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470766541
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Cuba - 1988
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470766541
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document
title
Cuba - 1988
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CF00194-004
collections
Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Latin American Affairs Directorate Subject Files
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470766541
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1988-12-31
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1988
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1988-01-01
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1988
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2005-0995-F
2005-0995-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Subject Files 1989
OA/ID Number:
CF00194
Folder ID Number:
CF00194-004
Folder Title:
Cuba 1988
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
V
7
1
2
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01. Memo
From Officer for Latin America Re: [Interagency meeting on
07/10/89
(b)(1)
S
Cuba] (4 pp.)
02. Memo
From Jorge Mas, Armando Valladares to Vice President Quayle
07/14/89
(b)(1)
Re: [Cuba] [annotated] (1 pp.)
03. Analysis
Re: Cuba [pages 6-7 only] (2 pp.)
07/09/89
(b)(1)
TS
04a. Note
To David Pacelli Re: [Cuba] (1 pp.)
07/12/89
(b)(1)
C
04b. Report
Re: [Cuba] (5 pp.)
07/12/89
(b)(1)
C
05a. Note
From David A. Pacelli to Ted Re: Kimmitt wants NSC
n.d.
(b)(1)
concurrence (1 pp.)
05b. Memo
From Robert B. Morley to R. Richard Newcomb Re: Broadcast
06/27/89
(b)(1)
Rights for the 1991 Pan American Games (1 pp.)
05c. Memo
From R. Richard Newcomb to Paul Wisgerhof Re: Broadcast
04/27/89
(b)(1)
Rights for the 1991 Pan American Games (1 pp.)
06. Report
Re: [Havana] (2 pp.)
06/01/89
(b)(1)
07. Report
Re: Cuba (1 pp.)
04/01/89
(b)(1)
TS
Page 1 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Subject Files 1989
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Cuba -1988
Pinksheet Number:
SS255
OA/ID Number:
CF00194-004
Date Closed:
6/9/2010
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2005-0995-F
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
08. Report
Re: [Fidel Castro's Statements] (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Page 2 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Subject Files 1989
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Cuba -1988
Pinksheet Number:
SS255
OA/ID Number:
CF00194-004
Date Closed:
6/9/2010
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2005-0995-F
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01. Memo
From Officer for Latin America Re: [Interagency meeting on
07/10/89
(b)(1)
S
Cuba] (4 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Subject Files 1989
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Cuba -1988
Date Closed:
6/9/2010
OA/ID Number:
CF00194-02
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2005-0995-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRAJ
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION
CIRCLE ONE BELOW
MODE
PAGES 2
IMMEDIATE
SECURE FAX #
DTG 202158Z
PRIORITY
ADMIN FAX # 266
RELEASER
ROUTINE
FROM/LOCATION
1. Jackie Tillman
TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT
1. Ambassador Ted Briggs
2.
3.
4.
TOR: ZOZZO4Z Joly89
5.
6.
7.
INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT
1.
2.
SITUATION ROOM
PO : & 08 02 700 88
HOUSE
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:
UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION
JUL-20-'89 THU 17:59 ID:C.A.N.F WASHINGTON
TEL NO 202-338-0308
#059 P01
THE CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION
1000 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W., Suite 601
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202)265-2822
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TO:
NAME:
amb Ked Briggs
LOCATION:
NSC - Latin america Directorate
FROM:
Jackie Fillman
# OF PAGES:
2
(incl. cover letter)
DATE:
7-20-89
TIME:
COMMENTS:
Someone 6 showing leadership!
Bush Library Photocopy
Proservation
IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES PLEASE CALL BACK AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE
PHONE: (202) 265-2822
RETURN FAX #: (202) 338-0308
PRESS RELEASE
NOTA DE PRENSA
June 20, 1989
IMMEDIATE DISTRIBUTION
Contact:
Jacqueline Tillman
(202)265-2822
SENATE INCREASES ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON CASTRO
Two important pieces of legislation sponsored by SENATOR CONNIE
MACK (R-FL) regarding Cuba were passed by overwhelming vote on
the floor of the U.S. Senate this week.
Earlier today, an amendment to the state department
authorization bill which eliminats certain loopholes in the
U.S embargo against Cuba passed by an 87-13 vote. The
amendment effectively closes loopholes created by a 1975 reform
of the trade embargo which allowed foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies to trade with Cuba. This business amounts to $300
million each year, and represents 47% of Cuba's trade with the
West.
Just this month, during the unprecedented show-trial of General
Arnaldo Ochoa, Cuba revealed for the first time the existence
of the MC Division within the Ministry of Interior whose sole
mission was to circumvent the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba.
The Cuban government confirmed that it used various front
companies and other means to circumvent the embargo.
Yesterday, the Senate passed by a unanimous 99-0 vote a
strongly worded resolution condemning Fidel Castro's 30 year
rule of Cuba and asking for a free and fair national
plebiscite, by secret yes/no ballot to approve or reject his
rule The amendment set certain conditions for a truly free
vote including the release of political prisoners and allowing
international observers to monitor the electoral process.
Jorge Mas, Chairman of the Cuban American National Foundation
declared: "The United States Senate has acted with wisdom and
foresight with these two votes. It has shown the exemplary
leadership required in light of the current crisis in Cuba.
These actions promote freedom and human rights in Cuba/ we
applaud them."
Mr. Mas added, "I am sure the entire Cuban American community
feels an enormous sense of gratitude to Senator Connie Mack for
his role in these efforts."
####
Bush Library Photocopy
Preservation
The Cuban American National Foundation 1000 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W. Suite 601 Washington, D.C. 20007
JUL 20 '89 22:01
C.A.N.F WASHINGTON
PAGE. 002
File: WTF CUBA
THE CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION
1000 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W., Suite 601
DAP
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 265-2822
July 14, 1989
This is rat
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JORGE MAS mas
a
Valladares
ARMANDO VALLADARES
gorge was C.
SUBJECT:
CUBA--DRUGS AND THE PURGE
left the am
w/ eloquent
The active involvement of Cuba in narcotrafficking has been
request
pervasive and well-documented over the last decade. But this
is not the central issue behind the purge and executions
currently underway in Cuba. Castro is dealing with regime
for USG
stability and is using the drug issue to distract from his
vor to
serious problems and to assure that his involvement in drug
all
trafficking is not revealed.
We respectfully request that the Bush Administration, at a time
when Castro's power is threatened internally and abroad, take over
the offensive and formulate a strong, coherent policy to
prevent Castro from escaping the consequences of his
alleged
decade-long involvement in narcotrafficking and the serious
stability issues he is experiencing. We would recommend the
following steps:
billingues
1) A full interagency review of U.S. Cuba policy and the
development and implementation of a policy for Cuba that is
to coop dues. a
premised on promoting democracy in Cuba and exploiting Castro's
vulnerabilities.
Instad,
2) Declassification and full public disclosure of the vast
information, including videotapes, available from all the
V.P. way
relevant agencies of the U.S. government about Cuba's active
role in narcotrafficking. USIA must make a major international
effort to expose and inform the world about Cuba's drug related
obestion expens
activities. Revealing this information at an appropriate
international forum would serve to empahasize U.S. concern with
Cuban involvement with narcotrafficking.
point
3) The U.S. government should publicly and officially
demand that Cuban government officials under indictment in the
to fustures 40C
U.S ---including Admiral Aldo Santamaria, Chief of the Cuban
in
Navy; Fernando Ravelo, former Cuban Ambassador to Colombia and
currently serving as Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua; Gonzalo
in
his
Bassols, Minister Counselor at the Embassy in Bogota, and Rene
Rodriguez Cruz, President of the Cuban Institute of Friendship
with the Peoples---as well as Robert Vesco, who lives in Cuba
July19
and is also under indictment in the United States, be turned
over to U.S. courts for trial.
gital
by
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
03. Analysis
Re: Cuba [pages 6-7 only] (2 pp.)
07/09/89
(b)(1)
TS
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Subject Files 1989
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Cuba -1988
Date Closed:
6/9/2010
OA/ID Number:
CF00194-02
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2005-0995-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
12 Jul 89
TO:
David Pacelli
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
392
010 EOB
REMARKS:
FROM:
C/ALA/MCD
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
4F29
Hqs
4825806
FORM NO.
REPLACES FORM 36-8
1 FEB 56 241
(47)
WHICH MAY BE USED.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04a. Note
To David Pacelli Re: [Cuba] (1 pp.)
07/12/89
(b)(1)
C
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Subject Files 1989
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Cuba 1988
Date Closed:
6/9/2010
OA/ID Number:
CF00194-02
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2005-0995-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA)
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRAJ
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM Removed as a personal record misfile
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04b. Report
Re: [Cuba] (5 pp.)
07/12/89
(b)(1)
C
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Subject Files 1989
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Cuba -1988
Date Closed:
6/9/2010
OA/ID Number:
CF00194-02
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2005-0995-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA)
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
file Caba
For Official Use Only
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
1 May 1989
INFORMATION
SERVICE
Survey of the Cuban Press: A Reference Aid
The following is a survey of the most authoritative and widely disseminated
Cuban periodicals. Titles are arranged in alphabetical order and are followed by
a description of the targeted audience. Names of a periodical's management
are provided when available. Descriptions and evaluations are based on long-
range patterns of reporting and are offered as road maps for locating and
assessing information in the Cuban press.
The Cuban press consists of government-controlled publications destined
for specific audiences. The targeted audience determines the overall focus of
each publication; however, there is little variation in format and content. For
example, TRABAJADORES, the labor daily, and JUVENTUD REBELDE, the
youth daily, cover similar topics, share lookalike layouts and have the same
number of pages. Journalists are not necessarily confined to one publication.
The same bylines found in GRANMA may also appear in BOHEMIA. Little open
source information is available on specific writers and editors.
BASTION
Manuel Gonzalez Bello, Argelio Santiesteban, Carlos
(Armed Forces Daily Organ)
Pineiro Loreda, and Felix Guerra. Ilse Bulit covers
human interest stories. BOHEMIA's first section
Director: Lieutenant Colonel Frank Aguero Gomez
reviews art, movies, television, and books. This is
Assistant Director: Armando Boudet Gomez
followed by "Archipelago," a section covering
domestic issues. This section begins with an editorial,
BASTION, the newspaper of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces [FAR] Ministry, is usually four pages
long. The front page generally reports any activity of
Fidel or Raul Castro in connection with the FAR.
The last page carries selected international news.
Bohemia
Other features include human interest stories about
EN EL ANIVERSARIO OCHENTA
troops in Angola, interviews with soldiers expressing
TURISMO,
pride in being members of the military, and articles
TE llaman VARADERO
on sports, culture, and scientific endeavors within the
military. Except for reporting on Cuito Cuanavale
during the first months of 1988, there is generally no
detailed reporting on ongoing military activity.
BOHEMIA
(Weekly Magazine)
-
Director: Magdali Garcia More
BOHEMIA, a news magazine, is aimed at the
more sophisticated reader. Featured writers include
Cover of BOHEMIA promotes the potential for tourism
Juan Sanchez, Luis Sexto, Alberto Pozo, Ilse Bulit,
on Cuba's beaches.
For Official Use Only
For Official Use Only
TRABA JADORES
verd
Cumplen plan
de pasta dental
ESTRO
AMIGO
4
Son 20 los cargadores frontales
Asiste Fidel a boda colectiva
terminados hasta ahora
30
en el Hospital Miguel Enríquez
to,
Front page of TRABAJADORES. Main headline
sold
celebrates fulfillment of toothpaste production plan,
clón
while photo shows Fidel Castro attending a "collective
wedding" in Miguel Enriquez Hospital.
Cover of VERDE OLIVO. Smiling recruits look on their
"teacher and friend,' " the training sergeant.
VERDE OLIVO
(Monthly Military Magazine)
VERDE OLIVO, a publication of the
The Provincial Press
Revolutionary Armed Forces, carries feature stories
rather than news. The stories focus on FAR
recruitment and training, as well as the correct
Twelve provincial daily newspapers are
political orientation of a good FAR soldier.
published in Cuba, one for each of the country's
Interviews with soldiers who tell of their love of the
provinces and for the Isle of Youth. These
military life and articles that describe training
papers report almost exclusively on such items
exercises are included. These articles are written in a
of local interest as the accomplishments of
vague and general manner and lack hard military
agricultural and construction brigades,
information. For example, there are no details on
community-level defense exercises, problems of
where an exercise takes place or how many troops are
inefficiency in local enterprises, the vagaries of
involved. Historical pieces, on topics such as the
local sports teams, etc. An example is
Sierra Maestra campaign, are also included. Poems,
TRIBUNA DE LA HABANA, which devotes
crosswords, and centerfolds of Cuban military
most of its coverage to local events in Havana
equipment are regularly featured.
City in addition to games, puzzles, and some
reporting on international news.
Any articles dealing with significant
Information compiled by Sara Mathis and
political, economic, or social developments at
Amy Rollins. Questions or comments may be
either the national or provincial level appear
addressed to Martin Gurri, Chief, Central
initially in GRANMA, the PCC organ, before
America/Caribbean Section (733-6295).
being picked up by the provincial press.
For Official Use Only
Ted insure age
Kimmett wants NSC this
(an to desk). David Nalan
concernence on
on phone Cata The memo.
- - ABC I agree has a with tenta to Cabe the It should deal for to
park clusive & gmillum rights. USE in be
- They still a con-exclusive buy DAS vasis.
akixed by footage
Tile: Cuba
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
June 27, 1989
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Mr. R. Richard Newcomb, Director
Office of Foreign Assets Control
Department of the Treasury
FROM:
Robert B. Morley
Coordinator for Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT:
Broadcast Rights for the 1991 Pan American Games
REF:
OFAC Memorandum No. 111774 of April 27, 1989
This is in response to your memorandum of April 27, 1989
requesting Department of State views on the application by
Trans World International, Inc. (TWI) to act as an agent for
the Government of Cuba (GOC) with regard to broadcast rights to
the 1991 Pan American Games and the application by ABC Sports
for the purchase of the U.S. rights.
The Pan American Sports Organization (PASO) chose Cuba as
the site for the 1991 games with the knowledge that the U.S.
maintains a comprehensive economic embargo on that country.
The United States is not obliged to change its foreign policy
due to the action of a private organization such as PASO.
The Department recommends that the licenses for TWI and ABC
be denied in order to prevent Cuba from earning significant
amounts of hard currency and to protect the integrity of the
embargo. Due to the latter consideration, the Department would
recommend denial even if payments to Cuba were to be made into
blocked accounts.
The Department would have no objection on foreign policy
grounds to U.S. broadcasters covering the games as a news
event, provided no payments are made to Cuba. The Department
would also have no objection to U.S. firms acquiring film/tape
footage of the games for rebroadcast in the United States under
the informational materials exception to the embargo.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
FAC No. 111774
APR 27 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL WISGERHOF
DEPARTMENT OF STATE/EB/EWT
FROM:
R. RICHARD NEWCOMB
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
SUBJECT:
Broadcast Rights for the 1991 Pan American
Games (Our Reference: C-12960)
We have received an application from Trans World International,
Inc. ("TWI") requesting a license to enter into an agreement
with Cimesports S.A. and Empressa Cubana de Radio y Television
regarding the development of financial, technical, and
physical arrangements for the radio and television broadcast-
ing of the 11th Pan American Sports Games of 1991 to be held
in Havana, Cuba. Under the agreement, TWI would provide
worldwide comprehensive marketing, negotiating, promotional,
and sale services and representation regarding broadcast
rights to the games on behalf of the Cuban entities.
Included with TWI's application is an application of ABC
Sports for the purchase of the U.S. broadcast rights.
As you know, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R.
Part 515 ("the Regulations"), prohibit all unlicensed
economic transactions in which Cuba has an interest.
Although, pursuant to subsection 515.543 (c) of the Regulations,
specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis for
communications-related transactions, the undertaking for
which TWI is requesting a license is beyond the scope of
subsection 515.543 (c), and this office would not favor
granting TWI's application, as it would produce significant
hard currency earnings for Cuba.
Regarding ABC Sports' application for a license allowing it
to purchase U.S. broadcast rights, similar policy reasons
apply against granting a license. In this case, however, an
alternative option of placing the purchase price in a
blocked account may be offered to ABC, although is it
questionable if this would be acceptable to Cuba. Given the
potential foreign relations implication as well as domestic
public interest regarding these applications, the views of
the Department of State are requested before a licensing
decision is made. My staff and I are available to discuss
this matter with you and other appropriate offices of your
Department at your convenience.
Attachment
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FBIS TRENDS
1 June 1989
Fde cuba
Cuba-U.S.
Havana Threatens New Round of Confrontation With U.S.
Havana's sharp criticism of President Bush's recent policy
statement on Cuba signals an end to its courtship of the new
administration. While it has not ruled out an improvement in
relations-as it has done with previous administrations-it appears
to be gearing up for a new period of confrontation.
Havana responded authoritatively to the President's 22 May statement on
Cuba in a strongly worded editorial carried on the front page of the party
paper Granma on 24 May and reported the same day by its radio and
television network, Tele-Rebelde. The editorial rejected what it described as
the "list of demands" put forward by the President in a meeting with a group
of Cuban-Americans, which called on Havana to change its policies and
behavior-hold free and fair elections, respect human rights, allow
unrestricted emigration, and stop meddling in the internal affairs of other
countries-as a first step toward improved relations with the United States.
Reflecting Havana's longstanding sensitivity to any U.S. questioning of the
legitimacy of the Castro regime, the editorial took particular umbrage at the
President's call for a plebiscite in Cuba. After questioning the President's
right to "give recipes" to Cuba, it went on to stress that the Cuban people have
"irreversibly opted for Marxism and Leninism." And in an apparent critical
allusion to the political and economic reforms being implemented in the Soviet
Union, the editorial said that the President "will not see capitalist renovations
wearing a socialist disguise" in Cuba.
Suggesting that Havana has cast aside any expectation of a near-term
improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations, the editorial did not express any
interest in opening a dialogue with the administration, as President Castro had
done in December.¹ Instead, it made it clear that Havana is prepared to
maintain a confrontational stance toward the United States rather than
submit to what it depicted as the President's "threats to make Cuba change its
behavior."
1 See the Trends of 14 December 1988, page 36.
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FBIS TRENDS
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1 June 1989
Specter of Another
Noting that President Bush has challenged the Castro
"Mariel"
regime to allow the unrestricted emigration of Cubans,
the editorial seemed to threaten another mass exodus
of malcontents similar to that from the port of Mariel nine years ago. Thus, it
asked rhetorically whether "the United States Government wants migration
terms like those of 1980." The editorial went on to blame the United States for
hindering the Cuban people's right to emigrate, saying Washington, in
"blatant violation" of the immigration accords signed by the two countries in
1987, has granted only "a few hundred" of the 20,000 visas it agreed to issue
per year.
TV Marti
The Granma editorial also warned that Cuba will
Broadcasts
retaliate if the United States carries out its plan to
beam television broadcasts to Cuba. It noted pointedly
that such broadcasts, which "violate" international law and Cuban
"sovereignty," will "unavoidably lead to the poisoning of the international
atmosphere to limits that George Bush himself cannot imagine." While the
editorial did not indicate what specific steps Havana would take against TV
Marti, Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez took a tough line, saying in an
interview reported by Radio Rebelde on 19 April that Cuba is "willing to take
the necessary measures" and asserting that it "has the resources and means to
confront this reactionary mission." Similarly, Jorge Gomez Barata, Central
Committee member and section chief of that body's Revolutionary Orientation
Department, implied that Cuba could begin counterbroadcasts to the United
States. According to the Mexican news agency Notimex on 16 May, he said
that Havana intends to respond to TV Marti "with all available means:
political, diplomatic, and technical."
Although Havana also threatened to take countermeasures against Radio
Marti, which began broadcasting to Cuba in May 1986, it has thus far
refrained from disrupting the frequencies of U.S. radio stations on a sustained
basis. It has, however, demonstrated on several occasions since 1982 that it has
the technical capacity to transmit high-powered broadcasts that interfere with
a number of U.S. radio- stations. For example, Radio Taino, using a high-
powered transmitter that broadcasts in Spanish and English and that Havana
claims is intended for tourists in Cuba, has periodically interfered with U.S.
stations by remaining on the air past its normal signoff.
