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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 35, folder \"Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1)\"\nof the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nNuclear Export file\nMEMORANDUM TO:\nNSC - Dr. DAVID D. ELLIOTT\nFROM:\nOES/SCI/AE - Myron B. Kratzer\nSUBJECT:\nRequirements for Export Licensing\nDetermination under the Atomic\nEnergy Act\nFollowing up on our conversation of this morning, I have attempted\nto summarize below the principle points in support of the view that individual\nexport transactions under an Agreement for Cooperation do not require a finding\nthat such exports are \"non-inimicable to the common defense and security.\"\n1. Agreements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic\nenergy are contained under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Sub-\nsection b requires that \"the President has approved and authorized the\nexecution of the agreement and made a determination in writing that the\nperformance of the agreement will promote and will not constitute an\nunreasonable risk to the common defense and security. 11 Thus, a\ndetermination is made at the time the agreement is signed, stating\nnot merely that the agreement meets U.S. security interests but that its\nperformance meets these objectives. I belive that this structure was\nintentional from the outset, inasmuch as it was recognized in the earliest\ndays of the peaceful nuclear program that we must offer reasonable\nassurance of continued supply to other nations.\n2. The interpretation that the President's determination under\nSection 123(b) is intended to be a continuing one is supported by the new provision\nunder Section 144(b) and (c) which deals with the agreements for cooperation\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nDigitized from Box 35 of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n2\nin the more sensitive field of military uses of atomic energy. Under these\nprovisions, added to the Act in 1958, the President is required to determine\nfrom time to time that \"the proposed cooperation will promote and will not\nconstitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. \" No\nsuch requirement for renewed determinations during the course of the\nimplementation of agreements for cooperation in civil uses was added to\nSection 144(a), which deals with agreements in civil uses.\n3. Additional provisions relating to export licensing of specific\ntypes of nuclear goods are covered in other sections of the Act. Chapter 10\ndeals with licenses for production and utilization facilities. Section 103\ncovers licenses for commercial facility, i. , power reactors, while\nSection 104 covers licenses for research and development facilities.\nIn point of fact, licenses are rarely if ever issued for commercial power\nreactors since these are built abroad from components derived from a\nnumber of sources. At most, individual components of such reactors are\nshipped from the U.S. under export licenses issued by the Department of\nCommerce. Those reactors which have been the subject of export licenses\nas complete units are usually research reactors exported under Section 104.\nUnder Section 104(d) no license may be issued for the export except under terms\nof an agreement for cooperation although component parts specially\nidentified by the Commission may be exported without an agreement for\ncooperation on a determination that the export will not constitute an un-\nreasonable risk to the common defense and security. The language\nBERALE which FORD VIBRARY\n3\nappears in the last sentence of Section 104(d) that no license may be\nissued to \"any person within the United States\" if this would be\ninimicable to the common defense and security clearly relates, in my view,\nto activities within the United States and not to the act of export itself.\nThe export of source material is covered under Section 64. It is\nentirely clear that under this Section the export of source material can\ntake place either under an agreement for cooperation or on a determination\nthat the export will not be inimicable. A similar approach is provided for\nby Section 82 in relation to export of by-products material. These sections\ncontemplate that distribution of source and by-product material would\nnormally be accomplished by the Commission itself, i.e., AEC, and this indeed\nwas the normal procedure in the early days of the program.\nThe foreign distribution of special nuclear material is covered by\nSection 54 and 57. In practice this is by far the most important area of\nexports since these occur on a repetitive basis over the lifetime of such\nreactors. Here again the original procedure dealt with exports directly\nby the Commission. Under Section 54 it is clear that the only export\nrequirement is that it be pursuant to the agreement for cooperation. After\nthe 1964 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, export by licensees\nbecame the normal procedure. Section 57 (c) provides that the Commission\nshall not distribute any special nuclear material to any person not under there\njurisdiction of the U.S. except under Section 54, i. e., under an agreement\nfor cooperation. Alternatively, the Commission may not distribute any\nspecial nuclear material to any person within the U.S. except on a finding\n4\nof noninimicability. The structure of this section makes it clear that\n\"within the United States\" referes to distribution of material for uses\nwithin the U.S., and not simply to possession by licensees for the purpose\nof exports. Section 53 which now authorizes the issuance of licenses for\nthe import or export of special nuclear material originally dealt with the\ndomestic distribution of special nuclear material and the Section is still so\nentitled. The language authorizing import and export licenses was added\nat the time of the private ownership amendments of 1964. Significantly it\nrefers only to export under the terms of an agreement for cooperation and\ncontains no language calling for a finding of non-inimicability.\nIn summary, I conclude that:\n1. Exports of the more sensitive items, i.e., complete reactors\nand special nuclear material, are to take place only under an agreement for\ncooperation. When this requirement is met, there is no need or room for the\nadded requirement of a non-inimicability finding on a case-by-case basis.\nThe President has made the definitive finding that performance on the\nagreement will not be inimical to U.S. security interests.\n2. In the case of export of less sensitive items, i.e., source\nmaterial, by-product material, or reactor components, the Act provides\ntwo alternatives for export: under an agreement for cooperation or on a\nfinding of non-inimicability. This latter alternative was intended for the\nexport of these less sensitive items where no agreement had been executied\nand was indeed frequently applied in just that way.\nGERALD LIBRARY\n5\n3. There is language which appears in several sections of the\nAct calling for a finding of non-inimicability when issuing licenses to\npersons \"within the United States. 11 When viewed in the overall structure\nsummarized above, I believe that it becomes clear theat the words \"within\nthe United States\" relate to activities which the licensee will undertake\nwithin the U.S., and not to the act of export itself.\nIt is my distinct recollection that as we began to issue licenses for the\nexport of reactors and special nuclear material, we informed the Regulatory\nside of the Commission only that the proposed export was pursuant to an\nagreement for cooperation. I have been informed that this procedure has been\nmodified in recent years and that a \"dual determination\" is made, i.e., that\nthe export is not only pursuant to an agreement for cooperation but also that\nit is non-inimicable. I have discussed the interpretation discussed above with\nseveral attorneys, including Jack Pender and Mark Rowden. Mark informed me\ntoday that he had looked again at this question following my conversation with\nhim on this point some two weeks ago. It is his conclusion that the Act was\nunclear and that either interpretation can be defended; by practice, however,\nthe AEC has essentially opted for the approa ch requiring a dual certification.\nMark also states, and I havenot had an opportunity to review this personally,\nthat the Commission regulations call for the dual determination thus further\nstrengthening this interpretation.\nFOKO\nis\nWhatever the practice has been, I am convinced that the interpretation\nthat an export under an agreement for cooperation need not be subject to\na separate determination of non-inimicability, is the correct one. Indeed,\n6\nI believe there is a strong basis on which to conclude, in view of the\nPresident's determination under Section 123(c), that any further determination\nby any other authority is improper and contrary to the Act.\nFORD LIBRARY\nAnnounced 2/2/75\nStencilled\nTo Archives 2/2/76\nEXECUTIVE ORDER\n- 11902\n-\nPROCEDURES FOR AN EXPORT LICENSING POLICY\nAS TO NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT\nThe Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 transferred\nto the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission the\nlicensing and related regulatory functions previously\nexercised by the Atomic Energy Commission under the Atomic\nEnergy Act of 1954, as amended.\nThe exercise of discretion and control over nuclear\nexports within the limits of law concerns the authority and\nresponsibility of the President with respect to the conduct\nof foreign policy and the ensuring of the common defense\nand security.\nIt is essential that the Executive branch inform\nthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission of its views before the\nCommission issues or denies a license, or grants an\nexemption.\nNOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested\nin me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States\nof America, including the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as\namended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), and as President of the\nUnited States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:\nSection 1. (a) The Secretary of State is designated\nto receive from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a copy of\neach export license application, each proposal by the Nuclear\nRegulatory Commission to issue a general license for export,\nand each proposal by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for\nexemption from the requirement for a license, which may\ninvolve a determination, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act\nof 1954, as amended, that the issuance of the license or\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n2\nexemption from the requirement for a license will, or will\nnot, be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to\nthe common defense and security.\n(b) The Secretary of State shall ensure that a copy\nof each such application, proposed general license, or\nproposed exemption is received by the Secretary of\nDefense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of\nthe United States Energy Research and Development Adminis-\ntration, hereinafter referred to as the Administrator, the\nDirector of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,\nhereinafter referred to as the Director, and the head\nof any other department or agency which may have an\ninterest therein, in order to afford them the opportunity\nto express their views, if any, on whether the license\nshould be issued or the exemption granted.\nSec. 2. Within thirty days of receipt of a copy\nof a license application, proposed general license, or\nproposed exemption, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary\nof Commerce, the Administrator, the Director, and the head\nof any other agency or department to which such copy has\nbeen transmitted, shall each transmit to the Secretary of\nState his views, if any, on whether and under what conditions\nthe license should be issued or the exemption granted.\nSec. 3. The Secretary of State shall, after the\nprovisions of section 2 of this order have been complied\nwith, transmit to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary\nof Commerce, the Administrator, the Director, and the head\nof any other department or agency who has expressed his\nviews thereon, a proposed position of the Executive branch\nas to whether the license should be issued or the exemption\ngranted, including a proposed judgment as to whether issuance\nof the license or granting of the exemption will, or will\nnot, be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk\nto the common defense and security.\nFORO LIBRARY 39\n3\nSec. 4. If the heads of departments and agencies\nspecified in section 2 of this order are unable to agree\nupon a position for the Executive branch, the Secretary of\nState shall refer the matter to the Chairman of the Under\nSecretaries Committee of the National Security Council in\norder to obtain a decision. In the event the Under\nSecretaries Committee is unable to reach a decision, the\nChairman of that Committee shall refer the matter to the\nPresident for his decision.\nSec. 5. The Secretary of State, after taking\nthe actions required by this order, shall notify the Nuclear\nRegulatory Commission of the position of the Executive branch\nas to whether the license should be issued or the exemption\ngranted, including the judgment of the Executive branch as\nto whether issuance of the license or granting of the exemp-\ntion will, or will not, be inimical to or constitute an\nunreasonable risk to the common defense and security.\nThe Executive branch position shall be supported by\nrelevant information and documentation as appropriate to\nthe proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.\nHerald R. Ind\nTHE WHITE HOUSE,\nFebruary 2, 1976.