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National Security Council - General (4)
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National Security Council - General (4)
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Philip W. Buchen Files
Philip Buchen's General Subject Files
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National Security Council. Central Intelligence Agency. (09/18/1947 - 12/04/1981)
Law and legislation
International relations
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The original documents are located in Box 27, folder "National Security Council - General
(4)" of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 27 of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 9, 1976
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
In response to your letter of December 24, the White House Coun-
sel's Office believes that the paroling of up to 11, 000 additional
Indochina refugees into the United States is consistent with the
President's program. Our opinion presumes that State will pro-
vide you, as Attorney General, and the appropriate Congressional
committees with a complete analysis of all the refugee information
that is presently known or that can be reasonably estimated.
Although the Administration clearly indicated in consultations with
the appropriate Congressional committees that the level of Viet-
namese, Cambodian and Laotian refugees to be permanently resettled
in the United States would not exceed approximately 130,000, it is
our understanding that this assurance was based on inadequate infor-
mation and that State now has available more accurate and recent
information to support the request for additional parolees. It also
is our understanding that sufficient appropriated funds remain in
the 1975 Migration and Refugee Assistance Act for this new group
of refugees and tha t sufficient American sponsors are available to
enable the refugees to proceed directly to homes in the United States.
Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
Philip Buchen
Counsel to the President
The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530
GERALD FORD VIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 9, 1976
Phil --
I have eliminated any mention of the 150, 000 number.
I had obtained the information of a Congressional
authorization of 150, 000 from Ken Quinn of the NSC
and it is explicitly stated in Scowcroft's memo. In
addition, the letter from the Attorney General speaks
in terms of exercising the "authority vested in the
Attorney General to permit the entry to the United
States of up to 150, 000 Vietnamese, Cambodians
and Laotian refugees who met certain criteria, with
the unde rstanding that not more than approximately
130, 000 of them would be permanently resettled in
the United States. 11
However, after talking at length with Mark Wolf,
who is on the Attorney General's personal staff, I
think that the mention of 150,000 raises so many
questions that it is better to omit it.
Bobbie
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
MEMORANDUM
8383
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
URGENT ACTION
December 30, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: PHILIP BUCHEN
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT walfor
SUBJECT:
Parole Authority for Indochina Refugees in
Thailand
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll sent the Attorney General a letter on
December 19 (Tab A) requesting that the Department of Justice
approve our seeking to parole up to 11, 000 more Indochina refugees
into the United States. Some 1000 qualify under the criteria of
being former U.S. Government employees, or else relatives of
Americans or refugees in the United States. The rest are in the
high risk category. The Attorney General's office has informed
us that they plan to send this issue to you for policy guidance.
On December 19 I sent a letter to the Attorney General (Tab B)
urging approval of the State Department request. I still believe
that we have a real obligation to assist these people. The Meo
refugees from Laos had a long and close association with the CIA.
The Khmer resisted the Communists in large part because of
promises we made to them. Our reports from Cambodia indicate
that high-risk refugees would face almost certain death if they were
returned to Cambodia.
That return is an ever-present threat. Aside from the humanitarian
motive of alleviating the suffering of these individuals, most of whom
are living under deplorable camp conditions, there in the additional
consideration that Thailand might force them to return home.
Questions of obligation and humanitarianlam aside, these new refugees
are not likely to cause a significant problem. They would not enter
refugee camps in the United States, but would move from Thailand
directly to the homes of U.S. sponsors. The resettlement of the
LIBRARY GERALD P. FORD
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
2
refugees already in the United States has gone more quickly and
smoothly than we originally anticipated. These individuals should
also fit well into our society.
Congress has already given us authorization to bring in 150, 000
refugees. I realize that we indicated to congressional committees
that we would be using only about 134, 000 spaces. At that time,
however, we were not aware of these additional high-risk refugees.
Julia Taft believes that low-level consultations could produce the
needed approval for these additional 11, 000. She discussed this
subject with Congressman Eilberg's committee on December 18
and received no strong objection to the State proposal. Moreover,
Senator Kennedy has written to the President (Tab C) indicating
his support for the additional parole authority.
I would appreciate your giving favorable consideration to the State
Department request and hope you will consult with us prior to
providing Justice with a White House position,
BERALD R. FORD LIBRABY
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
2pm
5
NSC
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 10, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
PHIL BUCHEN T.
After our talk this morning, I thought
you would be amused by the attached
letter.
Attachment
Positively 2/11/76 bulliant!
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
F.S I, 1956
Dear Mr Biche,
d comment to you attention
Miss May McGray as on
next permanel representative L
the U.N
Swally,
Date
3725 they Heals- Pack
Bronx NY 10163
FORD i GERALD LIBRARY
NSC
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 2, 1976
Dear Congressman Fascell:
In further response to your letter to the President of January 19,
we have reviewed carefully the material supplied to the Congress
and to the General Accounting Office concerning the Mayaguez
incident, as well as the material which had been requested by the
GAO but which we had been unable to supply. We have also asked
the individual agencies to conduct a similar review.
As we informed the GAO orally, the minutes of NSC meetings have
traditionally not been made available outside the Executive Branch.
We believe it is necessary that the participants in these meetings
feel able to provide the President with candid advice. Knowledge
that the views expressed during these meetings would be subject to
Congressional or GAO scrutiny would have an inhibiting effect which
might deprive the President of the frank and honest opinion of his
senior advisers, SO necessary for the effective conduct of our foreign
relations. For these reasons, we were unable to provide the minutes
and records of discussions of NSC meetings, the options and recom-
mendations prepared for these meetings, or the intelligence briefings
provided the Council or the President in connection with them. For
similar reasons, we were unable to provide the papers concerning
the NSC staff preparations for such meetings. We have, however,
prepared a list of statutory and agency participants in the NSC
meetings on the Mayaguez incident, which is attached.
Although we were unable to provide the GAO investigators with the
internal NSC material they sought, in an effort to be responsive to
their desires for information, we arranged for several of the NSC
staff members who had been most closely associated with the hour-
to-hour developments in the Mayaguez incident to be interviewed by
the investigators. I understand that these interviews were extremely
detailed and that the staff members answered the GAO questions, with
FORD : GERALD LIBRARY
- 2 -
the exception of those directly concerning information and options
presented to the President, on the basis of their extensive per-
sonal knowledge of the events.
The GAO representatives also asked for "pre- and post-meeting
communications to other agencies and officials. " The only such
communication we could identify was a classified May 12, 1975
memorandum from the President to the Secretary of Defense con-
cerning the use of riot control agents. We provided the GAO
representatives with a copy of this memorandum.
With regard to the request for post-mortems, the GAO representa-
tives were given the After Action Report prepared by the Department
of Defense. A separate CIA post-mortem was prepared at the
direction of the President. Although the document remains highly
sensitive, we are prepared to provide a copy of it on loan to your
Committee. It should, of course, be protected as a classified
document and its contents should not be made public in any way.
You or a member of your staff should contact Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis,
Staff Secretary of the National Security Council (395-3440) who will
make the copy of this document available to you.
I note that the GAO has finished its report on the Mayaguez
incident and, on February 3 provided a copy to the NSC Staff for
review and comment. This review is almost completed. The
report appears to be a comprehensive and detailed account of the
events surrounding the seizure and release of the Mayaguez. I
hope you will agree that the large volume of material supplied by
the various departments and agencies, supplemented by the material
enclosed herewith, provides a detailed report to the Congress on
events connected with this incident.
Sincerely,
Plug
PhilipW. Buchen
Counsel to the President
The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Subcommittee on International
Political and Military Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
FORD is LIBRARY
NSC Meetings on the
Seizure of American Ship by Cambodians
1.
May 12, 1975
Principals:
President, Vice President, Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, Acting Chairman of JCS
David C. Jones, Director of Central Intelligence
Others:
Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, Brent Scowcroft,
W. Richard Smyser
2.
May 13, 1975, 10:15 am
Principals:
President, Vice President, Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco, Secretary
of Defense, Acting Chairman of JCS David C.
Jones, Director of Central Intelligence
Others:
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld,
Robert Hartmann, John Marsh, Brent Scowcroft,
W. Richard Smyser
3. May 13, 1975, 10:40 pm
Principals:
President, Vice President, Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, Acting Chairman of JCS
David C. Jones, Director of Central Intelligence
Others:
Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, John Marsh, Robert
Hartmann, Philip Buchen, Brent Scowcroft,
W. Richard Smyser
4.
