Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
323153384
label
Baltic Freedom Day Signing Ceremony 6/13/91 [OA 8324]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
323153384
contentType
document
title
Baltic Freedom Day Signing Ceremony 6/13/91 [OA 8324]
citationUrl
identifierLocal
13760-001
collections
Records of the White House Office of Speechwriting (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Speech Backup Chronological Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
323153384
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
b14e63129ee28684
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
S
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series:
Speech File Backup Files
Subseries:
Chron File, 1989-1993
OA/ID Number:
13760
Folder ID Number:
13760-001
Folder Title:
Baltic Freedom Day Signing Ceremony 6/13/91 [OA 8324]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
26
21
4
6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 11, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH:
TONY SNOW TS
FROM:
DAN McGROARTY
SUBJECT:
BALTIC FREEDOM DAY SIGNING CEREMONY
I. SUMMARY
On Thursday, June 13, at 2:15 p.m., you will give brief
remarks in the Roosevelt Room before signing a proclamation
declaring Baltic Freedom Day.
II. DISCUSSION
The remarks (5 minutes, on cards) discuss our desire
for peaceful change as the Baltic nations strive for freedom
and independence.
McGroarty/ (Simon/Trujillo)
June 11, 1991
5:00 pm
[BALTIC]
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: BALTIC FREEDOM DAY SIGNING CEREMONY
THE ROOSEVELT ROOM
JUNE 13, 1991
2:15 pm
Sen. Riegel, Cong.
Welcome, all of you, to the White House. [Introductory Rittert
acknowledgements. Congressional co-sponsors.] Let me begin by Hertal.
thanking all of you for coming today. I had the pleasure of
meeting a few of you several months ago here at the White House.
I valued the chance to exchange views on the situation in the
Baltics and I pledge my Administration's desire to continue close
consultations with the Baltic-American community -- and of course
the Congress. /
It is an honor to mark this important occasion with so many
of the men and women who champion the cause of freedom in the
Baltics. //
More than 50 years have passed since the dark days of June
1940, when three sovereign nations were subjugated by superior
force. In those 50 years, the courage of the Baltic peoples has
shown that force can subjugate a nation -- but it cannot rob a
people of their desire for freedom.
Never has anyone in this room believed that the fate of the
Baltic states was sealed by the secret pact between Hitler and
Stalin. Never has the United States recognized the forcible
incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.
Never in five long decades have the Baltic peoples lost hope
-- the indomitable spirit that sustains their heritage and
2
history. Generations of sons and daughters who have never known
freedom have faith that the Baltics will one day, once more be
free. //
Today, that dream of self-determination -- the Baltics'
democratic destiny -- burns bright and fierce. //
In Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, freely elected
legislatures now govern in the name of the people. The popular
will has expressed its clear and unmistakable desire for
freedom. And in the face of violence and intimidation, the
Baltic peoples and their freely-elected leaders have steadfastly
refused to answer violence with violence -- preferring the path
of peace and principle. //
The resumption of negotiations between the Soviet government
and the Baltic states is a positive step. Yet there is much
reason to be concerned about recent Soviet actions against
customs posts in Lithuania and Latvia -- and the ongoing Soviet
occupation of broadcast facilities in Vilnius -- acts that are
incompatible with a process of peaceful change. Good-faith
negotiations cannot go forward in an atmosphere of threat and
intimidation. //
This nation has taken steps to demonstrate our support for
the Baltic peoples. In February -- through the generous support
of many of the groups represented here today -- the U.S. shipped
emergency medical supplies to Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. /
I am proud to say that since the response from the Baltic-
3
American community has been so great, we will soon send a second
shipment to the Baltics. //
These shipments are but one sign of the affinity we feel as
Americans with the aspirations of all the Baltic peoples. In
May, I met here in the White House with the elected leaders of
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia -- my sixth meeting with Baltic
leaders in the past 12 months. I will tell you today what I told
them: At every opportunity, I have made clear to President
Gorbachev and to other Soviet leaders this nation's firm belief
in the legitimate aspirations of the Baltic states.
Let me add one thing more: You have my word that when I
next meet with President Gorbachev, the fate of freedom in the
Baltics will be high on my agenda. //
Once more, welcome -- and may God bless all the people of
the Baltics. // I will now sign the proclamation, designating
June 14, 1991 Baltic Freedom Day.
# # #
McGroarty/(Simon/Trujillo
June 7, 1991
8:00 am
[BALTIC]
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: BALTIC FREEDOM DAY SIGNING CEREMONY
THE ROOSEVELT ROOM
JUNE 13, 1991
2:15 pm
Jen. Rugel
Welcome, all of you, to the White House. [Introductory
acknowledgements. Congressional co-sponsors.] Let me recognize
Angela Nelsas of the Baltic-American Freedom League. Dr. Olgerts
Pavlovskis, Chairman of the Joint Baltic-American National
Committee. Maido Kari of the Baltic World Council. Juhan
Simonson of the American National Baltic Association -- and all
the other leaders in this great cause. / It is an honor to mark
this important occasion with so many of the men and women who
champion the cause of freedom and independence in the Baltics.
More than 50 years have passed since the dark days of June
Lithuanian June14, 40
(51)
the
1940 when three sovereign nations were subjugated by superior
(2)
force. In those 50 years, the courage of the Baltic peoples has
shown that force can subjugate a nation -- but it cannot rob a
people of their independence.
Molotoution
Never has anyone in this room believed that the Baltics fate
Pact
-39
Press
ent
was sealed by the secret pact between Hitler and Stalin. Never
Atzwater
has the United States recognized the forcible incorporation of
8
May
the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.
(June 14,40
Never in five long decades have the Baltic peoples lost hope
gretter
the indomitable spirit that sustains their heritage and
history. Generations of sons and daughters who have never known
2
freedom have faith that the Baltics will one day, once more be
free. //
Today, that dream of self-determination -- the Baltics'
democratic destiny -- burns bright and fierce.
//
Andrew Silsky
In Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, freely elected
legislatures now govern in the name of the people. The popular
647-
will has expressed its clear and unmistakable desire for
3188
independence. And in the face of violence and intimidation, the
Baltic
x
Aff.
Baltic peoples and their freely-elected leaders have steadfastly
State
refused to answer violence with violence -- preferring the path
Dept.
of peace and principle. //
In spite of our great hopes, there is much reason to be
concerned. Recent Soviet actions against customs posts in
Lithuania and Latvia -- the ongoing Soviet occupation of
freedom for
broadcast facilities in Vilnius -- these and other acts are
incompatible with a process of peaceful change. Good-faith
negotiations cannot go forward in an atmosphere of threat and
intimidation. //
The United States recognizes the deep desire of all the
Statement
Press
Baltic peoples for freedom and independence. In May, I met here
in the White House with the elected leaders of Lithuania, Estonia
8mayal
and Latvia -- my sixth meeting with Baltic leaders in the past 12
months. I will tell you today what I told them: At every
opportunity, I have made clear to President Gorbachev and to
other Soviet leaders this nation's firm belief in the legitimate
aspirations of the Baltic states.
3
Let me add one thing more: You have my word that when I
travel to Moscow later this month, the fate of freedom in the
Baltics will be high on my agenda. //
Once more, welcome -- and may God bless all the people of
the Baltics.
I will now sign the proclamation, designating
this day June 14. 1991 -- Baltic Freedom Day.
this to this day
# # #
June 14, 1991
374
Sanner NSC
BALTIC FREEDOM DAY, 1991 AND 1992
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DRAFT
A PROCLAMATION
During the past year, the long struggle of the Baltic
peoples to recover their freedom has been marked by both triumph
and tragedy: triumph in their bold calls for liberty and
independence; tragedy in the bloody events of January 1991.
The United States and, indeed, all freedom-loving nations
have long denounced the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that
led to the forcible incorporation of the independent Baltic
States into the Soviet Union. Both the West and the Baltic
peoples have continued to believe that the freedom of Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia must and can be restored. Recent events
suggest that our hopes have not been misplaced.
In peaceful, democratic referendums, the peoples of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have asserted overwhelmingly
their intention to restore their independence. Toward that aim,
they have sought to enter into meaningful negotiations with
Moscow about their status. Despite the tragic events of
January 1991, when Soviet forces killed at least 13 pro-
Independence Lithuanians and injured hundreds of others, a
dialogue between the Baltic governments and the Soviet Union has
begun. We hope that it will bear fruit.
However, the United States remains deeply concerned over
the continued Soviet occupation of broadcast facilities in the
Lithuanian capital of Vilnius; the recent ransacking of customs
posts along the Lithuanian and Latvian borders; and other
applications of intimidation and force by Soviet authorities.
Such actions are incompatible with the process of peaceful
change through fair and constructive negotiations.
The United States never has and never will recognize the
forcible annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union.
2
I reiterated this policy during my recent meeting with
Lithuanian President Landsbergis, Estonian Prime Minister
Savisaar, and Latvian Prime Minister Godmanis. The
United States actively supports self-determination for
the Baltic peoples, and we urge the Soviet Union to move
forward with the talks.
As we commemorate "Baltic Freedom Day," we reaffirm
our support for the right of the Baltic peoples to liberty
and self-determination, to free and fair elections, and to a
better life for themselves and for their children.
102-17
The Congress, by House Joint Resolution 167, has
designated June 14, 1991, and June 14, 1992, as "Baltic
Freedom Day" and has authorized and requested the President
to issue a proclamation in observance of this event.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the
United States of America, do hereby proclaim the days of
June 14, 1991, and June 14, 1992, as Baltic Freedom Day. I
call upon the people of the United States to observe these days
with appropriate ceremonies and activities to reaffirm their
commitment to human rights and to freedom and democracy for all
oppressed peoples.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
day of
, in the year of our
Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-one, and of the Independence of
the United States of America the two hundred and fifteenth.
Administration of George Bush, 1991 May 9
e have to look
continuing to establish settlements-that
States, had requested the meeting, the
people may be telling the Secretary one
more, the U.S.
President's sixth with Baltic officials during
thing but either unable to deliver or actual-
the past 12 months.
aq. Aren't you
ly not telling the truth about their inten-
you tried so
The President reiterated the longstanding
tions.
U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the forcible
The President. As we know, these differ-
incorporation of the Baltic States into the
1 know, I ex-
ences have gone on for a long, long time.
Soviet Union in 1940. The President noted
that I did not
And I don't think that's the case, that some-
the United States had transported emergen-
it what we're
body's saying one thing and then going off
cy medical assistance to the Baltic States in
getting enor-
and just doing something behind his back.
February. The United States intends to
we're in there
But, no, it's complex. But I don't accept
send additional shipments of medical sup-
d helping in-
that criticism. There's plenty of room to cri-
plies to the Baltic States and to continue its
ssein's brutal-
tique this and to wish for more progress
program of medical assistance in the Soviet
good question
from one country or another. But there's a
Union itself.
us get into a
lot going on. And I want to stay involved
The President said the United States was
arily involved
myself. I want to be a part of this because I
encouraged by the resumption of negotia-
ce required. I
think we have an opportunity now. And I
tions between the Soviet Government and
ry-General of
think countries that the United States have
the Baltic States. The United States believes
', and I would
helped recognize that. And I think Israel
that fair and constructive negotiations are
in the north
understands that. I think the Saudis under-
the only way to resolve the complex prob-
e south.
stand that. I think the Egyptians under-
lems between Moscow and the Baltic gov-
really do have
stand that. And so, I want to use that good
ernments. He said the United States hoped
will to further peace in the Middle East.
that all parties to these negotiations could
And so I'm-put it this way-moderately
be flexible and pragmatic in order to reach
optimistic.
a just and lasting resolution of the problem.
tell us your
Thank you all very much.
Middle East?
heading back
Note: President Bush spoke at 8:35 a.m. in
oviet Foreign
the Briefing Room at the White House. In
ng to be there
his remarks, he referred to Robert M. Gates,
Remarks to the Hispanic Alliance for
gnal some sort
Assistant to the President for National Secu-
Free Trade
ng? Is there
rity Affairs; John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
May 9, 1991
use for opti-
to the President; Gary Sick, former National
Security Council official during the Carter
Thank you very much. And some of that
t say break-
administration; Marlin Fitzwater, Press Sec-
has to do, I think, with my fibrillating
kthrough. But
retary to the President; and President
heart-[laughter]-but it's all right. I just
there's reason
Saddam Hussein of Iraq.
came back from Bethesda and really got a
ito the details
wonderful report. I won't go into the clini-
ou're dealing
cal assessment, but it's great. I just take
lexity and of
something to do with the thyroid, and the
se some quiet
heart is perfect. So, I'm very lucky, very,
Baker is very
Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater
very lucky.
er his last trip
on President Bush's Meeting With
I came over to talk to you today about an
eports. And I
President Vytautus Landsbergis of
issue that is really of vital concern to me
nk there's still
Lithuania and Prime Ministers Ivars
and, I think, of our country. And I have
1 I don't say
Godmanis of Latvia and Edgar Savisaar
some talking points here, but let me just
of Estonia
ter talking to
put them away and speak from the heart. I
rs around the
May 8, 1991
see my friend the Ambassador here, and I
timism, but I
have great respect for him. And I might say
on it because
The President met today with President
I have enormous respect for President Sali-
Landsbergis of Lithuania, Prime Minister
nas of Mexico.
Godmanis of Latvia, and Prime Minister
think that you
And he is taking that country that we all
Savisaar of Estonia for about 40 minutes in
they cite for
love and moving it in a direction that we
as the Israelis
the Cabinet Room. The three Baltic leaders,
can all admire. And it would be a terrible
who are on a private visit to the United
tragedy if we took this Fast Track authority
583
June 18 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1982
Statement on the Extension of United States Sanctions on the
In Witness Where
my hand this 14th (
Export of Oil and Gas Equipment to the Soviet Union
of our Lord ninetee
June 18, 1982
two, and of the Inde
States of America
I have reviewed the sanctions on the
posing the sanctions has been and continues
sixth.
export of oil and gas equipment to the
to be to advance reconciliation in Poland.
Soviet Union imposed on December 30,
Since December 30, 1981, little has
1981, and have decided to extend these
changed concerning the situation in Poland;
sanctions through adoption of new regula-
there has been no movement that would
tions to include equipment produced by
enable us to undertake positive, reciprocal
Remarks of the
subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad, as
measures.
well as equipment produced abroad under
The decision taken today will, we believe,
Israel Following
licenses issued by U.S. companies.
advance our objective of reconciliation in
June 21, 1982
The objective of the United States in im-
Poland.
The President. It
have Prime Ministe
House again.
Proclamation 4948-Baltic Freedom Day
All of us share a
June 14, 1982
of the need to bring
the Middle East. To
By the President of the United States
people. The United States has never, over
portunity to exchan
of America
the intervening forty-one years, recognized
cause can be advar
the forcible incorporation of the Baltic
clear that we and Isr
A Proclamation
States into the Soviet Union.
the violence there
The independence of Lithuania, Latvia,
As a nation, we remain dedicated to the
pendent Lebanon un
and Estonia was extinguished in 1939 as a
furtherance and preservation of the funda-
strong, central gover
result of a nefarious deal struck between
mental human rights and freedoms of all
We agree that Isra
the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Hitler
people and take note on this special day of
ed to violence fror
handed Stalin the three Baltic republics as a
our hope that the blessings of liberty will
United States will
bonus to secure his cooperation in the de-
one day be part of the national life of the
achieve these goals a
struction of Poland and to obtain a secure
courageous people of Estonia, Latvia, and
drawal of all foreign
eastern frontier which enabled him to
Lithuania.
And, now, our
launch war against the western democra-
The Congress of the United States by
Begin.
cies. Subsequently, hundreds of thousands
Senate Joint Resolution 201 has authorized
The Prime Ministe
of Baltic nationals were deported to the
and requested the President to proclaim
dent.
Soviet Union where many of them perished
June 14 as Baltic Freedom Day.
Mr. President, la
in prisons and forced labor camps. The
darkest day of that great human tragedy
Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, Presi-
good afternoon. I'm
dent of the United States of America, do
friend, the President
occurred on June 14, 1941 when their
homes and jobs were taken by Russian set-
hereby designate June 14, 1982, as Baltic
for his invitation to
Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the
again, after my firs
tlers.
Today, some of the survivors of these
United States to reaffirm their belief and
1981, in the White H
mass deportations are citizens of the United
hope that the citizens of Latvia, Lithuania,
sion, a very fruitfu
President and his adv
States. Their aspirations for a better future
and Estonia and of all nations will one day
achieve through peaceful means the goals
Everybody of you
for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lith-
of democratic freedom and self-determina-
now a situation in tl
uania have helped to bring new meaning to
calls for activity, grea
our nation's commitment to freedom for all
tion.
798
PUBLIC LAW 102-17-MAR. 22, 1991
105 STAT. 57
Public Law 102-17
102d Congress
Joint Resolution
Designating June 14, 1991, and June 14, 1992, each as "Baltic Freedom Day".
