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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 7, folder \"Science and Technology Adviser: May\n1-21, 1975\" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential\nLibrary.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 7 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nMEMORANDUM\nOFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT\nWASHINGTON\nMay 1, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT\nFROM: Roger W. Hooker, Jr.\nRust\nBecause of the apparent failure on the\npart of the White House to come forth with a\nplan to provide ongoing science and technology\nadvice to the President, Senator Kennedy intends\nto schedule hearings in early June on S.32,\nhis bill to:\n1. Establish a Council of Science Advisors\n(similar to the Council of Economic Ad-\nvisors) in the White House.\nCERALO FORD LIBRARY\n2. Require the Council to recommend annual\nlevels of federal investment in R & D\nand to indicate how such funds should be\nallocated within broad categories.\n3. Provide some money and technical assistance\nto assure greater imput at the state and\nlocal level from the science and technology\ncommunity.\nAccording to Ellis Mottur, his principal\nstaff person in this area, Senator Kennedy:\n1. Is not wedded to the S.32 approach.\n2. Was encouraged and impressed by his\ndiscussion with you on this subject some\nweeks back,\n3. but is concerned that nothing has emerged\nfrom the White House.\nTHE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMEETING ON SCIENCE ADVISER\nTuesday, May 13, 1975\n12:15 p.m. (30 mins.)\nThe Oval Office\nFrom:\nJim Cannon Jane\nI.\nPURPOSE:\nTo resolve organizational issue on the\nScience Adviser question.\nII.\nBACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN\nA. Background: In December, you asked the\nVice President to study this issue and report\nto you. Since that time various options have\nbeen recommended by the Vice President and\nothers. A paper identifying these options\nis at Tab A.\nB. Participants:\nThe Vice President\nDon Rumsfeld\nJim Lynn\nJim Cannon\nC. Press Plan:\nNot to be announced.\nA\n4\n4\nTHE WHITE\nACTION\nWASHINGTON\nApril 24, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nJIM CANNON\nJune\nSUBJECT:\nScience and Technology\nAdviser to the President\nBACKGROUND:\nSome time ago you requested a recommendation from the Vice Presi-\ndent on a Science and Technology Adviser to the Administration.\nThe Vice President submitted a proposal, then conducted additional\nresearch and submitted another proposal on March 3, 1975 (Tab I)\nYou then indicated an interest in having a study made of what pre-\nvious Presidential science advisers had actually accomplished for\nthe Presidents they served. One outside analysis is at Tab II. An\nevaluation by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., who was the first adviser\nto President Eisenhower and one of the best of all science advisers,\nis at Tab III.\nThe 15-year record of the office indicates, in sum, that when a\nPresidential science adviser had a clear and specific objective with-\nin the President's broader goals, provided a wider range of solu-\ntions for the President, and kept his own ambitions and ego in check,\nhe made great contributions to government and was a major political\nasset.\nThe best example of the effectiveness of the Presidential scientific\napparatus came in the late Fifties, under President Eisenhower. It\nmet a visible need to catch up with the Russian space and missile\ntechnological advances, gave a sense of confidence to the American\npeople, and thereby became a political plus for the President.\nToday's need for scientific and technological advances to meet energy\nneeds appears to be somewhat analogous.\n-2-\nAny proposal for a Scientific Adviser would be a new spending pro-\ngram, but it seems to me that it could be justified if it were related\nclosely to energy.\nCONGRESSIONAL SITUATION\n1.\nCongress is likely to pass some kind of Science and Tech-\nnology bill at this session. The House Committee on Science\nand Technology is committed to passage of a bill creating\na Council of Advisers on Science and Technology in the Ex-\necutive Office. On March 6, 1975 Representatives Teague\nand Mosher introduced a comprehensive bill that would--\na)\nwrite into law a national science policy,\nb)\ncreate a five-member Council of Advisers, with\na Chairman to be Science Adviser to the President,\nc)\nestablish a Cabinet level Secretary of Research\nand Technology Operations, and,\nTOHD LIBRARY\nd)\nform a government corporation to promote public\nuse of research and development.\n2.\nInformal discussions with House Science and Technology Com-\nmittee members and staff indicates that the House Committee\nis flexible and wants to work with your staff on passage of a\nbill that is acceptable to you. But it appears that Chairman\nTeague's Committee does want the President and his Admin-\nistration to have a strong, effective and visible scientific ad-\nvisory group.\n3.\nThe Senate is likely to pass a Science and Technology bill\nat least as extensive as the proposed House bill.\nOPTIONS\nFollowing are three options offered by the Vice President and a fourth\nrecommendation by Phil Buchen which have been staffed to your\nsenior staff for comments and recommendations. Their responses have\nbeen summarized and are included with each option for your consid-\neration on the following pages.\nOPTION #1\nDescription:\nA three-member Council of Technology and Science Advisers with\nup to 20 assistants.\nCost:\n$2.5 - $5 million annually.\nArguments for:\nSuch an approach would be a substantial commitment that would\nenable initiatives in a full range of subject areas. It would be well\nreceived by the scientific and academic community and would prob-\nably satisfy Congress.\nArguments against:\nIt would be a large and costly operation and difficult to integrate\ninto the present White House Staff.\nRecommend:\nNone\nAgree\nMR7\nDisagree\nOPTION #2\nDescription:\nA single Director of Technology and Science with up to 17 assistants\nas needed.\nCost:\nInitial cost would be $1 - $1.5 million annually.\nArguments for:\nA single director would provide a better reactive capacity and a\nclearer identity. This option would probably be acceptable to Con-\ngress, and would be less costly than what Congress is likely to\ncome up with. The staff would be easier to organize and integrate\nthan Option 1.\nArguments against:\nExpenditures and staff additions are still large and the organization\ncould not be set up quickly.\nRecommend:\nJim Cannon\n\"Since previous Presidential science advisers were\nmost effective in solving specific problems subject\nto scientific and technological resolution, I would\nrecommend this option, with the Director speci-\nfically directed to work with your energy group\ntoward reaching your energy independence goals.\nBut I think the spending could be scaled down. If\nRuss Train\n\"An organization comparable to the former office of\nScience and Technology, if established, could have\nstrong positive reactions throughout the scientific\nand academic community. \"\nTed Marrs\n\"With a larger budget this office would be a poten-\ntially, highly productive function which can pay\nits way - if properly managed - by savings through\nselectivity and coordination of scientific activities. \"\nRuss Peterson\n\"Important for President to have a separate and\ndirect input from a scientific adviser; thus, a single\nperson rather- than a Council.\"\n987\nAgree\nDisagree\nWith\nOPTION #3\nDescription:\nA Science and Technology adviser with up to three assistants.\nCost:\n$100,00 - $200,00 annually.\nArguments for:\nExtremely simple approach whose cost would be relatively minor and\nsuch an effort could be in place quickly. Only administrative action\nwould be required.\nArguments against:\nBLEGRO\nThis approach would have limited capability in terms of issues it could\ndeal with on its own and thus would have to rely almost exclusively on\noutside resources. It probably would not preclude further action by\nCongress.\nRecommend:\nJack Marsh\n\"This group could get cracking quickly and instead\nof trying to become the big problem solvers them-\nselves, could draw on the manifold sources already\nin place in a dozen existing agencies. II\nBob Goldwin\n\"Should avoid establishing one more operative group\nwithin the White House. There is already a vast sci-\nentific enterprise in America but the President does\nneed to be advised and informed by an S & T Adviser.