May 14, 1975
Principals:
President, Vice President, Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, Acting Chairman of JCS
David C. Jones, Director of Central Intelligence
Others:
Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of
Defense, James L. Holloway, Donald Rumsfeld,
John Marsh, Robert Hartmann, Philip Buchen,
Brent Scowcroft, W. Richard Smyser
5. May 15, 1975
Principals:
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of
Defense, Acting Chairman of JCS David C.
Jones, Director of Central Intelligence B. FORD
Others:
Députy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of HARVA
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, Robert Hartmann,
Brent Scowcroft, W. Richard Smyser
NSC
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 2, 1976
TO:
JACK MARSH
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
PHIL BUCHEN P.
Why not a signing ceremony after the
Florida primary? I would think it
desirable to call attention to these
Conventions and the U. S. Ratification
at this time.
FORD & LIBRARY 076875
4:25 p.m.
Tuesday, March 2, 1976
One of the reasons the signing ceremony for the United Nations
Documents on Women was rejected was because of the Florida
primary.
When you bring the subject up at Sr. Staff Meeting tomorrow
morning, you might suggest the President having a signing
ceremony after Florida. There is no required signing date.
Bobbie
Javison this Nice
from do note to to go
FORD : LIBRARY 076870
Fredersdref. a Scewcreft:
attached for March,
Grapara note to be
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
theFlordow
"Why not
Ceremony/ I would think
it desirable to call
attention to theseConvertions
and tho U.S. Ratification
st thistime"
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
February 28, 1976
TO:
MR. BUCHEN
MR. MARSH
MR. FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
(x-3440) Room 374
Attached for your clearance and/or
comment is a package on the Instrument
of Accession to the Convention on
the Political Rights of Women, and the
Instrument of Ratification of the Inter-
American Convention on the Granting of
Political Rights to Women prepared by
Hal Horan on the NSC Staff. If you concur,
please initial the President's memo at
Tab I and send package on to next person
and return to me.
Thank you.
Attachment
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
1
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
883
ACTION
February 26, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Hal Horan HN
SUBJECT:
Instrument of Accession to the Convention on
the Political Rights of Women, and the Instru-
ment of Ratification of the Inter-American
Convention on the Granting of Political Rights
to Women
The attached memo to the President forwards for his signature, in
duplicate, the subject Convention and Ratification concerning poli-
tical rights to women. It was originally planned to have a signing
ceremony, but now it has been decided that this will not take place.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you forward the memo at Tab I to the President for signature.
GERALD R. FORD LIBRANA
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
883
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Brent Scowcroft
SUBJECT:
Signing of the Instrument of Accession to the
Convention on the Political Rights of Women,
and the Instrument of Ratification of the Inter-
American Convention on the Granting of Poli-
tical Rights to Women
On January 22, 1976 the Senate gave its advice and consent to the U.N.
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, done at New York on
March 31, 1953, and the Ratification of the Inter-American Convention
on the Granting of Political Rights to Women, done at Bogota on
May 2, 1948.
The Conventions provide that women shall have equal rights with men
in the enjoyment and exercise of political rights.
The Conventions require your signature in duplicate.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the two Conventions, in duplicate, at Tab A.
Messrs. T.W.B. Marsh and Friedersdorf concur.
FORD : LERALD LIBRARI
THE WHITE HOUSE
nse
WASHINGTON
March 13, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEANNE DAVIS
FROM:
PHIL BUCHEN T.
SUBJECT:
Letter to the President from
Idaho Governor Andrus Requesting
Presidential Letter of Introduc-
tion to the Shah of Iran
In response to your memo of March 12, 1976, I
suggest telling Governor Andrus of our policy,
and at the same time having someone other than
the President write to Ambassador Helms --
either Secretary Kissinger, Secretary Richardson
or General Scowcroft.
LIBRARY GERALD = 0804
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
March 12, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. JACK MARSH
MR. PHIL BUCHEN
MR. DOUG SMITH
FROM:
JEANNE W. DAVIS
SUBJECT:
Letter to the President from Idaho
Governor Andrus Requesting Presidential
Letter of Introduction to the Shah of Iran
This is in response to the request to provide General Scowcroft's
view to the President on the letter to him from Governor Andrus
of Idaho at Tab B of the attached package.
We have prepared this draft memo to the President based on our
understanding of the existing policy on Presidential letters of
introduction to foreign government officials for Americans travell-
ing abroad in an unofficial Federal Government capacity. We
would very much appreciate having your views, concurrence and/
or suggested revisions so that these could be incorporated in a
final memo.
In particular, we would appreciate your views on the approach
suggested in the memo, including whether or not we should recommend
the gesture of a Presidential letter to Ambassador Helms. The al-
ternative to this would be including the memo with a recommendation
that the Governor's office be told of our policy, with no message to
the Ambassador.
=
GERALD
FOR
LISTARY
MEMORANDUM
1395
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Request from Governor Andrus of Idaho
for a Message to the Shah of Iran
At Tab B is the letter from Idaho Governor Andrus expressing the
hope that you would write a letter of introduction to the Shah of Iran
for personal presentation by him and a group of Idaho businessmen.
The Governor notes that Senator McClure and former Representative
Harding will accompany this mission.
This travel is in line with our policy of encouraging expanded trade
opportunities between the US and nations of the Middle East and Per-
sian Gulf. As is the practice, the Departments of State and Commerce
are providing assistance and we also understand that Ambassador
Zahedi is recommending to his Government that the Shah meet with
the Governor and his colleagues.
However, I do not believe that it would be appropriate for you to write
a letter of introduction to His Majesty. It has been the practice to
recommend against letters addressed to foreign government officials
and provided to Americans who are not travelling abroad on official
Federal Government missions. This policy has evolved for several
reasons:
1.
Presidential letters of this kind might suggest official
endorsement by the USG of the activities and statements
of American citizens who are visiting foreign countries
in unofficial capacities. Though the Governor's trip may
be a constructive one, he is not travelling to Iran as a
representative of the Federal Government.
2.
Such letters might further be used by individuals involved
to gain special access or courtesies from foreign government
officials which they are unable to receive on their own.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
is
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE -- 2
Also, we want to avoid any potential embarrassment
should foreign government officials be unable to meet
or not want to meet with travelling Americans carrying
Presidential messages.
4. Such letters might also suggest official USG preference
for one group of American businessmen over another
in private sector business dealings with foreign govern-
ments, even though this may not be intended.
5. Finally, the appropriateness of this policy would seem
especially relevant against the backdrop of recent problems
arising from improper activities of US firms seeking con-
tracts with foreign governments.
Under this policy a wide range of similar requests from prominent
Americans travelling abroad on business and other special interests
involving the private sector have been regretted. Making an excep-
tion in this instance would create problems with others seeking simi-
lar treatment and embarrassment for those who have not received it
in the past.
On the other hand, if you have an interest in responding in some way
to the Governor, there is one option which has been employed in the
past. You could send a letter to Ambassador Helms indicating that
the Governor plans this trip to Iran and requesting appropriate
courtesies. A copy could be given to Governor Andrus. This would
fall within the framework of being helpful but through official USG
channels.
I would suggest that an appropriate member of the staff here be in
touch with the Governor's office to explain that as a matter of policy
such messages are not provided to foreign leaders. Should you decide
to write a letter to Ambassador Helms along the lines of Tab A, we
would inform the Governor and forward a copy.
RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the approach above, including
signing the letter to Ambassador Helms should you wish to do this.
APPROVE, including letter
-
FORD
DISAPPROVE; explain our policy to the Governor but
no letter to the Ambassador is necessary.
LIBRARY
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
A
B. FOR
GERALD
4.
the
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
I understand that Governor Cecil Andrus of Idaho
will lead a delegation of businessmen from his State to
Iran in the near future and that the Departments of State
and Commerce are rendering the appropriate assistance
in line with our policy of encouraging expanded trade
opportunities and increasing mutual United States-Iranian
understanding. I just want to let you know that I appreciate
the efforts which you will make in ensuring that they have
a constructive visit.
With best wishes,
The Honorable Richard Helms
American Ambassador
Tehran
[Sample of similar letter attached]
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
February 3, 1976
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
Under the leadership of Mr. Mortimer Dayle, the
International Committee of the American Society of
Association Executives will, 1 understand, be visit-
ing Singapore and other Asian countries. The
Committee is made up of premisent citizens whose
visit to Singapore will surely strengthen ties of
trade and friendship.
I hope that you will find time to provide appropriate
assistance to them during their stay.
With kindest personal regards,
The Honorable John H. Holdridge
American Ambassassor
Singapore
ec: Mr. Mortimer Doyle
FORD
American Society of Association Executives ERALO
Chairman, International Committee
1101-16th Street, NW.