Mar. 22, 1991
[H.J. Res. 167]
Whereas on June 14, 1941, the Soviet Union began mass deportation
to Siberia of peoples from the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania;
Whereas the United States has for the past 50 years refused to
recognize the forced incorporation of the Baltic republics into the
Soviet Union;
Whereas the Soviet Union has consistently refused to follow the
request of the United States that it begin negotiating a peaceful
end to the occupation of the Baltic republics;
Whereas the Baltic republics, which in 1990 reaffirmed independ-
ence from the Soviet Union, have not been allowed to pursue
policies which would realize the intent of these declarations;
Whereas the armed forces and secret police of the Soviet Union
continue to maintain an extensive presence in the Baltic
republics;
Whereas, although the Soviet Union has stated its intention to
pursue policies of Glasnost and Perestroika, recent events in the
Baltic republics indicate that the Soviet Union is not fully
committed to those policies;
Whereas the Soviet Union has consistently pursued measures which
and are contrary to its stated goal of sovereignty for Soviet republics;
Whereas the Soviet Union has not acted in accord with the Helsinki
agreements, which it signed 15 years ago, because it has not
allowed the Baltic republics to exercise their respective rights to
self-determination: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That June 14,
1991, and June 14, 1992, are each designated as "Baltic Freedom
Day", and the President of the United States is authorized and
requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the
United States to observe such days with appropriate ceremonies and
activities.
Approved March 22, 1991.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY-H.J. Res. 167:
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 137 (1991):
Mar. 5, considered and passed House.
Mar. 7, considered and passed Senate.
49-139 O 91 (17)
White House News Summary
Thursday, June 6, 1991
4:45 P.M. NEWS UPDATE
SOVIET AID/PRESIDENT (Aboard Air Force One/Reuter) -- President
Bush said the U.S. and Soviet Union were pushing hard for a
strategic arms accord and a summit, and he was convening a "rather
important" NSC meeting to expedite decisions. Bush said Secretary
Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh would try to iron out
differences on a START treaty and clear the way for an imminent
U.S.-Soviet summit when they meet on Friday. "I assume they' be
talking about a possible summit meeting, Bush told reporters
aboard the presidential jet en route to Washington. "But as I've
said before, we want to move START further along, so we'll be
talking substance. I'll be having a meeting when I get back this
afternoon, a rather important meeting, and that will help Secretary
Baker go ahead."
BALTICS/GORBACHEV (Stockholm/AP) -- Mikhail Gorbachev, stung by
criticism of his policy on the Baltics, warned Western powers
against getting involved in internal Soviet affairs by encouraging
separatist movements. Gorbachev visited Sweden and Norway, but his
Nobel triumph was clouded by questions about Soviet troop attacks
in secessionist Lithuania. "Compassion by a neighboring country
must not take the form of meddling in the affairs of the Soviet
Union, especially when it is in the process of reform," Gorbachev
said. The Soviet president, renewing his call for Western aid,
said "one should instead support this process, which is being
carried out within the framework of the constitution. To support
separatism and oppress minorities is not acceptable."
CIVIL RIGHTS/PRESIDENT (Robert Shepard, UPI) -- President Bush said
Congress should take a serious look at the civil rights bill he is
proposing and denied that his opposition to a Democratic measure
amounts to "divisive politics." Commenting on House passage of the
Democrats' bill, Bush said what he wants to happen next is for
"somebody to take a look at our legislation. I don't think any of
you have heard a serious analysis of our bill and the reason is
we're always playing from somebody's else's sheet of music, " Bush
told reporters on Air Force One.
FROHNMAYER/PRESIDENT (Atlanta/Chris Connell, AP) -- After the
Southern Baptists adopted resolutions Wednesday demanding that
President Bush fire NEA Chairman Frohnmayer, the President said,
Frohnmayer was "in a very difficult positions, and in my view he's
done a good job. It's tough because we don't want censorship, but
we don't want just plain sacrilegious junk being pedalled as art."
Bush said some works "put forward and called art that are totally
sacrilegious are deeply offensive to me. And I also think it's
offensive to John Frohnmayer."
GUN CONTROL/MITCHELL (UPI) -- Sen. Mitchell introduced gun control
legislation that he said would meet the goal of keeping weapons out
of the hands of criminals. Mitchell [who opposed the Brady Bill]
said it will be incorporated in anti-crime legislation that the
Senate expects to consider as early as next week. Mitchell's bill
would include a 7-day waiting period -- that would end when a
national phone-check system is fully in place -- but also requires
a background check prior to the sale of a handgun.
-erom-
THORNBURGH CRITICISM (UPI) -- [Responding to criticism from Sen.
Mitchell about the attorney general's timetable,] spokesman Dan
Eramian said, "The attorney general does not work for Mr. Mitchell.
He works for the President of the United States and the President
of the United States asked him to stay on."
MIDEAST ARMS (AP) -- The Bush administration will soon proceed with
billions of dollars worth of new weapons sales to the Mideast, a
senior State Department official said. Undersecretary of State
Bartholomew said the sales aren't at odds with President Bush's
goal of halting proliferation of all kinds of weapons in the
region. Bush's plan "is not aimed at preventing peaceful nations
from having the ability to defend themselves, Bartholomew said at
a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. "It is not aimed at
stopping the international transfer of arms." New sales "directly
undercut the notion of restraint," said Sen. Pell. "Having gone
through the wrenching Gulf war, how can we now countenance, much
less lead, a new arms race?"
SDI FUNDING (UPI) -- Seven of the Senate's most conservative
Republicans launched a bid to rescue the administration's SDI
program from deep cuts inflicted by the House. Some suggested that
the 1972 ABM Treaty needs to be reopened to permit deployment of
SDI weaponry. "A ballistic missile defense is clearly within the
technical ability of America, argued Sen. Wallop, who organized
the morning remarks. "It is not within the political ability."
IRAQ/FOOD DIVERSION (U.N./AP) -- Bush administration complaints
that Iraq is diverting emergency food supplies are exaggerated, the
U.N. said. "The problem has been dramatized out of proportion,"
said U.N. spokesman Giuliani. He said he had been informed that
some food had been diverted but "onde the World Food Program
pointed this out, the (Iraqi) government replenished what had been
taken, and there was no major problem."
STRAUSS NOMINATION (UPI) -- The leader of a conservative business
group downplayed earlier criticism of Robert Strauss' nomination
as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and said his group, the U.S.
Business and Industrial Council, would not try to block
confirmation.
AIDS (Atlanta/UPI) -- Assessing the U.S. AIDS epidemic 10 years
after it began, federal health officials projected the disease will
become the second leading cause of death of young men and one of
five leading causes of death among young women in 1991. "Clearly,
AIDS is taking its place as a common cause of death of young adults
in the United States,' said Dr. James Curran, director of the AIDS
division of the federal CDC.
###
06/06/91 11:04
202 726 6785
LATVIAN LEGATION
001
91 JUN 6 P12: 25
LEGATION OF LATVIA
4325 SEVENTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D.C 20011
Bob-
ATTN: MR. BOB SIMON
please. help
file.
1 page follows
tions were the triumph of the working classes. In solving the question
Socialist Republics has proclaimed the incorporation of the Republic
of the political regime "we turn our eyes toward the great example
of Latvin into the Soviet Union, I have the honor to inform you that I
002
set by the friendly peoples of the Soviet Union. Every worker in
consider this act to be nn outrageous infringement of international
1
the U.S.S.R. is guaranteed the right to work, to rest, to education
law, practice and morals and that I protest against this violation of
and to material support in his old age." The declaration continues
Latvin's integrity.
with eulogies of the Soviet system.
Although the U. S. S. R. has attempted to give a semblance of
A declaration concerning the incorporation of Latvin into Soviet
logality to the proceedings, a glance at the Constitution of Latvia
Union after accusing the former Government of oppressing the
shows that this "legality" is nothing but a flimay veil to cover the an-
peasants, squandering the conntry's wealth, increasing its indebted-
nibilation of the independence of FL weaker country by brutal forco,
ness and making the country dependent on foreign capitalists and
Article One of the Constitution of Latvia states that
bankers, accuses it of failure to fulfill the mutual aid pact of October
5, 1939 with the U.S.S.R. and states that n firm and stable union'
"1. Latvin is an independent democratic republic."
between Latvia and the U.S.S.R. must be legally established.
Articles Seventy-six and Seventy-seven of the Constitution further
A telegram to Stalin starts with eulogistic greetings and continues
state that
that the Sacima, expressing the will of the people, has unanimously
"70. Sacima [Parliament] 3 may amend the Constitution in sessions
established the Latvian Socialist Republic. Another telogram to
In which at least two-thirds of the members of Sacima participate.
Molotov is in the Bame voin.
Amendments shall be adopted in three readings by n majority of not
WASHINGTON
loss than two-thirds of the votes of the depution present."
LATVIAN LEGATION
"77. Should the Sacima amend Articles One, Two, Three or Six
861.01/2198 Telegram
of the Constitution, such amondments to attain legal force shall be
referred to FL national referendum."
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Scoretary of State
It is woll known that no referendum WAS carried out in Latvin and
Moscow, August 4, 1010.
that even the Sacima elections wore illegal, only one party being per-
[Recoived August4-10 48 A. m.]
mitted to run. Moreover, no referendum could have been enried out
057. The Supreme Soviet yesterday passed 11. law stating that It
in the presence of the huge military forcos of the Soviet Union occupy-
had resolved "to satisfy the request of the Seim of Lithuanin and to
ing Latvia, Thus the notion of the U. S. S. R. and of the Latvian
admit the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Union of
puppet Sacima in incorporating the Republic of Latvin into the
Soviet Socialist Republics as n constituent Soviet Socialist Republic
Soviet Union does not have the slightest constitutional legality.
possessing equal rights".
In view of the above and 118 the duly accredited envoy and repre-
Action with respect to Estonia and Latvin presumably will be taken
centative of the constitutional Government of Latvin to the United
202 726 6785
at meetings next week.
States of America, I have the honor respectfully to beg the United
THORSTON
States Government to refuse to recognize this prodatory act of the
U. S. S. R. whereby the Republic of Latvin has been robbed of its
800P.00/327
independence.
The Latvian Minister (Bilmanis) to the Secretary of State'
Accept [etc.]
DR. ALFRED BILMANIS
No. 701/502
WASHINGTON, August B, 1940,
Sm: With reference to my Notes dated July 18th, 18th and 23rd,"
$60P.01/80 Telegram
and in view of the fact that the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet
The Chargé in Latvia (Washington) to the Scoretary of State
06/06/91 11:04
"The Chargé in the Seviet Union informed the Department in (elegram No.
RIGA, August B, 1940-1 p.m.
972, August 0 (801.01/2100), and in telegram No. 080, August 7 (8601.01/73),
that the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union had similarly resolved to admit
[Received 1: 13 p. m.]
Latvin into the Soviet Union on August d, and Detonia on August 7.
$ Similar notes were presented to the Department by the Lithuanian Minister,
254. Latvin has greated the first day of its incorporation into Soviet
Povilns Zadeikis, on August 3, and by the Acting Consul General of Matonia in
Russia with no evidences of spontaneous enthusiasm. Manifestation
New York, In charge of the Estonlan Legation, Johnnnes Kniv, on August 6. The
is scheduled for 0 P. m., today however and members of trade unions
receipt of all three notes Was acknowledged on August 10 by the Commeter of the
Department, R. Walton Moore.
"None printed.
Brackets appear in the original note.
JSSR
ESTONIA
AND THE
nce
ESTONIANS
Toivo U. Raun
m
HOOVER INSTITUTION
STANFORD 885 TANFO PROMOTE will UN VERIF 1919
HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS
Stanford University
Stanford, California
The Post-Stalin Era
195
Aleksei Müürisepp (1961-1970)
Artur Vader (1970-1978)
Johannes Käbin (1978-1983)
Arnold Rüütel (1983-)
It is noteworthy that, after a string of four Russian-Estonians, Rüütel is the first
native Estonian to hold this post since Jakobson in 1958.
In conjunction with the promulgation of the new all-Union constitution in
1977, a similar one was proclaimed for the ESSR in 1978. In comparison to the
1940 constitution, the new document is much longer and more detailed. For the
first time the leading role of the Communist Party is specifically recognized, and
the goal of building communism, rather than socialism, sets the standard for
behavior. Although it updates the 1940 document and eliminates certain ob-
solete clauses, the practical significance of the new ESSR constitution appears
to be limited. Nevertheless, both the all-Union and ESSR constitutions of the
late 1970s can be seen as a codification of the centralizing tendencies of the
post-Khrushchev era. 22
DISSENT
Under the Stalinist regime, nonviolent dissent in Estonia had vir-
tually no basis for existence. As noted above, the only visible form of resistance
was the violent opposition of the pro-independence guerrilla movement. How-
ever, after 1953 the dismantling of most of Stalin's terror apparatus, the
rehabilitation of many of his victims, and the return of surviving deportees
contributed to a new era of rising political expectations. De-Stalinization
implied that the Soviet règime was ready for reforms. Nevertheless, the
Khrushchev era passed without fundamental change, and under Brezhnev the
Soviet authorities toed an increasingly harder political line. It was disappoint-
ment with the unfulfilled promises of reform that first led to the emergence of
open dissent in Moscow by the second half of the 1960s.
In Estonia dissent had appeared by 1968, no doubt on the Moscow model,
and was fueled by the effects of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of that
year. It is noteworthy that the first letters of protest from Estonia in the late
1960s were the work of both Estonians and non-Estonians and concerned
primarily civil rights issues rather than nationalist ones. By the 1970s, however,
nationalism had become the major theme of Estonian dissent. In 1972 the
Estonian Democratic Movement and the Estonian National Front, two small
dissident groups, demanded the restoration of Estonian independence and
called on the United Nations to administer the election of a constituent assem-
196
SOVIET ESTONIA
bly. In 1975 four members of the two groups were sentenced to five or six years
in prison for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."2³
Despite the crackdown by the authorities, the scope of Estonian dissent
broadened in the late 1970s. In 1977 eighteen natural scientists condemned the
pollution caused by careless and overly ambitious oil-shale and phosphorite
mining in Estonia. Estonian dissidents made contact with other Balts, resulting
most strikingly in the "Baltic appeal" for self-determination on the fortieth
anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1979 and a call for a Nordic
nuclear-free zone including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1981. One of the
Estonian signers of the "Baltic appeal," the long-term dissident and scientist
Mart Niklus, was sentenced in 1981 to a ten-year imprisonment. At the same
trial, fellow scientist Jüri Kukk, who had declared solidarity with the "Baltic
appeal," received a two-year sentence, but he died in mysterious circumstances
while on a hunger strike only two months later. The arrest and trial of Estonian
dissidents continued in the early 1980s as did various forms of protest against
the Soviet regime, including a call for a monthly "silent half-hour" at workplaces
and an increase in the number of defections to the West-in some cases by
highly placed individuals. 24 Among various Estonian samizdat publications the
most important and long-lived has been Lisandusi mõtete ja uudiste vabale
levikule Eestis (Some additions to the free flow of thoughts and news in Estonia).
In nineteen issues in 1978-1984 it reported mainly on dissident activity and
trials, but it also addressed other matters such as the situation in Poland.25
Although a tradition of spontaneous student demonstrations expressing
nationalist sentiments dates back to the 1960s, youth unrest has increased in the
recent past in the major cities. Tartu University has been the main center of
protests, but the largest demonstration took place in Tallinn in October 1980.
About 2,000 secondary-school students marched in the streets and shouted
slogans calling for an Estonia free from Russian rule. 26 The use of police force
to quell the demonstration as well as clashes with Russian students prompted
one of the most remarkable documents of the Soviet era in Estonia. In a signed,
open letter, 40 established Estonian intellectuals-some with excellent party
credentials-decried the increase in ethnic tensions in the ESSR and spoke out
in defense of the Estonian language and culture, which they regarded as
increasingly threatened in recent years. A second, unsigned letter from fifteen
Estonian intellectuals, dated March 1982, provides a blunter and more graphic
description of the growing role of Russians and the Russian language in
Estonia. A third, signed letter from thirteen Estonian dissidents in October
1982 appealed to Finnish firms and workers not to participate in the construc-
tion of the new Muuga harbor near Tallinn because it would only lead to the
further influx of Russians and other non-Estonians into Estonia. 27 In short,
during the Vaino years since 1978 the social base of dissent has broadened, and
The Post-Stalin Era
197
its major concern has shifted from political demands to the more fundamental
issues of national and cultural survival.
STRUCTURE OF THE
POST-STALIN ECONOMY
In the decades after Stalin's death the Estonian economy became
further integrated into the all-Union one, and Soviet authorities continued to
emphasize industrial development. By the late 1950s, for the first time in
Estonian history, the number of workers in industry had outnumbered those in
agriculture. However, in the 1960s and 1970s the proportion of industrial
workers remained nearly constant at 34-35 percent, and the share of agri-
cultural workers was cut in half from about 25 percent in 1960 to less than 13
percent in 1980. As might be expected in an increasingly developed economy,
employment in trade and in the service sector-material, educational, and
cultural-has shown the greatest increases in the last two decades. 28 If the
structure of the economy is measured by total annual output in rubles, the role
of industry has been dominant throughout the post-Stalin era (60 percent in
1956, 63 percent in 1983). In agriculture growing mechanization has partially
compensated for the loss of labor, keeping its share at 17 percent of total annual
output in 1983 as compared to 24 percent in 1956. The only other economic
sector worthy of mention in this regard is construction, whose contribution
to total output remained stable at 7-9 percent annually between 1956
and 1983.29
Economic ties with the other parts of the Soviet Union have played an
important role in the Estonian economy in the post-Stalin era. This develop-
ment reflects the Soviet emphasis on regional specialization as well as Estonia's
relative lack of raw materials for its growing industrial sector. In 1977, 82
percent of all imports to the ESSR and 93 percent of exports from it involved
other Soviet republics. Of the imports, 40 percent consisted of raw materials
and fuel. Among exports from Estonia in the early 1970s, three areas domi-
nated: light industry (30 percent), food products (24 percent), and machinery
(19 percent). In 1977, 55-60 percent of Estonia's external trade in both
directions was with the RSFSR. The share of the other union republics, from 12
percent for the Ukraine to 0.3 percent for Tadzhikstan in 1972, was generally
proportional to their size and inversely proportional to their distance from
Estonia. Outside the USSR, Estonia's main trading partners were, in order of
importance, Eastern Europe, Finland and Western Europe, and Third World
countries in Africa and Asia.³⁰
JUN- 6-91 THU 13:28 LITHUANIAN LEGATION
P.01
.
