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This file contains concerns especially the possible discontinuance of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.
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4520917
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Terrorism
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document
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id
4520917
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document
title
Terrorism
description
This file contains concerns especially the possible discontinuance of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.
citationUrl
collections
Philip W. Buchen Files
Philip Buchen's General Subject Files
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Terrorism
Cabinet
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1976-05-01
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5
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1976
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1974-11-01
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1974
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The original documents are located in Box 62, folder "Terrorism" of the Philip Buchen
Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 62 of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
See
material
filed in
Protection -
Secret Service
for I oraigno
officials and
ignitaries
R. FORD TIBRARY
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
SEPTEMBER 25, 1972
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
The President today has directed the establishment of a Cabinet Committee
to Combat Terrorism to develop and coordinate the various activities
throughout the Government to deal quickly and effectively with the worldwide
problem of terrorism. The President attaches the utmost importance to an
immediate vigorous attack on this problem and its earliest resolution.
The Committee, to be chaired by Secretary Rogers, will comprise:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Transportation
The United States Ambassador to
the United Nations
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The Assistant to the President
for Domestic Affairs
The Acting Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation
Others may also be included as Secretary Rogers may require. The
Committee will not only consider the most effective means by which to
prevent terrorism here and abroad but it will also implement procedures
so our government can take appropriate action quickly and effectively
should acts of terrorism occur. In this regard, Secretary Rogers will
be in touch with other governments and international organizations.
#
#
#
BERALD LIVERTY F. FORD
Saturday 11/2/74
2:15 Skip Williams called to say General Scowcroft had
931-4527
talked with Mr. Scali, who advises that Monday is a
very crucial day -- they're expecting demonstrations
against most of the Arab missions and he hoped that we
could get the EPS there by Monday. (Apparently in
the meeting yesterday morning it was anticipated that
it wouldn't be possible to arrange it by Monday.)
I told Skip that we had sent the letter to Secretary Simon,
and that you had talked with Dave McDonald.
I called Mr. McDonald, and he advised that the EPS
would be there by the opening of business on Monday --
and that he had advised you of this.
I called Skip back to let him know, and he will call
Gen. Scowcroft to advise the EPS will be there -- who will
get word to Mr. Scali.
<60
TORD LIBRARY .
Terrorism
November 5, 1974
Dear Mr. Hoffacker:
Thank you very much for your kind letter of
October thirtieth, welcoming me aboard.
It will be my pleasure to work with the
Cabinet Committee/Working Group in the
months ahead. I would enjoy having lunch
with you at your convenience.
Most sincerely yours,
Jay T. French
Assistant Counsel
to the President
Mr. Lewis Hoffacker
Special Assistant to the Secretary
and Coordinator for Combatting
Terrorism
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
JF:em
FORD & LIDRARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
I
Washington, D.C. 20520
October 30, 1974
Mr. Jay French
Assistant Counsel to
the President
Room 110
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. French:
I understand that you will be following terrorism
in our Cabinet Committee/Working Group. Welcome aboard.
I regret that Skip Williams will be moving on to
another assignment. My hope is that we shall be able
to continue to work with your office in the same manner
as with Skip. I therefore would be pleased to call
on you if I can be of further help on the matter of the
so-called "package" (protection of foreign officials).
Alternatively, may we get together at luncheon?
Warmest regards.
Sincerely,
Lewis
Lewis Hoffácker
Special Assistant to the
Secretary and Coordinator
for Combatting Terrorism
TORO - LIBRARY 03
11/15/74
4:10
Ambassador Hoffacker called to discuss
632-9892
the Working group arrangement for the Cabinet
Committee to Combat Terrorism -- sending a copy
of the members of that group.
FORD is LIBRARY STREET
TRANSMITTED BY:
456-2845 2845
RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)
(Date & Time Stamp)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SITUATUATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center
LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
'74 NOV 15 PM 4: 35
1974 NOV 15 PM 4 23
S/S #
LDX MESSAGE NO.
645 , CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
1 NO. PAGES TO
DESCRIPTION OF MSG. List of Persons on Cabinet Committee
FROM: Amb. Hoffacker , S/CCT
632-9892
5243A, New State
,
,
Officer
Office Symbol
Extension
Room Number
LDX TO:
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION:
ROOM NUMBER:
, Mrs. Ava Daughtrey
, 456-2632 , Second Floor
Counsel to the President
West Wing
,
White House
,
Mr. Buchen's office
,
,
,
,
,
,
FOR:
CLEARANCE /
/
INFORMATION
/
/
PER REQUEST
/
/
COMMENT
/
/
REMARKS:
VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY:
Stalles lles
Executive Secretariat Officer
PORD 1 LIBRARY SERVICE
11
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
Special Assistant to the Secretary
"/15
Dear Mrs Daughtrey- 1
Please find
attached a
members it partier
the working Group
pants,
leavis Sincerely, Hyper
TORD 1. LIBRARY
Friday 11/8/74
4:00
Donna had the call from State earlier -- she suggested
she get in touch with our office -- but had thought she
would be writing a letter.
4:45
I've tried to call Ann Cary back but have not been
able to reach her.
I will suggest they write requesting the name of a replacement
for Mr. Shepard ----- Mr. Shepard feels that Mr. Buchen
should make that decision.
FORD of STATES LIBRARY
Friday 11/8/74
11:00 Ann Cary in State Operations Center said they are
updating their list on the Council on Terrorism.
632-8678
Buchen has basically replaced Tufaro.
They understood Geoff Shepard is leaving and ask who
will replace him.
BEBALD R. FORD
LIBRAST
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
The following item is restricted upon
rereview under NARA IG 1600-1:
coster and info. on members of CCCT
war; grap Oot,3, 3, 1974
DAY
1/3/02
FILE LOCATION
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 5-82)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Classified document attached
January 4, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Phil Buchen
FROM:
Bill Casselman S
Geoff Shepard referred the attached CIA memorandum to this office
for review. Shepard currently serves as the White House representative
to the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and
will shortly be leaving the White House staff. He has recommended that
this office take-over responsibility for liaison with the Committee,
since such activity is more properly a White House rather than Domestic
Council function.
Please advise (1) whether you wish this office to involve itself in the
activities of the Working Group, and (2) if so, whether you wish to
represent the office or designate another member of the staff to serve
on the Working Group.
It might be helpful if you would speak to Shepard about the activities
of the Committee. From my discussions with him, I know that he has
rather strongly held views concerning the efficacy of its work.
Enclosure
Classified document attached
ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 01313
Collection/Series/Folder ID
: 001900359
Reason for Withdrawal
: NS, National security restriction
Type of Material
:
MEM, Memo (s)
Creator's Title
: Member, Working Group, Cabinet Commi
ttee to Combat Terrorism
Receiver's Title
: Members, Working Group, Cabinet Comm
ittee to Combat Terrorism
Description
:
re terrorism in Japan
Creation Date
: 12/23/1974
Volume (pages)
: 2
Date Withdrawn
: 06/28/1988
sanitized 10/20/97 KBH
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
2 3 DEC 1974
PHOTO COP:
FROM
GERALD FORD LIERN
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Working Group
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
SUBJECT
: Study on the Japanese Red Army
1. Attached for your information is a copy of a study
entitled "The Emergence of the Japanese Red Army". The
study traces the origins of the Japanese Red Army (JRA) with
emphasis on its past terrorist operations in conjunction with
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
The discovery of a large JRA network in Paris is also dis-
cussed in detail.
2. Copies of a revised edition of this study are being
disseminated abroad to selected liaison services.
3. Additional copies may be obtained by contacting
this office
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
CIA Memember, Working Group
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
Declassified
Attachment:
As stated
Classified by signer.
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652. Exemption Category 5B (2).
Impossible to determine date of automatic
declassification.
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12953 Sec. 1.5 (<) 1.6(d)(1) XII
#30 CIA Hr. 7/28/97
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
By KBH NARA, Date 10/20/97
JUN 18 1997
SECRET
Distribution: Ambassador Lewis B. Hoffacker
Special Assistant to the Secretary
Department of State
General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Safety and Consumer
Affairs
Department of Transportation
Mr. Robert F. Ellsworth
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
Mr. James M. Frey
Deputy Associate Director for International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
Colonel Richard T. Kennedy
National Security Council Staff
Mr. David R. Macdonald
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for
Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs,
and Operations
Mr. Kevin T. Maroney
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
Declassified
Mr. Herbert K. Reis
Legal Advisor
United States Mission to the United Nations
Mr. Geoff C. Shepard
Associate Director of the Domestic Council
Mr. W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Central Intelligence Agency
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 01314
Collection/Series/Folder ID
: 001900359
Reason for Withdrawal
:
NS, National security restriction
Type of Material
:
REP, Report (s)
Description
:
re terrorism in Japan
Creation Date
: 11/1974
Volume (pages)
: 11
Date Withdrawn
: 06/28/1988
Sanitized 10/20/97 KBH
Document receipt Saintizal 4/11/85
Secret
PHOTO COPY
No Foreign Dissem
FROM
Controlled Dissem
GERALD F FORE LIBRARY
I
CENTRAL D'UNITED INTELLIGENCE AMERICA AGENCY
STATES
OF
Emergence of the Japanese Red Army
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
Declassified
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12953 Sec. 1.5 (C)1.6(d)(1)
Secret
MR 94-7, # 31 GA Hr. 7/28/97
November 1974
By KBH NARA, Date 10/20/97
Copy No 8
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
JUN 18 1997
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 055664
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
§ 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
Declassified
SECRET
NO FOREIGN. DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
Emergence of the Japanese Red Army
Summary
For the past two and one half years a relatively small
group of Japanese terrorists, working with the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), has conducted or col-
laborated with the PFLP in three terrorist operations. These
incidents--the Lod Airport massacre in May 1972, the Japan
Airlines (JAL) hijacking in July 1973, and the Singapore in-
cident in January 1974--are believed to have been planned by
the PFLP and then implemented with the assistance of Japanese
radicals operating out of the Middle East. In the recent suc-
cessful operation in the Hague to secure the release of Furuya
Yutaka, a Japanese Red Army (JRA) comrade held in a French
jail, the JRA appears to have acted independently of the PFLP.
An interrogation of Furuya led French police to a network of
JRA members in Paris which was planning attacks on Japanese
businessmen and a diplomat in Germany. In spite of obvious
flaws in the forged documentation carried by JRA members in
past operations, JRA terrorists were still able to enter target
countries with little, if any, difficulty.
Origin of the Japanese Red Army
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
1.5(c)
Current information from
the U.S.
1.6(c)(1)
Embassy in Tokyo indicates that the JRA has little support from
Declassified
or connection with other terrorist organizations operating in
Japan. The JRA is not "red" in the old communist interpreta-
tion of the word and is not an army in the conventional sense.
The JRA has no known ties of any kind with the USSR, China, or
the Japanese Communist Party and appears to have little or no
appeal to most leftist Japanese youth. Little is known con-
cerning its ideology other than adherence to a form of world
revolution in which the masses will rise up and defeat the
existing imperialist governments.
In 1969 a group calling itself the Red Army emerged in
Japan, advocating violent revolution. This organization ap-
parently was little different from the approximately 27 other
radical groups then operating on Japanese campuses.
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
In the past five years several groups
which could have had their antecedents in the old Red Army of
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
1969 have emerged with such names as the Red Army Faction, The
United Red Army, The Red Army Guard, The World Red Army, The
Red Army Arab Committee and now the Japanese Red Army.
1.6(d)(1)
Available information indicates that Shigenobu Fusako,
currently thought to be the leader of the JRA, made contact
with the PFLP in 1971. In May 1971 she helped produce a film
called "The PFLP and the Red Army Declare World War." She also
appears to have participated in the publication of a book en-
titled The Arab Guerrillas and the World Red Army. It is not
known whether Shigenobu and her JRA followers initiated contact
with the PFLP on their own volition or as the agents of a ter-
rorist organization inside Japan.
15/5
1.6(d)(1)
Okudaira and two other Japanese radicals were trained and
sent by the PFLP into Israel to perpetrate what is now called
the Lod Airport massacre in May 1972. It is likely that the
three men were not members of any well-established organiza-
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
tion in Japan, but rather individuals who were motivated by the
1.5(e)
goals of the PFLP in combating Israel.
1.8(d)(1)
Declassified
A
PFLP spokesman in June 1972 readily admitted that the PFLP had
trained and dispatched the Japanese terrorists on the Lod
mission.
Following the Lod operation there were a few reports that
Japanese radicals and the PFLP intended to mount more joint
1.5(c)
operations.
the targets were to be
1.6(d)(1)
airport facilities in Germany, Switzerland, Italy and France.
The Japanese reportedly made this agreement with followers of
Wadi Haddad, chief of the PFLP's Foreign Operations Committee,
but without the knowledge of PFLP leader George Habbash.
On 20 July 1973 a combined JRA-PFLP group hijacked a Japan
Airlines (JAL) Boeing 747 as it departed Amsterdam's interna-
tional airport. The aircraft finally landed four days later in
2
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DSSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM
Libya, where the terrorists destroyed the jet with explosive
charges.
1.5fc
1.6(d)(1)
During the JAL operation the four terrorists described
themselves as members of the Sons of the Occupied Land Organi-
zation (SOLO) working with the JRA.
1.5(p)
SOLO also claimed credit for
1.6(d)(1)
the bombing of a JAL office in Bonn, Germany on 31 May 1974.)
The JAL hijacking was the first instance in which the title
JRA was linked publicly with the PFLP.
Several months later the PFLP and the JRA struck again,
this time against the Shell oil refinery on Pulau Bukum Island
near Singapore. Two PFLP terrorists and two JRA members set
fire to one oil storage tank and attempted to blow up three
others before seeking to escape from the refinery in a ferry
boat. Shortly after they seized the ferry, the four men
identified themselves as members of the Japanese Red Army and
the PFLP.
In a press conference the day after the attack, a PFLP
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
spokesman in Damascus described the operation as a warning to
monopolistic, exploitative oil companies and as a rejection of
the Geneva efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine
problem. Negotiations between Singapore authorities and the
terrorists dragged out for seven days, and on 6 February five
FLP terrorists seized the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait and
demanded that the four Singapore terrorists be released and
flown by the Japanese government to Kuwait. After the Japanese
and Kuwaiti governments agreed to these conditions, the four
Singapore terrorists and their five comrades were flown from
Kuwait to Aden, where they were subsequently set free.
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
3
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
Japanese Red Army Activities in Europe
On 26 July 1974 French authorities arrested Furuya Yutaka,
a Japanese national, for possessing four altered passports and
ten thousand dollars in counterfeit U.S. Federal Reserve notes.
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
members of the
Curiel Apparatus were providing support to the JRA. The Curiel
Apparatus is a Paris-based "leftist" organization which has
provided support in the way of training, documentation and fi-
nancial assistance to revolutionary and national liberation
groups in numerous countries. Financial support for the Curiel
group is believed to come from fees it receives for services
rendered to the various organizations it assists.
The most important JRA member arrested and interrogated
was Takahashi Taketomo, believed to be the chief of the Euro-
pean network of the JRA.
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
Declassified
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
4
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
1.5(=)
1.6(d)(1)
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
5
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/ CONTROLLED DISSEM
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
JRA Secures Release of Furuya
Three JRA members successfully obtained the release of
Furuya (Yamada) from a French prison in mid-September, in a
well-planned and coordinated operation which involved seizing
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
the French embassy in the Hague and trading the Ambassador and
eight other hostages for Furuya and his documents.
Declassified
The hostages were held from 13 to 17 September, when Dutch
and French authorities finally reached an agreement with the
JRA terrorists. After leaving behind their hostages, the
terrorists were given U.S. $300,000 and were allowed to leave
Amsterdam in an Air France 707 flown by a volunteer crew.
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
6
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
JRA Modus Operandi
While there is little information available on the JRA to
illustrate definite patterns of operation which could be indica-
tors of impending attacks, a few generalizations can be made on
the basis of their past attacks.
1.5(c
1.6(d)(1
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
Unfortunately no pattern of JRA activities can be obtained
by comparing the Lod and Singapore incidents, because the
operations were so different. At Lod the task was to kill as
many people as possible with automatic weapons and grenades.
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
Therefore a minimum amount of preparation was necessary. At
Singapore, however, the terrorists prepared detailed plans over
a month in advance.
Declassified
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
7
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
1.5(=)
1.6(d)(1)
Ph
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
m Ge
Declare
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
8
FROM
SECRET
BRARY
NO FOREIGN DISSBM/ CONTROLLED DISSEM
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
1.5(c)
1.5(d)(1)
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)
Declassified
9
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/04/11 : NLF-PB-1-19-1-8
1a
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NOTICE TO RECIPIENT
COURIER REC. NO.
DATE SENT
DOCUMENT RECEIPT
Sign and Return as Shown on Reverse Side
Q283211
24 Dec 74
SENDER OF DOCUMENT(S)
LDG.
DATE DOCUMENT(S) SENT
CIA-DDO
HQS
24 December
25X1
DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT(S) SENT
CIA NO.
DOCUMENT DATE
COPIES
DOCUMENT TITLE (IN BRIEF)
ATTACHMENTS
CLASS
Nov74
1
Emergence of the Japanese
Secret
Red Army
w/Con-
trols
RECIPIENT
ADDRESS OF RECIPIENT
SIGNATURE (ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF ABOVE DOCUMENT(S))
Mr. Geoff C. Shepard
National Security
OFFICE
DATE OF RECEIPT
FORM
615
USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
(33)
5.72
Approved For Release 2005/04/11 : NLF-PB-1-19-1-8
DECLASSIRED, with poltions exempt
AUTHORITY RDC nLF-PB-1-19-1-8 4/11/05
BY
bula
NLF, DATE 6/29/09
FORD & LIBRARY RALD
10
Approved For Release 2005/04/11 : NLF-PB-1-19-1-81
TO: CIA RECIPIENT
Place signed receipt in outgoing messenger box for return to sender of document
through agency messenger service.
TO: NON-CIA RECIPIENT
Place signed receipt in envelope and transmit to:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
STOP 64
Approved For Release 2005/04/11 : NLF-PB-1-19-1-8
FORD & LIBRARY RALE
10
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Jock Marsh:
circumstances, I suggest
Underpresent
we should question
the cont nuance of
this Committee and its
working group.
Is this proposed
memo to Bront anappropriate
way to do that?
" Phil
the pack
SEAL R. FORD LIBRARY
January 6, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
PHILIP W. BUCHEN
SUBJECT:
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
I understand that there is a Cabinet Committee to Combat
Terrorism, which was established by Executive Order after
three Foreign Service Officers were killed in, I believe,
Khartoum.
Apparently, the Cabinet Committee itself has not met in at
least two years, but has a Working Group which consists
mainly of State Department employees.
I would appreciate your personal appraisal of whether
a need still exists for this Committee; and particularly
whether the Cabinet Committee structure is still necessary.