Washington, D. C.
(Mr. Doyle's copy sent to Rues Roarke for meeting with him on 2/4)
GRF:Hasek:jmc
cc: D.E.Dowaton/R.Nessen/R.Rartmann/C.Andersoa/J.Commor/
E.Hasck/CF
Cleared by NSC Davis, NSC
B
B. FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
/
MASSACHUSETTS
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
CECIL D. ANDRUS
BOISE
GOVERNOR
March 2, 1976
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
In the near future, it will be my pleasure, as Governor of Idaho, to
lead a delegation of prominent Idaho business executives to Iran to
exchange ideas and viewpoints related to energy, mining, agriculture
and recreation with Iranian government officials and business leaders
of Iran. Senator James McClure will also be accompanying the mission.
I believe it would be of great assistance to the success of the
mission and also a matter of courtesy if you would be so kind as to
write a letter of introduction to His Imperial Majesty the Shah of
Iran for my personal presentation to him upon our arrival. We will
also extend an invitation to the Iranian government and business
officials to visit the United States and Idaho this summer.
At a recent luncheon at the Iranian Embassy, His Excellency Ardeshir
Zahedi, Ambassador of Iran, was most complimentary to our country and
to you personally in a toast. Ambassador Zahedi is most anxious for
the success of this mission and has been very helpful to Senator
McClure and myself in making the necessary arrangements. We will also
be accompanied by one of your former colleagues in the House of Repre-
sentatives, Ralph Harding, who is also assisting us.
Your favorable consideration to furnish us with a letter of intro-
duction will be greatly appreciated; and I shall look forward to
your reply at your earliest convenience.
Sincerely,
Cecilh
CECIL D. ANDRUS
GOVERNOR
&
FORD
wmb
GERALD
LIBRARY
IRAN - IDAHO SYNERGISTIC
P. O. Box 1559
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone Number: (208) 343-5454
ATTENTION: Blaine F. Evans
PARTICIPATING IDAHO COMPANIES
OFFICIAL AND COMPANY
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
James (Jim) McClary
Construction
Chairman of the Board
Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc.
400 Broadway Avenue
Boise, Idaho 83729
(208) 345-5000
William (Bill) Bridenbaugh
Lumber, Housing,
Senior Vice President
Building materials,
Boise Cascade Corporation
Paper products and
One Jefferson Square
packaging
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 384-6527
J. R. (Jack) Simplot
Agriculture,
Chairman of the Board
Livestock, Produc-
J. R. Simplot Company
tion, Food processi
One Capitol Center
Fertilizer producti
Boise, Idaho 83701
Mining
(208) 336-2110
William C. (Bill) Janss
Recreation and reso
President
operations, Condom
Sun Valley Company
construction, sales
Sun Valley, Idaho 83353
rentals.
(208) 622-4111
Charles (Chuck) Rice
Nuclear Energy
President
technology and
Energy, Incorporated
alternative energy
381 Shoup Avenue
R.
FORD
sources
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
(208) 524-1000
LIBRARY
Sam Bennion
Oil Refining, Petr
President
leum Products dist:
V 1 Oil Company
bution. Member of
1800 North Holmes Avenue
Federal Reserve BO
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
(208) 522-1210
OFFICIAL AND COMPANY
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
J. H. (Jack) Hume
Chairman of the Board
Potato and Onion and
American Potato Company
Garlic Processing
4600 Bank of America Center
San Francisco, California
9404
(415) 981-5590
G. T. (Bud) Newcomb
President
Sprinkler Irrigation
G. T. Newcomb, Inc.
Systems, Land develop-
P. O. Box 246
ment, Potato production
Ketchum, Idaho
83340
(208) 726-5641
(602) 991-1899
Robert (Bob) Rebholtz
President
Cattle ranching and
Snake River Cattle Company
Cattle feeding
P. O. Box 549
American Falls, Idaho
83221
(208) 226-5126
:
GERALD
FORD
LIBRARY
IRAN - IDAHO SYNERGISTIC
P. O. Box 1559
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone Number: (208) 343-5454
ATTENTION: Blaine F. Evans
ELECTED OFFICIALS, DELEGATION LEADERS AND STAFF
Honorable Cecil D. Andrus
Governor
State of Idaho
State Capitol
Boise, Idaho
83221
(208) 382-2100
Honorable James McClure
United States Senator
Room 460 Russell Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
(202) 224-2752
Ralph R. Harding
General Manager - Iran-Idaho Synergistic
Route 4, Box 164
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
(208) 785-1248
Blaine F. Evans
General Counsel - Iran-Idaho Synergistic
Elam, Burke, Jeppesen, Evans & Boyd
1010 Bank of Idaho Building
P. O. Box 1559
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-5454
Wayne Mittleider
Assistant to Governor Andrus
State Capitol
Boise, Idaho 83720
(208) 382-2100
Mike Hathaway
Assistant to Senator McClure
&
FORD
Room 460, Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
(202) 224-2752
GERALD
James A. Goller (NOT GOING TO IRAN)
Assistant to Senator McClure
8th and Bannock Streets
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 343-1421
Allen Suderman (NOT GOING TO IRAN)
Treasurer & Controller
Iran-Idaho Synergistic
Elmer Fox, Westheimer and Co.
515 Bank of Idaho Building
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 344-2527
Claude J. Greene (NOT GOING TO IRAN)
Travel Agent
Travel, Inc.
217 N. 10th Street
P. O. Box 420
Boise, Idaho
83701
(208) 343-4667
ALD R. FORD LIBA
IRAN - IDAHO SYNERGISTIC
P. O. Box 1559
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone Number: (208) 343-5454
ATTENTION: Blaine F. Evans
AUXILIARY
Mrs. Cecil D. Andrus (Carol)
1805 North 21st Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-5570
Mrs. James McClure (Louise)
3467 North Venice Street
Arlington, Virginia 22207
(703) 536-8562
Mrs. James McClary (Mary Jane)
4903 Roberts Road
Boise, Idaho 83705
(208) 343-9535
Mrs. J. R. Simplot (Esther)
1500 Harrison Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 343-2457
Mrs. William C. Janss (G15nn)
Sun Valley, Idaho 83353
(208) 622-5975
Mrs. Ralph R. Harding (Willa)
Route 4, Box 164
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
(208) 785-1248
R.
SERALD
FORD
Mrs. Blaine F. Evans (Lucille)
LIBRARY
6700 Randolph Drive
Boise, Idaho 83705
(208) 375-6896
Mrs. Sam Bennion (Faye)
635 11th Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
(208) 523-1950
Mrs. G. T. Newcomb (Debbie)
Box 325
Sun Valley, Idaho 83353
(208) 726-3287
Mrs. J. H. Hume (Betty)
3355 Pacific Avenue
San Francisco, California 94118
(415) 929-2345
Mrs. Robert Reboltz (Dorothy)
Route 1
American Falls, Idaho 83221
(208) 226-5615
nsc
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 17, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RICHARD OBER
FROM:
PHILIP BUCHEN P.W.B.
SUBJECT:
Draft Preamble for NSCIDs
Attached is a copy of the Lansdale memo which you furnished
me. On it I have marked two suggested word changes which
avoid the problem of using the word "inherent."
If the President does not have the authority either under the
Constitution or under statutes, he has no authority and there-
fore the language as I have changed it is preferable.
Attachment
cc: Bill Hyland
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORM
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
March 15, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: PHILIP BUCHEN
FROM:
Richard Ober Ro
SUBJECT:
Draft Preamble for NSCIDs
The attached memorandum from Dick Lansdale gives proposed
language to be used as a preamble for each of the National
Security Council Intelligence Directives which are being
redrafted in accordance with the President's instructions in
Executive Order 11905, February 18, 1976. I anticipate that
at least some of these NSCIDs will be unclassified and that all
of them will at some time be furnished to the appropriate
committees of the Congress.
It appears to me that citing "inherent authorities vested in
the President" may create problems unnecessarily. It is
requested that you clear the language of the proposed preamble
with particular reference to the desirability of including
or excluding the reference to "inherent authorities."
Since several of the revised NSCIDs are to be presented to
the Committee on Foreign Intelligence for approval on
Friday, March 19, prior to submission to the NSC for
final approval, an early response from you will be most
helpful.
Attachment
cc: Bill Hyland
x.