91 JUN 6 P I : 44 LITHUANIAN LEGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
2622 16th St., N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20009
Tel: 202-234-5860
Fax: 202-328-0466
MR. BOB SIMONDS - THE WHITE HOUSE FAX:456-6218
FAX MESSAGE TO :
STASYS LOZORAITIS - LEGATION OF LITHUANIA
FROM :
5
Number of Pages
(incl. Transmittal Page)
COMMENTS :
I AM ENCLOSING THREE DIPLOMATIC
DOCUMENTS SENT AFTER THE SOVIET
OCCUPATION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND TO THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR FOREIGN APPAIRS VISCOUNT
HALIFAX.
Scaofs
JUN- 6-91 THU 13:28 LITHUANIAN LEGATION
P.02
TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
CERTIFIED
American
Valstybems
LITHUANIAN LEGATION,
Wushington, D. C., July 22, 1940.
The Honorable CORDELL HULL,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
SIR: Referring to my communication of July 13, 1940, concerning the national
crisis precipitated by the Soviet Union's unlawful intervention in Lithuania's
internal affairs, I have the honor to invite your attention to the nature of that
intervention and to the results that followed.
On October 10, 1939, Lithuania formally entered into a Mutual Assistance Pact
with the Soviet Union, which was based on nonintervention in internal affairs
of either High Contracting Party. Limited garrisons of Soviet troops in
Lithuania were agreed upon. Lithuania, for obvious reasons, scrupulously ob-
served all the requirements of the Pact and expected, naturally, reciprocal
attitude from her collossal neighbor.
During the short period of comparative tranquility, satisfaction was expressed
by Soviet authorities concerning the treatment accorded the Red Army garri-
sons in Lithuania. But on May 25, 1940, like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky
came the news that Soviet officials advanced certain charges regarding mis-
treatment of Red Army soldiers in Lithuania, such as kidnapings and even death
of a soldier, presumably a deserter; there were also accusations directed against
the Entente of the Baltic States; charges and accusations not substantiated as
yet.
All efforts on the part of the Lithuanian Government to wipe out all possible
misunderstandings and suspicions and to placate the Soviet authorities, were
in vain; even Prime Minister Merkys' trip to Moscow did not bring any better-
ment of the situation nor did it obtain the necessary cooperation of the Soviet
authorities in clarifying their charges.
At midnight of June 14th, the Soviet Union Commissar for Foreign Affairs
presented an ultimatum to Mr. Urbsys, the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, who was in Moscow at that time by order of Prime Minister Merkys.
Only nine hours were given in which to comply with the terms of the ultimatum
which were as follows: (1) the prosecution of officials responsible for the alleged
provocative acts against the Red Army garrisons; (2) the formation of a pro-
Soviet government; (3) the admission into Lithuania of an unlimited number
of Soviet troops.
If the government of Mr. Merkys could be accused of any guilt, it certainly
was guilty not of provocative acts against the Red Army garrisons, but perhaps
of too lenient an attitude towards them. In this instance it is well to recall an
opinion of one great American statesman that, "The presence of troops of one
country on the soil of another constitutes prima facie evidence of aggression."
Although the terms of the Soviet ultimatum were incompatible with the letter
and spirit of the Mutual Assistance Pact and undoubtedly constituted an illegal
intervention in Lithuania's internal affairs, the Lithuanian Government, under
the circumstances and in view of the imminent Invasion of the Red Army, com-
plied with the terms and resigned. General Rastikis was designated by the
President of the Lithuanian Republic to form a new government, but this move,
which was the last act of the free government, failed because of the Soviet stand
taken. Mr. Justas Paleckis, the Soviet's choice, was named Prime Minister
instead.
JUN- 6-91 THU 13:30 LITHUANIAN LEGATION
P.03
TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
Amerikos
CERTIFIED
Pgn
Valstybeats
Concerning the Soviet Union's demand for unlimited numbers of Red Army
Hope to be stationed in Lithuania, it must be observed that such a demand
ould have been prompted by some emergency or by an anticipated attack by
European Power, as stipulated by Article Five of the Mutual Assistance
But the plain fact is that there was no emergency and no anticipated
ttack from anywhere. And if the Soviet Union's demand to Increase her army
rrisons in Lithuania were to constitute an extension of the Mutual Assistance
there is no doubt that there was no formal agreement entered into and
atified as required by law.
On June 15, 1940, numerous Red Army divisions crossed Lithuania's frontiers
at several points. H. E. Antanas Smetona, President of the Republic of Lith-
mania, as stated in my previous note, departed from the country and went abroad
without tendering his resignation as President. A few hours later n special
Commissar from Moscow arrived by plane to Kaunas to supervise the formation
of a new government. Thus on June 17, 1940, the Paleckis government came
Into being, as related in my note of June 25, 1940.
The parliamentary elections of July 14 and 15 were guarded by devastating
numbers of foreign troops, supervised by a special emissary from a foreign
capital and managed exclusively by one Party (the Communist Party) with a
single list of candidates, while other political parties that stand for the country's
Independence were barred from the polls. Therefore, such elections, regardless
of the high voting rate, as reported by the press despatches are illegal in all
respects as, under the above described circumstances, they not only cannot and
do not represent the true will of the free people, but at the same time they aim
at the very heart of national existence by usurping the sovereignty rights of
the free Lithuanian Nation as defined in Article One of the Constitution of the
Republic of Lithuania. This illegally elected body, the Seimas (Parliament),
on July 21, 1940, according to telegraphic despatches from Kaunas, declared
that from now on Lithuania is a Soviet Republic and requested membership in
the Union which, of course, was granted In advance by the Soviet government.
Thus with the creation of the Paleckis government, with the Red Army pres-
ent in all parts of Lithuania and new elections carried out to suit its purposes,
the government of the Soviet Union, using the most modern methods of veiled
aggression accomplished Its task-the destruction of the independence of the
Lithuanian Republic at such a time when peaceful conditions prevailed and the
development of friendly relations had a fair chance of success. This evil act
was committed by Soviet stratngem while the Lithuanian-Soriet Union Non-
Aggression Treaty was still in effect and the clause of non-intervention in inter-
nal affairs only eight months old.
The Treaty of Non-aggression between Lithuania and the Soviet Union sounds
rather Ironical in present circumstances:
ARTICLE 2. The Republic of Lithuania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lies mutually undertake to respect in all circumstances the sovereignty and terri-
torial Integrity and inviolability of each other.
"ARTICLE 3. Each of the two contracting parties undertakes to refrain from
any aggressive action whatsoever against the other party."
And another document worth while recalling at this time is the Convention for
the Definition of Aggression, signed in London, July 4, 1933, of which the
Soviet Union was the initiator and signatory. Article 2 of the Convention reads
as follows:
"Accordingly, the aggressor in an International conflict shall, without prej-
ndice to the agreements in force between the Parties to the dispute, he con-
sidered to he that State which is the first to commit any of the following
actions:
"(a)
"/hi with or without a declaration of war. of
Extended Page
3.1
(b) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration UI war, V4
the territory of another State;
"(c) # # #
"ARTICLE 3. No political, military. economic or other considerations may serve
as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article 2."
The Soriet Union, concerned solely with her own interests, found it expedient
to deny even the elementary rights to her smaller neiglibor. This, evidently, is
the common way of an aggressor.
As a duly appointed representative of the sovereign State of Lithuania, I
voice my solemn protest against the unprovoked aggression and occupation of
Lithuania by the Red Army of the Soviet I... Union the and subsequent incorporation
Government of the Union of
JUN- 6-91 THU 13:32 LITHUANIAN LEGATION
P.04
TRUE AND CORRECT copamerikos
CERTIFIED
Rend
Здащин
No. 1009
LITHUANIAN LEGATION,
Washington, D. C., August 3, 1940.
The Honorable CORDELL HULL,
Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.
SIR: According to information available, the supreme Soviet authority of the
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on August 3, 1940 made a move to incor-
porate the Republic of Lithuania into the Soviet Union, thus not only completing
a process whereby the Lithuanian nation has been deprived, temporarily at least,
of her independence and the possibility of exercising her sovereignty rights, but
also inflicting untold suffering and misery upon the innocent people.
The government of the Soviet Union, in order to camouflage its devious meth-
ods of aggression and to confuse world opinion. was eager to base this ignomin-
lous move against Lithuania's integrity on a resolution made in Moscow but
adopted in Kaunas on July 21, 1940 by the Seimas (Parliament) which, in fact,
was elected illegally and was one of the hyproducts of the Soviet invasion. But
the Soviet leaders for obvious reasons failed to mention the Lithuanian-Sorlet
treaties broken by them: the Treaty of Nonaggression, for example, extended
to 1945; the Lithuanian-Soviet Russian Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920, the first
Article of which reads as follows:
"Relying on the strength of a declaration made by the Federal Soviet Socialist
Republic of Russia to the effect that all peoples of every nationality have the
right of self-determination and complete separation from the State to which
they belonged previously, Russia. without any reservation whatsoever, recognizes
Lithuania as n self-governing and independent State with all Juridical conse-
quences that follow from such n recognition and in a spirit of free and good will
renounces all sovereignty rights of Russia concerning the Lithuanian nation and
Lithuanian territory which previously belonged to her. The fact that Lithuania
for some time was under Russian sovereignty does not impose on the Lithuanian
people and their territory any obligations towards Russia."
As the so-called Parliamentary elections of July 14 and 15. 1940, and the forced
adoption of я resolution to join the Soviet Union were utterly void of legality,
AS referred to in my previous note of July 22. 1940. so is the incorporation of
Lithuania. together with her historic capital Vilnins and the Vilnins District,
into the Soviet system a lawless net. contrary to elementary rules of interna-
tional conduct-an net that is in fact the final phase of velled aggression and
Imposition by threat of force of the Soviet's will upon its weaker neighbor.
As the duly accredited representative of the Sovereign Republic of Lithnania
near the Government of the United States of America I repeat my protest against
the unprovoked aggression and illegal incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet
Union and at the same time express the hope of the Lithuanian nation that no
State in the world will recognize this international outrage as having any legality
or bona fide excuse.
I take this opportunity to express my most profound gratitude to the American
Government for the stand taken in this matter as evidenced in the statement by
the Soviet Socialist Republics. Lithuania, with her rich historic traditions dat
ing back from the XII century, her ancient language, her devotion to religion and
western culture, has the undisputable right to independence and free economic
development. During twenty-two years of independent existence, Lithuania,
comprising 24,000 square miles of territory and with her population of three
million souls, who differ racially and linguistically from the Soviet Russiana,
thanks only to the spirit of independence was able to convincingly demonstrate
to her neighbors and to the world her ability of self-government and to achieve
rapid progress in every respect.
In view of the foregoing, I deem it my duty to register my plea and my hope
that the Government of the United States of America champion of legal
Extended Page
4.1
that the Government of the United States of America, champion of legal inter-
course among nations, will consider this present Soviet occupation of Lithuania
as an illegal act contrary to the spirit of International Law, and will accord,
if possible, every assistance to Lithuanian citizens wherever there are no legal
representatives of the Lithuanian State.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
P. ZADEIKIS,
Minister of Lithuania.
JUN- 6-91 THU 13:34 LITHUANIAN LEGATION
P.05
AND CORRECT COPY
CERTIFIED
alsoybems
1103
TOADIEFT
23d JULY, 1940.
The Rt. Hon. VISCOUNT HALIFAN. K. G., P. C., G. S. C. I.. G. C. I. E.,
Ilis Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office, London, S. W. 1.50
MY LORD: I consider It my painful duty to inform you that my country has be-
come a victim of unprovoked aggression committed by the Soviet Government in
violation of a series of treaties by which the Soviet Government had solemnly
undertaken to abstain from direct or indirect aggression against Lithuania.
2. As late as 10th October, 1939, a treaty was concluded between the Soviet
Union and Lithuania, providing for the stationing of a limited number of Russian
garrison troops in Lithuania, ostensibly for the mutual protection of both States.
This treaty contains the following provision:
"The fulfilment of the present treaty shall not in any way affect the sovereign
rights of the contracting parties. particularly their State organization, economic
and social system, military methods, and generally, the principle of noninter-
vention in internal affairs. (Article VII)."
3. On June 14, 1940, on the pretext of entirely false charges, the Soviet Govern-
ment abruptly confronted my Government with an ultimatum, presented at mid-
night of that day and expiring nine hours later: demanding unlimited occupa-
tion of Lithuania by Soviet military forces and the formation of a new Govern-
ment ucceptable to the U. S. S. R. while the entire country came under the rigid
occupation of the Soviet military forces.
5. On July 14th and 15th, elections were staged for the return of a new Parlia-
ment which, on July 21st, decided unanimously, it is claimed, to surrender the
independence of Lithuania and asked for incorporation into the U. S. S. R.
6. It must be obvious to any impartial and unprejudiced observer that neither
the "elections" held under the pressure of foreign occupational troops nor the
so-called Parliament constituted under such conditions can in any manner what-
soever reflect the will of the Lithuania people: they did not possess a shred of
electoral liberty or the remotest possibility of expressing their true wishes.
7. In these circumstances, my duty as a representative of the Lithuanian
people in this country, is to voice a most solemn protest against this wanton act
of aggression against my country. At the same time, I wish to declare that I
am unable to recognize as valid and binding any decision of the Parliament
elected under foreign domination or any act of the Government formed and
acting under duress.
8. Bringing the above to the notice of His Majesty's Government, I venture
to hope that His Majesty's Government, themselves engaged in a struggle "till
freedom for ourselves and others is secured" (to use your Lordship's own inspir-
ing words of yesterday) will decline to recognize the acts depriving Lithuania
of her freedom.
I have the honour to he,
With the highest consideration,
My Lord,
Your obedient Servant,
TD b BALUTIS
LATVIA
COUNTRY AND PEOPLE
CHIEF EDITOR
J.
RUTKIS
N
F
LATVIAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION
STOCKHOLM
274
GOVERNMENT
are run by managers (directors) chosen by the Party. The consumer's cooperatives,
too, are not independent organizations. Actually, they are part of the State goods
distribution system.
There are no cultural organizations worthy of their name. During the "thaw", in
1956, the Latvian Ministry of Culture planned to establish a "Latvian Cultural
Society" with sections throughout the country. Its purpose would have been to revive
the traditions of free Latvia. However, the realization of this plan was not permitted.
Factories, kolkhozes, et cetera, have "clubs" which occasionally arrange lectures,
concerts or theatrical performances but mostly they have to engage in communistic
and anti-religious propaganda.
The actual position of the "social organizations" may be characterized by a state-
ment of Dr. M. Valters: "The Bolshevik monstre recognizes no other law than that
imposed by the Communist Party". 33
THE LIFE-STRUGGLE OF THE LATVIAN NATION
The Soviet occupation has shaken the very foundations of the Latvian people,
whose existence as a national unit is now threatened more than ever before in their
history. The major actions directed against their national, political and cultural
interests are:
1. Genocide, as defined in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, signed in 1948 and endorsed by the Soviet
Union. The Soviet regime, in addition to mass executions, has deported Latvian
citizens, mostly to the Arctic regions of Siberia and other areas with a harsh climate.
Some 70 percent of the deportees have perished there in forced labour camps, and only
a minor number survived to fall under the provisions of the so-called amnesty issued
after Stalin's death. According to an estimate by Professor A. Švãbe, Latvia lost
35,000 or 1.89% of her population during the first Soviet occupation (1940/41).
This percentage would represent 2,400,000 persons in the United States, 865,000 in
Great Britain and 205,000 in Canada. Under the 2nd Russian occupation (since 1944)
Soviet terror and deportations have exacted an even heavier toll of Latvians. 34
2. Deportation of Latvian youths continued under Khrushchev, disguised as a
"voluntary" large-scale transfer of labour to Kazakhstan and other newly developed
agricultural and industrial areas.
3. Colonization by aliens, mostly Russians, sent to take the place of deported Lat-
vians. As a result of this process, which tends to expand, the proportion of ethnic
Latvians in the Latvian population is decreasing (see Population).