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FBIS TRENDS
1 June 1989
Outlook
Despite its condemnation of President Bush's policy
statement on Cuba, Havana seems reluctant to slam
the door on the possibility of improved relations with Washington. Although
Castro has made several speeches since the President's 22 May statement, he
has, thus far refrained from joining in the media campaign against the
President, leaving it to lower level Cuban officials and the media to condemn
him by name. In an apparent allusion to the President's statement, Castro, in
remarks to a group of students on 25 May, limited himself to saying that while
Cuba "will do everything possible to prevent war, there is a limit that one
cannot go beyond" (Tele-Rebelde, 26 May). In the past, Castro took it upon
himself to denounce, in harsh terms, policy statements issued by new U.S.
administrations on relations with Cuba.
In light of Castro's restraint, Havana may view the scheduled TV Marti
broadcasts, which are slated to begin this fall, as the acid test of the
administration's intentions toward Cuba. Suggesting that the regime still
hopes to avoid a confrontation with Washington over this issue, the Cuban
delegation to the recent conference of the International Telecommunications
Union was cited. by Tele-Rebelde on 31 May as expressing Havana's
willingness to negotiate with Washington to "solve their differences." At the
same time, the delegation made a point of noting that Cuba is "capable of
responding to aggression" and that it "will hold the United States responsible
for the consequences."
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FBIS TRENDS
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1 June 1989
CEMA
CEMA Inner Group Seen as Way Out of Reform Stalemate
The apparent failure of the most recent CEMA Executive
Committee meeting to make any progress toward resolving the
longstanding problems blocking CEMA integration has given rise to
proposals that, if implemented, could weaken that already
moribund organization. The proposals would shift responsibility for
reforming international economic ties from CEMA as a whole to
bilateral and multilateral groups of countries, an arrangement that
would circumvent the existing CEMA bureaucracy and render
meaningless the CEMA organization as a whole.
Statements by participants following the 16-18 May Moscow meeting of the
CEMA Executive Committee (deputy premiers of the member-states) suggest
that efforts to reform economic relations within the bloc remain stalled,
prompting calls for the formation of an inner group of countries that would not
wait for consensus to be achieved before going ahead with reforms.¹ The
communique of the meeting indicated that reform of "price formation in
mutual trade" and of "the international currency and financial mechanism"-
two of the chief stumbling blocks to economic integration in CEMA-are
"still slow in being carried out" (Pravda, 19 May). Although the primary
purpose of the meeting was to prepare for the meeting of the premiers of the
CEMA countries scheduled for June in Sofia, Polish Deputy Premier Sekula
complained that the working group drafting decisions for the Sofia meeting
has made insufficient progress. He attributed the working group's failure to
"the vast differences between the views of the individual countries"
concerning reform (Trybuna Ludu, 19 May). Executive Committee chairman
Lukanov of Bulgaria also held out little hope that an expected CEMA summit
of heads of state would be held in the foreseeable future, despite his assertion
that "only a meeting at the highest level" could resolve the existing differences
(Rude Pravo, 19 May).
1 The "interested party" principle in CEMA decisionmaking rules stipulates that an
agreement is binding only on those members who declare an interest in it. Among those who
declare an interest, however, decisionmaking must be unanimous. A member can thus exercise
a veto over any agreement by declaring its interest and then voting against the agreement.
32
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
07. Report
Re: Cuba (1 pp.)
04/01/89
(b)(1)
TS
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Subject Files 1989
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Cuba -1988
Date Closed:
6/9/2010
OA/ID Number:
CF00194-02
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2005-0995-F
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
Fre
Fidel Castro's Statements
Cuba
on Glasnost, Perestroika, and Secretary General Gorbachov
- Castro summoned his top party officials to a closed meeting on November 15, 1988.
He spoke for three hours and said Cuba was the last bastion of true Marxism and
called the Moscow News, a Soviet weekly in the glasnost mode, more
counterrevolutionary than Radio Marti.
- On December 5th, he made a fiery speech before 400,000 Cubans, adivising Third
Washington. World nations to be wary of the new climate of detente Moscow was creating with
- Castro has become increasingly critical of Gorbachev's program of perestroika, or
restructuring, in speeches during the past six months, dismissing them last July as
"methods that reek of capitalism." In December, he criticized Moscow by warning
of "difficulties that may come from the camp of our own friends." On Jan. 1, he
provocatively contrasted his self-proclaimed ideological purity with Gorbachev's
new openness by proclaiming "Marxism-Leninism or death."
- "We must not play or flirt with capitalist things," he told the Cuban people.Cuba
has its own problems and requires "a different course," Castro said in a three-hour
speech marking the 35th anniversary of the start of the revolution that brought him
to power in 1959.
He disdained the sorts of initiatives advanced by Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev to promote decentralization and a freer marketplace and warned the
crowd of more than 100,000 in the city of Santiago that, ultimately, Cuba must be
responsible for itself.
"If the U.S. imperialists attack us, who will defend us? No one," he exclaimed.
"We will defend ourselves. Our revolution is 10,000 kilometers from the Soviet
Union."
American
Review
INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN STUDIES
RAND AFRIKAANS UNIVERSITY
DIENS DEUR KENNIS
1989
Tenth Anniversary Edition
Cuba-Africa:
Quo Vadis ?
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Uganda
Kenya
Gabon
Rwanda
Congo
Zaire
Burundi
Tanzania
Angola
Malawi
Mozambique
Zambia
South West
Zimbabwe
Africa/Namibia
Botswana
INDIAN
Swaziland
OCEAN
Lesotho
ATLANTIC
Rep. of South Africa
OCEAN
Key:
Major railways ++++++
IAS
American Review
SPECIAL EDITION 1989
INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN STUDIES
ISBN 0257-862X
RAND AFRIKAANS UNIVERSITY
This special edition of AMERICAN REVIEW commem-
orates the establishment of the Institute for American
Editor: Carl F Nöffke
Studies on June 1, 1979. The IAS devotes this special issue
Deputy Editor: Fienie Janse van Rensburg
to Cuba and its political, economic, military and ideologi-
Contributing Editor: Sanet Wessels Glatt-
cal role. The papers reproduced in this special edition are
haar
Production Editor: James Mitchell
based on presentations at a symposium held by the Institute
Research Consultant: Rentia M Seeber
in Pretoria on November 25, 1988 on the theme: "Cuba-
Administrative Manager: Marie Venter
Africa: Quo Vadis?" The papers by Dr Goure, Mr Morris
and Prof Nöffke were rewritten, taking into account the
latest developments.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD:
Proff TH Greene (Univ Southern Califor-
nia, Los Angeles), C A Woodward (Val-
dosta State College, Georgia), G N Barrie
CONTENTS
(Rand Afrikaans Univ), PH Kapp (Univ of
Stellenbosch), D T Künert (Univ of the
Witwatersrand) and C F Nöffke (Rand
Afrikaans Univ).
2 CUBA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET INTERNATIONAL POLICY
by Leon Goure
Dr Goure is Director of the Center for Soviet Studies at McLean,
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE:
Chairman: Prof C F Crouse (Rector);
Virginia, USA. Born in the USSR, he was educated in Gemany,
members: Proff J Poolman (Vice-Rector),
France and the USA. He is an outstanding Sovietologist and a
CF Nöffke (Director), O P F Horwood,
renowned expert on Cuban foreign affairs.
G N Barrie, J C Kok, S Super and Mr MT
de Waal. Secretary: Mrs F Janse van
10 CASTRO'S CUBA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Rensburg.
by Vladimir Ramirez
Dr Ramirez is a psycholigist and former Cuban political prisoner.
Prior to his defection to the USA in 1987, he conducted extensive
ADVISORY COMMITTEE:
research at various prison institutions in Havana, Cuba. He is at
Chairman: Prof C F Crouse (Rector);
present Executive Director of the Latin American Study Center in
members: Proff ) Poolman (Vice-Rector),
Miami, Florida.
PMS von Staden (Dean Faculty of Arts
and Philosophy), C F Nöffke (Director),
17 CUBA'S INTERNATIONAL ADVENTURES
Messrs R Meyer, N. P van Heerden, S
by Eric Morris
Mulholland, H H Schwarz, D B Sole, J F
Clarke, Drs B G Fourie, H de Loor, LGC
Mr Morris, an established author of more than a dozen books in
Scheepers, Gen H de V du Toit, Proff I P
the field of international politics and military history, is a strategist
de Lange, O P F Horwood, G N Barrie, TE
and consultant political analyst based in the United Kingdom. He is
Beukes, W de Klerk, G L de Wet, P G W
du Plessis, I C Kok, D J Kotzé, J M Sche-
a graduate of the University of Wales and Leicester, where he
pers, H J van Aswegen, DJ Geldenhuys, A
specialised in defence studies. He lectured at the Universities of
I van der Westhuizen and JJ Snyman. Sec-
Liverpool and Wales before joining the faculty staff of the Royal
retary: Mrs F Janse van Rensburg.
Military Academy at Sandhurst.
20 CASTRO'S SELF-IMAGE AND HIS GEO-POLITICAL VISION OF
AFRICA.
by Alberto Coll
Institute for American Studies
Rand Afrikaans University
PO Box 524
Dr Coll is Professor of Strategy and International Law at the US
Johannesburg 2000
Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island. Dr Coll was born and
Telephone: (011) 489-2460
raised in Cuba. He has specialised in international politics, law and
Telex: 424526
organisation; national security affairs; and Latin America and the
Fax: (011) 489-2797, 726-8373 & 726-7723
Soviet Union.
27 SOUTHWESTERN AFRICA: MYTHS AND REALITIES
by Carl Nöffke
The views in AMERICAN REVIEW are
those of the authors. They do not neces-
Professor Nöffke heads the Institute for American Studies at the
sarily reflect the views of the Institute for
Rand Afrikaans University. He edited a daily newspaper and
American Studies.
headed the South African public information programme in the
United States, before accepting his current position during 1984.
Goure
Cuba as an Instrument of Soviet International Policy
Although it may seem that the "golden age of Fidel Castro's adventurism" may be
over, at least for the time being, as the Soviet Union tries another policy line, the
duration of this shift is quite uncertain. Those who believe the talks about an "his-
toric opportunity" to settle all major political world problems forget the lessons of
history as well as the inevitability of social, political, and economic change and the
impact of what the Soviets call the "scientific-technological revolution."
A
mong the Communist states which make up
of a traditional communist party to serve as the
the so-called "socialist fraternity" headed by
vanguard of the revolutionary struggle.
the Soviet Union, Cuba has played and con-
tinues to play a unique role as Moscow's most politi-
Second, Cuba was the first communist state to be
cally militant and militarily active proxy. From the
established in an area not contiguous to, and geo-
Soviet Union's perspective, this has made Cuba a
graphically remote from, the Soviet Union. Fur-
highly valued instrument of Soviet expansionist
thèrmore, it was the first communist state to
policies, especially in the Third World. This does not
appear in the Western Hemisphere where Mos-
mean, however, that there have not been times when
COW had believed this to be impossible because of
Fidel Castro's agenda and ambitions conflicted with
anticipated resistance by the United States. Break-
the interest and policy lines of the Soviet Union.
ing this so-called "geographic fatalism," which had
Indeed, Fidel Castro seeks to be Moscow's consci-
been thought to characterise the Western Hemi-
ence in the matter of the Soviet commitment to sup-
sphere, was a major triumph not only for Fidel Cas-
port of the revolutionary and "liberation" struggle in
tro, but also for the Soviet Union and the interna-
the Third World, that is, primarily in Africa and Latin
tional communist movement.
America. But while there have been temporary dis-
agreements over policy between Havana and Mos-
Third, unlike most other Soviet satellite states,
cow, this has not led Fidel Castro to waver in his close
revolutionary Cuba actively sought Moscow's
alliance with the Soviet Union and his support of
embrace and support as a prerequisite for ensur-
Soviet interests throughout the world. Undoubtedly,
ing the island's security and economic develop-
Gorbachev's policies and restructuring of Soviet
ment and for allowing Fidel Castro to play a larger
priorities will place new strains on this alliance, but it
role in the global promotion of revolution and "na-
will survive. Cuba is firmly anchored in the Soviet
tional liberation."
camp even when Fidel Castro pouts and chides Mos-
COW for being less than totally committed to "proleta-
Fourth, unlike other communist countries, Fidel
rian internationalism."
Castro's contol of Cuba does not rest primarily
with the communist party. The Cuban Communist
Party (PCC) which Fidel Castro inaugurated in 1965
is largely his own creation and only one among
several instruments of his control over the island.
Cuba was the first communist state to be
Indeed, one of his key power bases is the Cuban
established in an area not contiguous to,
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), headed by his
and geographically remote from, the
brother, Raúl Castro.
Soviet Union.
Given Cuba's exposed position only 90 miles from
the United States, Fidel Castro's anti-American.
stance, and Cuba's impoverished economy, it is not
surprising that Castro had to seek out the Soviet Union
Cuba's peculiar characteristics
as Cuba's patron and protector. Moscow in turn was
delighted with the opportunity of having a friendly
There are many factors which make Cuba so
and dependent communist state in what it called the
unique in the constellation of Soviet satellites:
"backyard" of the United States. Consequently Fidel
Castro has been able to extract an enormous amount
First, it is a country where a self-proclaimed
of economic and military assistance from the Soviet
Marxist-Leninist regime came to power by means
Union. Thus, Soviet economic aid and subsidies
of armed struggle and did so without direct Soviet
amounted to some $6,75 billion in the period 1961-
assistance and guidance and without the existence
1975 and $26,5 billion in the period 1975-1983, the
2
American Review
increase corresponding to Cuba's military involve-
Cuba as a proxy of the Soviet Union
ment in Angola and Ethiopia. At present, the Soviet
Union gives Cuba annually some $4-$5 billion in
The Soviet-Cuban axis undoubtedly makes for
economic assistance and in addition, has provided
what may be called an "odd couple." It is an active
the island since 1961 with more than $7 billion-worth
partnership between a giant and a "pygmy," as Castro
of modern weapons and military equipment, mostly
has referred to Cuba: it is also a partnership between
free of charge. It should also be noted that Cuba's
a highly structured, bureaucratised, professional,
debt to the Soviet Union and other communist coun-
coldly calculating leadership of Soviet "apparatchiks"
tries exceeds $22 billion, with an additional $3,5 bil-
and probably the one and only romantic communist
lion owed the West in hard currency. Consequently,
firebrand in power - Fidel Castro - who fantasises
while unlike the Eastern European states, Cuba is too
leading the revolutionary transformation of the Third
far from the Soviet Union to be controlled by a possi-
World. When Castro's ambition and Soviet interests
ble threat of Soviet military intervention, as hap-
coincide, as they did especially in the 1975 to 1985
pened in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland,
period, Moscow is only too willing to let Cuba take
Cuba is economically and militarily critically depen-
the risks and lumps it so eagerly seeks. During such
dent on the Soviet Union, thus providing Moscow
periods, the Soviets are particularly lavish in their
with a great deal of effective control.
praise of their Cuban partner. For example, the
recently dismissed Soviet Politburo member Solo-
mentsev said in Havana in 1985 that:
"Cuba's fraternal aid to Angola and Ethiopia, its
The "internationalist" mission of Cuba is a
unselfish aid to Arab peoples, and many other
key element of its foreign policy.
international actions have won Cuba apprecia-
tion of all those fighting for freedom, indepen-
dence, and social progress."
What is so unique about Cuba, however, is Fidel
Castro's desire to be more than the leader of a Carib-
Cuban soldiers are sufficiently varied in
bean Bulgaria. He wants to play a leading role in the
colour and looks to make them appear
Third World's "anti-imperialist national liberation
more acceptable to Third World coun-
struggle," to internationalise Cuba's revolutionary
tries.
experience and be a driving force behind the rise of
radical-left and Marxist-Leninist regimes in Africa and
Latin America. He wants to be an historic figure on
the world stage. This, in turn, lends greater legiti-
macy to his revolution in Cuba and enhances the
But while Cuba receives praise for its military and
Cuban people's pride in the island's stature in world
technical assistance to various Third World countries
affairs. Of course, by focusing on the United States'as
and increases in Soviet economic aid, it is the Soviet
Cuba's nemesis and as the leader of the "imperialist
Union which, in the end, acquires such countries as
camp," Castro is also able to maintain Cuba in a state
its own clients and incorporates them in its sphere of
of permanent war mobilisation and to justify domes-
influence. From Moscow's perspective, there are
tic economic failures by blaming the United States.
many advantages in letting Cuban troops, advisers, and
civilian instructors serve as proxies of the Soviet Union:
The "internationalist" mission of Cuba is a key ele-
First, there is a happy coincidence between what
ment of its foreign policy. Thus, the Cuban Com-
both countries have most readily available for
munist Party's platform on the "Principles and Objec-
export, i.e. military and civilian manpower in the
tives of Foreign Policy," which was adopted at the
case of Cuba and weapons and military equipment
third PCC Congress on February 7, 1986, states that
in the case of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the
"Our Party and people will continue to fulfill honor-
Cubans can do the fighting and the Soviet Union
ably their international duties, exercising solidarity
provides their logistic support.
with the peoples who are struggling for their inde-
pendence and national liberation." As to Fidel Cas-
Second, the use of Cuban troops and other per-
tro, he has proclaimed that "there is no greater hon-
sonnel in other countries is far less provocative
our for the record of a citizen of this country than to
than a similar use of Soviet personnel. A "progres-
have completed an internationalist mission, either
sive" regime can be saved or supported in power
civilian or military." Indeed, Fidel Castro has been
by Cuban troops and still keep the conflict
volunteering his citizens as combat soldiers, military
localised or regionalised, whereas the use of
advisers, as well as doctors, teachers, and technicians
Soviet troops would internationalise the conflict
to more than 30 countries, 25 of them in Africa, which
and increase the likelihood of a dangerous con-
is an astonishing accomplishment for a poor, rela-
frontation with the United States or, at the very
tively small island with a population only approach-
least, cause a major international crisis.
ing 10 million. Consider that in the case of Angola
alone, since 1975, over 200 Cubans have served in
Third, given that Cuba is a small Third World coun-
that country at least one 2-year tour of duty and many
try and disclaims any ambition to impose its own
have done so more than once.
controls on the recipient of its assistance, the pre-
American Review
3
sence of Cuban troops is less frightening to the
men on active duty and over 135 000 trained reser-
host country and its neighbours. Cuba does not
vists, many of whom have seen service in Angola and
carry the historic stigma of Western - including
elsewhere abroad, as well as some 1,5 million serving
Soviet "colonialism."
in the Territorial Militia Troops (MTT), 10 in civil
defence, and so on. A 1982 book, entitled Courage
Fourth, Cuban soldiers are sufficiently varied in
and Brotherhood, prepared jointly by the Institute of
colour and looks to make them appear more
Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defence and
acceptable to Third World countries.
the Centre for Military History of the Cuban Armed
Forces solemnly states that:
Fifth, the Cuban Armed Forces are equipped
entirely with Soviet weapons and material, thus
"The history of the formation of a new type of
reducing the need for Soviet instructors to teach
army in Cuba is the history of the birth and
their use to recipients of Soviet military assistance.
development of brotherly Soviet-Cuban friend-
ship, the history of their combat collaboration;
Finally, the dependence of the Cuban expedition-
it is one of the most brilliant pages in the practi-
ary forces on Soviet logistic support gives Moscow
cal implementation of proletarian international-
effective control over them and, therefore, also
ism."
over Cuban decisions to send such forces.
Furthermore, it is said that the strengthening of
FAR makes "an important contribution to the
strengthening of the countries of the socialist frater-
nity. Naturally, Fidel Castro like the leaders of
Of special significance are the close ties
other Soviet-satellite states - has repeatedly pro-
between Cuba's Revolutionary Forces, or
claimed Cuba's readiness to fight in defence of the
Soviet Union.
a major part at least of the Cuban officer
corps, and the Soviet Armed Forces.
