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Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy Report
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This file contains materials relating to Mike Mansfield and Nelson Rockefeller comments.
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder "Commission on the Organization of
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy Report" of the Richard B. Cheney Files at
the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Vice Present' nice.
Very helpful.
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
June 25, 1975 AR7
FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
The Vice President
had
SUBJECT:
Senator Mansfield's Comments on Murphy
Commission Report
I thought you would be interested in a copy of
Senator Mansfield's critical comments (Tab A) concerning
the report of the Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy
Commission). These comments will be published in an annex
of the report along with those of Congressman Broomfield,
Jane Engelhard and myself. Although my supplementary re-
marks (Tab B) make some of the same criticisms, they are
presented in a more constructive spirit.
Senator Mansfield's main concerns are that:
-- The findings of the Commission do not justify
all the time, effort and money expended. (As
a key sponsor of the Commission he is obviously
sensitive about the money spent by the staff in
an effort which began three years ago.)
-- The Commission has ignored the atmosphere in
which it was created, a time when "the White
House had come to a point of virtual belli-
gerency in its relations with the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee." At the same time, he
criticizes the Commission for not looking
"determinedly forward."
-- The "entire thrust" of the report "goes toward
enshrining the pre-eminence of the executive
branch in the conduct of foreign policy."
-- There is an almost total absence of mention of the
role of Congress until the last part of the report.
(I raised the same objection from a different
perspective, but the Commission staff felt Mansfield
wanted discussion of Congress downplayed.)
The Senator also opposes "exhortations" about "creating
a new era of cooperation between Congress and the Executive
branch;" objects to the proposal for a Joint Committee on
National Security, and feels (as do I) that Congress should move
slowly on the issues of executive agreements and executive
privilege.
In the area of intelligence, he expresses disappointment
with the "modest" suggestions concerning CIA, calls for eliminating
the Military intelligence agencies and reducing the size of the
National Security Agency (NSA), and favors a "full house cleaning
of CIA. He opposes giving the Director a White House office
and changing the name of the agency. He also wants your Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board disbanded.
The reference on page 4 to "a spokesman for an absent
member who was accorded unusual weight" is a thinly veiled
reference to the role played by General Goodpaster. In fact,
however, a number of other Commissioners were represented by
staff who sat at the table and spoke during Commission delibera-
tions. Mrs. Engelhard's representative was particularly active
in her absence. She could not appear at meetings due to illness.
Senator Mansfield, himself, elected not to attend any
Commission meetings during the five months that I served on the
Commission and only occasionally had a staff member present.
When the staff member appeared on the Senator's behalf, his
abrasive comments were treated deferentially.
2
p
A
207649
COMMENTS BY SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD
With regret I must record my differences with some segments of the
Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct
of Foreign Policy. My regret stems from several sources. I recognize how much
time and attention Ambassador Robert Murphy gave to the activities which he
faithfully chaired. Other members of the Commission are distinguished, busy
citizens whose service in this undertaking obviously is not diminished by my
disagreement with some of their decisions. My own participation in the arduous,
frustrating work of editing staff-offered language necessarily had to be minimal
because of my Senate duties.
My expression of personal disappointment naturally does not mean
that there are not useful observations, wise comments and helpful recommenda-
tions contained in the pages of the Commission's report. On the whole, however,
I fear that the ratio of effort to result has not been up to expectations. A
surfeit of words masks an absence of clarity. Thin gruel is being served in a
very thick bowl.
Whatever the reasons, the Commission paid little attention to the
circumstances in which the legislative mandate for the Commission was created.
The declared purpose was to look determinedly forward and not backward but the
result is not in harmony with that purpose. In establishing the Commission, the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate called for an investigation of the
mechanisms for the conduct of foreign policy at a time of intense confrontation
between the executive and legislative branches of the U. S. Government. But
- 2 -
the Commission seems to have interpreted its mandate largely as an invitation
to conduct a sort of elaborate management study of certain Executive Departments,
notably the Department of State.