\nHowever, three assistants are too low, just as sev-\nenteen would be too many II\nFrank Zarb\n\"Appointment of a Science Adviser, but with a small\nstaff, would draw favorable response from the sci-\nence community, the Congress and the public at\nlarge. \"\nAlan Greenspan\n\"Recommends this option but holds out for the pos-\nsibility of a more elaborate apparatus at some future\ntime pending further evaluation and review. \"\nPaul O'Neill\nSupports this option, with comments (Tab IV).\nMax Friedersdorf Supports this option.\nAgree\nMR7\nDisagree\nRECOMMENDED BY PHIL BUCHEN\nDescription:\nThe appointment of a Scientific and Technology Liaison Adviser to\nthe President who would serve simply as a point of contact between\nthe Administration and the Scientific community.\nCost:\nMinimal (no dollar estimate)\nArguments for:\nA simple step which could be taken immediately at little cost. It would\nbe understood as having no substantive responsibility other than\nliaison and as a point of contact and therefore would not create false\nexpectations.\nArguments against:\nWould probably not satisfy Congress and might be viewed in the sci-\nentific community as no more than a token effort.\nRecommend:\nPhil Buchen\n\"The subject matter of science and technology is\nmuch too diverse to make feasible a substantive\nadvisory role with anything less than the kind of\nstaff indicated by Option 1. Since substantive\nadvice is normally provided through the expertise\nof the departments and agencies who, if there is\nneed on occasion for an additional viewpoint, can\nbring an appropriate outside adviser to the Pres-\nident -- not to formulate any in-house White House\nposition on the subject. \"\nBill Seidman\n\"The S & T proposal falls under the umbrella of\nno new spending programs, and every effort\nshould be made to hold the line against unneces-\nsary expenditures as well as the appearance of\na new spending program. A White House staff\nmember designated to undertake liaison with the\nalready existing National Science Foundation\nseems adequate. Another layer of bureaucracy\nis not needed.'\nAgree\n1223\nDisagree\na\nTHE VICE PRESIDENT\n\"\nWASHINGTON\n\"\nMarch 3, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nThe Vice President\nhar\nSUBJECT:\nRe-establishing a Science and Technology\nAdvisory Apparatus in the Executive Office\nof the President\nThis is in response to your request for a memorandum concerning\nthe re-establishment of a science and technology advisory apparatus\nin the Executive Office of the President.\nINDEX\nTab A - Problem\nTab B - Background\nTab C - Functions\nTab D - Structure\nOption 1 - Creation of a Council of Technology\nand Science Advisers\nOption 2 - Creation of an Office of Technology\nand Science\nOption 3 - Appointment of a Science and Technology\nAdviser to the President\nTAB A.\nPROBLEM\nThe dissolution of the science advisory structure in\nthe White House in 1973 was greeted with great dismay\nby the scientific community. Pressure is growing\nsteadily from scientific community leaders for action\nto restore some science presence in the White House.\nA June 1974 report by a special committee of the\nNational Academy of Sciences, recommending the crea-\ntion of a Council on Science and Technology in the\nExecutive Office of the President, has heightened this\npressure and has made likely Congressional action to\nre-establish some kind of scientific and technical\npolicy organization in the Executive Office of the\nPresident.\nTAB B.\nBACKGROUND\nPresident Truman\nThe concept of providing scientific and technical advice\ndirectly to the President in a formal way was initiated\nby President Truman in 1951. The Scientific Advisory\nCommittee in the Office of Defense Mobilization met\noccasionally with the President and, in spite of its\nlocation in the Department of Defense, had direct access\nto the President. President Truman, himself, recognized\nthis function of the group and dealt with them as\npersonal advisers.\nPresident Eisenhower\nThe \"Sputnik\" crisis of 1957 created a political situa-\ntion that made it advisable to locate a scientific\nadvisory structure in the White House itself. Accordingly,\nthe scientific advisory function which was located in\nthe Office of Defense Mobilization was moved to the\nWhite House and greatly expanded. An official with\nthe title of Science Adviser to the President was\nappointed and a President's Science Advisory Committee\nwas established.\nThe President's Science Adviser also served as Chairman\nof the new interagency Federal Council on Science and\nTechnology, which took over the function of coordinating\nall of the scientific research and technical develop-\nment going on with the Federal Government.\nPresident Kennedy\nIn 1962, under a reorganization measure of the Executive\nBranch, President Kennedy created a large staff office\nin the White House under the Science Adviser to assist\nin advising the President and in overseeing the\nburgeoning Federal responsibility for science and\ntechnology. This office, called the Office of Science\nand Technology, also served as the staff arm of the\nPresident's Science Advisory Committee.\nThe Office of Science and Technology and the President's\nScience Advisory Committee were remarkably successful\nin heightening the overall interest in scientific and\ntechnical developments among the various Departments\nof the Federal government. In fact, their creation\nsparked the establishment of line offices in charge of\nscientific research and development in all of the\noperating Departments of the Federal government.\nThrough the early and middle 1960s, the Office of\nScience and Technology enjoyed a fairly prominent\nposition in the White House, as the space and defense\nprograms dominated the national scene. As the\nnational focus shifted to the economic and social\nproblems of the late Sixties, however, the role of\nthe Office of Science and Technology in national policy\nformulation became less clear and its influence in\nthe White House less substantial.\nPresident Nixon\nDuring the late Sixties and the early Seventies, the\nOffice of Science and Technology became more and more\nof a \"special pleader\" for its science constituency --\nadvocating positions and ideologies not always\nconsistent with Administration policy. Instead of\nserving to advise the President, the Office of Science\nand Technology often became his critic.\nFinally, in July 1973, President Nixon abolished the\nposition of Science Adviser, the Office of Science and\nTechnology and the President's Science Advisory Committee.\nThe functions of the Science Adviser were given to the\nDirector of the National Science Foundation and those\nof the Office of Science and Technology and the\nPresident's Science Advisory Committee transferred to\nthe National Science Foundation in civilian areas and\nthe National Security Council in military areas.\nAlthough many scientists viewed the dissolution of\nthe science advisory structure in the White House as\npurely politically motivated, there were several good\nreasons for making some kind of change.\n1. By the early 1970s, virtually all Federal\nDepartments had developed their own scientific\nand technical arms. This significantly\nlessened the need for a large scientific and\ntechnical staff in the White House (which,\nafter all, had no line functions).\n2. The failure of the Office of Science and\nTechnology's staff to relate to the White\nHouse policy formulating procedure made it\ndifficult to integrate that Office's\nrecommendations with those of other advisory\nfunctions in the White House. Therefore, as\nemerging national problems began to include\ncomponents other than \"hard\" technology,\nthe Office of Science and Technology became\nless effective and useful in contributing\nto Presidential-level decision-making.\n3. As the Office of Science and Technology's\nallegiance to its constituency grew, its\neffectiveness in serving the President\ndiminished.\nFORD & LIBRARY 938839\nTAB C.\nFUNCTIONS\nThe scientific community is now generally united in the belief\nthat the President should have available to him an independent\nsource of scientific and technological judgment on a wide range\nof areas, including:\n-- social and behavioral sciences;\n-- physical and life sciences;\n-- medicine;\n-- engineering;\n-- international aspects of science and technology;\n-- science and technology in the private sector;\n-- education and training of scientific manpower.