GERALD
FORD
LIBRARY
UK
OGC 76-1122
8 March 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Thomas
Ruin
SUBJECT
OLD EOB
:. NSCID Preamble Boilerplate Language
I have discussed with John Warner the matter of boilerplate language
for inclusion in the preambles of all the NSCIDs in line with our agreement
at your meating this morning. We suggest the following:
By virtue of and pursuant to the Constitutional and inherent statutory
authorities vested in the President of the United States and the
including
authorities conferred on the President and the National Security
Council by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and
delegated to the Council by Executive Order 11905, and in order
to provide for the security and defense of the United States and
to further the policies, purposes and objectives of the National
Security Act and Executive Order 11905, it is hereby directed:
The thought of course is to make clear that all of the relevant authorities
available to the President and the NSC are the legal basis for the NSCIDs,
this to avoid any subsequent charge or question that the authority delegated
by an NSCID was outside the scope of the National Security Act or Executive
Order 11905 and therefore was an invalid delegation.
RICHARD H. LANSDALE
Associate General Counsel
Chicf, General Law Division
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORD
I
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
March 15, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: PHILIP BUCHEN
FROM:
Richard Ober
Ro
SUBJECT:
Draft Preamble for NSCIDs
The attached memorandum from Dick Lansdale gives proposed
language to be used as a preamble for each of the National
Security Council Intelligence Directives which are being
redrafted in accordance with the President's instructions in
Executive Order 11905, February 18, 1976. I anticipate that
at least some of these NSCIDs will be unclassified and that all
of them will at some time be furnished to the appropriate
committees of the Congress.
It appears to me that citing "inherent authorities vested in
the President" may create problems unnecessarily. It is
requested that you clear the language of the proposed preamble
with particular reference to the desirability of including
or excluding the reference to "inherent authorities."
Since several of the revised NSCIDs are to be presented to
the Committee on Foreign Intelligence for approval on
Friday, March 19, prior to submission to the NSC for
final approval, an early response from you will be most
helpful.
Attachment
cc: Bill Hyland
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
American Expt. Captured
in Indochina
Wednesday 3/17/76
2:00 Bobbie said they have approved this by phone to
Granger's office (Granger was out so she gave the
message to his secretary -- and later McDonnell, who
works for Granger, called and she repeated the message
to him). She asked them to be sure they notify
Treasury of its role.
They said that was enough -- and we don't need to put
it in writing.
ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 01369
Collection/Series/Folder ID
: 001900293
Reason for Withdrawal
: NS, National security restriction
Type of Material
:
MEM, Memo (s)
Creator's Name
: Antonin Scalia
Receiver's Name
: Bobbie Kilberg
Description
:
re American equipment captured in
Indochina
Creation Date
: 02/05/1976
Volume (pages)
: 1
Date Withdrawn
: 07/13/1988
ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 01370
Collection/Series/Folder ID
: 001900293
Reason for Withdrawal
Type of Material
: NS, National security restriction
Creator's Name
: MEM, Memo (s)
Creator's Title
: Ronald Taylor
Counsel
: Attorney - - Adviser, Office of Legal
Receiver's Name
: Antonin Scalia
Description
:
Indochina
re American equipment captured in
Creation Date
: 02/02/1976
Volume (pages)
: 7
Date Withdrawn
: 07/13/1988
Wednesday 3/17/76
9:30 Attached is the previous memo (1/22/76) -- which I find
Bobbie requested a legal opinion from Nino Scalia, and
which she sent to NSC (she promises to send us a copy).
She said she would like to see the latest memo to see if
it follows --
Shall we send her a copy?
Or would you like her to
come over?
7021
MEMORANDUM
Copy Bothin pent
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
to
SECRET
ACTION
January 22, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PHIL BUCHEN
FROM:
JEANNE W. DAVI
SUBJECT:
American Equipment Captured in Indochina
With the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia to the Communists forces,
an estimated $6.0 billion worth of supplies and U.S. military equipment
was captured. During recent months the United States has been approached
by several friendly governments concerning our position relative to their
possible purchase of some of this equipment and our willingness to
cooperate in supplying spare parts and technical services.
An interagency study has been completed concerning this issue and
has been forwarded to the NSC Staff for review prior to being submitted
to the President. Several options have been identified ranging from
complete opposition to any possible sale of equipment to that of active
U.S. encouragement to potential buyers.
One area that requires legal review is how to deal with the question of
U.S. firms or persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction becoming involved
in any potential sale. While the NSC Staff has not completed its analysis
of the study, we are leaning toward a position of quietly encouraging
friendly governments to acquire this equipment and cooperating with
them in providing spare parts and technical services. We are not anxious
to have U.S. firms and persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction involved
in the action. If licenses were granted for this trade, it would represent
a major departure from the current policy of not permitting trade with
Hanoi. Further, this could erode our ability to maintain the existing
embargo in other areas, such as banking, export-import trade, etc.
Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
SECRET - GDS
December 31, 1984.
WHM 5/8/00
SECRET
-2-
The legal ramifications and the advisability of favoring the purchase
of this equipment on a government-to-government basis and at the same
time denying U.S. firms and persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction
permission to engage in such transfers represents an area where your
legal advice and possibly that of the Department of Justice is required.
Since this issue is extremely sensitive and requires the President's
attention as soon as possible, your analysis and thoughts on this aspect
of the problem will represent a key consideration for the NSC Staff in
reaching its recommendations. We appreciate your prompt assistance
on this question.
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
March 15, 1976
MEMO FOR:
PHIL BUCHEN
FROM:
CLINT GRANGER are
SUBJECT:
American Equipment Captured
in Indochina
Brent has requested your review of the attached
package concerning American Equipment
Captured in Indochina prior to being forwarded
to the President. John Marsh is also reviewing
the package at this time.
The issue is time sensitive and I would
appreciate your concurrence (ext 4996) as
soon as possible.
1290
MEMORANDUM
wall
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET - GDS
ACTION
March 3, 1976
BRENT SCOWCROFT E
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
CLINTON E. GRANGER X
SUBJECT:
American Equipment Captured in Indochina
The memorandum for the President at Tab I explains the issues and
options pertaining to the American equipment captured in Indochina,
and presents the Senior Review Group recommended position developed
on February 27, 1976.
The Department of State is developing a public statement for release at
an appropriate time. State will forward the statement to the NSC for
clearance.
The NSDM at Tab A, if approved, would implement the policy approach
that the Senior Review Group recommended.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
Dr
D
Max Friedersdorf and Les Janka concur.
Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
SECRET - GDS
December 31, 1984.
WHM 5/8/00
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
1290
SECRET - GDS
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
American Equipment Captured in Indochina
The Problem
There are a number of indications that North Vietnam is preparing to
sell some U.S. manufactured military equipment it captured in South
Vietnam. A U.S. policy position with respect to the possibility of such
a sale is required. An interagency study (Tab B) has identified a range
of policy options. The Senior Review Group considered this study on
February 27, and recommends a policy of public opposition to North
Vietnam's sale of this equipment but quiet cooperation with any friendly
countries who actually purchase it.
Background
With the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia, Hanoi acquired an estim-
ated $6. 0 billion worth of U.S. equipment, ranging from sidearms to
sophisticated transport and fighter aircraft. The right to war booty
under international law gives the Vietnamese clear title to the captured
equipment. While the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, issued
under the Trading With the Enemy Act, prohibit persons or firms subject
to U.S. jurisdiction from unlicensed dealings with North Vietnam in this
equipment, our ability to influence and control the movement of the captured
equipment, particularly into unfriendly hands, is obviously quite limited.
We have a number of intelligence reports that North Vietnam may be
attempting to sell some of this equipment. Moreover, during recent
months, representatives of such friendly governments as Singapore and
Nigeria have approached the United States for advice regarding potential
purchases. We have also received from private arms merchants and
other sources several reports of possible equipmenttransfers. To date,
however, there have been no confirmed sales or transfers.
Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
SECRET - GDS
December 31, 1984
WHM 5/8/00
SECRET - GDS
- 2 -
A number of friendly countries want weapons of the type that the Vietnamese
captured. We do not at this time supply this equipment, either for policy
reasons, lack of available materiel in our inventory or in timely production,
or because of funding limitations. It could thus be in the United States
interest that captured stockpiles fill these requirements at bargain prices.
This action would also forestall unfriendly forces from acquiring these
weapons and provide a basis for continuing our defense relationship with
friendly countries through future supply of spare parts and rehabilitation
services.
Options
An interagency review identified the following alternative responses to
attempts by Vietnam to sell captured American equipment:
Option I. Use all practicable means to prevent the outflow of U.S. equip-
ment from Vietnam. We would inform all potential purchasers that we would
object to any acquisition and that we would furnish no spares or support for
such equipment.