4. Russification is deliberately pursued by the present regime in several ways. The
first is by means of school policy. Russian is a compulsory subject in all schools in
Latvia; there have been established the so-called "amalgamated schools" where Lat-
vians study together with Russians and other non-Latvians; in addition, Latvians
are urged to send their children to Russian schools (i.e. schools where all subjects are
taught in Russian) because, it is said, the graduates of such schools would have
greater opportunities later on. Secondly, the appointment of Russians to leading posi-
tions in the "Party and government", law courts, industry, commerce and agriculture
causes Russian to become the language in which business is transacted in all govern-
mental agencies. Thirdly, and this is the most important point, there is the new (1961)
programme of the Soviet Communist Party. Its section, "Tasks of the Party in the
Field of National Relations", calls for the total elimination of national character-
istics. It admits that the "disappearance of linguistic differences" may prove a long-
GOVERNMENT
275
range proposition but declares that "all the Soviet nations are developing a common
international culture" and that "for all the people of the U.S.S.R., Russian has
already become the language of mutual communication and cooperation". As regards
the future, the programme utters definite threats: "No expression of national pecu-
liarities will be tolerated in the Soviet Republics as regards the training and employ-
ment of officials belonging to different nationalities. The suppression of any expres-
sion of nationalism is in the interests of all the nations and peoples of the U.S.S.R."³
Hence, the programme calls for the elimination of a Latvian nation and the dis-
solution of their national culture into an "international" one, actually into a uniform
Russified culture of the "Soviet man".
LATVIAN RESISTANCE
It goes without saying that these Soviet measures have not failed to cause reaction
on the part of the Latvians. There have been open fights and the Latvian opposition
has never entirely ceased. It should be recalled here that the right of every people
to independent existence is not only an integral part of international law, but is also
recognized by the United Nations' Declaration on Human Rights, especially by the
amendments proposed by its drafting committee, viz.: "Whenever a government, a
group of persons or an individual seriously or systematically violates the basic rights
and basic freedoms of man, both individuals and peoples have the right to resist
oppression and tyranny". Such resistance has, indeed, been shown by the Latvians
to the Soviet regime.
First in this connection should be mentioned the armed clashes between more or
less spontaneously formed Latvian guerilla groups and minor units of the Red Army,
during the early stage of the Russo-German war in 1941. There followed the Latvian
military units which fought on the East Front. Whatever the conditions under which
these units were formed, their basic purpose was to fight against a regime that had
deprived their nation of freedom and had imposed on them a way of life alien to
their tradition and mentality. They fought in the hope of preventing the return of
the Soviet regime to their country. Their siding with the Germans against the Rus-
sians (not the West) was no more morally reprehensible than was the alliance between
the Western Powers and Soviet Russia. Moreover, there was certainly no love lost
between the Latvians and National Socialist Germany, while in the West - during
the war and in the postwar period - even influential groups favoured the transfor-
mation of their military alliance with Stalin's regime into a lasting peace-time co-
operation, although it was the same regime that had killed or deported millions of
Ukrainians during the enforced farm collectivization in the 1930s, that had given
Hitler a free hand to invade Poland and, by the same token, to start World War II,
had participated in the 4th partition of Poland, had been expelled from the League
of Nations for aggression against Finland and had killed thousands of Polish officers
at the Katyn camp.
After Germany's capitulation in May 1945, some of the units of the Latvian Legion
did not lay down arms but took to the woods and continued their fight against the
Red Army, until 1949 when the last guerillas were killed or captured. Adolfs Šilde,
who has described the heroic fight of these Latvian Legionaries quotes their oath:
"Before God and my people, I swear to devote all my thoughts and efforts to the
fight for the Latvian people".36 These former legionaries were joined by Latvian
farmers who had lost their land and equipment as a result of the forced agricultural
collectivization drive started in 1948. Tens of thousands - farmers and their family
276
GOVERNMENT
members - were then deported to Siberia while the younger men went into hiding in
the woods, from where they fought a desperate fight against the Russian oppressors.
Opposition against the occupation regime, i.e. the Russian central power in Mos-
cow, developed even within the Latvian Communist Party. The post-Stalin thaw
gave rise to manifestations of "national communism" even in Latvia. Groups of Lat-
vian communists wished to bring about radical changes: to arrest the flow of non-
Latvians to Latvia, to preserve Latvian culture and schools and to put an end to the
economic exploitation of Latvia by Russia. This movement was headed by E. Ber-
klavs, a member of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party and was
supported by trade-union and Communist-Youth members, as well as by students. It
was considered serious enough to demand Khrushchev's personal intervention. He
came to Riga in 1959 and initiated a purge which resulted in 800 Latvian function-
aries being "purged" and replaced by Russians sent by Moscow. In fact, viewed
against the background of intensified Russification, the purge - elimination of Lat-
vian elements from the Latvian Communist Party - still continues.
Yet the spirit of opposition is still alive among the Latvians. Since 1959 it seems to
have had no organized leadership, but is occasionally manifested by acts of sabotage
and by spontaneous actions, against restrictions and prohibitions imposed on Lat-
vians by the Russians.
LATVIAN EXILES
While the Soviet regime imposes silence on the Latvians in their own country, their
cause is defended by the Latvian exiles in the free world. During the war some
125,000 Latvians left their homes and have now found refuge in the United States,
Canada, Australia, England, West Germany, Sweden and many other countries. In
each of these countries they have formed their national committees or councils, as
the case may be, which in turn have established central organizations whose purpose
is to work for the restoration of independent Latvia. Thus, there is in Europe the
European Centre of the Committee for Restoration of Latvia, founded in 1952, with
headquarters in London. A global organization - the Latvian Association in the
Free World - was formed subsequently. In addition to these organizations, open to
all Latvians in a country of refuge or a wider area, there are a number of specialized
bodies. The larger political parties, such as the Social Democrats, Agrarians, Liberals,
New Settlers and Latgallian Christian Democrats have set up their exile centres. The
"Daugavas Vanagi", a veterans organization, primarily cares for war invalids, aged
people, and orphans on a world-wide basis. Specialized organizations, such as the
Latvian National Foundation, with headquarters in Stockholm, Sweden, are engaged
in the collection and spreading of information about conditions in Soviet-occupied
Latvia. There are very active Latvian youth organizations in the different continents
of the free world. All of them promote the cause of Latvian freedom in one way
or other.
Significant is the cooperation of Latvians with representatives of other oppressed
nations. Here we may mention the Committee for A Free Latvia, established in 1951
within the framework of the American organization, "Free Europe", and especially
the joint organization of the Eastern and Central European countries known as the
Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN), founded in 1954. Its Latvian
group or delegation was long headed by the experienced diplomat Dr. Vilis Masens
until his death in 1964. He has been succeeded by Major Vilis Hazners. The late
Adolfs B|odnieks (former Prime Minister, and member of both the Committee for a
GOVERNMENT
277
Free Latvia and ACEN) states in his book devoted to the struggle for Latvia's
freedom:
" ACEN was established in New York on September 20, 1954, by the
representatives
of the Albanian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Estonian, Hungarian,
Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and Romanian nations.
"In many meetings the ACEN did endeavour to speak on behalf of the said nine
European nations, asking for freedom and independence for one hundred million
peoples now in Soviet captivity and not represented in the international bodies or
misrepresented in the United Nations by their occupants.
"
the captive peoples place their hopes on the free world, the guardians of the
rights of man. They trust that their just and legitimate aspirations to be free and to
enjoy the rights guaranteed by the United Nations charter cannot be disregarded
unless the free world is prepared to forsake the very basis on which it stands.
"To voice the rightful aspirations of the silenced captive European peoples is the
right and the duty of the exiled representatives of the Soviet-enslaved peoples in the
free world."
It goes without saying that the efforts of the Latvian exile organizations receive
support from those Latvian diplomatic representatives who enjoy a more or less of-
ficial status in their respective countries of residence. Since the death of Envoy Kärlis
Zarinš (1881-1963), the senior diplomats are Professor Dr. Arnolds Spekke (1887)
in the United States and Mr. Roberts Liepins (1890) in Federal Germany. The Lat-
vian objective of regaining political independence is likewise backed by the Latvian
exile press, as well as by foreign newspapers, broadcasting stations and other infor-
mation agencies that promote the cause of freedom throughout the world.
THE LATVIAN PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
WESTERN STANDPOINTS
The Soviet military occupation of 1940, renewed in 1944, and Latvia's annexation
by the Soviet Union constitute an international delict to which the countries of the
free world have reacted in different ways.
To date the staunchest stand has been taken and the most consistent policy fol-
lowed by the United States. As early as June 23, 1940 the Washington government
declared that it did not recognize the devious processes by which the Soviet Union
had seized control over the Baltic countries. In line with the principle known as
Stimson's doctrine ("no country shall subject another country by means of force"),
the United States has rejected repeated Soviet demands for recognition of the in-
corporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. Washington continues to re-
cognize Latvia's existence as a subject of international law and, accordingly, to re-
cognize Latvian diplomatic and consular representatives in the United States.
In recent years, this American attitude has also been expressed by the following
resolution on the Baltic States, adopted by the United States House of Representatives
and Senate:
Calendar N. 1573
H. CON. RES. 416
[Report No. 1606]
BALTIC STATES IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 23, 1966
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
September 19 (legislative day, September 7), 1966
Reported by Mr. Fulbright, without amendment
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
278
GOVERNMENT
Whereas the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of
the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and
cooperation; and
Whereas all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social,
cultural, and religious development; and
Whereas the Baltic peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been forcibly
deprived of these rights by the Government of the Soviet Union; and
Whereas the Government of the Soviet Union, through a program of deportations
and resettlement of peoples, continues in its effort to change the ethnic character
of the populations of the Baltic States; and
Whereas it has been the firm and consistent policy of the Government of the United
States to support the aspirations of Baltic peoples for self-determination and
national independence; and
Whereas there exist many historical, cultural, and family ties between the peoples
of the Baltic States and the American people: Be it
1
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
2
concurring), That the House of Representatives of the
3
United States urge the President of the United States-
4
(a) to direct the attention of world opinion at the
5
United Nations and at other appropriate international
6
forums and by such means as he deems appropriate, to
7
the denial of the rights of self-determination for the
8
peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and
9
(b) to bring the force of world opinion to bear
10
on behalf of the restoration of these rights to the Baltic
11
peoples.
Passed the House of Representatives June 21, 1965.
House Concurrent Resolution 416 was adopted by the House of Representatives
by a vote of 293 yeas to no nays on June 21, 1965, and unanimously passed by
the United States Senate on October 22, 1966.
During World War II Great Britain recognized Latvia's incorporation de facto,
but she has refused a de jure recognition of the Soviet action. Some countries in the
British Commonwealth, such as Canada and Australia, have rejected Moscow's de-
mands for recognition of the incorporation in a more definite manner.
Some Western countries (France, Italy, Switzerland) have, it is true, withdrawn
recognition from the Latvian legations in their capitals and thus de facto recognized
the annexation, yet a de jure recognition has not been declared.
A number of countries of the free world (Spain, Portugal, Eire, Colombia, Uru-
guay and others) have followed the example set by the United States and have
recognized Latvia's incorporation neither de facto nor de jure.
Since the Soviet rule in Latvia has not been recognized de jure, the restoration of
Latvian sovereignty would imply under the international law not the creation of
a new State but only the reinstitution of the Latvian Republic in its former status.
GOVERNMENT
279
LATVIA AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER
During World War II President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States and
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed on the "Atlantic Charter", i.e.
on basic principles governing the sovereign rights of the peoples and the liberation
of forcibly occupied countries. It was a declaration under international law and there
was all reason to expect that its demands would be realized after the war. Later
(May 14, 1944) Churchill, speaking in the British parliament, claimed that the Char-
ter was designed only as a "war-time programme" of the Allied Powers and therefore
should not be considered as a source of law. This post-factum denial of the Charter's
basic aims is untenable, at least from the technical viewpoint, because (1) this
bilateral document had become a multilateral one through the accession to it on Sept.
24, 1941 of the Belgian, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Greek, Luxemburg, Netherlands,
Norwegian, Soviet, Polish and Free French (de Gaulle) governments; the representa-
tives of these governments declared adherence to "the general political principles of
the statement" and pledged "to do their best" to implement them; (2) the Yalta con-
ference (Feb. 3-11, 1945) expressly confirmed "the principles of the Atlantic
Charter": viz. that "all peoples have the right to choose the form of government they
desire, to have restored to them their sovereignty and self-government of which they
have been deprived by aggressors, to create a provisional government with a broad
representation of all democratic groups, which shall as soon as possible hold elections
that would reflect the nation's will and, if necessary, to promote the organization of
such elections. Winston Churchill was not authorized to renounce unilaterally
these principles which had validity under international law.
LATVIA AND THE UN CHARTER
Whatever the reason, the principles of the Atlantic Charter have not become a
source of law of practical significance. Are there any other internationally binding
provisions that nations which have been, in the words of the Atlantic Charter,
forcibly deprived of their sovereign rights might invoke? The United Nations bylaws,
without expressly naming any country, embody the same inalienable principles of
the rights of man, national self-determination and political independence as were
introduced into the sphere of international law by the American President Woodrow
Wilson in 1918 through his "Fourteen Points", which promoted the rise of a number
of new sovereign states, including Latvia. A few of the provisions of the United
Nations bylaws may be quoted here: Art. 4-2 says that "all UN members shall
refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any country"; Art. 32: "any country, even if not a member of UN, but that is
party to a dispute with another country, may be invited to the Security Council,
without having a vote in her case", Art. 34: "The Security Council may examine
and decide any question (issue) that may cause international complications, in order
to preserve international peace and security"; and Art. 55: "The UN has the right
to demand that there exist among the peoples peaceful and friendly relations, in ac-
cordance with the principles of equality and self-determination of peoples". In ad-
dition, the UN bylaws provide for sanctions, including expulsion from the UN, to be
applied against recalcitrant members (Art. 6).³⁹
280
GOVERNMENT
These provisions of the United Nations bylaws are explicit enough. And yet the
world organization has not been able to settle major outstanding political issues, such
as the restoration of freedom to countries subjugated by the Kremlin.
CONCLUSIONS
Whatever her political regime, Russia has always-under Peter I, Stalin, Khrushchev
or Brezhnev-regarded the Baltic area as an obstacle to its imperialistic westward
expansion. An Eastern Bloc dominated by Greater Russia is and will be a permanent
threat to the European nations. The liberation of Latvia, the two other Baltic States
and the so-called Soviet satellites from Moscow's control is not only a regional
problem. A free East Europe is a prerequisite for the preservation of all European
peoples from the imperialistic designs of the Kremlin. A Latvian geographer has
calculated that, before World War II, the Soviet westward expansion was obstructed
by five independent countries whose protective wall extended over 3400 kilometres
from Finland to the Black sea. During World War II this wall was seized by the
Soviet Union, which thus has pushed the western defence lines 1000-1200 kilometres
further west.
These are plain facts. What conclusions do they permit? What are the prospects
for the restoration of Latvian political independence?
History (along with the history of international law) may provide us with an
answer, since it gives examples and offers comparisons. The Latvian occupation has
now lasted more than 25 years, yet there are peoples who have reacquired their
independence after hundreds and even thousands of years have passed. The Irish
lost their freedom in 1014 and fully recovered it as late as 1949. Bohemia (Czecho-
slovakia) came under the Habsburg rule early in the 17th century and became free
after 300 years. The 3rd partition and elimination of free Poland took place in 1795,
its restoration became possible in 1917. And even more significant is the reestablish-
ment of the State of Israel after some 2000 years.
What is the decisive factor in the national independence of a country? The "bal-
ance of power" is subject to change and with it the destinies of individual nations.
International treaties likewise do not provide an absolutely safe foundation, since
treaties may expire or become obsolete and the stronger country may violate the
rights of the weaker one. But the sovereign will of a people, being a natural right,
knows no limitations in time, provided the people itself does not lose the will to be
free and independent. The Irish had preserved their determination for some one
thousand years. The same is true of the Jewish Zionists who, scattered all over the
world, reestablished their country, returning to the land of their forefathers after
2000 years. And if the Latvians do not lose the determination to restore Latvia's
freedom, the time will come when it will bear fruit. For the sovereign will of a
people is a source of international law. In this sense one should understand the words
of the Latvian historian and jurist, Professor A. Švãbe: "The 18th of November of
1918 is neither the beginning nor the end of the struggle for the Latvian people and
the Latvian State".
Administration of George Bush, 1990 / June 14
Proclamation 6146-Baltic Freedom
themselves and for their children-these
Day, 1990
are the just aspirations of the people-of Es-
tonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. On this Baltic
June 14, 1990
Freedom Day, we reaffirm our support for
By the President of the United States
them.
of America
The Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution
251, has designated June 14, 1990, as
A Proclamation
"Baltic Freedom Day" and has authorized
The struggle for Baltic freedom has en-
and requested the President to issue a proc-
tered a new era of great promise and hope.
lamation in observance of this event.
The 50-year-long effort by the peoples of
Now, Therefore, I, George Bush, Presi-
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to regain
dent of the United States of America, do
freedom and democracy has begun to bear
hereby proclaim June 14, 1990, as Baltic
fruit.
Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the
The international community has long de-
United States of America to observe this
cried the dark summer of 1940 when, as a
day with appropriate remembrances and
result of a self-serving agreement made ear-
ceremonies to reaffirm their commitment
lier by Hitler and Stalin in the Molotov-
to principles of freedom and liberty for all
Ribbentrop Pact, the Baltic States were
oppressed people.
denied their independent status. During
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set
that fateful summer, Soviet troops invaded
my hand this fourteenth day of June, in the
and occupied the Baltic States. The rigged
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
elections that followed put an end to Baltic
ninety, and of the Independence of the
self-determination.