\nBERALD ,FORD LIBRARY\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 16, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nGLENN SCHLEEDE\nTHROUGH:\nPHIL BUCHEN T.W.B.\nFROM:\nDUDLEY CHAPMAN NC\nSUBJECT:\nProtection of Information in\nCivilian Nuclear Installations\nThe issued raised by the letter from the Nuclear Regulatory\nCommission is whether new safeguards for commercial nuclear\nindustry information should be handled under the existing classifica-\ntion procedures (E. O. 11652) or some new procedure established\nspecifically for the commercial nuclear industry. The majority\nview of the Commission favors the use of existing classification\nprocedures. Commissioner Gilinsky dissents, arguing it would\nbe an overextension of the concept of national security to apply it\nto the risks of criminal activity associated with use of nuclear\nenergy in the commercial sector. He also objects to categoriza-\ntion of essentially private data in private hands as \"official\ninformation. \" Commissioner Gilinsky favors the study of an\nalternative procedure to meet what he categorizes as the \"inescapable\"\nneed for some degree of control.\nI am in complete agreement with Commissioner Gilinsky.\nTo the extent that there is a need to extend protection of commercial\nnuclear industry information to protect it from criminal activity\nwithin the United States, that purpose has no necessary connection\nwith national security. There is a valid and urgent need for protection\nagainst domestic criminal elements of information that may be of\nlittle or no importance for national security reasons. Even informa-\ntion known to the Russians, for example, may need to be protected\ninternally to keep it out of domestic criminal hands.\n2\nTo stretch the concept of national security for this internal purpose,\nwould be much less acceptable politically than to establish a new\nsafeguard system addressed specifically to domestic protection.\nSuch a system would not suffer from the negative connotations that\nare now rampant with respect to national security classification,\nand should find positive support for the purpose of preventing\nnuclear incidents at home.\nAdministratively, our study of this issue should reflect the domestic\nand civilian, as distinct from national security, purpose of the\nprogram. This suggests the desirability of giving the lead to the\nAttorney General and the Director of the FBI. Commissioner\nGilinsky should, of course, be given a full opportunity to participate\nin any study and in the formulation of recommendations.\nThe matter deserves a very high priority.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDate 7/16\nTO: Phic Buchea\nFROM: DUDLEY CHAPMAN\nI have revised This\nmemo to clear up The\nquestion you had.\n510\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 11, 1975\nTO:\nDUDLEY Glenn CHAPMAN\nFROM:\nGlenn Schleede\nWhat do you think of the\narguments of the dissident\nCommissioner in the attached?\nAttachment\n510\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 11, 1975\nTO:\nDUDEEY Glenn CHAPMAN\nFROM:\nGlenn Schleede\nWhat do you think of the\narguments of the dissident\nCommissioner in the attached?\nAttachment\nCONF IDENTIAL\nUNITED STATES\nNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION\nDECLASSIFIED\nWASHINGTON, D. C. 20555\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6\n98.31, #7; NRCltr 6118/01\nMAY 2 0 1975\nBy dal NARA, Date 6/25/01\nThe President\nThe White House\nDear Mr. President:\nI wish to convey to you the views of the Nuclear Regulatory\nCommission on the study of the national security aspects of\nreleasing safeguards information carried out under NSSM 216.\nThe Commission is in unanimous agreement with the general\nproposition that effective means to protect certain safeguards\ninformation are a necessary element in an overall system designed\nto guard against theft or diversion of nuclear materials or sabo-\ntage of civil nuclear installations. It would appear that\nachieving this objective - whether by classification or by some\ncombination of other means such as described in the study -- will\nrequire restrictions on access to such information within the\nindustry and by. the public. This means the application of an\nindustrial security program to private activities not now subject\nto security restrictions and also entails the imposition of limita-\ntions greater than are now the case on public participation in\nsafeguards-related aspects of the nuclear regulatory process.\nThus, what is involved is a major step - a step which departs\nfrom a consistent policy over the past twenty years of maximizing\nthe public's ability to participate in all aspects of nuclear\nregulatory proceedings.\nGiven these considerations, it is our view that any action to\nimpose added security controls on information of the subject type\nshould be carefully tailored so as to apply the minimum restrictions\nneeded to achieve safeguards objectives. The Commission would put\nforth, in this connection, the following operative principles:\n- Restrictions should apply only to those activities\nwhere such a requirement is definitely established\nfor safeguards purposes (principally, to those fuel\ncycle activities which involve the handling of signifi-\ncant quantities of strategic nuclear materials, with\nonly limited application to nuclear power plants)\nREVOLUTION\nAMERICAN\nBICENTENNIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDocument Transmitted\n1776-1976\nHerewith C.\nNATIONA:\nINFORMATION\nCONF IDENT IAL\nThe President\n- 2 -\nMAY 2 0 1975\nA new security program need not apply across-\nthe-board to the entire nuclear power industry.\n- As regards those activities which are covered,\nrestrictions should be applied to the minimum\ninformation necessary to achieve safeguards\nobjectives.\n- Any such restrictions should be applied only when\nand to the extent that some other measure will not\nsupply the protection deemed necessary for safeguards\npurposes.\nWith these principles in mind, the Commission has also carefully\nweighed the matter of whether the national security classification\nsystem is the regime best suited to give safeguards information\nthe requisite degree of protection. The majority of the Commission\nbelieves that it is. In reaching. this conclusion, two basic objec-\ntives were considered:'\n1. Assuring the trustworthiness of persons generating\nand having access to the subject information.\n2. Protecting the information from unauthorized disclosure\nwhile in the possession of NRC.\nShort of special legislation - which would not appear to be\nnecessary at this juncture - national security classification is\nthe only single way to accomplish both objectives; and, on balance,\nit is probably the soundest available way to achieve each of these\nobjectives. The Commission majority, in considering its position,\nwas particularly mindful that national security classification\nunder the Executive Order provides a framework which assures the\nprocedural rights of persons affected and is a system familiar to\nthe Congress, the courts and the public. The Commission would urge,\nhowever, that the firmest possible underpinnings be provided for\napplication of the national security classification system to this\ntype of information (i.e., information which is privately generated\nwithin a regulatory framework). This may make it desirable to\namend Executive Order 11652 so as to give such information explicit\ncoverage thereunder.\nIn sum, based on the foregoing considerations and with the limita-\ntions indicated, the majority of the Commissioners are of the view\nthat certain types of safeguards information should be covered by\nsecurity restrictions and that the classification system established\nunder Executive Order 11652 provides an appropriate basis for\nprotecting such information.\nCONF IDENTIAL\nThe President\n- 3 -\nMAY 2 0 1975\nCommissioner Gilinsky disagrees with the majority view. He\nbelieves that the disadvantages of employing the national\nsecurity classification system, pursuant to Executive Order\n11652, are so great, both for substantive reasons and those\nrelated to public perceptions, that more careful examination of\nalternative approaches should be undertaken before a final\ndecision is made. He believes the NSSM 216 study to be inade-\nquate in two respects: with regard to the analysis of alternatives\nfor protecting information, and with regard to the related dis-\ncussion of the impact of national security classification upon\npublic acceptability of civilian nuclear programs. The Commissioner\nalso suggests that, in consideration of the potentially momentous\nand long-term impact of the decision in question on a critical\ncivilian industry, further study of this issue should be done\nwith Domestic Council participation. The background of these\nviews is set forth at greater length in an enclosure to this\nletter.\nTurning to the matter of types of safeguards information warrant-\ning protection, the full Commission believes that -- apart from\nthe means adopted to protect the information - at least the\nsecurity plans of critical fuel cycle facilities should be given -\nprotection from unauthorized disclosure additional to that pro-\nvided today. However, with regard to light water reactors\nusing uranium fuel of low enrichment, the Commission believes\nthat alternative means of protecting security plans from unau-\nthorized disclosure, or compensating physical security measures,\nshould be further analyzed in light of the nature and consequences\nof sabotage to such facilities before applying national security\nrestrictions in this area. We also believe that the portions of\nthe study dealing with the disclosure of reports on inventory\ndiscrepancy of special nuclear material do not provide an adequate\nbasis for deciding under what conditions such information should\nbe withheld. We therefore urge that, before you make any\ndecision on withholding information of this kind from public\ndisclosure, you direct that further analysis be undertaken.\nSpecifically, we recommend analysis of the relationship between\nthe release of inventory discrepancy data - at any time - and\nthe credibility of hoaxes. We also recommend the development of\nalternative criteria for release of data (e.g., withholding of\n-a small, but particularly sensitive, part of the data; aggregat-\ning data), taking into account the possibility that hoaxes may\nnot become any less credible after a predetermined interval, such\nas the six months assumed in the study.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nTAL\nThe President\n- 4 -\nMAY 2 0 1375\nIn order to permit the earliest possible decision on the\nunresolved issues, we would urge that the NSSM 216 Working\nGroup be directed to complete quickly a detailed analysis of\nthe means which might be employed to protect inventory dis-\ncrepancy data, while at the same time keeping the public\nadequately informed of this aspect of the civil nuclear\nindustry --- a public policy consideration which the Commission\ndeems to be of prime importance. The Group should also carry\nout, simultaneously, an additional study of the risks associated\nwith sabotage of light water reactors and of the need for\nadditional information safeguards to reduce these risks.\nFinally, in line with our earlier observation, we urge that the\nJustice Department carefully review the question of whether the\npresent provisions of Executive Order 11652 are sufficiently\ncomprehensive to cover information of this type.\nThe Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff will be pleased to\nparticipate in additional analyses such as those we have\nrecommended, as well as in the necessary follow-on work to\nidentify specific safeguards information that should be classified\nor otherwise protected in accordance with decisions made. Prior\nto making our determinations on what specific safeguards informa--\ntion will be classified or otherwise protected, we will afford\nminations. the NSC staff an opportunity to comment on our proposed deter-\nOn behalf of the entire Commission, I would like to express our\nappreciation for the opportunity provided the Commission staff\nto participate in this study and for the invitation to the\nCommission to furnish you with its views.\nRespectfully yours,\nOriginal signed by\nWilliam A. Anders\nWilliam A. Anders\nChairman\nEnclosure:\nCommissioner Gilinsky Comment\nCONF IDENTIAL\nCOMMISSIONER GILINSKY'S COMMENT CONCERNING\nNATIONAL SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY DATA\nIn my view, commercial nuclear industry safeguards information is not of\nthe type contemplated in Executive Order 11652. The Order refers to\n\"official information within the Federal Government\" which \"bears directly\non the effectiveness of our national defense and the conduct of our for-\neign relations.\" It is, I believe, an overextension of the concept of\nnational security to apply it to the risks of criminal activity associated\nwith use of nuclear energy in the commercial sector. Furthermore, cate-\ngorization of essentially private data in private hands as \"official\ninformation\" on the basis that the industry in question is federally\nlicensed is, I believe, unprecedented. We should approach this uncharted\narea with great caution.\nIt is regrettable that any sort of information control is required here.\nUnfortunately, it seems inescapable that some degree of control is needed.\nBut before we institute more extensive controls than now exist, we should\nhave a better understanding than we have today of the threats against which\nwe must provide protection.\nWe will not, in the end, deny ourselves means that are essential to our\ndomestic peace. But if we are wise, we shall clearly circumscribe the\ndomain of restrictive measures. A broad interpretation of national security\nwith regard to nuclear power could lead step-by-step to extensive classifica-\ntion with consequent chilling effects on the public's need to know and debate.