SERA R. FORD LIBRARY
AUTHORITY:
Memorandum, 9/25/72; from the President to the Secretary of State and
Memorandum, 9/25/72, from the President to the Heads of Depts and Agencies
METHOD:
Ex officio
TERM:
Pleasure of the President
SALARY:
No additional compensation
PURPOSE:
1. Coordinate, among the government agencies, ongoing activity for the prevention of
terrorism. This will include such activities as the collection of intelligence world
wide and the physical protection of U. S. personnel and installations abroad and
foreign diplomats, and diplomatic installations in the United States.
2. Evaluate all such programs and activities and where necessary recommend methods for
their effective implementation.
3. Devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that OCCU
4. Make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concernin
proposed funding of such programs.
5. Report to the President, from time to time, concerning the foregoing.
Department
Subject
CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM
INDEPENDENT
MEMBERS
MEMBERS:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Transportation
The United States Ambassador to the United Nations
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
The Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and
such others as the Chairman may consider necessary.
NOTE: The Cabinet Committee will be supported by 2 Working Group
comprised of personally designated senior representatives of
the members of the Committee, chaired by the designee of the
Secretary of State.
N. FORD LIBRARY
CHAIRMAN:
The Secretary of State
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 18-80236-1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 25, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
SUBJECT:
Action to Combat Terrorism
As I stated in the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State,
I have today directed the establishment of a Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism, to be chaired by Secretary Rogers. I consider
it to be of the utmost importance that we move urgently and effi-
ciently to attack this worldwide problem.
This Committee will consider the most effective means by which
to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and it will also take the
lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our Government
can take appropriate action in response to terrorist acts swiftly
and effectively. In this regard, Secretary Rogers will be in
touch with other governments and international organizations.
I expect that you will be fully responsive to the requests of the
Secretary of State and assist him in every way in his efforts to
coordinate government-wide actions against terrorism.
Richard nitn
TORD . LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 25, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT:
Action to Combat Terrorism
Your report to me on the measures that are being taken to combat
terrorism indicates that we are moving effectively against the prob-
lem of thwarting acts of terrorism both here and abroad. The two
committees you have set up to cope with this major problem are
making commendable progress toward this end.
Because of the great importance and urgency I attach to dealing
with the worldwide problem of terrorism, which encompasses
diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement functions, I am
hereby establishing a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.
The Cabinet Committee will be chaired by the Secretary of State
and will comprise
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Transportation
The United States Ambassador to
the United Nations
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Assistant to the President for
Domestic Affairs
The Acting Director of the Federal
GERALE FORD LIBRARY
Bureau of Investigation
and such others as the Chairman may consider necessary.
The Cabinet Committee will be supported by a Working Group com-
prised of personally designated senior representatives of the members
of the Committee, chaired by the designee of the Secretary of State.
-2-
The Committee will consider the most effective means by which
to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and it will also take the
lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our government can
take appropriate action in response to acts of terrorism swiftly
and effectively. The Secretary of State will be in touch with other
governments and international organizations toward this goal.
Federal officers and Federal departments and agencies are to
cooperate fully with the Cabinet Committee in carrying out its
functions under this directive, and they shall comply with the
policies, guidelines, standards, and procedures prescribed by
the Cabinet Committee.
More specifically, the Cabinet Committee shall:
(1) Coordinate, among the government agencies, ongoing activity
for the prevention of terrorism. This will include such activities
as the collection of intelligence worldwide and the physical protec-
tion of U.S. personnel and installations abroad and foreign diplomats,
and diplomatic installations in the United States.
(2) Evaluate all such programs and activities and where necessary
recommend methods for their effective implementation.
(3) Devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of
terrorism that occur.
(4) Make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget concerning proposed funding of such programs; and
(5) Report to the President, from time to time, concerning the
foregoing.
Richard nife
SEAL R. FORD LIBRANT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Eva Please get out
me prompted the material
my memo T.
GERALE N. FORD LIBRARY
Eva: Please
add sealenes
THE WHITE HOUSE and show
WASHINGTON
going
to
Jock Marsh:
Runefeld
circumstonces, I suggest
Under present
we should question
the conti nuance of
this Committee and its
working group.
Is this proposed
memo to Bront on proproprise
way to do that?
on
Plut I think - plack you're
the NS at N.
July BERAU foro LIBRARY
January 6, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
PHILIP W. BUCHEN
SUBJECT: Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
I understand that there is a Cabinet Committee to Combat
Terrorism, which was established by Executive Order after
three Foreign Service Officers were killed in, I believe,
Khartoum.
Apparently, the Cabinet Committee itself has not met in at
least two years, but has a Working Group which consists
mainly of State Department employees.
I would appreciate your personal appraisal of whether
a need still exists for this Committee; and particularly
whether the Cabinet Committee structure is still necessary.
1. FORD LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 7, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Brent Scowcroft
FROM:
Philip W. Buchen P.W.B.
SUBJECT:
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
I understand that there is a Cabinet Committee to Combat
Terrorism, which was established by Executive Order after
three Foreign Service Officers were killed in, I believe, Khartoum.
Apparently, the Cabinet Committee itself has not met in at least
two years, but has a Working Group which consists mainly of
State Department employees.
I would appreciate your personal appraisal of whether a need still
exists for this Committee; and particularly whether the Cabinet
Committee structure is still necessary.
For your convenience, I attach copies of documents concerning the
origin, purposes, and structure of the Committee.
cc: John Marsh
Don Rumsfeld
TORD - LIBRARY
0136
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 27, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: PHILIP W. BUCHEN
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
Your January 7, 1975, memorandum requested my personal appraisal
of whether a need still exists for the Cabinet Committee to Combat
Terrorism (CCCT) and its Working Group.
Although the CCCT has met only once since its formation, it continues
to serve, in my view, two useful functions:
-- it serves as a tangible expression of the President's concern
with the still very acute problem of worldwide terrorism;
-- and, it serves as an umbrella for the extremely useful work which
has been conducted by its Working Group in meeting the objectives set
out in the President's memorandum to the Secretary of State of
September 15, 1972, directing the formation of the CCCT.
The Working Group, which meets every two weeks, consists of
representatives of the members of the CCCT as well as a number of
other organizations which are concerned with this problem. It is chaired
by Ambassador Hoffacker, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for Terrorism, assisted by two foreign service officers. Ambassador
Hoffacker keeps the CCCT Chairman fully apprised of the activities of
the Working Group while the other members keep their principals
informed of its activities.
Among its accomplishments, the Working Group has:
-- encouraged improved collection and dissemination of intelligence
relating to terrorist groups and threats;
-- developed standardized procedures to guide the reaction of the
USG to terrorist incidents;
DERALA FORD LIBRARY
- 2 -
-- prepared a study by an ad-hoc committee of the Working Group,
currently being reviewed by the NSC Staff, of ways to improve the
USG's protection of foreign officials and installations in this country;
-- served as a clearing house for the exchange of views and
experiences of USG agencies relating to terrorism;
-- encouraged increased coordination among agencies concerned with
the problem of terrorism.
In view of the continued acute threat of worldwide terrorism, and the
progress of the Working Group under the auspices of the CCCT, it is my
view that there is a continuing need for this cabinet-level body. It should
remain available to deal with major interdepartmental problems in this
area, should they arise in the future, and to serve as a focal point for
interdepartmental coordination and cooperation.
THE LIBRAR STATE
file
Terroison
CENTRAL LUNITED INTELLIGENCE AMERICA AGENCY
STATES
OF
Research Study
International and Transnational Terrorism:
Diagnosis and Prognosis
SEAL R. FORD LIBRARY
----
AR
PR 76 10030
April 1976
JUN 23 1976
This publication is prepared for the use of U.S. Government
officials. The format, coverage and contents of the publication are
designed to meet the specific requirements of those users. U.S.
Government officials may obtain additional copies of this document
directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Non-U.S. Government users may obtain this along with similar
CIA publications on a subscription basis by addressing inquiries to:
Document Expediting (DOCEX) Project
Exchange and Gift Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
Non-U.S. Government users not interested in the DOCEX
Project subscription service may purchase reproductions of specific
publications on an individual basis from:
Photoduplication Service
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
FOREWORD
The primary goals of this study are to cast the problem of
internationalized terror into clear perspective and to provide the reader
with a framework for a more systematic grasp of the subject. Terrorism
is, however, a particularly controversial and complex phenomenon.
Hence, it must be emphasized that the approach adopted and the
judgments advanced are those of the author, David L. Milbank. So,
too, are the basic definitions. And although it is analytically useful for
the purposes of this paper, the distinction made between international
and transnational terrorism is bound to draw some critical
comment-if only because the former term has acquired so broad a
currency in academic and journalistic literature.
The statistics presented also break new ground. This is because the
author was able to draw on a comprehensive new data bank called
ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events)
that was developed for the Office of Political Research by Edward F.
Mickolus during the summer of 1975 as a related but separate project.
Despite this advantage, however, several words of caution about
the figures and statistical inferences that are set forth in this study are in
order. In the first place, there are many significant gaps in our
knowledge about specific incidents and groups-and even those
terrorist organizations and actions on which there is considerable
reliable information do not always fit neatly into the typologies that
have been created for them. Moreover, the universe of incidents under
review is small enough that unintended omissions (of which there are
undoubtedly many) or erroneous classification of borderline events
could have a statistically significant impact.
Comments or questions concerning this study (which does not
represent a CIA position) will be welcomed. They should be addressed to
the Director, Political Research.
i
CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD
i
SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS
1
THE DISCUSSION
7
I. THE OBJECTIVES AND BOUNDARIES OF INQUIRY
7
II. ESTABLISHING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
8
Definitions
8
Method
9
III. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT
10
What, Where, and When?
10
Why?
18
How Cost Effective?
22
How Disruptive?
23
What International Constraints?
26
IV. THE OUTLOOK
28
International Terrorism
28
Transnational Terrorism
29
V. IMPLICATIONS
32
APPENDIX A: Significant Variables
35
APPENDIX B: Statistical Trends and Patterns in Terrorist
Activity
39
APPENDIX C: Noteworthy Groups
fold-out
SECURITY
VOID
iii
SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS
I. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this study, international and transnational
terrorism are defined as follows:
Common Characteristics: The threat or use of violence for political
purposes when (1) such action is intended to influence the attitudes
and behavior of a target group wider than its immediate victims,
and (2) its ramifications transcend national boundaries (as a result,
for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its
locale, the identity of its institutional or human victims, its
declared objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution).
International Terrorism: Such action when carried out by
individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state.
Transnational Terrorism: Such action when carried out by
basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy
some degree of support from sympathetic states.
II. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT
There has been a marked and enduring upsurge in transnational
terrorism since 1967 that has been characterized by:
-A substantial increase in the number of terrorist groups involved
as well as in the number of countries in which they are operating;
-A trend toward greater international contact and cooperation
among terrorist groups;
-A trend toward bolder and more dramatic actions;
-The general popularity of American targets; and
-A number of significant regional differences in the intensity and
nature of such violence.
This upsurge is attributable in part to the dynamics of the Middle
East conflict, an imbroglio which affects the interests of a large number
of nations and is attended by particularly deep-seated feelings of
bitterness and frustration. But the problem of transnational terrorism
1
would not have mushroomed to its present dimensions were it not for
the concurrent convergence and acceleration of a number of changes in
the global environment that had begun to take shape much earlier, e.g.:
-The technological advances that have provided terrorists with
new mobility, new weaponry, and (through the introduction of
TV-capable satellite communications) the near certain prospect
that their more dramatic actions will receive prompt and world-
wide publicity;
- -The growth, fed by modernizing change, of global and regional
ties, dependencies and obligations that have both provided
terrorists with a host of new and potentially highly disruptive
targets for attack (e.g., power grids and jumbo aircraft) and
fostered a reactive upsurge in nationalism and ethnicity;
-An increasingly permissive political environment born of the
challenge raised to the postwar order by the developing nations
of the Third World, the "maverick" Communist regimes,
various dissatisfied second rank powers, and a broad array of
social forces fired, with differing degrees of responsibility, by a
new sense of "social conscience";
-The persistent if uneven behavior of those states, less than a
score in number, that have furnished practicing or potential
terrorists with funds, arms, training, documentation, and other
operational support; and
-Changes in the overall economic environment that have fanned
local dissidence and fed the communities of emigre workers that
can provide terrorists with cover, recruits, and various forms of
operational support.
There has not, however, been a parallel upsurge in international
terrorism. Although there has been a good deal of such activity
associated with the Middle East conflict over the past decade, the
dimensions of the problem are essentially no greater today than they
were in 1968.
Another significant difference stems from the fact that resort to
international terrorism is just as likely to result from calculations
concerning the relative efficacy of alternative methods of bringing
national power to bear in a given situation as from an outright dearth of
national resources. Hence, such behavior has not been the special
province of any particular category of state. In contrast, as an option
more congenial to urban than to rural groups, transnational terrorism
has been characteristically spawned by societies at a mid to advanced
stage of socio-economic development.
2
For its practioners, terrorism's principal drawback is that its
consequences are to a considerable degree unpredictable. As
demonstrated in Jordan in 1970 and in Uruguay between 1970 and
1972, even what seem to be dramatic tactical successes can lead to
strategic reverses of major proportions. All told, however, the record to
date shows that the personal risks that have been incurred by
international and transnational terrorists have been relatively low, and
that their chances of achieving at least some of their near-term
objectives have been strong. Moreover, because the impact of their
activity has been magnified by the publicity it has received and by its
interaction with other destabilizing trends and forces, its disruptive
effects have been grossly disproportionate to the resources employed by
the terrorists as well as to the actual damage done in terms of the cost to
life and property.
With the exception of a number of bilateral agreements of proven
utility (most notably the US-Cuban accord of 1973), the international
response to terrorism has been relatively weak and ineffective. The
principal obstacles to greater progress in this field have been the
controversy over justifiable versus illegal political violence, a broad
resistance to such further infringement of national sovereignty as would
be implied in any inflexible curtailment of the right to grant political
asylum, and a natural reluctance on the part of many states to commit
themselves to any course of action that might invite retribution-either
by terrorist groups or by states sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.
III. THE OUTLOOK
International terrorism seems unlikely to pose much more of a
threat to world order or US interests in the decade ahead than it does
today.
-Even in its currently rather fluid condition, the international
system subjects states to a host of legal obligations and practical
constraints that they can ignore only at considerable risk.
-The potential implications of the various state-sponsored
terrorist incidents that have been associated with the Middle
East conflict notwithstanding, it seems likely that the
employment of terrorist groups in a surrogate warfare role will
continue to be more the exception than the rule for some time to
come.
Despite the potentially salutary impact of some recent or likely
developments (including the tougher stance toward terrorists that has
been adopted by a number of states and the probability that technical
innovations in the security field will make terrorism a more risky
affair), the outlook for transnational terrorism is considerably less
3
encouraging. Specifically, the following factors and trends hold promise
of aggravating the problem:
-The combined effects of technological advance, modernizing
social and economic change, and growing interdependence will
probably generate further increases in (1) divisive ethnicity and
nationalism, (2) urban unrest, (3) terrorist capabilities, and (4)
societal vulnerabilities.
-The widespread erosion of established institutions of
authority-manifested in multiple challenges to the postwar
international order and the increasing difficulties of governance
encountered at the national level-that has both invited and
facilitated terrorist activity in recent years seems likely to persist
throughout much of the decade ahead.
-Since the net thrust of the forces at work within the international
community promises to remain more centrifugal than
centripetal, it seems unlikely that efforts to combat terrorism
through binding world-wide conventions will prove to be much
more effective than in the past.
-The likelihood that (1) national liberation and leftist
revolutionary formations will continue to receive both moral
and material support from a wide variety of transnational and
international organizations and (2) transnational contact and
cooperation among terrorist groups will gain further momentum
holds forth the ominous prospect of the emergence of a complex
support base for transnational terrorist activity that is largely
independent of-and quite resistant to control by-the state-
centered international system.
-Under such circumstances, any governmental assistance
rendered to terrorist groups could have an even more deleterious
impact than in the past, for it would risk simply increasing the
recipients' potential for autonomous action.
-The problems of (1) extensive and sometime sympathetic
publicity for terrorist acts and (2) the diffusion of terrorist-
adaptable technological know-how are likely to persist in most
parts of the world and thus to reinforce the risks associated with
the wholesale deployment of sophisticated (and in many cases,
man-portable) weaponry and the race to sell nuclear technology
and modern armaments to developing countries.
The prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists can, in fact, no longer be
dismissed. But because of the major problems that would be involved in
the acquisition, storage, transport, and employment of a nuclear device,
a more likely scenario-at least in the short term-would be a terrorist
4
seizure of a nuclear weapons storage facility or a nuclear power plant to
exploit the publicity and the bargaining power inherent in the attendant
threat of radiological pollution.
A more pressing threat, however, would seem to lie in the field of
chemical, biological, and radiological agents of mass destruction. Not
only are many of these agents relatively easy to acquire, but (because
small-sometimes minute-quantities are usually all that are needed
for potentially devastating effect) they also tend to be easy to conceal,
easy to transport, and easy to introduce into the target area.
All told, transnational terrorism promises to pose a continuing and
potentially gravely unsettling problem for the world community until
such time-possibly years hence-that the international system gels
into new and generally accepted contours. Although the frequency and
intensity of violence in some current trouble spots will probably decline,
it seems likely that:
-The overall number of terrorist groups engaged in transnational
terrorist activity will, at best, remain at about the present level;
-The number of countries in which these groups are operating will
increase;
-Because of their symbolic value, their availability, and the
embarrassment they can create, the popularity of American
targets will remain high;
-The world will witness steadily greater and more widespread
sophistication in terrorist targetting, execution, and weaponry;
and
-Although most terrorist groups will probably continue to be
deterred by both moral considerations and calculations of the
risks involved, the danger that a fanatic few might resort to
weapons of mass destruction will increase accordingly.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The phenomenon of widespread internationalized terror is not only
likely to persist for at least the next several years, but also to evolve in
ways that could pose a more substantial threat to US interests-and,
under certain circumstances, to world order-than in the recent past.
-Whether or not weapons of mass destruction are actually
brought into play, the odds are that the impact of transnational
terror will be more sharply felt in the US in the years just
ahead-primarily as the result of periodic increases in attacks
on American targets abroad, but possibly through more
frequent terrorist demands on the US Government and
5
occasional operations on US soil by foreign-based groups as
well.
- Even if the problem of internationalized terror is not brought
closer to home in the ways suggested above, it promises to
impinge more directly on US interests and options with respect
to a broad range of critical issue areas, including both East-West
and North-South relations, the politically and economically
sensitive questions of arms sales and the transfer of advanced
technology, and the resolution of problems associated with the
dependence of Western industrialized countries on foreign
energy sources.
The importance of factors that are likely to affect the objective
capabilities and options of terrorist groups in the years ahead is
obvious. But in the final analysis, it is man's subjective perception of
"reality" that serves as the primary determinant of his political
behavior. Hence, those variables (e.g., cultural heritage, credo, and
changes in the overall political environment) that can shape or alter the
prisms through which the terrorists concerned view the world around
them will bear equal attention.