Of special significance are the close ties between
the FAR (or a major part, at least, of the Cuban officer
corps) and the Soviet Armed Forces. Thousands of
Cuban officers and technicians have attended Soviet
There are, of course, other advantages as well to
military schools, including the Frunze Academy and
the Soviet Union's effective control over Cuba. The
the Voroshilov General Staff Academy; many more
island is an outpost and springboard for Soviet influ-
thousands have been instructed and trained by the
ence and presence in Central and South America and
2 500 to 3 000 Soviet military instructors and advisers
because of Cuba's role, in the non-aligned move-
in Cuba. The chief of the Soviet military advisers is
ment, Cuba acts as a political proxy for Moscow in
usually a Colonel General who serves as adviser to
that movement. Cuba provides an important base for
the Cuban Ministry of Defence and General Staff and
Soviet intelligence operations, with some 2 100 tech-
personally to Raúl Castro, the Minister of Defence.
nicians and intelligence analysts operating an elabo-
Raúl Castro is considered to be strongly pro-Soviet
rate electronic listening and monitoring facility on
and is held in high regard by the Soviet Union.
Cuban soil, defended by a Soviet mechanised infan-
try brigade of some 800 men. This, by the way, is the
In the instruction and training of Cuban soldiers,
furthest deployment of a Soviet combat unit from the
great emphasis is placed on Cuba's close ties with the
Soviet Union. Airfields on the island allow the Soviets
Soviet Union. Indeed, it is said that "great attention is
to make round-trip flights from the Soviet Union with
paid to the education of Cuban soldiers in the spirit of
BEAR-D naval reconnaissance aircraft and BEAR-F
proletarian internationalism, and combat fraternity
anti-submarine patrol aircraft and thereby cover the
with the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and of
entire length of the east coast of the United States.
other fraternal socialist countries." Raúl Castro, who
Soviet warships are periodically deployed to Cuba
is a great admirer of the Soviet Armed Forces, claims
and conduct joint exercises with the Cuban navy and
that FAR has been learning "the art of winning from
monitor maritime traffic in the Caribbean, Panama
their brothers-in-arms," the Soviet Armed Forces. If
Canal and Gulf of Mexico regions. In addition, the
this is so, FAR has not learned this art very well, given
KGB. essentially controls Cuba's Intelligence Service
its past combat performance. 'But then again, the
(DGI) which provides valuable, worldwide support to
Soviet Armed Forces also appear to have forgotten
Soviet intelligence and subversive operations.
their "art of winning" in Afghanistán, which is the
only instance of combat employment of significant
Soviet-Cuban military relations
Soviet military forces since World War II.
There is another area relevant to Cuba's use of
Thus the close ties between the Cuban and Soviet
military forces as proxies for Soviet expansionist
Armed Forces are another factor making Cuba a will-
policies and that is Soviet influence on Cuba's
ing instrument of Soviet foreign policy interests. The
Revolutionary Forces (FAR). FAR is a Soviet creation
Cuban Armed Forces should not be expected to
which transformed a victorious, ragtag guerrilla army
oppose Fidel Castro's international ambitions or to
of a few thousand men into one of the most powerful
resist demands to make sacrifices in the interest of
modern armed forces in Central and Latin America. It
Soviet expansion. Of course, for all his flamboyance
has allowed Fidel Castro to militarise Cuba's society
and daring, Fidel Castro has been trying to achieve
to the highest degree anywhere in the world. At pre-
his objectives with relatively low risks to his troops.
sent, the Cuban Armed Forces have some 162 000
Thus, the offical Cuban line concerning the role of
4
American Review
Cuban forces in Ethiopia and Angola has been that
of Angola," now even Angola's security and the inde-
Cuban troops are not there to help the communist
pendence of Namibia did not suffice. According to
governments of these countries fight native rebel-
Castro, "Namibia's independence is important and
lions, but to protect them against "foreign aggres-
just. But today, the end of apartheid is more impor-
sion." Nevertheless, Cuban casualties have kept
tant, just and decisive because everything depends
mounting; furthermore, after the repeated failures of
on it - the future, security, and independence of
native communist armed forces to crush rebellions in
Southern Africa." Castro had insisted that Cuban
their countries, pressure has mounted for Cuban
forces will remain in Angola only as long as the MPLA
forces to take an increasingly active combat role. The
government wishes them to stay. At the same time,
problem for Fidel Castro is that while initial Cuban
however, he stated that:
military successes, as in the case of Angola in 1975,
rebound to his stature and Cuba's national pride,
as long as apartheid exists, Namibia's inde-
major military defeats could have a profound,
pendence, if it is achieved, would only be a fic-
adverse effect on Fidel Castro's own prestige and on
titious independence; that brother country
Cuban domestic support for foreign adventures.
would have no safety. As long as apartheid
exists, there will be no safety for any southern
African country, neither for Lesotho, Botswana,
Mozambique, Zambia, nor Tanzania, because
apartheid's arm is a long one
It
is
capable
of
As Havana and Moscow see it, the stakes
conspiring against any black African country
in Angola are especially high; indeed, far
There will be no security for any black African
country as long as apartheid exists."
higher than in Ethiopia.
Consequently, Fidel Castro has claimed that "our
people's and Party's wish is that Cuban inter-
nationalist troops remain in Angola as long as apart-
Cuba and Angola
heid exists." Both Fidel and Raúl Castro have
declared that, if necessary, Cuban forces were pre-
Despatching a Cuban Expeditionary Force to
pared to remain in Angola for another 10, 15 or even
Angola in 1975 was not the first Cuban venture in
30 years. Such statements were obviously intended to
sending troops to assist leftist regimes in the Third
serve psychological warfare purposes and to signal
World. For example, in 1963, Fidel Castro sent 2 000
Cuba's rejection of a solution of the Namibian prob-
soldiers to Algeria to help the Ben Bella regime repel
lem which would require as a quid pro quo the prior
a Moroccan invasion. Even so, and despite the fact
withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This was
that Cuba has sent thousands of military advisers,
also a position endorsed by Moscow.
technicians, and pilots to various African, Middle
Eastern, and Latin American countries, Cuban
The problem for Cuba was that after more than ten
involvement in Angola represents the high point of
years of involvement in Angola, no "victory" had
Cuba's exercise in "proletarian internationalism" and
been achieved. Yet Fidel Castro needed such a "vic-
of its attempt to play a large role in global affairs. It
tory" to justify Cuban losses in Angola and to
has also brought about a period of very close col-
enhance Cuba's influence in Africa. His instinct had
laboration between Havana and Moscow.
been to look to a long-term military solution not only
to the UNITA problem but to the Namibian-South
As Havana, and Moscow as well, see it, the stakes in
African problem. This, however, could expose the
Angola are especially high; indeed, far higher than in
Cuban forces to greater risks, especially if the Soviet
Ethiopia. In the latter case, Cuba sent troops to assist
Union preferred to avoid damaging its own improving
a client of the Soviet Union to help defeat an invasion
relations with Western Europe and the United States.
by a Third World and former Soviet client-state -
Nevertheless, Castro signalled his resolve again in
Somalia. The Cuban forces fought under the direct
1987 when, after the failure of the offensive against
command of a Soviet General and his staff. Following
UNITA, Cuba significantly increased the size of its
the defeat of Somalia, Cuban forces in Ethiopia have
forces in Angola and moved large units to the south-
been reduced from some 12 000 to approximately
ern part of the country.
3 000 to 5 000 and they do not actively participate in
Ethiopia's war against the Eritrean rebels. In the case
Although the continuing presence of Cuban troops
of Angola, however, Fidel Castro saw four intercon-
in Angola contributes to Cuban domestic problems, so
nected objectives: 1) to help ensure the survival of
would the return of the Cuban Expeditionary Forces.
the MPLA regime; 2) to strike a blow at the United
When implementing his "internationalist" policy,
States and South Africa by helping to defeat their
Fidel Castro had offered incentives to Cubans who
client, UNITA; 3) to help create a situation which
performed what he called their "internationalist
would lead the Republic of South Africa to give up
duty." First, Cuban conscripts in Angola and Ethiopia
control of Namibia; and 4) to lend support to the
served only two years in the armed forces as against
struggle against apartheid in South Africa and
three years for those who remained on the island.
thereby to its revolutionary transformation. Con-
Second, veterans of service abroad were promised
sequently, Castro had insisted that all four objec-
housing, a university education, preference in better
tives must be gained before the Cuban forces are
employment, and a more rapid acceptance into the
withdrawn from Angola. For example, in a speech in
Party. In fact, however, many of those sent to Angola
Luanda in September 1986, Castro said that while
have been reservists, and they have shown an
Cuban forces initially came to "reinforce the defence
increasing disinclination to serve additional service
American Review
5
tours abroad. Meanwhile, given that there are over
cutting principle must be introduced in policy
200 veterans of such service, the Cuban Govern-
also."
ment has had to renege on its promises to give them
special benefits because of the burden this would
More specifically, Shevardnadze argued that:
place on the Cuban economy. Yet the export of sol-
diers and civilians has also become a necessity for
"The main thing is that the country not incur
additional expenses in connection with the
Cuba, given the surplus of officers and of doctors,
need to maintain its defences and protect its
teachers, and so on and as a form of repayment for
legitimate foreign policy interest. This means
Soviet economic help. The economics of Cuba's
we must seek ways to limit and reduce military
involvement in Angola were also helped by requiring
rivalry, eliminate confrontational features in
the Angolan Government to pay in hard currency for
relations with other states, and suppress con-
each Cuban serving there. The return of the Cuban
flict and crisis situations."
Expeditionary Forces may, therefore, add to Cuba's
domestic problems and increase dissatisfaction
Other Soviet elaborations of the meaning of "new
among veterans, especially in the officer corps.
thinking" in Soviet foreign policy push three lines: 1)
the danger of nuclear war between the superpowers
must be averted, and their military competition must
A new stage in Soviet-Cuban relations?
be controlled, presumably so as not to burden the
Soviet economy which is poorly placed to engage in
Soviet foreign policy appears to have entered a
uncontrolled competition with the United States in
new stage since Gorbachev became General Secre-
advanced military technology systems; 2) in order to
tary of the CPSU in 1985. This new stage is the result
enhance the Soviet Union's security and to gain
of the Soviet leadership's emphasis on domestic
access to foreign technology and credits, it is neces-
affairs, which includes extensive reforms in the
sary to reassure the Free World about Soviet inten-
Soviet economic and political systems of manage-
tions; 3) and a re-examination of Soviet foreign policy
ment. Gorbachev's so-called perestroika and
shows that the Soviet Union can achieve less risky
economic "acceleration" policies face formidable
and better foreign gains by political means than by
difficulties and, consequently, are absorbing the
the use of force or in various instances the support of
main attention and energies of the Soviet leadership.
the use of force by its proxies.
While the policy of glasnost or "openness" is
beginning to threaten the communist party's tradi-
tional controls at home, perestroika has yet to bring
Fidel
Castro has found a good deal to be
any improvement to the Soviet economy that is not
just stagnant but actually becoming worse, especially
unhappy about
with Gorbachev's new
in the areas of inflation, food supply, consumer goods
policy lines.
and housing for the Soviet population. According to US
estimates, the Soviet economy in 1987 grew by less than
one per cent and is expected to grow only by 1,5 per
Indeed, some of the fundamental tenets of Marx-
cent in 1988. Obviously, given the apathy of the Soviet
ism-Leninism are being officially dropped so as to
population and the resistance of the governmental,
lend greater credibility to the new Soviet foreign pol-
economic and party bureaucracies which need to be
icy. For example, Shevardnadze told correspondents
overcome if perestroika is to have some chance of suc-
of the French newspaper Le Figaro in January 1989
cess, the Soviet leadership would like to reduce the
that:
drain on the economy due to the need to support a
number of impoverished client-states. Furthermore,
The class struggle is an internal problem for
the new Soviet leadership is not anxious, at this time, to
each people and each state. When ideological
factors interfere in international relations and
acquire new impoverished clients. Indeed, accord-
sometimes gain the upper hand, mankind's
ing to Gorbachev, what the Soviet Union needs is a
common ideals are relegated to second place.
period of peace and stability, with increased Soviet
However, our new political thinking proclaims
access to Western technologies and credits. Hence,
freedom of choice. Each people chooses the
the Soviet line of new thinking" in international rela-
system which suits it best, the system which cor-
tions which seeks an abatement in conflict and con-
responds to its development and maturity.
frontation and increased East-West cooperation;
hence also Moscow's avowed willingness to discuss
In addition to proclaiming that "class struggle" no
and seek the settlement of regional conflicts in
longer applies to Soviet relations with the Free
Afghanistan, Cambodia and southern Africa. In a
World, Soviet political and economic analysts have
speech in Moscow on June 27, 1987, the USSR Minis-
been publicly questioning the validity of the thesis
ter of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze,
proclaimed by Khrushchev, and which has guided
explained that the Soviet Union now must be guided
Soviet foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s, to the
by cost-benefit considerations in its foreign policy.
effect that with the help of communist states Third
According to him:
World countries could skip the capitalist stage of
development, and, instead, progress directly from
"We must increase the profitability of our
underdevelopment to true socialism. In effect these
foreign policy and try to reach a situation where
Soviet analysts suggest that Soviet expansionism in
interrelations among states encumber our eco-
the Third World has been strategically a wrong pol-
nomy as little as possible and create a stable
icy, that it has failed to achieve its objectives, and that
psychological atmosphere in which the Soviet
it has caused the Soviet Union to waste a great deal of
people can work peacefully
And
a
cost-
resources which were needed at home.
6
American Review
While it is certainly premature to accept Soviet
"It is essential either to convince the neo-
"new thinking" at face value, it is undeniable that
colonialists that it is necessary to change or
Gorbachev has been and continues to be engaged in
defeat their policy through struggle; this, and
a very forceful and on the whole, largely successful
none other, is the problem as we in the Third
campaign to persuade the Free World that Soviet
World view situations that arise here. The forces
policies have indeed changed. Gorbachev's visit to
we represent are part of this universal torrent."
New York in December 1988 and his announcement
there of large unilateral reductions in the Soviet
While Castro endorsed the Soviet Union's arms
armed forces was a dramatic example of this. Of
control policy, he wanted the monies saved to be
course, the current Soviet foreign policy offensive
used for the economic development. of the Third
may be all the more dynamic because Gorbachev may
World rather than that of the Soviet Union. Con-
see a need to preempt any Western exploitation of
sequently, he warned that "to think of peace without
the Soviet Union's domestic weaknesses. Further-
development would lack realism" and that unless
more, while calling for peaceful relations and greater
inequalities were eliminated, "our planet will not be
economic cooperation the Soviet Union appears to
free of violent social explosion."
be trying to break up US-supported alliances and iso-
late the United States.
Although Fidel Castro had somewhat reluctantly
endorsed the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan,
All this, however, signals that, at least for the pre-
he was obviously dismayed at the Soviet agreement
sent, that the role and utility of Cuba in Soviet foreign
to withdraw its forces from that country and seem-
policy are on the decline. Instead of being a valuable
ingly allow the emergence of a government of "na-
Soviet proxy, Fidel Castro's Cuba appears to be
tional reconciliation" which might not be Marxist-
increasingly perceived by Moscow as more of an irri-
Leninist in character. He has been equally unhappy
tant and an unwelcome drain on Soviet resources.
with Soviet-supported Vietnamese plans to withdraw
Fidel Castro's foreign ambitions and erratic
Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and leave the
economic management at home are out of line with
formation of a government of "national reconcilia-
Gorbachev's policy objectives and priorities.
tion" to negotiations among the communist and non-
communist Cambodian factions. Furthermore, he
For his part, Fidel Castro has found a good deal to
has rejected the application of Gorbachev's reform
be unhappy about with Gorbachev's new policy
policies to Cuba. As he insisted in July 1988, "the out-
lines. Thus, at the 27th CPSU Congress in February-
standing characteristic of this (i.e., Cuban) revolution
March 1986, Gorbachev made no mention of the trad-
is that it has not copied, it has created." Defending
itional Soviet pledge to support "wars of national lib-
this position, Raúl Castro has argued that Gorbachev
eration." This was the first time such a Soviet pledge
had agreed that there were various paths to
by a General Secretary was omitted in more than 30
socialism. "Unity does not imply similarity and
years. This omission has persisted ever since in Gor-
uniformity," he said.
bachev's pronouncements. Naturally, at the Con-
gress, Fidel Castro attempted to lobby for greater
Rather than adopt a form of Gorbachev's reform
Soviet support for the Third World. In his speech to
programme, Fidel Castro launched in 1986 a "rectifica-
the Congress, he reminded it that the "national liber-
tion" programme of the Cuban economic system. The
ation" struggle in "Vietnam, Nicaragua, El Salvador,
programme has been a failure. Indeed, in 1987 there
Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Western Sahara,
was a 3,5 per cent decline in Cuba's total output of
Palestine, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea" demanded
goods. Even worse, according to the Cuban National
support and sacrifice. He pleaded that "the fruit of the
Bank, the Soviet Union reduced its overall trade with
blood and lives of many of our people's best sons"
Cuba in the first quarter of 1988 by 12 per cent, includ-
not be reduced to "so-called low-level conflicts."
ing a drop in Cuba's imports from the Soviet's by 8 per
cent. This has undoubtedly contributed to Fidel Cas-
tro's testiness toward Gorbachev's policies. On the eve
But Moscow has been cutting back on its overt role
of Gorbachev's scheduled visit to Havana on Decem-
in support of these "national liberation" struggles. To
ber 9, 1988, which was then postponed because of the
Cuba's great disappointment, the Soviet Union did
Armenian earthquake, Fidel Castro told a press con-
nothing in response to US military intervention in
ference that his talks with Gorbachev would focus
Grenada, which had been Cuba's client, nor respond
primarily on international relations. At a meeting of
to the US air strikes on Libya. Instead, the Gorbachev
top Cuban party officials in November 1988, however,
global political and diplomatic offensive has
Fidel Castro is reported to have railed against Gor-
excluded Castro's radicalism.
bachev's domestic and foreign policies and to have
said that Cuba was the last bastion of true Marxism. In
Fidel Castro tried again in Moscow in November
a speech on December 5 1988, he advised Third World
1987 on the occasion of the 70th anniversary celebra-
countries to be wary of the detente in US-Soviet rela-
tion of the Bolshevik Revolution. In order to express
tions. There were many indications that during Gor-
his displeasure with Gorbachev's policies, he arrived
bachev's planned visit to Havana, Fidel Castro
late to the celebration and in his speech on Novem-
ber 5, 1987, did not follow the usual protocol for
intended to make him well aware of his unhappiness
with Soviet policies.
other communist leaders of uncritical praise for the
Soviet Union and its leadership. Instead, he com-
plained that the Third World "is not yet the battle of
Yet despite Fidel Castro's pouting and show of irri-
tation, the Cuban leadership has gone out of its way
socialism," and, as a self-proclaimed spokesman for
to repeatedly deny the existence of any break in
the Third World, went on to say that:
Cuban-Soviet relations. As Raúl Castro put it, "there
American Review
7
is not even the slightest breach in the communist
Obviously, what was viewed as a shift in Soviet pol-
principles between Cuba and the Soviet Union, and
icy required clarification. According to the official
there never will be." Indeed, Moscow has shown
Soviet news agency TASS (October 12, 1988):
much patience with Fidel Castro and Gorbachev has
"Strange as it may seem, perestroika has somewhat
exercised a good deal of his charm on him. For exam-
changed our (i.e., the Soviet Union's) attitudes
ple, in November 1987, while Fidel Castro came
toward the South African realities." To the questions
home from Moscow empty-handed as far as a greater
as to how the new policy "tallies with the struggle
Soviet committment to support the "national libera-
against apartheid and racism" and "peoples' right to
tion struggle" was concerned, Castro reported that
a liberation war," TASS replied that realistically, as
Gorbachev had "treated me with deference, interest,
long as apartheid existed, there could be no com-
and friendliness that might be described as excep-
prehensive, settlement in southern Africa. However,
tional." In his turn, Fidel Castro praised Gorbachev's
"untangling the Angolan-Namibian knot will un-
December 7, 1988 speech at the United Nations for
doubtedly create more favourable conditions for the
his leadership in the pursuit of world-wide peace and
struggle against apartheid." Consequently, by sup-
justice and for his proposals for relieving Third World
porting a political settlement in that region, "the
countries of their debt burdens. Yet he also warned
Soviet Union does not 'turn away' from the develop-
of the persistant US threat to Nicaragua and Cuba and
ing countries, as some claim."
reminded the Soviet Union of Cuba's need to chan-
nel a major part of its economic resources into
defence, which it now needs to strengthen even
further.