\nIt may turn out that no other course is open for protecting certain nuclear\nindustry information, such as facility security plans, which of course need\nto be protected. But in view of the far-reaching implications of such a\nstep - in particular, introduction of a military element into our civilian\nelectric power industry - it should not be taken without a searching and\ncomprehensive study of alternatives; this, in my opinion, has not yet been\naccomplished. For example, the NSSM 216 study dismissed too readily the\npossibility of supplementing NRC's present classification and clearance\nauthority by means of suitable legislation.\nThere is still time to re-study the matter. Industry is disinclined to\nreveal any of the information in question. The NRC is under pressure to\nreveal only material inventory discrepancy data. In the interim, the\nlatter data could adequately be handled in accordance with the guidelines\nproposed by the NSSM 216 study - in most cases this would mean release\nafter a six-month period.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nBECLASSISHED\nAUTHORITY RAC nuf. PB-1-13-2-3 5/5/08\nFORD & LIBRAR RALD\nBY\nNLF, DATE 6/29/09\n160\nCONF IDENTIAL\n- 2 -\nFinally, I believe that use of national security classification would\nadversely affect the acceptability of nuclear power in this country.\nSuch use would unnecessarily feed the existing apprehensions and fears\namong part of the public over the dangers of organized, malevolent acts\ninvolving nuclear facilities, and it would tend to support charges that\nnuclear energy can be employed in a secure manner only by resorting to\nprocedures more characteristic of a garrison state than those of the\ntraditional free enterprise system in the United States.\nCONF IDENTIAL\nFORD & LIBRARY RALA\n140\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6\nMR 98-31, etdept ets\nBy due NARA, Date 6/22/01\nE\n0\nCOPY\nDP IMMED\nMJA856SBA977\nDE RUSBAE #3407 0651301\n0 051300Z MAR 76\nFM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4460\ne B N F D E N T t NEW DELHI 3407\nFOLLOWING TEL BOMBAY 0566 DTD 05 MAR 76 RCVD NEW DELHI\nBEING REPEATED TO YOU. QUOTE\nE B N F D N A t BOMBAY 0566\nEO 11652: GOS\nTAGS: TECH ENRG IN\nSUBJECT: TARAPUR NUCLEAR FUEL EXPORT LICENSE\nREF: STATE 52153\n1. AS J.C.SHAH, LIKE CHAIRMAN SETHNA, IS OUT OF TOWN FOR PE\nDURATION OF THIS WEEK, THERE IS NO ONE AT EITHER THE IAEC OR AT\nTHE INDIAN ATOMIC POWER AUTHORITY WHO CAN OFFICIALLY CONFIRM OR\nPROVIDE DATA TO SUPPORT CHAIRMAN SETHNA'S AND J.C.SHAH'S STATE-\nMENTS THAT MARCH 15 IS THE ULTIMATE DATE FOR RECEIPT OF ENRICHED\nURANIUM TO AVDID ALOWDOWN AND PERHAPS EVENTUALLY SHUTDOWN OF\nTARAPUR POWER REACTORS. HOWEVER, CONGEN DID MANAGE TO TALK WITH\nA SENIOR TECHNICIAN WHO IS WELL VERSED ON THIS SUBJECT AND WHO\nPROVIDED CONSIDERABLE DETAIL TO THROW LIGHT ON EFFECT ON NON-\nRECEIPT OF ENRICHED URANIUM. IN VIEW OF SETHNA'S EXTREME SENSITIV-\nITY ABOUT QUOTING ALMOST ANYONE OTHER THAN HIMSELF ON MATTERS OF\nGREAT IMPORTANCE TO INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE\nTO PUBLICLY CITE IAEC OFFICIAL AS SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION\nALTHOUGH CONGEN IS QUITE CONFIDENT OF ITS ACCURACY AND THAT IT\nWILL ULTIMATELY BE BASIS OF WHATEVER PUBLIC STATEMENT SETHNA\nPROVIDES ON THIS POINT.\n2. IAEC SOURCE SAYS THAT PROBLEM HAS TO BE VIEWED IN TERMS OF NFC\nPRODUCTION CAPACITY AND PROCESS. HE OUTLINED PROBLEM AS FOLLOWS:\nHEXAFLORIDE (UF-6), THE ENRICHED URANIUM PROVIDED BY THE US, IS\nCONVERTED INTO PELLETS OF URANIUM OXIDE, WHICH, IN TURN, ARE\nINSERTED INTO THE FUEL RODS WHICH EVENTUALLY ARE GROUPED TOGETHER\nINTO BUNDLES OF 36 EACH FOR LOADING INTO REACTORS. EACH BUNDLE IS\nMADE UP OF RDDS CONTAINING THREE DIFFERENT ENRICHMENTS, THE GE\nSYSTEM PURCHASED BY THE IAEC. THE BREAKDOWN OF VARIOUS ENRICHMENTS\nIN EACH BUNDLE IS APPROXIMATELY 22, 11 AND 3. AS THE URANIUM\nPSN:017866 PAGE 01\nTOR:065/13:412 DTG:051300Z MAR 76\n0\n0\nCOPY\n0\nN\nD\nN\nCOPY\nHEXAFLORIDE IS PURCHASED IN CYLINDERS CONTAINING 1.5 TONS EACH,\nTHE VARIOUS ENRICHMENTS ARE MADE IN BATCHES WHICH ALLOWS THE NFC\nTO USE UP COMPLETE CYLINDERS so AT ANY ONE TIME THERE ARE A FEW\nSPARE RODS OF VARIOUS ENRICHMENTS IN INVENTORY. ANOTHER COMPLI-\nCATION IN THE PRODUCTION PROCESS IS THAT THE FACILITY HAS TO BE\nCOMPLETELY CLEANED UP AFTER EACH PARTICULAR SET OF ENRICHMENT RODS\nARE RUN THROUGH.\n3. OUR SOURCE ESTIMATES THAT THE COMPLETE LEAD TIME FROM APPROVAL\nOF THE LICENSE APPLICATION TO COMPLETION OF AN INTEGRATED BUNDLE\nIS 9 TO 11 MONTHS, INCLUDING AN AVERAGE OCEAN SHIPMENT TIME OF 60\nDAYS. AFTER ARRIVAL AT HYDERABAD, 5-1/2 TO 6 MONTHS ARE REQUIRED\nFOR THE COMPLETION OF THE INTEGRATED BUNDLES OF 36 RODS. THE\nANNUAL NEEDS OF THE TWIN TARAPUR REACTORS ARE FOR 130 RODS. THE\nCAPACITY OF THE NFC FOR PRODUCTION OF TARAPUR TYPE FUEL IS\nESTIMATED AT 10 PER CENT GREATER THAN THE NEEDS OF TARAPUR AND\nMIGHT UNDER ALL-OUT OPERATIONAL PUSH REACH 150 ROOS PER YEAR.\n4. ON MARCH 15, OR THEREABOUTS - BUT CERTAINLY NOT LATER THAN\nAPRIL 15 - THE NFC PRODUCTION SCHEDULE FOR TARAPUR WILL BE\nSLOWED DOWN AS THE FACILITY WILL NO LONGER HAVE SUPPLIES OF THE\nTHREE GRADES OF ENRICHED URANIUM REQUIRED FOR TARAPUR. SOMETIME\nIN APRIL OR MAY THE OUTPUT AT TARAPUR WOULD HAVE TO BE REDUCED\nAND WITHIN 5 TO 6 MONTHS, BARRING A NEW SUPPLY DR ALTERNATIVE\nSOURCES WHICH I AM TOLD ND ONE AT THE IAEC CAN FORESEE, TARAPUR\nWOULD SHUT DOWN COMPLETELY, ASSUMING THAT IT OPERATES UP TO THAT\nPOINT TO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE WITH THE FUEL AVAILABLE.\n5. MY SOURCE STRESSED THAT THESE DATA ARE ESSENTIALLY CORRECT,\nBUT THERE ARE SOME FLEXIBILITIES IN THE DEADLINES, BUT THEY ARE\nNOT GREAT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT UNLESS FUEL IS FORTHCOMING FOR\nTARAPUR WITHIN THE NEXT 2 OR 3 WEEKS, SOME ADDITIONAL ELECTRICITY\nCUTBACKS IN WESTERN INDIA WILL ENSUE AND ANY PROTRACTED DELAYS,\nLIKE 2 OR 3 MONTHS, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT IN MAJOR NEW\nRESTRICTIONS ON ELECTRICITY USAGE. WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY A\n3DAY ELECTRICITY HOLIDAY THAT WPGL BE NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE\nSHUTDOWN OF MAHARASHTRA'S MAJOR HYDRO FACILITY WHICH CURRENTLY HAS\nINSTALLED CAPACITY OF ABOUT 550 MW IN ORDER TO PUT IN TWO\nADDITIONAL GENERATORS OF 60 AND 80 MW. THIS ILLUSTRATES THE\nPROBLEM WESTERN INDIA IS NOW ENCOUNTERING IN MEETING ITS POWER\nREQUIREMENTS. THEY HAVE INSUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO MEET\nESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEMANDS, SO ANY REDUCTION\nCUTS IMMEDIATELY AND SHARPLY INTO EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME.\nCOURTNEY\nUNQUOTE\nSAXBE\nBT\nPSN:017866\nPAGE 02\nOF 02\nTOR:065/13:41Z\nDTG:051300Z MAR 76\n0\n0\n8\nN\nCOPY\nPUGLEAR REGULATORY\nUNITED STATES\nNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION\nSTATES\nCOMMISSION\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555\nUNITED\n*****\nMarch 5, 1976\nMr. George Springsteen\nExecutive Secretary\nDepartment of State\nWashington, D.C.\nAttention: Myron Kratzer, Acting Assistant\nSecretary of State (OES)\nDear Mr. Springsteen:\nOn March 2, 1976, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was served\nwith petitions seeking leave to intervene in two license\napplications for the export of special nuclear material to\nIndia (License Nos. XSNM-805 and XSNM-845). Copies of these\npetitions have been furnished previously to your Department\nthroùgh Acting Assistant Secretary Myron Kratzer. The\npetitioners (Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council,\nand Union of Concerned Scientists) also request a hearing\nin connection with the Commission's consideration of the\napplications.\nThese petitions constitute the first requests for interven-\ntion and hearing on an export licensing application for\nspecial nuclear materials received by either the NRC or its\npredecessor the Atomic Energy Commission. Before ruling on\nthe several issues presented, the Commission wishes to obtain\nfurther information and views of concerned government agencies\nand others to assist it in making its decisions. Accordingly,\nand consistent with the procedures outlined in Executive\nOrder No. 11902 for furnishing Executive Branch views on\nnuclear export license applications to the NRC, we invite\nyou to submit views and comments on the issues raised in the\npetitions.\nAlso, the Commission believes it would be appropriate for you\nto inform the Government of India of the NRC's intended\ncourse of action for determining the issues raised by the\npetitions, and its willingness to entertain any views that\ngovernment may wish to express, either for submission through\nyour Department or independently.\nFORD is LIBRARY 0ERALD\nGeorge Springsteen\n- 2 -\nMarch 5, 1976\nIn this regard, the Commission has asked that written state-\nments be filed with it no later than 5:00 p.m., Friday,\nMarch 12, 1976, and has scheduled a preliminary oral hearing\non issues relevant to the petitions at 10:00 a.m., on\nWednesday, March 17, 1976. The hearing will be held in the\nCommission's Conference Room (Room 1115) at 1717 H Street,\nN.W., Washington, D.C.\nThe oral hearing will be addressed to the need or desirabil-\nity of conducting a hearing on the applications for export\nlicenses, the matters proper to be considered in such a\nhearing, the procedures to be observed, the standing of\npetitioners to participate in those proceedings, and the\ntimeliness of the petitions, and not to the issuance or not\nof the licenses themselves. If the Commission decides to\nconduct hearings on one or both applications, those hear-\nings will be held at a later date. However, a full written\nexposition of facts and argument bearing on each of the con-\ntentions made in the motions for leave to intervene is\ndesired.\nIn particular, the Commission invites each of the partici-\npants to address the following questions in written and oral\npresentations:\n(1) On what date were notices of the license applications\nin XSNM-805 and-845 placed in the Public Document Room\nor actually made known to the petitioners or their\nattorneys?\n(2) Assuming a petition to intervene in the circumstances\nof this case to be otherwise proper, what standard\nshould govern the timeliness of a petition?\n(3) Do you consider that the present petitions are timely?\n(4) Are there special factors, such as the possibility of\nharm to foreign relations interests, that would warrant\ntreating one petition differently from the other with\nrespect to its timeliness? If the impact of any such\nfactors depend significantly upon the promptness with\nwhich the export licenses which are the subject of the\ntwo petitions are issued, what is the latest time each\nlicense might be issued to avoid this impact, taking\nFORD i LIBRARY 038470\nGeorge Springsteen\n- 3 -\nMarch 5, 1976\ninto account such feasible alternative methods of\ntransportation and other options which would extend\nthis time period to the fullest extent possible?\n(5) In your view, do either of the present petitions state\ncircumstances requiring or making it advisable in the\npublic interest to hold public hearings?\n(6) If a public hearing were held, what rules of procedure\nshould govern?\n(7) What procedures should apply to the receipt by the\nCommission of sensitive or classified information\nbearing on foreign relations issues and the Commis-\nsion's common defense and security responsibilities?\n(8) If a hearing is granted by the Commission on the\nTarapur export license applications, are there any\nissues raised by petitioners which should be excluded\nfrom consideration as falling outside the NRC's juris-\ndiction?\nIf you have any questions concerning the mechanics of the\nscheduled hearing or submission of written comments, please\ncontact the Commission's General Counsel, Mr. Peter Strauss,\nat 634-1398 or 492-7375.\nSincerely,\nSamuel J. Chilk\nSecretary\nCO:\nAll parties\nThe Assistant to the President\nfor National Security Affairs\nThe White House\nGERALD FORD LIBRART\nBefore the\nUNITED STATES\nNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20555\nIn the Matter of the Application\n)\nof Edlow International Company,\n)\nas Agent for the Government of\n)\nDocket No. XSNM-845\nIndia, to Export Special Nuclear\n)\nMaterial\n)\nPETITION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,\nTHE SIERRA CLUB AND THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS\nFOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE\nPursuant to Section 189 (a) of the Atomic Energy Act of\n1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. $2239 (a), and applicable rules and\nregulations of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission\n(the \"Commission\"), including 10 C.F.R. $2.714, the Natural\nResources Defense Council, Inc. (\"NRDC\"), the Sierra Club and\nthe Union of Concerned Scientists (\"UCS\") hereby respectfully\npetition the Commission for leave to intervene as parties in\nopposition to the proposed application dated October 21, 1975,\nof Edlow International Company, as agent for the Government of\nIndia, for a license to export special nuclear material (463.64 kgs.\nU235 in 18371.4 kgs U enriched to a maximum of 2.71 percent) for\nuse in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (\"Tarapur\"), India.\nThey further request a hearing in connection with the Commission's\nconsideration of such application.\nDiscussion\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\n1. Interests of Petitioners\nPetitioners NRDC and the Sierra Club are both national, non-\nprofit membership organizations which seek to intervene on their\n-2-\nown behalf and on behalf of their members in this proceeding.\nNRDC and the Sierra Club are environmental organizations com-\nmitted to the protection of the human environment and public\nhealth and safety. They have a combined membership in excess\nof 175, 000 persons in the United States and abroad, which in-\ncludes persons who are citizens of or reside in India and Pakistan.