This course of action could minimize criticism by Congress or the public.
Its disadvantages are that it could involve the U.S. in lengthy and possibly
counterproductive disputes with foreign governments, restrict the arms
flow to friendly countries, and still not prevent the equipment from reaching
unfriendly hands.
Option II. Attempt to insure that friendly governments acquire the
equipment. We would actively encourage friendly governments to negotiate
with Hanoi and would assure them of our willingness to furnish spare parts
and rehabilitation assistance insofar as legally possible. We would also
be prepared to license private transactions by U.S. firms on condition that
any subsequent resale be subject to prior USG approval. We would ask
purchasing governments to treat the equipment as subject to the same
restrictions applicable under the Foreign Military Sales Act with respect
to use and disposition.
This approach would be based on the assumption that Vietnam will export
much of the equipment in any case, and that it is therefore in the U.S.
interest to influence the flow to the maximum extent possible. Although
we could not prevent entirely the delivery of equipment to unfriendly govern-
ments or groups, we would through this option maximize the amount which
would go to friendly countries.
SECRET GDS
SECRET- GDS
- 3 -
This course of action could produce serious Congressional and public
criticism. Licensing U.S. firms to participate in this trade could open
the door to heavy pressure for comparable arrangements by oil companies,
export-import dealers, and banks.
Option III. Take no formal policy action in advance concerning the cap-
tured equipment. We would respond to potential foreign governmental
purchasers by stating that we would not look with favor on their acquisition
of the equipment, and we would review the question of spare parts on a
case-by-case basis. We would take all reasonable steps to inhibit the
flow of the equipment to unfriendly hands.
This approach would provide the USG with considerable flexibility, since
it would not require us to take action until after Vietnam had made or
begun to make its sales. Therefore, we could adjust our responses to
the circumstances and to our bilateral relationships with the countries
involved.
Despite our efforts to prevent this equipment from falling into the hands of
terrorist groups, this course of action could prove inadequate. We
could be criticized for not attempting more vigorous efforts to control the
flow of the equipment. We could also be criticized for assisting some
recipients with spare parts and rehabilitation support, while denying such
support to others.
Domestic Legal Considerations
The Department of Justice has reviewed the legal issues that could arise
from prohibiting U.S. firms and persons from engaging in such trans-
actions. It has concluded that such a prohibition is fully and directly
within Executive authority under present law and regulations, particularly
Munitions Control authority delegated to the Secretary of State; various
regulations of the Departments of Transportation and Commerce affecting
shipment of Munitions List items in U.S. vessels or aircraft; and the
Trading With the Enemy Act.
SRG Recommendation
The Senior Review Group has recommended a course of action which is
a combination of Options II and III. We would discourage Vietnam from
selling this equipment by taking a public stance against the sale; do what
we can to impede those countries that oppose us from acquiring this
SECRET GDS
SECRET - GDS
- 4 -
equipment; and discreetly help those countries that are friendly to us if
they decide to purchase equipment from Vietnam despite our pronouncement.
There is little we can do to prevent the movement of equipment into un-
friendly hands and this approach avoids favoring our enemies over our
friends. We would hope that an announced policy of not favoring the sale
of the equipment would raise doubts concerning availability of U.S.-
supplied spare parts and services, thereby reducing both selling price and
the number of sales. This case-by-case approach retains maximum USG
flexibility concerning whom we cooperate with and, since we would not be
actively promoting sales, public and Congressional criticism would be
minimized.
More specifically, we would pursue the following course of action:
--
The basic approach of the United States concerning Hanoi's
possible sale of this equipment will be one of quiet cooperation
with those countries friendly to the United States who are potential
purchasers. The United States will not actively promote such
equipment acquisitions, however.
--
The United States will determine its response to requests for
spare parts and technical service support on a case-by-case
basis, and in accordance with our bilateral relations with the
foreign governments concerned.
:
We will not authorize private transactions by U.S. firms, or by
persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The Department of the
Treasury, in coordination with other interested agencies, will be
responsible for developing the regulatory definitions, procedures,
and restrictions necessary to implement and enforce this policy.
--
The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of
Defense, will administer United States cooperation with foreign
governments concerning this equipment.
United States agreement to cooperate in the provision of spare
parts and technical services to a specific foreign government
purchasing this equipment will require White House approval.
SECRET GDS
SECRET - GDS
-5-
I concur in this approach, as does Max Friedersdorf. If you agree with
this position, the Department of State will release at an appropriate moment
a statement indicating that the United States looks with disfavor on the
Vietnamese sale of this captured equipment.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the approach recommended by the SRG and authorize
me to sign the implementing NSDM at Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET - GDS
A
ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 01374
Collection/Series/Folder ID
: 001900293
Reason for Withdrawal
: NS, National security restriction
Type of Material
:
MEM, Memo (s)
Creator's Name
: Brent Scowcroft
Receiver's Name
: Secretary of State, et. al.
Description
:
re American euipment captured in
Indochina
Creation Date
: 03/1976?
Volume (pages)
: 2
Date Withdrawn
: 07/13/1988
B
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET
AMERICAN ARMS CAPTURED IN INDOCHINA
I. Introduction
This paper responds to a request by the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs for a review
of the full range of options and recommendations regarding
the question of American arms captured in Indochina. As
directed, the review addresses the following issues:
--Should the United States attempt to control the
transfer of captured U.S. military equipment out of Vietnam?
--HOW should the United States respond to queries from
friendly governments that have been approached by the Viet-
namese Communists as potential recipients of captured U.S.
military equipment?
--What measures can the United States take to influence
the flow of U.S. military equipment out of Vietnam?
--What actions might the United States take in order to
influence the transfer of U.S. military equipment under
domestic or international law?
II. Background
With the fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam to the
Communist forces, an estimated $6 billion worth of U.S. sup-
plied military equipment was captured. A list of estimated
quantities of major items is at attachment 1; it should be
noted that some of these items are undoubtedly non-operation-
al and unsaleable because of battle damage, deterioration,
lack of spare parts, or other reasons.
The United States has been approached by representatives
of such friendly governments as Singapore and Nigeria for
advice regarding the potential purchase of some of this
captured equipment, and many reports of possible transfers
have also been received from private arms merchants and other
sources. The North Vietnamese have publicly denied some
SECRET
WHM 5/8/00
GDS
SECRET
- 2 -
published stories about their intentions, and six months
after the fall of Indochina there are no confirmed reports
of actual sales or transfers of the US-manufactured arms
and equipment from Indochina. Nevertheless, recent indica-
tions point to the probability that the Vietnamese, at
least, are ready to start sales efforts, including non-
lethal captured U.S. materiel, ranging from heavy construc-
tion equipment to clothing. A summary of reports of alleged
transactions is at attachment 2.
The very size of the capture indicates that final dis-
position could be world wide. The equipment ranges from
very sophisticated aircraft and electronics equipment to
infantry automatic weapons and vehicles. Some may be uti-
lized by the Vietnamese armed forces, some could be sold or
traded abroad for needed foreign exchange or bartered
commodities, and some could be used for ideological purposes
in support of "wars of national liberation" and other dissi-
dent or extremist terrorist groups. The Communists may be
very selective in their choice of weapons to serve these
various purposes, but their need for foreign exchange to
finance essential imports will probably impel them to sell
at least some of the equipment excess to their minimum per-
ceived domestic needs.
The United States Government cannot be indifferent to
the disposition of such vast quantities of lethal equipment
of U.S. manufacture. However, our ability to influence and
control the movement of the captured arms and equipment
under Communist control is severely limited.
Legal Position:
International Law
The right to war booty under international law is clear
and gives the Communists title to the equipment captured in
Indochina. The status of this captured equipment is entirely
different from that of the equipment recovered from repre-
sentatives of the defeated friendly regimes. In the case of
evacuated equipment, title reverted to the United States
Government under the terms of our agreements with the friendly
regimes which specified our right to reversionary ownership
when the equipment could no longer be used for the purposes
for which it was intended.
SECRET
SECRET
- 3 -
Authority Under U.S. Law
The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, issued under
the Trading with the Enemy Act, prohibit unlicensed dealings
with North Vietnam in this equipment by persons or firms
subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Licenses for such dealings,
however, could be issued if a policy decision to that effect
were reached; but this would represent a major departure
from the current policy of denial. Further, this could
erode our ability to maintain the existing embargo in other
areas, such as banking, export-import trade, etc.