Gorbachev delayed visiting Cuba until April 1989. As
It is true that the Angolan Agreement con-
a substitute, he sent Politburo member V I Vorotnikov
tains a major loophole which may allow
there in early January 1989 to discuss, among other
Cuban forces to fail to implement the pro-
topics, Soviet assistance to Cuba's economic develop-
visions for their withdrawal.
ment. This was followed by a visit to Havana in February
by the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy and
deputy USSR Minister of Defence Admiral of the Fleet
V N Chernavin. Of course, neither visit made up for
Gorbachev's failure to come to Cuba in December
The agreements signed by South Africa, Angola
1988. Indeed, given that Vorotnikov had suffered a
and Cuba on December 22, 1988, provided for a
demotion in September 1988 and was widely believed
phased withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola
to be slated for retirement from the Politburo in the
over a period of 27 months, along with a phased rede-
near future, his selection to visit Cuba could be per-
ployment of these forces to northern Angola by
ceived as a deliberate Soviet slap at Castro during a
October 31, 1989. At the same time, South Africa
crucial stage.
would begin the withdrawal of its armed forces from
Namibia on April 1, 1989 which would gain its inde-
Gorbachev, Castro, and Southern Africa
pendence after a UN-supervised election. The Soviet
Union has expressed itself to be well satisfied with
It seems quite obvious that the quadripartite
the agreement; which it helped to achieve. Soviet
negotiations on Namibia have not been much to Fidel
Deputy Foreign Minister, Adamishin asserted on
Castro's liking, even while the Soviet Union and the
December 16, 1988 that "we backed the stand of our
Angolan Government favour it. One of the things
Angolan and Cuban friends, including their desire to
Havana worried about was the Soviet-American talks
see the United States acting as a go-between in the
aimed at working out a deal without Cuba's participa-
talks, without feeling envy on this account." Again
tion. Surely the statements of Deputy USSR Foreign
speaking at the UN on December 22, 1988, he
Minister Anatoly L, Adamishin, who led the Soviet
declared that "I am instructed to say that the Soviet
delegation, did not bring happy news to Castro's
Union hails the productive and successful culmina-
ears. In an interview on Radio Moscow on August 20,
tion of the arduous and difficult negotiations." As to
1988, Adamshin said:
Gorbachev, he sent congratulatory messages to
Angola's Eduardo dos Santos, Fidel Castro and Sam
"The conflict in southern Africa is one of the
Nujoma of SWAPO in which he praised them for their
most deeply rooted ones, and it was thought
long and successful struggle. He noted that in the
that a solution could be achieved only with great
new "international climate" being presumably fos-
difficulty. However, it seems that the general
tered by the Soviet Union, it has become possible to
atmosphere in the world has changed to a great
solve politically the most complex issues "on the
extent. Our interaction with the United States in
basis of a balance of interest." In his message to Cas-
favour of settling conflicts is working in the
tro, Gorbachev called the agreements a "first but very
same direction
important step toward peace and security in the
southern African region." He also apparently tried to
One November is the date when Resolution
salve Castro's unhappiness by asserting that the
435 on granting independence to Namibia
agreements "became possible due to Cuba's years-
should begin to be implemented. The military
long and heroic assistance in Angola's struggle for
disengagement of the sides is taking place. A
independence and freedom."
mutually acceptable timetable should be pre-
sented for the total withdrawal of Cuban inter-
Fidel Castro also tried to put the best face on the
nationalists from Angola."
agreements by attributing their successful negotia-
8
American Review
tion to Cuba's military successes in Angola. Thus,
the fate of the present Soviet reform programmes, and,
speaking at a public rally on January 2, 1989, he
indeed, Gorbachev's own. Fidel Castro may hope,
claimed that the "victory of Cuban internationalist
therefore, to outwait Gorbachev's new policy lines.
troops in Cuito Cuanavale directly contributed to
No doubt, Gorbachev's foreign political, diplomatic
the reading of the agreements." The agreements also
and propaganda offensive has been remarkably suc-
allow Fidel Castro to pose as a "victor" because the
cessful, far more so than his domestic reforms. But
Cuban troop withdrawal will take 27 months and,
the widespread belief that the world is about to enter
therefore, Cuban forces will remain in Angola after
a new era of peace and stability is most likely prema-
the withdrawal of South African troops from
ture. The Soviet Union can be just as dangerous when
Namibia. This will permit Castro to make the Cuban
it is weakened by domestic problems as it has been
withdrawal appear contingent on the effective
when it appeared to be strong. More to the point,
implementation by South Africa of the other provi-
political, economic and local instabilities, especially
sions of the agreement. It will also allow the Cuban
in the Third World, will persist and can easily draw
forces to continue to protect the dos Santos regime
the Soviet Union and other states into their vortex. In
against UNITA.
this respect, Fidel Castro may be a greater realist, if he
doubts the feasibility of long-term US-Soviet cooper-
It is true that the Angolan Agreement contains a
ation and amiable relations. Furthermore, reversals
major loophole which may allow Cuban forces to fail
in Gorbachev's domestic policies, a return to greater
to implement the provisions for their withdrawal.
repression and an active programme of further mod-
Article II of the agreement gives Cuba and Angola the
ernisation of the Soviet military forces may greatly
right to "modify or alter" the redeployment and with-
alter for the worst the new international atmosphere
drawal schedule of Cuban troops in the event of a
and again intensify worldwide competition between
"blatant breach of the Tripartite Agreement occurs."
the Soviet Union and the United States.
What may constitute such a "breach" is open to their
interpretation. The Angolan Government has already
Even though it appears that Moscow wishes to
begun to complain about alleged South African mili-
reduce the burden and risks of its support of various
tary incursions into Angola. But the real issue appears
Third World client states and revolutionary move-
to be the question of future foreign support of
ments and is prompting the concept of peaceful solu-
UNITA. The Angolan Government insists that South
tions to various regional conflicts, the Soviet Union is
Africa must cease all such support. However, Presi-
not abandoning its friends nor giving up its desire to
dent Bush has announced that the United States will
play a large political role in the Third World. Although
continue to aid UNITA until the MPLA agrees to a gov-
Moscow is promoting a new detente policy and a
ernment of "national reconciliation" which would
political settlement in southern Africa, Soviet
include UNITA. A continuation of the civil war in
spokesmen claim that one of the cornerstones of
Angola would engender uncertainty about the ulti-
Moscow's new policy in Africa remains "solidarity
mate implementation of the total withdrawal of
with and support for the peoples in their struggle for
Cuban troops from that country. At the present time,
national liberation and, consequently, against
however, Gorbachev's apparent willingness to sup-
racism." The Soviet Union hopes to maintain strong
port the concept of governments of national recon-
ties with Angola and proclaims its willingness to assist
ciliation for Afghanistan and Cambodia, suggests that
a SWAPO regime in Namibia, although with reduced
he is likely to prefer a political solution to the MPLA-
means. It has promised to continue aid to Mozam-
UNITA problem to the costs and uncertain outcome
bique including military assistance. In other words,
of a continuing military struggle. Even so, the threat
Moscow's influence in Africa is not on the wane and
to "modify or alter" the agreement by Cuba and
it expects to be able to continue to play a significant
Angola could be used to pressure the United States to
role in the region. In the longer term, Soviet policies
abandon its support of UNITA.
and actions will depend on the Soviet Union's
capabilities and on opportunities to achieve gains at
It may appear at this time that the "golden age" of
acceptable costs and risks. Gorbachev's present
Fidel Castro's foreign adventurism and of his close
foreign policy strategy make it desirable for Moscow
collaboration with Moscow in promoting Soviet
to restrain Castro's ambitions and adventurism. But
expansionism in the Third World is over. Castro may
this could change. It would be premature, therefore,
openly criticise Gorbachev's new foreign policy
to relax our vigilance. Behind Gorbachev's smiles,
strategy and priorities, but Cuba remains not only
geniality and professions of peaceful intention, he
firmly committed to an alliance with the Soviet
has, as the recently retired old member of the Polit-
Union, but is more than ever dependent on it for
buro observed, "iron teeth." We may therefore, not
economic and military assistance. Of course, future
have seen the last of Cuban troops serving as proxies
trends in Soviet policies remain uncertain as is also
for Moscow's foreign amibitions.
American Review
9
Castro's Vladimar Ramirez
Cuba: Socio-Economic Conditions
As
a
Cuban,
as
a
revolutionary,
as
a
Socialist
/ think it is important for you to
know the sources, the origin, the theoretical or informational basis which underlie
my lecture's conclusions and ideas. In short, what intellectual authority / have in
order to talk to you as to the Cuban process and Fidel Castro's international pol-
icy.'
D
ealing with Cuba, with the Cuban issue, al-
veys and Professor Moreno's psychodrama were my
ways presents a serious communication prob-
research tools.
lem. Cuban realities - the circumstances in
which the Revolution has developed - are so specific
In a Western European country my life would have
and singular that when they are presented in a short
been like that of so many Western researchers, pro-
synthesis one always runs the risk of deforming them
fessors and scientists. But in Cuba, morning found
out of simplification or erroneous extrapolations.
people murdered on the streets, tortured by police,
and children died of parasitical infections out of lack
Yet this aspiration to objectivity and clarity is com-
of medical care. My vocation was science, but my
mon to all intellectuals. And it is also a problem for all
sense of humanity made me a militant in the July 26th
sociologists to wish to set aside the mist of human
Movement.
passions that masks and falsifies the real dynamics of
a revolution. As a Cuban, as a revolutionary, as a
Socialist, it is important for the reader to know the
sources, the origin, the theoretical or informational
basis which underlie my conclusions and ideas. In
As a researcher / had all the means, all the
short, what kind of intellectual authority I have in
order to examine the Cuban process and Fidel Cas-
resources, I was part of the power struc-
tro's international policy. That is why I feel bound to
ture, / was on the side of the winners. But
inform you about the beginnings of, and direction
the leadership changed course
the
taken, by my research.
shadows of Russian Stalinism began to
When in 1957 1 met Professor Erick Fromm in per-
darken the tropical clarity of the Cuban
son in Mexico, I was preparing my doctoral thesis. I
Revolution.
had become interested in the research on a group of
homicidal children, twelve in total, who had been
locked up in the Torrens National Prison for Minors,
an infernal place where they were supposed to be re-
educated. When I was explaining to Dr Fromm the
As a researcher I would think, auscultate and mea-
research technique I was using, he asked me why I
sure the realities around me. As a soldier of the
had become interested on that topic. I answered that
Revolution I struggled to remove the obstacles that
in my country children had never been involved in
prevented the development of my society. The date
crimes of violence and much less in murders, and the
of January 1, 1959 found me immersed in that dou-
fact that in the previous eighteen months twelve
ble role of clandestine fighter and man of science. In
homicides committed by minors under 14 years of
discharging that double task I went on to direct the
age had taken place and caused considerable alarm.
Military Psychology Department of the Chiefs of Staff
I have never forgotten Dr Fromm's answer:
of the Bjército Rebelde (Rebel Army), the Staff
Selection Department of the new and upcoming
Yes, the children's diagnosis is important, but
Cuban Security Police, and the Havana Behavioral
the diagnosis of the society that caused them to
Clinic.
kill is even more important still.
As a researcher I had all the means, all the
I have never forgotten that answer because it gave
resources, I was part of the power structure, I was on
a direction to my scientific activity and marked my life
the side of the winners. But the leadership changed
forever. Up to that moment, as a clinical
course. The persecuted of yore became the perse-
psychologist, my formation had been fundamentally
cutors, the Communists from the "Old Guard"
psychoanalytical; it was in that year I had started my
imposed their archaic Stalinistic dogmas on the direc-
"training analysis." But upon my return to Cuba I
tion culture should take, the Soviet consultants
started to carry out field research. The works of Mar-
started to arrive, and the shadows of Russian
garet Mead, Kardiner and especially Fromm made up
Stalinism began to darken the tropical clarity of the
my theoretical basis. Psychometric techniques, sur-
Cuban Revolution.
10
American Review
No honest scientist can accept the return to the
had penetrated their homes and was destroying
Middle Ages, the imprisonment of thinking by the
them.
bounds of police dogma, the conditioning of truth to
official propaganda, the use of education and culture
As of that moment I started to seekt out contacts
as instruments of disinforming manipulation.
with former combatants in Angola, who because of
different reasons had been demobilised. As was to be
No clearheaded revolutionary, with a modicum of
expected, this was no longer seen with indifference
political formation, can become an accomplice to
by State Security. The pressures and harassment
initiate in his country a sociopolitical model which
started, and in January 1978 I was arrested again and
has proved to be failure time and time again wherever
sent to prison.
it has been tried. The formula of building democracy
by means of repression, and of achieving economic
For seven years I remained at the Combinado del
development through nationalisation and violence,
Este Prison in East Havana. For seven years I per-
is not only deeply counter-revolutionary but totally
formed interviews, tests, psychodramas, and opinion
irrational.
surveys in a penal population of ten thousand
inmates. I encountered South Africa again, encoun-
These realities led again to confrontation, again to
tered Savimbi's guerrillas, in short, encountered the
war, again to prison. Towards the end of the year 1960
Angolan War through the Cuban soldiers and officers
I was detained and sent to the Isle of Pines Prison. For
who had been demobilised and who, due to the dis-
eleven years I was an inmate in several prisons in the
country. For eleven years I directed the psychiatric
orders caused by the war in them, had gone to aliena-
tion first and on to crime later.
assistance teams of those prisons, and together with
a group of physician and psychiatrist inmates, I car-
ried out sociopolitical research among the thousands
These socially and humanly destroyed men taught
of men from all social strata, from all regions of the
me more about the African adventure by Fidel Castro
country, from all creeds, and from the ideologies and
than all the "intelligence reports" by the Cuban DGI
militancies which went through those prisons. When
or by the CIA.
in 1972 I was transferred to open prisons and came in
direct contact with the population, I had the
When I finished my sentence in 1985 and was
methodological tools ready and a long experience in
released, I continued my sociopolitical research and
field work, in sociopolitical surveys and evaluations
my surveys among Cuban ex-combatants. Taking
of levels of social moral awareness.
more precautions, knowing that I was touching on
very sensitive areas, but with the advantage of a
Until the year 1978, when was arrested again, I was
weakened State Security, cut off from its base of
able to combine my professional practice as a clinical
popular support, and with some former comrades,
psychologist with these investigations, to which for a
who - now totally disappointed with Castroism -
long time the Cuban State Security did not attach any
looked this time with sympathy on one whom they
importance or danger. To them they were the obses-
had once considered a traitor.
sions of a madman who spent all his time doing pro-
jection tests, giving questionnaires which never men-
In September 1987 I left Cuba for the United States.
tioned politics or asked about military bases or statis-
In February of this year, with the help of the same
tics about sugar cane harvest figures.
doctors who co-operated with me in the research car-
ried out in the 60s, while prisoners in Cuba, ]
founded in Miami the Center for Latin American
Studies. With a small station monitoring Cuban radio
and television broadcasts, the analysis of the Cuban
These socially and humanly destroyed
press, and the surveys and interviews of those return-
ing or arriving daily from Cuba we keep up the
men taught me more about the African
analysis of the Cuban situation with techniques and
adventure by Fidel Castro than all the "in-
criteria that have shown their efficacy during the last
telligence reports" by the Cuban DGI or
twenty years.
by the CIA.
It is about this experience and based on this infor-
mation that I base this report.
The names and masks with which the Cuban
leadership has labelled itself, taken out of outdated
In 1976 1 started to work as supervisor in the
conceptual arsenals, are only disguises imposed by
Psychodiagnostic Centre of the Ministry of Public
that power group's ignorance, lack of creativity and
Health in Havana. There I had my first encounter with
circumstantial needs.
South Africa, with the realities of the war in Angola.
There were no soldiers there, but instead the wives
The following facts: external supply and revolutio-
and children of men who were fighting in Angola, or
nary magnitude, must be the starting points of every
who had died, or who had returned to Cuba seriously
analysis of the "Cuban Case." Soviet aid, known by
affected. I would not interview them, but the con-
everyone and labeled according to each person's
sequences of the war reached those human beings
sympathies, has not been evaluated from a strictly
who had never set foot on the battle front. The war
sociological point of view.
American Review
11
History knows of groups, parties and even govern-
It is only by taking this reality as a starting point that
ments that have been subsidised by foreign powers.
the Cuban Revolution must be evaluated. Only a just
But never, until 1965, had it ever happened that a
consideration of the meaning and consequences of
whole society, a whole country, was totally sustained
the parasitic nature of its economy can sustain an
by another during a quarter of a century. This fact
objective evaluation of the Revolution:
conditions all the peculiarities and exceptions of the
Cuban process.
The objective and subjective conditions of the
The Economy
Cuban Society at the beginning of the Revolution.
Castro's personality and character.
Cuba-US relations and their context in the conti-
The subject of the Cuban economy can only be
nent.
broached in terms of the Soviet subsidy. This assis-
Circumstantial factors related to the East-West
tance amounts to $40 billion between the years 1960
confrontation in the international area.
and 1985, which does not include military expenses.
Several Western authors.agre on this figure, but the
source I use is the JUCEPLAN, (the Spanish acronym
These constitute analysis vectors which can only be
for Cuba's "Central Planning Committee," i.e. Junta
evaluated in full by taking the Cuban process's
Central de Planificación de Cuba). The discrepancy
techno-economic parasitism.as a starting point.
between official statements and the actual facts
regarding the Cuban economy is so large that believ-
ing one or the other is in most cases a political choice.
But on a strictly academic level attention must be paid
The "American mediation" would see to it
to two series of facts which tend to lend acceptance
to the data by this group of Cuban economists.
that it was the worst who would come to
power. The only quality that American
1. Cuban economic realities in all sectors of pro-
diplomacy looked for in my country's
duction and services.
leaders and officers was obedience to the
2. The repeated statements, by Fidel Castro him-
orders coming from Washington.
self, on the non-profitability of certain state
firms. In the last statement, in February 1987, he
said that no firm in the country was profitable.
This time he told the truth, (Bohemia Magazine,
Havana, Cuba).
A common error is to believe the Cuban Revolu-
tion started on January 1st, 1959, or on July 26th, 1953
Official figures in 1985 mentioned a GNP of
with the assault on the Moncada Army Headquarters
14 779 700 with a per capita income of 2 690
in Santiago de Cuba. The Cuban Revolution began on
pesos. (E.C.L.A.). According to the JUCEPLAN
September 4th, 1933, and was started by a dark-
economists, the 1985 GNP did not surpass the figures
skinned sergeant in the National Army, of peasant
of 8 billion pesos. Each peso produced cost 1,15 on a
origins, whose name was Fulgencio Batista. The
national average, having sectors such as tourism in
"sergeants" coup d'etat" headed by Batista, the firsti
which each peso earned cost 1,45. There was also the
history, changed the Cuban Army's entire class com-
sugar industry, where each pound of sugar costs bet-
position, raising to the highest ranks in the army and
ween 15 and 18 cents to produce, while it is sold in the
in the institutions of the country soldiers and people
international market at a loss of between 12 and 15
of peasant extraction, who in order to leave behind
cents per pound.
abject poverty had enrolled in the army. All officers
were deposed, with the result that the latter, the
According to the same group, the only activity that
Independentist patricians and the members of the
yields profits to the Cuban Government is the war
social and financial aristocracy of the country, lost
and the export of services. In that same year Cuba
control of the fundamental instrument of govern-
received from Angola some $500 million on account
ment in Latin American societies: the use of force.
of "military services."