\nPetitioner UCS is a non-profit, tax exempt organization which\nseeks to intervene on its own behalf in this proceeding. UCS is\na coalition of scientists, engineers, and other professionals\nconcerned about the impact of technology on society. It conducts\nresearch on a wide variety of public policy and scientific\nquestions, and seeks to promote and ensure the rational and safe\nuse of modern technology. UCS has taken a major interest in the\nU.S. nuclear power program in general and the export of nuclear\nequipment, fuels and technology in particular.\nWith respect to this proceeding, all three Petitioners\ncontend that they have important institutional interests which\nwill be directly affected by its outcome. They are actively en-\ngaged in disseminating information to. the public concerning environ-\nmental and public policy issues in general and nuclear power in\nparticular. They further are seeking to promote the wise use of\ntechnology and natural resources and the development of sound\nenergy policy. Their interest in and ability to continue to carry\nout these functions is significantly and adversely impaired by the\nabsence of a full, open and independent review by the Commission\nGERALD LIBRARY\n-3-\nof the common defense and security, health and safety, and\nenvironmental issues raised by the pending application.\nPetitioners NRDC and the Sierra Club contend, in addition,\nthat the interests of their members will be directly affected\nby the outcome of this proceeding. Their members who travel to\nor reside in India may be exposed to the risks associated with\nthe operation of Tarapur. Moreover, because of the potential\nworldwide harm associated with the risk of diversion or theft\nof exported special nuclear material and the use thereof for\ndestructive purposes, as well as the risk of major radioactivity\nreleases at Tarapur resulting from accident, sabotage or armed\nattack, all their members' interests in the maintenance of a\nsafe, healthful and productive environment are directly threatened\nby the granting of the pending application.\nPetitioners have no other means to protect their interests\nin this proceeding, and those interests are not now represented\nby existing parties. Their petition is not interposed for delay\nor to broaden the proper scope of the proceeding. Further, Peti-\ntioners believe their participation will assist in developing a\nsound record.\nThe specific interests of NRDC, the Sierra Club and UCS and\nhow those interests will be affected are more fully set forth in\nthe affidavits of J. Gustave Speth, Charles Clusen, and Daniel\nF. Ford attached hereto as Appendices 1, 2, and 3, respectively.\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\n-4-\nII. Contentions of Petitioners\nThe risks inherent in the export of special nuclear\nmaterial are well-known. As a necessary consequence of its\nutilization in a power reactor such as Tarapur, plutonium and\nhighly radioactive waste products are generated. Plutonium may\nbe either openly or clandestinely diverted by nation-states for\nfabrication into explosive devices which threaten international\nstability and world order, as well as the common defense and\nsecurity of the United States. Moreover, it may be stolen by\nterrorist organizations for the purpose of producing a bomb or\ncreating other weapons of terrible destructive capability,\ni.e., plutonium aerosols which could be released anywhere in\nthe world. Additionally, a power reactor, such as Tarapur,\nin which the special nuclear material is utilized may be the\nobject of sabotage or armed attack, aimed at causing the release\nof enormous quantities of radioactivity or of literally holding\na city or country hostage to political demands. Use of special\nnuclear material in a power reactor, such as Tarapur, further\ncarries with it the possibility that accidental mechanisms will\ncause its release into the environment, with untold damage to\nthe health and safety of exposed populations. Finally, in the\nabsence of long term waste management solutions, high level\nradioactive wastes, which will pose hazards for ensuing genera-\ntions, may be introduced into the environment, causing death,\ndisease and genetic mutation to living organisms. Should any\nFORD : GERALD LIBRARY\n-5-\nof these eventualities occur, the extent of damage and other ad-\nverse consequences may not be bounded by national frontiers and\ncertainly may not be limited to the Indian subcontinent.\nThe general risks inherent in the export of special nuclear\nmaterial are magnified in the specific case of fuel shipments to\nIndia. Risks of diversion, theft and sabotage may be particularly\nacute. India is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation\nof Nuclear Weapons (the \"NPT\"). 1/ Thus, it has not committed\nitself internationally to forswear the development of nuclear weapons,\nand it has proceeded to develop and detonate a nuclear explosive\ndevice fabricated from unsafeguarded nuclear fuel irradiated in a\nreactor supplied for peaceful purposes only. Moreover, because\nit has not adhered to the NPT, and because its bilateral Agreement\nfor Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy with the\nUnited States 2/ contains no provision to the contrary, it has\nmaintained and continues to maintain nuclear facilities which are\neither only partially safeguarded or which are totally free from\ninternational and United States safeguards against their use for\nthe production of nuclear weaponry. .In such circumstances, the\n1% Done at Washington, London and Moscow, July 1, 1968; entered\ninto force for the United States, March 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 483\nT.I.A.S. No. 6839\n2/ Done at Washington, August 8, 1963; entered into force\nOctober 5, 1963, T.I.A.S. No. 5446.\n:\nFORD\nGERALD\ncontinued shipment of special nuclear material to Tarapur funda-\nmentally undercuts the long-standing non-proliferation policy of\nthe United States as embodied in the NPT, discriminating against\nthose countries which have undertaken NPT obligations and effect-\nively sanctioning India's refusal to accept those obligations.\nIt can only have the effect of encouraging other countries to\nignore the prohibition against nuclear weapons development, and,\nwithin the region, it may continue to increase the insecurity of\nother nations, leading to even further proliferation.\nHealth and safety risks attendant upon the shipment of\nspecial nuclear material to Tarapur may also be significant.\nTestimony presented on January 30, 1976, at hearings held by the\nUnited States Senate Committee on Government Operations indicates\nthat operations at Tarapur have resulted in the leakage of sub-\nstantial radioactivity, and that high radioactivity levels have\nforced turnover in plant personnel, leaving less well trained re-\nplacements in charge of many operations. The continued shipment\nof special nuclear material to Tarapur may aggravate these problems\nand increase the threat of a major nuclear accident at Tarapur,\nwith repercussions not just for the health and safety of affected\npopulations, but for the United States' relations with India and\nits other trading partners.\nSpecifically, Petitioners contend that the Applicant has\nnot demonstrated, and the Commission cannot properly determine,\nthat the granting of the pending application will not be inimical\nto or constitute an unreasonable risk to \"the common defense and\nMENRIT GERALD FORD\nsecurity,\" within the meaning of Sections 3 (d) and 53 (b) of the\nAtomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§2013 (d), 2073 (b), and\nExecutive Order 11902, 41 Fed. Reg. 4877 (February 3, 1976), or\nthat such action would not be \"inimical to the interests of the\nUnited States,\" within the meaning of the Commission's regulations,\n10 C.F.R. $70.31 (e). Petitioners further contend that the grant-\ning of the pending application would be in violation of the\nrequirements of Sections 3(d) and 53 (b) of the Atomic Energy\nAct of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§2013 (d) and 2073(b), which require that\nCommission actions not be inconsistent with the \"health and\nsafety of the public.\" Petitioners additionally contend that the\npending application cannot be granted until it has been established\nin accordance with the requirements of the National Environmental\nPolicy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. S$4321 et seq. (\"NEPA\") and the\nCommission's implementing regulations, 10 C.F.R. Part 51, that\nsuch action is appropriate. Finally, Petitioners contend that\ngranting the pending application would be inconsistent with and\nin violation of (a) Article I of the NPT, which prohibits the\nUnited States from transferring \"nuclear weapons or other nuclear\nexplosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive de-\nvices directly or indirectly\" to any nation and from \"assist[ing]\n...\nany non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire\nnuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over\nsuch weapons or explosive devices,\" and (b) Article III of the NPT\nwhich prohibits the transfer to special nuclear material to any\nnon-weapons State in the absence of safeguards on all nuclear\nactivities within its territory, or under it control or jurisdict\nGERAL OFORD TIBRARY\n-8-\nIn support of their contentions, Petitioners maintain\nthat, for both procedural and substantive reasons, the Commission\nis unable to make the determinations required by law as a pre-\ncondition for the issuance of an export license for special nuclear\nmaterial to be shipped to Tarapur. Procedurally, with regard to\nthe pending application, the Commission has issued no public\nnotice of its receipt and consideration, is applying no criteria\nto judge facts and information relevant to its licensing decisions,\nhas not consulted directly with other federal agencies having\nrelevant expertise, and has neither obtained nor analyzed all\nrelevant facts and information, so as to enable it to exercise\nits independent licensing judgment with regard to safeguards and\nhealth and safety risks associated with the shipment of special\nnuclear materials to Tarapur. Moreover, it has not prepared,\ncirculated for comment and considered in its decisionmaking pro-\ncess, in accordance with Section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C.\n$4332 (2) (C), a detailed environmental impact statement, covering\nthe pending application.\nSubstantively, given India's failure to ratify the NPT,\nits position with regard to non-proliferation, and the significant\npossibility that international conflict with such neighboring\ncountries as Pakistan and China might disrupt safeguards agree-\nments and severely threaten the security of nuclear materials\nand facilities, there is inadequate assurance that issuance\nof the license will meet the standards of the Atomic Energy\nAct and the Commission's implementing regulations with\nFORD & LIBRARY\n-9-\nregard to protection of the common defense and security and the\ninterests of the United States. Further, such standards cannot\nbe met in this proceeding because the United States has failed\nto require India, inter alia, (a) absolutely to refrain from the\ndevelopment of further nuclear explosive devices: (b) to permit\nsafeguards on all of its nuclear facilities; (c) to refrain from\ndeveloping national enrichment and reprocessing facilities;\n(d) to agree, prior to the shipment of fuel to Tarapur, to safe-\nguards and physical security requirements for any future reproces-\nsing of such fuel, should such reprocessing be permitted; (e) to\nestablish physical security requirements applicable to Tarapur;\n(f) to permit additional bilateral safeguards on Tarapur and re-\nlated facilities; and (g) to permit U.S. control over the dis-\nposition of plutonium produced at Tarapur. Finally, the Commission\ncannot lawfully determine that issuance of the license will meet\nthe standards of the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's im-\nplementing regulations with respect to protection of the health\nand safety of the public and the interests of the United States\nbecause the United States has failed, inter alia, to require\nIndia to meet the above-mentioned conditions, and to establish\neffective programs to ensure that adequate health and safety\nstandards are applied and enforced in the operation of Tarapur\nand that repair and maintenance capability is sufficient to ensure\nsafe reactor operation.\nThe detailed contentions of Petitioners and the bases for\nFORD & OFFACO LIBRARY Speth,\nthem are more fully set forth in the affidavit of J. Gustave\nattached hereto as Appendix 4.\n-10-\nIII. Request for Financial Assistance\nPursuant to the provisions of law and regulations now in\nexistence or to be subsequently adopted, Petitioners request that\nthe Commission provide them with financial assistance to enable\nthem to represent fully their views and the views of their\nmembers. At an appropriate time, Petitioners will submit a\ndetailed request for financial assistance.\nConclusion\nBased upon this Petition and the supporting affidavits,\nPetitioners request that leave to intervene be granted and\nthat a hearing be ordered in this proceeding.\nDated: Washington, D.C.\nMarch 1, 1976\nRespectfully submitted,\nlevel Eldon V.C. Greenberg\nRichard A. Frank\nCenter for Law and Social Policy\n1751 N Street, N.W.\nWashington, D.C. 20036\n(202) 872-0670\nCounsel for Petitioners\nJ. Gustave Speth, Esquire\nS. Jacob Scherr, Esquire\nNatural Resources Defense Council, Inc.\n917 15th Street, N.W.\nWashington, D.C. 20005\n(202) 737-5000\nOf Counsel\nFORD & 93RALD LIBRARY\n-11-\nAffirmation\nI affirm that I am the duly authorized counsel for\nPetitioners in this proceeding and that the statements con-\ntained in this Petition are true and correct to the best of\nmy personal knowledge.\nEldon V.C. Greenberg\nSubscribed and sworn to before\nme this jst day of march\n1976.