 1981 the Administration asked Congress
to "gut" the Freedom of Information Act.
The facts:
The Administration supports two bills to reform
FOIA, neither of which would "gut" the Act. The
One,
1
general FOIA reform bill is S. 774, whi eh would
information in law enforcement files The and the the
(among other things) improve the protection of
Admi istration also supports S. 1324 which would
exempt certain CIA operational files from FOIA.
Both bills have passed the Senate on voice votes,
with strong bipartisan support--indeed, without a
dissenting vote.
*
*
*
Executive Order on Classification
Rowan says:
In April 1982, President Reagan issued a new
Executive Order that "made it almost mandatory for
bureaucrats to put secrecy classifications on more
documents.
"
- 2 -
The facts:
Statistics recently compiled by the Information
Security Oversight Office (ISOO) show that the new
order has not produced an increase in the amount
of classified information. During the first year
that the new order was in effect (FY 1983),
original classification declined by 18%. Total
classification activity (including derivative
classification) increased by only 3%, which is
much lower than 8-10% annual increases during the
last two years of the Carter Administration.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
The new order eliminated the requirement that some
"identifiable potential harm to national
security had to be demonstrated inside the
government before information could be
classified. " (Emphasis in original.)
The facts:
The new order requires that information can be
classified only if its unauthorized disclosure
"reasonably could be expected to cause damage to
the national security. " This order eliminated the
requirement, which was imposed for the first time
in the Carter Administration, that "identifiable
damage" must be shown. Incidentally, this
standard is not one that is applied only inside
the Administration, since under the Freedom of
Information Act all classification decisions are
subject to de novo judicial review.
*
*
*
Rowans says:
The new order requires "officials with any doubt
to classify materials at the highest rather than
the lowest possible level of secrecy. "
The facts:
The order says: "If there is reasonable doubt
about the appropriate level of classification, it
shall be safeguarded at the higher level of
classification pending a determination by an
original classification authority, who shall make
this determination within thirty (30) days. "
*
*
*
Rowan says:
The new order gives officials the power to
reclassify information that has been made
public, which serves no legitimate purpose.
- 3 -
The facts:
The order allows information to be reclassified
only if it (a) requires protection in the interest
of
of national security and (b) may reasonably be
recovered. Where declassified information has
received any substantial public dissemination it
is not reasonably recoverable and thus cannot be
reclassified. The purpose of this provision,
which has rarely been applied, is to permit the
government to countermand an unwise decision to
declassify if the information in question has not
been widely disseminated. Otherwise,
declassification decisions would be irrevocable-
regardless of the resulting harm to national
security.
*
*
*
Canadian Films
Rowan says:
In January 1983 the Administration tried to
discredit some films produced by the Canadian
government because they dealt with controversial
environmental issues.
The facts:
Career employees of the Justice Department simply
applied the Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938 to these films, in the same way that this law
had been applied in prior administrations. A
federal judge has recently held the statute
unconstitutional, but his opinion indicated that
Congress had intended the statute to cover films
such as these. (The statute, by the way, does not
restrict dissemination of the films, but merely
requires an identifying label.)
*
*
*
Polygraphs
Rowan says:
The directive calls for expanded use of lie
detectors. An employee who refused to take a
polygraph test could be disciplined or even
fired.
The facts:
The Administration has taken the position that
employees with civil service protection could not
- 4 -
be fired or demoted for refusing to take a
polygraph test. However, where these employees
deal with highly classified information, they
could be moved to less sensitive positions at the
same salary level. CIA and NSA have used
polygraph examinations as part of their security
program for many years. Consideration has been
given to expanding use of the polygraph to a small
number of additional jobs that are of exceptional
interest to hostile intelligence services. This
is primarily a counter-espionage program rather
than an anti-leak measure.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
The congressional Office of Technology (OTA) says
that "there is no scientific evidence to support
the use of lie detectors for screening large
numbers of people, as in an investigation for
leaks
"
The facts:
Although the OTA study found no scientific
evidence of polygraph validity for large-scale
screening, it did not apply this conclusion
generally to leak investigations. The OTA did
find scientific evidence of polygraph validity in
criminal investigations. In fact, OTA
concluded: "[T]o the extent polygraph use in
unauthorized disclosure investigations is similar
to the way the polygraph is used in criminal
investigations, there is at least some although
far from conclusive scientific basis for polygraph
validity.
"
*
*
*
Conclusions
Rowan says:
President Reagan, because of "his oft-stated fear
of Communism, " is attempting to impose security
restrictions that "will in fact make America more
and more like Communist regimes he so abhors. "
The facts:
Nothing the President has
proposed will change the fact that this is the
most open society, with the freest press, in the
world. Many perfectly other democratic countries--such
- 5 -
as Britain and Sweden--have much stricter official
secrecy laws than the United States. Too much
secrecy is obviously bad, but when it comes to
intelligence and military matters, some secrecy is
necessary and indeed vital to our ability to live
in peace and freedom.
*
*
*
Rowan says:
Even though President Reagan has held up on
implementing the most controversial provisions of
NSDD-84, Congress should refuse to compromise on
these issues. Indeed, the Directive should be
completely withdrawn.
The facts:
Most of the Directive's provisions have nothing to
do with prepublication review or polygraphs, and
have not been criticized by Congress. Rowan has
articulated no reason in the world to withdraw
these non-controversial provisions of the
Directive.
- 6 -
From: NSMDC -CPUA
Date and time
04/20/88 16:45:23
To: NSMDC ==CPUA
UNCLASSIFIED-
NOTE FROM: Maria D. Clark
SUBJECT:
ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(1988)
President
National Security Advisor
Deputy National Security Advisor
Executive Secretary
Deputy Executive Secretary - 1
Deputy Executive Secretary- - 2
Directorates
Staff Officers
Secretariat
Administration
WHSSS
FOI
Paper Flow:
Directorates - NSC/S - WWD - DepExSec - ExSec - DAPNSA - APNSA - President