With respect to foreign firms which may engage in trade
in the captured arms, the Foreign Assets Control Regulations
could be extended to affect some transactions, e.g., by
designating as an agent of North Vietnam any foreign firm
engaged substantially in the disposal of this equipment.
This would make such a foreign firm ineligible for even un-
related trade with a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
Should nationals of close allies become involved in the dis-
position of the captured equipment, we could ask their
governments to apply their national legislation, if any,
comparable to the Trading with the Enemy Act, or otherwise
to discourage such involvement. Approaches to governments
of third countries would be particularly appropriate in the
event of involvement by nationals of COCOM countries in arms
sales to Communist countries because such sales would clearly
be in conflict with the basic purpose of COCOM export con-
trols.
In addition, benefits derived by foreign countries
under various U.S. programs, such as those authorized by
the Foreign Assistance Act, the Foreign Military Sales Act,
the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act, the Export-
Import Bank Act and the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act could be withheld. Although none of the
relevant statutes would require a suspension or termination
of such benefits, all of them give the Executive Branch
sufficient discretion to extend or withhold benefits in
furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives. (The single
mandatory statutory sanction, section 103 (d) of PL 480, has
been recently amended to permit waiver of ineligibility for
PL 480 sales of countries trading with North Vietnam.)
SECRET
SECRET
- 4 -
It is, of course, possible that the U.S. Congress might
impose further sanctions through the medium of domestic
legislation in the event the nature of trafficking in cap-
tured arms, or the position of the U.S. Government relative
thereto, becomes controversial and a matter of serious con-
cern to the Congress. The Executive Branch could also take
the initiative with the Congress to propose new legislative
sanctions of various sorts against foreign firms or govern-
ments which engage in such trade, rather than rely on
Executive Branch discretionary authority under existing law.
Other Measures Available
It would be theoretically possible to invoke a wide
range of measures in our bilateral relations with foreign
governments and in international fora in an effort to in-
fluence the flow of captured U.S. military equipment out of
Indochina, or to penalize countries which act contrary to
our interests. However, the effectiveness of such measures,
as with the measures described above, and their relationship
to present and future U.S. interests, would require careful
evaluation. The recent vote in the United Nations General
Assembly supporting the applications for membership from
North and South Vietnam suggests that we might have consider-
able difficulty in rallying much international support.
Diplomatic efforts with the major Communist powers during
the height of the Vietnam conflict had only limited impact
on the actions of the Vietnamese Communists. In view of
the sensitivity with which such a major U.S. trading partner
as Japan regards its relations with Hanoi, it would also
appear that economic sanctions might be difficult to apply.
In general, any concerted effort to deny foreign exchange
to the Communist regimes in Indochina would entail controls
over other trade than the arms transfers addressed in this
review.
The future supply of spare parts and support for the
U.S. manufactured equipment is the most effective means
available to us, although only the relatively sophisticated
weapons and materiel would be dependent on U.S. supplies.
Even then such equipment might be maintained in operational
condition for a number of years through use of captured
spares, cannibalization, and the international black market
in arms. U.S. denial of spare parts for purchasers of this
SECRET
SECRET
- 5 -
equipment would probably discourage some intending purchasers
and reduce the value of the sale to the Communists. If
coupled with a general policy to deny access to U.S. arms
supply and defense materiel to any country which purchases
captured equipment, most friendly countries might be dis-
suaded, but in some cases, at a substantial cost to our bi-
lateral relations.
III. Discussion
We must assume that much of the U.S. equipment remain-
ing in Indochina is in useable condition and that the
Communists, one way or another, will be able to dispose of
most of what they do not wish to retain for their own use.
However, the longer this equipment remains in Vietnam, the
more it will deteriorate.
A number of friendly countries have need for weapons
of the type captured by the Communists in Vietnam which we
do not supply at this time either for policy reasons or for
lack of available materiel either in our inventory or in
timely production (e.g., Turkey, Pakistan, Kenya (F-5A's),
Malaysia and Singapore). It therefore could be argued that
it would be in the United States interest that these require-
ments be filled at bargain prices from the captured stockpiles,
preventing these weapons from being utilized by unfriendly
forces and providing a basis for continuing our defense re-
lationship through future supply of spare parts and rehabili-
tation services.
A permissive attitude on the part of the United States,
whether explicit or implicit, would raise major public rela-
tions problems. A sizeable increase in the foreign exchange
available to Vietnam from the sale of this equipment would
increase Hanoi's influence in Southeast Asia, and it would
also create a largely negative impact both in Congress and
with the American people.
It can be assumed that the Vietnamese Government will
act in a manner inimical to our interests in many cases.
Some of the equipment may be provided to insurgent groups
or terrorists, while some may go to governments unfriendly
to us. Transfers even to neutral governments whose security
requirements in our view do not require the kinds of U.S.
SECRET
SECRET
- 6 -
equipment now available from Vietnam may bring pressures on
us for offsetting supply to neighboring countries.
On the other hand, any USG efforts to control arms ex-
ports from Vietnam and deny foreign exchange to the Commu-
nist governments would entail many complications in our bi-
lateral relations with other governments concerned. The
Vietnamese themselves would probably regard our efforts as
a sign of U.S. hostility and interference in their affairs,
raising another issue to be considered in any future normali-
zation of US-Vietnamese relations.
Regardless of the position we take on this issue, there
will most likely be a significant public and Congressional
relations problem.
Finally, we must recognize that there are severe limita-
tions on our ability to influence the flow of arms and equip-
ment from Vietnam and that, regardless of the course upon
which we embark, we cannot hope to be completely successful.
The potential customers with whom we can expect to have the
most influence are those with whom we have the closest rela-
tions. Conversely, we have the least ability to influence
the decisions of those governments which we would least like
to see acquire the captured arms.
IV. Options
Option I ------------------------- USG would use all practicable means to pre-
vent the outflow of U.S. equipment from Vietnam. We would
inform all possible purchasers that we would strenuously
object to any acquisitions and that no spares or support
would be furnished for such equipment. We would announce
publicly to all U.S. firms that no commercial transactions
involving these arms and falling within the scope of the
Foreign Assets Control Regulations would be licensed regard-
less of circumstances.
Although this option could not be completely successful,
it could have considerable impact on Vietnam's ability to
earn sizeable amounts of foreign exchange. This option
could be particularly effective in restraining the transfer
of the more sophisticated captured equipment. Furthermore,
such efforts to minimize proliferation would be well received
by a considerable part of the American public and Congress.
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On the other hand, this option does eliminate any possi-
bility of cooperating and thus influencing the potential
arms flow to friendly countries. We would have to recognize
that regardless of the USG position, some equipment will un-
doubtedly reach governments and groups whose objectives are
inimical to our interests. Indeed, there is not only no
practical way to prevent it altogether, but the outflow to
unfriendly customers might actually be increased under this
option.
This option could also involve the U.S. in lengthy and
possibly counter-productive disputes with foreign govern-
ments entailing risks of hostile publicity and strained
relations, which could undermine our position.
Option II - The USG would undertake to insure that the
equipment is acquired by friendly governments. We would
encourage these governments to undertake necotiations with
Vietnam and would assure them of our williness to furnish
spare parts and rehabilitation assistance insofar as legally
possible. We would also be prepared to license private
transactions by U.S. firms on condition that any subsequent
resale be subject to prior USG roval. As a condition of
our cooperation, we would ask the purchasing government to
agree to treat the property as subject to the same U.S.
Government controls as are applicable under the Foreign Mili-
tary Sales Act with respect to use and disposition.
This option would be based on the assumption that Viet-
nam will export much of the equipment in any case, and that
therefore, it is in the U.S. interest to influence the flow
to the maximum extent possible. Although we could not pre-
vent entirely the delivery of some of the equipment to
unfriendly governments or groups, we would have a better
opportunity for influence since this option would presumably
be financially more profitable to Vietnam than any other
process.
The USG's participation in arms exports from Vietnam
could undoubtedly raise serious Congressional and public
relations problems. We would expect efforts on the part of
the Legislative Branch either to block the Administration's
efforts or at least introduce legislation which would restrict
such future flexibility as we now possess. We could also
expect criticism for encouraging countries which normally buy
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materiel from U.S. sources to purchase this equipment from
Vietnam instead. Some Congressional support might be gained
through candid and effective explanation of our policy, but
opposition could not be entirely precluded. For this reason,
this option should not be pursued until wide consultations
have been held with members of Congress.
This option would also increase Vietnam's access to
foreign exchange. On the other hand, it would diminish the
opportunity for political influence that Vietnam could exer-
cise through the selected disposition of the equipment in
defiance of USG policy.