\nJune Notary a Public Truby\nMy Commission Expires March 31, isel\nFORD i 078830 LIBRARY\n-12-\nAffirmation\nI affirm that I am the duly authorized counsel for\nPetitioners in this proceeding and that the statements con-\ntained in this Petition are true and correct to the best of\nmy personal knowledge.\nRill A X\nRichard A. Frank\nSubscribed and sworn to before\nme this 1st day of march\n1976.\nJune Notary M Public Truby why\nMy Cotamission Expires Match 31, 198\nFORDO & GERALD LIBRARY\nAppendix 1\nBefore the\nUNITED STATES\nNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20555\nIn the Matter of the Application\n)\nof Edlow International Company,\n)\nDocket No. XSNM-845\nas Agent for the Government of\n)\nIndia, to Export Special Nuclear\n)\nMaterial\n)\nAFFIDAVIT OF J. GUSTAVE SPETH\nIN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION OF THE\nNATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.\nFOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE\nCITY OF WASHINGTON\n)\nDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS:\nJ. GUSTAVE SPETH, being first duly sworn, deposes and\nsays:\n1. I am an attorney on the staff of Petitioner, Natural\nResources Defense Council, Inc. (\"NRDC\"), with an office at 917\n15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. I am a member of the\nBar of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. I am\nfamiliar with the facts set forth in this affidavit, which I\nmake in support of NRDC's petition for leave to intervene in the\nabove-captioned proceeding.\n2. NRDC is a non profit, public benefit membership corpora\ntion organized and existing under the laws of the State of New\nYork. NRDC is a charitable organization exempt from taxation\nunder Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code. NRDC'\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\n-2-\nprincipal office and place of business is located at 15 West\n44th Street, New York, New York. It maintains other offices\nat 917 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., and at 664\nHamilton Avenue, Palo Alto, California. NRDC has a membership\nin the United States and abroad of more than 22,000 persons,\nincluding scientists, lawyers, educators, and other citizens\ndedicated to the defense and preservation of the human environ-\nment and the wise use of natural resources. Other persons\nsupport NRDC's objectives by financial contributions and\npersonal efforts.\n3. NRDC's members include citizens of India and Pakistan.\nIn addition, its members have travelled in the past and can\nbe expected to travel on the Indian subcontinent.\n4. The objectives of NRDC include:\n(a) to maintain and enhance environmental quality;\n(b) to monitor federal departments and regulatory\nagencies to ensure that environmental values are fully considered\nin decisionmaking, and, in particular, to ensure that federal\nstatutes designed to protect and enhance the environment are\nfully and properly implemented;\n(c) to improve federal agency decisionmaking which\naffects the environment by commenting, furnishing information,\nand participating in administrative proceedings;\nFORD & LIBRA\n(d) to select and undertake environmental lawsuits and\nadministrative actions which have a potential for establishing\nwidely applicable precedent for saving or reclaiming some\nimportant aspect of the environment, and, in particular, which\nrequire federal agencies to meet legal obligations established\nin federal statutes designed to protect and enhance the environ-\nment; and\n(e) to provide a central, national focus for scientists,\nlawyers, and educators, and concerned citizens in an effort to\nmake our courts and administrative agencies effective instruments\nof environmental protection.\n5. NRDC has had a special interest in preventing\nharm to the international environment. It has established\nan International Project with two main objectives:\n(a) to monitor and influence decisions of United States\ngovernment agencies and international agencies which affect the\nquality of the international environment; and\n(b) to make NRDC's environmental expertise systematically\navailable to foréign environmental groups so as to enhance their\neffectiveness.\n6.\nIn pursuit of its objectives, NRDC has been involved\nin numerous proceedings involving the Nuclear Regulatory\nCommission (the \"Commission\") and its predecessor, the Atomic\nEnergy Commission, including domestic reactor licensing, rule-\nmaking, and administrative reviews of proposed nuclear\nwastFord BERALD LIBRARY\n-4-\nmanagement, liquid metal fast breeder reactor and plutonium\nrecycle programs. In particular, as regards the export of nuclear\nequipment, fuel and technology, NRDC was a plaintiff in the lawsuit\nagainst the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of State and\nthe Export-Import Bank of the United States seeking preparation\nof an environmental impact statement on U.S. nuclear power export\nactivities (Sierra Club, et al. V. Energy Research and Development\nAdministration, et al., D.D.C. Civil Action No. 1867-73), and it\nhas played an active and vigorous role in the administrative\nreview of the impact statement resulting from such suit, comment-\ning extensively at each opportunity for public input in the review\nprocess. NRDC has also commented on the international aspects of\ndomestic waste management and enrichment proposals in the context\nof NEPA reviews of such proposals, and it has testified before\nCongressional committees reviewing controls over nuclear exports.\n7. NRDC, in addition to its institutional interests, has\na further interest in this proceeding to protect the health and\nsafety of its members and others similarly situated from the\nrisks occasioned by the continued shipment of nuclear fuel to\nTarapur Atomic Power Station (\"Tarapur\"). As noted in paragraph\n3 above, members of NRDC are citizens of India and Pakistan and\nhave travelled and can be expected to travel to the Indian\nsubcontinent. Thus, they have been and may be exposed to the\nhazards associated with the operation of Tarapur. Additionally,\neach member and supporter of NRDC has a personal interest in\n=\nFORD\nmaintenance of a safe, healthful and productive environment.\nLISAARY\n-5-\nContinued shipments of nuclear fuel to Tarapur create\na risk of diversion or theft of special nuclear material\nand the use of such material for destructive purposes. Further,\nthe use of such fuel in Tarapur carries with it the threat of\nmajor radioactivity releases resulting from accident or sabotage.\nThe danger of hostilities with Pakistan, China or other nations,\nmoreover, creates that possibility that Tarapur may be the object\nof armed attack or that India will utilize nuclear weapons,\nemploying material derived from Tarapur, to wage such a conflict,\nwith widespread destructive consequences. The extent of damage\nwhich could occur, should these risks or threats be realized,\ncannot be bounded by national frontiers and may certainly not be\nlimited to the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, the use of nuclear\nweapons on the Indian subcontinent could have far reaching\nconsequences for international stability and world order as\nwell as the common defense and security of the United States,\nwhile terrorist action using stolen plutonium in explosive or\ndispersal devices could be directed against transportation and\nother public facilities virtually anywhere in the world, includ-\ning the United States. The interests of NRDC, and the interests\nof its members and supporters in the environment in which they\nlive and work, are thus directly threatened and would be\n=\nFORD\nGERALD\nadversely affected and injured by the granting of the pend-\ning application.\ng Ant\nJ. GUSTAVE SPETH\nSubscribed and sworn to before me\nthis lst day of March , 1976\nJeyoca Notary a Public Truge\nMy Commission Expires March 31 1980\nGERALD R FORD 1\nAppendix 2\nBefore the\nUNITED STATES\nNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20555\nIn the Matter of the Application\n)\nof Edlow International Company,\n)\nas Agent for the Government of\n)\nDocket No. XSNM-845\nIndia, to Export Special Nuclear\n)\nMaterial\n)\nAFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES CLUSEN\nIN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION\nOF THE SIERRA CLUB\nFOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE\nCITY OF WASHINGTON\n)\nDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\n)\nSS:\nCHARLES CLUSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:\n1. I am the Washington Representative of the Sierra\nClub, with offices at 324 C Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.\nAs such, I am fully familiar with the organization, membership,\npurposes and policies of the Sierra Club. I make this affidavit\nin support of the Sierra Club's petition for leave to intervene\nin the above-captioned proceeding.\n2. The Sierra Club is a non-profit organization, incorpor-\nated in 1890 under the laws of the State of California, with\nits headquarters and principal place of business at 530 Bush\nStreet, San Francisco, California 94104, an office in Washington,\nD.C. and an office of international environmental affairs in\nNew York, New York. The Sierra Club is a conservation organiza-\ntion which has sought to enlist public cooperation in the pro-\nFORD\nGERALD\ntection of the natural environment and its resources, to provide\nthe public with information relevant to environmental issues,\nand to stimulate informed public discussion with respect to\nsuch issues. The stated corporate purposes of the Sierra Club\nare:\n\"To protect and conserve the natural resources\nof the Sierra Nevada, the United States and\nthe World; to undertake and publish scientific\nand educational studies concerning all aspects\nof man's environment and the natural eco-systems\nof the World; and to educate the people of the\nUnited States and the World to the need to\npreserve and restore the quality of that environ-\nment and the integrity of those ecosystems.\"\n3. The Sierra Club has a membership of approximately 156,000\npersons throughout the world. Such membership comprises persons resid-\ning in the United States and 100 foreign countries, including India.\n4. The Sierra Club has organized and intends to continue\nto organize tours for its members to places of environmental,\nhistorical and cultural significance on the Indian subcontinent.\nSince 1970, the Sierra Club has organized approximately 20 such\ntrips and more than 250 persons have participated in them.\n5:\nAs an integral part of its effort to protect the\nnatural and human environment, the Sierra Club has devoted special\nattention to the consequences of producing electrical energy in\ngeneral and to the problems of nuclear power, in particular.\nThe Sierra Club has sponsored conferences and meetings for the\npurposes of discussing energy policy, and has published books,\npamphlets and articles thereon, including, e.g., the following.,FORD\nGERALD\nBooks\n\"Towards an Energy Policy\" ed., Keith Roberts (1973)\n\"Energy\", John Holdren and Philip Herrera (1971)\nPamphlets\n\"Energy and the Sierra Club\" (June 1975)\n\"The Sierra Club and Nuclear Power\" (July 1975)\nArticles\n\"Stop, Wait, Look and Listen,\" Roger Olmsted and\nSteve Whitney, Sierra Club Bulletin (April 1975)\n6. The Sierra Club has further manifested interest and\nconcern in international environmental problems. Its Office of\nInternational Affairs publishes an International Report which is\ndistributed to environmentalists around the world, and has parti-\ncipated in international conferences, and has joined in panels and\nseminars on matters of international concern. The Sierra Club has\ntwo Chapters outside the United States, and its International\nCommittee has appointed six country representatives outside the\nUnited States in order to \"provide as communications and represen-\ntation liaison for the Club in a given country.\"\n7. In the pursuit of its objectives, the Sierra Club has\nparticipated in various court and administrative proceedings\ninvolving the licensing and construction of nuclear power plants.\nIt was, for example, a party to the landmark decision of Calvert\nCliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. V. Atomic Energy Commission,\n=\nFORD\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and most recently has actively\nparticipated as an intervenor in licensing proceedings before\nthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission involving the Clinch River\nBreeder Reactor (Docket No. 50-537).\n8. In particular, as regards the export of nuclear\nequipments, fuel and technology, the Sierra Club was a plaintiff\nin the lawsuit against the Atomic Energy Commission, the Depart-\nment of State and the Export-Import Bank of the United States\nseeking preparation of an environmental impact statement on U.S.\nnuclear power export activities (Sierra Club, et al. V. Energy\nResearch and Development Administration, et al., D.D.C. Civil\nAction No. 1867-73), and it has played an active and vigorous\nrole in the administrative review of the impact statement result-\ning from such suit, commenting extensively at each opportunity\nfor public input in the review process. The Sierra Club has\nalso commented on the international aspects of domestic waste\nmanagement and enrichment proposals in the context of NEPA\nreviews of such proposals, and it has testified before Congres-\nsional committees reviewing controls over nuclear exports\n9. The Sierra Club believes that nuclear exports should\noccur only under such conditions as are sufficient to protect the\nenvironment and the health and safety of the public, and eliminate\nor meaningfully reduce potential risks of diversion, theft and\nsabotage. Insofar as the pending nuclear fuel shipment to\nR.\nFORD\nGERALD\nTarapur is concerned, such conditions do not now exist. Thus,\na decision at this time to grant the pending application will\nadversely affect its interests, and the interests of its members,\nin the adoption of sound nuclear power export policy.