Looking back to 1972, one has to remember that at that time the execu-
tive branch had sought to block every avenue to deny Congress a role in U. S.
foreign policy, mainly in regard to Indochina. The so-called doctrine of
Executive privilege had been invoked and extended to the point where it was
offensive to representative government;* efforts by Senate committees to obtain
information were blocked, evaded or ignored; the White House had come to a point
of virtual belligerancy in its relations with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
One can read the several hundred pages of the Commission's report with-
out gaining much more than an inkling of this background. That is not to imply
that a partisan or institutional bias should have been the motivating force behind
the Commission's work. But to ignore the atmosphere in which the Commission was
created represents a distortion of its purpose.
Even a cursory reading of the Commission's report is likely to impress
the reader with its timidity and its paucity of substance. The Commission's
*See the testimony of former Attorney General Kleindienst on April 10,
1973, before three Senate subcommittees, as follows:
"Senator Muskie. I am talking about 2½ million employees of the
executive branch;
"Mr. Kleindienst. You do not have the power to compel me to come up
here if the President directs me not to
"Senator Muskie. Does that apply to every one of the employees of the
Federal branch of the United States?
"Mr. Kleindienst. I think if the President directs it, logically, I
would have to say that is correct." (p. 46, Vol. I, Hearings on Executive
Privilege, Secrecy in Government, Freedom of Information, before the Subcommittee
on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations and the
Subcommittees on Separation of Powers and Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Committee of the Judiciary, U. S. Senate).
- 3 -
mandate was to make a full and comprehensive study of all Government agencies
concerned with foreign policy and to come up with recommendations which might
be quite sweeping in character--including the abolition of certain "services,
activities and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of foreign
policy. ." Unfortunately, the obvious lack of any consensus among the
Commissioners has meant that in the various drafts of the report it has been
necessary to water down progressively every recommendation. What is left leaves
much to be desired.
Perhaps most remarkable is the almost total absence--until one reaches
the concluding chapters-of any consideration of the role of the Congress in
foreign policy. It may be argued that there are references to the Congress
scattered through the report. These often amount to little more than a passing
notation that there is indeed a legislative branch of our Government. It is
astonishing to discover that the first article of the Constitution of the United
States seemingly has been almost overlooked in the Commission's report. It may
be that the reversal of roles which has placed Article II in the preeminent posi-
tion is a mere recognition of fact. If so, then the American people should be
informed accordingly by this report. The entire thrust of the Commission report
goes toward enshrining the preeminence of the executive branch in the conduct of
foreign policy. This appears to reflect a belief that the inflated role of the
Presidency should not only be continued but bolstered, notwithstanding the
experiences of the last several years.
The structuring of the Commission itself did little to counter the
emphasis on the executive point of view. While Congressional members and
appointees were named soon after the enactment of Public Law 92-352, the White
House delayed its appointments process for a half-year. Moreover, far from
- 4 -
serving as a balancing force, much of the staff talent was not used, or was
diverted into "make-work" projects. Most of the material printed in the
appendices apparently had almost no effect on the Commission's findings.
The Commission is made up of duly appointed members. However,
on occasion, a spokesman for an absent member who, in fact, had no legal
status in the Commission's study, was accorded unusual weight. This
spokesman sat at the table as a quasi-alternate Commissioner, despite my
relayed objections. This dubious practice had the effect of a further
diminution in the consideration of the Congressional role in foreign policy.
Lack of appreciation of the role of Congress appears as early as the
second page of Chapter I. An illustration is provided to underscore the supposed
importance of differences in the decision-making process--and the story is both
incomplete and misleading. The fact is that after the Geneva Protocol was
sent to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification it was discovered
that there was no clear policy on whether tear-gas and herbicides were covered,
and a letter went to the President of the United States from the Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requesting clarification. It took several
years of argument before the issue was at least theoretically resolved. The
renunciation of use of herbicides, in fact, did not come until well after the
ending of U. S. military actions in Vietnam. It is not likely--as stated that
the decisions of the two Presidents "would have been similar."