Indeed, although the dimensions of the threat posed by
internationalized terror should not be overdrawn, the factors bearing on
this phenomenon and its potential ramifications are so numerous and
cut across so many jurisdictional and disciplinary lines that the
development of more effective national and international
countermeasures is likely to be a particularly demanding task. Sadly,
there are no sure guidelines for endowing any given government's
approach to the problem of terrorism with the qualities required to
meet this challenge. But while any number of alternative courses of
action could prove equally effective, it bears emphasis that together
with timely intelligence and sound multi-disciplinary analytical
support, flexibility and extensive coordination (both intra- and inter-
state) would seem to be critical to devising and implementing a counter-
terrorist strategy that is both internally consistent and minimally
disruptive to national values and foreign policy objectives in terms of
"hidden" social, political, and economic costs.
6
THE DISCUSSION
I. THE OBJECTIVES AND BOUNDARIES OF
more dramatic actions, with an accompanying
INQUIRY
escalation of casualties, damage, and demands. And
Political violence predates recorded history. As a
most importantly, perhaps, there has been a quantum
distinctive form of political violence sporadically
jump in terrorist incidents affecting the interests of
more than one state.
employed by rulers and ruled alike, terrorism is
probably not much younger-albeit it owes its name
Not surprisingly, these developments have
and subsequent conceptual flowering to the French
generated unprecedented interest in terrorism as a
Reign of Terror (1793-1794). Nor is the spill-over of
subject for serious research and analysis. In sharp
terrorist activity onto the international stage a
contrast with the situation which prevailed only a
particularly recent development: witness the stir
decade or so ago, existing literature-both open and
caused by various anarchist groups operating in
classified-now offers a wide range of useful insights
Europe and North America in the late 19th and early
into the root causes, logic, and characteristic
20th centuries as well as by the behavior of a few of
attributes of political terrorism as well as a substantial
their more self-interested political contemporaries.
number of detailed case studies.
Some 70 years ago, for example, a renegade
Moroccan chieftain foreshadowed a tactic favored by
The trouble is that the picture which emerges is still
a number of terrorist groups today by kidnapping two
confused and incomplete. For one thing, there is as yet
foreign businessmen (one English, the other of
no generally accepted definition of terrorism per se,
dubious American citizenship) in a successful effort to
much less of its international or transnational
get England and the US to pressure France into
variants. For another, much of the work that has been
forcing the Sultan to accede to a long list of
done on terrorism suffers from the limiting effects of
demands-including a substantial ransom, the release
narrowly focused tactical concerns or of
of a large number of prisoners, the cession of two
particularistic institutional and personal biases. And,
territorial districts, and the arrest of a few key
largely because of these differing perspectives and
enemies.
priorities, little progress has been made toward
development of a comprehensive and readily
But despite historical precedents and parallels,
accessible data base. In short, we are still hard put to
modern-day terrorism is very much a function of our
explain the current state of affairs or to venture firm
times. Advances in technology and growing world
predictions about the future.
interdependence have afforded terrorists new
mobility, new targets, new weaponry, and the near
Of necessity, therefore, this study is an exercise in
certain prospect that their more dramatic acts will
both synthesis and innovation. It is confined to an
receive prompt and world-wide publicity. Moreover,
examination of international and transnational
recent changes in the overall political and economic
terrorism as defined in Section II below (with primary
climate have provided terrorists with a somewhat
emphasis on transnational terrorism as, in the short
more hospitable environment in which to operate.
term at least, potentially the more injurious to US
interests). Its principal underlying assumptions are
Indeed, there has been such an upsurge of terrorist
three. The first is that the basic societal problems and
activity in recent years that some observers have
tensions that can give rise to political violence-and
warned that we may be entering a veritable age of
thus to terrorism-are likely to prove particularly
terrorism. Among other things, there has been a
intractable in this era of rapid change, growing
marked increase in the number of active terrorist
nationalism and ethnicity, and world-wide economic
groups as well as in the number of countries in which
strains. Such irritants may, in fact, be treated as
they are operating. Internal and international
"givens" in the global environment for many years to
cooperation among terrorist groups has also risen
come. The reader is forewarned that because of this,
notably. There has been a trend toward bolder and
and because they have already received considerable
7
scholarly attention, these factors will not be subjected
surrounds the concept of terrorism and to spell out
to extensive analysis here.*
precisely what sort of behavior falls within the purview
Corollary to the above, it is assumed that the
of this study. In part, the existing confusion is
potential for domestic, international, and
attributable to journalistic license and a popular
transnational terrorism will remain high in the decade
tendency to label terrorist a host of acts in which the
ahead and that the scope of the problem will therefore
element of terror is clearly incidental to other and
depend primarily on factors affecting the
more pressing objectives. But, as amply illustrated by
opportunities, alternatives, and behavioral constraints
the tortured and fruitless efforts of a 35-member ad
faced by the group actors involved.
hoc UN committee to define (and thereby, in effect, to
Finally, it is postulated that man's subjective
outlaw) international terrorism not long ago, the heart
perception of "reality" serves as the primary
of the problem lies in differing moral perspectives and
determinant of his political behavior. Hence, without
priorities.* Simply stated, one man's terrorist is
neglecting the many factors that have affected-or
another man's freedom fighter.
that may affect-the objective capabilities and options
of terrorist groups, this paper repeatedly draws
Since terrorism always involves the deliberate
attention to those variables (e.g., cultural heritage,
breach of generally accepted bounds for individual or
credo, and changes in the overall political
collective violence, it is difficult to define in totally
environment) that can shape or alter the prisms
value-free terms. Nevertheless, it can be set in a
through which the terrorists concerned view the world
relatively rigorous and objective perspective. A good
around them.
way to begin is by quoting a perceptive description of
Broadly stated, the objectives of the study are to
the characteristic attributes of terrorism by one of the
gain a better understanding of the dynamics and
leading specialists on the subject.
consequences of international and transnational
terrorism since 1965, to identify those factors likely to
The threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or a
promote or inhibit such activity in the years ahead,
campaign of violence designed primarily to instill fear-to
and to assess the implications of these findings with
terrorize-may be called terrorism. Terrorism is violence for
effect: not only, and sometimes not at all, for the effect on the
respect to US policies and interests. Such goals
actual victims of the terrorists. In fact, the victim may be
preclude any effort to gauge the extent of the threat
totally unrelated to the terrorists' cause. Terrorism is violence
posed to US interests and world order by any
aimed at the people watching. Fear is the intended effect, not
particular terrorist group or consortium. Given the
the byproduct, of terrorism. That, at least, distinguishes
host of variables that would have to be considered,
terrorist tactics from mugging and other forms of violent
that task must remain the province of traditional and
crime that may terrify but are not terrorism.*
painstaking case-by-case analysis. It is hoped,
however, that the substantive generalizations and
Political terrorism is, then, the above sort of
methodological techniques that are set forth below
violence employed in pursuit of political objectives. It
will provide a valuable frame of reference for more
is, as claimed by its practitioners, "propaganda of the
definitive treatments of specific aspects of the
deed." It is calculated violence aimed at influencing
terrorism problem.
the attitude and behavior of one or more target
audiences. Its proximate objectives may include
II. ESTABLISHING AN ANALYTICAL
publicity, coercion, extortion, disorientation and
FRAMEWORK
despair, provocation of unpopular countermeasures,
and (with regard to the terrorists themselves) morale-
Definitions
building. Its ultimate goals can be either concrete
As a first step, it is necessary to cut through some of
(e.g., the seizure or consolidation of political power or
the semantic and value-generated fog which currently
*The committee, which met in New York from 16 July to 11 August
1973, was also unable to reach agreement on either the causes of
*These factors include weak and inefficient government, societal
international terrorism or on measures which might be taken to prevent
rivalries and inequities, social and economic dislocations stemming from
such activity. In consequence, its report was simply a compendium of
the accelerating process of change, and high levels of frustration born of
disparate and conflicting views. To date, neither the UN General
social immobility or feelings of relative deprivation. (The term relative
Assembly nor the Sixth Committee thereof has been able (or willing) to
deprivation is defined by its originator, Professor Ted Robert Gurr, as a
find time to consider it.
"perceived discrepancy between the goods and conditions of life which
*Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of
members of a group believe are their due and the goods and conditions
Conflict, Research Paper No. 48, California Seminar on Arms
which they think they can in fact get and keep." Why Men Rebel,
Control and Foreign Policy (Los Angeles: Crescent Publications,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 319.)
1975), p. 1.
8
the attainment of ethnic self-rule) or nebulous (e.g.,
for the time being, at least, the two phenomena do
the fomenting of world-wide revolution).*
pose questions and problems of a qualitatively
different order. For one thing, since it involves the
The foregoing observations and generalizations
behavior of state actors, international terrorism can in
form the basis for the definitions of international and
theory be handled and contained within the
transnational terrorism that are employed in this
framework of the existing international system with
study. These are as follows:
only minor adjustments. Moreover, its practitioners
-Common Characteristics: The threat or use of
seem to be somewhat fewer-or, with a few notable
violence for political purposes when (1) such
exceptions, at least more restrained-than at some
action is intended to influence the attitudes and
other points of time in the recent past. Transnational
behavior of a target group wider than its
terrorism, on the other hand, has been growing in both
immediate victims, and (2) its ramifications
geographic scope and intensity. And the international
transcend national boundaries (as a result, for
system is still ill-equipped to deal with autonomous
example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its
non-state actors.
perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its
institutional or human victims, its declared
Method
objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution).
-International Terrorism: Such action when
At best, discussions of methodology carry the risk
carried out by individuals or groups controlled by
of blurring and diluting the analytical thrust of a
research paper. But the subject at hand presents
a sovereign state.
something of a special case-one in which a few words
-Transnational Terrorism: Such action when
about the analytical techniques employed are needed
carried out by basically autonomous non-state
to lay the groundwork for subsequent discussion. For
actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of
one thing the myriad of factors which bear on terrorist
support from sympathetic states.'
activity dictated adoption of a multi-disciplinary
approach. For another, the fuzzy boundaries that
Just how meaningful the posited distinction between
separate terrorism from other forms of violence-and
international and transnational terrorism is likely to
the previously cited lack of any generally accepted
be in the longer run is, of course, open to question. But
analytical approach or comprehensive and logically
organized data base-required the construction of a
*In his chapter entitled "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation"
relatively detailed framework for screening and
in Internal War: Problems and Approaches (edited by Harry
Eckstein and published by Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, in
ordering the available information.
1964), Thomas P. Thorton defines political terror as "a symbolic
Briefly, a number of working hypotheses derived
act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means,
entailing the use or threat of violence." Other particularly useful
from a survey of the existing literature on both
general analyses of political terrorism are to be found in Brian
terrorism and political violence per se were used to
Jenkins, op cit.; Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas (London: Temple
generate a list of (1) key group and environmental
Smith, 1972); Brian Crozier, ed., Annual of Power and Conflict,
variables that appear to have affected the scope,
1972-73 and 1973-74 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict);
nature, and intensity of international and
Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 1974);
Martha C. Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary
transnational terrorism in recent years, and (2)
Terrorism," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume XVI,
analytically useful event characteristics. (Those initial
Number 3, September 1972, pp. 383-396; and Philip A. Karber,
hypotheses that survived subsequent testing appear,
"Urban Terrorism: Baseline Data and a Conceptual Framework,"
together with later additions, as judgments and
Social Science Quarterly, Volume 52, December 1971, pp. 521-533.
conclusions at various points in this study.)
The last-named author stresses the symbolic qualities of political
terrorism and suggests that it can be analyzed in much the same
The resultant tabulation is presented in somewhat
fashion as other mediums of communication.
abbreviated form at Appendix A. It will be noted that,
*Given the element of governmental patronage that is common to
in addition to fulfilling their primary (and distinctly
both, the boundary line between transnational and international
terrorism is often difficult to draw. To the degree that it can be
traditional) disciplinary function, most of the
determined, the key distinction lies in who is calling the shots with
variables listed therein are amenable to machine
respect to a given action or campaign. Hence, groups can and do drift
processing and manipulation. And while, as suggested
back and forth across the line. For example, even a one-time "contract
in the Foreword, the statistical inferences that are
job" undertaken on behalf of a governmental actor by a group that
normally acts according to its own lights qualifies as international
highlighted below rest on sometimes rather rudimen-
terrorism.
tary data, they can-and did-serve to refine some of
9
the author's preliminary assumptions and hypotheses
dimension is added in, 1968 emerges as a watershed
and to suggest other trends and patterns that cold be
year. At that juncture, a combination of Palestinian
significant.
initiatives and the cumulative impact of the broader
environmental trends discussed below seems to have
III. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT
finally sensitized dissident groups throughout the
world to their latent and growing potential for
What, Where, and When?
effective transnational terrorist activity.
As previously indicated, international and
From 1 January 1968 through 31 December 1975,
transnational terrorism were not yet matters of much
there were at least 913 recorded international and
official or academic concern in 1965. In contrast to
transnational terrorist incidents. Of these, 123 were
other forms of political violence, there simply had not
kidnappings; 31 were barricade and hostage episodes;
been very much of either since the close of World War
375 entailed the use of explosive devices of one type or
II-at least not of the sort that made headlines.
another; 95 were armed assaults or ambushes; 137
Moreover, much of what there was had been
involved the hijacking of an aircraft or other means of
associated with-and overshadowed by the more
transportation; 59 fell under the category of
important consequences of-clear-cut adversary
incendiary attack or arson; 48 constituted
relationships stemming from either the Cold War or
assassination or murder; and 45 were characterized by
the anti-colonial struggle. For the most part,
other forms of violence. All told, more than 140
noncombatant third parties had been left unmolested.
terrorist organizations-including a number of
It is true, of course, that two brief flurries of
fictional entities created to shield the identity of the
skyjacking had already drawn attention to a potential
perpetrators of some particularly shocking or
new problem area. But, for the most part, neither had
politically sensitive acts-from nearly 50 different
involved more than a few actions that would be
countries or disputed territories (e.g., Palestine) have
classified as terrorism under the definition employed
thus far been linked to this activity, and there may
here. The first, in the early 50s, had been comprised
have been more.
almost entirely of Eastern European aircraft
Figure 2 portrays the overall geographic
commandeered for the sole purpose of escape to the
distribution of international and transnational
West. And while the second, which extended from the
terrorist incidents for the 1965-1975 period. A more
late 50s to the early 60s, had been climaxed by the first
informative breakdown of 1968-1975 statistics by type
postwar hijackings of American airliners (thereby
of event and other operational criteria is provided in
prompting the US to press for a comprehensive
Appendix B.
international convention covering crimes committed
on civilian aircraft engaged in international aviation),
Despite the widespread and continuing popularity
it too had been attributable primarily to individuals
of certain "traditional" forms of violence (e.g.,
seeking personal advantage-e.g., expedient transport
assassinations and highly discriminate bombings), the
to or from Cuba or outright extortion-rather than
picture which emerges from these assorted charts and
political leverage or impact.
tables underscores a number of marked regional and
time-related variations in the frequency and nature of
In any event, skyjackings tapered off again in 1963.
transnational terrorist incidents. Sub-Saharan
The overall level of international and transnational
Africa and large parts of Asia have, for example,
terrorist activity remained relatively low through
1966, then turned upward against the backdrop of
*This figure excludes terrorist attacks on US and allied personnel and
intensified Palestinian guerrilla activity that preceded
installations in Indochina. It also excludes most of the mutual
assassination efforts and cross-border operations associated with the
the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Admittedly, the record up
Arab-Israeli conflict. The only exceptions in this regard are incidents
to that point is sketchy. For one thing, the mass media
that either victimized noncombatant nationals of states outside the
still lacked either the incentive or the technical means
principal arena of conflict or were of such a nature that they became the
for systematic and comprehensive coverage of
object of international controversy.
terrorist incidents-and many undoubtedly went
**There are relatively few political groups in the world that are totally
unreported. But even if Figure 1 below substantially
dedicated to terrorist violence. As used here, the term terrorist
understates the number of international and
organization simply denotes a group that has employed terrorist tactics.
transnational terrorist incidents that occurred in the
*Although international and transnational terrorist incidents are
lumped together in these charts, the former were outnumbered by the
1965-1967 period, the international impact of such
latter by more than 20 to 1 and thus had little impact on the patterns
activity was negligible. Indeed, when the qualitative
reflected therein.
10
Figure 1
International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents
250
200
150
100
50
O
1965
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
568580 2-76
11
Figure 2
Geographic Distribution of International and
Transnational Terrorist Incidents, 1965-75
Total: 951
Transregional
1
Pacific and Australia
6
USSR/Eastern Europe
22
Sub-Saharan Africa
38
Asia
43
Middle East and
122
North Africa
North America
126
Latin America
260
Western and
333
NATO Europe
568581 2-76
been relatively free of such activity. So too has the
Another point brought home by the data presented
Soviet/East European region. Latin Americans have
in Appendix B is that although transnational terrorists
demonstrated a particular affinity for kidnapping
have, until recently at least, rarely sought to wring
foreign diplomats and businessmen. On the other
concessions from Washington, American
hand, except for skyjackings, seemingly
targets-whether human or physical, official or
indiscriminate and potentially bloody
private-have consistently been among the most
spectaculars-e.g., mass hostage episodes, large
popular for attack. For example, between mid-1969
bombs in public places, Lod Airport type massacres of
and early 1973 (when tightened security and the
innocent bystanders, and the destruction (or
implications of the US-Cuba agreement made
attempted destruction) without warning of passenger-
American planes seem less attractive), US aircraft
carrying aircraft-have most frequently been the
figured in about 30 percent of all skyjackings.
province of extremist formations from the Middle
Moreover, this ratio is relatively modest in
East, Europe, and Japan.
comparison to US experience with some other forms
For its part, skyjacking reached near epidemic
of terrorist activity, especially kidnapping. Indeed, the
proportions in 1970 only to taper off sharply
available data suggests that over the past eight years,
thereafter. There were, in fact, fewer recorded
US citizens or US facilities have been victimized in at
terrorist skyjackings in all of 1975 than there were in
least one-third of all transnational terrorist incidents.
an average month just five years earlier. The dramatic
The hard fact is that substantial pockets of popular
decline in popularity of this particular form of
opinion in many parts of the world are prone to
terrorist violence has, however, been partially offset
identify the US with reaction, intervention, and "neo-
by a rise in equally unsettling barricade and hostage
colonial" exploitation. Hence, American targets have
episodes.
a high symbolic value for "anti-imperialists" of both
12
FIRST
ATIONAL CITY BANK
A Classic Example of the Threat to Americans Abroad
On 4 August 1975, a group of Japanese Red Army terrorists seized the adjoining offices of
the US Embassy's consular section and the Swedish Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in a successful
bid to secure the release of several other terrorists who were then in Japanese custody. The
photo shows some of the hostage diplomats being herded onto a bus bound for the waiting
JAL jetliner that eventually carried the JRA gunmen and their newly freed compatriots to
Libya.
nationalistic and ideological persuasion. Moreover,
unavoidably subjective judgments concerning the
such targets also tend to have a high "embarrassment
relative difficulty, risk, and shock value associated
quotient" in relation to the governments of the
with often quite dissimilar incidents. Nevertheless, the
countries in which the attacks occur and, if different,
inherent dynamics and logic of a campaign of terrorist
the governments against which the terrorists levy their
violence are such that it has a natural propensity to
demands.
escalate over time. Globally, this has found reflection
Despite their summary nature, the group profiles
in the adoption and spread of aggressive new tactics.