\nThey have pointed out that a White House science and technology\nadvisory apparatus could perform the following vital functions:\n1. Advising the President in the formulation and review\nof national policies in areas involving science and\ntechnology development. Energy, transportation,\nenvironmental planning, health care delivery and food\nsupply are examples of these.\n2. Providing technical advice for the President and his\nstaff, including the Domestic Council, the Council of\nEconomic Advisers, and the Office of Management\nand Budget, on specific issues and questions dealing\nwith science and technology.\n3. Working with the Federal Council on Science and\nTechnology in coordinating the large existing in-house\ncapability of the Federal government in scientific\nand technological research and development. There\nare approximately 100,000 people employed in Federal\nresearch and development establishments, and it is\nimportant to see that this large and sophisticated\nwork force is properly and effectively employed.\n4. Identifying and reporting on gaps in scientific\nresearch and technological developments in the\npublic and private sector and initiating studies\nwhere appropriate.\n5. Providing the President with \"early warning\" of\nproblems, opportunities or developments that have\na scientific or technological component, including\nsome longer-range forecasting of such problems,\nopportunities and developments.\n6. Consulting with the President on the appointments\nof various scientific and technical officials in the\nFederal agencies.\nFORD & LIBRARY GERATE\nMoreover, the scientific community is now in full agreement\nthat the proper function of such an advisory apparatus is to\nadvise and service the President -- not to be public advocates.\nTAB D.\nSTRUCTURE\nOPTION 1. CREATION OF A COUNCIL OF TECHNOLOGY\nAND SCIENCE ADVISERS\nThe President could propose legislation creating a 3-member\nCouncil of Technology and Science Advisers in the Executive\nOffice of the President. The Council would be similar in\nfunction to the Council of Economic Advisers. The members\nof the Council would be appointed by the President from among\nthe different disciplines in the science and technology fields.\nThe Chairman of the Council would also serve as the President's\nTechnology and Science Adviser.\n(VARIATION: Some have proposed creation of a 7-member\nCouncil, composed of four Presidential appointees and the\nPresidents of the National Academy of Science, the National\nGERALE\nAcademy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine serving\nex officio. )\nSTAFFING: The Council's staff would consist of an Executive\nAssistant to the Chairman and a number of professional assist-\nants (15-20) and supporting clerical staff. The Council would\nalso be authorized to establish ad hoc committees composed of\ngovernmental and/or non-governmental experts to do in-depth\nanalyses of selected problems and issues.\nFISCAL IMPLICATIONS: $2. 5 - $5 million annually.\nARGUMENTS FOR:\nIn essence, this is the approach embodied in the\n\"Kennedy bill\" passed by the Senate last year. It\nincorporates the recommendation of the National\nAcademy of Science's special committee, and is\nfully responsive to the scientific community's\ndemands.\n-2-\nThis assures greater depth in the science and\ntechnology advisory apparatus and greater repre-\nsentation and input from the various disciplines in\nthe science and technology field.\nThis would ensure an ongoing structure in the\nExecutive Office of the President fully capable of\nrendering scientific and technological advice or\nperforming such other related responsibilities as\nthe President may assign to it.\nThe authority to create ad hoc groups permits\ntapping of the resources of the scientific community.\nARGUMENTS AGAINST:\nLIBRARY seas\nThis structure might be difficult to integrate into\nthe existing White House operation.\nIt is more susceptible to \"politization\" both as to\nits internal operation (with each of the three members\nrepresenting the views of his own constituency) and\nas to its relationship with the Administration (because\nof the structural autonomy of a council).\n-- It would result in a visible increase in the size and\nbudget of the White House.\n;\nThis structure is larger than is necessary to meet\nthe problem and is also unwieldy.\nOPTION 2. CREATION OF AN OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY\nAND SCIENCE\nThe President could propose legislation creating an Office of\nTechnology and Science in the Executive Office of the President.\nThe Director of the office would be a highly qualified scientist\nappointed by the President, who would serve also as the\nPresident's Technology and Science Adviser.\nSTAFFING: In addition to the Director, the office would have\na Deputy Director (for administration) and, as is required\n-- up to five Assistant Directors (for various specialties);\n--\nup to twelve professional assistants; and\n-- supporting clerical staff.\nThe Director would also be empowered to establish ad hoc\ncommittees composed of governmental and/or nongovernmental\nexperts to do in-depth analyses of selected problems and issues.\nFISCAL IMPLICATIONS: $1 - $1.5 million annually.\nARGUMENTS FOR:\n-- This is largely responsive to the legitimate demands\nof the scientific community and could, therefore, be\nexpected to satisfy the Congress.\n-- It assures to the President and his staff the avail-\nability of a broad range of scientific and technical\nexpertise. This would be tremendously useful to\nthe Domestic Council, the Council of Economic\nAdvisers, the Office of Management and Budget,\net al.\n-2-\n-- This structure will help to assure the development\nof an ongoing scientific and technological capacity\nin the Executive Office of the President.\n-- The authority to create ad hoc groups permits tapping\nof the resources of the scientific community.\n-- This structure is sufficiently flexible to permit\ngrowth of in-house capacity when and as necessary.\nARGUMENTS AGAINST:\n-- This would involve Congressional action to implement\n(and, of course, to undo).\n-- There are those who feel that this would unduly\nincrease the size of the President's staff.\n-- Some contend that the need for a science and\ntechnology capacity in the White House does not\njustify the creation of an office.\nOPTION 3. APPOINTMENT OF A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY\nADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT\nThe President could, by administrative action, appoint a full-time\nScience and Technology Adviser to the President to serve on the\nWhite House staff.\nSTAFFING: The Science and Technology Adviser would be author-\nized a few (1-3) professional assistants and supporting clerical\nstaff, but would otherwise have to rely on National Science Founda-\ntion professional staff for support.\nFISCAL IMPLICATIONS: $100,000 - $200,000 annually.\nLIBRARY\nARGUMENTS FOR:\n-- This could be accomplished by administrative act of the\nPresident.\n-- It would relieve some of the pressure for Congressional\naction on this issue.\n-- This would make available to the President and his staff\nat least some independent scientific and technological\nexpertise.\n-- This would be relatively inexpensive and would not\nsignificantly increase the size of the President's staff.\nARGUMENTS AGAINST:\n-- This approach would satisfy neither the scientific\ncommunity nor the Congress and, therefore, it could\nnot be expected to avert independent Congressional\naction on the issue.\n-- It is doubtful whether, under this structure, the Science\nand Technology Adviser could \"cover the waterfront.\"\nTherefore, pressure to increase the size and scope of\nthis apparatus will continue.\nThis structure is not suitable for the development of an\non-going scientific and technological capacity in the\nWhite House.\nThis structure is not suitable for tapping the resources\nof the scientific community on an interim basis since\nthe Science and Technology Adviser would not be\nempowered to create ad hoc panels for special research\npurposes.\nPRESIDENTIAL DECISION\nProceed with further development of:\nOption 1\nOption 2\nDiscuss\nOption 3 Jm Jan\nTT\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nApril 18, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nJIM CANNON Jul\nSUBJECT:\nContributions of Science Advisers to\nPrevious Presidents\nSUMMARY:\nThe Presidential scientific apparatus was a\nsplendid tool in the early days under President Eisenhower.\nIt met a visible need to catch up with the Russians, and\nwas an important political plus for the President.