There are typical exhortations in the Congressional report about
creating a new era of cooperation between Congress and the executive branch.
- 5 -
We have heard such language for twenty or more years. Invariably what is pro-
posed is a one-way street. In practice, it is Congress that is expected to "see
the light" and accept the executive position. Much of the discussion in Chapters 13
and 14 would not be needed if the executive branch took seriously its duty to
share information and to consult fully and freely with the Congress. The
pendulum has swung so far toward the executive for so long that anything like
a return to a vertical position is greeted with cries of outrage from the
Executive Departments. By the same token, proposals for new committees and other
such devices would be seen as irrelevant if proper use were made of the existing
standing committees.
This last point leads me to a discussion of the Commission's major
proposal of a new "Joint Committee on National Security." (This should not be
confused with the idea of a Joint Committee on Intelligence--a subject to which
I will return). First, the report speaks approvingly of a proliferation of
subcommittees and staffs--a concept with which I entirely disagree--and then it
finds that the executive branch will have problems dealing with such an increased
number of power centers. So the old idea of a Joint Committee on National
Security is brought out once again.
My objections to such a new committee are numerous. First, such a
committee would cut across the jurisdictions and tasks assigned existing standing
committees and in time inevitably would decrease their authority and powers.
Second, it would become a favorite tool of the executive for centralizing
Congressional oversight functions and diminishing their scope. Third, the
committee would have no promise of access-quite the contrary-- to NSC materials
and deliberations, so it would be a one-way street. Fourth, the report antici-
pates that the Committee would be composed of the most senior members of Congress
- 6 -
and would squeeze out the junior members. Fifth, it would presumably take over
intelligence oversight in time, but that would not be the main function and it
could easily drop out of view. Sixth, it could become a barrier to the dis-
semination of sensitive material to standing committees, while having little
or no power itself to initiate legislation. Seventh, and not necessarily finally,
giving such a committee control over reports means control over information and
soon over action; a "super-committee" might easily fall under executive dominance
and reduce the overall authority of the Congress.
The Commission report reiterates time and time again themes like inter-
dependence, the inter-relationships between foreign and domestic policies and
the importance of economic issues. One might think these themes only recently
discovered, instead of ideas we have long considered truisms.- They certainly
do not justify the creation of some amorphous Joint Committee on National
Security.
Although the discussions of war powers, executive agreements, executive
privilege and comparable topics are relatively brief, they do raise questions
that require answers not yet forthcoming from the executive branch. In my
view, Congress should move slowly on the issues of executive agreements and
executive privilege: in the first case because before legislating we need
further information, which even the State Department apparently does not possess;
in the second case because I am fearful of giving the Presidency under the rubric
of Congressional reform more power than the office now has under the Constitution.
As for the war powers resolution, however, I believe there is every reason to
press the executive vigorously on the consultation and reporting sections of
the law. These have been tested several times in recent months and the executive
responses have been far from adequate.
- 7 -
Returning to the subject of intelligence, I would strongly emphasize
the fact that both the executive and legislative branches have been inexcusably
lax in supervising intelligence activities. But I am also disappointed with the
Commission's findings in this regard. After giving a brief outline of the
"intelligence community" the report goes on to make some modest suggestions
which represent little if any advance over the conclusions of the Rockefeller
Commission, which had a substantially more restricted mandate. Everything is
accepted as given and some delicate tinkering with the machinery apparently is
considered a sufficient response to the profound issues which have emerged in
this connection.
It is intolerable that the public should still be burdened with a
swollen, expensive and inefficient intelligence "community." - Since the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established in the early 1960s to consolidate and
replace the several military intelligence agencies, I recommend that the task be
accomplished and the latter abolished as soon as possible. If the Service chiefs
say that is impossible, then the DIA should go out of existence forthwith as an
expensive redundancy.
I would also recommend that the National Security Agency (NSA),
thousands of employees larger than the CIA, be dramatically reduced in size--
especially so long as each of the armed services maintains its own cryptologic
agency.