In the political sphere a new generation made its
All this is irrational from the strictly economic point
appearance, assuming control of the government.
of view, but totally comprehensible on a sociopoliti-
Originating from the petit bourgeoisie, intellectuals,
cal level. The USSR gives Cuba around $3 million a
physicians and attorneys without clientele, adventur-
day for strictly political reasons. The Cuban Govern-
ers and dreamers who found nothing more interest-
ment subsidizes labour activities, spends 2,9 billion
ing or lucrative to do, devoted themselves to politics.
in education and public health, 23,9 per cent of the
The living ties that bound government and society
national budget, and another billion in housing and
had been broken forever. As of that moment, the
community services, also for strictly political reasons.
economically impoverished classes of the country
would attempt to govern it through intermediaries.
The debt to the USSR has now reached the figure of
12 billion. The USSR is not applying any pressure to
The "American mediation" would see to it that it
collect, so the debt will go on increasing, solely for
was the worst who would come to power. The only
political reasons. This makes it impossible to form a
quality that American diplomacy looked for in my
strictly economic approximation regarding "the
country's rulers and officers was obedience to the
Cuban Case."
orders coming from Washington.
12
American Review
Only by keeping in mind the changes in the com-
Cuban Revolution and of the decisions by its
position of the classes at the political and military
Maximum Leader if the sociopolitical background of
leadership that took place during that first stage of
the process is not known, if only by and large. Let us
the Cuban Revolution can we understand the events
review Castro's twenty-five years of government, in
that took place on that First of January of 1959.
order to later evaluate his international policy.
On January 1, 1959 Fidel-Castro was the leader of
Between 1959 and 1965 Castro consolidated his
the entire country, of all classes. Of the rich landow-
internal power with the support of 80 per cent of the
ners who financed his Movement, of the middle clas-
country's population. The year 1965 marked the
ses who made up the leadership and members of the
beginning of unipersonal tyranny, the loss of support
26th of July Movement, of agricultural labourers, and
from the majority of the people and the beginning of
of urban workers. Of these who had everything and
his total dependency on the Soviet subsidy.
wanted. more, and of those who had nothing and
needed something.
The destruction of the Cuban economy by this time
was complete. Since 1965 Cuba was no longer a pro-
The Cuban Revolution was the consequence of the
fitable country. The government and the entire soci-
half a century of American paternalism in Cuba.
ety subsisted by virtue of the Russian umbilical cord.
Americans intervened in 1898 in the Cuban War of
Independence against Spain, frustrating a war of 30
Between 1965 and 1970 the rift deepened between
years' duration and all of the hopes and aspirations of
the Cuban leadership and the people, going from
the Cuban Nation. The Treaty of Paris of 1899 bet-
populistic manipulation to the repressive control of
ween Spain and the US, by guaranteeing Spanish
the whole society. The failure of the drive for the "10
interests in Cuba, delivered a deadly blow to the
Million Ton Sugar Cane Harvest" gave rise to the
Independentist patricians by leaving in Spanish
awareness on the part of the incipient government
hands all assets confiscated from Cubans during 30
technocratic staffs, which together with criticism on
years of war. This not only caused a deep resentment
the part of the Soviets started to exert pressure in the
against the United States, but also weakened the
direction of the institutionalisation of the country:
economic basis of the social class that was called
that is, to attempt to limit the chaotic and unipersonal
upon to build a democratic republic.
leadership of Fidel Castro. The year 1970 may also be
labeled as the moment in which Castro-Stalinism
The events of January 1, 1959 were not the work of
emerged as the Commander-in-Chief's style of per-
Cuban Communists (a small minority in disrepute
formance.
because of its complicity with the Batista regime and
its opposition to insurrection), or of Soviet subver-
sion and their espionage agencies. They were the
result of 60 years of American colonial policy in Cuba
and of the struggle and sacrifice of us, a young gener-
ation (Castro was 33 years old), who believed naively
Meanwhile Castro, completely devoted to
and irrationally that with good will, honesty and cour-
international politics, became the leader
age we would be able to build a freer, more just soci-
ety.
of the Third World, using all of his time
"playing war" directing the battles in
The 28 months between January 1, 1959 and April
Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua from the
16th, 1961 provide the framework for a series of
erroneous measures by the American Administration
Revolutionary Armed Forces Chief of
which consolidated Castro's prestige in the interna-
Staff's Communication Room.
tional arena and mainly in Latin America:
The humiliation suffered by Castro in his first trip
to the US.
The oil embargo.
The suspension of the sugar purchase quota.
Between 1970 and 1975 the rise in the price of sugar
and the increase of Soviet assistance created a trium-
The protection given to Batista's henchmen,
phalist euphoria which inclined Castro to devote
including known murderers and torturers.
himself completely to foreign policy (which from the
The press campaign against the Cuban Revolution.
Training an invading army, where side-by-side
beginning was his genuine interest) and to accept
with true patriots they included known Batista
Soviet and Cuban suggestions towards organising
henchmen, even torturers and murderers.
the economy and institutionalising the country. Dur-
ing this period Fidel Castro fitted "harmonically" in
the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
They allowed Castro not only to consolidate inter-
nally by crushing all opposition arising from the
Government functions, which had always been a
revolutionary ranks, but to become the Latin Ameri-
heavy burden for the Cuban leader, who liked to give
can David confronting the Yankee Imperialist
orders but not to.run a government, were transferred
Goliath.
by him to his brother Raúl (who among other things
was an excellent administrator). Raúl, who is not a
The rest is world history. It is not possible to under-
stand the present and much less the future of the
genius but is instead very sensible, sensibly decided
first to fly to the USSR and ask what he should do.
American Review
13
Upon his return he called on Humberto Pérez and his
And the Farabundo Marti guerrillas became consoli-
group, who directed the Planning Committee, and
dated in El Salvador. But the triumphalist intoxication
they started to organise the economy in a serious
and the isolation from domestic realities led Castro
manner, something that Castro had never allowed.
to make a mistake which marked the beginning of the
Why? Because the consolidation of the Revolution
irreversible deterioration of his influence in Cuba:
meant the limitation of unipersonal power. Castro, in
the opening of the country to visits by the Cubans
order to be unsubstitutable, had also to be indispen-
who had left in the 60s.
sible.
For the first time the political leadership of the
The First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party
Party confronted Fidel Castro collectively in regard to
institutionalised the government and the new
a decision made by him. For seven hours the national
economic orientation - material incentives, manage-
ranks of the Communist Party argued with Castro,
rial autonomy, administrative decentralisation,
attempting to make him understand that the coun-
economic controls - in short, some rationality in the
try's sociopolitical conditions did not allow for mas-
midst of Castroist chaos.
sive contact with Cubans residing abroad, and that
the consequences of this would be very serious for
the Revolution. Castro did not want to understand
anything; he screamed, yelled insults and, like
always, imposed his opinion.
The triumphalist intoxication and the iso-
It was not necessary to wait long for the conse-
lation from domestic realities lead Castro
quences to appear. During March 1980, when the
to make a mistake which marks the begin-
government carried out one of its many intimidation
schemes - this time against the Peruvian Embassy in
ning of the irreversible deterioration of his
Havana in a few hours more than five thousand
influence in Cuba: the opening. of the
Havanians entered the premises of the embassy
country to visits by the Cubans who had
requesting political asylum and the right to leave the
left in the 60s.
country. What followed, the Mariel Boatlift, is widely
known: 120 left the island for the United States.
What the international press did not divulge is the
following:
Meanwhile Castro, completely devoted to interna-
Over a million people expressed their willingness
tional politics, became the leader of the Third World,
to leave the country.
using all his time "playing war," directing the battles
The average age of those who left was between 18
in Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua from the Revolu-
and 25.
tionary Armed Forces Chief of Staff's Communication
Among the first three thousand Havana residents
Room. He remained ignorant of the organisational
who sought asylum, at the Peruvian Embassy there
progress, of the increase in production and produc-
were 450 government officials - members of the
tivity in the whole country and especially of the big
middle stratum of Socialist technocrats - all of
leap in quality taken by agricultural production and
whom were members of the Communist Party.
distribution. For the first time since the triumph of
the Revolution, the population was actually receiving
What the Western mass media did not highlight
the preset rationing quotas and furthermore they
either is that the Mariel Exodus was a lot more than
were able to acquire agricultural and agro-industrial
the popular expression of rejection of the system. It
products at the free peasant markets, and at the so-
was the surfacing of the muffled but deep gap bet-
called parallel markets at prices that were indeed
ween the new generations and the generation that
high, but without the anguish of the black market.
fought in the original Revolution a rift reaching
from the people all the way up to the political and
The Non-Aligned Nations Summit Conference in
administrative leadership.
Havana marked Castro's zenith, the highest point in
his political career. As of that moment the deteriora-
What is now called the Gorbachev trend, opposing
tion of his power at a national level began to become
Castro's personalism, experienced its baptism of fire
visible, while at the international one his influence
when the leadership of the Party, publicly and collec-
started increasing as his revolutionary charismas
tively, opposed Castro's projects in regard to the
decreased. To the world it became evident that he
Cuban Community abroad.
who aspired to become the leader of the Third World
had come to be a representative of the geopolitical
When the events brought about by the Mariel Boat-
interests of the Kremlin. Cuban armies support
lift demonstrated to everyone in Cuba that Castro did
unpopular regimes in Angola and Ethiopia, and are at
not only make mistakes in economics, but also in
present involved in 17 countries in the area. Mean-
politics, this invertebrate group, diluted in the
while, Castro undertook international trips and
enormous bureaucracy of the country, became
"played the chess game" of world politics.
aware of itself and its own identity before the eyes of
the entire nation. As of that moment the dynamics of
In Latin America, after ten years of failures in
the Cuban process changed totally. And only in terms
exporting guerrillas and subversion, Sandinistas took
of it, does the analysis of that reality become possi-
over in Nicaragua, turning it into a Cuban satellite.
ble.
14
American Review
Castro-Stalinism
rationality's checks and balances, changed. Instead
of the vulgar daily tasks of administrating, of govern-
Leon Trotsky used to comment that while Louis XIV
ment Castro was free to devote himself completely to
had expressed monarchic absolutism is his statement
"world revolution."
"L'etat c'est moi," Stalin could say: 'La sociètè c'est
moi."
Cuba became some type of a private farm in which
Castro would idle away his time, feed his omnipo-
Sociologically, it is totally comprehensible that the
tence and gratify his distributional paternalism: a
greater the concentration of economic factors under
gigantic "nursery," an experimental farm and military
State control, the greater the political power in the
school-headquarters, the ideal rear-guard for a mes-
hands of those in government. But the heterogeneity
siah turned into a god of armies. Never has any per-
of races, languages, cultures and levels of develop-
son concentrated so much power in his hands or
ment, plus the territorial extension of the Russian
exercised such an absolute control over an entire
domains, limited the Kremlin's centralising decisions
country:
while financial rationality, the internal logic of mate-
rial production - in short, the compulsive economic
Cuba's territorial and demographical smallness, its
needs placed limits to Stalin's personality cult vol-
sociocultural homogeneity, together with the means
untarism and imposed a measure of sanity on his
of communication, transportation and processing,
messianic authoritarianism.
endowed Fidel Castro with attributes ascribed by the
ancients to their gods: omnipresence and omnisci-
ence.
Castro, in Cuba, may anywhere at any time get to
Cuba became some type of a private farm
know almost everything about almost every thing tak-
in which Castro would idle away his time,
ing place in the country. Fidel Castro has structured
feed his omnipotence and gratify his dis-
an enormous intelligence and repression machinery,
which, in relation to the dimensions of the country, is
tributional paternalism.
the largest in the world.
To this capacity for "social control" must be added
the assistance and education plans: disproportion-
ate, chaotic, unaffordable for a Cuba reduced to its
The wish for changes and the speed of the
limited resources, but very efficient as instruments
socio-economic transformations were conditioned by
for collective manipulation and as propagandistic
material production, by the scientific and technical
scenography at an international level. This manipula-
development of the country itself. This kept chaos,
tion made it easier for the power structure to guaran-
arbitrariness, the traditional mad disorderliness of
tee at all times aside from the disasters brought
the Russian bureaucracy, and Stalin himself within
about by his economic management-t satisfaction
parameters and directions, which, though they did
of the vital needs of the whole population.
destroy individuals, increased the suffering by the
people and delayed the development of the country,
would never question the viability of the system.
Never has any person concentrated so
Quite another was Cuba's situation. The revolutio-
nary process developed, until 1962, with the national
much power in his hands or exercised
peculiarities but within the classic patterns of the
such an absolute control over an entire
Continent. But with the "Missile Crisis" the massive
country.
Soviet aid changed all the sociodynamic parameters
of the Revolution.
Castro's personality was typically "Ceasar-like"
(which is anyway common in Latin America). At this
time he had all political power and was the leader of
All the manipulative capacity, all the political ability
shown by Castro for the past thirty years, has been
the majority of the country. He saw himself pro-
jected, by virtue of the danger of nuclear war, on to
made possible, due not only to his political genius,
which is undeniable, but to the fact that he has been
an apocalyptical situation.
able to count on resources separate from the produc-
tive capacity of the country, and independent of its
From a guerrilla fighter without battles to a world
administrative efficacy.
personality, Castro's ego swelled beyond his own
expectations. His messianic megalomania, having
Any tin-pot Latin American dictator who had at his
objective confirmation, overrode his reason to
disposal unlimited resources of repression and sup-
become subjected to his wildest dreams.
ply, would remain indefinitely in power. Any ruler of
a small country, who would have used the resources
Soviet supplies, by disconnecting the function of
handed over by the USSR to Cuba during 28 years
government from any imperative to produce, freed
(some $40 billion), by using a minimum of financial
Castro from any organisational efficiency, from any
political realism. His personality, without economic
sensibility, would have secured the prosperity and
development of his people. Without the massive
American Review,
15
Soviet assistance Castro would have lost power in
lically would Castro's power survive a defeat in Africa.
1965.
Castro's prestige in Cuba is experiencing today its
lowest level. From 1980 to 1985 Castro has suffered a
Castro-Stalinism is the maximum expression of the
series of domestic and international failures which
personality cult absolutism known by history. It
have undermined his influence within the govern-
arises out of the circumstantial combination of the
ment's own rank and file:
messianic vocation of a brilliant man and the hege-
monical interests of a superpower growing on the
The Mariel Exodus.
propitious grounds of a continental revolution with
The defeat of Granada.
an ecumenical vocation. Fidel Castro's "Inter-
The deterioration of the situation in Angola.
nationalism" is not simply a pretext by the Cuban
The awareness on the part of Cuban public opin-
leader to keep his internal power, although in fact he
ion as to the huge loss of life and the realities of
does keep it. It is the mise-en-scène of his genuine
war.
vocation, of his metalogical constant.
The internal struggle by Fidel Castro against the
JUCEPLAN (Planning Committee), the only group in
Castro's obsession to bask in the role of the main
the Cuban leadership that had managed to
character, and his messianic and power needs, grew
organise the economy.
to the point of delusion when his rule and his
The defections by Manuel Sánchez Pérez, a top
charisma turned into instruments of Soviet
economic executive, and by General Rafael Del
imperialism.
Pino, an Army hero.
The emergence in Cuba of a strong Gorbachevist
But it is important to understand that Castro
trend born as a consequence of the confrontation
doesn't have armies in Africa so that the USSR can
between Fidel Castro and the Soviet leader's policy
keep him in power in Cuba. Rather he tries to keep
of openness.
his power in Cuba to be able to keep armies in Africa
The generation gap between the population under
(between January and March 1959, as a Cuban intelli-
40 and the so-called Generation of the Centennial.
gence officer, I assisted in the preparation of four
expeditions to countries in the area: Santo Domingo,
Haiti, Dominican Republic).
Castro loves power. He needs power like the
All of the above makes Angola the base of
addict needs his drug. But power to Castro is not an
support and the Achilles' heel of Fidel
end in itself, it is an instrument, a weapon to fulfill his
Messianism and etch his place in history. This is what
Castro.
makes a leader out of Castro and endows him with his
charm and his charisma
and also with his destruc-
tiveness. He believes in himself; he believes in his
conduct's ethical validity.
All of the above make Angola the base of support
The option of self-centeredness changes the most
and the Achilles' heel of Fidel Castro. The Cuban
machiavellian schemes into high political moves, val-
technocracy wants to consolidate the system in order
idated by the mystique of higher objectives.
to make the Cuban Revolution viable. Castro knows
that any financial rationality will undermine his
Because of the above we can be sure Castro will
unipersonal power once it manages to make him
never give up his presence in Africa. Neither
cease to be indispensible.
psychologically nor politically can he give up what
has always been the meaning of his life and which
The interests of the country, of the Cuban Revolu-
constitutes at present his only way to stay in power in
tion, collide with Fidel Castro's messianic interests
Cuba.
and with the use of Cuba simply as a platform for his
international manoeuvres. The Cuban people and a
Without the military services he provides in Africa,
good part of the country's leadership oppose having
subsidies received by Cuba would decrease (bet-
Cuban soldiers die in order to support Castro's mes-
ween 1960 and 1975, Cuba received $7 billion, not
sianism and Russian imperialistic interests.
01
counting military expenses. As of 1976, Cuba
received $10 billion in only 4 years), turning Castro
To put an end to the war in Angola, to return Cuban
into a very vulnerable figure internally.
troops to their fatherland, represents my people's
dearest wish, and the fundamental condition needed
The repatriation of the armies in Angola would
for us Cuban revolutionaries to put an end to Castro-
pose unsurmountable social and political problems
Stalinism, rebuild the economy and consolidate a
at the present time. Neither psychologically nor polit-
socialist democracy in Cuba.
16
American Review
Eric Morris
uba's International Adventures: Economic and
Military Implications in southern Africa
Cuba has been involved militarily in Africa to the early 1960s and before but it is in
Angola and Ethiopia that Cuban support and commitment have been seen at their
most overt and striking. Mr Morris argues that Cuba is no pawn of the Kremlin and
that Moscow does not dictate Cuba's foreign policy. Diplomatic sources suggest
that Fidel Castro regards not merely Savimbi as an obstacle to peace but Dos Santos
as well and also that the Cubans intend to retain a permanent presence in Angola.
Despite Cuban machinations and impressive Soviet/Cuban air defences the critical
forces remain those of South Africa. Nothing has changed. South Africa remains
the regional superpower.
C
uba has often been described as a small nation
have emerged victorious in March 1976, but it is also
with a big power's foreign policy. Though her
the case that more than eleven years later Cuban
prominence in the world is not a new
troops in even greater numbers are still necessary to
phenomenon, the expansion in diplomatic contacts
ensure the survival of the Marxist regime in Luanda.
began in earnest after 1970, as the country began to
emerge from the isolation caused by Washington's
intense though unnecessary efforts to isolate the
The Moscow-Havana Axis
nation and topple its leader.
It is frequently the case that Cuba is simply dismis-
It is important to note that Cuba's active policy in
sed as a satellite surrogate or proxy for the Soviet
Africa did not begin with the Angolan Civil War -
Union. It always strikes me that there is insufficient
though this certainly marked a large escalation but
evidence to support the surrogate thesis, although it
can be traced back to the early 1960s and before. Even
can of course be a contested proposition that influ-
before diplomatic links had been established with
ence can only be identified in observable behaviour.
Moscow, Cuba sent military support and medical
It should be remembered that we are dealing with
supplies to the Algerian Liberation Front (FLN). In the
two states which are communist. Communication
mid-sixties Castro was attempting to export revolu-
within and between Soviet-type political systems, to
tion to Africa. Che Guevara led some 200 Cubans into
the great frustration of Western politicians and scho-
combat against Moise Tshombe in Congo-Brazzaville
lars, is conducted in considerable secrecy. It is thus
in 1965.
often impossible to be absolutely certain that we
understand the motivations and goals of their
policies and actions. We are left with no alternative,
when dealing with such secret societies, but to use
Communication within and between
our judgment when comparing the little information
we have with the behaviour we observe.