\n10. The Sierra Club, in addition to its institutional\ninterests, has a further interest in this proceeding to protect\nthe health and safety of its members and other similarly situated\nfrom the risks occasioned by the continued shipment of nuclear\nfuel to Tarapur Atomic Power Station (\"Tarapur\"). As noted in\nparagraph 4 above, members of the Sierra Club reside in and may\ntravel to India on Club-organized tours. Thus, they may be exposed\nto hazards associated with the operation of Tarapur. Additionally,\neach member of the Sierra Club has a personal interest in maintenance\nof a safe, healthful and productive environment. Continued\nshipments of nuclear fuel to Tarapur create a risk of diversion\nor theft of special nuclear material and the use of such material\nfor destructive purposes. Further, the use of such fuel in\nTarapur carries with it the threat of major radioactivity\nreleases resulting from accident or sabotage. The danger of\nhostilities with Pakistan, China or other nations, moreover,\ncreates that possibility that Tarapur may be the object of\narmed attack or that India will utilize nuclear weapons employ\ning material derived from Tarapur, to wage such a conflict, wit-\nwidespread destructive consequences. The extent of damage which\nis\nFORD\nGERALD\n-6-\ncould occur, should these risks or threats be realized, cannot\nbe bounded by national frontiers and may certainly not be\nlimited to the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, the use of nuclear\nweapons on the Indian subcontinent could have far reaching\nconsequences for international stability and world order, as\nwell as for the common defense and security of the United States,\nwhile terrorist action using stolen plutonium in explosive or\ndispersal devices could be directed against transportation and\nother public facilities virtually anywhere in the world, including\nthe United States. The interests of the Sierra Club's members\nin the environment in which they live and work are thus directly\nthreatened and would be adversely affected and injured by the\ngranting of the pending application.\nCHARLES CLUSEN\nSubscribed and sworn to before me\nthis 15 day of 1976\nJay Notary a Public Truky march,\nmy Commission expires 2/31/80\ni\nFORD\nGERALD\nAppendix J\nBefore the\nUNITED STATES\nNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20555\nIn the Matter of the Application\n)\nof Edlow International Company,\n)\nDocket No. XSNM-845\nas Agent for the Government of\n)\nIndia, to Export Special Nuclear\n)\nMaterial\n)\nAFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL F. FORD\nIN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION\nOF THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS\nFOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE\nCITY OF WASHINGTON\n)\nDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\n)\nSS:\nDANIEL F. FORD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:\n1. I am Executive Director of the Union of Concerned\nScientists (\"UCS\"), with offices at 1208 Massachusetts Avenue,\nCambridge, Massachusetts 02138. As such, I am fully familiar\nwith the organization, purposes and policies of UCS. I make\nthis affidavit in support of USC's petition for leave to inter-\nvene in the above-captioned proceeding.\n2. UCS is a non-profit corporation, organized and exist-\ning under the laws of the District of Columbia, with its head-\nquarters and principal place of business at 1208 Massachusetts\nAvenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 and an office in\nWashington, D.C. It is a charitable organization exempt from\ntaxation under Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code.\n3. UCS was formed as an informal faculty group at the\nMassachusetts Institute of Technology in 1969. It is a coalition\ni\nFORD,\nof scientists, engineers and other professionals concerned\nabout the impact of advanced technology on society. Based upon\ntechnical research performed by faculty members for a number of\ncolleges and universities who devote their time in the public\ninterest, it seeks to disseminate its independent studies to\ndecisionmakers, the national and local media, other scientists\nand the general public. Its research has been conducted on a\nwide range of questions relating to the strategic arms race, air\nand water pollution, pesticide use, liquified natural gas storage\nand transport, nuclear power plant safety, radioactive waste\ndisposal options, and energy policy alternatives.\n4. UCS maintains a Technical Advisory Committee, consist-\ning of a number of distinguished academicians, to advise it on\ntechnical and public policy questions. Current members of the\nTechnical Advisory Committee are:\nAnn P. Carter,\nProfessor of Economics, Brandeis University\nOliver Cope,\nProfessor of Surgery Emeritus,\nHarvard Medical School\nSenior Consultant\nMassachusetts General Hospital\nStanley Dawson,\nAssistant Professor of Environmental Health\nEngineering, Graduate School of Public Health\nHarvard University\nJohn D. Edsall,\nProfessor of Biology, Harvard University\nR\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n-3-\nJames A. Fay,\nProfessor of Mechanical Engineering, M.I.T.,\nChairman, Massachusetts Port Authority\nBernard T. Feld,\nProfessor of Physics, M.I.T.\nLee Grodzins,\nProfessor of Physics, M.I.T.\nMaurice S. Fox,\nProfessor of Biology, M.I.T.\nThomas C. Hollocher,\nAssociate Professor of Biochemistry\nBrandeis Uriversity\nJerome Y. Lettvin,\nProfessor of Biology and Electrical\nEngineering, M.I.T.\nPhilip Morrison,\nInstitute Professor, M.I.T.\n5. UCS has taken a major interest in the U.S. nuclear\npower program. It has published technical studies on nuclear\npower and has participated on its own behalf and on behalf of\ncitizens' groups in a number of administrative proceedings before\nthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its predecessor, the Atomic\nEnergy Commission. In particular, UCS has been a party to the\nfollowing Atomic Energy Commission proceedings:\n(a) In the matter of Boston Edison Company, Pilgrim\nNuclear Power Station Unit; and\n(b) In the matter of Interim Acceptance Criteria for\nEmergency Core-Cooling Systems for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear\nPower Reactors, Docket RM50-1.\n&\nFORD\nGERALD\nLISSABA\n6. As regards the export of nuclear equipment, technology\nand fuels, UCS has undertaken independent technical studies of\nthe problems associated with such exports, and it has recently\npublished analyses of related issues in its book, The Nuclear\nFuel Cycle (MIT Press 1975). UCS further sponsored the\nDeclaration by Members of the American Technical Community,\nsigned as of August 6, 1975, by 2,500 scientists and engineers,\nwhich urges \"the nation to suspend its program of exporting\nnuclear plants to other countries pending resolution of the\nnational security questions associated with the use by these\ncountries of the by-product plutonium from United States nuclear\nreactors.\" Given, in addition, current uncertainties with regard\nto reactor safety and radioactive waste management, UCS believes\nthat a decision at this time to grant the pending application\nwould be unwise. Such a decision would adversely affect its\ninterests in promoting and ensuring the rational and safe use\nof modern technology and the development of sound energy policies.\nDANIEL F. FORD\nSubscribed and sworn to before\nme this 27 day of February, 1976\nPhylli Notary L Lander Public\nFORD\nMy commission expires January 31, 1978.\nLIBRARY\nAppendix 4\nBefore the\nUNITED STATES\nNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20555\nIn the Matter of the Application\n)\nof Edlow International Company,\n)\nDocket No. XSNM-845\nas Agent for the Government of\n)\nIndia, to Export Special Nuclear\n)\nMaterial\n)\n)\nAFFIDAVIT OF J. GUSTAVE SPETH\nIDENTIFYING SPECIFIC CONTENTIONS AND BASES\nCITY OF WASHINGTON\n)\nDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\n)\nSS:\nJ. GUSTAVE SPETH, being first duly sworn, deposes and\nsays:\n1. I am an attorney on the staff of Petitioner, Natural\nResources Defense Council, Inc. (\"NRDC\"), with an office at\n917 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. I am a member\nof the Bar of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.\nI have consulted with members of NRDC's staff and knowledgeable\nexperts concerning the matters contained in this affidavit,\nwhich I make in accordance with 10 C.F.R. $2.714 (a), to set\nR.FORD\nforth the specific contentions, and the bases therefor, which\nGERALD\nthe Petitioners for intervention seek to raise herein.\n-2-\nProcedural Objections of the Granting\nof the Pending Application\n2. Petitioners submit that the Nuclear Regulatory Com-\nmission (the \"Commission\") cannot make the determination required\nby law for the issuance of a license for the export of special\nnuclear material for use in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station\n(\"Tarapur\"), India, and that the granting of the pending ap-\nplication for such export would therefore be unlawful under\nthe Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§2011 et seq. (the\n\"Atomic Energy Act\") for the following procedural reasons:\n(a) There has been no public notice, by publication\nin the Federal Register or otherwise, of the receipt and consid-\neration of the pending application. Interested members of the\npublic have thus been deprived of information necessary for a\ntimely evaluation of such application, and the opportunity for\nintervention and the presentation of opposing views has been\nseverely and unwarrantedly abridged. The absence of public\nnotice, moreover, has necessarily limited the Commission's\nopportunity to receive and hear potentially significant, adverse\ninformation being on the decision to grant or deny the pending\napplication.\n(b) The Commission is not applying criteria in its evaluation\nof the pending application which define more precisely the general,\nstatutory standards which must be met if such application is to be\nLIBRARY\n-3-\ngranted. The absence of further definition of the standards \"not\ninimical to the common defense and security\" and \"consistent with\nthe health and safety of the public\" leave the Commission with no\nmeaningful guidelines to follow in its consideration of the pend-\ning application and disables the Commission from making detailed\nand informed judgments consistent with the purpose and require-\nments of the Atomic Energy Act.\n(c) The Commission has not consulted individually with\nExecutive Branch agencies having relevant expertise as to whether\nthe granting of the pending application would be \"inimical to\nor constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and\nsecurity,\" nor has it consulted with Executive Branch agencies\nhaving relevant expertise as to the health and safety risks posed\nby such application. The Commission, therefore, is not in a\nposition independently to exercise its licensing judgment, under\nthe Atomic Energy Act, with all relevant facts and information in\nits possession.\n(d) Even though the Agreement for Cooperation Between the\nGovernment of the United States and the Government of India Con-\ncerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy (the \"Agreement for\nCooperation\") 1% provides in Article I. for exchange of unclassified\n1/ Done at Washington, August 8, 1963; entered into force\nOctober 25, 1963, T.I.A.S. No: 5446.\n/\nGERALD\nE\nAUGRARY\ninformation with respect to problems of health and safety at\nTarapur, the Commission has made no independent analysis of and\nno findings regarding health and safety risks in connection with\nthe pending application. Significant health and safety risks\nmay attend the shipment of special nuclear material to Tarapur.\nThese result from leakage of radioactivity during normal operations,\ncontamination of the surrounding environment and population, in-\nadequate personnel training, and difficulties in maintenance and\nrepair. Further, serious health and safety consequences may fol-\nlow from acts of sabotage, terrorism or theft directed against\nTarapur and related facilities. Continued shipments of nuclear\nfuel to Tarapur also increase the threat of a major nuclear ac-\ncident, which would have serious repercussions not just for the\nhealth and safety of affected populations, but for United States'\nrelations with India and its other trading partners.\n(e) The Commission has made no independent analysis of and\nno findings regarding the risks associated with Article VI (c)\nof the Agreement for Cooperation which permits the Government of\nIndia to remoye from the scope of such Agreement quantities of\nspecial nuclear material provided that it places agreed equivalent\nquantities of the same type of special nuclear material under the\nscope of such Agreement. Assurances by the Government of India\nthat \"special nuclear material that has been or is hereafter made\navailable for, or used, or produced at the Tarapur Atomic\nLIBRARY GERALD\n-5-\nStation located at Tarapur will be devoted exclusively to the\nneeds of that Station.\nIf\nmay not override such provision.\nFurther, restrictions on transfer of special nuclear material\ncontained in Articles II (f) and VII (A) (2) of the Agreement for\nCooperation may not apply to exchanged special nuclear material.\nArticle VI (C) may thus permit India to substitute fuel from another\nsource for an identical amount of U.S.-supplied fuel, and then\neither transfer such material to a third country outside of any\nsafeguards or utilize plutonium separated from the U.S.-supplied\nfuel for an explosive device, thus circumventing restrictions\nunder the Agreement on such actions.