My belief is that the CIA, with all its blemishes, remains at the
heart of our intelligence operations. A full house-cleaning must be undertaken
as the facts come in (obviously some may never be known) and the agency's
standing thereafter at the center of the intelligence community should be
restored and strengthened. I agree that the Director of Central Intelligence
- 8 -
(DCI) should be given enhanced control over coordinating intelligence and should
have the fullest access to the President. I do not, however, agree that a White
House office is needed or is desirable for that purpose--it would be far too
seductive a place for the DCI. While the DCI's deputy clearly must take over
more of the running of the CIA, I believe the time is long overdue to make both
officials civilians. The practice of having either one a military man began a
generation ago when the CIA was just beginning; it is no longer necessary or
desirable especially when virtually every other intelligence component is run
by military officers.
To accomplish the necessary restructuring of the so-called intelligence
community I would look primarily to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
Thereafter, I would hope to see the creation of a Joint or Senate Committee on
Intelligence, which was first proposed twenty-one years ago. Such a Committee
should have the most extensive oversight powers possible, it should include
members of more recent vintage in its ranks. There might very well be, moreover,
a limited term of office (on the order of four to six years) for members serving
on such a Committee.
Finally, on the intelligence issue, I must register my dissent from
two propositions in the Commission's report. Granted there is a certain logic
in renaming the CIA the Foreign Intelligence Agency, the accompanying implication
that we need a "domestic intelligence agency" is distasteful and subject to mis-
interpretations; the frequent name changes experienced by the Soviet KGB also
cause me to reject such a course. Secondly, I disagree with the Commission's
views of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) which has
long been of dubious value as an impartial reviewing agency. It would be easier,
FORD
cheaper and logical to abolish it.
- 9 -
With the several exceptions described briefly above, I would like to
associate myself with a number of Supplementary Remarks of Commissioner Engelhard.
This is especially the case with her views on the value of the Commission's
effort to strengthen the departments and the cabinet, on the proper balance
between State and Treasury on economic policy responsibilities, on a greater
role for the OMB in the formulation and review of the Defense budget, and on
the cliches surrounding the phrase "multilateral diplomacy." At the same time,
I would warn against stressing the importance of economic events and the need for
economic "experts" to the point where they become fads.
In conclusion, I would repeat my belief that there are a number of
useful ideas and observations in the Commission's report, but that they seem to
me too few in volume and ignificance to have justified all the time, effort
and money required for their production.
SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS
by
THE HONORABLE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
In July 1972 when the Commission on Organization of
the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy was estab-
lished, the situation, both at home and abroad, was quite
different from the situation in the world today.
-- American forces were deeply involved in helping
South Vietnam meet an all-out invasion from
North Vietnam.
-- The President had made historic first trips
to the Peoples Republic of China, where the
important Shanghai Communique was issued, and
the Soviet Union, where the first Strategic
Arms Limitations Agreement was signed.
-- An uneasy tension loomed over the Middle East.
-- News of a break-in at the Watergate had just
come to the public's attention.
-- There were important elements of strained
relations between the Administration and the
Congress.
Much has happened in the intervening three-year period,
during which the Commission's report has been developed.
Dramatic events have tested the vitality and resilience of
our great nation:
-- The President and the Vice President resigned
from office and were replaced under the pro-
visions of the 25th Amendment of the Constitu-
tion.
-- A dangerous war in the Middle East has been
followed by negotiations which may lead toward
a lasting peace.
-- An oil embargo has demonstrated our growing
lack of energy independence, and a quadrupling
of oil prices has affected the economies of
industrial nations around the world.
-- The resulting inflation and subsequent recession
have caused high unemployment and a great chal-
lenge to the free nations of the world.
-- Our sacrifices to support the independence
and freedom of Indochina came to a traumatic
and tragic ending.
-- The Cyprus dispute between Greece and Turkey
and Communist gains in Portugal and elsewhere
have threatened the solidarity of NATO's western
and southern Mediterranean flanks.