\nBut in time, the scientists corrected the specific\nweaknesses that had at first made them necessary. Then\ntheir proposals became more diffuse, and seemed directed at\npreventing ills that had not yet materialized e.g., food\nand energy. Thus they lost out to greater demands within\nthe White House for solutions to problems that were\nimmediate and pressing. To make matters worse, the\nscientific community became politicized during the Vietnam\nwar, and was perceived as critical and unfriendly.\nThe 15-year record of the office indicates that\nwhen a Presidential science adviser supported the\nPresident's goals, broadened his range of solutions,\nand kept his ego and ambitions in check, he made great\ncontributions to government and was a major political asset.\nEISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION\nJames Killian of MIT became science adviser to\nPresident Eisenhower in 1957 and was later succeeded by\nGeorge Kistiakowski, a Harvard chemist. This was\nprobably the most effective and influential period\nfor science advisers.\nACCOMPLISHMENTS:\n1. Following SPUTNIK, helped assure the\nU. S. public that the country's missile\nand space program was in good hands and\nmoving ahead.\n2. Prompted creation of National Aeronautics\nand Space Administration.\n- 2 -\n3. Provided the scientific basis for\nPresident Eisenhower's proposal which\nultimately resulted in the 1963 test ban\ntreaty.\n4. Made a major impact on the ICBM program,\nincluding emphasis on solid fuel rockets.\n5. Accelerated the development of a ballistic\nmissile early warning system and anti-\nsubmarine capabilities.\n6. Assisted in advancing photo reconnaissance\nby satellite.\n7. Helped make available scientific and\ntechnical information for dealing with\nsuch problems as food additives and\nenvironmental health.\n8.\nHelped strengthen programs for the\neducation of U. S. scientists and\nengineers.\n9. Through the respect and prestige they\ncommanded, Killian and George Kistiakowski,\nhelped reassure a shaken public that the\nU. S. ballistic missile and space programs\nwould close the \"technological gap\" between\nthe U. S. and Soviet Union.\nPROBLEMS:\nNo major problems other than some criticism of\ntheir focus. on defense and space-related questions.\nKENNEDY ADMINISTRATION\nDr. Jerry Wiesner of MIT was President Kennedy's\nscience adviser. Some of the successes and most of\nthe problems of this period were a product of Wiesner's\npersonal and his assertive attempts to seek a bigger and\nbigger role in government decision making.\nACCOMPLISHMENTS:\n1. Provided valuable guidance leading to\nthe rejection of a number of Pentagon\nproposals which subsequent research\nhas shown would have indeed been mistakes.\ne.g. the Dynasoar space plane.\nП\n- 3 -\n2. Introduced interests beyond space and\ndefense and focused on many other areas\nof government scientific research such\nas health.\nPROBLEMS:\n1. Bitter public debates with NASA over\ntechniques to be used in moon landing, which\nbecame a personal struggle between Wiesner\nand Wernher von Braun.\n2. Alienated the scientific community by high-\nhanded attitude and suspicion that he was\nambitious to become the \"Czar\" of American\nscience.\n3. Criticism of the Defense Department. For\nexample, he boasted that he could make a better\nevaluation of defense development projects than\nSecretary McNamara.\n4. Expanded his authority to the point that\nhe was attempting simultaneously to be an\nunbiased and impartial staff adviser as well\nas director of a scientific operations unit\nadvocating specific programs.\nJOHNSON ADMINISTRATION:\nPresident Johnson's adviser was Donald Hornig, a\nchemist from Princeton. Hornig has a stormy and unfriendly\nrelationship with the President and therefore appears to\nhave had very little influence on policy.\nACCOMPLISHMENTS:\n1. Instituted many siginificant long-range\nstudies, e.g. the potential of the\noceans; the world food problem; restoring\nthe environment.\n2. In 1965 conducted the first major assessment\nof the U. S. energy situation.\n- 4 -\nPROBLEMS:\n1. Despite the predictive merit of his\nproposals, Hornig had little impact because\nhe had no access to the President and little\nstanding within the White House staff.\n2. As the Viet Nam war expanded, the scientific\ncommunitie's mounting opposition to the war\nmade it even more difficult for Hornig to\nserve as an adviser.\nFORD\nNIXON ADMINISTRATION:\nLIBRARY\nLee DuBridge was President Nixon's first science\nadviser and was succeeded by Ed David of Bell Laboratories\nin 1970. The decline of influence which began during the\nJohnson Administration accelerated until 1972, when President\nNixon abolished the science adviser.\nACCOMPLISHMENTS:\n1. Attempted to develop practical applications\nof science research.\nPROBLEMS:\n1. Presidential Science Advisory Committee\nstrongly and publicly opposed SST\nproposal at a time when the Administration\nwas actively seeking support for the SST.\n2. Acquired a reputation within the White\nHouse for generating proposals to spend\nmore Federal money.\n3. Scientific community regarded Ed David\nas lacking credentials because of his\nbackground as an engineer.\nJAMES R. KILLIAN, JR.\n77 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE\nCAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139\nMarch 20, 1975\nThe Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller\nVice President of the United States\nThe White House\nWashington, D. C.\nMy dear Mr. Vice President:\nIn response to your request, I have\nprepared the attached list of some of the contributions\nto Presidential policy-making in the Eisenhower\nadministration made by the Special Assistant for\nScience and Technology and the President's Science\nAdvisory Committee. At the beginning of this list,\nI have summarized the longer statement which\nfollows. In listing these contributions made during\nthe period when I was a participant, may I express\nsome personal views bearing on the study you are\nmaking of proposed science advisory arrangements.\nI fully recognize that present circumstances\ndiffer from those of the Eisenhower years both in the\norganization of the Presidential staff machinery and in\nthe diversity and complexity of the issues faced by the\nPresident.\nPresident Eisenhower looked to his science\nadvisory mechanism for assistance in the national\ndefense area and for supporting the work of the\nNational Security Council. I am aware that the\nNational Security Council now has staff competence\nand consultant panels which are providing a tech-\nnological dimension to the examination of national\nsecurity issues. These did not exist in the Eisenhower\nperiod. This arrangement appears to be working\n- 2 -\neffectively and to have the confidence of the Special\nAssistant for National Security Affairs. I personally\ndo not recommend that these arrangements be\nsupplanted by a new science and technology advisory\nmechanism but I do feel that the proposals for the\nnew mechanism are no less essential because these\nNSC panels exist. The existing NSC arrangements\nhave a national security policy focus on a very limited\nnumber of problems, and J. am convinced that there\nare important issues involved in assuring a healthy\nscientific and technological foundation for military\nresearch and development, and the preposals of the\nNational Academy Committee are directed toward\nproviding this foundation.\nI am also convinced that the scientific and\ntechnical feasibility and soundness of major weapons\nsystems developments evaluated by objective panels\nof the proposed advisory mechanism could serve the\nneeds of the President and the Office of Management\nand Budget as well as the National Security Council\nas the NSC might request. In my view it would be a\nmistake to exclude the Science Adviser from the\nnational security area and from the deliberations and\nstudies of the National Security Council because of the\ninseparability of policy and program considerations\nand the special perspective and judgments that a\nscience advisory group could contribute to Presidential-\nlevel discussion of national security issues.\nIn the Domestic Council area there is, of\ncourse, muth greater emphasis on problems in the\ncivilian sector, where developments in science and\ntechnology in many instances offer the best hope of\nlong-term solutions. The existence of the\nDomestic Council means that there is a focus for\nscientific and technological assessments of domestic\nproblems and an opportunity to couple scientific and\ntechnological considerations with economic, sociological,\ninstitutional, and political factors, all of which must\n11\n- 3 -\nbe brought to bear in developing options for Presi-\ndential consideration. The effectiveness of the\nSpecial Assistant for Science and Technology in\nthe national security area in past years was in no\nsmall measure attributable to the existence of the\nNational Security Council as a mechanism for\nassuring serious consideration of scientific studies.