Finally, licensing U.S. firms to participate in this
Vietnamese arms trade would open the door to heavy pressure
for comparable treatment by oil companies, export-import
dealers, banks, etc. A number of the firms may well be
interested in licenses to trade with Vietnam.
Option III - Under this option, we would not take any
formal policy action in advance concerning U.S. equipment in
Vietnam. We would not normally authorize any involvement by
U.S. citizens, individuals, or corporations subject to U.S.
jurisdiction as provided in the Foreign Assets Control
Regulations, and would consider discouraging involvement by
nationals or close allies, e.g., COCOM member nationals, in
a case where they were promoting sales to Communist countries.
We would respond to inquiring potential foreign governmental
purchasers by stating that we would not look with favor on
their acquisition of the captured equipment and that we would
review the question of spare parts and rehabilitation assis-
tance and other possible consequences for our bilateral
relations. Such review would be guided by our established
arms transfer policy vis-a-vis the country concerned.
This option would provide the USG with greater flexibility
since it would not require us to take any actions, except for
those which may be mandated by law, until after Vietnam had
made or begun to make its sales. Therefore, we could adjust
our responses to the circumstances and to our bilateral rela-
tionships with the countries involved.
We would however continue to make every effort to inhibit
the transfer of U.S. equipment to Palestinian guerrillas or
any other extremist terrorist or subversive groups. We would
inform any governments involved, including any acting as
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intermediaries, that we would view most seriously any trans-
fer or import of U.S. equipment from Vietnam destined to
extremist organizations. We would also make clear that we
would take whatever action we legally could against U.S.
and foreign firms participating in such transactions.
Despite our efforts to prevent this equipment from fall-
ing into the hands of terrorist groups, this option could be
seen as inadequate. We could be criticized for not attempt-
ing more vigorous efforts to control the flow of the equip-
ment. We could also be criticized for assisting some recip-
ients with spare parts and rehabilitation support, while
denying others.
V. Agency Views/Recommendations
A. The Department of State recommends that Option III
be adopted as USG policy. This option provides the USG with
maximum flexibility in dealing with problems as they arise
on a case by case basis. Moreover, this option recognizes
the fact that there are practical and political limits on
measures we can take to prevent the sale by North Vietnam of
equipment that clearly belongs to it under international law.
B. The Central Intelligence Agency also recommends that
Option III be adopted as USG policy. Further, the Central
Intelligence Agency concurs with the State Department's view
that this option provides the USG with maximum flexibility in
dealing with problems as they arise on a case by case basis.
C. The Department of the Treasury supports a variation
of Option III. Under this variation the U.S. would make a
policy statement at the outset outlining its position. We
would not indicate at the outset, however, what actions might
be taken to limit purchases by other countries. The U.S.
would remain silent, for example, on the question of whether
it would sell replacement parts or provide technical services.
This would be handled on a case by case basis as it suits our
national interest.
The lack of a definitive USG position on the availability
of parts and technical services from the U.S. obviously would
impose some risk on purchasers. The reason for raising this
doubt is to reduce the volume of sales and the price purchasers
might pay for sophisticated items which require parts and
services from U.S. controlled sources --- thereby reducing Viet-
nam's potential foreign exchange earnings.
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The main difference between Option III and the Treasury
recommendation is that Option III does not call for a formal
statement of policy by the U.S. Treasury takes this posi-
tion in the hope that a public announcement at the outset
would discourage certain purchasers, thereby reducing Viet-
nam's foreign exchange earnings from this source. If we do
not state our position some purchasers may consummate trans-
actions which might have been inhibited if our position were
known.
D. The Department of Defense recommends the adoption
of Option I as the preferred USG option. DOD believes
that the U.S. Government should not remain publicly passive
to any efforts by Hanoi to profit economically from the sale
of U.S. equipment captured during the conquest of South Viet-
nam. On the contrary, DOD feels the only publicly defensible
policy is a clear and firm U.S. stance in opposition to the
purchase of the equipment by any country. Option I would
achieve this objective by clearly stating at an appropriate
time our strennous objection to the acquisition of this
equipment by other countries and by barring follow-on support
for the equipment to countries who choose to ignore our
warnings. This option provides clearly and unequivocally a
strong U.S. position that will be understood by friends and
foe alike. Moreover, it provides the only policy relating
to this subject which will be able to withstand a critical
Congressional review, particularly during the forthcoming
Presidential election year.
Attachments:
1. Estimated Quantities of Captured
Equipment.
2. Reports of Alleged Transactions
Involving Captured Military
Equipment.
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Some items in this folder were not digitized because it contains copyrighted
materials. Please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for access to
these materials.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ROBERT MCFARLANE
FROM:
PHILIP BUCHEN
T.
When communicating with the President's party
on the incident in New York involving the
Soviet Mission to the United Nations, I suggest
you make the following points:
1. The shooting involved both a violation
of Federal and State laws.
Whether the persons committing the
act when apprehended will be charged
initially under Federal or State law,
cannot be decided now.
2. This Mission is under the sole protec-
tion of the New York Police Department;
therefore, it is important not to
leave any impression that the protection
afforded this Mission is not adequate or
that it could be improved upon. (The
only times that EPS services are provided
for the protection of Missions are when
the New York Police Department declines
for lack of manpower or other reasons to
provide the protection and it is usually
afforded only on a temporary basis.)
FORD LIBRARY
A081
o
SHOOT 4-2
NEW YORK (UPI) -- TWO SHOTS FROM A HIGH-POWERED RIFLE HERE FIRED
EARLY TODAY INTO THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, POLICE
SAID. THERE WERE NO INJURIES.
8 RIFLE WAS FOUND 8 BLOCK SWAY AT A CONSTRUCTION SITE, A POLICE
SPOKESMAN SAID. HE SAID THE SHOOTING INCIDENT OCCURRED RBOUT 3:50
A.M. BUT POLICE NOULD NOT 88 ALLOWED INSIDE TO INVESTIGATE UNTIL
LATER IN THE DAY.
IN A TELEPHONE CALL TO UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL AN HOUR AFTER
THE SHOOTING, AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE CALLER WHO SRID HE WAS FROM THE
JENISH ARMED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT READ A STATEMENT CLAIMING
RESPONSIBILITY. FOR THE SHOOTING AND CLAIMING A ".222 CALIBER HIGH
POWERED RIFLE" WAS USED.
SGT. JAMES J. PYNE SAID POLICE GUARDING THE MISSION HEARD TWO
SHOTS. A MAN WHO SAID HE WAS FIRST SECRETARY IN CHARGE OF SECURITY RT
THE MISSION TOLD POLICE HE HAD FOUND A BULLET EMBEDDED IN THE GREATO
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35
AN UNOCCUPIED NINTH FLOOR ROOM. THE BULLET HAD SHATTERED
WINDOE
THREE POLICE OFFICERS WERE ASSIGNED TO GUARD THE MISSION AT
TIME.
UPI 04-02 10:06 RES
Friday 4/2/76
11:05 Bud McFarlane brought up the attached.
Would like to get your signoff and would like you
to clear it also with Justice and Treasury.
LIBRARY GERALD : 0807
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, APRIL 3, 1976
Rifle Shots Are Fired
Into Soviet U.N. Mission
By KATHLEEN TELTSCH
Special to The New York Times
UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.,
man, Stanley H. Lowell, de-
April 2-Shots were fired into
clared that terrorist attacks
the Soviet Union's Mission to
could only hurt the cause of
the United Nations during the
Soviet Jews petitioning for a
night and an underground
right to emigrate or seeking
group called the Jewish Armed
their religious and cultural
Resistance claimed responsibil-
rights.
ity later today.
Dov Fisch, associate director
The group said that it was
of the Jewish Defense League,
prepared to kidnap Russian
exhibited a crudely lettered
relented
note that he said was found
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 14, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
PHIL BUCHEN
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:
LES JANKA
SUBJECT:
Security Assistance Bill
Both the House and Senate Committees have reported
new versions of the Security Assistance Bill the
President vetoed. They have made major improve-
ments but a few areas of concern remain. We are
urgently seeking the President's guidance for use
when the bills go to Conference Committee next
week. I would, therefore, appreciate your com-
ments on the attached draft ASAP.
Fenal OK'd draft
LIBRARY GERALD R. 0404
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: Brent Scowcroft
SUBJECT: Revised Security Assistance Legislation
Revised security assistance legislation has been
reported out by both House and Senate committees and
could come to a vote on the floor in both Houses as
early as Wednesday, May 14. The committees have produced
two-year bills which 80 part wav toward meeting the
objections you raised in vetoing the FY 1976 legislation.
