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President's Meeting with Richard Helms
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1561489
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President's Meeting with Richard Helms
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Richard B. Cheney Files
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The original documents are located in Box 7, folder "Intelligence - President's Meeting with
Richard Helms" of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 7 of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT
1. Cable
Eagleburger to Rumsfeld (1 p.)
12/27/74
A
Declassified 12/17/91 GG
2.
Silberman to the President, 1/3/75
2a. Memo
Laurence Silberman to the President (2 pp.) declassified ut ya7
1/3/75
A
2b. Memo
Memorandum for the File by James Wilderotter (6 pp.)
1/3/75
A
partions exempted 4/96 ut.
opened in full JFK 1781000410 114 5/24/00 KBH
FILE LOCATION
Cheney Files
General Subject File
Intelligence - President's Meeting with Richard Helms
Box 7
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
WHM, 5/30/85
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 5-82)
SENSITIVE
EYES
AMWQGIGZCZCWHA 117
Who
zz WTE15
DE WTE 8143 3611729
Z 271735Z DEC 7'
FM THE SITUATION ROOM
TO MR. DONALD RUMSFELD /VAIL/
ZEM
SEOREI SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY WH43653
FOR RUMSFELD FROM EAGLEBURGER
-FLASH-
SUBJECT:
HELMS APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT
1. I RECEIVED EARLIER THIS MORNING A TELEGRAM FROM DICK
HELMS ASKING ME TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARY TO SEE IF HE
WOULD ARRANGE AN APPOINTMENT FOR HELMS WITH THE PRESIDENT AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON AROUND
JANUARY 2 OR 3.
2. I HAVE TALKED WITH HENRY ABOUT THIS AND HE HAS TOLD ME
TO PASS ON THE HELMS REQUEST TO YOU WITH HIS STRONG ENDORSEMENT.
HENRY BELIEVES "IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE PRESIDENT
SEE HELMS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS (HELMS) RETURN."
3. HELMS WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH ME AS SOON AS HE ARRIVES IN
WASHINGTON WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE ON THE EVENING OF JANUARY 2.
HELMS WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO SEE THE PRESIDENT, THEREFORE, ANY
TIME FROM THE 3D ON. FYI: HELMS, IN HIS CABLE TO ME, SAYS
"SINCE IT LOOKS AS THOUGH I WOULD HAVE TO TESTIFY BEFORE
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ON AGENCY ACTIVITIES, I FEEL IT ESSENTIAL
THAT I HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS (WITH THE
PRESIDENT) RATHER FULLY AT THE OUTSET OF MY VISIT AND PREFERABLY
BEFORE I HAVE TO FACE THE PRESS."
4. HENRY MAY CALL YOU ABOUT THIS.
0238
8143
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
NNNN
MR 91-11,#5, State ltr, 10/22/91
By KBH NARA, Date 12/17/91
OFFERE
SE
SECRET
Dirch-
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
PRO
unlinois
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
JUSTITIA
January 3, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Laurence H. Silberman YNS
Phil Buchen has asked me to give you my views with respect
to certain items that may come up in your meeting with former
CIA Director Richard Helms.
I should state at the outset that I have not reviewed the
report recently submitted to you by William Colby. Mr. Colby
has, however, brought to my attention those items in the re-
port which, in his judgment, raise potential criminal questions.
Attached for your information is a summary memorandum recording
the various items that Mr. Colby discussed with me.
We have, of course, investigated none of the matters related
to us by Mr. Colby. Moreover, I have not yet formed a view as
to whether any of the items are prosecutable or appropriate for
prosecution. However, as I see it, the items reported to me raise
questions in the following areas:
1.
Possible Break-Ins and Entries Under State Law.
These items, discussed in paragraphs five and six
of the attached memorandum, could also constitute
violations of Federal law under the civil rights
statutes (18 U.S.C. 241-242).
2.
Possible Federal Postal Law Violations
(18 U.S.C. 1701-1703).
These items are reported in paragraphs eight and
nine of the enclosed memorandum; the violations
appear to be in the opening and reading of mail.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
MR 91-12, Justice letter 4/4/96
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By ut NARA, Date 1/8/97
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- 2 -
3. Possible Violations of the Federal Statute
Prohibiting Interception of Wire Communications
(18 U.S.C. 2511).