\nIn the latter days of the Special Assistants\nand the President's Science Advisory Committee\nmany of the excellent, farseeing studies which were\nmade by the advisory setup were not systematically\nconsidered and followed up because there was no\nmechanism such as the Domestic Council and its\nstaff to receive and assess them. During the\nKennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations\nthere were numerous important studies made by\nPSAC and its panels which dealt with environmental\nmatters, energy policy, and the world food problem\nwhich could have been of great value to the adminis-\ntration in the formulation of policy and the taking\nof initiative in areas that later came to be of great\nnational concern. There was a national loss in the\nfact that these farseeing studies did not receive\nthe necessary follow-through attention.\nIn making these observations, I am\nmindful of the arguments that by strengthening the\nscientific and technical capabilities of the National\nSecurity Council, the Domestic Council, and the\nOffice of Management and Budget, there may be\nless need for a separate White House level science\nand technology mechanism and that a separate\nmechanism might have difficulty in relating its\nscientific and technological analyses to the issues\nas they are perceived by those staff agencies.\nThese arguments were carefully examined by the\nNational Academy of Sciences Committee on Science\nand Technology, which I chaired. The membership\n- 4 -\nof that Committee included a former Assistant\nDirector of the Office of Management and Budget\nand a former member of the Council of Economic\nAdvisers, both of whom were experienced in the\noperations of the White House staff. It was the\nstrongly held view of the Committee that the\nscientific and technical capabilities of the National\nSecurity Council, Domestic Council, and OMB\nshould be strengthened and by so doing there would\nbe a more effective interaction achieved and a two-\nway coupling between those offices and a new\nscience and technology mechanism. The new\nmechanism proposed can look at the totality of the\nnation's scientific and technical resources in rela-\ntion to national needs and by having this broader\nview, can help to offset a fragmented approach\noccasioned by the differing missions of the execu-\ntive agencies, both at operating and Presidential\nstaff levels.\nThe reasons supporting the establish-\nment of a new science and technology mechanism\nhave been intensively treated in the National\nAcademy and other excellent reports and articles\nin the past year. My interest in making the for-\ngoing observations is to emphasize a few points\narising out of the discussions which were prompted\nby the Academy report.\nI am in full accord with the comments\nmade by President Handler of the National Academy\nof Sciences when he wrote you recently emphasizing\nthat the mission of the new science and technology\nadvisory mechanism which has been proposed shoul d\nbe to serve the needs of the President. \"It should, \"\nas he wrote, \"not be a privileged means to represent\nspecial interests of the scientific and technological\ncommunities. Nor should it be a privileged advocate\n- 5 -\nfor science and technology per se. To be useful,\nits analyses must recognize the essential inter-\ndependence of science, technology and fiscal,\neconomic, social, political, and institutional\nfactors in developing policy alternatives.\"\nI am grateful for this opportunity to\nprovide supplemental information and to recall the\nmany ways in which the scientific mechanism\nestablished by President Eisenhower served him\nand successive Presidents and assisted greatly\nin the formulation of sound national policies.\nYours respectfully,\nJime J. R. Killian, Jr.\nJRK:cp\nenclosure\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT\nOFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20503\nMAR 7 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR: JIM CANNON\nFROM:\nPaul O'Neill\nOhem\nSUBJECT:\nScience Advisory Options Memorandum from\nthe Vice President\nI have reviewed the draft memorandum to the President con-\ncerning the reestablishment of a science advisory apparatus\nin the Executive Office of the President.\nI am concerned that the problem statement does not seem to\nbe related to the arguments presented for the three options.\nThe only motivation given in the description of the problem\nis one of the constituent pressure by the scientific com-\nmunity. If that is the only problem we are concerned with,\nthen it seems to me the options should be measured by that\ncriterion and by that criterion alone. If on the other hand,\nwe want to assert that there is a substantive problem as\nwell, we should specify the problem as clearly as possible\n(with examples, perhaps) and show how each option would help\nto solve the \"problem.\"\nSecond, I believe the range of options in the draft could be\nusefully expanded. Options 1 and 2 are virtually identical\nexcept for the multi-headed nature of the Council described\nin option 1 and the difference in funding for contractor and\nconsultant support (i.e., $1.0-1.5 VS. $2.5-5 million). Be-\nyond this, no options are presented which either strengthen\nor build upon the present apparatus or which might seek to\nintegrate a science advisory apparatus into an existing\nExecutive Office organization (the Domestic Council).\nThird, I am concerned about the way some of the arguments\nfor and against each of the options is presented. For ex-\nample, it seems to me, use of such descriptions as \"tremendously\nuseful\" and such judgmental terms as \"unduly\" belong in a\nrecommendation section of the paper so that, as nearly as\npossible, we separate value judgments from facts.\nFurthermore, the arguments are not presented consistently\nfrom one option to another. Specifically, all the arguments\n2\ncited for and against option 1 are equally valid for option 2.\nFor example, the need for congressional action for implemen-\ntation is cited as an argument against option 2 although it\nis also true for option 1. Also, the argument of difficulty\nof integration of science advice in broader policy issues\nand the susceptibility to \"politization,\" which are cited as\narguments against option 1, are equally valid arguments against\noption 2.\nIn sum, it is my view that the options paper put together\na few weeks ago (see copy attached) was extremely well done\nand balanced. I would recommend strongly that you replace\nthe options section of the present memorandum with something\nclose to that version. I would be happy to discuss.\nAttachment\nL\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 12, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nJIM CAVANAUGH\nSUBJECT:\nScience and Technology in the Executive\nOffice of the President\nThis memorandum (a) identifies arguments for and against the science\nadvisory arrangements recommended by the Vice President's staff,\n(b) discusses and assesses other alternatives, and (c) recommends an\nalternative plan for assuring that adequate scientific and technical advice\nis available for you and your advisers.\nBackground\nThe Vice President's staff recommendations (Tab A) call for the creation\nby law of an Office of Technology and Science (OTS) in the Executive Office\nof the President, with the head of the office also designated as the\nPresident's science and technology adviser. In addition to the Director,\nthere would be a deputy, five assistant directors, up to 12 professional\nstaff, and additional supporting staff. The Director and office would be\nassisted by ad hoc panels of experts from outside the government.\nThe recommended arrangements are quite comparable to the science\nadvisory apparatus which was abolished in July 1973 which included the\nOffice of Science and Technology, with the Director designated as Science\nAdviser, and the President's Science Advisory Committee which included\nexperts from outside the government. In 1973 the civilian functions were\ntransferred to the National Science Foundation and its Director has\nserved as Science Adviser.\nExcept for the single Director rather than a three member Council as the\nleadership, the Vice President's staff recommendations are like those\nrecommended in June 1974 by a National Academy of Sciences Committee\nchaired by James Killian and provided for in a bill passed last November\nby the Senate (the Kennedy bill). There are a number of advantages and\ndisadvantages of this proposal, and there are other alternatives that\nwarrant consideration.