United States of America the two hundred
These events, however, did not end the
and fourteenth.
desire of the Baltic peoples for freedom and
George Bush
independence. During the past year, they
have taken major steps toward achieving
[Filed with the Office of the Federal Regis-
self-determination. Generally free and fair
ter, 11:12 a.m., June 15, 1990]
elections based on a vigorous multiparty po-
litical system produced popular legislatures.
In decisions reflecting the will of the Baltic
geniume
peoples, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia have
Proclamation 6147-Father's Day, 1990
asserted their intention to restore their in-
June 14, 1990
dependence. The representatives of the
Baltic peoples have taken a nonviolent path
By the President of the United States
and have consistently appealed for dialogue
of America
and negotiations with Moscow.
A Proclamation
For 50 years the United States has re-
fused to recognize the forced incorporation
Each year, on the third Sunday in June,
of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.
we pause to honor our fathers and to ex-
As I assured the Prime Minister of Lithua-
press our gratitude for their generosity and
nia during her recent visit, the United
devotion. Father's Day is more than a day
States will remain faithful to this policy. We
rich in family love and tradition-it is also a
istory
support self-determination for the Baltic
day when we are deeply mindful of the
peoples, and we call upon the Soviet Union
many ways fathers strengthen our commu-
to enter a good-faith dialogue with repre-
nities and Nation.
unitage
sentatives of the Baltic governments who
As children, we cannot fully fathom the
received popular mandates in free and fair
depth of our father's love for us. Neither
elections. We are encouraged by recent
can we fully realize the weight of his re-
steps in that direction and hope that a full
sponsibilities. Children cherish their father's
and productive dialogue will materialize.
affection and attention, as well as the time
The right to liberty and self-determina-
they spend together-be it playing a favor-
tion; free and fair elections; a better life for
ite game, assembling a kite or train set, or
BALTIOS Nexis.
1) Angela Nelsao- 1
Baltic-Amercan from Lge.
2) DR. Olgents Pavlovshis
Chmn of fout
Nat/Commidee.
5
Other disnitances
3)
MAIDO KARI, of the
Balhc Wird Comicel.
4)
Juhan Simonson -
PRES(?) Amer icam NoM Babic
Asin,
Rose Marden HE
LITHUANIA
700 Years
Edited by DR. ALBERTAS GERUTIS
Translated by ALGIRDAS BUDRECKIS
Introduction by RAPHAEL SEALEY
MANYLAND BOOKS
New York
Liberation Attempts from
Abroad
by ALGIRDAS BUDRECKIS
I. AN IDEALISTIC CRUSADE, 1940-45
1.
Almost one million Lithuanian immigrants and their descend-
ants lived in the United States before World War II. Numerous
communities of Lithuanians, numbering an additional 100,000,
were living in Great Britain, Canada, and the countries of South
America. Most of them had their own cultural and religious
organizations, as well as thirty-five newspapers. The Lithuanians
abroad reacted most strongly against the Soviet invasion of their
homeland. Special committees for Lithuanian liberation were or
ganized in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Canada and the United
States. It is the activities of the major liberation movements with
which we will be concerned in this study.
While the Lithuanians did not despair and were determined
to continue their opposition to the Kremlin's domination by all
available means, they also realized that, by themselves, they were
too weak to throw off the rule of the Soviet Union. Their eyes,
therefore, turned toward the international sector. They refused
to believe that the free world would remain passive spectators to
the unprecedented Lithuanian tragedy, especially since the occu-
pation of their country was not of their own choosing.
The Lithuanian people were encouraged by the indignation
393
and protest expressed in behalf of the United States government
by the then Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, in June,
1940, and by the assurances given to the American Lithuanian
Council several months later by United States President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt. They had an almost naive belief that Nazi
Germany would first crush the Soviet Union and then, in turn,
be defeated by the Anglo-American alliance, which would restore
Europe on an ante bellum status. The Lithuanians in the Nazi-
occupied homeland and abroad believed in the sanctity of the
wartime legal commitments and political pledges of the great
Western powers, as set forth in the Atlantic Charter. The At-
lantic Charter, proclaimed by President Roosevelt and the prime
minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, brought new hope
to the Lithuanians. It stipulated that no territorial changes should
take place unless freely accepted by the clearly expressed will of
the interested populations (Article 2 of the Charter). Referring
to the old democratic principle of the right of all people to self-
determination, the leaders of the Anglo-Saxon democracies pledged
themselves, in Article 3 of the Charter, to respect the right of all
people to choose the form of government under which they will
live; and declared it to be their wish to see sovereignty and self-
government restored to those who had been forcibly deprived
of them. These principles apply in every respect to Lithuania.
The free Lithuanians believed in the sanctity of the United
Nations Declaration and the Yalta Declaration on liberated Eu-
rope, which promised the restoration of independence to nations
which had fallen victims to aggressive powers. They believed with
a crusading ardor that the universal application and implementa
tion of the right of all people to self-determination does not stop
at the Iron Curtain.
Their optimistic enthusiasm suffered a setback on February
11, 1945, when a communiqué was issued making known the
results of the conference held at Yalta in which the participants
were President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston
Churchill and Joseph Stalin. The Yalta Agreement, confirming
the division of Europe into military zones previously adopted at
the Conference at Teheran, ultimately decided the fate of Central
and Eastern Europe, as Soviet military occupation was bound to
394
turn into Communist political domination. By the same token,
the fate of all nations of Central and Eastern Europe was sealed.
2.
At the beginning of Soviet-Lithuanian friction in 1940, the
Lithuanian Foreign Ministry felt that arrangements should be
made to continue government functions in case the Soviet Union
occupied Lithuania. The post of diplomatic chief was conceived
in conjunction with Telegram 288 sent by the Lithuanian For-
eign Minister Juozas Urbšys on June 2, 1940, to Stasys Lozo-
raitis, envoy to Rome: "If we are met with a catastrophe, Stasys
Lozoraitis is to be held chief of the remaining diplomatic corps
abroad." Two alternates were also designated-Jurgis Šaulys in
Switzerland and Petras Klimas in France.
Although the Lithuanian state continues to exist, there is no
organ which could exercise further the rights deriving from its
continued legal existence. Nevertheless, certain ministers pleni-
potentiary and other diplomatic representatives of Lithuania were
still recognized and continued to fulfill certain functions deriving
from state sovereignty. But they were executive bodies, and not
sovereign political representatives. As such, they were subordin-
ated to central government. No organ existed any longer, how-
ever, capable of concentrating in itself the execution of sovereign
rights in their completeness.
The Lithuanian diplomats abroad considered the Merkys
cabinet left behind by President Smetona to operate in the face
of the Soviet invasion, as provisional in nature, in no way hinder-
ing President Smetona's freedom to appoint a new ministry.
Smetona, while still isolated in East Prussia following his flight,
informed Minister to Berlin Kazys Škirpa that he planned to
form a new ministry, with Lozoraitis, the minister to Rome, at
its head (the so-called Kybartai Protocol which dismissed Merkys
from the Premiership).
Since the last legal government of Lithuania had not made
any formal protest against the Soviet aggression, its inaction auto
matically hindered such protests by the Lithuanian diplomats
abroad. The occasion came one month after the Soviet occupation.
395
When the Soviets convened the puppet "Peoples' Diet" in
Kaunas on July 21, which announced that it had petitioned for
admission of Lithuania into the USSR, the Lithuanian diplomats
protested.
On the basis of a communication between the Lithuanian dip-
lomats, it was felt that corresponding notes should be presented
on July 22 in all of the capitals in which Lithuania was repre-
sented. Lithuanian diplomats in Washington, London, the Vati-
can, and Rome protested the republic's incorporation into the
USSR. Similar notes were sent to the governments of Argentina,
Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Rumania,
Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. Simultaneously,
the diplomats presented their protests against the falsification of
the will of the Lithuanian nation directly to the puppet govern-
ment of Soviet-occupied Lithuania. These protests, on the one
hand, formally exposed to the world that the Soviets were at-
tempting to mask their aggression against Lithuania; on the other
hand, the diplomatic protests authoritatively encouraged the
Lithuanian nation to have hope and to wage resistance against
the USSR. The diplomats were deprived of Lithuanian citizen-
ship by the puppet regime on August 14, 1940. This was the
only way the Soviets could mete out punishment for the dip-
lomats' bold stand.
3.
A plan to organize the Lithuanians under a united front for
the struggle was formulated as early as July, 1940, while Minister
Kazys Škirpa was still at the Lithuanian Legation in Berlin. Presi-
dent Smetona, whom Škirpa informed about his projects, ap-
proved of the plans in principle, informing Škirpa that he would
give him a mandate to form a new ministry if the Lithuanians
succeeded in restoring sovereignty in "at least one township."
From September 19-25, 1940, Lithuanian diplomats Stasys
Girdvainis, Stasys Lozoraitis, Petras Klimas, Eduardas Turauskas
and Kazys Škirpa held a conference in Rome. Petras Klimas sug-
gested the formation of a national committee, modeled after
Masaryk's Czech National Committee, which at the appropriate
moment could become the provisional government. Such a com-
396
mittee was set up in Berlin, based on the legal authorization by
the republic to its legations to protect Lithuanian interests abroad.
Ernestas Galvanauskas, who had recently fled to Germany, was
appointed chairman. His ipso jure alternate was Stasys Lozoraitis.
Eduardas Turauskas and Kazys Škirpa were to be permanent
members. Later, Minister to Washington Povilas Zadeikis was
designated as a second alternate. The Lithuanian envoys, by con-
certed action, approved of the formation of the Lithuanian Na-
tional Committee as the unifying agency for the restoration of
independent Lithuania.
On August 11, the Soviets pressured the Germans to force
Škirpa and his staff to vacate the Lithuanian Legation and turn
over the property to the Russians. President Smetona also had
problems. He wanted to remain in Europe, close to Lithuania;
however, since his presence in Germany threatened to complicate
Nazi-Soviet relations, the unsympathetic German government
coaxed him into leaving the country. Smetona received his dip-
lomatic visa on September 19 and immediately left for Bern,
Switzerland.
The Lithuanian diplomatic corps made contact with Spanish
Foreign Minister Colonel Juan Beigbeder y Atienza, a personal
acquaintance of Škirpa's, to allow some ten Lithuanian political
leaders, including Galvanauskas, to reside in Spain until the
opportune moment when this group, without any hindrance,
could set up a provisional government. Foreign Minister Beig-
beder was willing to give his consent to this plan, but the Nazis
would not permit Galvanauskas to leave Germany.
While in Switzerland, Smetona decided that he could serve
the cause of Lithuanian freedom better in the United States. On
February 14, 1941, the Smetona family sailed to Rio de Janeiro.
While in Brazil, the president appointed Frikas Meieris to the
post of Lithuanian Minister to that country.
On March 10, 1941, President Smetona landed in New York,
and immediately began organizing the nationalistically-minded
Lithuanian-Americans. On April 1, he visited Sumner Welles in
the State Department. Through the efforts of Minister Žadeikis,
he had a private audience with President Roosevelt, whom he
397
thanked for the United States government's firm stand against
Lithuania's occupation.
On May 4, the Mayor of Chicago, Edward Kelly, at a special
reception in honor of the Lithuanian President, declared: "To
President Smetona we offer the solemn pledge of our continuing
resistance to the oppression that snatched liberty from Lithuania."
During 1941, the exiled president's supporters flocked to the
Lithuanian Liberation Alliance (Lietuvai Vaduoti Sajunga). He
visited the larger cities-New York, Newark, Elizabeth, Phila-
delphia, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland-urging his
nationals to organize for liberation.
Smetona found a temporary haven on Mr. Joseph Bachunas'
Tabor Farm in Michigan. Finally in May, 1942, he settled down
in his son's home in Cleveland, and devoted his energies to writing
a study about Lithuania's boundaries, making speeches concerning
Lithuania's restoration. As Lithuania's President-in-exile, he con-
tinued to exercise a moral force as a symbol of Lithuanian state
sovereignty. The case for the continuity of government met with
complications when he died in a fire in his son's home on January
9, 1944. His last testament to the nation was the advice given to
friends on January 2, 1944, to wit: "One must go down various
routes to the one goal-restoration of Lithuanian Independence.
One must not be discouraged, if everyone does not fit into one or
ganization." (Reikia eiti visokiais keliais prie vieno tikslo-kad
Lietuvai buty iškovota nepriklausomybè. Nereikia nuleisti ranky,
jeigu nesutelpama i vieną organizaciją.)
In addition to the National Committee, the Lithuanian po-
litical exiles in Berlin organized a liberation movement, which was
headed by Kazys Škirpa. On November 17, twenty-eight exile
political leaders met and formally established the Lithuanian Ac-
tivist Front (LAF or Lietuviy Aktyvisty Frontas). The LAF
had two purposes: to fight for the restoration of independence
and to prepare a program for the organization of the restored
state. Among the refugees who fled to Germany were many
Lithuanian statesmen, famous civic and cultural leaders, former
officers and civil servants. They all supported the plans and activ-
ities of the LAF, in spite of prior political differences. In order
to prepare for the revolt, the LAF established contact with the
398
underground in Lithuania, providing it with necessary informa-
tion for the preparation of the armed revolt.
The Lithuanian resistance movement with its centers in Kau-
nas and Vilnius, acknowledged the Berlin LAF as its center. The
entire resistance movement merged into the LAF. The Berlin
staff maintained precarious relations with the German foreign
ministry and the army high command. Škirpa formulated instruc-
tions and plans for the eventual revolt; he even drew up a list
of ministers for the provisional government, which was accepted
with slight alterations by the Lithuanian underground. He soon
realized that the Germans intended to use the Lithuanian resist
ance to help establish German rule in the Soviet-occupied Baltic
States. He therefore proceeded to instruct the underground to
quickly set up a functioning Lithuanian administration at the
outbreak of the Russo-German conflict, in order to confront the
Nazis with an independent state.
When, on June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the USSR,
a spontaneous revolt against the Soviets erupted, and a Lithu-
anian provisional government was proclaimed in Kaunas, naming
Škirpa its head, The Berlin LAF publicized these events to the
world through American, Swiss and Swedish correspondents in
Berlin and through operatives in Sweden and Switzerland. The
Nazis retaliated by placing Škirpa under house arrest. Other pro-
visional ministers in Berlin were detained from returning to
Kaunas. Only General Raštikis, provisional defense minister, was
permitted to fly to Kaunas. He informed the provisional cabinet,
presided over by Education Minister J. Ambrazevičius, of German
designs to set up a protectorate. On August 5, after six weeks of
administration, the provisional government was suppressed by
the Nazis. Members of the Berlin LAF were deported to German
provincial towns or to concentraton camps by the Gestapo. Sev-
eral LAF operatives abroad, such as Albertas Gerutis in Bern,
Switzerland, continued to inform the Lithuanian diplomats of
developments in Lithuania.
Immediately after the Soviet invasion of Lithuania, the diplo-
matic and consular representatives protected the properties of the
Lithuanian Government as well as the properties of their na-
tionals "by all legal means." First, there were the deposits of the
399
state and private banks as well as those of corporations and
Lithuanian nationals in the United States banks. There were also
several ships under the Lithuanian flag in foreign ports and on
the high seas. The Lithuanian representative, Mr. Povilas Za-
deikis, requested the United States Government to safeguard and
secure these deposits and property.
In a memorandum on July 15, 1940, Loy W. Henderson,
Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs of the U.S.
State Department, after describing and evaluating the Soviet ac-
tivities in the Baltic States, stressed that "the recent events in the
Baltic States have raised a number of rather important questions,"
the first of which was the basic policy and the political philosophy
of the United States toward these countries. The problem con-
cerning this basic question was worded in a memorandum as
follows:
Is the Government of the United States to apply certain
standards of judgment and conduct to aggression by Ger-
many and Japan which it will not apply to aggression by
the Soviet Union? In other words, is the Government of the
United States to follow one policy with respect to, say,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark and German-occupied Poland, and
another policy with respect to Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and
Finland? Is the United States to continue to refuse to rec'
ognize the fruits of aggression regardless of who the aggressor
may be, or for reasons of expediency to close its eyes to the
fact that certain nations are committing aggression upon
their neighbors?
The United States will probably not receive one cent of
the several million dollars which the governments of these
three countries owe us. Furthermore, American interests in
those three countries will probably be a total loss.
The Treasury Department acted on the same day and decided
to block all the accounts of the three Baltic countries in the
United States. Title to the assets remained in the names of the
non-Soviet governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The
protests which followed from Soviet Russia and its three new
"republics" did not change the U.S. position in this matter.
400
Although the assets were "frozen," disbursements from them
were subsequently accorded to the Baltic diplomatic and consular
missions in order to support their continued operations, not only
in the United States but also in the other countries which had
not recognized the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States.
Following the declaration of the puppet Diet in Lithuania for
union with the Soviet Union, the U.S. Undersecretary of State,
Sumner Welles, issued (July 23, 1940) a statement condemning
the deliberate suppression by "devious process" of the independ-
ence of the Baltic States. He went on to say to the press:
During these past few days the devious processes where-
under the political independence and territorial integrity of
the three small Baltic Republics-Estonia, Latvia, and Lith-
uania-were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their
more powerful neighbors, have been rapidly drawing to
their conclusion. From the day when the people of these
republics first gained their independence and democratic
form of government, the people of the United States have
watched their admirable progress in self-government with
deep and sympathetic interest.