---- A younger, more restive Congress has been elected.
The United States has rebounded from this difficult
period under the leadership of a strong new President. In
2
President Ford we have gained a great leader with the
courage and vision to deal with the difficult challenges
we face in the international area. He is especially dedi-
cated to working constructively and openly with the Congress.
The President is backed by an extraordinarily skillful
Secretary of State to whom America owes a great debt for
steady and imaginative initiatives in U.S. foreign policy
during a tumultuous and complex period. His brilliant
contributions are in many ways unprecedented in our history.
In his joint capacities as Assistant to the President and
Secretary of State, he has been able to be most effective
in assisting the President in building a safer and better
world.
In trying to develop a report which both reflects the
lessons of history and anticipates the organizational problems
we will face in the future, the Commission has had to cope
with this difficult period of transition. Although I was
only privileged to participate in Commission deliberations
during the final five months of its existence, I have been
impressed with the ambitious range of issues it undertook
to study and with its dedicated efforts to grapple with
extremely complex problems.
Creative organizational recommendations can help us better
meet economic, military and ideological challenges.
One of the limiting aspects of this Commission's inter-
pretation of its charter has been the decision not to attempt
3
to project American purposes and objectives for the future
as a framework for evaluating various organizational mechanisms.
If we do not act on the basis of a clear conception of
our national interests -- our human goals, economic and
financial needs, and political purposes -- the assessment of
organizational structures must necessarily be narrow.
We must be organized in the years ahead to ensure that
democracy will continue to be a dynamic force in the world,
dedicated to the best interests and well being of peoples
everywhere and to respect for human dignity, justice and
freedom. We must enhance our economic strength and national
vitality. We must recognize that threats to our national
security while far more complex are as real today as in the
past and far more serious for the future.
But while the third century of our national existence
presents complex dangers; at the same time, it offers increased
and exciting new opportunities for building a better world.
A question we must face is how an open society, dedi-
cated to the ideals of freedom, democracy and human rights,
can protect itself and work in partnership to strengthen
those who share the same ideals, in a world of ideological,
military, political, and economic competition with closed
societies. For this reason we must have a strong sense of
national purpose and dedication to our basic beliefs in human
justice and freedom with a powerful military, a skillful
intelligence service, and a vigorous and healthy economy,
4
which is essential for the protection and expansion of
equal opportunity and respect for human dignity.
In competing with authoritarian governmental structures,
a democracy has inherent organizational disadvantages. Our
system depends on effective Executive leadership together
with effective and constructive cooperation between the Con-
gressional and Executive branches.
The Commission has made a number of excellent suggestions
for future organization. I believe, however, that more
creative proposals might have been developed in some areas
for strengthening our democracy to meet the challenges we
face. This is particularly true in the area of Congressional-
Executive relations.
Congressional-Executive Relations. The Congress shares
the responsibility with the Executive in regard to foreign
policy, but the relationship can be destructive if it para-
lyzes the President in meeting his broad responsibilities for
national security and world peace.
The process of conducting and implementing our foreign
policy is complex. The Congress has injected itself more
assertively into that process. There has been a return swing
of the power pendulum -- which has tended to shift over the
years between the President and the Congress.
Although tension between branches is inherent in our
system, we need a renewed unity of purpose and a spirit of
5
confidence, both at home and abroad, especially at this moment
in history.
This thought was cogently expressed by the Prime Minister
of Singapore in a May 8, 1975 toast to the President when he
called for the
restoration of confidence in the capacity
of the United States to act in unison in a
crisis. No better service can be done to non-
Communist governments the world over than to
restore confidence that the American government
can and will act swiftly and in tandem between
the Administration and Congress in any case of
open aggression, and where you have a treaty
obligation to do SO.
Disunity within Congress itself, like organizational
problems within the Executive, can also complicate the
process of cooperation. Today, some of the challenges to
past practices within the Congress make it more difficult
for the President and the Congress to find a concerted
position.