Locally, it has been manifested in the tendency of
set forth in Appendix C serve, in part, to document the
three additional trends-beginning with the
proliferation of active terrorist groups in recent
years-that were cited as particularly significant at
the outset of this study. For example, even though the
criteria employed for selecting the groups included in
Appendix C (relative levels of activity or prominence)
tended to favor long-lived formations, the majority of
the organizations listed therein are less than eight
years old. Less evident from the profiles but perhaps
more significant is the instability and ephemeral
quality that have been characteristic of many if not
most of the organizations that have engaged in
transnational terrorism over the past decade. The net
growth in their numbers has, in fact, been as much
attributable to the splintering of old groups as to the
emergence of entirely new ones.
Debris flies through the air as the PFLP commences
destruction of the three airliners-worth a total of $20
The next-mentioned trend-that toward bolder
million-that it hijacked to Dawson Field, Jordan in early
actions-has been uneven. Moreover, its precise
September 1970.
contours defy precise definition for they depend on
13
certain groups to probe the effective limits of any such
more smoke than fire.* But at a lower level, a growing
innovation that they elect to employ before scaling
network of overlapping ad hoc alliances and mutual
back on its use or on their associated demands. Thus
assistance arrangements have added an ominous new
we have witnessed:
dimension to the terrorist threat.
-the multiple skyjacking operation staged by the
Although terrorist groups in the Western
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in
Hemisphere seem to have been entering the picture
September 1970 which capped the wave of
more often of late, this phenomenon has been most
aircraft seizures that had begun two years
evident in Europe and the Middle East where the
earlier;*
advantages that can be derived from transnational
-the all time record for multiple and cumulative
cooperation have brought together some strange
diplomatic kidnappings established by the
bedfellows indeed. For example, support rendered by
Tupamaros between mid-1970 and early 1971 in
individuals associated with the anarchist Baader-
their effort to secure the release of about 150
Meinhof Gang facilitated preparations for the attack
imprisoned collaborators; and
on the Israeli Olympic team which was staged by the
extremist but relatively non-revolutionary Palestinian
-the escalation of the amount of ransom
Black September Organization in the fall of 1972. Not
demanded by Argentine terrorists for the release
only have the Popular Front for the Liberation of
of kidnapped multinational corporation
Palestine (PFLP) and the Japanese Red Army (JRA)
executives from $62,500 in 1971 to a reported
teamed up in a number of dramatic ventures, but-as
figure of over $60 million in 1975.
suggested by the fact that the three Japanese gunmen
Because of the complexity of the relationships
who executed the Lod Airport massacre in May 1972
involved, the sensitive nature of much of the available
carried papers forged in Germany and weapons that
information, and the questions which are raised with
they had picked up in Italy-both organizations have
respect to the past and present role of various state
received assistance from a number of other terrorist
actors, the third trend-that toward more extensive
groups in various parts of the world. The Turkish
international cooperation among terrorist
People's Liberation Army has used Palestinian
groups-deserves detailed examination in a separate
training camp facilities in Syria and has reciprocated
research study. Indeed, although a number of
by attacking Israeli targets in Turkey. The Irish
notations concerning known or suspected
Republican Army (IRA) has developed links with a
transnational links have been included in the material
number of terrorist organizations outside the UK and
presented in Appendix C, the broad scope of this
Northern Ireland, including separatist groups in
paper precludes more than a brief overview of the
France and Spain as well as some Palestinian
problem.
formations in the Middle East.
So far, at least, the efforts of various terrorist
Overall, more and more groups throughout the area
have begun providing each other with arms, safe
groups to promote broad regional and inter-regional
coordination through the holding of periodic
housing, and other forms of support. In fact, there is
conferences and the formation of such umbrella
evidence that a European-based terrorist "service
organizations as Latin America's Revolutionary
industry" has emerged in the form of organizations
Coordination Junta (JCR) seem to have generated
devoted primarily or exclusively to providing training,
documentation, and other specialized assistance to
*See photo on p. 13. In a series of well-coordinated actions (all
revolutionary and national liberation movements in
but one of which were staged during the course of a single day: 6
all corners of the world. Just how complicated this
September 1970), the PFLP hijacked four airliners and attempted
web of interrelationships has become is well illustrated
to seize a fifth. One plane was flown to Cairo, where it was
by France's celebrated-but still murky-"Carlos
destroyed as soon as the passengers and crew had disembarked. The
Affair" and its recent dramatic sequel in Vienna (see
other three aircraft were diverted to a landing strip in the Jordanian
desert. These were blown up on 12 September, but some of their
pages 16-17).
passengers were held hostage for another 13 to 18 days.
*The JCR is composed of Argentina's Revolutionary People's Army
**In the latter case, the Montoneros organization kidnapped Jorge
(ERP), Bolivia's National Liberation Army (ELN), Chile's Movement
and Juan Born, co-owners and directors of Bunge and Born Ltd., in
of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), Paraguay's National Liberation
September 1974 and held them for nine months. An additional
Front (FREPALINA), and the remnants of Uruguay's National
condition for their release-which also was met-was the publication in
Liberation Movement (MLN/Tupamaros). Backed by the ERP's
several leading Western papers of a full page political "announcement"
overflowing coffers, it has grown more active in recent months and has
drawn up by their captors (see Figure 3).
the potential for becoming an effective and dangerous organization.
14
A
28
Thursday
June
1001
THE WASHINGTON POST
The Following Commentary is a paid advertisement"
"The Following Commentary is a paid advertisement"
"The Following Commentary is a paid advertisement"
Bunge and Born Ltd. wishes to clarify that it has been forced to publish this an-
deemed to imply agreement with its content.
nouncement by the imposition of the Organization which holds in its power its
In relation to the judgment made by the Organization against the company the
executives Jorge and Juan Born. In no circumstances should its publication be
following clarifications are in order:
1. In Aregntina for the last 30 years salaries have been established by collective wage bargaining committees
with the respective national trade union.
7. On the contrary the Company is the only one in Argentina which exports technology and ingresses the
2. The Company has always respected these agreements. It has been the permanent policy of the company to
corresponding royalties.
maintain income levels above those established in the collective
8. It has always been the consistent policy of the Company not to finance investments in one country with
3. In the areas of its activities the Company pays the highest wages and offers the best working conditions in
resources derived from another. On the other hand the Argentina Central Bank prohibits such transfers
the country. The related confirmatory information can be obtained from the relative trade unions.
and the Company respects the law.
4. Leaving aside the definition of the term "multinational monopoly, no Argentine has the right to deprive
another Argentine of his rights as citizen.
9. Peron was overthrown in 1955 by a military putsch in which the Company neither directly nor indriectly
played any part.
5. The fact that Company has activities in various countries by no means implies that its shareholders or its
executives disown their own.
10. The company resoultely opposes any attempt to impose ideas by methods of violence.
6. The Company the most important one in the Argentine Republic and that which has effected the greatest
11. The Company's files contain correspondence with General Peron which bears ample witness to the high
investments. This casts doubt on the assertion that it has transferred its capital abroad.
level of respect and esteem felt by the General towards the Company.
"In September, 1974 the Montoneros decided to submit the company Bunge y Born to
a revolutionary trial. The antecedents relative to the Company's activities were studied
THE TREASON AGAINST THE POPULAR TRIUMPH OF 11th MARCH 1973
from its point of origin up to the present day, both in the country and abroad, and it was
Following the popular triumph of 11th March 1973 the imperialist strategy maintained
decided to make Bunge) Born respond to the following charges:
these principles and, far from confronting globally the Peronista government, proposed
1. Exploitation of the Working Class:
as its objective detracting from that triumph deposing from the government structures
the authentic Peronists and filling them little by little with the traitors.
For years this company has expanded thanks to the exploitation of its workers, by
With General Peron dead, this strategy entered into its final phase, and in a few months
paying them low salaries and appealing to police repression when mobilizations look
one of the greatest of popular triumphs became transformed into one of the most dicta-
place demanding justice in the distribution of profit.
torial, repressive and pro-imperialist governments that the Argentine people has had to
2. Monopolistic Practices
endure.
In addition to exploiting its workers the company has used on numerous opportuni-
From the 11th of March 1973 nothing remains, neither Peron as head of the Movement.
ties with differing devices strangling maneuvers to liquidate the small and medium
nor Campora as President; neither the provincial governors, nor the Ministers nor even
sized national company.
the program voted for by people. A small group lusting for power, pivots of the imperi-
alist strategy, has been accumulating in their hands the control of the institutional appa-
3. Agression against National Interests
ratus of the Peronista Movement and the Government. From there they defend the in-
In addition to the foregoing Bunge y Born has committed permanently attacks
terests of the monopolies vaunting the shirt of Peronism. They consist of the President
against specific national interests. Through the decapitalization which it generates by
Isabel Martinez, Minister Lopez Rega, Raul Lastiri, President of the Chamber of Depu-
using the profits earned in the country for foreign expansion, Bunge y Born has
ties, with all their unconditional followers.
ceased to be a national company to convert itself into a multinational monopoly
Economically the country is bankrupt, virtually in crisis. The inflation has reached a rate
thanks to exchange irregularities, thinking in the interests of the company and con-
of 10% per month and already the people have lost the capacity for shock; the real wage
spiring against the national interest. Additionally its participation backing the reac-
of the workers, continually deteriorating, makes it necessary to perform acrobatics to
tionary and pro-imperialist coup-d'etat that in 1955 overthrew the Peronists, linking
survive; investment is zero, there is no offtake of the labor force, and unemployment
itself permanently to the illegal governments that succeeded it, places the company
aggravates the decline in salaries; the external debt has climbed from 6.500 million dol-
in the position of enemy of the Argentine Republic in the political terrain. This fact
lars in 1974 to 9.300 million today; the balance of payments is in deficit, the hard cur-
was clearly demonstrated when the Peronists government came to power on March
rency reserves fall alarmingly daily; the devaluation of the Argentine currency is really
11, 1973 by its practice of creating supply shortages to provoke chaos and facilitate
outstanding-in six months the black market dollar has tripled in value; small and me-
the detraction of the popular triumph.
dium-sized industry is being liquidated. The world crisis of capitalism is thrown onto
the shoulders of the dependent countries; so that the multi-national monopolies may
With the object of carrying out the trial the Montoneros realized a military operation
save themselves from the disaster the Argentine people will, together with the other de-
and proceeded to detain Jorge and Juan Born, both owners and directors of the com-
pendent countries, suffer the consequences.
pany. Following extensive interrogation and an analysis of the magnitude of the respon-
The complement of this economic policy is a repression that has no parallels in the re-
sibility of the company in the charges formulated the Montoneros imposed on Bunge
cent history of the country. With the objective of simulating a popular government,
Born the following penalties:
which governs nourishing itself on the majority and with the consent of the minority, it
a) One year's prison for Jorge and Juan Born, later commuted to 9 months when the
is necessary to abort every kind of opposition be it justified or not. The most advanced
company fulfilled the remainder of the obligations.
repressive legislation has been imposed, making possible the joint action of the forces
b) Payment of a very large sum in dollars as bail for the freeing of Jorge and Juan Born,
of repression headed by the armed forces. Completing this institutionalized repressive
and fine for the crime of exchange irregularities, this sum being handed over to the
machinery there has been mounted from the very government the parapolice organiza-
Montoneros as the representatives of the national interest and to whose uses it will
tion, A.A.A., which has commited hundreds of savage assassinations with total impu-
be applied.
nity. Integrated by police, military and mercenaries, it imposes the politics of terror,
c) The delivery in townships, factories, schools and hospitals of merchandise to a value
blasting with bullets, dynamiting and setting on fire the popular militants. journalists,
of 1,000,000 dollars as punishment for the supply shortages the company inflicted
political leaders, priests, etc. At the head of this repressive machinery the Minister of
on the people.
Social Welfare Jose Lopez Rega pretends in his madness for power to emulate Hitler of
d) Immediate solution of the union conflicts produced during the period of imprison-
Nazi Germany. Similar in his methodology, Lopez Rega aspires to the control of all the
ment of both directors, accepting the demands of the workers.
apparatus of repression to invest himself with power and will never rest till he achieves
e) As retribution for the affront to the Argentine people that its participation in the 1955
his objectives.
coup d'etat represented, the placing in all its factories in the country of a bust of
Apart from repressing those who confront the government, there is necessary the si-
both General Peron and Eva Peron, granting the workers authorization to suspend
lence of the press. To that legislation which chokes the freedom of expression to the
activities and effect acts of homage when these are unveiled
closure of newspapers and magazines, there are added threats, persecution and the as-
f) The placing of the present announcement on the notice boards of these factories, ex-
sassination of those journalists who dare to make any criticism or simply gather the
hibiting it for period of 15 days.
truth and publish it. To the censure imposed by law there is added the autocensure
This operation of the Montoneros constitutes one of the most transcendental political
which terror imposes upon the media.
events of the country and is effected in the context of a situation really dramatic for the
In the face of all this the majority of the liberal political leaders-where Dr. Ricardo Bal-
Argentine People.
bin stands out-play at constructive opposition based on dialogue and respect for the
30 YEARS OF ANTI IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE
institutions". Masters of all the skills to make the popular struggles their own without
ever representing their interest, these gentlemen prefer to fall silent or speak ambigu-
During the last 30 years our people have been waging a heroic struggle against imperial-
ously rather than provoke a confrontation they cannot control. They defend the same
ism and its local allies. The national interests against those of imperialism; the forces
interests as the government, they differ in that they are liberals; they disagree with the
which fight for liberty combating those that favor dependence. Imperialism or the Na-
way in which the present policies-with which essentially they agree-are implemented
tion, Dependence or Liberation-these define the principal terms of the confrontation.
only because they are left to the side in the execution. Enemies of the process of Na-
One of the most important elements in this long fight is the emergence of the Peronista
tional Liberation, they are allies of the imperialist strategy of annihilating the Authentic
movement as the political identity of the Working Class and small urban and rural pro-
Peronism to frustrate the organization of the Working Class and the People to castrate
ducers, and as the organizational framework inside which the people engages in its
the revolutionary process.
global battle against the monopolistic interests.
The struggle against the pro-imperialist coup d' etat which in 1955 overthrew Peron, the
ONLY THE PEOPLE WILL SAVE THE PEOPLE
popular resistance which the people carried out for 18 years against the successive vari-
ants with which the system tried to frustrate the popular will, the resonant popular tri-
To overcome this critical situation into which the country has been dragged we cannot
umph that on 11th March 1973 terminated the Military Dictatorship of General Lanusse
count on any nationalist coup d'etat or anything similar; the Armed Forces will never
-these had as their central protagonist and the unifying axis of all sectors of the nation
defend the popular interests and at every moment they prove this. Nor can we hope
the Peronista Movement led from exile by General Peron.
that the most distinguished liberal political leaders abandon their posture of many years
Sons of these 18 years of resistance, matured by multiple popular struggles, as the ex-
of emulating the regime, helping to leave the people isolated from the decisions. The
pression of the highest levels of confrontation and as a synthesis of this long experi-
most heroic defenders of the "democratic institutions' provided these serve to
ence, there evolved the armed organizations of Peronism which then converged into
continue in a state of dependence-they have no hesitation in supporting constantly
the present politico-military organization of the Montoneros.
more this totalitarian government.
All methods were tried by Imperialism to destroy the Peronista Movement as the Move-
Today more than ever before there is fulfilled the pronouncement of General Peron:
ment for National Liberation: persecution, gaol, torture, shootings, exile-these
"Only the People can save the People".
clashed magainst a movement which maintained its unity around General Peron and
The Montoneros have accepted the historic challenge. To continue the process of Na-
which was intransigent in defense of the popular interests.
tional and Social Liberation has a concrete meaning, one path only to follow. It implies
With its attempts at destruction a failure, imperalism fell back on the ploy of joining the
deepening a process which can only be consistent to the extent it is hegomenised by
regime, trying to convert it into a liberal structure that co-exists inside the system, em-
the Working Class. Which will be possible when we construct a Popular Power which
plying it of its content of the masses, depriving it of its revolutionary essence and de-
liquidates the political, military and economic power of the imperialism which will be
stroying it as the Movement of National Liberation. It prepared and promoted double
definitize when we destroy the dependence on capitalism and constr socialism.
strategy: through bribery, infiltration, ideological penetration, the incorporation into
We assume the responsibility of the moment and we commit all our Les to:
the very economic structure of monopolies-through these, imperialism began to
1. Reconstruct the Peronist Movement as the authentic expression of the interests of
spawn a layer of business, union and political leaders who abandoned defense the
the Working Class and the People avoiding that these are destroyed by treason. The
interests of the Peronista people to convert themselves into the instrument of the impe-
Authentic Peronism will arise from this crisis strengthened by its experience of strug-
rialist strategy for the destruction of the Peronista Movement as the Movement for Na-
gle, converted into the Movement of National Liberation by means of which the Peo-
tional Liberation; traitors to the fatherland and the movement, the supporters of the
ple will wage its definitive war against imperialism.
monopolistic interests, these sectors chose in the confrontation the battle camp of De-
2. To promote the construction of the National Liberation Front which, led by the Per-
pendence. Simultaneously they savagely repressed all those leaders, militants and ag-
onist Movement, joins together in the fight for National Liberation small and me-
grupations which continue loyal to the interest of the working class and the people, and
dium sized businessmen and all those sectors which are in contradiction with impe-
which, faithful to the Fatherland and the movement, never abandoned the war for Lib-
rialism.
eration. There is invented on "institutional" Peronism, empty of the masses and full of
3. To continue without truce the resistance to the present government, laying bare its
traitors who accept docilely the rules of play of the system at the same time that they
anti-popular, repressive and pro-imperialist essence, attacking without respite the
attempt to annihilate the Authentic Peronism.
forces that sustain it until we achieve its annihilation.