The policy of this government is universally known. The
people of the United States are opposed to predatory activ-
ity no matter whether they are carried on by the use of
force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed
to any form of intervention on the part of one state, how-
ever powerful, in the domestic concerns of another state,
however weak.
These principles constitute the very foundations upon
which the existing relationship between the 21 sovereign
republics of the New World rests.
The United States will continue to stand by these prin-
ciples, because of the conviction of the American people
that unless the doctrines in which these principles are inher-
ent once again governs the relations between nations, the
rule of reason, of justice, and of law-in other words, the
basis of modern civilization itself-cannot be preserved.
This declaration constituted the basis of the policy of non-
recognition of the annexation of the Baltic States. The example
401
set by the United States in this nonrecognition has been followed
by the majority of those nations which have expressed an attitude
in regard to this problem. The United States government reem-
phasized on subsequent occasions its nonrecognition of the incor-
poration of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. In view of
this American position, Lithuanian diplomatic and consular rep-
resentatives have continued to function in the United States,
enjoying all rights usually accorded to such representatives.
The attitude of Great Britain toward Lithuania's status was
less clear than that of the United States. During World War II,
Great Britain extended de facto recognition of Lithuania's incor-
poration into the USSR. However, the British government re-
fused to accord de jure recognition to the annexation. The
problem of the Baltic States was raised during the Soviet-British
negotiations for a friendship and alliance treaty (December,
1941, to May, 1942). The Soviet government exerted pressure
upon Great Britain to include in the treaty a clause which would
have recognized the Soviet frontiers of 1941, i.e., including the
Baltic States. Mainly due to the unswerving attitude of the
United States government against any territorial changes during
the war period, the British government refused to accede to the
Soviet wishes, and the treaty was finally signed without any
territorial clauses. Lithuania was listed in the British official
Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book
1942 alongside its colleagues. The Lithuanian diplomats' names
appeared under the name of their respective country. This has
also been true in all subsequent editions.
In 1942, the names of the ministers of the Baltic States and
their staff members were placed by the Diplomats' Annual in a
separate category at the end of the official diplomatic list, without
any indication of the country they were representing, under the
caption: List of Persons No Longer Included in the Diplomatic
List But Still Accepted by His Majesty's Government as Per-
sonally Enjoying Certain Diplomatic Courtesies. In a letter on
this occasion from the Foreign Office to the Latvian Minister, it
was stated that it was "felt desirable and in fact necessary to
take into account the anomalous situation in which you and your
Estonian and Lithuanian colleagues find yourselves as a result of
402
having no government to represent." In the House of Commons
on December 21, 1944, Sir Henry Williams asked the Foreign
Secretary "Whether His Majesty's Government still recognises
the Governments or republics of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania?"
Answering for Secretary Eden, Mr. George Hall said: "His
Majesty's Government has not recognised any Government in
the Republics of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania since the changes
occurred in June, 1940."
The position of the French government was subject to more
fluctuation. At least de facto recognition to the annexation was
accorded by the French in 1940, but the Lithuanian Legation was
closed on August 15, 1940, and Minister Petras Klimas was sub-
sequently arrested by the Germans. The request by the diplomatic
representatives of the Baltic States for permission to continue
their activities was denied after the departure of the Germans
in September, 1944. Yet, there has still been no official announce
ment concerning the recognition of the annexation.
The attitude of Mussolini's Italy was not clear. In 1940,
the Mussolini regime closed the Lithuanian Legation, but no
formal declaration to this effect was issued. This act alone would
infer a de facto recognition of the annexation.
Spain and Portugal, as members of the Savedra-Lamas Pact,
assumed a mutual obligation not to recognize any territorial ar
rangement "which is not obtained by pacific means, nor the va-
lidity of an occupation or acquisition of territory that may be
brought by force." Consequently, they have not recognized the
annexation of the Baltic States. Although there were no official
pronouncements by Latin-American states on the subject of their
treatment of the diplomatic and consular representatives of the
Baltic States and the nationals of these states, it is safe to assume
that they have not recognized the annexation either de jure or
de facto. In Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Colombia, Lithuanian
diplomatic and consular officers continued to function and carry
on their duties.
Sweden came. closest to a de jure recognition of the Soviet
annexation, although it has never officially affirmed it. According
to the official Swedish point of view, Lithuania disappeared as
an independent state and, accordingly, its incorporation into the
403
Soviet Union merited de facto recognition. Foreign Minister
Gunther emphasized, in a statement in the upper house of the
Riksdag, that practical considerations have led Sweden to such
recognition. No Lithuanian nationality is recognized by the Swed-
ish government, and former nationals are officially considered
either Soviet citizens or stateless persons. They are considered
stateless if they left their homeland before the enactment of the
Soviet Nationality Edict of September 7, 1940, which declares
the citizens of the Baltic States to be Soviet citizens.
All in all, the Lithuanian Foreign Service, in spite of the
occupation, remained active. Under the leadership of Minister
Plenipotentiary Stasys Lozoraitis, officially designated Chief of
the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service Abroad, the following minis-
ters continued their functions during the war years: Povilas
Žadeikis-Washington; Bronius Balutis-London; Stasys Gird-
vainis-the Holy See; Kazys Graužinis-Buenos Aires and Mon-
tevideo; Frikas Meieris-Rio de Janeiro. For a while in 1940,
the following ministers continued in quasi-official capacities:
Kazys Škirpa-Berlin; Petras Klimas-Paris; Jurgis Saulys-
Berne; Vytautas Gylys-Stockholm. Lithuanian consuls also con-
tinued at the following posts: Consul General Jonas Budrys-
New York; Vytautas Stašinskas, consul-New York; Anicetas
Simutis, vice-consul-New York; Julius Bielskis, honorary consul
-Los Angeles; Anthony O. Shallna, honorary consul-Boston;
Aleksandras Polišaitis, consul-Sao Paulo; Friedrich Simon, con-
sul general-Zurich; Dr. N. Rachmilevičius, consul-Tel Aviv;
Colonel Grant-Suttie, consul general-Toronto.
4. The Lithuanian American Council-ALT
When the Soviets occupied Lithuania on June 15, 1940, the
Lithuanian-American community in the United States began
organizing to protect Lithuania's interests. The prevailing mood
was to form one organizational center to coordinate the work.
The Lithuanian American Roman Catholic Federation, conven-
ing in Pittsburgh on August 10, 1940, voted in favor of an inter-
group center. In September, the Socialists reorganized into a
Democratic Lithuanian Independence Alliance (Demokratijos ir
404
Lietuvos Nepriklausomybès Sajunga) whose purpose was to
fight for a democratic Lithuania.
After Sumner Welles' pronouncement, the idea was conceived
to visit Washington and thank President Roosevelt for his con-
dolences to enslaved Lithuania. Spokesmen of the three main ideo-
logical groups Socialists, Catholics, and Liberal nationalists formed
the delegation. The delegation had an audience with President
Roosevelt on October 15, 1940, at which time Dr. Pijus Grigaitis
bemoaned the fact that Lithuania had lost her independence and
urged that the President help the nation. President Roosevelt out-
did the Lithuanians in his reply:
I understand perfectly your feelings concerning the fate
of Lithuania. Let me tell you that you have made here two
mistakes: the first mistake is in your address that you gave
me. It is stated here that Lithuania has lost her independence.
It is a mistake to say so. Lithuania did not lose her inde-
pendence-Lithuania's independence was only temporarily
put aside. Time will come and Lithuania will be free again.
This will happen sooner than you may expect. The other
mistake as I observed was made by one of your speakers
when he referred to Lithuania as a very small state. Look at
the Latin American Republics and you will see that there
are even smaller states than Lithuania, but they live a free
and happy life. It is not fitting to even talk about the small-
ness of Lithuania for even the smallest nation has the same
right to enjoy independence as the largest nation.
He went on to say that the United States would do every'
thing in its power to hasten that day, and that after the war
Lithuania and the other enslaved nations would be free. (When
he subsequently received President Smetona, on April 18, 1941,
President Roosevelt assured him of American support for Lithu-
anian independence.)
After the audience with President Roosevelt, inspired by his
assurances, the delegation met at the Lithuanian legation and
decided that the remarks had opened the way for further Lith-
uanian-American action. That same day, they formed the inter-
group Committee to Aid Lithuania (Lietuvai Gelbeti Taryba).
405
This was just the beginning. There were no by-laws, guide-
lines, treasury or chapters as yet. The Lithuanian-American polit-
ical leadership did not have a popular attractive name for their
nucleus. The problem faced them as to how and on what basis
to coordinate the thirty-four patriotic Lithuanian newspapers and
2,000 societies.
On May 15, 1941, when the delegation met in Chicago for
deliberations, the name Lithuanian American Council (Amerikos
Lietuviu Taryba) was accepted.
On June 7-8, 1941, the Lithuanian Nationalist leaders
held a convention in Sodus, Michigan, and decided to form the
Lithuanian Liberation Alliance (Lietuvai Vaduoti Sajunga). The
first chairman was the brilliant young Lithuanian-American
lawyer Anthony Olis of Chicago. In 1942, the center was reor
ganized and moved to Cleveland, to the Dirva newspaper office.
For three years the LVS chairman was Dr. Stasys T. Tamošaitis;
he was followed for three years by Pijus J. Ziurys; the last chair-
man was Dr. Motiejus J. Colney. The long standing secretary
was the editor of Dirva, Kazys S. Karpius. The LVS or Alliance
formed chapters in the Lithuanian communities, organized Presi-
dent Smetona's lectures among Lithuanians and Americans, and
published literature on Lithuania. In 1943, money was raised
for the publication of the book Timeless Lithuania by the former
American Minister to Kaunas, Owen Norem, which was distrib-
uted to American government officials, diplomats and civic
leaders.
In order to inform the American public about Communist
methods of terror, the LVS translated and published Colonel
Petruitis' book Kaip jie mus šaude. The LVS later published an
anthology by Lithuanian journalists entitled Lithuania in the
Chains of Tyrants. During the February 5-6, 1944, Congress in
New York, a special commission was formed to present the Lith-
uanian problem to the American public. This commission was
designated the Lithuanian American Mission (Amerikos Lietuviy
Misija); the executive board consisted of Anthony Olis (chair
man), Antanas G. Kumskis and Pijus J. Žiurys.
The Lithuanian American Mission was the political action
organization of the Nationalists. Its purpose was to work for
406
Lithuanian freedom and independence. In order to realize this
aim, it established close ties with members of the United States
Congress and periodically visited the State Department. On
March 21, 1945, then Vice President Harry S. Truman received
the Mission's executive board. On March 23, the Mission organ
ized a reception in Washington for members of the United States
Congress and American statesmen, and the speeches made at that
reception and later in Congress were recorded in the Congres-
sional Record. (This tactic, developed by Anthony Olis, was
later adopted by the Lithuanian American Council). The Mission
had numerous articles about Lithuania published in the American
press. When, in May, 1945, the United Nations Organization
met in San Francisco, the Mission organized a press conference,
and informed the American and other Western delegations about
developments in Lithuania. It also organized a solemn mass for
Lithuania in the local cathedral.
When the Nationalists rejoined ALT in November, 1948,
A. Olis became a member of the Executive Committee of ALT
(he was succeeded by Eugenijus A. Bartkus after his death). The
Nationalists maintained their LVS ties until 1949.
On January 8, 1943, the Lithuanian American Council held
a conference in New York and decided to place the entire organ-
ization on a firm footing by preparing by-laws, setting up a treas-
ury, authorizing an executive committee to act in the organiza
tion's name, and to incorporate in the state of Illinois as a
non-profit organization.
The agreed purpose of the Lithuanian American Council was
to unite all of the democratic forces of Lithuanians in the fight
for basic human rights, and to support world efforts to establish
permanent peace based on justice, democracy and freedom; to
work for the realization of the Atlantic Charter and to see to
it that its provisions were applied to Lithuania which would re-
store her independence with historical-ethnographic boundaries;
to give moral and material aid to Lithuania's people in their
struggle for freedom and to aid refugees from oppression and
Lithuania's exiled citizens, to disseminate to the public at large
truthful information about Lithuania and to protect the latter
from the lies and calumny of her enemies.
407
The executive committee of ALT was comprised of three
members, who lived in Chicago, all three of whom were editors
and represented three ideological newspapers: Pijus Grigaitis-
socialist Naujienos, Leonardas Šimutis-Catholic Draugas, and
Mykolas Vaidyla-liberal nationalist Sandara.
The January 8, 1943, ALT conference issued an appeal to
the Lithuanian Americans to organize commemorations of Lith-
uanian Independence Day on February 16 in the various com-
munities, and to collect money for the liberation of Lithuania.
Since 1943, all of the Lithuanian communities have observed
February 16, during which commemorations money is still raised
to support the activities of ALT. These commemorations have
featured prominent Americans as key-note speakers.
On September 2-3, 1943, ALT called a national convention
in Pittsburgh attended by 400 delegates from various organiza-
tions, all of whom put aside their ideological differences and
agreed to better intergroup relations for the common cause. They
established a solid front against Lithuanian Communists, who
supported the Soviet occupation. The Pittsburgh convention also
authorized ALT to set up an information bureau and to establish
a fund to help refugees. As a result, the following year the Lith-
uanian American Relief Fund (Bendrasis Amerikos Lietuviy
Šalpos Fondas-BALF) was created, which helped bring to the
United States over 30,000 Lithuanian displaced persons.
As its activities increased, the structure of ALT expanded.
Two huge fraternal alliances-the Lithuanian Alliance of Amer-
ica and the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Alliance of America-
joined the Council. With the return of the Nationalists in 1949,
the Lithuanian American Council consisted of thirty-four repre-
sentatives. The Executive Board was chosen for one year. Local
ALT chapters were created in the Lithuanian communities, com-
prising representatives of the four major ideological groups as
well as representatives of local societies.
In April, 1944, ALT founded the Lithuanian American In-
formation Center (LAIC) in New York City, which maintained
ties with American Senators, Congressmen and government offi-
cials, providing information for newspaper men and various
agencies which sought news about Lithuania. It also published the
408
Lithuanian Bulletin which contained news about current devel-
opments in Lithuania, about Lithuanians and their activities. The
original publisher was the Lithuanian National Council (Lietuviu
Tautine Taryba) which in 1943 printed ten issues, and many
more followed in succeeding years. The LAIC also published
twelve books in English on various questions dealing with Lith-
uania. When the United Nations met in San Francisco, the
LAIC sent a delegation which informed the various government
members and world press about Lithuania. For a while, the LAIC
had a correspondent-observer at the United Nations; it cooper
ated with R. Lemkin in preparing a detailed report on genocide
which he presented to the Senate Foreign Affairs Subcommittee,
and also urged the United States Congress to investigate offi-
cially the Soviet occupation of Lithuania.
The overall concern of the Lithuanian American Council
during the war was to counter Soviet pressure in Washington to
recognize the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States. On March
4, 1945, any doubts on this subject were dissipated by the decla-
ration of the United States Secretary of State in Washington that
"as far as the United States is concerned, the status of the Baltic
States has not altered in any way, not even after the Yalta
Conference."
ALT also saw to it that Lithuanian interests would be pro-
tected at the San Francisco meeting and that the United Nations
not recognize the incorporation of the Baltic States into the
USSR.
5. The Lithuanian Council of Canada
The idea to form a uniting body was conceived by a group of
Toronto Lithuanians in 1940. The conference took place in Sep-
tember, 1940, and voted to form the Lithuanian Council of Can-
ada to fight for the liberation of the homeland. The Council
gained the support of all patriotic groups scattered throughout
the Dominion. In order to coordinate activities, an official weekly
paper, Nepriklausoma Lietuva, (Independent Lithuania) was
started.
The Lithuanian Council of Canada was comprised of thirty
409
representatives of various organizations. It organized Lithuanian
Independence Day commemorations every year in the cities and
issued protest resolutions denouncing the Soviet occupation of
Lithuania to the Ottawa Government. It also took concrete meas-
ures to keep Canada from recognizing the Soviet occupation of
Lithuania.
6. The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania
With the death of President Antanas Smetona in 1944, the
last executor of the sovereign rights of the nation disappeared.
Since there were no constitutional organs to continue the execu-
tive functions, the Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithu-
ania (Vyriausias Lietuvos Islaisvinimo Komitetas or VLIK), as
a revolutionary organ, took over the political leadership of the
nation. VLIK, as supreme underground center of the resistance
to the Nazi occupation, through its operative in Sweden, Al-
girdas Vokietaitis, kept the Lithuanian diplomats abroad informed
of developments in the homeland. VLIK sent its military repre-
sentative, Kazys Ambraziejus, to Sweden, but he was arrested by
the German Gestapo in Tallinn, Estonia, and returned to Lithu-
ania for interrogation. As a result, the Nazis began to arrest
members of VLIK and its operatives on April 29-30, 1944. The
Lithuanian political groups appointed new representatives in their
stead. This reconstructed VLIK saw the inevitability of a second
Soviet invasion and occupation; the threat was spelled out in the
May 25, 1944, appeal to the nation. As a positive measure, VLIK
appointed a delegation in Germany, while three authorized mem-
bers of VLIK were to remain in Lithuania; the rest withdrew to
carry on the struggle in the West.