These developments have contributed to a number of
foreign policy difficulties, and to the appearance in recent
times of a disorganized, fragmented, and often immobilized
American foreign policy. The following are just a few
examples:
-- The exclusion of four important friendly oil
producing nations from many benefits of the
1974 Trade Act, even though they did not
participate in the oil embargo of 1973.
6
-- The exclusion of the Soviet Union from Most
Favored Nation trading status, with a markedly
negative impact on Jewish emigration.
-- The cutoff of military assistance and sales
to Turkey, a key member of NATO with borders
on both the Soviet Union and the volatile
Middle East.
Broad goals have usually not been at issue. Rather,
it has more often been a question of different views on
tactics to achieve objectives. The situation is complicated
by the fact that lobbies, both domestic and foreign, are
increasingly influential in Congress on foreign policy issues.
Failure to develop a concerted position has resulted in
legislation and policies which are counter-productive, in
most cases, to the aims of the sponsors of these restrictive
resolutions.
The dangerous result has been an international per-
ception by some that the U.S. does not always act responsi-
bly -- even in accordance with its own interests. The image
of 536 individuals' hands on the tiller of the Ship of State
does not inspire confidence that we will hold a steady course.
Surely, the Founding Fathers did not intend the Congress
to have a veto on the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs.
The President must have the flexibility to manage our foreign
relations, to negotiate with foreign governments, and to take
7
those measures necessary to safeguard our national interests,
always with appropriate participation by the Congress.
We need the proper measure of Congressional involvement
and the processes which best serve our national interests.
We need to build mutual confidence and genuine communication.
Greater understanding and cooperation from the Executive must
be matched by a sense of responsibility and trust on the part
of the Congress.
Our co-equal branches of government need to build
together a new spirit of cooperation. A dynamic Executive-
Congressional partnership can usher in a new period of
achievement in foreign relations.
The Commission's report could have made more creative
suggestions for bolstering this essential cooperation.
-- In the chapters on the Executive branch there
is not enough emphasis on the shared responsi-
bilities of the two branches and the important
Executive responsibility of liaison with Con-
gress. In recognition of this, the new Presi-
dent, his staff, and Cabinet officers have made
a special effort to strengthen contact and
communication with the Congress.
-- In Chapter 13, which deals directly with
Executive-Congressional relations, the col-
lective impact of the recommendations seems
to amount to a further curtailment of Executive
flexibility.
8
The Commision has also attempted in the chapter on
Executive-Congressional relations to cover in a short space
questions which raise deep and difficult Constitutional
issues that do not lend themselves to brief treatment. The
questions of war powers, executive privilege and executive
agreements are three of these complex issues which have a
long history of Judicial, Congressional and Executive argu-
ment.
Although I have some reservations about the formula-
tions on these subjects, I am gratified by modifications
during Commission deliberations. I commend to the attention
of those interested in the complicated questions of executive
privilege and executive agreements the attached letter from
Attorney General Levi, which he thoughtfully prepared on
behalf of the Commission during the course of earlier discus-
sions.
The net impact of the formulations in these areas and
in other areas addressed in the chapter, such as time
limiting provisions in legislation and a system for statutory
classification, may restrict the needed flexibility of the
Executive in day-to-day operations.
While I question the practicality of defining by
statute, rules for the entire classification system of the
government, I wholeheartedly endorse the Commission's call
for legislation to provide criminal sanctions for persons
who endanger the national interest by releasing classified
9
information. I endorse, as well, the Commission's call for
more responsible handling of classified materials on Capitol
Hill, believing this will facilitate a fuller exchange of
information without jeopardizing security interests.
Executive. In the Executive area, there is a commend-
able tendency in the report to encourage greater participa-
tion by the various departments involved with foreign policy.
However, some de-emphasis on the role of the President's staff
is also implied. It would be a mistake to take any step that
would diminish the President's ability to receive a full pre-
sentation of conflicting views on broad questions of national
interest and to make decisions.