PERON OR DEATH
LONG LIVE THE FATHERLAND
UNTIL VICTORY MY GENERAL
MONTONEROS"
BUNGE YBORN 301 Mayo, Buenos Aires. Argentina
Figure 3. The notice inserted in the Washington Post by Bunge and Born Ltd. as a
condition for the release of Jorge and Juan Born
15
THE SAGA OF CARLOS
Guided by a Lebanese guerrilla-turned-informen
year-old son of a wealthy and staunchly Communist
named Michel Moukarbel, three French
Venezuelan lawyer who had dispatched his family to
counterintelligence agents in Paris attempted to bring
London in 1966.
in a suspected terrorist-a man known to them only
by his cover name of Carlos-for questioning on the
Carlos' early political career was highlighted by a
evening of 27 June 1975. Inexplicably, they were
brief stint at the Patrice Lumumba University in
unarmed. Carlos was not. He escaped in a blaze of
Moscow-from whence he was reportedly expelled for
gunfire that left Moukarbel and two of the French
dissolute living and improper attitudes in early 1970.
security officers dead at the scene. The third French
Little is known of Carlos' movements in the wake of
agent was gravely wounded.
his unscheduled departure from the USSR. In any
event, more than a year was to pass before he returned
to London, and he apparently spent at least part of
this period in the Middle East. At some point in the
early 1970s, he became a member of the extensive
terrorist network operated by the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)-a fact openly
acknowledged by a PFLP spokesman in July 1975
with the boastful addition that Carlos and Moukarbel
had been planning a series of dramatic new actions
when the French authorities finally closed in on them.
Painstaking investigation of Carlos' known
associates subsequently revealed that, in addition to
Moukarbel (described by the PFLP as its "Paris
paymaster"), he had been working with a mixed
entourage of dedicated revolutionaries that included
several Latin Americans. One of the latter has been
further identified as a member of the secretariat of the
Colombian Communist Party. Carlos had also been
provided with shelter and other helpful services by a
number of women friends, including at least two
European nationals, who probably had little
knowledge of what he was really doing.
Charged, in general terms, with striking at
"Zionism and imperialism," the Carlos organization
A French police photo of Carlos in Paris
had apparently been given latitude to operate over a
wide geographic area embracing not only the UK and
Carlos vanished-leaving a thoroughly shaken
much of Continental Europe but, according to plans
French security service behind him-only to reappear
recovered by British authorities, parts of the Middle
as the leader of the group of terrorists that successfully
East as well. Moreover, evidence in the form of
took almost all the delegates to an OPEC ministerial-
records that had been maintained by Moukarbel and
level conference in Vienna hostage on 21 December
the nature of some of the weapons that Carlos had left
1975. He remains something of a man of mystery. But
for safekeeping with friends in England and France
during the months between his hasty exit from Paris
established that the group had been cooperating, in
and his dramatic return to the limelight, enough
keeping with PFLP policy, with a number of other
evidence documenting-or hinting at-remarkably
terrorist groups-most notably the Japanese Red
extensive terrorist activities and connections was
Army (JRA) and the German Baader-Meinhof Gang.
uncovered to make him seem like a real life "Jackal."
It now seems certain, for example, that Carlos and
The first piece in the jigsaw puzzle was furnished by a
Moukarbel were deeply involved in the planning of the
chance break in London that enabled the British to
JRA seizure of the French Embassy in The Hague in
identify Carlos as Illich Ramirez-Sanchez, the 25-
September 1974.
16
unknown. But Cuban officials had been maintaining
contact with members of the Carlos group in both
England and France, and the French were sufficiently
suspicious of this activity to send three of Havana's
diplomats packing in the wake of Carlos' escape.
Since 1974, at least, the group that Carlos had
headed in Paris had generally identified itself as the
"Mohammed Boudia Commando." When he
reappeared in Vienna in December 1975, it was at the
head of a seemingly new formation with a different
name (the "Arm of the Arab Revolution") and,
possibly, a different principal sponsor. (The PFLP has
denied responsibility for the OPEC operation; so too
has Libya, but the Egyptians, among others, have
openly accused Colonel Qaddafi of being behind it.) In
any event, the composition of Carlos' Vienna attack
force (believed to have consisted, in addition to its
Venezuelan leader, of two Germans and three
Palestinians) provided solid new evidence of the trend
toward closer cooperation among terrorists of
different nationalities.
ABOVE: The Soviet-made RPG-7 rocket launcher used by
members of Carlos' group in their abortive attack on an El
As of this writing, Carlos' whereabouts are again
Al plane at Orly airport outside Paris on 13 January 1975
unknown. Nor are the returns on his December
venture as yet all in. It remains to be seen, for ex-
BELOW: A French policeman points to the hole in the
ample, just what new international counter-
fuselage of the Yugoslav airliner that was hit by one of the
measures-if any-will result from that action.
rocket grenades fired at the El Al plane
Nevertheless, the immediate outcome of Carlos'
OPEC operation (including safe haven for the
terrorists and massive publicity for their
objectives)-coupled with his boast that he currently
controls some two-score seasoned profes-
sionals-suggests that the world will hear from him
again before too long.
JUGOSLOVENSKI
AEROTRANSPORT
Other headline incidents to which Carlos has been
linked since his near arrest in France include an
0E-LDB
assassination attempt against J. Edward Sieff (a
prominent English Jew and clothing-store magnate) in
December 1973; the bombing of a popular Paris Left
Bank hangout, Le Drugstore, in 1974; two attacks
against El Al aircraft at Orly Airport in January 1975;
and an assassination attempt against a Yugoslav
consular official in Lyons in March 1975. Extras or
The hostages taken in Carlos' attack on the OPEC
principals from other terrorist organizations were
ministerial-level conference in Vienna on 21 December
involved in some of these as well. To what extent, if
1975 board the Austrian Airlines DC-9 that flew them and
any, that state actors may also have taken a hand is
their captors to Algiers (with a side trip to Tripoli)
17
Why?
IRA and among the various Palestinian terrorist
The commonalities, differences, or changes in
groups are evidence enough of this. But far more
patterns of behavior that have been described thus far
research is needed before confident judgments will be
are, of course, attributable to the interplay of a host of
possible with respect to just what combinations of
variables. Only a few of these, i.e., the ones that seem
beliefs are most likely to foster repeated resort to
extreme and indiscriminate forms of violence.
to have had the greatest direct bearing on the timing,
scope, and nature of the internationalization of terror,
Since the extent and efficacy of internal security
are addressed at any length below. No attempt is
controls bear heavily on the frequency, form, and
made to develop some sort of model or overarching
domestic impact of transnational terrorist incidents in
theory with respect to this phenomenon. Far more
any given country, the proliferation of this form of
modest, the objective here is simply to ascertain to
political violence has both contributed to and fed upon
what extent the current rash of transnational (and, to
the recent trend toward more widespread resort to
a lesser degree, international) terrorist activity is
various forms of authoritarian rule. On one hand,
attributable to broad regional and global trends and
open societies and weak or permissive authoritarian
developments as opposed to unique and possibly
regimes are particularly vulnerable to such
transitory local problems and circumstances.
activity-and to its domestic ramifications. On the
other, rigid and forceful authoritarian rule can foster
A few general observations-some of them, perhaps
self-evident-are needed to set the problem in
transitional terrorism by forcing dissidents to operate
abroad.
perspective and to lay the groundwork for further
analysis. First of all, transnational terrorism is by
Together with earlier references to the basic societal
nature more congenial to urban than to rural-based
problems that can give rise to various forms of
groups and is thus characteristically spawned by
political violence, the foregoing observations focus on
societies at a mid to advanced stage of socio-economic
the human and local environmental factors affecting
development. Resort to international terrorism, on the
the extent, nature, and domestic impact of
other hand, is just as likely to result from calculations
transnational or international terrorist activity in
concerning the relative efficacy of alternative methods
different parts of the world. The question remains,
for bringing national power to bear in a given situation
however, as to just why there has been such a marked
as from an outright dearth of national resources.
and enduring upsurge in transnational terrorism over
Hence, such behavior is not the special province of any
the past eight years. In part, this phenomenon is
particular category of state.
attributable to a war-punctuated regional conflict
Modern-day practitioners of transnational
affecting the interests of a large number of nations and
terrorism have benefited from a generally permissive
attended by particularly deep-seated feelings of
international environment-a point which will be
bitterness and frustration. But it would not have
elaborated below. For the most part, therefore, the
grown to its present dimensions were it not for the
constraints on their behavior have either been a
concurrent convergence and acceleration of a number
function of local environmental factors affecting their
of changes in the global environment that had been
objective capabilities, opportunities, and alternatives
taking shape much earlier.
or have been self-imposed for tactical or philosophical
These trends are difficult to disaggregate.
reasons.
Technological advance, growing global inter-
These latter restraints are, of course, uncertain, for
dependence, and the increasing urgency attached to
personal predilections can be overshadowed by
forced draft modernization in many parts of the world
frustration or desperation. Nevertheless, as evidenced
are, for example, closely interrelated. But each bears
by the data presented in Appendices B and C, cultural
brief comment.
heritage has been a key factor affecting individual
The impact of new technology on terrorist
terrorist groups' perceptions of the limits beyond
capabilities with respect to weapons, mobility, and
which the level or intensity of violence is likely to
tactical communications has already been cited. As
become counterproductive. Moreover, although
evidenced by the development of ever more
generalization is difficult because the ideological mix
sophisticated letter bombs, the occasional
is different in almost every case, so-has what is here
employment of missiles, and the staging of
termed the group's credo or ethos. The sharp
coordinated actions in widely separated locations, it
differences in behavior between the two wings of the
has been significant. But whatever the nature of a
18
terrorist act or the means of its execution, it must be
business in 1968 becomes something of a logical if
remembered that the role of the media is critical to the
unexpected extension of a chain of developments that
spreading and intensification of its psychological
had included the emergence of the unruly New Left, a
impact. Hence, among all the technological advances
further proliferation of violence-prone splinter groups,
in recent years, the development of satellite
and the first indications of the general post-Guevara
communications, and in particular, their upgrading in
shift in emphasis from rural to urban guerrilla warfare
1968 to include a television capability have
in Latin America.*
unquestionably been among the most important in
The characteristics and contours of this
making transnational activity seem attractive to
terrorist groups.
"revolutionary atmosphere" have undergone some
change in the intervening years. The salience of some
The advent of satellite communications has also fed
of the original contributory issues, e.g., Vietnam, has
and underscored the thickening network of political,
faded. But, as amply illustrated by the increasingly
economic, and technological dependencies and
sympathetic treatment accorded to the Palestine
obligations now commonly subsumed under the rubric
Liberation Organization (PLO) in the United Nations
of interdependence. Whether or not this term has been
General Assembly (UNGA) and other international
abused of late, the growth in both the numbers and
forums over the past 18 months, that of the new
importance of international, transnational, and (as a
moral, political, and economic standards championed
consequence of the centralizing imperatives of local
by the Third World has not. On the contrary, now
modernization efforts) subnational linkages over the
backed by the new political clout of the Arab oil
past decade has had at least a two-fold impact on the
states, these values appear to be gaining in force. In
world-wide potential for terrorism. On the one hand,
short, the established postwar international political
it has created a host of new, vulnerable, and
system has been cast into something of a state of
potentially highly disruptive targets for terrorist
flux-with all that that implies with respect to its
attack (e.g., commercial and communications centers,
effective order-keeping capabilities.
transportation hubs, international power grids and
pipelines, super tankers, and jumbo aircraft). On the
Terrorists have benefited from this overall state of
other, it has generated a sort of identity crisis that has
affairs in many ways. Among other things, it has:
been reflected in a troublesome countervailing upsurge
-Accorded an aura of legitimacy to the acts of any
of nationalism and ethnicity.
terrorist group claiming leftist revolutionary or
national liberation movement status;
For their part, the many other strains and
dislocations associated with the process of
-Frustrated efforts to develop more effective
modernizing change have swelled the ranks of the
international countermeasures;
alienated in many parts of the world. They have also
-Facilitated transnational contact and cooperation
added millions of emigre workers to the international
among terrorist groups;
pool of political exiles and refugees which terrorists
can exploit for cover, recruits, and various forms of
-Fostered a significant increase in the number of
operational support.
national, transnational, and international
organizations providing national liberation
The upsurge in transnational terrorism has also
movements and other "progressive" dissident
been aided and abetted by a "revolutionary" turn in
the overall political environment somewhat
*With Guevara's demise and subsequent decline in stature as a
reminiscent of that experienced about 200 years ago.
revolutionary theorist and tactician, the works of such leading
The postwar order has, in fact, come under challenge
advocates of terrorist violence as Fannon, Satre, and Marighela
from all sides: from the developing nations of the
have assumed increasing importance as a major literary source of
Third World; from "maverick" Communist regimes;
inspiration for ultra militants in many parts of the world.
from dissatisfied second rank powers; and from a
**The PLO is a political umbrella organization embracing several
broad array of social forces fired, with differing
Fedayeen commando groups. It was accorded recognition as the
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (at the
degrees of responsibility, by a new sense of "social
expense of Jordan) by the 1974 "Islamic nonaligned" and Rabat
conscience."
summit meetings. In November of that same year, it was granted
observer status by the UNGA. All told, some 50 states have allowed
By late 1967, the potential for a general escalation
the PLO to open offices in their capitals. In addition, five UN-
of political violence was clear. Viewed in this context,
affiliated international agencies (ILO, WHO, UPU, ITU, and
the Palestinians' dramatic entry into the air piracy
UNESCO) have granted it observer status.
19
formations with various forms of direct and
Tripoli's focus has been on nationalist formations,
indirect support.
whatever their ideological coloration or religious
leanings. Thus, the recipients of its favors (in the form
The attitudes and behavior of supportive
of various combinations of financial, logistical, and
states-ranging from those willing to provide little
technical support) have been numerous and varied. In
more than kind words and occasional safe haven to
addition to some of the more militant Palestinian
those that regularly furnish practicing or potential
splinter groups, they have included the Irish
terrorists with funds, arms, training, documentation,
Republican Army and a number of less widely known
and other operational support-have constituted
guerrilla movements based in the Philippines,
another key global environmental factor affecting the
Ethiopia, Somalia, the People's Democratic Republic
scope and nature of transnational terrorist activity
of Yemen, Chad, Morocco, Tunisia, Thailand, and
during the period under review. Variable might be a
Panama.
better term, however, for the extent of such assistance
has fluctuated with changing appreciations of broader
This list is not exhaustive. Moreover, it bodes well
interests on the part of the state actors involved. For
to grow since, despite Tripoli's professions of
example, 1975 witnessed a distinct downward trend in
reluctance to grant safe haven to the JRA terrorists
such support.
who seized the American Consulate General in Kuala
Lumpur in August 1975, there have as yet been no
In any event, if one excludes the simply indulgent or
convincing indications that Colonel Qaddafi has
indifferent (including those liberal Western European
undergone a change of heart.
states like France and Switzerland that, because of
their strategic location and the extensive protection
Moscow's posture has been more ambiguous.
they accord to democratic rights and freedoms, have
Basically, the Soviets have had serious misgivings
become involuntary hosts to all manner of foreign
about the utility of transnational terrorist activity.
dissident groups) the list of nations in question
They have repeatedly warned that excessive violence
dwindles to less than a score. Counting a few states
can tarnish the reputation of those involved and have
that have recently retired-or partially retired-from
stressed their belief that such tactics are not only
the business, these "activists" include (but are not
generally unproductive but can lead to unforeseen and
limited to) Libya, Cuba, the USSR, China, North
possibly uncontrollable adverse consequences. At the
Korea, Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of
same time, however, the Kremlin's broader
Yemen, Tanzania, Congo, Zaire, Egypt, Syria, Iraq,
interests-including, importantly, those stemming
and, however reluctant it has been to engage in such
from its continuing adversary relationship with
activity, Lebanon.
Peking-have denied it the option of a straight-
forward hands-off policy. Thus, after a period of
In some of these states, most of the support
hesitancy, the Soviets began channelling funds,
rendered to foreign revolutionary or guerrilla
weapons, and other assistance to fedayeen groups
formations has been directed toward influencing the
through a number of intermediaries in 1969. All
course of developments in one or two neighboring
indications are that they continue to do so today.*
states or territories. And for many, perhaps most, the
Similarly, they have continued their long-standing
actual promotion of terrorist violence has been no
program (the more innocuous aspects of which are
more than a largely unintended byproduct of their
publicly associated with Moscow's Patrice Lumumba
activities. Nevertheless, in one way or another, all of
University) of bringing young revolutionaries from all
them have directly contributed to the recent upsurge
parts of the Third World to the Soviet Union for
of transnational terrorism.
training and indoctrination. And like Carlos, some of
these individuals have subsequently cropped up on the
Two or three bear special mention. Take Libya, for
transnational terrorist scene.
example. The oil-rich Qaddafi regime has for some
There is also a considerable body of circumstantial
years been the world's most unabashed governmental
evidence linking Moscow to various terrorist
proponent of revolutionary violence. And from the
formations in Western Europe. That some linkages
number of times that Libya has been linked to specific
terrorist groups and incidents-including Carlos' raid
on the OPEC meeting in Vienna-it would appear
*In their commentary on fedayeen activities, however, the Soviets
have consistently been careful to distinguish between "permissible"
that Colonel Qaddafi has also been one of the world's
attacks on "legitimate" targets inside Israel and "regrettable"
least inhibited practioners of international terrorism.
incidents involving noncombatant third parties.
20
exist may, in fact, be taken for granted, for the broad
terrorist groups are likely to engage in more frequent
considerations cited above give the Soviets ample
ransom and resupply operations of their own. Partly
reason for selectively attempting to monitor,
because of this, and partly because Castro has made it
penetrate, and gain some influence over such groups.
abundantly clear that he does not intend to effect a
But for obvious reasons, they have had to be very
parallel cutback in his support of armed revolutionary
circumspect. They seem, for example, to have relied
struggle outside of Latin America, the impact of
more heavily there than anywhere else on the
Cuba's new posture on the overall level of
cooperation of intermediaries who, if exposed, can be
transnational terrorism may be minimal.
plausibly represented as having acted on their own
initiative. In any event, the only hard evidence of
The last and most elusive global variable to be
Warsaw Pact member assistance to individuals
addressed here is the overall economic environment. It
associated with the Baader-Meinhof Gang points to
can impact on the problem of terrorism in a number of
Pankow and Prague. The arms destined for the non-
subtle and, in some cases, countervailing ways. For
Marxist Provisional Wing of the IRA that were seized
example, extra-cyclical world-wide economic
at Schiphol Airport in Holland in late 1971 were of
strains-such as those generated by the sudden
Czechoslovak origin and had been handled by a
quadrupling of oil prices-can so overtax the
Czechoslovak firm. Even in the original "Carlos
capabilities of local regimes as to invite domestic
Affair," Cuba was the state actor most directly
violence of a sort that could easily spill over national
implicated. In short, the true dimensions of Soviet
boundaries. Short of this, they can contribute to a
involvement remain extremely difficult to ascertain.
general undercurrent of unrest by curtailing the
resources that can be devoted to ameliorating societal
Nonetheless, one thing is clear. However much the
ills.