\n- 2 -\nCritical Considerations\nCritical considerations that bear upon a decision on science advisory\nFORD is 078330 LIBRARY\narrangements include:\n1.\nIntegration of staff advice. There are few problems and issues\nrequiring Presidential or Executive Office attention that involve only\nscientific and technical considerations. A group limited primarily to\nscientists and engineers is not well equipped to deal with other perti-\nnent considerations -- economic, social, legal, political, intergovern-\nmental, etc. Thus, the output of a scientific and technical group, even\nif it reports to the President, must be integrated with the work of others\nto provide a full analysis of a problem or issue and a full range of\nalternatives -- not limited to scientific and technical alternatives.\n2. Focus of special purpose offices. Past experience with special\npurpose offices in the Executive Office indicates that they tend to\nbecome \"special pleaders\" or advocates for particular alternatives\nor programs, thus making more difficult the job of reaching balanced\ndecisions among competing interests. For example, they advocate\nprograms which involve additional funding for their constituancy.\n3. Scientific community views. Pressure is growing steadily from\nscientific community leaders for action to restore some science\npresence in the White House. Arguments are often more emotional\nthan substantive. (If not resolved this year, the subject could even\nbe a campaign issue for scientists in 1976.)\n4.\nCongressional action. There is a good chance that Congress will act\non its own initiative this year to create some new Executive Office\norganization.\nAlternatives\nThere are four principal alternatives that have been advanced for\norganizing scientific and technical advice.\nAlt. #1 Propose legislation to create an Office of Technology and Science\n(as recommended in the Vice President's staff report, Tab A)\nArguments for:\nWould be fully responsive to the scientific and technical\ncommunity.\nWould defuse the pressures in Congress to mandate their\nsolution.\n- 3\nHaving independent scientific and technical advice immediately\navailable could be useful on occasions.\nArguments against:\nAs in the case of the arrangements existing prior to July 1973,\nthere will be problems of integrating the work of this single\npurpose group with other elements of the Executive Office.\nReestablishes the special interest problem.\nWould add substantially. to the White House staff and would\nbe costly.\nWould be viewed as Administration endorsement of Senator\nKennedy's bill. Establishes a permanent and rigid structure.\nAlt. #2 Continue the existing arrangements, wherein the Director of NSF\nalso serves as Science Adviser. Or strengthen it with a formal\nScience Adviser to the President designation and involve him in\nmore issues, perhaps through Presidential assignment.\nArguments for:\nWhite House scientific oversight is less important now than\nin the 1950's and 1960's, because line agencies and NSF are\nmuch better staffed to deal with technical considerations.\nThe Science Adviser can devote more staff and funding\nresources to the function since he can draw upon all NSF\nresources.\nThe Science Adviser has functioned principally as an adviser\nto the OMB. His advice is integrated with other inputs --\navoiding the \"special pleader\" problem.\nArguments against:\nThe arrangement is not satisfactory to the scientific community\nwhich has complained of three principal weaknesses:\n- The Science Adviser is not involved in national defense\nissues, thus there is essentially no scientific and technical\nreview from outside DOD. (In fact, NSC established in 1973\na scientific advisory apparatus consisting of technical staff\nand 25 technical consultants. )\n- The Science Adviser is too far removed from the President.\n- The Science Adviser has a \"conflict of interest\" in that he\nmust seek and defend before OMB NSF's request for R&D\nfunds while also evaluating R&D requests of other agencies.\nElements of the Executive Office other than OMB have received\nrelatively little help from the Science Adviser.\nThe selection of this alternative will probably result in\nlegislation such as the Kennedy bill.\nn\n- 1 -\nAlt. #3 Appoint a Science Adviser to the President on the White House\nstaff. Provide him with a few (1 to 3) professional assistants\nand expect him to draw upon scientific and technical expertise\nin agencies and from non-Federal ad hoc committees -- much\nthe way Bob Goldwin functions with the academic community.\nThe Science Adviser would continue to draw upon NSF for staff\nsupport. NSC's existing staff and advisory group would be\ncontinued and would work closely with the Science Adviser.\nArguments for:\nProvides a \"science presence\" in the White House.\nProvides additional expertise for addressing critical issues\nthat involve scientific and technical considerations.\nAvoids institutionalizing another large special purpose staff.\nArguments against:\nThis limited arrangement may not be adequate to satisfy the\nscientific community (c. g., it might not meet the criticism\nthat the President needs technical advice independent of NSC\nand DOD on defense matters) or head off Congressional\naction.\nOnce created, pressure may still be strong to expand it to a\nfull-blown office or council.\nThe Science Adviser may become a special interest advocate.\nAlt. #4 Expand significantly and restructure the policy analysis capability\nof the Executive Office of the President by creating a more broadly\nbased analytical or planning group which includes scientific and\nengineering experts.\nArguments for:\nThe policy analysis and long range planning capabilities of the\nExecutive Office are not adequate and should be expanded.\nScientific and technical expertise should be integrated with\nother parts of the policy analysis and decision making structure.\nArguments against:\nThis would involve rethinking and restructuring the roles of\nOMB, NSC and Domestic Council and has not been developed\nadequately to permit serious consideration at this time.\nSuch expanded White House-Executive Office capability probably\nwould be opposed on the Hill and by line agencies.\nProbably would not be acceptable to the scientific community\nwhich tends to view integration of its advice at some level below\nthe President as de facto subordination of scientific advice.\nIT\n- 5 -\nRecommendation\nFrom the standpoint of substantive contribution to improve decisions, I\ndo not believe that it is necessary to provide new scientific and technical\ncapability in the White House or Executive Office. However, the growing\npressures from the scientific community and the Congress are compelling\nreasons for some action. I believe Alternative #3 (Science Adviser with\nsmall staff) is the best course of action and recommend that you direct that\nfurther development of this alternative be undertaken. I also recommend\nthat you meet with leaders of the community before deciding a course of\naction.\nBrent Scowcroft, Jim Lynn (Paul O'Neill), Phil Areeda and Phil Buchen\nalso recommend Alternative #3.\nDecision\nProceed with the development of a detailed proposal to:\nCreate an Office of Technology and Science (Alt. #1)\nStrengthen existing arrangcments (Alt. #2)\nAppoint a Science Adviser with limited staff (Alt. #3)\nExplore further the development of a broad policy\nanalysis capability (Alt. #4)\nSCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE\nPRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE\nRecommendations\nFebruary 5, 1975\nFebruary 5, 1975\nSCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND\nTHE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE\nRecommendations\n1.\nThere should be a scientific and technological\ncapability directly available to the President\n(a) Many issues that come to the President, either\nfor decision or for initiative, involve science\nand technology, sometimes to a very high degree,\nin the analytical and judgmental process.\n(b) While the federal departments and agencies have,\nand should have, scientific and technological\nof high quality. the President should\nhave available to him an independent source of\nscientific and technological judgment of the very\nhighest quality. The organization set up to pro-\nvide such a source for the President must not be,\nor be perceived as, the representative of the\nscientific and technical community in the\nPresident's office.