This is discussed in paragraph three on page six
of the attached memorandum; the wiretapping in
1963 discussed in paragraph two on page two may
not have violated existing law at the time and in
any event is not prosecutable under the statute of
limitations.
There are also the matters referred to in paragraph eleven
of the attached memorandum -- that is, plans to assassinate
certain foreign leaders -- which, to say the least, present
unique questions.
You should also be advised that the Justice Department is
currently investigating, following a report from Mr. Colby,
the possibility that Mr. Helms may have committed perjury
during the confirmation hearings on his appointment as
Ambassador to Iran.
In my judgment, you should either avoid discussing any
of these matters with Mr. Helms or, if you do discuss any
of them with him, that you make it clear to him that (a)
he should consult with an attorney and (b) that you are
under an obligation to report to the Department of Justice
anything he may disclose to you which appears to constitute
violations of the law.
I understand that Phil Buchen will be with you in the
meeting. You could leave to him the judgment of whether
and to what extent warnings such as those indicated above
ought to be given.
Attachment
SECRET
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
SECRET
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
DATE: January 3, 1975
FROM :
James A. Wilderotter
DECLASSIFIED
Associate Deputy Attorney General
JTK Assass. Roc. Collection Act of 1992
# 1781000 410 114
SUBJECT:
CIA Matters
NADA date 5/24/00 By KBH
CIA Director William Colby and CIA General Counsel John Warner
met with LHS and JAW Tuesday, December 31 to discuss certain
matters, including items apparently reported to the President
by Colby in connection with the recent New York Times articles.
Colby did not show us his report to the President, but para-
phrased that portion of its contents which, in Colby and Warner's
judgment, presented legal questions.
Colby began the meeting by describing the management style of
former CIA Director Richard Helms. According to Colby, Helms
utilized a very "compartmentalized" organizational structure,
with each head of a constituent unit within the organization re-
porting directly to Helms. Colby described it as like "spokes
from a hub," with Helms as the "hub" and the various compart-
mentalized units constituting the "spokes." It was possible to
be in one "spoke" and have no knowledge of what the other "spokes"
were doing.
Colby indicated that the various Watergate revelations touched the
CIA in several ways, including: (a) Howard Hunt; (b) the matter
of "psychological profiles;" and (c) the McCord letters to the
CIA. Colby indicated that former CIA Director James Schlesinger
sent a memorandum on May 9, 1973 to all CIA employees, directing
them to report on all activities undertaken that may have fallen
outside the CIA's charter. When the reports came in, Colby -- by
then the CIA Director -- sent out "corrective" memoranda. Ac-
cording to Colby, the reports submitted in response to Schlesinger's
May 9, 1973 memorandum constitute the "skeletons in the closet,"
and form the basis of Colby's recent report to the President. Colby
and Warner are trying to track down more details about the various
"skeletons."
The "skeletons" related to us by Colby are as follows:
(1) In 1964, a Russian defector was brought to the
United States; apparently, CIA thought he was a "fake." The de-
fector, a Russian citizen, was immediately confined in a house in
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Maryland, and later in a CIA facility in Virginia, for about
two years. Apparently, he was interrogated during the two-
year physical confinement. This defector is now settled in
the United States, is married, and still works voluntarily with
the CIA. According to Colby, former CIA Director McCone ap-
proved this confinement. Colby stated that occasionally, the
CIA confines defecting individuals, but only outside the United
States. Defectors are interrogated in the United States only
voluntarily; according to Colby, "they can walk away any time."
Colby speculated that the confinement of the Russian defector
from 1964 to 1966 might be regarded as a violation of the kid-
napping laws.
(2) In 1963, the CIA wiretapped two columnists ---- Robert
Allen and Paul Scott -- following a column in a newspaper in
which they disclosed certain national security information. CIA
records indicate that the wiretapping was approved by McCone after
"discussions" with then Attorney General Robert Kennedy and then
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The wiretaps, which con-
tinued from March 12 to June 15, 1963, were described as "very
productive" -- among those overheard calling Allen and Scott were
twelve Senators, six Congressmen and so forth. Apparently, the
tap did not disclose the source of the security information publishe
in the Allen-Scott column.