Soviets might wish otherwise, their efforts to gain
some handle on extremist activity have, together with
Because the social and political effects of cyclical
their pursuit of less congruent objectives, done more
trends in the overall economic climate tend to be
to aggravate than to contain the current rash of
delayed and uneven, the potential consequences of
transnational terrorist activity. The hard fact is that it
short-term fluctuations do not lend themselves to
is difficult to translate assistance into leverage or
generalization. Medium- to long-term trends,
control when there are other available sources of
however, can affect both the potential and the
support. Indeed, as the Soviets should by now have
opportunities for transnational terrorist activity in any
learned, any assistance provided to an extremist group
given area. In so far as it affects industrialized
under these circumstances risks simply increasing the
countries, rising economic prosperity can, for
recipient's potential for autonomous action.
example, facilitate the undetected movement of
terrorist groups by fostering a heavy flow of tourist
A third actor deserving of separate comment is
and commercial travel. It also attracts the large
Cuba-not so much because of the extent of Havana's
aggregations of emigre workers that not only make it
past activities in support of revolution and rebellion,
easier for foreign terrorists to escape notice but
but because there is mounting evidence (such as the
provide a ready pool of manpower for their
statement issued at the conclusion of the regional
operational teams and support mechanisms. More
Communist conference which was hosted by the
broadly, a prolonged and general economic upturn
Cubans in June 1975) that Castro's ambiguous
can increase local potentials for political violence
policies have finally undergone a fundamental change
by causing popular expectations to far outpace
in this regard. After years of hedging, the Cubans have
governmental capacities to deliver. And in more
now publicly espoused Moscow's recommended via
affluent societies, at least, the attendant emphasis on
pacifica strategy with respect to revolutionary struggle
materialistic values can alienate significant segments
in Latin America-a development which bodes ill for
of the student and intellectual communities. Indeed, a
those smaller militant formations that still rely heavily
combination of these last two destabilizing trends
on Cuban support. It would appear that they will have
contributed, together with the factors cited earlier, to
to fall in line or face the risk of extinction. But many
the emergence of a distinctly "revolutionary" political
of Latin America's more active proponents of armed
atmosphere in the late 1960s.
struggle are less vulnerable to Cuban retrenchment.
Some are already highly self-sufficient. Of the
Conversely, a prolonged economic decline
remainder, those who are unable to tap the enormous
(something which some observers predict the world
war chests that have been accumulated by Argentine
will experience for the next 20 years or more) has
21
YORK
LIBRAR
generally tended to dampen revolutionary ardor.
-40 percent chance that all or some demands
Popular expectations decline, and people everywhere
would be met in operations where something
are preoccupied with the exigencies of day-to-day
more than just safe passage or exit permission
existence. But the world has much changed since its
was demanded;
last broad economic slide. Whether the numbing
effects of generalized adversity will be felt as strongly
-29 percent chance of full compliance with such
demands;
in the future is thus open to question. Their potential
impact on the level of transnational terrorist activity is
-83 percent chance of success where safe passage
even more uncertain. The actors engaged therein are
or exit, for the terrorists themselves or for others,
scarcely representative of the general population.
was the sole demand;
They are few in number and elitist by nature. And
given the proven strength of their convictions, they are
-67 percent chance that, if concessions to the
likely to be among the most resistant to the
principal demands were rejected, all or virtually
all members of the terrorist team could still
psychological effects of untoward changes in the
overall economic environment.
escape alive by going underground, accepting safe
passage in lieu of their original demands, or
How Cost Effective?
surrendering to a sympathetic government; and
The answer to this question depends on the vantage
-virtually a 100 percent probability of gaining
point of the observer. The achievement of
major publicity whenever that was one of the
disproportionately large effects from the employment
terrorists' goals.*
of minimal resources is, of course, what political
terrorism is all about. Its most serious drawback is
Such hostage operations have resulted in the freeing
that its consequences are, as the Soviets maintain, to a
of large numbers of prisoners, the payment of huge
considerable degree unpredictable. It can alienate
ransoms, and in one case where Austria was targetted,
those groups whose sympathy was sought. Rather
the changing of government policy. Until mid-1974, at
than disorient the masses, it can rally them to a
least, the record for skyjacking was fully comparable.
previously unpopular government. It can galvanize a
Out of 127 terrorist attempts to seize aircraft between
weak or wavering government into forceful
March 1968 and early July 1974, only a dozen were
counteraction. In short, tactical successes can, as in
abortive. Of the remainder, less than 10 are known for
Jordan in 1970 and Uruguay in 1970-72, lead to
certain to have ended in the death or imprisonment of
strategic reverses of major proportions.
the terrorists. In a great majority of cases through
1972, the skyjackers were successful in securing full
This risk is, however, easily accepted by those who
compliance with their demands. Thereafter, however,
dispose of no effective alternative methods for
they generally received no more than safe haven, and
achieving their goals. Moreover, despite a number of
for the past year and a half, skyjacking has been a
sobering experiences, the overall balance sheet thus
distinctly losing proposition. Of the 6 attempts made
far provides the practitioners of transnational
between late July 1974 and the end of 1975, 4 were
terrorism with grounds for considerable optimism.
nipped in the bud and the other 2 brought sentences of
Briefly put, the record shows that both trans-
death or life in prison to the terrorists involved.
national and international terrorists have generally
been successful in avoiding capture (or, if caught, in
Terrorist acts lacking a bargaining dimension (e.g.,
escaping punishment) and in meeting at least some of
bombings and assassinations) have generally entailed
their proximate objectives. For example, in a study of
a correspondingly lower degree of risk. All told, only
about 267 individuals associated with transnational
63 major kidnapping and barricade operations
executed between early 1968 and late 1974, the
terrorist activity have been caught in the past five
RAND Corporation concluded that such actions were
years. Of these, 39 were freed without punishment, 58
subject to the following probabilities of risk and
escaped punishment by getting safe conduct to
another country, 16 were released from confinement
success:
-87 percent probability of actually seizing
*As excerpted in Terroristic Activity-International Terrorism:
hostages;
Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
-79 percent chance that all members of the
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
terrorist team would escape punishment or death,
Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session; Part 4; May 14,
whether or not they successfully seized hostages;
1975 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 240.
22
One Barricade and Hostage Operation That Went Awry
On 24 April 1975, a group of West German terrorists identifying themselves as members
of the Holger Meinz Commando seized the FRG Embassy in Stockholm in a bloody and
abortive attempt to force Bonn to release 26 individuals associated with the Baader-Meinhof
organization from jail. When their demands were refused, the terrorists dynamited the top
story of the embassy building in an equally unsuccessful effort to cover their escape. The
photo shows the embassy burning in the background as Swedish police carry off one of the
captured terrorists.
on the demand of fellow terrorists, 50 were released
figures in better perspective, consider the fact that
after serving out their prison terms, and 104 were still
they fall somewhat short of the total casualties
in jails as of mid-September 1975. The average
attributable to domestic terrorism in Northern Ireland
sentence meted out to those terrorists who have
alone during the same period or that Argentine
actually stood trial has been 18 months.
terrorists and "counterterrorists" have managed to
How Disruptive?
kill more than 1,000 of their countrymen since mid-
1974. For a starker contrast, take Vietnam. There, in
The human and material toll exacted by
one year (1968), Viet Cong terrorists were credited
transnational and international terrorist violence over
with assassinating 6,000 people and wounding 16,000
the past eight years has beeen relatively low. For
more. Comparisons with "normal" levels of domestic
example, although the total cost of such activity in
violence in the US may also be useful. There were, for
terms of ransom payments and property damage has
example, about 20,000 homicides-and more than
never been tallied, all indications are that it falls far
2,000 bombings-recorded here in 1975.
short of the half billion dollars loss suffered to school
vandals in the US each year.
The juxtaposition of these statistics suggests that
the dimensions of the problem posed by transnational
Closer track has been kept of the human casualties
and international terrorism are still quite small and
involved. Latest estimates place these at about 800
that the increase in such activity since 1968, while
killed and 1,700 wounded-including the losses
marked, should have done little to undermine world
incurred by the terrorists themselves. To put these
order. But the disruptive impact of these terrorist
incidents and campaigns has been magnified by the
*"Terrorism: 'Growing and Increasingly Dangerous'," (Interview
with Robert A. Fearey, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
publicity they have received and by their interaction
and Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism), U.S. News and World
with other destabilizing trends and forces. Thus, while
Report, 29 September 1975, p. 79.
the terrorists have made no revolutions and, by
23
DATELINE:
HIGHLIGHTS OF A YEAR-END
AND INTERNATIONAL
2 DECEMBER: South Molluccan Terrorists Seize a Dutch Train
South Molluccan terrorists pick up
supplies outside the train that they held for
12 days before surrendering to Dutch
authorities.
4 DECEMBER: South Molluccan Terrorists Seize the Indonesian
Consulate in Amsterdam
A blindfolded and tethered hostage is
displayed on a third floor balcony of the
Indonesian Consulate on 5 December-a
full two weeks before his South Molluccan
captors finally laid down their arms and
surrendered.
24
DECEMBER 1975
UPSURGE IN MAJOR TRANSNATIONAL
TERRORIST INCIDENTS
21 DECEMBER: The Carlos-Led "Arm of the Arab Revolution" Attacks
the OPEC Ministers' Meeting in Vienna
Wounded in the assault on OPEC's
Vienna headquarters, a terrorist is
carried off to the hospital. The following
day, he was placed on board the plane
that carried the rest of his group and 43
of their hostages to North Africa.
SMTWTFS
21 DECEMBER: An American
123456
Employee of a US Firm is Kidnapped
in Ethiopia by Eritrean Terrorists
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 29 30 31
23 DECEMBER: A US Embassy
Official is Gunned Down by Unidenti-
22 Days of Terror: The overlapping periods
fied Terrorists in Athens
of direct terrorist violence associated with the five
incidents cited here spanned almost the whole
month of December.
25
themselves at least, toppled no governments, they
In short, while scarcely cataclysmic, the spoiling
have:
effects of modern-day transnational and international
terrorism have been substantial. Harking back to
-Embarrassed several governments and con-
earlier discussion, this state of affairs is both a
tributed to the effective collapse of a few (e.g., the
measure and, in large part, a consequence of
initial Bordaberry Administration in Uruguay
increasing global interdependence. As the dimensions
and the Isabel Peron regime in Argentina);
and complexity of the web of interstate and
transnational linkages that together comprise the
-Added an abrasive new dimension to both North-
functional core of the "international system" have
South and East-West relations;
grown under the impact of technological advance, the
-Contributed to the growing international status
reverberations of events-including terrorist
and fortunes of the PLO;
attacks-which disturb or threaten its more important
intersections have tended to become increasingly
-Compelled some nations to temporarily abandon
widespread and sharply felt. At the same time, the
their law enforcement function (e.g., to release
limits within which individual states can attempt to
captured terrorists) out of fear of future
cope with such problems through unilateral action
retribution;
without risk of adversely affecting the interests of
-Aggravated and accentuated the dilemmas
others have steadily narrowed. But, as previously
generated within the existing international system
observed, rather than encourage increasing interest in
by the emergence of a growing company of
supranational solutions, the frustrations born of this
powerful non-state actors;
de facto shrinkage of sovereignty have generated an
unhelpful backlash of nationalism. And this, of
-Introduced strains in relations among those
course, has been one of the key factors that have
Western nations which, because of divergent
affected the nature and effectiveness of the
national interests, feel constrained to adopt
international community's response to the terrorist
differing positions with respect to specific
threat.
incidents or broader terrorist-related issues;
-Reinforced the currently pervasive sense of global
What International Constraints?
flux and disorder;
-Caused a large number of nations, including the
With the exception of a number of bilateral
US, to divert substantial resources to defense
agreements providing, inter alia, for a greater
against terrorist attacks;*
exchange of intelligence and technical assistance or, as
-Adversely affected the quality of life in many
in the memorandum of understanding concerning
open or formerly open societies.
hijackers of aircraft and vessels that was signed by the
US and Cuba in 1973, for the prompt extradition of
specified categories of terrorists, the international
*In the US, this has been reflected most clearly in the installation
response to terrorism has been relatively weak and
of an effective but costly airport security system and, following the
ineffective.
Khartoum incident of 1973, in a supplemental $20 million
appropriation provided to the Department of State for the sole
The UN's problems in grappling with transnational
purpose of improving the security of American diplomatic and
terrorism were cited and illustrated at the outset of
consular installations abroad. The construction of a special bomb-
this study. International terrorism, however, has
proof courthouse in which to try the captured leaders of the Baader-
Meinhof Gang was one of the more notable extra expenses that have
proved to be a somewhat less contentious issue.
been incurred by Bonn. By the time these proceedings are over, it is
Indeed, the Declaration on Principles of International
estimated that they will have cost the West German taxpayer more
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
than $6 million. Even the liberal Swedes have become nervous since
Among States which the General Assembly adopted
incurring the wrath of the JRA in March 1975 by arresting two
without vote on 24 October 1970 asserts at one point
members of that group and deporting them to Japan. In any event,
that:
they chose to take no chances when they hosted the Chilean Davis
Cup tennis team some six months later. They converted the
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing,
fashionable coastal resort where the matches were held into a
veritable fortress protected by floodlights; fences up to 35 feet high;
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or
and a 1,300-man police force equipped with gunboats, helicopters,
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized
scores of dogs, and some 50 horses.
activities within its territory directed towards the commission
26
of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present
of Civil Aviation): Signed in September 1971, it
paragraph involve a threat or use of force.*
came into force in January 1973. Covering the
sabotage or destruction of aircraft or air
But even as an essentially unenforcible admonition,
this rule of behavior is weakened and clouded by the
navigational facilities, it requires the contracting
greater emphasis that the Declaration accords to the
parties to make such offenses subject to severe
penalties and establishes the same extradition-or-
"principal of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples." The language employed in this regard
prosecution system for offenders as in The Hague
implies that it is the overriding duty of all states to
Convention. Sixty-three countries have ratified it.
assist groups struggling for the realization of these
The Organization of American States
rights in every way possible. For example, the
Convention (Convention to Prevent and Punish
Declaration avers that:
Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion that are
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action
of International Significance): Signed in
which deprives people referred to above in the elaboration of
February 1971, it entered into force in October
the present principles of their right to self-determination and
1973 (the US is a signatory, but not a party).
freedom and independence. In their actions against, and
With its emphasis on the prevention and
resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of
punishment of crimes against persons to whom
their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to
the state owes a special duty of protection under
seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes
international law, it was a precursor of the UN
and principles of the Charter. [Emphasis added]**
convention concerning the protection of
There have, in addition, been a total of five
diplomats which is cited below. It also employs
international conventions adopted over the past 12
The Hague Convention extradite-or-prosecute
years that have dealt with one or another aspect (in all
formula. Only four of the thirteen signatory
cases rather narrow) of the terrorism problem. These
countries have ratified it.
are as follows:
The United Nations Convention on the
-The Tokyo Convention (Convention on Offenses
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Internationally Protected Persons Including
Aircraft): Signed in September 1963, it did not
Diplomatic Agents: Signed in December 1973, it
come into force until December 1969. It is a very
has yet to come into force. It requires the
limited accord which does no more than to set a
contracting states to establish certain specified
few jurisdictional ground rules and to require the
acts against protected persons (or against the
contracting states to (1) make every effort to
official premises, private accommodations, or
restore control of the aircraft to its lawful
means of transport of such a person) as crimes
commander and (2) arrange for the prompt
under internal law. Once again, The Hague
onward passage or return of hijacked aircraft
Convention on extradite-or-prosecute formula
together with their passengers, cargo, and crew.
applies. So far, only nine countries have ratified
As of this writing, 77 countries have ratified it.
it.
-The Hague Convention (Convention for the
Although they reflect international concern and at
Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft):
Signed in December 1970, it came into force 10
least a slim majority consensus that something must
months later. Its principal feature is that it
be done, these conventions presently do not, singly or
in combination, constitute much of an effective
requires (albeit with important discretionary
exceptions) contracting parties either to extra-
constraint on terrorist activity. In the first place, many
dite or to prosecute skyjackers. Seventy-four
states-including a high percentage of those that have
countries have ratified it.
been particularly active in supporting revolutionary or
national liberation groups-are not yet parties
-The Montreal Convention (Convention for the
thereto. Secondly, the conventions lack teeth in that
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
all make the extradition or prosecution of terrorists
subject to discretionary escape clauses and none
*Yearbook of the United Nations: 1970 (New York: United
provides for the application of punitive sanctions
Nations Office of Public Information, 1971), p. 790.
against states that simply refuse to comply at all.
**Ibid., p. 791.
Finally, the exclusive focus on skyjacking and the
27
protection of diplomats leaves a good deal of terrorist
salutary catalytic effect may yet be borne out in
activity outside the cognizance of international law.
practice.) There are, moreover, a host of other factors
which could alter the attitudes and behavior of any of
But this, it would seem, is all the traffic will bear.
the state actors concerned. Hence, whether or not all
The US has tried repeatedly to correct some of these
the obstacles to a more effective international
deficiencies and has run into a stonewall of opposition
response that have been cited thus far will retain their
on each occasion. For example, at the conclave
present force in the decade ahead is a valid
sponsored by the International Civil Aviation
question-and it is one that is addressed below.
Organization (ICAO) that formulated the final draft
of The Hague Convention, the US delegation sought
IV. THE OUTLOOK
unsuccessfully to (1) limit drastically exceptions to
International Terrorism
extradition of hijackers, (2) establish hijacking as a
common crime, and (3) exclude political motivation as
Although it is possible that a few others may
a defense against extradition or prosecution of
emulate the irresponsible behavior of Libya's Colonel
hijackers. Two years later, in September 1972, the US
Qaddafi, international terrorism seems unlikely to
submitted a draft convention to the UNGA that was
pose much of a threat to world order or US interests
aimed at limiting the "export" of terrorism. But even
during the next few years. Even in its presently
though it established a number of restrictive criteria
weakened state, the international system subjects
that would have to be met before its enforcement
states to a host of legal obligations and practical
provisions became applicable, it was effectively stifled
constraints that they can ignore only at considerable
by opposition centering on the impermissibility of
risk. The continuing force of these considerations is
interference with the right of self-determination. The
evidenced by the fact that international terrorism is no
following summer, a proposal sponsored by the US
more prevalent today than it was in 1968.
and several other nations for a separate enforcement
Indeed, throughout the entire postwar era, both the
convention that would have backed the Tokyo,
weak and the musclebound have tended to view
Hague, and Montreal documents with sanctions
international terrorism as a policy tool to be used
affecting the rights and services guaranteed under
sparingly and (except when exercising their "right" of
existing international and bilateral air service
retaliation) discreetly when potentially effective
agreements was soundly defeated at the ICAO's
alternative means are lacking. Moreover, while no
Rome Conference and Assembly.
apologia for such activity is intended, it should be
The obstacles which have blocked more effective
noted that-with the exception of certain actions
international action are formidable. They have, as
undertaken in connection with the Middle East
previously indicated, included the controversy over
conflict-its objectives have generally been defensive
justifiable versus illegal political violence and broad
(e.g., the neutralization of hostile foreign-based
resistance to such further infringements of national
groups or individuals) as opposed to the offensive and
sovereignty as would be implied in any inflexible
deliberately disruptive character of most transnational
curtailment of the right to grant political asylum.
terrorism.