The VLIK delegation abroad held its first meeting in Berlin
on October 3, 1944, and decided to enlist more members. On
October 25, the expanded delegation decided to use the full title
Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania, since only one
of the VLIK plenipotentiaries remained in Lithuania. On De-
cember 14, VLIK spoke out against the conference called by the
Nazis to mobilize Lithuanians for the war effort. As the Eastern
Front fell back toward Berlin, the group moved to Würzburg,
which was soon taken by the American army. Under these new
410
conditions, the group called its first meeting on March 9, 1945,
and held its last meeting five days later, when the president of
VLIK, Steponas Kairys-Kaminskas, arrived.
After the American occupation of Würzburg, this supreme
Lithuanian political organization began its operations in the free
world, convinced that the free world would help Lithuania re-
gain its freedom and independence. The Teheran and Yalta con-
ferences, however, had dimmed the hopes of immediate Western
aid.
President Kairys called a meeting of the reconstituted VLIK,
into which the Lithuanian Peasant Party and Lithuanian Peasant
Union were admitted. The basic problems under discussion were:
1) communication with Lithuanian representatives in Washing
ton, London, Paris, Rome, the Vatican, Montevideo and else-
where, and 2) the quick preparation and presentation of a memo-
randum to the Allied Supreme Commander General Eisenhower.
This memorandum introduced VLIK to General Eisenhower as
the only Lithuanian political and resistance center in exile, and
presented Lithuania's case. Subsequent memoranda spelled out
the deportees and displaced persons problems of security and
subsistence, and the question of prisoners of war captured by the
Allies.
II. THE STRUGGLE BASED ON WESTERN HELP, 1945-56
1.
The Lithuanians were especially hopeful in the monocentric
era that immediately followed the end of the second World War.
Because of its atomic monopoly, the United States was at that
time the dominating, if not the only, center of military strength
and political and economic power. A peace conference, the
Lithuanian exiles and immigration thought, would have to include
on its agenda the righting of the wrongs done to the Baltic States
by the Stalin-Hitler conspiracy. This hope vanished when it
became obvious that, because of Soviet machinations, no peace
conference was in, sight.
When the Soviet deceit and hypocritical policies became
411
known, the United States reacted. On March 12, 1947, President
Harry S. Truman announced that the purpose of American pol-
icy was to help the free nations resisting conspiracies to enslave
them by internal revolts, by armed minorities or by external
aggression. This was the beginning of the so-called Truman Doc-
trine. A new period was ushered in when the United States gave
aid to Greece, then fighting against Communist insurgents. Help
was also given to Turkey. The Truman Doctrine slowly evolved
into the so-called policy of "containment" or "stop Russia."
The bipolarization of the world that followed, when the Soviet
Union became a nuclear rival of the United States, brought
promise of the early liberation of the captive nations of East-
Central Europe by peaceful and legitimate means. Such a libera-
tion, the Lithuanian exile and immigration leaders had been
assured, "has been, is and, until achieved, will be the major goal
of United States policy."
A number of pronouncements by the administrations of
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower affirmed this stand. For ex-
ample, on November 20, 1953, Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles stated before the House Select Committee to Investigate
the Incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR that "the
United States for its part maintains the diplomatic recognition
which it extended in 1922 to the three Baltic nations. We con-
tinue to deal with their diplomatic and consular representatives
who served the last independent governments of these states."
In spite of hopeful promises by the Eisenhower Administra
tion, Lithuanian hopes for vigorous Western aid ended when
Soviet tanks brutally and with impunity crushed the Hungarian
Revolution of November 1956.
2.
During the period under consideration, the attitude of Great
Britain toward Lithuania's status was not as clear as that of the
United States. At the Nuremberg War Trials, the representatives
of Great Britain made the same reservations as the United States
concerning the Soviet listing of the Baltic States in the indict-
ment as part of the Soviet Union; England emphasized that such
412
a listing had no relation to the British position on the question of
Soviet sovereignty in the Baltic States. An official statement about
the de facto recognition was given on May 23, 1947, in the
House of Commons by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs May-
hew, who stated that "it is necessary for us to deal with these
facts as we find them. We have not however recognized these
countries de jure." As recently as 1954, the joint Parliamentary
Undersecretary in the Foreign Office, Dodds-Parker, declared in
response to an inquiry in the House of Commons that "Her
Majesty's Government are not prepared to take any steps which
would imply or constitute de jure recognition of the Soviet
annexation of the Baltic States."
The Lithuanian Legation in London continued to function as
in the past, and the Foreign Office maintained relations with it.
Members of the British Commonwealth-Australia, Canada and
New Zealand-for the most part adopted the same attitude as
Great Britain. Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonians consulates also
functioned in Toronto, Canada. (When Grant-Suttie died on
May 24, 1949, Minister Stasys Lozoraitis appointed Vytautas
Gylys to succeed him as consul general. When Mr. Gylys died
on June 14, 1953 the consulate general was vacant until Prime
Minister Diefenbaker recognized the appointment of Jonas Žmuid-
zinas on February 10, 1962.)
In 1948, when the Soviet government attempted to induce
Lithuanian citizens in Canada to register at Soviet consulates as
Soviet citizens, the Canadian government issued statements to
the effect that the Soviet government in Lithuania was not a de
jure government. This position was further confirmed in a gov-
ernmental statement in the House of Commons on May 17,
1954:
There has been no occasion when the Government of
Canada considered it necessary to reaffirm or withdraw for-
mally de jure recognition of these Baltic States.
Because the Lithuanian Legation in Paris remained closed, it
would appear that the French government recognized the annexa-
tion. The Supreme Court of France, however, in its decision in
413
the case of Gebraud v. de Medem (1951), rejected such an inter'
pretation regarding the Baltic States:
Considering that no act of international significance has
intervened to obliterate the recognition of the Latvian State
as a holder of rights and liabilities to legal obligations; that
the Court of Appeal rightly decided that so long as the peace
treaty has not determined the fate of Latvia, it is impossible
to say that Latvians at present have no nationality.
The position of the Belgian government is based on a state
ment of the High Court in Brussels in its decision in the case of
Compagnie Belgo-lithuanienne d'Electricité V. Société des Cen-
trales electriques regionales (October 26, 1946), in which it was
stated that Belgium has not recognized the annexation of Lith-
uania de jure and that "no document issued by the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade establishes that the Belgian
Government considers such annexation recognized de facto."
Mention in this connection should be made also of the fact that
the government in 1945 refused to repatriate to the Soviet Union
nationals of the Baltic States then in Belgium.
A de facto recognition of the Soviet annexation may be in-
ferred from the acts of the Swiss government. The Federal Gov'
ernment of Switzerland decided on November 15, 1946, to take
under its trusteeship the assets of the Baltic States and the archives
of their former missions in Switzerland. The diplomatic missions
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had not been recognized as such
by the Swiss government since January, 1941, but the final
change in policy came when Switzerland exchanged diplomatic
notes with the Soviet Union on March 18, 1946.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has
not publicly stated its position in regard to the annexation of the
Baltic States. Its actions, however, did not leave any doubt that
it did not recognize the annexation either de facto or de jure.
A circular letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of September
12, 1952, stated that the republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu-
ania are still legally existing. Furthermore, the Bonn government
honored passports issued by the consular representatives of the
Baltic States, and showed its willingness to accept semi-diplomatic
414
representatives of these countries. On April 29, 1953, the For
eign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany notified
the judicial organs of the city of Berlin that it considered Latvia
to be still in existence, since neither the German Reich nor the
present Federal government had ever recognized that state's
annexation. In the circular letter of March 2, 1953, the same
ministry stated that, since the annexation of the Baltic States was
not recognized in international law and the citizens of those
states had not become the citizens of the Soviet Union, the citi-
zenship of those persons remained unchanged; hence, passports
issued by the diplomatic and consular services of Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania were valid as long as they conformed to the usual
regulations.
The Latin American states, signatories of the Savedra-Lamas
Pact, like Spain and Portugal, did not recognize the annexation
of the Baltic States. Peron's regime in Argentina alone suspended
the functioning of the Lithuanian Legation in 1948, until the
question of the Baltic States is solved by the United Nations. The
Lithuanian Legation under Dr. Kazys Graužinis was then trans
ferred from Argentina to Uruguay where it continued to operate.
Through the efforts of Mr. Stasys Lozoraitis, a Lithuanian con-
sulate under Dr. Stasys Sirutis was opened in Bogota, Colombia,
in 1954.
After the war, the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service Abroad re-
established a close-knit organization in the West. Stasys Lozo-
raitis, with his office in Rome, was acknowledged by all as the
diplomatic chief. He wrote notes, protests, and memoranda to
states which did not have official Lithuanian representatives. He
also designated Lithuanian consuls (e.g., Vytautas Stašinskas'
elevation to consul general in New York in 1964) and transfer
of diplomatic officials (e.g., Stasys Bačkis from Paris to Wash-
ington). The Lithuanian diplomats had power to issue or confirm
Lithuanian passports. They also retained the right to attend con-
ferences and receptions. The consuls handled court cases dealing
with Lithuanian property and wills. (The honorary consul in
Boston, Anthony O. Shallna was instrumental in forging legal
decisions regarding Lithuanian property that are still cited as
precedents in American courts.) The consuls also handled
415
searches for missing persons and confirmed documents. For ex-
ample, the consulate general in New York catalogued a file of
over 100,000 Lithuanian names and addresses for such purposes.
As one could see, in addition to preserving the symbol of Lithu-
anian sovereignty the Lithuanian diplomats also served a useful
purpose.
The Lithuanian diplomats and their staffs were financed by
the interest accrued on the Lithuanian gold assets frozen in the
United States. The United States Department of the Treasury,
together with the State Department, administered the reserves of
the Lithuanian Republic. The Lithuanian Legation in Washington
submitted budgets for all of the Lithuanan overseas missions.
The Lithuanian Legation in Washington published a bulletin
in English The Lithuanian Situation. The first issue appeared on
August 3, 1940; the second issue was much larger (44 pages)
and appeared on June 15, 1941. The third issue was called The
Current News of the Lithuanian Situation. This name was used
until 1955, when the former name was readopted. Altogether,
twelve volumes or 145 issues of this information bulletin were
published until the fall of 1957. At first, it appeared twice a
month. Since 1946, it has been a bi-monthly publication. In addi-
tion to articles about the plight of Lithuania, The Lithuanian
Situation expounds the views of prominent statesmen on perti-
nent questions as well as on bibliographical reviews.
3. American/Lithuanian Council
Both ALT and BALF were instrumental in the passage of
the Displaced Persons bill by the U.S. Congress, which eased the
way for the immigration of 30,000 Lithuanian refugees to Amer'
ica from Western Europe. This immigration was a vital factor
for the continuation of the Lithuanian cause. Some 75 percent
of the nation's intellectuals had escaped to the West, along with
85 percent of the republic's municipal and government employees;
close to 80 percent of the physicians, lawyers, teachers, engineers,
artists, writers and businessmen. The intellectual calibre and
scope of activities in the decade following the 1949-50 period of
immigration was quite marked among the Lithuanian-Americans
416
as a result. Eventually, many of the displaced persons became the
dynamic civic and cultural leaders of the ethnic community in the
free world. This transition, of course, took place with some fric-
tion and misunderstandings, because of the difference in climate
between the old and new immigrants.
ALT also held annual conventions at which time the political
goals were formulated and the work of the past year was ratified.
Between conventions, a four-man Executive Committee handled
all of the financial matters and executed the plans. Leonardas
Simutis was president during the 1945-56 period. Dr. Pijus Gri-
gaitis, serving at times as vice president or as secretary, was the
leading political light of ALT. When the Nationalists rejoined
ALT in 1949, Anthony Olis also played a prominent role. A
loose network of chapters, following local by-laws, functioned
under various names, such as New York Lithuanian Council,
ALT Cleveland Chapter, Committee to Aid Lithuania (in Eliz-
abeth, N. J.), etc.
In addition to organizing conventions and congresses, the
ALT Executive Board continually felt the official pulse in Wash-
ington-ascertaining whether the American government was
planning policy changes in regards to the Baltic States. This ques-
tion plagued ALT when Hitler declared war against his former
ally Russia, which made the USSR a wartime ally of the United
States and the West. Relations between the United States and
the USSR became so cordial that it took courage to speak out
in public against Russia or even to raise the question of Lithuania.
Returning from the Potsdam Conference, President Truman said
the following about Stalin: "I like Joe, he's a good fellow.
Since Berlin had been turned over to the Russians, ALT feared
that the Baltic States would also be recognized as part of the
USSR. ALT tried to ascertain policy in this matter. On October
29, 1946, an ALT Delegation visited President Truman and
asked him if his administration had not changed its policy toward
the Baltic States. President Truman reassured them that it had
not. ALT visited President Truman on two other occasions; each
time it received the same assurance.
ALT used the 1952 American presidential elections to gain
party pledges from both the Democrats and the Republicans that
417
the Baltic States would not be recognized as part of the Soviet
Union. Its representative also paid visits to the State Depart-
ment and to Capitol Hill. In the fall of 1951, a project for the
codification of "international crimes" was raised in the General
Assembly of the United Nations. There was a threat that this
code would be used against resistance movements in opposition
to Soviet occupation; ALT took vigorous measures to have this
project stricken from the Assembly's agenda. On January 13-16,
1952, ALT representatives paid a visit to the State Department
with a memorandum concerning Soviet genocide in Lithuania.
ALT also organized a letter-writing campaign directed at the
United States Senate over the ratification of the United Nations
Genocide Convention; 36,000 letters were sent. Unfortunately,
the Senate did not ratify this convention.
ALT also organized press conferences in New York and
Washington, when the VLIK representatives, Mykolas Krupavi-
čius and Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, first visited the United States,
when former President Kazys Grinius came to America, and
when three fishermen fled from occupied Lithuania to the free
West. In order to solicit public opinion against genocide in
Lithuania, the ALT chapters organized June Commemorations
to observe the first mass deportations of 1941.
ALT was instrumental in the establishment of a Lithuanian
Section of the Voice of America. On February 16, 1951, the
first Lithuanian broadcast over the Voice took place; these broad-
casts took place twelve times a day. The former head of the
Lithuanian-American Information Center, Dr. Kostas Jurgela,
became its director. The broadcasts were heard in Lithuania,
America and Australia; Munich broadcasts were heard three times
a day. These were the more popular of the two Lithuanian-lan/
guage programs of the Voice of America. (It was discontinued in
1958.) Following the ill-fated Hungarian revolution, the Wash-
ington broadcasts became innocuous, carefully omitting aspects
of Lithuanian political activities.
The ALT Executive Committee also visited President Eisen-
hower on several occasions, presenting its views on the Lithuanian
situation, and memoranda were submitted to the State Depart-
ment, a complete collection of which would fill a huge volume.
418
Of course, these various activities required a substantial war
chest. Money was raised by the ALT chapters during rallies and
mass meetings. Between 1943 and 1952, the Lithuanian-American
community contributed $353,501.33.
All in all, the most important victory of ALT was the crea-
tion of the so-called Kersten Committee by the United States
Congress. The idea was conceived by a Brooklyn lawyer and
member of ALT, Stephen Bredes. It was imperative to put the
facts of the Soviet occupation on record in order to bolster the
claims for restoration of independence. Although the Lithuanian-
Americans knew how their mother country had been enslaved,
the Soviet government always dangled the rebuttal that the SO
called Peoples' Diet of Lithuania had voted for incorporation into
the USSR. The Soviets asserted that they had merely complied
with the wishes of the Lithuanan people!
The American diplomats did not believe this lie, however,
they did not know how to refute it. It is for this reason that
ALT suggested the creation of a Congressional Committee to
investigate the facts. On July 27, 1953, the United States House
of Representatives passed a resolution by virtue of which the
House Baltic Committee was created to investigate the seizure
and forced incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union and
the treatment of the Baltic peoples during and following the
occupation by the Soviets. Congressman Charles J. Kersten was
designated chairman. Later, this bipartisan committee was ex-
panded into the Select and Bi-Partisan House Committee on
Communist Aggression. President Eisenhower supported this
project and Congress appropriated $30,000 for its hearings.
The investigations began in Washington, where Lithuanian
Minister Povilas Žadeikis, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
and others testified. Lithuanian witnesses were later questioned in
New York, Detroit and Chicago. The Lithuanian-American
Council also collaborated by gathering documents, classifying
and registering witnesses, and translating these testimonies into
English and sending them to the Kersten Committee. ALT ga-
thered data from over 1,000 witnesses who had experienced
Soviet terror in Lithuania.
After questioning Eastern European witnesses in America,
419
MAY 03 '91 03:39PM YALE U SECRETARY
P.2/9
Yale University News Bureau
New Haven, Connecticut
STate 7-3'31, Ext. 344
#415
Steve Kezerian, Director
For Release on Delivery (at 11:30 A.M.), Monday, June 11, 1962.
New Haven, Conn., June 11: Following is the text, as
delivered, of the Commencement Address of John F. Kennedy, President of the
United States, at Yale's 261st Commencement on Monday morning, June 11.
President Kennedy received the honorary Doctor of Laws degree
during the exercises.
This text was transcribed by the White House staff and
released for the press.