\n(f) The Commission has made no independent analysis of and\nno findings regarding the risks associated with the various pro-\nvisions of the Agreement for Cooperation which provide for sub-\nsequent United States approval of certain actions by the Indian\ngovernment, e.g., fuel reprocessing (Article II (E) ) transfer to\nthird parties (Article II(F)). To the extent that such approvals\nare solely within the discretion of Executive Branch agencies\nand there is no Commission review thereof, it may not be able to\nbe determined that safeguards conditions will be adequately main-\ntained.\n(g) The Commission has made no independent analysis of and\nno findings regarding the adequacy and effectiveness of existing\nsafeguards applicable to special nuclear materials shipped. too\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\n-6-\nTarapur. In accordance with the terms of Article VIII of the\nAgreement for Cooperation, and the terms of the Agreement Between\nthe International Atomic Energy Agency (the \"IAEA\"), the Govern-\nment of India and the Government of the United States of America\nRelating to Safeguards Provisions. 2% implementation of safe-\nguards over Tarapur is the responsibility of the IAEA, and United\nStates bilateral rights have been suspended. Approximately 1,000\npounds of plutonium, enough fissionable material to fabricate 100\natomic bombs, have accumulated to date at Tarapur and are under\nIndian guard and control, subject to inspections and measurements\nby the IAEA. In such circumstances, before yet further special\nnuclear material is committed to Tarapur, the Commission must assess\nsuch issues as limitations (in both time and space) on the access\nof inspections to facilities, deficiencies in the technology of\ncontainment and surveillance measures (locks, seals, guards, in-\ntrusion detectors, etc.), potential inaccuracies in measurement\ndevices, lack of IAEA authority over physical security, and ab-\nsence of IAEA or other international sanctions in cases of proven\ndiversion or supply of fissionable materials to another country\nfor developing nuclear explosive devices. However, while the\nIAEA has entered into \"Subsidiary Arrangements\" with India which\ndetail the specific safeguards applicable to Tarapur, the particu-\nlars of the Subsidiary Arrangements have not been made available\nto the Commission in the licensing process. Further, the Commission\ndoes not have access to \"Safeguards Confidential Information\"\nFORD\nGERALD\nLIDNARY\n2/ Signed at Vienna January 27, 1971; entered into force January 27,\n1971, T.I.A.S. No. 7049,\ncerning the experience of the IAEA in applying safeguards to\nTarapur. The Commission thus has not only not carried out the\nnecessary review but does not even have the necessary information\nto properly evaluate the risks associated with further nuclear\nfuel shipments to Tarapur.\n(h) The Commission has made no independent analysis of and\nno findings as to whether and under which circumstances, if any,\nthe United States could retrieve special nuclear material from\nTarapur in the event that India took actions inconsistent with\nits Agreement for Cooperation, license conditions, or other as-\nsurances to the United States. As noted in paragraph 2(g), supra,\nmore than 1,000 pounds of plutonium have accumulated at Tarapur.\nIf retrieval of such material were not possible should India deter-\nmine to repudiate its agreements and assurances and/or to utilize\nsome part of it to fabricate an explosive device, then yet further\nshipments of special nuclear material to Tarapur may exacerbate\nthe risks associated with its operation.\n(i) The Commission has either obtained back-up material and\nother data supporting the general expression of the Executive\nBranch position, prepared in accordance with Executive Order 11902,\n41 Fed. Reg. 4877 (February 3, 1976), concerning the pending ap-\nplication, nor made an independent analysis of and findings with\nregard thereto. The Commission thus is making its licensing de-\ncision with regard to the pending application on the basis of the\nopinions of other agencies, not the facts supporting such opinions.\n(j) The Commission has neither obtained safeguards information\nnor made an analysis of and findings with regard to facilit\nthereto FORD LIBRASE\nother than Tarapur within India, the safeguards applicable\n-8-\nor the relationship of those facilities to Tarapur. India, for\nexample, has an unsafeguarded reprocessing facility at Trombay,\nwith a capacity of 350 kilograms per day, as well as a planned\nreprocessing facility at Tarapur itself, with a capacity of 100\nmetric tons per year. Information concerning such facilities\nis relevant to the issue of whether, under what circumstances,\nand in what amounts India could separate plutonium from spent\nfuel should special nuclear material be diverted from Tarapur.\nEssential information, in other words, pertaining to the\nability of India to circumvent safeguards and develop nuclear\nweapons is not before the Commission.\n(k) The Commission has neither obtained physical security\ninformation nor made an analysis of and findings with regard to physica\nsecurity for the handling of special nuclear material intended for\nTarapur. In particular, raw files of physical security inspections\ncarried out by the Energy Research and Development Administration\nhave not been made available to the Commission. The Commission con-\nsequently cannot assess what protection Tarapur may have against\nacts of sabotage; terrorism theft directed against such facility\nnor can it assess the possibility of acts of sabotage or terrorism\ncausing core disruptive accidents or severe reactor accidents and\nthe probability of such acts occurring Further, the Commission\nhas no information concerning physical security requirements ap-\nplicable to the special nuclear material if and when it is removed\nFORD\nGERALD\nLIBRAR\n-9-\nfrom Tarapur, reprocessed, and recycled. The Commission thus is\nin the position of authorizing the supply of fuel in the absence\nof any assurance that the United States will be able to reach a\nfuture agreement with India establishing physical security standards\nfor the handling of spent fuel.\n(1) The Commission has neither obtained information nor made\nan analysis of and findings with regard to India's plans for re-\nprocessing and waste management of special nuclear material shipped\nto Tarapur, and the materials accounting safeguards and physical\nsecurity standards applicable thereto. Because the Agreement for\nCooperation would permit India to reprocess its own materials, which\nare not safeguarded under such Agreement, in the same facility in\nwhich U.S. -supplied special nuclear material might also be reproces-\nsed, the workings of any materials accountability and safeguards\nsystem may be appreciably complicated. In the absence of detailed\ninformation and analysis, the Commission cannot assess the safeguards\nrisks at the \"back end\" of the fuel cycle associated with the ship-\nment of nuclear fuel to Tarapur.\n(m) The Commission has neither obtained detailed information\nnor made an analysis of and findings with regard to such factors as\nIndia weapons development capability and plans and its external\nand internal political situation as they relate to the risks that\nspecial nuclear material supplied to Tarapur may be diverted and\nused for unlawful purposes, e.g., fabrication of nuclear weapons.\nFORD is 076330 LIBRARY\nThe Commission thus cannot adequately assess safeguards risks\nassociated with the shipment of nuclear fuel to Tarapur.\nNEPA Objections to the Granting of\nthe Pending Application\n3. Petitioners submit that the granting of the pending ap-\nplication for export of special nuclear material to Tarapur would\nbe unlawful under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,\n42 U.S.C. SS4321 et seq. (\"NEPA\"). No environmental impact state-\nment has been prepared, pursuant to Section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA,\n42 U.S.C. SS4332 (2) (C) and the Commission's implementing regulations.\nNonetheless, the issuance of a license for the export of significant\nquantities of nuclear fuel to Tarapur is a \"major federal action\nsignificantly affecting the quality of the human environment\"\nwithin the meaning of NEPA, and no license can be issued until\nit has been established, after preparation, circulation for comment\nand consideration of a detailed environmental impact statement,\nthat such action is appropriate thereunder.\nSubstantive Objections to the Granting\nof the Pending Application\n4. Petitioners submit that the Commission cannot lawfully\ndetermine that granting of the pending application would not be\ninimical or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense\nFORD\n-11-\nand security and the interests of the United States within the\nmeaning of the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's imple-\nmenting regulations, given the risks associated with India's\nposition on non-proliferation and its current international re-\nlations:\n(a) India is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Pro-\nliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the \"NPT\"). 3/ Thus, it has not\ncommitted itself internationally to forswear the development of\nnuclear weapons, and it has proceeded to develop and detonate a\nnuclear explosive device fabricated from unsafeguarded nuclear\nfuel irradiated in a reactor supplied for peaceful purposes only.\nThe continued shipment of special nuclear materials to Tarapur\nfrustrates and impairs the non-proliferation policy of the United\nStates as embodied in the NPT and discriminates against those\ncountries which have undertaken NPT obligations. Further, it\neffectively sanctions India's refusal to accept those obligations,\nand can only have the effect of encouraging other countries to\nignore prohibitions against nuclear weapons development. Such\nproliferation is plainly inconsistent with the purposes and\nrequirements of the Atomic Energy Act.\n3/ Done at Washington, London and Moscow, July 1, 1968; entered\ninto force for the United States, March 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 483,\nT.I.A.S. No. 6839.\nGERALD R: FORD LIBRARY\n(b) India has, within the past five years, engaged in armed\nhostilities against Pakistan, and its relations with Pakistan,\nChina, and other neighbors are a subject of continuing friction\nand rivalry. Given the current political situation, and, in\nparticular, the potential instability of the area, there is a\nsignificant possibility of international conflict which would dis-\nrupt safeguards agreements and threaten the security of nuclear\nmaterials and facilities. There is thus inadequate assurance\nthat safeguards over special nuclear material at Tarapur can or\nwill be maintained, and accordingly, further transfer of fuel can-\nnot be deemed consistent with the common defense and security and\ninterests of the United States.\n5. Petitioners submit that the Commission cannot lawfully\ndetermine that granting the pending application would not be\ninimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common de-\nfense and security and the interests of the United States within\nthe meaning of the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's imple-\nmenting regulations, because of the failure of the United States\nto impose the following conditions, singly and in combination\non further transfers of special nuclear material to Tarapur:\n(a) The United States has not required India absolutely\nto refrain from the development of further nuclear explosive de-\nvices. Such failure, whatever the safeguards applicable to U.S.-\nsupplied special nuclear material and whatever conditions of export\nFORD\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n-13-\nsuppliers may agree upon, permits India to continue on its program\nof developing nuclear explosives, to the detriment of the non-prolifer-\nation policy of the U.S. as embodied in the NPT. Peaceful nuclear\nexplosives and nuclear weapons cannot be differentiated; to allow\nIndia to continue to develop and test \"peaceful nuclear explosives\"\nis thus incompatible with effective, international nuclear arms\ncontrol.\n(b) The United States has not required India to permit safe-\nguards on all its nuclear facilities. Because India has not ad-\nhered to the NPT and because the Agreement for Cooperation contains\nno provision to the contrary, such failure allows India to maintain\nnuclear facilities which are either only partially safeguarded\nor which are totally free from international and United States safe-\nguards against their use for the production of nuclear weaponry.\nIt thus permits India to obtain the benefits of U.S. -supplied special\nnuclear material, without assuming the obligations of those countries\nwhich have adhered to the NPT. The effect of the failure to impose\nsuch a requirement is that India is free to use unsafeguarded\nfacilities to develop nuclear weapons. Safeguards, even when\napplied to all the special nuclear material utilized at Tarapur,\nare not enough to ensure that non-peacéful nuclear activities\nare not carried on in India so long as fissionable material from\nunsafeguarded sources remains free of control and so long as un-\nsafeguarded facilities are available to process special nuclear\nmaterial diverted from Tarapur.\nLIBRARY GERALD ? FORD\n(c) The United States has not required India to refrain\nfrom developing national enrichment and reprocessing facilities.\nIndia, as noted in paragraph 2(j), supra, already has one oper-\national reprocessing facility and one under construction. There\nare, moreover, no restrictions on development of national enrich-\nment capability. The current absence of restrictions has\nalready contributed to the purchase by Pakistan of a reprocessing\nfacility, thus increasing the risk of a nuclear arms race on the\nIndian subcontinent. Enrichment and reprocessing are from the\nstandpoint of safeguards the most critical elements of the nuclear\nfuel cycle. In order to reduce or eliminate the risks associated\nwith national fuel centers, the NPT Review Conference, in its\nFinal Declaration of May 30, 1975, promoted the study and encourage-\nment of regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centers. 