(3) From February 15 to April 12, 1972, "personal surveil-
lances" were conducted by the CIA on Jack Anderson and members of
his staff (Les Whitten, Britt Hume, and Mr. Spear). The physical
surveillances consisted only of watching the targets, and involved
no breaking, entry or wiretapping. Apparently, the physical sur-
veillance occurred after Jack Anderson's series of "tilt toward
Pakistan" stories. The physical surveillances were authorized
by Helms and conducted by the CIA's Office of Security. (The Of-
fice of Security was headed by Howard Osburn from 1967 to 1973.)
(4) Between October, 1971 and January, 1972, the CIA con-
ducted a physical surveillance of Mike Getler, a Washington Post
reporter. Again, there is no indication of wiretaps, a break-in
or an entry. Like the Anderson surveillances, the Getler physi-
cal surveillance was apparently authorized by Helms and run by
the CIA's Office of Security.
(5) In 1971, the CIA had reason to suspect a female CIA
employee, who was then living with a foreign (Cuban) national.
The former CIA employee and the Cuban national apparently maintained
a joint residence and a joint place of business. CIA agents broke
into the business premises and unsuccessfully attempted to break
into the residence to search for any documents the former CIA em-
ployee may have taken with in r. The agents found nothing. The
break-in apparently occurred in Fairfax, Virginia, and was con-
ducted by the Office of Security.
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(6) In July 1970, CIA agents broke into and entered an
office occupied by a former defector who was still "on contract"
to the CIA, looking for any CIA documents he may have had. The
operation was conducted by the Office of Security, and occurred
in Silver Spring, Maryland.
(7) CIA agents apparently "talked their way into" the
apartment of one Toftey -- at that time a CIA employee -- to re-
cover CIA documents he had converted. The documents were re-
covered, and Toftey was promptly fired. Toftey apparently sued
Helms, alleging that, in addition to the CIA documents, the CIA
agents had also taken some of his, Toftey's, personal correspon-
dence. The suit was dismissed.
(8) Between 1953 and 1973, the CIA's Counterintelligence
Staff screened -- and in some cases opened -- mail to and from
the Soviet Union going through the Kennedy Airport Mail Depot.
This operation was terminated in 1973 by Colby. While it was in
existence, it was "cleared by" at least three Postmasters General;
and CIA records indicate that Helms discussed it with then At-
torney General John Mitchell.
(9) From 1969 to October, 1972, the Far East Division of
the CIA reviewed, in San Francisco, mail going to and from the
Peoples' Republic of China in an operation similar to the Soviet
one at Kennedy Airport. Apparently the CIA sought in this opera-
tion "tips" with respect to possible sources, contacts, etc.; the
CIA was apparently also interested in mail handling procedures
within the PRC.
(10) Between 1963 and 1973, the CIA funded research in
some institutions, apparently including academic institutions,
on the general subject of behavioral modification. According to
Colby, these activities included the participation -- on a "un-
witting basis" -- of some U. S. citizens, who were not told of the
true nature of the testing. The example given by Colby was that
of a pole put in the middle of a sidewalk, with peoples' obser-
vations recorded as to which side of the pole they would walk.
Apparently, some of the other testing also included reactions to
certain drugs, although it is not known whether any "unwitting"
individuals were used with respect to that type of experiment. In
response to a question from LHS, Colby and Warner indicated they
would provide more information on these activities, but that their
own knowledge of them was very limited at this point.
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4
(11) The CIA apparently "plotted" " the assasination of some
foreign leaders, including Castro, Lumumba and Trujillo. The
CIA had no role whatsoever in Lumumba's murder on January 17,
1961. With respect to Trujillo's assasination on May 30, 1961,
the CIA had "no active part;" but had a "faint connection" with
the groups that in fact did it. In connection with these matters,
Warner referred to 18 U.S.C. 960, concerning "expeditions against
a friendly nation. "
(12) Between 1967 and 1971, the CIA covertly monitored
dissident groups in the Washington, D. C. area (and possibly else-
where) who were considered to pose a threat to CIA installations.
The monitoring apparently consisted of physical surveillances only;
no wiretaps were involved. Some results might have been distributed
to the FBI.