\n(c) While the present need for such a capability is\nclear, in our complex and technologically varied\nsociety, the need to draw upon science and\ntechnology to meet urgent problems and oppor-\ntunities will be even greater in the decades ahead.\n11\n2.\nThis caoability should be lodged in\nan Office of Technology and Science\n(a) fill Office of Technology and Science should be\nestablished by Congressional action and should\nbe headed by a Director who should also have the\ntitle of Science and Technology Advisor to the\nPresident.\n(b) An Office, better than a single Advisor, or a\nCouncil or Committee of: Advisors, can\n--- cover the full range of necessary competence\nwithout seeming to subordinate one area to another;\n-- interact with (and \"translate\" the reports of)\nad hoc expert task forces of consultants drawn\nfrom a variety of disciplines in and out of\nscience and technology;\n-- call on and utilize the best scientific,\ntechnological and professional talents in the\ncountry for specific tasks relevant to the\nPresident's responsibilites;\n-- resist the pressures to make the President's\nScience Advisor the \"spokesman for science and\ntechnology\" as distinguished from the President's\nneed for scientific competence in meeting his\nnational responsibilities.\nof Technology and Science should be principally.\nNote: Not all of the following activities need\nbe undertaken at the outset. The func-\ntions of the Office should be allowed\nto grow as the President may require,\nas relationships with the departments\nand agencies of government develop,\nand as emerging national programs,\npolicies and issues may make desir-\nable and useful. ]\n(a) To respond on scientific and technical matters\nto requests from the President with respect to\nissues that are before him for decision, or\nnew initiatives.\n(b) To help the President resolve conflicting\nadvice involving scientific matters that come\nto the President from departments, agencies\nor the Congress.\n(c) To organize ad hoc panels of consultants to\nassist in the collection and evaluation of\nrelevant data with respect to particular\ntechnical and scientific issues.\nThe membership of such panels would be\ndrawn from the special competence available\nin the private and public sectors including\nuniversities, the National Academies, industry,\nand government laboratories.\n(a) To provide the President with early warning\nof either\n-- opportunities, or\n-- problems\nthat have a scientific or technological com-\nponent, including some longer range forecasting\nof such opportunities, problems or developments.\n(e) To identify and report on any gaps in scientific\nresearch and technological development in the\npublic or private sectors that merit attention.\n(f) To consult with the President on the appoint-\nments of various scientific and technical\nofficials in the federal agencies.\n(g) To stay in contact with the professional staffs\nof the federal departments and agencies, and of\nstate and local governments, as well as with\nprivate sector organizations involved in science\nand technology.\n(h) To be available for participation in reviews\nof policies and programs of the departments\nand agencies having technical responsibilities\nand thus to assist in the formulation of national\npolicy on technical and scientific matters.\n(i) To assist the Domestic Council, the National\nSecurity Council and the OMB in reviewing de-\ndepartment and agency programs that have techni-\ncal and scientific content.\n(j) To have a modest budget to initiate analyses'\nand studies in support of: the ad hoc panels\nmentioned in subparagraph (c) above. These\nanalyses and studies would be performed in\nuniversities, private industry or federally\nsupported institutions.\n4.\nOrganization of the Office\n(a)\nThe full-time Director of the Office should\nserve at the pleasure of the President.\n(b)\nThe Director should have a full-time deputy\nresponsible for the administration of the\nOffice who need not be a scientist.\n(c)\nThere should be provision for a flexible number\nof full-time Assitant Directors (up to five)\nso as to cover a decent range of professional\ndisciplines without trying for \"reprosentation\"\nof every professional discipline or interest.\nand to respond to the possible growth in\nPresidential needs for special competence.\n(d)\nProvision should bc made for a flexible number\nof full-time professionally qualified staff\n(up to a dozen) as well as a clerical staff\nto meet the responsibilities of the Office\nas they may develop.\n(e)\nThe ad hoc advisory panels (mentioned in para-\ngraph 3 above) which are central to the effective\nfunctioning of the Office should:\nR\n(i) be exempt from the Federal Advisory\nCommittee Act.\nFrank and objective advice cannot be\nexpected to be available if exposed to con-\ntinuous and public scrutiny and controversy.\n(ii) have their members, in general, appointed\nby the President.\n(iii) serve on a part-time basis for a limited\nterm;\n(f) The Director would maintain close relationships\nwith the National Academies of Science and of\nEngineering and the Institute of Medicine and,\nin establishing ad hoc panels, would make full\nuse of their membership, as well as of academic\nfaculties and such organizations as the Social\nScience Research Council.\n(g) The Office in its initial full year of operation\nshould have an annual budget in the $1 to $3 mil-\nlion range.\n(h) Since science and technology are profoundly inter-\nrelated (not only among the scientific disciplines\nthemselves, but with domestic and foreign social\nand political issues and the intellectual activity\nof the nation) the area of the Office's con-\ncorn should be broad and include:\n-- social and behavioral sciences\n-- physical and life sciences\n-- medicine\n-- engineering\n-- military applications\n-- international aspects of science and technology\n-- science and technology in the private sector\n-- education and training of scientific manpower\n5. The Qualifications of the Director\nThe Director must have, or be the type of\nperson who can readily gain, the personal confidence\nof the President.\nHe or she should be a scientist, engineer or\nmedical person of proven scientific or technical\ncapability, have some experience in public service\nor administration, and should preferably be a member\nof one of the National Academies of Science or\nTechnology or the Institute of Medicine.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMay 14, 1975\nADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nJIM CANNON\nFROM:\nJERRY H. JONES\nSUBJECT:\nScience and Technology\nAdviser to the President\nYour memorandum to the President of April 24 on the above subject\nhas been reviewed and the following was noted:\nOption #1 -- A three-member Council of\nTechnology and Science Advisers with up\nto 20 assistants. Disagree.\nOption #2 -- A single Director of Technology\nand Science with up to 17 assistants as needed.\nAgree with the following notation:\n-- With more limited staff + less\nfunding.\nOption #3 -- A Science and Technology adviser\nwith up to three assistants. Disagree.\nOption #4 -- The appointment of a Scientific and\nTechnology Liaison Adviser to the President who\nwould serve simply as a point of contact between\nthe Administration and the Scientific community.\nDisagree.\nPlease follow-up with the appropriate action.\nThank you.\nCC: Don Rumsfeld\nJim Lynn\nINFORMATION\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMay 14, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nJIM CANNON June\nSUBJECT: Science Adviser Decision and Action\nI.\nThis is my understanding of your decision and\nyour direction for action:\n1. There will be a Science and Technology Adviser\nto the President.\n2. The office and staff will be authorized by\nlegislation.\n3. There will be a single director, someone of\nthe ability and scientific standing of\nDr. Harold Brown, President of Cal Tech.\nThe Director should know scientists, be able\nto attract the best minds, and know how to\ninclude their counsel in the executive\ndecision-making process.\n4. He will have assistants, but not as many as the\n17 called for in Option 2 of the April 24, 1975\nmemorandum. He might begin, for example,\nwith a staff of five assistants.\n5. Extensive use will be made of consultants as\nmembers of scientific and technological task\nforces for various projects.\n6. Initial costs would be $1 million - $1.5 million\nannually.