Equally important, however, they have also included
Nevertheless, the sporadic employment of
an understandable reluctance on the part of many
government-controlled terrorist groups against Israeli
nations otherwise ill-disposed toward terrorist activity
targets both within and outside that country's borders
to commit themselves to any course of action that
raises some troublesome questions about what the
might either invite direct terrorist retribution or
1980s may hold in store. And while their true
provoke the application of sanctions by states that
sponsorship has yet to be firmly established, so do the
happen to be sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.
recent Rejectionist Front-associated operations in
Madrid and Vienna that were intended to bring
To make these observations is not, however, to
pressure on moderate Arab regimes.
imply immutibility. It must be remembered, for
example, that such progress as has been made in the
These questions center on the kind of adjustments in
field of multilateral countermeasures has, in each
international behavior that may flow from ongoing
instance, been occasioned by reaction to some general
changes in the distribution and component elements of
or specific escalation of terrorist violence. (In this
national power and, no less important, from the
regard, hopes that Carlos' assault on the OPEC
growing array of economic, political, and
ministerial meeting in Vienna will have some sort of
technological restraints affecting the ways in which
28
latent power can be translated into effective leverage.
would all but disappear if a state were to engage in
Are Arab actions a precursor of things to come? Is it,
such activity on a regular basis. For another, barring
in fact, likely that, lacking or despairing of more
total collapse of world order and consequent
conventional means for defending or advancing their
international anarchy (something that no state actor
international interests, an increasing number of states
has reason to promote), international terrorism is
will opt to engage in-or to sponsor-terrorist
highly unlikely to gain acceptance as an admissible
activity?
form of behavior in the foreseeable future.
In assessing this possibility, some observers have
All told, in fact, it seems likely that the employment
noted that because of the expense, the risks, and the
of terrorist groups in a surrogate warfare role will
constraints deriving from the patron-client
continue to be more the exception than the rule for
relationships that are now involved, high-intensity
some time to come. And if this proves to be the case, it
conventional warfare-even of the local variety-may
follows that while there may be a slight upward trend
be becoming obsolete. On the other hand, although it
in the annual total of international terrorist incidents,
is "permissible" under current international ground
the scope of the problem in 1985 should not be much
rules, low-level protracted conflict of the Vietnam
more serious than it is today.
type is not, as they point out, a very attractive
alternative. For these reasons, they suggest that there
Transnational Terrorism
will be a strong temptation for governments to employ
terrorist groups as means of waging "surrogate
On balance, the outlook with respect to
warfare" against other nations. Brian Jenkins has
transnational terrorism is less encouraging. On the
expressed this notion as follows:
positive side, the decline in the number of states
willing to provide terrorist safe haven gives promise of
Terrorists, whatever their origin or cause, have
demonstrated the possibilities of a third alternative-that of
being lasting.* It seems most doubtful that the
"surrogate warfare." Terrorism, though now rejected as a
currently shrinking aggregations of emigre workers
legitimate mode of warfare by most conventional military
will soon regain their former size, and this will
establishments, could become an accepted form of warfare in
probably have some small impact on the security and
the future. Terrorists could be employed to provoke
resources of terrorist groups operating in Western
international incidents, create alarm in an adversary's
country, compel it to divert valuable resources to protect
Europe. More importantly, political developments of
itself, destroy its morale, and carry out specific acts of
a sort which presently seem to be at least possible
sabotage. Governments could employ existing terrorist groups
could significantly reduce levels of terrorist activity in
to attack their opponents, or they could create their own
such current trouble spots as Northern Ireland,
terrorists. Terrorism requires only a small investment,
Argentina, and the Middle East.
certainly far less than what it cost to wage conventional war.
It can be debilitating to the enemy. Prior to the 1973 Yom
But overall, the potential for domestic,
Kippur War, a senior Israeli officer estimated that the total
international, and transnational terrorism is-as
cost in men and money to Israel for all defensive and offensive
measures against at most a few thousand Arab terrorists was
asserted at the outset of this study-almost certain to
40 times that of the Six Days War in 1967. A secret backer of
remain high. Furthermore, most of the broad
the terrorists can also deny sponsoring them. The concepts of
environmental factors that have contributed to the
subversion sabotage, of lightning raids carried out by
feasibility, efficacy, and popularity of transnational
commandos, are not new, but the opportunities are.*
terrorism in recent years will continue to operate with
The case presented, however, is far stronger with
at least equal force in the decade ahead. The salience
respect to the probability of increasing resort to some
of some, in fact, seems bound to increase.
form of surrogate warfare-which, as Brian Jenkins
notes, is scarcely a new phenomenon-than for the
Barring some cataclysmic event which reduces
corollary argument that this development is likely to
mankind to a more primitive order of existence,
be characterized by widespread adoption of terrorist
technological advance, modernizing social and
tactis. For one thing, the safety factor of deniability
economic change, and growing global interdependence
are, for example, essentially irreversible phenomena
*Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of
Conflict, op. cit., p. 21.
*Although this trend has been evident for some time, it was
**It must be remembered that under the definitions employed
underscored in August 1975 when the JRA terrorists who had seized
in this study, there are many kinds of covert subversive
the US Consulate in Kuala Lumpur not only had great difficulty in
activity-including support of insurgent paramilitary forces and
finding a state willing to grant them safe haven, but were even
even sponsorship of highly discriminate sabotage operations-that
denied permission to transit nationally-controlled airspace by some
would not of themselves constitute terrorism.
Third World countries.
29
with an urgency and momentum which seems more
by-the state-centered international system. This does
likely to increase than to decline in the coming decade.
not mean, however, that the behavior of supportive
And while their political consequences can, to a
state actors will become increasingly irrelevant. On
certain degree, be controlled by carefully-tailored
the contrary, it suggests that unless the principal
policy decisions, they bode well to aggravate the
patrons of subversion and revolutionary violence cut
terrorism problem by generating further increases in
back on the assistance they are furnishing to
(1) divisive ethnicity and nationalism, (2) urban
practicing or potential terrorists more drastically than
unrest, (3) terrorist capabilities, and (4) societal
currently available evidence as to their intentions gives
vulnerabilities.
grounds to expect, the deleterious impact of their
behavior may be considerably greater than in the past.
In the political field, the widespread erosion of
established institutions of authority that has both
The problem of extensive and sometimes
invited and facilitated terrorist activity in recent years
sympathetic publicity is another aggravating
shows no signs of abatement. For its part, the postwar
environmental factor that promises to persist in many
international order seems likely to remain under
parts of the world. Not only has all the attention that
challenge-and thus in flux-throughout the decade
has been focused on terrorism made it increasingly
ahead. But the problem will probably continue to be
newsworthy, but the coverage and capabilities of the
most evident at the national level where increasing
world's satellite communications systems have been
difficulties of governance hold forth the prospect of a
steadily upgraded since 1968. Moreover, radio,
further proliferation of ineffective and unstable
television, and the press are bound to continue to
regimes.
reach an ever larger audience.
As a byproduct of the above, most non-state actors
Although most Western media officials, at least, are
on the world stage will probably manage to escape
by now fully aware of the danger of playing into
significantly firmer national or international control
terrorist hands, competitive pressures are strong and
for some time to come. Because of this, and because
the line between responsible and irresponsible
the values underlying the strong "social conscience"
reportage or commentary is very fine. In short, self-
component of today's political environment seem
censorship is unlikely to work very well. On the other
likely to retain their current force, the chances are that
hand, the only potentially more effective
national liberation and leftist revolutionary
alternative-firm governmental management of the
formations will continue to receive both moral and
news-is, in time of peace, virtually out of the
material support from a wide variety of transnational
question in most Western democracies.
and international organizations as well as a potentially
substantial flow of ransom and "insurance" payments
Another aspect of the information explosion that
from vulnerable multinational corporations.
promises to continue to be troublesome is the diffu-
sion of terrorist-adaptable technological know-how
At the same time, the trend toward greater
and-to a lesser degree-of possibly inspirational
international contact and cooperation among terrorist
speculation about new and potentially ultra-disruptive
groups that has already markedly enhanced the
terrorist tactics. Although the objectives of such
operational capabilities of some of the organizations
literature may be (and most often are) above
involved seems likely to gain further momentum. For
reproach, it can scarcely help but aggravate the
one thing, lingering inhibitions born of sharply
problems posed by the development and wholesale
different goals and outlook are bound to decline in the
deployment of sophisticated (and in many cases, man-
face of continuing and widely-publicized proof of the
portable) weaponry; the world-wide proliferation of
advantages that can be derived from such a course.
nuclear facilities; and the race, motivated by both
For another, the tough but scattered local counter-
political and economic considerations, to sell nuclear
terrorist campaigns that are sure to dot the political
technology and modern armaments to developing
landscape throughout the decade ahead will each
countries. And these problems are serious enough as it
provide compelling new incentives for transnational
is. Indeed, despite the attention that has been paid to
cooperation.
nuclear safeguards and the physical security of
Ominously enough, therefore, the wave of the future
sensitive installations and depots, the world seems to
seems to be toward the development of a complex
be moving toward a state of affairs in which the limits
support base for transnational terrorist activity that is
of any "technological escalation" of terrorist violence
largely independent of-and quiet resistant to control
will depend more on the self-imposed restraints
30
affecting the behavior of the groups involved than on
passive storage but, if deployed against specific
lack of capability or opportunity.
targets, during the delivery and bargaining phases of
It is, of course, the upper limits of the potential
the operation as well. Moreover, there is further room
scale of terrorist violence that are of most concern.
for trouble when it comes to establishing the
Individual terrorist groups already have the capability
credibility of the threat since the target authorities
of manufacturing or otherwise acquiring a variety of
must be persuaded not only that the terrorists actually
weapons or agents of mass destruction. More will be
have a nuclear device but that it will probably work.
in a position to exercise this option in the future. Just
Finally, all but the most fanatical terrorists might be
how likely is it that they will do so?
given pause by the fact that if worst comes to worst,
the destructive effects of such weapons are not
That the threatened employment of such awesome
manageable.
ordnance would have profound political and
psychological effects is undeniable. But it must be
Thus, while the prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists
emphasized that there are major hazards that would
can scarcely be dismissed, a more likely scenario-at
be involved for the terrorists as well. The most
least in the short term-would seem to be a terrorist
important of these (and the one probably primarily
seizure of a nuclear weapons storage facility or a
responsible for the failure of terrorists to make more
nuclear power plant in a straightforward barricade
of an effort to exploit mass destruction technology in
operation. Such a group need not threaten a nuclear
the past) is the high risk of adverse public
holocaust (although that possibility would be in the
reaction-particularly in the event that the group
back of everyone's mind), just the destruction of the
involved were to end up in a position where it felt
bunker or reactor with the attendant danger of
compelled to make good its threat.
radiological pollution. The threat would be inherently
credible. The publicity would be enormous. And if
Although a few terrorist groups have, in fact,
their demands were to be denied, the terrorists would
resorted to indiscriminate mass murder, such
be in a position to tailor the amount of damage they
instances have been relatively rare, and in each case
actually inflicted to their appreciation of the existing
thus far the human toll has been negligible in
circumstances.
comparison to the casualties that would result from
the broadcast of only a few ounces or less of a highly
A more pressing threat, however, would seem to lie
toxic agent or the detonation of even a small nuclear
in the field of chemical, biological, and radiological
device. Basically, terrorists are in business to influence
agents. In contrast to nuclear devices, many of these
people, not exterminate them. Moreover, those that
are presently relatively easy to acquire. Hence the
aspire to some sort of political legitimacy-and this
danger that they could turn up in the hands of the sort
means most of them-are generally quite sensitive to
of ultra-radical or psychopathic fringe group that
the need to take some care to avoid alienating local
would have the fewest compunctions about actually
and international opinion.
using them is very real. Moreover, since
The fact remains, however, that weapons of mass
small-sometimes minute-quantities are usually all
destruction cannot help but hold considerable
that are needed for potentially devastating effects,
temptation for militants whose basic strategy of
such agents also tend to be easy to conceal, easy to
violence centers on wringing maximum political
transport, and easy to introduce into the target area.
leverage from publicity and fear. Hence, it seems
Credibility poses few problems, for a small sample of
prudent to assume that sooner or later some group is
the agent delivered by mail or left at some designated
bound to take the plunge.
pick-up point should quickly dispel any doubts on this
score. Finally, a number of these agents offer the
Because their very mention strikes terror into the
additional advantage of being amenable to relatively
hearts of many, nuclear weapons come first to mind.
selective targeting (e.g., the occupants of a single
But the practical problems facing the would-be
building or compound).
nuclear blackmailer are numerous and complex.
Although nuclear devices are clearly no longer beyond
As implied in earlier discussion, any such dramatic
terrorist reach, their acquisition (whether through
escalation of terrorist violence as that suggested by
theft or manufacture) is still-and for a few years yet
these brief scenarios on weapons of mass destruction
will probably continue to be-a relatively demanding
would be likely to touch off a new flurry of efforts to
task. Once in terrorist hands, their emissions present
devise international countermeasures. Indeed, another
anti-detection shielding problems not only during
convention or two would probably result. But just how
31
much practical effect this would have is open to
Ironically, there may well be fewer people engaged
serious question.
in transnational terrorist activity some five years
hence than there are today. But this prospect is not as
Simply put, the net thrust of the forces at work
encouraging as it sounds. For even if changes in the
within the international community promises to
political environment or partial satisfaction of their
remain more centrifugal than centripetal throughout
objectives do encourage some of the larger and more
the decade ahead. Indeed, all indications are that
"responsible" formations to eschew transnational
rising nationalism and ethnicity, the developing
violence, their place on the international stage is likely
nations' fundamental challenge to the existing world
to be quickly filled by more militant splinter
order, and the related proliferation of subnational and
groups-not to mention a smattering of total
other non-state actors will continue to render the
newcomers to the game. And since (as amply
international system increasingly complex and
demonstrated by the JRA, Carlos and company, and
uncertain. Moreover, the attendant diffusion and
the PFLP) small terrorist groups can, when properly
erosion of political authority will tend to be self-
connected, mount all manner of highly disruptive
reinforcing. And under these circumstances, the
operations, such a development could-through the
degree of consensus needed to adopt and enforce
introduction of additional increments of fa-
meaningful counterterrorist accords will be more
naticism-provoke at least temporary increases in the
elusive than ever.
intensity of terrorist violence.
In any event, it seems likely that the constraints on
It follows that the recent stiffening of a number of
terrorist behavior will, through international default,
nations' policies toward terrorists is almost certainly
continue to depend primarily on (1) the terrorists'
more reflective of relatively narrow and quite
subjective orientation and (2) the policies and
disparate tactical calculations-with respect, for
resources of the individual countries in which they
example, to such things as improved domestic security
operate. Of necessity, however, the impact of these
arrangements, the current state of play in the Arab-
will be uneven. Remember, too, that the inherent
Israeli conflict, or the latitude of action that may now
dynamics and logic of a campaign of terrorist violence
be afforded by Third World divisions and the general
are such that it has a natural propensity to escalate
unpopularity of certain terrorist groups-than of any
over time. Moreover, all but the most isolated
broad upsurge of interest in a global approach.
terrorist groups will be able to draw on a common
Nonetheless, this development is encouraging for it
and cumulative media-fed pool of experience and
opens up new possibilities for bilateral and limited
inspiration. Hence, even if the cited constraints do
multilateral counterterrorist undertakings of a sort
result in some tapering off in the frequency of
that have, in combination with unilateral measures,
transnational terrorist incidents during the next few
proved relatively effective in the past.
years, we should expect to witness steadily greater and
more widespread sophistication in targetting,
In sum, although it is unlikely to trigger a collapse
execution, and weaponry. And while, as suggested
of world order, transnational terrorism promises to
earlier, most groups will probably continue to be
pose a continuing and potentially gravely unsettling
deterred by both moral considerations and
problem for the world community until such
calculations of the risks involved, the danger that a
time-possibly years hence-that the international
fanatic few might resort to weapons of mass
system gels into new and generally accepted contours.
destruction will increase accordingly.
The frequency and intensity of violence will decline in
some areas. The cast of characters will be constantly
changing. In all likelihood, technological and
V. IMPLICATIONS
organizational innovations in the security field will
make terrorism a more risky affair. Yet at best the
Two basic messages emerge from the foregoing
overall number of terrorist groups seems unlikely to
discussion. The first is that the phenomenon of
decline-and the number of countries in which they
widespread internationalized terror is not only likely
are active appears destined to grow. Furthermore,
to persist for at least the next several years, but also to
because of their symbolic value, their availability, and
evolve in ways that could pose a more substantial
the embarrassment they can create, the popularity of
threat to US interests-and, under certain
American targets will probably remain high.
circumstances, to world order-than in the recent
32
past. The second is that the factors bearing on this
with respect to a broad range of critical issue areas.
phenomenon and its political ramifications are so
For example, it is likely to:
numerous and cut across so many jurisdictional and
-Figure as even more of an irritant in both East-
disciplinary lines that the development of more
West and North-South relations;
effective national and international countermeasures
is likely to be a particulary demanding task.
-Sharpen the dilemmas inherent in the politically
Whether or not weapons of mass destruction are
and economically sensitive questions of arms
sales and the transfer of advanced technology;
actually brought into play, the odds are that the
impact of transnational and international terror will
-Provide potential new grounds for strains in
be more sharply felt in the US in the years just ahead.
Washington's relations with its principal friends
There is, for example, good reason to believe that at
and allies;
least a few foreign terrorist groups are planning to
-Reinforce some of the obstacles which currently
step up their attacks on American targets abroad in
the near future. Moreover, the influx of foreign
impede efforts to find a mutually-acceptable way
travellers and dignitaries expected in connection with
to cope with the dependence of Western in-
such major US-sponsored events as the current
dustrialized countries on foreign energy sources;
Bicentennial celebrations and the 1980 Winter
and
Olympics will inescapably afford a host of
-Impose burdensome new demands on limited
opportunities for dramatic terrorist action. Hence,
human and material resources.
despite the likelihood that the practical considerations
that have so far generally deterred foreign-based
Although, as emphasized in earlier discussion, the
terrorist groups from extending their areas of
dimensions of the threat posed by international and
transnational terror should not be overdrawn, the
operation to US shores will retain their present force,
there is a good chance that a few will succumb to the
picture outlined above is sobering. Among other
temptation to do so. Finally, no matter how tough
things, it suggests that the machinery and guidelines
and well-publicized a "no concessions" policy the US
that the US and its allies have so far developed for
Government maintains, it seems likely that
dealing with the problem bear careful review.