Soviet-type political systems, to the great
frustration of Western politicians and
It is my contention that Cuba is no pawn of the
scholars, is conducted in considerable
Kremlin. Despite obvious disparities in power bet-
ween the two countries and Cuba's continued
secrecy.
economic dependence on the Soviets, Moscow does
not dictate Cuba's foreign policy. In any case,
economic dependence does not neatly translate into
political influence for the benefactor in the patron-
Cuban military expertise has since been passed on
to many different African and Middle Eastern coun-
client relationship. It is my experience in the study of
tries including Libya, Syria and South Yemen. But it is
interstate relations that dependence on one side
in Angola and Ethiopia that Cuban support and com-
does not automatically mean an equivalent degree of
influence for the other.
mitment have been seen at their most overt and strik-
ing.
Operation Carlotta November 1975-March 1976
For an under-developed Caribbean island with a
population of only 10 million this global activism is
The first contingent of Cuban troops set sail for
quite remarkable. Indeed it is unprecedented in
Angola in September 1975. They comprised 480 mili-
international politics. Neither can its impact be un-
tary specialists, vehicles, communications equip-
derestimated. Without the direct participation of
ment and doctors. One month after this contingent
Cuban combat troops during the height of the Ango-
arrived, South African troops crossed the border into
lan civil war 1974/76 the MPLA would certainly not
Angola.
American Review
17
In November the Cubans began an airlift of troops.
southern third of the country and conducting opera-
They used old Cuban converted freighters and obso-
tions in the majority of Angola's 18 provinces.
lete commercial aircraft which required refuelling
rights in the Caribbean. They had airlifted some 6 000
Between 1985/88 the MPLA Government (nomi-
troops by January 1976.
nally) and Soviet commanders directed the Angolan
Army in a series of offensives aimed at capturing the
The US put pressure on Barbados and other Carib-
UNITA "capital" at Jamba. In 1987 the campaign was
bean states to deny refuelling rights and this brought
under the personal supervision of General Konstan-
Soviet transport aircraft and ships into the operation.
tin Shaganovitch, reputedly the highest ranking
These Soviet airlifts and ships, involving 20 ship tran-
Soviet officer ever to be posted outside Europe or
sits and 70 flights by March 1976, brought an esti-
Afghanistan. He was assisted by General Mikhail Pet-
mated 20 000 Cuban troops into Angola along five
rov, supposedly one of the Kremlin's top specialists
separate supply routes. Soviet AN-22 transport air-
in counter insurgency warfare.
craft flew to Maya Maya, near Brazzaville in the
Congo (materials were trans-shipped to MPLA
strongholds north of Luanda). AN-22s flew direct
from airfields in the southern USSR to Luanda or Hen-
rique de Carvalho (refuelling in Guinea, Algeria or
At the root of Castro's present dilemma is
Mali), and Soviet freighters delivered small arms to
the need to justify 14 years of warfare
Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, Pointe Noire in Congo or
involving more than 300 000 troops serv-
to Guinea, which were then ferried to collection
points in territory controlled by the MPLA.
ing in Angola.
Although Cuban manpower and Soviet
Their military campaign, like the previous two, was
a disaster for the Angolan Army, Cuban advisers and
military support were instrumental in sec-
Soviet patrons: the combined socialist forces, were
uring the MPLA's control of the capital
routed.
Luanda, and of the vital oil producing
After 1987 the military campaigns were increasingly
Cabinda enclave, it has been unable to
a reflection of the complex diplomacy involving
secure success in its struggle to defeat
Angola, South Africa, Cuba and a number of interna-
Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces.
tional actors. In 1988 Castro changed the ground
rules governing engagement without apparently pay-
ing very much heed to the dictates of Moscow or the
needs of Luanda. The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale
assumed pivotal importance. Subsequently there
The logistic, diplomatic and military dimensions of
was a significant build-up of Cuban forces which also
the joint Soviet/Cuban operation Carlotta required
led to a move into southern Angola.
excellent planning and execution and considerable
co-ordination.
Cuba's Dilemma
The Soviet weaponry and Cuban military allowed
At the root of Castro's present dilemma is the need
the MPLA to outgun the rival forces. The rival FNLA
to justify 14 years of warfare involving more than
was completely demoralised and ceased to be a fac-
300 000 troops serving in Angola. Cuban losses are
tor in the civil war. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces
supposedly secret, but are thought to be about 10 000
retreated in good order to camps in the tribal home-
dead and wounded. Throughout the island there are,
lands of Ovamboland in south eastern Angola where
families mourning sons, buried in Angolan grave-
they have until recently drawn on South African pat-
yards. The war is not popular in Cuba, neither is this
ronage in the Caprivi Strip. South African forces, hav-
helped by returning veterans complaining they were
ing reached to within 150 miles of Luanda, retreated
not welcome in Angola.
south into Namibia. The MPLA was recognised as the
legitimate government of Angola by the United
An increasing number may soon not be welcome
Nations.
back in Cuba. Reports speak of a rising incidence of
AIDS among Cuban troops caught from Angolan
Subsequent Cuban Involvement
women. Already stringent precautions have been
introduced. Soldiers are quarantined until confirmed
Although Cuban manpower and Soviet military
clear and supplies of blood for battlefield trans-
support were instrumental in securing the MPLA's
fusions are now flown in from Cuba and Eastern
control of the capital Luanda, and of the vital oil-
producing Cabinda Enclave, it has been unable to
Europe for the exclusive use of Cuban and Bloc per-
sonnel.
secure success in its struggle to defeat Jonas
Savimbi's UNITA forces.
The bulk of the Cuban military bill is met by the
Soviets. Castro's financial "indebtedness" to the
Under South African tutelage UNITA had by the
Kremlin must be enormous, burdensome and an
earlier 80s become the single most-decisive factor in
encumbrance but neither can he readily absorb
Angola politics, at one time controlling much of the
40 000 plus military into the civilian economy.
18
American Review
Castro's Blueprint
and stay on as "civilians". This is bound to have
appeal, being at least better than returning to the
The preliminary accord at the Peace Conference
austerity of Cuba and in any case, the prime objective
and the subsequent withdrawal of South African
of many Cubans is to get to Miami - paradoxically it
troops behind the Angola/Namibian border has
may be easier to reach from Angola than from Cuba.
allowed Castro the luxury of a more pragmatic
approach. It would indeed appear that he has devised
There is a supposedly "secret" agreement between
a bold long term strategy.
Cuba and the Congo People's Republic under which
Cuban troops may be deployed on leaving Angola.
They are apparently to be based at Kimongo, close to
Congo's border with the Angolan enclave of
Cuba's Vital Statistics*
Cabinda. There is a large military base at Kimongo,
which includes an airstrip; the base is apparently
being cleaned up and expanded.
Population:
10 334 000
Manpower available for 1 594 000
Military and Economic Implications
Military Service
years)
The first economic implication is for Cuba. It does
need to be borne in mind that the Cuban economy
Total Armed Forces:
would experience severe strain if it had to absorb such
Active:
180 500 (79 500
a large number of soldiers discharged from Angolan
conscripts)
commitments and seeking employment in the civil sec-
Reserves:
130 000
tor.
Army:
145 000 (60 000
conscripts)
UNITA is likely to remain a threat to the Luanda
Navy:
135 000 (8 500
Government and because of its recent redeployment
conscripts)
poses an even greater threat to the oil rich resources
Air Force:
22 000 (11 000
of the Cabinda Enclave. Thus it is likely that the corre-
conscripts)
lation of economic, military and political forces in the
Forces Abroad
region remains as confusing as ever. The US Adminis-
tration, while chairing the peace talks, is providing
Angola:
50 000 military + 8 000
military support to UNITA to attack Cabinda. Ameri-
civilian advisers
can and Western Oil Companies in Cabinda will be
Congo:
500
protected by a largely Cuban garrison, while royalties
Ethiopia:
2 800
and income levied from the oil companies will be
Mozambique:
600
used by the Luanda Government to foot the bill - or
South Yemen:
500
at best part of it.
Nicaragua:
4 000 (incl. 3 500
civilians)
The weakness of the pact made in South-
* Source: Military Balance 1988-89, IISS London.
West Africa/Namibia and Angola is that it
is a house of cards. The points upon which
the agreements have been reached are so
delicately balanced against each other
Diplomatic sources suggest that the Cuban leader
regards not merely Savimbi as an obstacle to peace
that it could fall at any time.
but Angola's President Eduardo Dos Santos as well.
Dos Santos is viewed as an incompetent recluse who
rarely ventures from his guarded palace. Neither of
course does Dos Santos have the status of a tribal
In the meantime war and politics have all but
chieftain to both add prestige to his office or cushion
destroyed Angola. It is vast, empty and fertile with
the threat of a possible coup. Savimbi is seen by many
coffee on the bushes, diamonds in the hills, gold in
as fatally compromised by his lengthy connection
the rivers and oil beneath the sea. Other than oil most
with South Africa, a move which has proved a peren-
of the assets lie unused, while civil war rages.
nial source of friction if not open dissent among the
UNITA high command.
The statistics are horrendous. It is estimated that
since 1875 nearly 50 per cent of Angola's 8,5 million
There has been speculation from diplomatic
people have been uprooted by war. In the last two
sources that Castro will seek to find a Luanda politi-
years a further 700 000 have left the countryside to swell
cian who would be acceptable to both the MPLA and
the jobless vagabond population in the urban ghettos.
UNITA to form a provisional government of unity.
These deslocados- about 1:10 of the rural population,
together with the two million urban dwellers, will
The Cubans intend to retain a permanent presence
remain overwhelmingly dependent upon food from
in Angola. The widely leaked plot is for Cuban sol-
abroad. There are nearly half a million Angolan
diers to take their discharge, marry Angolan women
refugees in neighbouring countries.
American Review
19
Conclusions
Moscow on the lower slopes of the Summit. How-
ever, comparisons with Afghanistan are quite erro-
Much will depend upon the complicated and inter-
neous.
related timetable which links Cuban withdrawal to
Namibian self-determination and majority rule. The
Presumably a peace agreement in Angola will mean
Cuban timetable is phased over 30 months with a
that the internationalism of the region will be consid-
limited presence, at a very early stage, south of the
erably reduced. This means the withdrawal of Soviet
13th parallel- "front loading".
and East Bloc Advisers and the end of the sanctuary
for terrorist organisations such as the ANC.
The Peace Accord must be seen as a "house of
cards". But peace in Angola would suit its
The lesson of Angola is the clear precedent to
neighbours, some of whom increasingly believe that
southern Africa Black and White - of the price that
the Cubans no longer have any business to be there
can be paid when disputes and conflicts are inter-
now that South Africa has withdrawn.
nationalised.
This takes me back to the point with which I began
Despite Cuban machinations and impressive
- Cuba Quo Vadis?
Soviet/Cuban air defences the critical forces remain
those of South Africa. Nothing has changed; South
Cuba relies heavily upon the Soviet Union for
Africa remains the regional super power. The weak-
economic assistance to ensure viability, and for mili-
ness of the pact made in South-West Africa/Namibia
tary supplies to ensure its security. These are the two
and Angola is that it is a house of cards. The points
core interests of any state in the international system,
upon which the agreements have been reached are
and without the Soviet Union it is difficult to envisage
so delicately balanced against each other that it could
how Cuba could possibly survive and maintain its
fall at any time.
form of government. Soviet withdrawal from the
southern African scene, coupled to a reduced Cuban
The Kremlin and Washington are particularly anx-
commitment, is bound to influence the relationship
ious for a settlement. Their officials discussed it in
between Cuba and the Soviet Union.
Alberto Coll
T aking "Übermenschen" Seriously: Castro's
Self-image and his Geopolitical Vision of Africa
In Castro's life and personality the intense consciousness of a historical mission
has gone hand in hand with two other character traits that have shaped consider-
ably the particular expressions this consciousness has evinced. Those traits are a
glorification of military violence, and an obsession with revolutionas the all-con-
suming end of political life.
n spite of its small size and population, Cuba has
The chief, though by no means the only factor
been one of the leading extra-continental military
and diplomatic powers in Africa over the last fif-
behind Cuba's activism is the peculiar personality,
teen years. The Cuban economy is comparable in
self-image, and geopolitical vision of its dictator for
output and technological backwardness to that of
thirty years, Fidel Castro. Other factors include the
Jordan or Colombia. Yet Cuba wields considerable
convergence between Cuban policies and the larger
political influence and has an extensive network of
strategic objectives of the Soviet Union, and the
diplomatic and military ties with numerous states
domestic political instability and economic back-
throughout the African continent far out of propor-
wardness of many African nations which render them
tion to what one could expect of a state with its
vulnerable to civil strife, left-wing authoritarian
meagre resources and capabilities.
regimes, and Soviet bloc intervention.
20
American Review
Next to North Korea's Kim-li-Sung, Fidel Castro is
ensued, Castro's personal objectives, while con-
the longest surviving dictator in today's world. At a
gruent with Soviet strategy, have acquired a life of
vigorous 63 years of age, Castro easily could hold on
their own and have propelled the Cuban-Soviet
to power for another two decades, and is therefore
alliance towards a more extensive intervention than
likely to remain for the foreseeable future a major
perhaps Moscow would have been willing or able to
international player with whom to reckon seriously.
pursue on its own.
Castro has survived in the face of the determined
opposition of his powerful neighbour 90 miles away,
It is not only that the Cubans provide combat
and in pursuit of an activist foreign policy coupled
troops and are prepared to serve as cultural and racial
with numerous risky military adventures throughout
intermediaries between the Soviet empire and black
Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, facts that
Africa, thus enhancing considerably the USSR's
should serve as clues to his remarkable political
capabilities for intervention in the continent. An
prowess and cunning.
equally critical factor has been Castro's determina-
tion to play an historic role in Africa, which has
Castro's significance to Soviet strategy
increased significantly the political will and persis-
tence behind Cuban-Soviet efforts. This has been no
It is difficult for many international relations
small factor in Angola, where the Cubans and the
analysts to take Fidel Castro seriously. Cuba's ob-
Soviets have been mired in a 13-year struggle of attri-
vious weaknesses and Castro's inflated rhetoric lend
tion against the South Africans and Jonas Savimbi's
themselves to parody if not outright condescension.
UNITA. If instead of Castro, a different Communist
Western conservative critics have difficulty conced-
leader in the mould of an inward-looking Voijech
ing to a Caribbean dictator the status of a significant
Jaruzelski or a technocratic Janos Kadar were in.
world figure. Liberal critics, on the other hand, are
power in Havana today, the Cubans' role in what Paul
too historically and culturally narrow to conceive of a
Seabury has called "the international Soviet proxy
dedicated Marxist-Leninist who believes in his ideol-
network" would be far more modest in scope and
ogy and his self-image as a great man of history. It is
less military in character than it is today. Without Cas-
easier to see Castro as the mouse that roared, the
tro's political will and the expanded capabilities for
aspiring Third World "caudillo" whose grandiose
intervention offered to the USSR by the Cubans, the
ambitions far outstrip the puny size of the historical
USSR might have decided one or two years ago to
stage to which he has been relegated to play his
prod the Luanda regime into a political settlement
antics. Analysts who grapple with Cuba's interven-
with UNITA as a means of facilitating a more or less
tionism in Africa often see it, therefore, as the simple
graceful disengagement.
by-product of Cuba's faithful tutelage to, and depen-
dence on, the USSR. According to this view, Cuba
The critical nature of the Cuban role in the Cuban-
intervenes when and where the USSR wants it to
Soviet partnership, and the independent significance
intervene, and only after Moscow has determined
of Castro's own political and strategic agenda in
that such intervention is in its interests.
southern Africa can be gleaned from a few illustra-
tions from events in the past three years. The first has
to do with the nature of the Havana-Luanda relation-
ship. Repeatedly, the Cubans have had to exert them-
selves rather forcefully to prevent Luanda from mak-
Without Castro's political will and the
ing greater concessions to Pretoria and to UNITA
expanded capabilities for intervention
than Castro considers compatible with Cuban pres-
offered to the USSR by the Cubans, the
tige and the long-term Cuban objective of securing a
complete victory in Angola. Havana has so little confi-
USSR might have decided one or two
dence in Luanda's ability to resist tempting possi-
years ago to prod the Luanda regime into a
bilities dangled before it by its adversaries that early
political settlement with UNITA as a
on in the recent negotiations sponsored by the
means of facilitating a more or less grace-
United States it attached the ubiquitous Jorge Ris-
quet, one of the highest-ranking members of the
ful disengagement.
Cuban Politburo, to the talks in order to stiffen the
MLPA's diplomatic resolve and make sure that
Luanda's obvious desire for a cessation of hostilities
did not weaken its bargaining position.
While such a simple view contains many elements
One also can look at the Cuban-Soviet relationship
of truth, it also misses some essential subtleties. It is
itself for further evidence of Cuba's weight. Between
true that without massive Soviet economic and mili-
1984 and late 1987 the Soviet Union called the shots
tary support Cuba could not carry out its African
over the issue of the strategic direction of the Ango-
adventures, and that nowhere in the continent the
lan war. Under Soviet direction, MPLA forces with
Cubans have acted contrary to Soviet interests. Yet
Cuban and Soviet support carried out several offen-
there is more to the story. On many occasions such as
sives aimed at destroying Jonas Savimbi's strong-
in Angola in 1975, the impetus for particular inter-
holds east and southeast of Cuito Cuanavale in
ventions has originated with the Cubans, who after
Angola's southeastern quadrant. The offensives
taking the initiative have persuaded Moscow to com-
failed, largely because of South Africa's ability to back
mit its own political prestige and military resources to
UNITA with air force and artillery support at critical
bolster and sustain the Cuban effort. In the war that
moments. By late 1987, as the much-heralded Soviet-
American Review
21
Cuban-MPLA offensive against Savimbi's positions in
effect because they had been concerned about the
Mavinga was routed disastrously through the com-
political and military risks entailed in such escalation,
bined action of South African and UNITA forces, it
and besides they had been confident that they could
was increasingly clear that the war was in a stalemate.
strangle UNITA without resorting to a direct push
Meanwhile, the United States was putting diplomatic
against the South Africans. By late 1987, however, it
and political pressure on Luanda to arrive at a settle-
was obvious to the Soviets that their strategy had
ment involving the withdrawal of Cuban troops, and
failed and that a bolder approach was necessary to
Gorbachev was indicating a greater Soviet willing-
break the stalemate. That they decided to go ahead
ness to settle through political and diplomatic means
with the Cuban strategy is both evidence of their
some of the so-called "regional conflicts" around the
appreciation of the Cuban's pivotal role, and of the
world so as to liquidate some of the USSR's costly
Soviet leadership's hesitation to liquidate the Ango-
Third World military ventures. Thus, neither the
lan venture on terms humiliating to the USSR.
military nor the diplomatic fronts looked promising
for the Cubans.
The Cuban-inspired offensive of early 1988 was a
military and, perhaps more importantly, a political
success. After the halt and defeat of their offensive in
the latter part of 1987, the Cuban-MPLA forces had
South African underestimation of Fidel
withdrawn to the town of Cuito Cuanavale. South
Castro is nothing new, and it is perhaps
African and UNITA forces moved towards Cuito, hop-
ing to encircle it and inflict on the Cubans a defeat of
understandable.