4 /\nSecretary of State Kissinger, at the opening of the 30th Session\nof the United Nations General Assembly, stressing the proliferation\ndangers of national reprocessing centers, proposed \"the estab-\nlishment of multinational regional nuclear fuel cycle centers\"\nas an alternative to national facilities. 5 / To continue to\ntransfer special nuclear material to Tarapur while permitting\n4 / \"NPT Review Conference Report, \" IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 17,\nNo 4 (August 1975) at 21-26\n5 / United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release\nU.S.U.N. - 99 (75) (September 22, 1975).\nis\nFORD\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n-15--\nIndia to maintain and develop its own fuel facilities is incon-\nsistent with the U.S. initiatives and creates unwarranted risks\nto the common defense and security.\n(d) The United States has not required India to agree, prior\nto the shipment of nuclear fuel to Tarapur, to safeguards and\nphysical security requirements for any future reprocessing of\nsuch fuel, should reprocessing be permitted. Thus, there is in-\nadequate assurance that the special nuclear material shipped to\nTarapur will not be used for non-peaceful purposes. Should an\nagreement as to appropriate safeguards and physical security re-\nquirements not be reached in the future, the fuel would still be\nin India and subject to diversion or theft under inadequate safe-\nguards and physical security requirements.\n(e) The United States has not required India to establish any\nphysical security requirements applicable to the operation of\nTarapur and the protection of special nuclear material utilized at\nsuch facility. There are thus insufficient guarantees against\nacts of sabotage, terrorism or theft. Should such acts occur,\neven though nominally directed only against the Indian Government,\nthey may directly affect the defense and security interests of\nthe United States.\n(f) The United States has not required India to accept\nbilateral safeguards at Tarapur, additional to those implemented\nby the IAEA, at least as effective as domestic U.S. safeguards.\nSuch failure creates an unwarranted risk of diversion. The United\nFORD\nGERALD\nStates has developed domestic safeguards systems which may be more\neffective in terms of detection, containment and surveillance than\nthose currently employed by the IAEA. Further, access at all times\nand in all places for physical inspections would provide greater\nassurance of protection than current, limited IAEA inspection\nrights. The absence of such additional safeguards increases the\npossibility of a successful diversion and the ultimate use of\nspecial nuclear material shipped to Tarapur for non-peaceful purposes.\n(g) The United States has not required India to agree to\nU.S. control over the disposition of plutonium produced at Tarapur.\nThe proposed transfer under the pending application is pursuant to\na contract of sale, and India, not the United States, has title\nto the special nuclear material. There are no conditions in the\nAgreement for Cooperation or other instruments which call for the\nreturn of reactor-produced plutonium to the United States, or which\nrequire specific disposition abroad (outside of India) or which\notherwise give the United States authority to obtain access to\nand control over such material, e.g., as in a lease rather than\nsale transaction. Thus, spent fuel containing plutonium has been\nand will continue to be stockpiled in India, creating the risk of\nand opportunity for diversion. Should India repudiate its Agree-\nment for Cooperation or other assurances with regard to peaceful\nuses, the absence of such a requirement would leave India with the\nwherewithal to fabricate dozens of nuclear devices and thus is\nplainly inconsistent with the defense and security interests of\nthe United States.\n8817 GERALD ? FORD\n-17-\n6. Petitioners submit that the Commission cannot lawfully de-\ntermine that granting the pending application would not be inimical\nor constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the\npublic and the interests of the United States within the meaning\nof the Atomic Energy Act and the Commisions's implementing regu-\nlations, because of the failure of the United States to impose\nthe following conditions, singly and in combination, on further\ntransfers of special nuclear material to Tarapur:\n(a) The United States has not required India to meet the\nconditions specified in paragraph 5 above. Such failure poses risks\nnot only to the common defense and security, but, should nuclear\ndevices be used for destructive purposes, to the health and safety\nof the public.\n(b) The United States has not required India to establish,\nmaintain, and enforce an effective program for the application of\nadequate health and safety standards to the operation of Tarapur,\nnor has it determined that such health and safety standards as\nthe Indian Government may apply to Tarapur are adequate to protect\npotentially affected persons. Such failure unjustifiably creates\nhealth and safety risks, inconsistent with the purposes of. the\nAtomic Energy Act, which may extend beyond the Indian supcontinent\n(c) The United States has not required India to establish\nand maintain adequate repair and maintenance capability, utilizing\nqualified personnel, at Tarapur, nor has it determined that such\nrepair and maintenance capability as now exists is adequate to en-\nsure safe operation and maintenance of nuclear activities.\nGEBALO OR.FORD\nin maintenance and repair, as well as staffing, may substantially\naggravate the risks of both operational releases and major accidents.\nIn the absence of requirements in this regard, there is insufficient\nassurance that the health and safety of the public will be properly\nprotected.\n7. Petitioners submit that granting the pending application\nwould be inconsistent with and in violation of the United States'\nobligations under the NPT:\n(a) In light of severe proliferation risks posed by the pro-\nposed transfer of special nuclear material to Tarapur, as set forth\nin paragraph 4 above, and in light of the failure of the United\nStates to impose conditions sufficient to protect against risks\nof diversion, theft and sabotage, as set forth in paragraph 5\nabove, granting the pending application would violate Article I\nof the NPT which prohibits the United States from transferring\n\"nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over\nsuch weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly\" to any\nnation and from \"assist[ing]\nany non-nuclear weapon State\nto manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear\nexplosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive de\nvices.\nи\n(b) light of the lure of the United States to require\nIndia to permit safeguards on all its nuclear facilities, as set\nforth in paragraph 5 (b) above, granting the pending application\n:\nFORD\nwould violate Articles III (1) and III (2) of the NPT which require\nthat transfer of special nuclear material to a non-weapons State\nbe subject to a condition that safeguards required thereunder \"be\napplied on all sources or special fissionable material in all peace-\nful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under\nits jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere\"\n(emphasis added).\nI Guiten Spith\nJ. Gustave Speth\nSubscribed and sworn to before me\nthis 1st day of March, 1976\nNotary\nJun Public\nCommission Expires Merch 31, 1980\nSEARLE FORD LIBRARY\nBefore the\nUNITED STATES\nNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION\nWashington, D.C. 20555\nIn the Matter of the Application\n)\nof Edlow International Company,\n)\nDocket No. XSNM-845\nas Agent for the Government of\n)\nIndia, to Export Special Nuclear\n)\nMaterial\n)\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing \"Petition of\nthe Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Sierra Club and\nthe Union of Concerned Scientists for Leave to Intervene,\" together\nwith the two affidavits of J. Gustave Speth and the affidavits of\nCharles Clusen and Daniel F. Ford, annexed thereto as Appendices\n1 through 4, was delivered by hand this 2nd day of March, 1976,\nto the following:\nHoward Shapar, Esquire\nPeter Strauss, Esquire\nOffice of the Executive\nOffice of the General\nLegal Director\nCounsel\nU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission\nU.S. Nuclear Regulatory\nWashington, D. C. 20555\nCommission\nWashington, D.C. 20555\nChase Stephens, Chief\nDiane Wright\nDocketing and Service Section\nAssistant to the Vice\nOffice of the Secretary of the\nPresident\nCommission\nEdlow International Company\nU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission\n1100 17th Strect, N.W.\nWashington, D.C. 20555\nWashington, D.C 20036\nELDON V.C. GREENBERG\nGERABOR\nFORD\nABRAR\nSteachled\nTo Archive: 0/2/76\nEXECUTIVE ORDER\n- 11902\n-\nPROCEDURES FOR AN EXPORT LICENSING POLICY\nAS TO NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT\nThe Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 transferred\nto the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission the\nlicensing and related regulatory functions previously\nexercised by the Atomic Energy Commission under the Atomic\nEnergy Act of 1954, as amended.\nThe exercise of discretion and control over nuclear\nexports within the limits of law concerns the authority and\nresponsibility of the President with respect to the conduct\nof foreign policy and the ensuring of the common defense\nand security.\nIt is essential that the Executive branch inform\nthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission of its views before the\nCommission issues or denies a license, or grants an\nexemption.\nNOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested\nin me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States\nof America, including the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as\namended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), and as President of the\nUnited States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:\nSection 1. (a) The Secretary of State is designated\nto receive from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a copy of\neach export license application, each proposal by the Nuclear\nRegulatory Commission to issue a general license for export,\nand each proposal by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for\nexemption from the requirement for a license, which may\ninvolve a determination, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act\nof 1954, as amended, that the issuance of the license or\nGERALD ? FORD\n2\nexemption from the requirement for a license will, or will\nnot, be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to\nthe common defense and security.\n(b) The Secretary of State shall ensure that a copy\nof each such application, proposed general license, or\nproposed exemption is received by the Secretary of\nDefense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of\nthe United States Energy Research and Development Adminis-\ntration, hereinafter referred to as the Administrator, the\nDirector of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,\nhereinafter referred to as the Director, and the head\nof any other department or agency which may have an\ninterest therein, in order to afford them the opportunity\nto express their views, if any, on whether the license\nshould be issued or the exemption granted.\nSec. 2. Within thirty days of receipt of a copy\nof a license application, proposed general license, or\nproposed exemption, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary\nof Commerce, the Administrator, the Director, and the head\nof any other agency or department to which such copy has\nbeen transmitted, shall each transmit to the Secretary of\nState his views, if any, on whether and under what conditions\nthe license should be issued or the exemption granted.\nSec. 3. The Secretary of State shall, after the\nprovisions of section 2 of this order have been complied\nwith, transmit to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary\nof Commerce, the Administrator, the Director, and the head\nof any other department or agency who has expressed his\nviews thereon, a proposed position of the Executive branch\nas to whether the license should be issued or the exemption\ngranted, including a proposed judgment as to whether issuance\nof the license or granting of the exemption will, or will\nnot, be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk\nto the common defense and security.\n=\nFORD\nLIBRA.\n3\nSec. 4. If the heads of departments and agencies\nspecified in section 2 of this order are unable to agree\nupon a position for the Executive branch, the Secretary of\nState shall refer the matter to the Chairman of the Under\nSecretaries Committee of the National Security Council in\norder to obtain a decision. In the event the Under\nSecretaries Committee is unable to reach a decision, the\nChairman of that Committee shall refer the matter to the\nPresident for his decision.\nSec. 5. The Secretary of State, after taking\nthe actions required by this order, shall notify the Nuclear\nRegulatory Commission of the position of the Executive branch\nas to whether the license should be issued or the exemption\ngranted, including the judgment of the Executive branch as\nto whether issuance of the license or granting of the exemp-\ntion will, or will not, be inimical to or constitute an\nunreasonable risk to the common defense and security.\nThe Executive branch position shall be supported by\nrelevant information and documentation as appropriate to\nthe proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.\nHerald R. Int\nTHE WHITE HOUSE,\nFebruary 2, 1976.\nBERALD R. SHOP"
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