*****
President Griswold, members of the faculty, graduates and
their families, ladies and gentlemen: Let me begin by expressing my appreciation
for the very deep honor that you have conferred upon me. As General DeGaulle
occasionally acknowledges. America to be the daughter of Europe, so I am pleased
to come to Yale, the daughter of Harvard. It might be said now that I have the
best of both worlds, a Harvard education and a Yale degree.
I am particularly glad to become & Yale man because as I
think about my troubles, I find that a lot of them have come from other Yale men.
Among businessmen I have had & minor disagreement with Roger Blough, of the Law
School Class of 1931, and I have had some complaints too from my friend Henry
Ford, of the class of 1940. In journalism, I seem to have & difference with John
Hay Whitney, of the class of 1926 -- and sometimes I also displease Henry Luce
of the class of 1920, not to mention - always - William F. Buckley, Jr., of the
class of 1950. I even have some trouble with my Yale advisors. I get along with
them, but I am not always sure how they get along with each other.
I have the warmest feelings for Chester Bowles of the class of 1924 and for Dean
Acheson, of the class of 1915, and my assistant, McGeorge Bundy, of the class of
1940, but I am not 100 per cent sure that these three wise and experienced Yale
men wholly agree with each other on every issue.
more
MAY 03 '91 03:39PM YALE U SECRETARY
P.3/9
415 -2-
So this Administration which aims at peaceful cooperation
among all Americans has been the victim of a certain natural pugnacity developed
in this city among Yale men. Now that I, tco, am a Yale man, it is time for
peace. Last week at West Point, in the historic tradition of that Academy, I
availed myself of the powers of Commander in Chief to remit all sentences of
offending cadets. In that same spirit, and in the historic tradition of Yale,
let me now offer to smoke the clay pipe of friendship with all of my brother
Elis, and I hope that they may be friends not only with me but even with each
other.
In any event, I am very glad to be here and as a new member
of the club, I have been checking to see what earlier links existed between the
institution of the Presidency and Yale, I found that a member of the class of
1878, William Howard Taft, served one term in the White House as preparation for
becoming a member of this faculty. And a graduate of 1804, John C. Calhoun,
regarded the Vice Presidency as too lowly 8 station for a Yale alumnus -- and
became the only man in history to ever resign that office.
Calhoun in 1804 and Taft in 1878 graduated into a world very
different from ours today. They and their contemporaries spent entire careers
stretching over 40 years in grappling with a few dramatic issues on which the
nation was sharply and emotionally divided, issues that occupied the attention
of a generation at & time: The National Bank, the disposal of the public lands,
nullification or union, freedom or slavery, gold or silver. Today these old
sweeping issues very largely have disappeared. The central domestic issues of our
time are more subtle and less simple. They relate not to basic clashes of
philosophy or ideology but to ways and means of reaching common goals -- to
research for sophisticated solutions to complex and obstinate issues. The world
of Calhoun, the world of Taft had its own hard problems and notable challenges.
But its problems are not our problems. Their age is not our age. As every past
generation has had to disenthrall itself from an inheritance of truism and
sterectype, so in our own time we must move on from the reassuring repetition of
stale phrases to a new, difficult but essential confrontation with reality.
For the great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie --
deliberate, contrived and dishonest but the myth persistent, persuasive and
unrealistic, Too often we hold fast to the cliches of cur forebears. We subject
all facts to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the comfort of
opinion without the discomfort of thought.
Mythology distracts us everywhere -- in government as in
business, in politics as in economics, in foreign affairs as in domestic policy.
But today I want to particularly consider the myth and reality in our national
economy. In recent months many have come to feel, as I do that the dialogue
between the parties between business and government -- is clogged by illusion
and platitude and fails to reflect the true realities of contemporary American
society.
I speak of these matters here at Yale because of the self-
evident truth that a great university is always enlisted against the spread of
illusion and on the side of reality. No one has said it more clearly than your
President Griswold: "Liberal learning is both & safeguard against false ideas of
freedom and a source of true ones." Your role as university men, whatever your
calling, will be to increase each new generation's grasp of its new duties.
more
MAY 03 '91 03:40PM YALE U SECRETARY
P.4/9
#415 -3-
There are three great areas of our domestic affairs in which,
today, there is a danger that illusion may prevent effective action. They are,
first, the question of the size and the shape of government's responsibilities;
second, the question of public fiscal policy; and third, the matter of confidence,
business confidence or public confidence, or simply confidence in America. I want
to talk about all three, and I want to talk about them carefully and dispassion-
ately -- and I emphasize that I am concerned here not with political debate but
with finding ways to separate false problems from real ones.
If a contest in angry argument were forced upon it, no
Administration could shrink from response, and history does not suggest that
American Presidents are totally without resources in an engagement forced upon
them because of hostility in one sector of society. But in the wider national
interest, we need not partisan wrangling, but common concentration on common
problems. I come this morning to ask you to join in this great task.
Let us take first the question of the size and shape of
government. The myth here is that government is big, and bad -- and steadily
getting bigger and worse. Obviously this myth has some excuse for existence.
It is true that in recent history each new Administration has spent much more
money than its predecessor. Thus President Roosevelt outspent President Hoover,
and with allowances for the special case of the Second World War, President
Truman outspent President Roosevelt, Just to prove that this was not & partisan
matter, President Eisenhower outspent President Truman by the handsome figure of
$182 billion. It is even possible something of this trend may continue.
But does it follow that big government is growing relatively
bigger? It does not -- for the fact 1s for the last 15 years, the Federal
Government -- and also the Federal debt -- and also the federal bureaucracy OF
have grown less rapidly than the economy as a whole. If we leave defense and
space expenditures aside, the Federal Government since the Second World War has
expended less than any other major sector of our national life -- less than
industry, less than commerce, less than agriculture, less than higher education,
and very much less than the noise about big government.
The truth about big government is the truth about any other
great activity -- it is complex. Certainly it 1s true that size brings dangers --
but it is also true that size also can bring benefits. Here at Yale which has
contributed so much to our national progress in science and medicine, it may be
proper for me to mention one great and little noticed expansion of government
which has brought strength to our whole society. The new role of our federal
government as the major patron of research in science and in medicine. Few
people realize that in 1961, in support of all university research in science and
medicine, three dollars out of every four came from the federal government. I
need hardly point out that this has taken place without undue enlargement of
government control -- that American scientists remain second to none in their
independence and in their individualism.
I am not suggesting that federal expenditures cannot bring
some measure of control. The whole thrust of federal expenditures in agriculture
has: been related by purpose and design to control. as a means of dealing
with the problems created by our farmers and our growing productivity. Each
sector, my point is, of activity must be approached on its own merits and in terms
of specific national needs. Generalities in regard to. federal expenditures,
more
MAY 03 '91 03:41PM YALE U SECRETARY
P.5/9
415 -4-
therefore, can be misleading ⑉⑉ each case, science, urban renewal, education,
agriculture, natural resources, each case must be determined on its merits if
we are to profit from our unrivaled ability to combine the strength of public
and private purpose.
Next, let us turn to the problem of our fiscal policy. Here
the myths are legion and the truth hard to find. But let me take as a prime
example the problem of the federal budget. We persist in measuring our federal
fiscal integrity today by the conventional or administrative budget -- with
results which would be regarded as absurd in any business firm -- in any country
of Europe -- or in any careful assessment of the reality of our national
finances. The administrative budget has sound administrative uses. But for
wider purposes it 1s less helpful. It omits our special trust funds; it neglects
changes in assets or inventories. It cannot tell a loan from a straight
expenditure -- and worst of all it cannot distinguish between operating expen-
ditures and long term investments.
This budget, in relation to the great problems of federal
fiscal policy, is not simply irrelevant; it can be actively misleading. And
yet there is & mythology that measures all of our national soundness or
unsoundness on the single simple basis of this same annual administrative
budget. If our federal budget is to serve, not the debate, but the country, we
must and will find ways of clarifying this area of discourse.
Still in the area of fiscal policy, let me say a word about
deficits. The myth persists that federal deficits create inflation and budget
surpluses prevent it. Yet sizeable budget surpluses after the war did not
prevent inflation, and persistent deficits for the last several years have not
upset our basic price stability. Obviously deficits are sometimes dangerous --
and so are surpluses. But honest assessment plainly requires & more sophisticated
view than the old and automatic cliche that deficits automatically bring
inflation.
There are myths also about our public debt. It is widely
supposed that this debt is growing at a dangerously rapid rate. In fact, both
the debt per person and the debt as a proportion of our gross national product
have declined sharply since the Second World Wer. In absolute terms the
national debt increased only 8 per cent, while private debt was increasing 305
per cent, and the debts of state and local governments increased 378 per cent.
Mersever, debts, public and private, are noither good nor bad, in and of
themselves. Borrowing can lead to over-extension and collapse -- but it can
also lead to expansion and strength. There is no single, simple slogan in this
field that we can trust.
Finally, I come to the problem of confidence. Confidence
is a matter of myth and also & matter of truth -- and this time let me take the
truth of the matter first.
It is true -- and of high importance -- that the prosperity
of this country depends on assurance that all major elements within it will live
up to their responsibilities. If business were to neglect its obligations to
the public; if labor were blind to all public responsibility; above all, if
government were to abandon its obvious -- and statutory -- duty of watchful
concern for our economic health -- if any of these things should happen, then
confidence might well be weakened and danger of stagnation would increase. This
is the true issue of confidence.
more
MAY 03 '91 03:42PM YALE U SECRETARY
P.6/9
1/415 -5-
But there is also the false issue -- and its simplest form
is the assertion that any and all unfavorable turns of the speculative wheel --
however temporary and however plainly speculative in character -- are the result
of, and I quote, "lack of confidence in the national administration." This I
must tell you, while comforting, is not wholly true. Worse, it obscures the
reality -- which is also simple. The solid ground of mutual confidence is the
necessary partnership of government with all of the sectors of our society in
the steady quest for economic progress.
Corporate plans are not based on a political confidence in
party leaders but on an economic confidence in the nation's ability to invest and
produce and consume. Business had full confidence in the Administrations in
power in 1929, 1954, 1958, and 1960 -- but this W&B not enough to prevent
recession when business lacked full confidence in the economy. What matters
is the capacity of the nation as a whole to deal with its economic problems
and its opportunities.
The stereotypes I have been discussing distract our
attention and divide our effort. These sterectypes do our nation a disservice,
not just because they are exhausted and irrelevant, but above all because they
are misleading because they stand in the way of the solution of hard and
complicated facts. It is not new that past debates should obscure present
realities. But the damage of such & false dialogue is greater today than ever
before simply because today the safety of all the world -- the very future of
freedom -- depends as never before upon the sensible and clear-headed management
of the domestic affairs of the United States.
The real issues of our time are rarely SO dramatic as the
issues of Calhoun. The differences today are usually matters of degree. And
we cannot understand and attack our contemporary problems in 1962 if we are
bound by traditional labels and worn-out slogans of an earlier era. But the
unfortunate fact of the matter is that our rhetoric has not kept pace with the
speed of social and economic change. Our political debates, our public discourse
-- on current domestic and economic issues -- too often bear little or no
relation to the actual problems the United States faces.
What is at stake in our economic decisions today is not some
grand warfare of rival ideologies which will sweep the country with passion but
the practical management of a modern economy. What we need is not labels and
cliches but more basic discussion of the sophisticated and technical questions
involved in keeping a great economic machinery moving shead.
The national interest lies in high employment and steady
expansion of output, in stable prices, and a strong dollar. The declaration of
such an objective is easy; their attainment in an intricate and interdependent
economy and world is a little more difficult. To attain them, we require not
some automatic response but hard thought. Let me end by suggesting a few of the
real questions on our national agenda.
First, how can our budget and tax policies supply adequate
revenues and preserve our balance of payments position without slowing up our
economic growth?
COM
MAY 03 '91 03:42PM YALE U SECRETARY
P.7/9
415 -6-
Two, how are we to set our interest rates and regulate
the flow of meney in ways which will stimulate the economy at home, without
weakening the dollar abroad? Given the spectrum of our domestic and international
responsibilities, what should be the mix between fiscal and monetary policy?
Let me give several examples from my experience of the
complexity of these matters and how political labels and ideological approaches
are irrelevant to the solution.
Last week, a distinguished graduate of this school, Senator
Proxmire, of the Class of 1938, who is ordinarily regarded as a liberal
Democrat, suggested that we should follow in meeting our economic problems a
stiff fiscal policy, with emphasis on budget balance and an easy monetary
policy with low interest rates in order to keep our economy going. In the same
week, the Bank International in Basel, Switzerland, a conservative organization
representing the central bankers of Europe suggested that the appropriate
economic policy in the United States should be the very opposite; that we should
follow & flexible budget policy as in Europe, with deficits when the economy
is down and a high monetary policy on interest rates in Europe in order to
control inflation and protect goals. Both may be right or wrong. It will
depend on many different factors.
The point is that this is basically an administrative or
executive problem in which political labels or cliches do not give us a solution.
A well-known business Journal this morning, as I journeyed to New
Haven, raised the prospects that a further budget deficit would bring inflation
and encourage the flow of gold. We have had several budget deficits beginning
with a $12 billion deficit in 1958, and it is true that in the Fall of 1960
we had a gold dollar loss running at $5 billion annually. This would seem to
prove the case that a deficit produces inflation and that we lose gold, yet
there was no inflation following the deficit of 1958 nor has there been
inflation since then.
Our wholesale price index since 1958 has remained completely
level in spite of several deficits, because the loss of gold has been due to
other reasons; price instability, relative interest rates, relative export-
import balance, national security expenditures -- all the rest.
Let me give you a third and final example. At the World
Bank meeting in September, a number of American bankers attending predicted to
their European colleagues that because of the Fiscal 1962 budget deficit, there
would be a strong inflationary pressure on the dollar and a loss of gold. Their
predictions of inflation were shared by many in business and helped push the
market up. The recent reality of non-inflation helped bring it down. We have
had no inflation because we have had other factors in our economy that have
contributed to price stability.
I do not suggest that the government is right and they
are wrong. The fact of the matter is in the Federal Reserve Board and in the
Administration this Fall, a similar view was held by many well-informed and
disinterested men that inflation was the major problem we would face in the
Winter of 1962, but it was not, What I do suggest 1e that these problems are
endlessly complicated and yet they go to the future of this country and its
ability to prove to the world what we believe it must prove.
more
MAY 03 '91 03:43PM YALE U. SECRETARY
P.8/9
415 -7-
I am suggesting that the problems of fiscal and monetary
policies in the Sixties as opposed to the kinds of problems we faced in the
Thirties demand subtle challenges for which technical answers, nct political
answers, must be provided. These are matters upon which government and business
may and in many cases will disagree. They are certainly matters that the
government and business should be discussing in the most sober, dispassionate
way if we are to maintain the kind of vigorous economy upon which our country
depends.
How can we develop and sustain strong and stable world
markets for basic commodities without unfairness to the consumer and without
undue stimulus to the producer? How can we generate the buying power which can
consume what we produce on our farms and in our factories, How can we take
advantage of the miracles of automation with the great demand that it will put
upon highly skilled labor and yet offer employment to the half million of
unskilled school dropouts each year which enter the labor market, eight million
of them in the 1960's.
How do we eradicate the carriers which separate substantial
minorities of our citizens from access to education and employment on equal
terms with the rest?
How, in sum, can we make our free economy work at full
capacity -- that is, provide adequate profits for enterprise, adequate wages for
labor, adequate utilization of plant and opportunity for all?
These are the problems that we should be talking about --
that the political parties and the various groups in our country should be
discussing. They cannot be solved by incantations of the forgotten past, but
the example of Western Europe shows that they are capable of solution -- that
governments, and many of them are conservative governments, prepared to face
technical problems without ideological preconceptions, can coordinate the
elements of & national economy to bring about growth and prosperity -- a decade
of it.
Some conversations I have heard in our own country sound
like old records, long-playing, left over from the middle Thirties. The debate
of the Thirties had its great significance and produced great results but it took
place in a different world with different needs and different tasks, It is our
responsibility today to live in our own world -- and to identify the needs and
discharge the tasks of the 1960's.
If there is any current trend toward meeting present
problems with old cliches, this is the moment to stop it -- before it lands us
all in a bog of sterile acrimony.
Discussion is essential; and I am hopeful that the debate of
recent weeks, though up to now somewhat barren, may represent the start of &
serious dialogue of the kind which has led in Europe to such fruitful
collaboration among all the elements of economic society and to a decade of
unrivaled economic progress. But let us not engage in the wrong argument at
the wrong time between the wrong people in the wrong country -- while the real
problems of our own time grow and multiply, fertilized by our neglect.
more
MAY 03 '91 03:44PM YALE U SECRETARY
P.9/9
#415 -8-
Nearly 150 years ago Thomas Jefferson wrote, "The new
circumstances under which we are placed call for new words, new phrases, and
for the transfer of old words to new objects." That is truer today than it
was in the time of Jefferson, because the role of this country is so vastly
more significant. There is & show in England called "Stop the World, I
Want to Get Off". You have not chosen to exercise that option. You are part
of the world and you must participate in these days of our years in the
solution of the problems that pour upon us requiring the most sophisticated
and technical judgment, and as we work in consonance to meet the authentic
problems of our times, we will generate 8 vision and an energy which will
demonstrate anew to the world the superior vitality and the strength of the
free society.
//////