Dien Bien Phu proportions. It was at this time that
Castro threatened to send more reinforcements
directly from Cuba, a warning to which many South
African military officials reacted sceptically. In
Within Cuba itself, dissatisfaction with the Angolan
January, with Soviet logistical support, Castro began
morass was mounting. In May 1987, Brigadier Gen-
transporting by air some 9 000 10 000 of his elite
eral Rafael Diaz del Pino, former chief of staff of the
troops from Cuba directly into southern Angola and
Cuban Air Force and a man who had played a critical
Cuito, increasing the total number of Cuban forces in
role in the Angolan war by coordinating Cuban air
Angola to some 55 000 men. Several hundred of
force and anti-aircraft forces operations there,
Cuba's finest pilots were brought in as well. The
defected to the United States. His revelations, broad-
Soviets flew in massive quantities of military
cast to the Cuban people through the United States
hardware, including surface-to-air missiles in an
Information Agency's Radio Marti, confirmed what
effort to neutralise the South African Air Force, anti-
many Cubans already suspected, namely, that the
tank artillery, and a large number of the most sophis-
war in Angola was not going well, that thousands of
ticated fighter jets in the Soviet arsenal, the Mig-23s,
Cubans had died there for what seemed by 1987 to be
to be piloted by Cubans.
a futile neo-colonial venture, and that thousands
more would likely die in the future for the sake of
Predictably, Castro's moves in southern Africa in
upholding objectives solely related to Fidel Castro's
early 1988 caught by surprise most observers, includ-
personal prestige and geopolitical dreams and having
ing the South Africans themselves, who perhaps
little to do with Cuba's genuine national interests.
should have known better but who, like almost
Since its establishment in May 1985 Radio Marti
everyone else, have tended to underrate his political
had been broadcasting the names of Cubans killed in
will, tenacity, and extraordinary flair for boldness.
combat in Angola, information which the Castro
regime had kept and continues to keep secret. Radio
Early intimations
Marti also had broken the news over the growing
South African underestimation of Fidel Castro is
AIDS epidemic in Cuba tracing it to soldiers who had
nothing new, and it is perhaps understandable. In a
acquired the virus in Angola and had brought it to
1966 visit to South Africa a prominent anti-Castro
Cuba upon their return. Its hand forced by Radio
Cuban exile, Luis V Manrara, held a long conversa-
Marti, the Castro regime admitted the existence of an
tion with a former high ranking South African intelli-
AIDS problem in Cuba, though it never has acknow-
gence and security official, concerning Soviet
ledged the connection between AIDS and the Ango-
hegemonial aspirations and the likelihood of inaction
lan war. Yet most Cubans, on the basis of either their
on the part of Washington to deter effectively such
own intuition or Radio Marti's broadcasts, know the
moves. The timing could not have been more
connection exists, and this has contributed to the
appropriate. Castro had just hosted in Havana earlier
war's unpopularity.
that year the "Tri-Continental Conference" for the
purpose of co-ordinating political and military
By late 1987, Castro knew he had to act energeti-
strategy among the numerous Third World "national
cally if he was to reverse the military and political
liberation" movements then in operation, many of
trends that were threatening to turn the Angolan
them of a decidedly Marxist-Leninist and pro-Soviet
stalemate into a political blow to his international and
bent. Top leaders and representatives from guerrilla
domestic credibility. He persuaded the Soviets to
groups in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (the "three
allow him to pursue the strategy he had been pres-
continents") were in attendance, including insurgent
sing on them for a while: to escalate the war by
factions that would later come to power in the 1970s
engaging in an all-out direct offensive against the
in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-
South African forces in southern Angola. The Soviets
Bissau. Ignored by the Western media, the "Tri-
previously had resisted Cuban entreaties to this
Continental" signalled Castro's intention to step up
22
American Review
his support for, and play a future leadership role in,
personality and his immense political gifts. The most
Third World revolutionary movements.
significant dimension of Castro's personality is his
consciously nurtured self-image as a great man of his-
From Castro's viewpoint, the conference was
tory, as a Hegelian "world-historical figure" with an
highly successful. He gained considerable prestige
appointed task of truly historical and universal pro-
and political leverage among many of the groups in
portions.
question as a result of his political support and
encouragement to them, and impressed on many of
This task, as in Hegel's "great individual" or
their leaders the need for long-term strategic plan-
Nietzsche's "übermensch", is no less than the
ning and trans-national co-operation. It is no exag-
actualisation of his own will in history as a means to
geration to say that at the conference the foundations
the unfolding of the historical process itself. Castro
were laid for the Third World components of the
believes that the realisation of his will in the stage of
emerging international Soviet proxy network, even
international politics, and fulfillment and worldwide
though at the time the Soviets were myopically scep-
acknowledgement of his greatness, are mandated by
tical of the conference's usefulness to their interests
history. History supposedly will use his force of will
and did not foresee its potentialities to the same
and his greatness to bring about its own objectives.
degree Castro did. Many political and ideological
Thus, whatever promotes Fidel Castro's own objec-
links among the various revolutionary groups were
tives and his greater glory is also conducive to the ful-
first established at the conference, and they would
fillment of history itself.
make an important contribution a decade later to the
growth of that Soviet proxy network through which
pro-Soviet regimes were installed and strengthened
in Grenada, Nicaragua, Yemen, Ethiopia, Vietnam,
Angola and Mozambique.
In June of 1958, months before he seized
Cuba also emerged as a future provider of political
power, Castro wrote to his close friend
support and ideological and military training to many
of the groups, and its status as an intermediary bet-
Celia Sanchez a long letter, preserved to
ween them and the USSR began to acquire focus,
this day in Havana's Museum of the
even if at the time it is not clear that the Soviets them-
Revolution, confiding that after the
selves recognised fully such a development and all of
its implications for their future successes in the Third
expected triumph of the revolution he
World. The Soviet Union, then as now, realised that
would begin an historic task of even
its aspirations to gaining recognition from the West
greater magnitude and longer duration: a
as a legitimate superpower and a respectable
member of the international system required it to
war to expel the Americans from "the
downplay any direct connections with radical nation-
Americas".
al liberation movements. The Cubans emerged as
ideal intermediaries, even if it took Castro some time
to persuade the full Soviet leadership of the value to
them of such an arrangement. The Cubans could
speak the political rhetoric of Third World violent
The two overriding aims in Castro's life which he
radicalism, and in many places their greater cultural
perceives as being closely tied to the fulfilment of his
and ethnic affinity with Third World peoples made
own greatness and to the larger purposes of the his-
them far more useful advocates for the benefits of
torical process are the Cuban-led emancipation of
membership in the Soviet sphere of influence than
Latin America from United States domination, and
the Soviets themselves could ever hope to be, sad-
the liberation of the Third World from American and
died as they were with notions of Russian cultural and
Western hegemony through a violent paroxysm of
racial superiority over "backward" peoples. At the
unceasing revolutionary struggle to which Cuba will
same time, whenever it was tactically convenient, the
make a critical contribution. Historians have traced
Cubans could be disavowed or even reined in if they
the enmity towards the United States to Castro's
threatened to getiout of hand or cause unintentional
upbringing as the son of a disgruntled Spanish sol-
damage to the USSR's long-term political interests.
dier who resented American intervention in Cuba's
By the early 1970's, Leonid Brezhnev and his col-
war of independence from Spain in 1898, and from
leagues had fully accepted Castro's viewpoint, and
whom Castro imbibed strong doses of virulent anti-
they perceived the political brilliance inherent in Cas-
Americanism since his earliest days. In June of 1958,
tro's vision of Cuba as both an intermediary and a
months before he seized power, Castro wrote to his
magnet to draw Third World regimes and "liberation
close friend Celia Sanchez a long letter, preserved to
movements" into the Soviet orbit.
this day in Havana's Museum of the Revolution, con-
fiding that after the expected triumph of the revolu-
Fidel Castro as "Übermensch"
tion he would begin an historic task of even greater
magnitude and longer duration: a war to expel the
An enormously egoistical tyrant, Fidel Castro will
Americans from "the Americas." Besides discrediting
rank someday as one of the twentieth century's most
the once fashionable theory that the United States was
formidable political figures. The imagination staggers
responsible for pushing Castro into his pro-Soviet,
as one ponders the "might-have-beens" of history
anti-American policies, the letter sheds light on Cas-
had Fidel Castro had at his disposal a stage larger than
tro's intense self-consciousness and his belief that he
that of Cuba in which to play out his powerful will and
had been fated to play a world-historical role.
American Review
23
The profound disappointments he encountered in
alters its course. Castro also may have read and been
his unsuccessful efforts through the early sixties to
inspired by Hitler's Mein Kampf. What is clear is that
"liberate" Latin America moved Castro towards an
Castro's intellectual roots were not Marxist, but fas-
increasingly more global conception of Cuban
cist and Nietzschean. If he eventually became a Marx-
involvement. Africa, suffering from the remnants of
ist it was because in the late twentieth century and in
colonialism, and full of revolutionary expectations
the context of Cuba's peculiar geopolitical circum-
and instability, was an ideal theatre for amplifying
stances, Marxism was the only viable ideology that
and realizing Castro's unfulfilled visions of leading an
enabled him to be what he was first and foremost, a
historic liberation struggle against the American-
violent revolutionary. Thus, he was not a Marxist who
dominated global western "imperium".
turned to violent revolution as the best path to fulfill
the Marxist vision, but a revolutionary who turned to
The Cubans had supported the FLNA in the closing
Marxism as the means to actualise his inner longings
stages of Algeria's bloody civil war, and by the end of
for violent struggle. Castro's glorification of violence
the decade of the sixties, especially after the impetus
during his guerrilla war against Batista was attractive
provided by the "Tri-Continental" Conference, they
to American liberals such as the influential New York
were heavily involved throughout Africa. An interest-
Times journalist Herbert Matthews who were capti-
ing and largely unexpected turn of events unfolded.
vated by Castro's bold brand of Latin "machismo".
After the death of Che Guevara in the Bolivian jungles
Despite Castro's early tergiversations for the benefit
in 1967, Cuban activities in Latin America slowed
of his domestic bourgeois sympathisers and the
down for a decade and did not pick up again until the
foreign media, his revolution was conceived in vio-
Sandinistas began to gain momentum in their war
lence, established and perpetuated by force of arms,
against Somoza in 1978. Yet, during all this time the
and continues to derive whatever ideological fervor
tempo of Cuban involvement in Africa never slowed
and sense of popular legitimacy it has left from its
down, and it accelerated sharply following the disin-
worship of violence and force as the ultimate arbiters
tegration of the Portuguese empire in 1974 and the
of history.
collapse of American will brought about by the
traumas of Watergate and defeat in Southeast Asia.
The same can be said of Castro's obsession with the
primacy of revolution as an end in itself, his belief in
Thus, Castro's early failures and frustrations in
revolution as the great and only significant force of
Latin America only served to broaden his self-defined
history in the late twentieth century the inevitable
historical mission to include Africa, an intellectual
and never-ending process by which societies around
and psychological task in which he was confirmed by
the globe will be liberated and set upon the road of
the successes he had in the mid-seventies. By the
constructing socialism. Only Cubans who have en-
time he was elected leader of the non-aligned move-
dured for three decades Castro's interminable
ment in 1979, Castro saw himself no longer as a purely
speeches and his wearisome efforts to build a
Latin American figure, but as a Third World leader of
revolutionary "man of the twenty-first century", and
global stature, the undisputed champion of world-
perhaps those mothers who have lost'sons in the far-
wide revolutionary struggle who might justly aspire
away jungles of Angola, can appreciate the almost
to greater historical recognition for his impact on the
pathological quality of this obsession. Again, the
African stage than even any individual African revo-
comparison with Hitler may be enlightening, if for no
lutionary could claim.
other purpose than to force skeptical Western
analysts into taking seriously the authentic character
In Castro's life and personality the intense con-
of Castro's personality and belief-system, and the
sciousness of an historic mission has gone hand in
degree to which these, in spite of their apparent irra-
hand with two other character traits that have shaped
tionality or impracticality, shape his policies and
considerably the particular expressions this con-
those of the nation he rules. A belief in the primacy of
sciousness has evinced. Those traits are a glorifica-
revolution is for Castro what anti-semitism was for
tion of military violence, and an obsession with
Hitler: a highly irrational, impractical ideology which
revolution as the all-consuming end of political life.
may get in the way of the nation's true interests objec-
As Irving Louis Horowitz and others have noted,
tively considered, but which provides the Maximum
militarism has been an essential component of Cas-
Leader with the spiritual energy and sense of purpose
tro's personality and ideology. The beliefs that law
necessary for the fulfillment of his own greatness. If
and politics grow out of the barrel of a gun, and that
the Caribbean Sysiphus has been far more pragmatic
all the critical factors of political life, either at the
than the Nazi in the pursuit of his ideological dreams,
domestic or the international level, are determined
it is not because his vision is less-embracing but
by the correlation of military forces and the will to use
perhaps because Germany had just sufficient power
them are among Castro's most deeply held convic-
to tempt Hitler into believing that he could succeed.
tions. As a young university student, he quickly
Castro, with far greater constraints and highly depen-
gained recognition for his skills as one of the leaders
dent on his Soviet patrons, has to engage continu-
of the gangster-like student gangs which roamed
ously in the humbling process of adjusting his grand
Havana's streets in the second half of the 1940s. He is
designs to his limited capabilities.
also known to have read the works of the Spanish
falangist Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, and it was
While Castro's compulsive personality and beliefs
through the latter that he may have come in contact
have found a magnificent stage for their exhibition
with Hegelian and Nietzschean notions of the "great
and realisation in the disordered condition of the
historical individual" who by the force of his will
African continent over the last two decades, he has
becomes an instrument of history and in so doing
been driven there too by the internal necessities of
24
American Review
maintaining his rule over Cuba. Revolutions need
the oppressed people of southern Africa that Castro
myths on which to run, and their dictators a grand
can maintain, in his own mind and in that of his
"raison" to provide them with the requisite legiti-
people, that he is still historically necessary, that
macy.
Cuba still needs him in order to carry out the vital his-
toric mission to which he has forced it to devote so
By its nature, the Revolution can never stop. Were
much of its energies and blood. That the USSR has
it to stop, the great revolutionary leader would no
supported him in this task, and has found him enor-
longer have a reason for being, nor would his people
mously useful for the furtherance of its long-term
need him. The Revolution, and the leader with which
strategic objectives, there is no doubt. It is even likely
it has become synonymous in one of the most per-
that in places like Ethiopia Castro's decision to send
sonalistic political cults of the twentieth century,
combat troops was in response to a Soviet request
must be forever in motion. The problem is that, once
that he do so. Yet, the dictator's peculiar sense of his
again, the Cuban stage is too constricted and rickety
historical role, his cult of violence and revolution,
for the leader's dynamic energies. A moribund
and the necessities of preserving a personalistic
economy that is as dependent today as it was in 1959
regime founded on such values go far towards ex-
on the export of sugar to a superpower (81 per cent of
plaining the strategic impetus and operational
total exports); chronic bureaucratic inefficiency, cor-
dynamics of Cuba's African interventions. Castro's
ruption and an ever thriving black market; large
geopolitical vision of Africa, then, is that of a vast
reservoirs of apathy, disillusionment and outright
stage in which to demonstrate, to a degree denied to
cynicism among the younger generation that was
him in his own continent, his character as one of the
supposed to herald the coming of a new revolution-
great historical individuals of this century.
ary man (45 per cent of Cuba's population is under
21); and a general sense that the country is falling
rapidly behind the cultural and technological
Future prospects
advances of the civilised world, and even of such
Socialist countries as Hungary; this is hardly the stuff
The diplomatic accord reached among the govern-
with which to keep alive the Revolution and its
ments of Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United
mythology.
States on November 15, 1988 raises the question of
Castro's future moves in southern Africa. It is possi-
Even the Latin American stage, while larger than
ble to see this accord as a successful manoeuvre on
Cuba's in its geopolitical space, appears equally
the part of the United States to achieve the goal it has
unpromising. With a few exceptions such as the San-
long sought- to get the Cuban troops out of southern
dinistas and various small radical groups, the bulk of
Africa. If, as prescribed by the agreement's terms,
Latin America's left, while still outwardly adoring of
Cuba withdraws its combat forces within the next 27
Castro and awed by his powers of resistance and
months, leaving in Angola only small contingents of
political imagination, no longer looks to Cuba as a
trainers and advisors, South Africa's future security
model of development. This is especially the case of
options will have been enhanced. Pretoria's decision
the new generation of Latin American social demo-
in the spring of 1988 not to escalate the conflict by
crats who have come to power in Brazil, Argentina,
responding to Castro's forceful military moves in
Peru and Venezuela, and who in various ways have
southern Angola would then be seen in retrospect as
made their peace, however grudgingly, with the
politically wise; by allowing the Cubans to claim a
superpower to the north. For all their Third World
military victory of sorts, Pretoria made it possible for
rhetoric, they have decided that their countries'
Castro to leave Angola. He would not have agreed to
future lies with the capitalist West and its economic
withdraw his combat forces in a situation where he
and political arrangements rather than with the
would have appeared as having sustained a humiliat-
unpromising path of revolutionary violence and per-
ing defeat. The Cubans are now free to claim that they
petual struggle offered by Castro. While they treat
"defeated" the South African Defence Force and con-
Castro with respect and a degree of sympathy, they
tributed to Namibia's "liberation", but all the same
consider him essentially an anchronism, and a some-
the reality is that their combat troops will be going
what dangerous one at that.
home, leaving South Africa more secure militarily
than if they remained in the region.
Thus, the Maximum Leader has had to look beyond
his own country and beyond the hemisphere whose
Undoubtedly, Castro will remain militarily
liberation he swore to carry out as part of his histori-
involved in the area. He will continue to post advisers
cal mandate, in order to find a credible setting in
and trainers in Angola, as he does now in several
which to legitimate his role as the Revolution's guar-
other African nations. If SWAPO comes to power in
dian and justify the indispensability of his continued
Namibia, the Cubans also will try to gain influence
rule over his native land. The Revolution, initially a
over the new regime by offering their assistance in
Cuban and later a Latin American affair, has been
the training of a SWAPO army. It is difficult to predict
transmuted into a global cause as its original
how far the Cubans will succeed in this effort. There
intended beneficiaries have grown indifferent to it or
are elements within SWAPO which are well aware of
become skeptical of the need for its perpetuation.
Namibia's economic dependence on South Africa,
And once again, the African continent has been the
and who realise that economic and political co-
sole stage where this role has proven feasible. It is
operation between both countries will be essential to
there that Castro can claim that the Revolution, or at
Namibia's future economic development. If preva-
least its dimension of military violence and struggle,
lent within a SWAPO government, such elements
still lives. It is by portraying himself as a liberator of
would discourage any excessively close ties with the
American Review
25
Cubans that might alienate Pretoria. Certainly, one
open to discussion, it is difficult to predict what Cas-
can expect South Africa to use its considerable
tro's response to such developments would be. As I
economic and diplomatic leverage over Namibia to
have argued, there are powerful forces within him-
discourage a large Cuban military presence there.
self and within the very structure of his regime pro-
pelling him towards political and military involve-
Many analysts suggest that the Soviet Union is
ment in African affairs, even if in the future the levels
apparently undergoing a slow but perceptible re-
and scope of that involvement are somewhat cur-
orientation of its foreign and economic policies that
tailed. As of late 1988, political shrewdness, military
may put pressure on Castro to liquidate much of his
preparedness, and readiness to anticipate future
involvement in Africa and settle down to increase the
bold moves on his part remain far better guides to
efficiency of the ailing Cuban economy. Even if such
policy when dealing with Fidel Castro than any pre-
apparent tendencies in Soviet policy were to coalesce
mature expectations of his withdrawal from the stage
into a definitive trend, something which in itself is
of African, or for that matter, world politics.
Cunene River
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA
Ruacana
Katima Mulilo
Oshakati
Ondangwa
Caprivi
Rundu
Kaokoveld
Ovambo
Kavango
Skeleton Coast
Tsumeb
Grootfontein
Bushmanland
Damaraland
SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA
Okahandja
Rössing
Swakopmund
Gobabis
Windhoek
Walvis Bay
(South Africa)
Rehoboth Gebiet
Rehoboth
Tswanaland
Desert Namin
BOTSWANA
Gibeon
Namaland
ATIANTIC
Lüderitz
Keetmanshoop
OCEAN
River
REPUBLIC OF
Oranjemund
Orange
SOUTH AFRICA
IAS
26
merican Review
Carl Nöffke
outhwestern Africa the Myths and the Realities
The question could be asked why the Institute for American Studies arranged a
special symposium on Cuba's role in Africa and now devotes a special edition of
this quarterly to the issue. The answer is clear. The Institute analyses issues and
developments in North America and the Caribbean which could influence events
in southern Africa. The peace initiative in south-western Africa in which the United
States, the USSR and Cuba played important roles is of interest to the Institute and
also of the utmost importance to the subcontinent of southern Africa.
S
outhwestern Africa is, hopefully, moving to
April 1: D-day for SWA/Namibia with the United
wards peace. However, because of a skilful
Nations General Assembly formally accepting a reso-
programme of disinformation, the realities of
lution providing for the implementation of the peace
the political road ahead and the disastrous Cuban
plan. UN Resolution 435 of 1978 becomes operative.
military involvement in Angola remain obscure.