(13) Between May and September, 1971, the CIA conducted a
physical surveillance of a Latin American female (and others, in-
cluding U. S. citizens), apparently in the Detroit area, who had
advised the CIA of a plot to assasinate Helms and then Vice Presi-
dent Agnew. It is possible that a "mail cover" was also utilized.
It is likely that the Secret Service was advised of the assasina-
tion threat with respect to the Vice President.
(14) In 1972, the CIA conducted a physical surveillance of
Victor Marchetti -- who wrote a book about the CIA -- to deter-
mine his contacts with CIA employees.
Except as noted, Colby and Warner did not indicate whether any of
the above items had been approved by any individuals outside the
CIA.
*
*
*
Colby then discussed a program conducted by the CIA beginning in
1967 and aimed at identifying possible foreign links to American
dissidents. This program was handled in the CIA by James Angleton
and Richard Ober. Around July, 1967, Helms sent a cable from CIA
Headquarters referring to CIA's "participation in an inter-agency
group" with respect to these matters. Apparently, the cable also
refers to "overseas coverage of subversive students and related
activities.
"
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Apparently, a November, 1967 document in the CIA's possession
refers to a CIA survey of anti-war activities, including the
U. S. peace movement and foreign groups.
In September, 1969, according to CIA documents, Helms reviewed
the CIA's efforts against "the international activities of
radicals and black militants."
Apparently, under this program, the CIA alerted people abroad to
try to identify the foreign contacts of American dissidents. Ac-
cording to Colby, many requests in this area were originated by
the FBI. Colby also indicated that the CIA had apparently placed
some agents in the peace movement in the United States, with the
purported purpose of establishing credentials to travel abroad.
A "by-product" of these agents-in-place was information on the
domestic activities of various peace organizations. Apparently,
these CIA agents undertook no disruptive activities.
Apparently, the CIA's files under this program contain the names
of some 9,900 plus Americans. In response to a question from LHS
referring to the New York Times stories about the "files on 10,000
Americans," Colby indicates that the CIA's "9,900 names" is not
the same as the IDIS master subject index described in the Decem-
ber 30, 1974 memorandum from LHS to Philip E. Areeda, Counsel to
the President.
According to Colby, approximately two-thirds of the names in the
CIA's "9,900 plus" list were the results of either FBI requests
or reports from the CIA's foreign offices. The other one-third
consist of FBI reports on Americans in the peace movement, but
no other information. Colby indicated he does not know why the
CIA held these latter reports since no foreign travel was in-
volved, etc. He speculated that they were kept as a result of
the tendency of bureaucrats to retain paper whether they needed
it or acted on it or not.
According to Colby, the "Huston Plan" and the subsequent establish-
ment of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee "gave stimulus" to
this entire effort by the CIA. Colby, after reviewing this pro-
gram, considers it "worthless" from an intelligence standpoint.
Among other things, the Soviets apparently thought U. S. dissidents
were too unruly to be trusted with any sensitive operations.
*
*
*
Colby also reported on three other items:
(1) At the CIA's request, the Sheriff of San Mateo, Cali-
fornia polygraphed certain applicants for employment in an experi-
ment to test effectiveness of the polygraph.
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(2)
Colby and Warner indicated that the CIA utilizes
certain systems to create alias documents, such as birth certi-
ficates. Other documents -- such as credit cards -- are used
for what Warner described as "flash" purposes; that is, they
are not utilized in themselves, but are used only to corroborate
the operative identifying document (such as a birth certificate).
For example, a false credit card or similar materials described
by Warner as "pocket litter" will not be used to actually charge
credit purchases but rather only to corroborate a driver's license
or birth certificate. When documents of a Federal Agency are
involved -- such as a Social Security Card -- the CIA does not
manufacture or otherwise create the documents except with the
knowledge of that Federal Agency. Warner indicated, however,
that it may be a violation of some State Laws to "manufacture" or
otherwise forge state agency documents. Colby and Warner indicated
that this was an on-going operation.
(3)
Colby indicated that the CIA occasionally tests experi-
mental electronic equipment on American telephone circuits. The
CIA apparently has established guidelines for these tests, which
provide among other things that no records may be kept, no tapes,
and so forth.
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