\n7. You will invite Representatives Teague and\nMosher, Senators Tunney and Beall, and Senator\nKennedy to the White House next week (perhaps\non Thursday, May 22) to make known your decision,\ndescribe the kind of Science Adviser and staff\nyou want, and express the hope that they will\nfollow your proposal for legislation.\n- 2 -\n8. The Vice President, Jim Lynn, Brent Scowcroft\nand I will work together to define the role\nof Science Adviser and clarify his relationship\nto military and international science meetings.\nII.\nAs the next steps to carry forward your decision\nafter your meeting with members of the House and Senate,\nI propose that the Domestic Council Staff:\n-- Draft legislation to carry forward your decision\n-- Draft a message to the Congress.\n-- Work with Max Friedersdorf and his staff, to\ndevelop with Congressional leaders legislation\nthat you and the Congress will support.\nIn broad terms, our objectives are to:\n-\nassure the development of an ongoing scientific\nand technology capacity in the Executive Office\nof the President.\n- assure the availability of a broad range of\nscientific and technical expertise;\n-\nacknowledge Congressional support for an\neffective and visible science advisory group;\n- demonstrate unequivocally the Administration's\ncommitment to using the resources of the nation's\nscientific community and technology industry to\nmeet the overriding needs of our times; and\n-\nmake known to the nation the Administration's\nability to develop and support new and innovative\nideas through the creation of Executive Branch\ntask forces operating out of the Office of the\nScience and Technology Adviser to the President.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMay 14, 1975\nLIURAK\nTO:\nDONALD RUMSFELD\nFROM: JIM CONNOR gu\nJerry Jones asked me to bring to your attention\nthe discrepancies between the President's decision\non the Science Advisor and the attached information\nmemorandum being submitted by Jim Cannon to\nthe President.\nOf particular concern are items 4, 5 and 6 on the\nfirst page. It appears that Cannon may be assuming\na staff growing well beyond the 5 to 7 numbers\nthat were discussed. The decision memorandum\nas I read it does not discuss the use of consultants,\nextensive or otherwise. The President had decided\non \"less funding\" than the $1 million to $1. 5 million\nannually.\nJerm\nSex we\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMay 21, 1975\nMEETING WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS\nON THE SCIENCE ADVISOR ISSUE\nThursday, May 22, 1975\nThe Cabinet Room\nFrom: Jim Cannon\nI.\nPURPOSE\n9:45 a.m. (30 minutes) June\nTo discuss your decision on the Science Advisor with\nkey Senators and Congressmen.\nII.\nBACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN\nA. Background: You requested this meeting.\nB. Participants: The Vice President; Senators Frank\nMoss, Barry Goldwater, J. Glenn Beall and Paul\nLaxalt; Congressmen Olin Teague, Charles Mosher,\nRay Thornton, John Conlan and James Symington;\nJim Cannon, Jim Lynn, Jack Marsh, and Max\nFriedersdorf.\nRegrets: Senators John Tunney and Ted Kennedy.\nC. Press Plan: To be announced.\nIII. TALKING POINTS\n1. I have considered the various options for providing\nthe President science advice and have concluded\nthat an advisory presence in the White House is\ndesirable.\n2. Dr. Stever, as science advisor, has done an out-\nstanding job in assisting the Executive Office\nand the White House. He has assembled resources\n2\ndevoted to science and technology policy in NSF\nwhich we expect him to retain and to use in support\nof the new White House group. I feel that this\nnew arrangement can be even more effective in\nkeeping me and my top White House staff advised\non issues involving science and technology.\n3. The new science advisory arrangement would consist\nof a single science advisor assisted by a small\nstaff. I believe that through such an arrangement\nwe can encourage more extensive use of experts from\nthe scientific community who are knowledgeable on\nspecific problems and issues that may arise. In\naddition, this office will be able to continue to\ndraw on the resources of the National Science\nFoundation.\n4. The major responsibilities of the science advisor\nand his office would include:\nAnalyzing the scientific and technological aspects\nof major National policy problems or issues and\nexamining their implications for policy alternatives.\nActing as the President's spokesman on government-\nwide matters affecting the government's partici-\npation and conduct in R&D activities.\nKeeping me and my top advisors abreast of new\ndiscoveries or breakthroughs in science and\ntechnology that may have impact on National\npolicies or government programs.\n5. I would expect the science advisor to arrange for\nme occasional meetings with leaders of the scientific\nand technological community from both industry and\nacademia so that I can gain from them first-hand\ninformation on matters of National importance.\n6. I hope you agree with me that this new arrangement\nwill be an effective vehicle in providing me\nscientific advice. I will be forwarding legislation\nshortly to establish this new office and I ask your\nsupport in deferring action on pending legislation\nin this area until the Congress can consider the\napproach I am recommending.\nPOINTS ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGY\nADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT\nA) The Vice President will probably bring this\nsubject up in his 2:30 meeting tomorrow with the President.\nB) The Vice President has committments out to his\nfriends in the scientific community (Baker, Teller, etc.)\nApparently he has promised to secure a major voice inside\nthe White House for the scientific community.\nC) The Cannon paper recommends a single Director of\nScience and Technology with up to 17 assistants at a\ncost of $1,000,000 to $1,500,000 annually. Basically,\nthis is a high cost, large organization option. In\nchoosing this option the paper fails to address the two\nkey organization problems with such an office.\n1) How does it fit with the rest of the White\nHouse Staff, what does it do, and how does it obtain\nan effective policy voice on scientific matters in\nWhite House deliberations? The last office was\nnot able to find a place in the sun for very real\nreasons; why will a new office do better?\n2) How do we organize it in such a way as to prevent\nit from becoming an advocacy office for special\nscientific interests. In essence, the paper\nrecommends a large office without specifying its\nmission or how it would fit with all of the rest\nof us. In my view, this is a formula for\nestablishing an unsatisfactory organization which\nwill come back to haunt us. (Read the O'Neill\npaper at Tab 4 and the original Cavanaugh paper\nof February 12 at Tab 4).\nD) The choice to do nothing is not realistic.\nCongress will force some type of organization on us.\nE) As far as I can tell, the correct mission for an\noffice of science and technology would be to perform a\nrole for the scientific community like the one Bob Goldwin\nis presently performing for the intellectual community,\ne.g., the role of converging key concepts from the academic,\nprivate, and governmental organizations and individuals\ndealing with scientific policy in a way that can be used\nin the policy counsels of the White House. Ed David has\nsuggested a third option (Tab A) ; upon reflection, his\nsuggestion would surely give birth to an advocacy office.\nUnless it can be proven that a large office can work\neffectively within the White House, we should not go\nthat road, but rather stick to the Goldwin format.\nThere are two keys to making the Goldwin format work:\n1) The man selected to perform the role\nmust be someone the President will work with\nand whose expertise the President will be\nwilling to draw upon. Also, he has to be highly\nregarded in the scientific community if they are\nto accept such a limited role and office.\n2) The President will have to personally sell\nthis limited option if we are to sustain the\nposition:\na) The Vice President must be convinced.\nb) The Hill committees, and particularly\nTiger Teague, must be convinced.\nF) The NSC has not yet been consulted. This is a major\noversight since the NSC assumed most of OST's duties within\nthe White House when it went out of business. The NSC\nis sure to object to the formation of a new competing\norganization which will more than likely get into the\nbusiness of commenting on weapon's technology (I have\ngiven a copy of the paper to Scowcroft for comment).\nHAM A"
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