There is a formal cessation of hostilities by South
Africa and Swapo with both forces restricted to their
Our Institute for American Studies analyses issues
bases-although a de facto ceasefire has been in exis-
and developments in North America and the Carib-
tence for some time. The UN Special Representative
bean which could have an influence of southern
and his staff arrive in Windhoek, UN military person-
Africa.
nel (UNTAG) start monitoring military and police activ-
ity inside SWA/Namibia and possible infiltration from
The peace initiative in southwestern Africa in
across the Angolan border. The Special Representative
which the United States, the USSR and Cuba played
starts liaising with neighbouring governments about
important roles is of interest to our Institute and of
transitional procedures. All political prisoners and
the utmost importance to the subcontinent of south-
detainees are released,
ern Africa.
May 13: South African military forces are reduced
Cuba has been actively involved in Africa for more
to 12 000 men, still confined to bases. The UN Com-
than two decades. During 1962 and 1963 Che Guevara
missioner for Refugees begins implementing con-
and Raúl Castro, brother of Fidel, initially involved
tingency plans to assist exiles wishing to return to
Cuba in Congo Brazzaville. Since that period Cuba
SWA/Namibia. All remaining discriminatory laws and
has been involved in more than 15 countries in Africa,
restrictive measures are repealed.
including Nigeria, Chad, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Al-
geria, Tunisia, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Egypt,
Zambia, Angola and Mozambique.
Despite the peace process underway, US
Cuban soldiers arrived in Angola 15 years ago. In
intelligence sources indicate that Cuba
fact, they arrived seven months before South Africa
came to the rescue of UNITA when the MPLA dis-
has shipped chemical weapons to Angola.
carded the Alvor agreement which provided for the
MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA to form a joint govern-
mental structure before free elections. The ideal of
free elections was never pursued. The original force
June 3: The repatriation of exiles-including Swapo
level of a small number of military advisors in 1974
soldiers-starts under UN supervision.through desig-
had increased to more than 50 000 at the end of 1988.
nated entry points into SWA/Namibia.
The present peace initiative will, hopefully, end the
June 24: South African forces are reduced to 1 500
conflict in Angola and create an independent South
men confined to bases at Oshivello and Grootfon-
West.Africa/Namibia.
tein. All military installations on the SWA/Angola bor-
der should by now either be deactivated or put under
UN Security Council Resolution 435, which pro-
civilian control under UN supervision. The military
vides for the independence of South West Africa/
section of UNTAG should by now be fully deployed
Namibia, includes constitutional guidelines. The
and have assumed responsibility for hospitals, power
Angolan peace agreement requires South Africa to
stations and other installations previously protected
begin implementing Resolution 435 on April 1, 1989.
by the South African military.
In terms of the agreement the peace plan will be
June 25: The election process in SWA/Namibia
implemented as follows:
starts. Meanwhile, across the border in Angola, a
American Review
27
ANGOLA: AIRCRAFT DELIVERIES VS. LOSSES
PERIOD 1984-88
97
77
100
87
80
66
34
60
40
26
20
0
IAS
Other types
Fighters
Helicopters
Total losses
Total deliveries
parallel process of disengagement involving Cuban
Despite the peace process, US intelligence sources
forces is also underway. From April 1 Cuban forces
indicate that Cuba has shipped chemical weapons to
should have been departing for Havana at the rate of
Angola, apparently to help the MPLA regime repel
3 500 a month. By August 1 the reamining Cubans
attacks by UNITA forces after the withdrawal of
should be moved. north of the 15th parallel - a line
Cuban forces. The chemical weapons, believed to
about 350 km north of the Namibian border,running
include the lethal agents Soman, Sarin and Tabun,
roughly from the harbour town of Namibe across
are being stored in Luanda.
Lubango to Cuito Cuanavale.
Moreover, the massive concentration of Angolan
November 1: Election day in SWA/Namibia. The
troops and military equipment in south-east Angola
Cuban forces should by now be reduced by half (at
suggests that an offensive against UNITA may be
least 25 000 should have left Angola already). The rest
launched shortly. Informed sources in the Angolan
should be confined to bases north of the 13th parallel
capital believe that if offers of amnesty are rejected by
- about 550 km from the SWA/Namibian border and
UNITA, the MPLA regime will attempt to destroy
north of the Benguela railway line.
UNITA once and for all.
US officials have time and time again praised the
The total number of FAPLA troops known to
USSR for helping in bringing about the peace deal.
US State Department officials believe the Soviet
have been killed during the 1987 and 1988
Union will exert pressure on the MPLA to deal a
involvement of South African forces in
death-blow to UNITA.
Angola is 4 768. In the same period South
Among the influential Americans expressing con-
Africa lost 31 men.
cern in one way or another has been Dr Henry Kis-
singer, former US Secretary of State. He has called for
a watertight verification agreement to ensure all
November 8: The South African administration of
Cuban troops leaving Angola, while warning against
SWA/Namibia is formally ended and a Constituent
American euphoria at Soviet President Mikhail Gor-
Assembly of those elected is convened.
bachev's "new thinking". Drawing on his experi-
ences in trying to settle the Vietnam conflict, he said
April 1990: 75 per cent of the Cuban military in
the Communist members of the verification panel
Angola has left.
would never find a violation of the agreement, no
matter how obvious.
July 1, 1991: All Cuban personnel and equipment
must be out of Angola.
The United States administration has made it clear
28
American Review
that it expects United Nations officials monitoring the
1 ZSU-23-4 23 mm multiple anti-aircraft gun
Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to do their job
5 bunker vehicles (supplier)
properly. The US statement came after the warning
4 radio vehicles
issued by Mr R F Botha, South Africa's Minister of
5 radar systems.
Foreign Affairs, that the entire series of inter-locking
peace agreements reached between South Africa,
Experts estimate that hidden costs, such as actual
Angola and Cuba could be endangered if any of the
running costs and the training and deployment of
parties did not fulfil their commitments. Mr Botha's
new troops, will eventually amount to the entire
warning followed a reported comment by Brigadier-
MPLA military budget for 1988-1989.
General Pericles Ferreira Gomes, the UN Chief Mili-
tary Observer in Luanda, that the UN verification mis-
Four basic considerations prompted South Africa
sion would rely on the word of Angola and Cuba.
to become involved during 1987 and 1988 in Angola:
Cuban sources have argued repeatedly that the
(a) the importance of supporting UNITA as part of
peace agreement follows Cuban military successes in
South Africa's strategy for the protection of its
Angola.
own interests in a regional context;
Facts, however, dispute this assertion.
(b) the continued terrorist threat which SWAPO,
Since the phase of the Angolan Civil War which
actively supported by FAPLA, could exert on
began in May 1987, South Africa's involvement in
Kavango and the Caprivi if given free reign in
Angola remained supportive of UNITA and was
Angola's Sixth Military Region in the South;
strictly limited and controlled.
(c) the direct terrorist threat posed to the South West
In contrast to the vast Cuban and FAPLA forces,
African/Namibia population and the infrastructure
there were never, during that period, more than
in Kavango and the Caprivi; and
3 000 South African troops in Angola.
(d) opposition to the establishment of ANC camps
The total number of FAPLA troops known to have
and terrorist training facilities in the south of
been killed during the 1987 and 1988 involvement of
Angola which would facilitate incursions into
South African forces in Angola totals 4 768.
South Africa; and South Africa's responsibility as a
regional power to stem the tide of southward
In the same period South Africa lost 31 men.
Soviet expansionism from its Angolan stronghold.
As early as March 1987 it was clear FAPLA intended
South Africa also lost three tanks, four infantry
launching an offensive into Angolan territory under
combat vehicles, one fighter aircraft and one light air-
UNITA control. The FAPLA/Cuban/Soviet alliance had
craft in operations in South-East Angola.
been stockpiling arms and equipment in the Sixth
Military Region, which has as its headquarters
FAPLA's losses were:
Menongue, the Three military region with its head-
quarters at Luena. Alarming quantities of new and
4 MiG-21 aircraft
sophisticated Soviet military hardware were also
8 MiG-23 aircraft
arriving on an almost daily basis at Luanda harbour.
2 Su-22 aircraft
Moreover, there had been substantial troop move-
8 helicopters
ments in these regions.
94 tanks
2 BTS-4 armoured personnel carriers
9 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles
32 BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles
65 BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers
The FAPLA campaign against Mavinga was
3 BM-14 140 mm multiple rocket launchers
33 BM-21 122 mm multiple rocket launchers
a total failure.
3 B-10 82 mm recoilless rifles
2 120 mm mortars
4 60 mm mortars
7 AGS-17 30 mm grenade launchers
3 GRAD I-P 122 mm single tube rockets
It became apparent that FAPLA would launch two
7 TMM bridges (vehicle-mounted)
independent, but concurrent and supporting offen-
372 logistics vehicles
sives in these two regions. In the eastern sector of
7 SA-8 mobile missile systems (with radar)
Three Military Region the town of Lucusse was
3 SA-9 mobile missiles (no radar)
developed as the primary base for the launching of a
5 SA-13 mobile missiles with radar (upgraded)
two-pronged offensive into Cassamba and Can-
33 SA 14/16 shoulder-launched surface-to-air
gamba.
missiles
11 D-30 122 mm howitzers
This was done in an attempt to occupy fully the
4 M-46 130 mm field guns
attention of UNITA troops in the area. This, believed
20 ZU-23 23 mm anti-aircraft guns
FAPLA, would prevent the UNITA forces in the area
American Review
29
from being re-deployed to help counter the main
The next phase was a planned march on and cap-
FAPLA offensive against Mavinga.
ture of Mavinga, which was to be followed by an
offensive against the UNITA stronghold at Jamba.
The campaign was a total failure. UNITA elements
penetrated to the rear of the advancing columns
where they harassed logistics, while others effec-
At least one platoon; of Cuban soldiers was
tively engaged the advancing columns with light artil-
attached to each FAPL brigade used in the offensive
described above.
lery, forcing both columns to retreat to Lucusse.
Further south, in the Sixth Military Region, Cuito
Operation Modular
Cuanavale was developed as the base for the launch
of the main offensive eastwards towards Mavinga.
The South African Defence Force (SADF) did not
The deployment was completed by August 14, 1987.
support UNITA in Three Military Region (Luena).
UNTAG DEPLOYMENTS IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA
Mpacha/
Katima Mulilo
40
40
Ruacana
TRANS
40
Ondangwa
70
70
Rundu
70
Opuwo
40
150
Grootfontein
70
550
(-)
TRANS 100
CIV
C
135
SPT
50
Swakopmund
20
EMI
SPT
75
Windhoek
MP
22
750
(+)
200
Walvis Bay
O
12
TRANS
50
Mudicidi
TRANS
50
TRANS 20
6
75
540
I
100
120
I
135
600
40
MP
5
20
220
ADM
80
5
MP
5
MP
10
SPT
200
1
4
8
H
230
I
2
IT
80
Keetmanshoop
230
IAS
30
However it was decided that should UNITA request
Accordingly during August and September it was
help in that area, SADF liaison teams would be sent to
decided that long-range artillery would be deployed
evaluate the situation.
to give UNITA added fire support, and a mechanised
element would assist in stopping the advancing 47th
According to instructions received from the Chief
FAPLA Brigade south of the Lomba river. As a result 47
of the SADF, it was decided that the SADF would sup-
Brigade was prevented from establishing a bridge-
port UNITA in the development of an anti-tank plan
head for the other brigades.
to neutralise the FAPLA armoured fighting vehicles
and, if necessary, SA Air Force assistance would be
The FAPLA forces were however, still in a position
sought.
to threaten Mavinga. Various attempts were made to
build bridges over the Lomba river but none of these
The FAPLA offensive was launched on August 14,
were successful because of the rout of 47 Brigade.
1987, following a dramatic increase in air transport
The FAPLA elements and equipment which was used
missions to Cuito Cuanavale during the preceding
in these attempts were decimated by UNITA, SADF
months.
and SWA Territory Force elements.
The single FAPLA brigade which was lodged east of
the Cuito River at Tumpo was reinforced by deploy-
ment of a further four brigades. The FAPLA bridge-
head at the Cuito River was extended at the rate of
The offensive was halted on October 3,
several kilometres a day, while Cuito Cuanavale was
1987. By then remnants of 47 Brigade had
re-activated as a Frontline Command Post.
fled northwards under cover of darkness
At this stage, following UNITA'S request; the SADF
and linked up with 59 Brigade, leaving all
deployed a limited amount of artillery south of the
their equipment behind in abandoned
Lomba River to supply added fire support to the
positions.
UNITA soldiers. By now, UNITA had both regular and
semi-regular battalions deployed East of Cuito
Cuanavale.
The FAPLA forces were uncertain exactly where and
On September 13 and 14 six fierce battles took
how much support the SADF would give UNITA. The
place during which a FAPLA tactical group was put to
long logistical lines and a badly damaged infrastruc-
flight, 382 FAPLA soldiers killed, six tanks and a vari-
ture as a result of prolonged UNITA actions were
ety of other vehicles and weapons captured.
another problem area, and most worrisome was a
marked decline in the motivation and morale of
In these engagements the SADF and SWA Territory
FAPLA forces, a situation which was to deteriorate
Force lost six men, three armoured personnel car-
even further when Cuban and Russian elements were
riers. An additional two armoured personnel carriers
seen to be evacuating the battle area.
were damaged.
UNITA and the SADF also faced long logistical lines
The offensive was halted on October 3, 1987. By
to support the limited SADF involvement, with the
then remnants of 47 Brigade had fled northwards
area of operations far removed from SADF bases.
under cover of darkness and linked up with 59
Brigade, leaving all their equipment behind in aban-
doned positions.
During the initial stages of the conflict in the Sixth
Military Region, FAPLA forces were close to their sup-
The FAPLA forces thus lost an additional 250 troops
ply and air bases and they could therefore choose the
and the following equipment was destroyed or cap-
most advantageous time to initiate an advance.
tured:
UNITA, on the other hand, was and is well
120 logistical vehicles
acquainted with the area and the terrain, and they
18 tanks
had been able to prepare the battlefield by, for exam-
16 armoured personnel carriers
ple, laying mines. This task was further aided by the
6 122 mm artillery guns
fact that due to various reasons including water
5 armoured reconnaissance vehicles
supplies, FAPLA was limited to certain routes of
3 anti-aircraft batteries
advance. UNITA was also able to limit the effective-
3 infantry combat vehicles
ness of the Angolan Air Force with their anti-aircraft
1 anti-aircraft surface-to-air missile system
weapons. Their troops were extremely well moti-
(SAM-8 System consisting of 3 vehicles)
vated and this situation continued to improve as the
2 anti-aircraft surface-to-air missile systems
war progressed.
(SA-9 systems)
As the FAPLA forces continued to advance the real
FAPLA was thus forced to retreat and regrouped
extent of their sophisticated weaponry, which
close to the original positions from which the
included artillery and tanks, was revealed. They were
advance had started.
also bringing in reinforcements. It became increas-
ingly clear that added reinforcements for UNITA
The 21st and 16th Brigades were deployed at the
were necessary.
source of the Chambinga River, while 59 Brigade and
American Review
31
a tactical group were based between the Vimpulo and
been given orders tobegin a process of tactical disen-
Mianei rivers. In the battles which preceded this mass
gagement.
retreat, one of the critical factors proved to be South
Africa's G-5 155 mm gun/howitzer and the profes-
The disengagement was taking place under opera-
sionalism of the gunners.
tional circumstances which meant that the forces
involved had to be continuously mindful of the on-
By mid-October, the long-distance G-5 guns,
going conflict in the area. The South African Minister
which have a maximum range of 39 km, were bom-
of Defence, General Magnus Malan, added at the
barding military targets in Cuito Cuanavale and the
time that this withdrawal could include offensive
vital FAPLA airstrip was rendered useless.
action, as detailed above.
At about the same time, South African tanks were
Extreme care had to be taken to ensure the safety of
ordered into action and became the first to be used
the soldiers involved, and to ensure that UNITA was
operationally since World War Two.
in a position to maintain the objectives which it had
been helped to secure.
Between 9 and 16 November 1987, South African
forces in support of UNITA were involved in further
action against FAPLA forces at the source of the
"This being an ongoing military operation, the
Chambinga and Hube rivers. In the fierce fighting
untimely release of information which the enemy
which ensued, 525 FAPLA troops were killed while
could use, like time scales, can jeopardise the safety
South Africa lost 16 men. After the FAPLA forces were
of our forces," General Malan said. "Concern for the
forced to retreat, UNITA/SA troops captured or
soldiers involved and the maintenance of that which
destroyed the following:
has been achieved is of primary importance in this
process, so much so that the Chief of the Defence
33 tanks
Force, Chief of the Army, the Surgeon-General and
15 armoured personnel carriers
other senior officers regularly visit the area to satisfy
111 logistical vehicles
themselves that all is going according to plan," Gen-
3 SA-13 surface-to-air missile systems (SAM's).
eral Malan added.
Operation Hooper
I have briefly sketched the background to some of
the most recent battles in Angola. It should be
By mid-December 1987 FAPLA was still sending
emphasised that South Africa has never, since 1974,
reinforcements - including Cuban troops and T62
utilised its immense military power, backed up by a
tanks - to the front, concentrating them in the Cuito
sophisticated industrial base, in southern Africa.
Cuanavale area.
The question now is simply Cuba - Africa: Quo
One of the positive effects of this move for UNITA
Vadis? We know that Cuba has virtually insurmount-
and South Africa was that it made the G-5 artillery
able economic difficulties and is suffering from what
bombardments on the area far more effective, and'
appears to be a grave unemployment problem. Will
desperate enemy attempts were made to locate the
Cuba be able to accept the return of 50 000-plus
sites of the guns which were inflicting such heavy
troops without catastrophic political repercussions?
losses.
Hopefully the adventurism of President Fidel Cas-
Operation Hooper was designed and aimed at
tro has come to an end with the signing of the South-
assisting UNITA in clearing the area between the
west-African Peace Accord.
Cuatir II and the Chambinga rivers of remaining
FAPLA forces, thereby preventing a repetition of the
Hopefully he has learnt the lessons of the past,
offensive.
namely that nations only go to military means when
their own interests are at stake. Clearly the aggres-
A series of attacks followed during which FAPLA
siveness and preposterousness of President Castro is
lost an estimated 480 men and a large portion of their
totally out of touch with the global mood in the final
military equipment while South Africa lost seven
year of the eighties. In a speech on January 4, 1989,
crewmen and some equipment.
honouring the 30th anniversary of the Cuban revolu-
tion, President Castro softened his earlier blunt criti-
Meanwhile UNITA had been maintaining relentless;
cisms of the Soviet Union by accusing the United
pressure on FAPLA strongholds elsewhere in Angola.
States of undermining the December 22, 1988 Brazza-
Several towns, including strategic points along the
ville Accords for the independence of SWA/Namibia.
vital Benguela railway line, had been secured by
The United States had taken the lead in an initiative in
UNITA during the past few months. This strategy is
the United Nations to reduce its peace-keeping
clearly paying handsome dividends for UNITA.
force: Dr Castro said US backing for the reduction
proposal should prompt Third World nations to
Tactical Disengagement
begin a movement to reform the structure of the
United Nations to boost their influence. His state-
In the meantime the overall situation was such that
ments appear to indicate an unwillingness to accept
on December 5, 1987, the Chief of the SADF, General
the status quo.
Jannie Geldenhuys, was able to announce that mem-
bers of the SADF and the SWA Territory Force had
Finally, Cuba- Africa: Quo Vadis?
32
American Review
ANGOLA: MILITARY DEPLOYMENT
CABINDA
2
ZAIRE
Soyo
10
1
18
Uige
10
8
9
Luanda
Malanje
Saurimo
7
Waco Kungo
13°S
4
2
Lobito
Luena
19
Benguela
Munhango
14
4
Lucusse
Huambo
14
Bie
3
ATLANTIC OCEAN
11
Lubango
Menongue
15°S
Namibe
5
Cuito Cuanavale
ZAMBIA
6
SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA
Key:
Fapla brigades
Cuban regiments
IAS
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