The President must have a competent staff to be well
informed, to ensure that the views of the many departments
and agencies concerned with foreign policy are fairly repre-
sented, and to convey his policies to the departments which
must implement them. The President must take the lead in
providing policy guidance and ensuring that the activities
of our government are consistent with that policy.
Pitting one department against another without systematic
resolution of controversial issues at the Presidential level
would lead to uncoordinated policies by competing agencies.
The President would have less understanding of the implications
of conflicting views. He might well be deprived of well-
thought-out options for the many significant policy decisions
which only he can make.
10
Intelligence. Because of the growing complexities of
the challenges to free societies, no national requirement
is more important today than an effective intelligence service.
With regard to the question of direction of the intel-
ligence community, the Commission was divided on the issue of
whether the National Security Council Intelligence Committee
should be chaired by the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs or the Director of Central (Foreign)
Intelligence. The Committee is designed to provide policy
guidance on intelligence from the perspective of the intel-
ligence user. I believe it would be a mistake to give leader-
ship of this Committee to anyone other than a policymaker.
That guidance is best provided, under the current system, by
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
who is in a position to understand the concerns of the Presi-
dent, the principal intelligence consumer.
Another committee associated with Intelligence is the
Forty Committee which considers proposals for actions that lie
in that grey area between diplomatic action and declared war.
The report may be overly critical of a supervisory system
which has functioned well. The primary reason the Committee
has met less frequently over the last year has been a cutback
of activity resulting from concern about the large number of
persons who must be informed about such operations. The pro-
posals in Chapters 7 and 14 of the report for establishing a
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small joint committee on intelligence or one on national
security could well provide the solution to this problem.
With regard to oversight of intelligence, the Commission
has noted the recommendations of the Commission on CIA
Activities Within the United States concerning the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. These recommendations
have important implications for improved Executive oversight,
including the assessment of the quality of foreign intelligence
collection, estimates, organization, and management; and
assessment of compliance by CIA with its statutory authority.
Other Areas. Although I have minor reservations about
other aspects of the lengthy report, I mention here only
five areas:
-- United States Information Agency. The Stanton
recommendations concerning USIA deserve most careful con-
sideration and appear to have merit. However, there should
be further evaluation of them, and an especially careful
study of the pros and cons associated with creating an
independent Voice of America (VOA). In contemplating any
change it would be necessary to assure that VOA will have
policy guidance from the Department of State.
-- Defense Budget. Although I strongly favor
taking those measures necessary to guarantee continued
American military security, I do not believe that the Com-
mission's suggestions will overcome existing organizational
problems associated with Defense budgeting. The President
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needs to be presented with genuine alternatives for struc-
turing our forces in order to make those decisions which
will safeguard our security and most effectively utilize
our national resources. Military security has first priority,
but it must be harmonized with domestic concerns and economic
constraints.
-- Embassy Communications. In endorsing a strong
role for the Ambassador in managing the country team overseas,
the formulations in Chapter 9 of the report concerning his
right to access to all communications, rather than just official
communications, goes beyond his actual requirements.
-- Energy. The Commission was not able to deliberate
sufficiently to develop proposals for solving the immense organ-
izational problems associated with obtaining energy independence.
These need urgent examination.
--- General Research. The studies commissioned by
the Staff are of uneven quality and, as indicated in the
preface, have not been reviewed or approved by the Commis-
sion as a whole.
Overall, the report contains a number of imaginative
and valuable contributions. A thorough consideration by
the Executive and the Congress of the findings of the Com-
mission will undoubtedly lead to constructive improvements
in organization.
I have thoroughly enjoyed working with the distinguished
members of the Commission and have great respect for the
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diverse views of the individual members. We are all indebted
to the skillful leadership of our Chairman, Ambassador
Robert M. Murphy, and to the dedicated efforts of Director
Francis O. Wilcox, Counsel William B. Spong, Jr., and the
other devoted members of the Staff. I am especially grateful
to General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret), and Captain
Jonathan T. Howe, USN, who have so ably assisted me in
meeting my own responsibilities to the Commission.
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