However, neither bill is acceptable in its present form;
both retain certain restrictive amendments and have
added questionable new provisions. We urgently need youR
guidance on what position the Administration should take
regarding this revised legislation, and on the strategy
WE should follow in obtaining a final bill acceptable
to you.
We have reached tentative agreement with the leaders
in both houses to 000050 all floor amendments and concentrate
on reaching accommodation in conference. (The sole exception
will he our support for a likely amendment in the House
to restore a 50% cut in Korean assistance levels.) We believe
WG will be in a strong position in conforence: Both houses
is
are weary of the debate and anxious to provide money to
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2
amendments is waning. Nevertheless, some accommodation on your
part may still be necessary to ensure apssage of a thoroughly
acceptable bill.
In this regard, the key element remains the issue
of Transition Quarter funding for Israel. There is some
evidence that Congress expects you to be forthcoming on
the TQ in reaction to what the Hill feels are significant
Congressional concessions to your position on authorizing
legislation. Meanwhile, the Israelis have signaled to us
that they need $281.0 million by the end of the TQ to
avoid the risk of default on commercial purchases. This
figure is, coincidentally, almost exactly the amount which can
be provided without exceeding the outlay figures in your
original budget request. If you are willing to provide
this amount in the TQ, WE believe Congress will eliminate
all major objectionable provisions from the revised bill
in conference.
There follows a list of the troublesome provisions
which remain in one or the other of the committee bills.
They are arranged in three categories: those which, if they
reamin in the final bill, would be grounds for consideration of
a veto: those WE will fight to alter or eliminate, but which
WE can probably accept: and those which, although undesirable,
are of lesser importance. With regard to each major provision
aros
we have included a recommended course of action: we willouse
your guidance as the basis for our negotiations with
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the conferees.
3
The following, if retained unaltered in the final
bill, would be grounds for consideration of a veto:
1. Discrimination -- The Senate has added
a joint resolution as the means of terminating assistance because
of discrimination. (In the previous bill, termination was
automatic.) In two other respects, however, the Senate bill
is worse than before: it no longer provides waiver authority,
and it limits the period provided for finding a diplomatic
solution to 60 days (previously this period was open-ended).
The House bill retains a statement of policy but has dropped
the termination sanction.
RECOMMENDATION: An all out fight against the Senate version,
including a veto threat if necessary; support for the House version.
agree
disagree
2. Human Rights -- The House bill retains a concurrent
resolution terminating aid for human rights abuses. The Senate
substitutes a joint resolution. Since a joint resolution is subject
to veto, this procedure is not constitutionally objectionable,
but it does complicate the foreign policy process by raising
the constant spector of Congressional intervention.
RECOMMENDATION: Fight for elimination of termination provisions
is
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in favor of a policy statement: accept the Senate version
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( joint resolution) if necessary, use veto threat against
4
the House version (concurrent resolution).
agree
disagree
3. $9.0 Billion Ceiling: The House retained unchanged
the $9.0 billion ceiling on arms sales which was one major
reason for your previous veto. The Senate bill drops the
ceiling. There is talk in the House of a compromise retaining the
ceiling principle but requiring you only to report every sale
over $9.0 billion. The principle, however, has always been
our main concern, along with the precedent set for future,
more restrictive legislation. We think compromises should
be avoided and that WE: should mobilize in support of the
Senate on this issue.
RECOMMENDATION: No compromise on the House version, support
for the Senate deletion of the ceiling.
agree
disagree
4. Nuclear Transfers: A Symington amendment added
to the legislation by the Senate would prohibit assistance
except for P.I. 480 to countries which either receive or
deliver nuclear fuel reprocessing or errichment technology
--urcless managed multilaterally and under IAFA auspices.
As written the provision is broad brush and could affect our
FUND
others. Moreover, it would hinder our diplomatic efforts
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5
to solve the proliferation problem. The House has no similar
provision. We think the best available compromise is
a Congressinnal study of the issue.
Recommendation: That WE Dress for deletion of the Symington
amendment in favor of a Congressional study of the proliferation
issue.
agree
disagree
5. Korea Punding Level: The House committee accepted
a Frazier amendment limiting military assistance
to Korea to $290 million in the period FY 1976-TQ-77
(vs. your request for $490 million) and economic assistance
to $175.0 million in the same period (vs. your request for
$281.0 million. Cuts of this magnitude would have a serious
effect on all of our Korean programs and, in particular,
greatly impede progress of the Korean force modernization
plan. Reprograming could, however, ease the potential assistance
shortfall.
RECONPENDATION: Major effort to raise the Korea PMS
and economic assistance levels to acceptable levels, including
a veto threat.
agree
dsiagree
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6
The following provisions, although troublesome,
would not warrent a voto:
6. Concurrent Resolutions: If WE are successful
in deleting the House concurrent resolution terminating
assistance on human rights grounds, the single remaining
concurrent resolution authority in both bills will
be the Nelson Pingham amendment, whereby Congress can forbid
certain arms sales. In the new Senate bill, this authority
is applicable to all FMS and commercial sales of
"major defense equipment" over $7.0 million; the House bill
applies only to FMS sales. As you know, there is similar
authority in the present bill covering FMS sales over
$25 million . Although the concurrent resolution authority
is onerous, we believe Congress would resist strongly
any attempt to delete this provision (during mark-up WE
could find no one, even among staunch supporters, to sponsor
such a move).
RECOMMENDATION: Be prepared to accept continuation of
concurrent resolution authority to forbid individual weapon
sales, while attempting toretain existing language covering
only PMS sales over $25 million. (If you sign a bill containing
anv concurrent resolution WO recommend a strong signing
statement.)
agree
disagree
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7
7. MAP and MAAG Termination: Both bills retain
provisions terminating MAP and MAAGS after FY 1977,
except as specifically authorized by Congress. We feel
we have sufficient legislative history on this subject
to support a presumption that both MAP and MAAGS will
be authorized, and that the new authority will amount to
no more than line-item authorization for both. Although
WE were prefer to see this otherwise, WE don't think it
is a major concern. Congress appears adament on retaining
the MAP and MAAG provisions, which could be useful
facesavers.
RECOMMENDATION: BE prepared to accept the MAP and MAAG
provisions, but emphasize our expectation that authorization
for both will be forthcoming after FY 1977.
agree
disagree
7. Assistance to Chile: A Kennedy amendment
imposes a total embargo on military sales to Chile after
October 1, 1976. Hence Dipeline sales which have been held
un could 80 forward and other minor salos could he made
before October 1. The House has retained the Buchanan
amendment cutting off assistance but permitting cash sales
of military equipment. Obviously WE prefer the House version,
but WE' do not believe the Senate version in itself would be
grounds for veto of an otherwise acceptable bill.
GERAL
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8
RECOMMENDATION: All out support for the House version.
agree
dsagree
In addition to the foregoing, there are other undesirable
features of the new legislation which WE will be working to
correct in conference. Included are:
--A Senate cut of MAP for Jordan from $70 million
to $40 million,
-- A Senate cut in authorization for Stockpiles
of Defense Articles for Foreign Countries from
$125 million to $50 million,
-- A Senate cut in overall FMS authorization of about
10%.
-- A House provision embodying funds for Greece and
Turkey in the FY 1977 security assistance appropriation.
We would rather this issue were addressed in the context
of base agreement ratification, as the Senate intends.
On the other hand, the now bills have several minor improvements:
-- deletion of the requirement that ACDA draft the annual
arms impact statement: the statement requirement remains,
but as an Administration document.
-- automatic termination of assistance for violation
of the terms under which it was granted (existing law)
has been replaced in the Senate version by termination
through joint resolution or Presidential action. The
Senate has also added a Presidential waiver and procedures
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for reinstatement.
9
Strategy
Chairman Morgan is anxious to reach some accommodation
with you as quickly as possible. He believes it is possible
to complete Congressional action on an acceptable bill by
the end of next week (May 21), but feels that you should
meet personally with the conferees to ensure this outcome.
I agree with the Chairman that speed is essential
and that your personal intervention with the conferees
would be especially useful. Such a meeting would be an ideal
forum for reaching a final compromise based on some TQ funding
for Israel in return for Congressional concessions on the
legislation.
Accordingly, I recommend that you call Chairman Morgan
and Senator Humphrey to ask their advice on how we should
now proceed (talking-point papers for these calls are
attached).
is
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