Washington will be targeted by terrorist demands
There is no magic formula for endowing any given
somewhat more frequently in the future-partly to
government's approach to the problem of terrorism
probe more fully the limits of US resolve, partly for
with the direction, breadth, and coherence required to
sheer publicity or other psychological effect, and
marshal the remarkably disparate talents and
partly to foster intergovernmental or domestic
resources that are needed and to weave its response
tensions.
into the overall fabric of its domestic and foreign
More importantly, perhaps, even if the problem of
concerns. Indeed, any number of alternative courses
internationalized terror is not brought "closer to
of action could prove equally effective. Nevertheless,
home" in the ways suggested above, it promises to
it bears emphasis that together with timely intelligence
impinge more directly on US interests and options
and sound multi-disciplinary analytical support,
flexibility and extensive coordination (both inter- and
*Despite the frequency with which terrorists have attacked
intra-state) would seem to be critical to devising and
American citizens and property overseas, the US has been lucky in
implementing a counterterrorist strategy that is both
many ways. For example, foreign terrorist groups have for the most
internally consistent and minimally disruptive to
part eschewed staging operations on American soil-and those
transnational terrorist incidents that have been authored here by
national values and foreign policy objectives in terms
domestic groups have generally been relatively minor affairs.
of "hidden" social, economic, and political costs.
Furthermore, the US Government has, as previously indicated,
rarely been the target of terrorist demands. Hence, except for
Obviously, such a strategy cannot be framed in
extensive (and readily accepted) airport security measures, the
isolation. Among other things, its architects would
quality of American life and democratic freedoms has been little
need ready access to top policymakers in both the
affected. And Washington has so far been spared the agony of
foreign and domestic fields as well as to the advice of a
having the lives of key political leaders or large numbers of
broad range of government and non-government
innocents, be they Americans or foreigners, hang on its decisions.
experts or interested parties. Moreover, the necessity
'While it bears note, the parallel danger that commonly
to maintain some freedom of maneuver (born of the
perceived opportunities for action in connection with such events
could result in growing contact and cooperation between US-based
fact that every new terrorist incident is likely to have
and foreign terrorist groups falls outside the purview of this study.
its unique aspects) is a particularly delicate
FORD
33
problem-and one that can easily contribute to
contingency plans with all the key domestic and
unnecessary misunderstandings. Hence, routine pre-
foreign actors whose interests and options they could
crisis coordination of terrorism-related policies and
affect becomes all the more important.
34
APPENDIX A
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM:
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
Group Characteristics
-Name of the organization or, if none, of the political, military, or bureaucratic
entity controlling the actors
-Country of origin
-Relationship to the government of that country
-Size and organization
-Leadership
-Composition (the occupational and educational qualifications of the members
and their age range)
-Credo/Ethos
Elementary Typology*
Particularistic (ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional)
Nationalistic (irredentist or anti-colonial)
Ideological
Anarchism
Radical Left (revolutionary socialists, Trotskyites, Maoists,
Guevarists, Castroites, and other ultra-left fringe groups)
Orthodox Communism
Extreme Right
Other
Pathological
-Domestic base (extent of popular sympathy and support, links with legitimate
social or political organizations, and links with other domestic dissident groups)
-Foreign links (with other terrorist organizations, with international or legitimate
transnational organizations, and with foreign governments)
-Life cycle (date of formation, period or periods of transnational or international
activity, and, if applicable, date of demise)
Event Characteristics
-Location of incident
-Nature of act
Elementary Typology
Kidnapping
Barricade and hostage
Bombing (any type of explosive charge or device, including letter
and parcel bombs)
*Major categories are not mutually exclusive.
35
Armed assault or ambush (with or without sophisticated weapons)
Hijacking (aircraft, ship, or other means of transportation)
Incendiary attack or arson
Assassination or murder
Chemical, bacteriological, or radiological pollution
Other
-Number, status, and nationalities of human victims
-Nature and national association of physical target
-Number, nationality, and organizational affiliation of the perpetrators
-Nature of demands (publicity, prisoner release, ransom, political action or
change, arms, or safe passage)
-Targets of demands (governments, corporations, or international organizations)
-Outcome (duration of incident, identity and posture of governmental and
transnational actors participating in its resolution, extent to which terrorists'
demands were satisfied, fate of human victims, fate of terrorists, extent of
property damage, and, if applicable, identity of nations granting or facilitating
safe haven)
Local Environmental Characteristics
-Type, repressiveness, and effectiveness of government (representative democracy,
authoritarian, or totalitarian)
-Societal traditions and attitudes with respect to authority and violence
-Homogeneity of the population
-Current levels of popular malaise and internal strife
-Current level of socio-economic development (including per capita GNP; levels
of industrialization, urbanization, and literacy; and the proportion of the
population possessed of higher education)
-Recent and current socio-economic growth rates (as above)
-Societal inequities (markedly unequal distribution of income, discriminatory
practices, and systemic limits on social and political mobility)
Global Environmental Characteristics
-Technological Advance
-Sophisticated man-portable weaponry (development, deployment, and
international trade in such weapons)
-Proliferation of nuclear facilities
-Communications advances (developments affecting both media coverage
and tactical communications)
-Mobility-related developments
-Interdependence
-New vulnerabilities (those links binding our increasingly interdependent
world-e.g., commercial and communications centers, transportation hubs,
international power grids and pipelines, super tankers, and jumbo
36
aircraft-that presently, or that may in the future, offer feasible and
potentially highly disruptive targets for terrorist attack
-Reactive upsurge of nationalism and ethnicity
-Modernizing Social and Economic Change
-Destablizing local effects
- -Large emigre worker concentrations
-Political Environment
-The "revolutionary" atmosphere highlighted by the challenge to the existing
world order raised by the "have not" nations
-The controversy over illegal versus justifiable political violence
-Shifts in priorities and values and the emergence of a strong sense of
"social conscience"
-The dispersion and erosion of political authority
- -The proliferation of non-state actors and the parallel increase in the number
of international and transnational organizations providing moral or material
support to national liberation or leftist revolutionary formations
-International agreements, treaties, and conventions relating to terrorist acts
-The behavior of states providing direct and indirect support to terrorist
groups
-Transnational contact and cooperation arhong terrorist groups
-Significant international economic trends and developments
-Extra-cyclical events
-Cyclical fluctuations
37
APPENDIX B
STATISTICAL TRENDS AND PATTERNS
IN
TERRORIST ACTIVITY
39
100
100
Kidnapping
Barricade and
International and
Total: 123
Hostage
Transnational Terrorist
75
75
Total: 31
Incidents by Category,
1968-75
50
50
Total: 913
25
25
0
0
1968
70
72
74
1968
70
72
74
100
100
100
Bombing
Armed Assault or
Hijacking
Total: 375
Ambush
(Air and Non-Air)
75
75
Total: 95
75
Total: 137
50
50
50
25
25
25
0
0
0
1968
70
72
74
1968
70
72
74
1968
70
72
74
100
100
100
Assassination
Incendiary Attack or
Other
Total: 48
Arson
Total: 45
75
75
Total: 59
75
50
50
50
25
25
25
0
0
0
1968
70
72
74
1968
70
72
74
1968
70
72
74
568582 2-76
*Includes 2 non-air hijackings.
41
Geographic Distribution of Terrorist Incidents by Category, 1968-75
North America
69
Total: 111
21
3
1
7
3
6
1
Western and
179
NATO Europe
Total: 327
30
33
19
20
13
14
19
Middle East and
North Africa
43
Total: 119
25
19
8
7
7
10
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total: 37
15
2
6
5
6
1
2
Asia Total: 43
13
6
2
6
7
4
5
Latin America
Total: 250
78
65
44
19
13
14
12
5
USSR/Eastern Europe
Total: 19
15
2
1
1
Pacific and Australia
Total: 6
4
1
1
Transregional
Total: 1
1*
Kidnapping
Barricade and
Bombing
Armed Assault
Hijacking
Assassination
Incendiary Attack
Other
Hostage
or Ambush
(Air and Non-Air)
or Arson
568583 2-76
*Mass letter bomb mailing.
42
International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents Directly Affecting US Citizens,
Corporations, or Institutions
Kidnap
B & H
Bomb
Ass'It
Hijack
1
Assass.
Incend.
Other
Total
1968-1975
Total incidents
123
31
375
95
137
48
59
45
913
US citizens or property known to
have been victimized
59
4
136
37
29
15
33
17
330
US government target of terrorist
demands
42
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
1968
Total incidents
1
0
24
2
6
4
0
0
37
US citizens or property victimized
1
0
1
0
0
3
0
0
5
US government target of demands
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1969
Total incidents
3
0
17
5
25
2
2
1
55
US citizens or property victimized
2
0
9
1
1
1
1
1
16
US government target of demands
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1970
Total incidents
26
1
17
6
47
6
2
9
114
US citizens or property victimized
15
0
12
4
16
3
1
5
56
US government target of demands
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1971
Total incidents
10
1
15
8
14
3
6
6
63
US citizens or property victimized
4
0
12
4
7
0
5
6
38
US government target of demands
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1972
Total incidents
11
3
38
6
16
4
3
5
86
US citizens or property victimized
1
0
18
2
3
0
1
1
26
US government target of demands
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1973
Total incidents
34
8
81
29
15
12
20
12
211
US citizens or property victimized
18
2
34
14
0
3
12
2
85
US government target of demands
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1974
Total incidents
12
9
95
24
9
8
11
11
179
US citizens or property victimized
5
1
32
6
2
2
7
2
57
US government target of demands
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1975
Total incidents
26
9
88
15
5
9
15
1
168
US citizens or property victimized
13
1
18
6
0
3
6
0
47
US government target of demands
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
1 Excludes numerous non-terrorist skyjackings, many of which victimized US planes or citizens.
2 This figure does not, of course, reflect more than a score of cases in which ransom demands were levied on-or were
eventually at least partially satisified by-U.S. corporations or private citizens.
43
International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents by Regional Origin of the
Perpetrators-1968-1975
Kidnap
B & H
Bomb
Ass'lt
Hijack
Assass.
Incend.
Other
Total
North America
4
0
21
4
5
0
3
0
37
Western and NATO Europe
10
1
61
10
5
3
4
4
98
Middle East and North Africa
5
17
41
31
25
12
2
15
148
Sub-Saharan Africa
16
1
1
5
6
1
0
0
30
Asia
6
5
2
4
11
3
5
0
36
Latin America
53
5
45
8
12
10
5
12
150
USSR/Eastern Europe
0
1
3
1
15
3
0
0
23
Uncertain or Mixed
29
1
201
32
58
16
40
14
391
Total
123
31
375
95
137
48
59
45
913
International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents-Fedayeen and
Non-Fedayeen by Category of Event: 1968-1975
Kidnap
B & H
Bomb
Ass'lt
Hijack
Assass.
Incend.
Other
Total
Fedayeen or
8
18
48
35
19
13
3
15
159
Fedayeen-
related
Non-Fedayeen
102
13
2491
53
79
29
37
22²
584
Unknown
13
0
78
7
39
6
19
8
170
Total
123
31
375
95
137
48
59
45
913
¹Includes the sole transnational terrorist attack on a nuclear installation during the period under
review-the 1975 bombing of a nuclear power facility in France by the Puig Antich-Ulrike Meinhof
Commando. It bears note, however, that Argentina's ERP did briefly occupy an unfinished
Argentine nuclear power plant in March 1973, an act which falls in the category of domestic
terrorism.
2 Includes the only two incidents in which a chemical, biological, or radiological agent has been
used to induce terror to date (the radio-active iodine employed by the self-styled "Justice Guerrilla"
in Austria in 1974).
International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents-Fedayeen and
Non-Fedayeen by Year: 1968-1975
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Fedayeen or Fedayeen-
related
3
10
21
10
19
46
33
17
Non-Fedayeen
31
28
60
28
40
112
137
148
Unknown
3
17
33
25
27
53
9
3
Total
37
55
114
63
86
211
179
168
44
Indiscriminate or High Casualty International or Transnational Terrorist
Bombings and Armed Assaults by Regional Origin of the
Perpetrators: 1968-1975
Randomly-Determined
Innocent Parties
More than 10
Deliberately
Non-Terrorist
Victimized
Casualties
Bombing
Armed Assault
Bombing
Armed Assault
North America
2
0
0
0
Western and NATO Europe
19
4
9
0
Middle East and North Africa
17
21
3
4
Sub-Saharan Africa
1
2
0
0
Asia
0
1
0
1
Latin America
7
2
2
0
USSR/Eastern Europe
1
0
0
1
Pacific and Australia
0
0
0
0
Unknown or Mixed
55
10
3
1
Total
102
40
17
7
Indiscriminate or High Casualty International or Transnational Terrorist
Bombings and Armed Assaults by Selected Groups
1968-75¹
Randomly-Selected
Innocent Parties
More than 10
Deliberately
Non-Terrorist
Victimized
Casualties
Bombing
Armed Assault
Bombing
Armed Assault
BSO: Black September Organization²
6
2
0
0
IRA (Provos): Irish Republican Army, Pro-
visional Wing
9
0
8
0
JRA: Japanese Red Army
0
1
0
1
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine
1
3
0
1
Mohammed Boudia Commando
1
2
1
0
PFLP-GC: Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine-General Command
0
1
0
1
Yugoslav Emigre Groups
2
1
1
1
¹When their overall record is taken into account, the listed groups appear to have been among the
least inhibited with respect to the number, fate, or ostensible "guilt" of their victims.
2Although the incident is not reflected in these statistics, the BSO is perhaps best known for the
bloody barricade and hostage operation it staged in connection with the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich.
Indiscriminate or High Casualty International or Transnational Terrorist
Bombings and Armed Assaults-Fedayeen and Non-Fedayeen:
1968-1975
Randomly-Determined
Innocent Parties
More than 10
Deliberately
Non-Terrorist
Victimized
Casualties
Bombing
Armed Assault
Bombing
Armed Assault
Fedayeen or Fedayeen-related
20
24
3
5
Non-Fedayeen
50
14
14
1
Unknown
32
2
0
1
Total
102
40
17
7
45
The Past Decade's Most Active
Tr:
Region: Western and NATO Europe
Known or suspected transnational 01
international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975
Established prior to 1968?
Date of most recent
transnational/inter-
national terrorist act
Current status
Significant transnational
links?
Significant direct or
indirect support from
state actors?
Name, description, or
Parent country or
Kidnapping
Barricade and
hostage
Bombing
Armed assault or
ambush
Hijacking
Assassination
Incendiary attack
or arson
territory
Ethos
Comment
Other
category of group
Primary location
Cristo Rey: Guerrilleros del Spain
Spain
Extreme Right
Yes
1975
Active
No
Possibly
Has engaged in numerous
9
Cristo el Rey (Guerrillas of
attacks against Basque
Christ the King)
nationalists in southern
France during 1975.2
ETA: Euzkacli Ta
Spain, France
Basque Provinces
Particularist/Radical
Yes
1973
Active
Yes
Unknown
Both urban and rural.
2
2
Azkatasuna (Basque
Left (Basque
several factions
Nation and Liberty)
Separatist)
FRAP: Frente Revolucionario
Western Europe
Spain
Radical Left (Maoist)
Yes
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Active among students
1
Anti-Fascista y Patriota
and intellectuals
(Anti-Fascist and Patriotic
Revolutionary Front)
German Ultra-Leftist Groups
Baader-Meinhof Gang:3
FRG
FRG
Radical Left/Anarchist
No
1973
Most
Yes
Possibly
Urban based, probably
5
leaders
no more than 50 hard
and
core activists at peak
members
in jail
Holger Meinz Commando FRG
FRG
Radical Left/Anarchist
No
1975
Most
Yes
Unknown
Urban based, formed
1
members
from Baader-Meinhof
in jail
survivors and
sympathizers
Puig Antich-Ulrike
FRG
FRG
Radical
Left/Anarchist
No
1975
Active
Yes
Unknown
Urban-based, bombed a
3
Meinhof Commando³
French nuclear power
station in 1975
2nd of June Movement
FRG
FRG
Radical
Left/Anarchist
No
1975
Active
Yes
Unknown
Used 1975 kidnap of
West Berlin politician
Peter Lorenz to secure
release of-and Middle
East safe haven for-5
Baader-Meinhof Gang
members
IRA (Provos): Irish
U.K., Ireland
Northern Ireland
Nationalist/
No
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Both urban and rural,
2
14
1
Republican Army,
Particularist
strength estimated at
Provisional Wing
(Catholic)
well over 1,000
Soldiers of the Algerian
Western
Europe
Algeria
Unknown
No
1975
Active
Unknown
Unknown
Has struck at official
4
Opposition
Algerian installations
in Paris, Bonn, London
and Rome
South Moluccan Extremists
Netherlands
Moluccan Islands
Particularist (Separatist)
Yes
1975
Active
Unknown
Unknown
1
1
1
(Indonesia)
Swiss Ultra-Leftist Groups
Switzerland
Switzerland
Radical Left/Anarchist
Mostly
1975
Active
Yes
Unknown
Urban-based
5
2
No
TPLA: Turkish People's
Turkey
Turkey
Radical Left (Maoist)
No
1972
Active
Yes
Unknown
Urban-based, strength
3
1
1
Liberation Army
estimated at about 100
1 Allegedly a free-lance vigilante group, Cristo Rey is generally believed to operate under the protection-and possibly control-of Spanish police authorities.
2 Just how many such attacks were actually executed by Cristo Rey is, however, uncertain. At least some may have been the work of ATE (Anti-ETA Terrorism) a new, seemingly mercenary-based, and possibly official
sponsored Spanish organization which surfaced in July 1975 following the arrest of one of its members in southern France.
3 Associated with the Rote Armee Faktion (Red Army Group).
4 Includes Petra Krause Group and Ligue Marxiste Revolutionnaire (LMR).
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa
Known or suspected transnational or
international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975
Established prior to 1968?
Date of most recent
transnational/inter-
national terrorist act
Significant transnational
Significant direct or
indirect support from
Name, description, or
Current status
links?
state actors?
Parent country or
Kidnapping
Barricade and
hostage
Bombing
Armed assault or
ambush
Hijacking
Assassination
Incendiary attack
or arson
category of group
Primary location
territory
Ethos
Comment
Other
ELF (Eritrean Liberation
Ethiopia
Eritrea
Particularist (Separatist)
Yes
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Primarily rural, strength
11
1
6
4
1
Front) Factions:
Radical Left
estimated at over 6,000
ELF-General Command
members
PLF (Popular Libera-
tion Forces)
Popular Revolutionary Party Zaire
Zaire
Radical Left
No
1975
Active
Unknown
Unknown
Rural-based crossed over
1
into Tanzania for cited
kidnapping operation
Tobou Rebels (Self-styled
Chad
Chad
Particularist (Muslim)
Yes
1974
Active
Unknown
Unknown
Were still holding a
1
"Armed Forces of the
French national hos-
Chadian Revolution,"
tage at the close of 1975
believed to be associated
despite Paris' earlier
with FROLINAT-the
partial accession to
National Liberation Front
their ransom demands
of Chad)
Region: North America
Known or suspected transnational or
international terrorist acts:
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa
Known or suspected transnational or
international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975
Established prior to 1968?
Date of most recent
transnational/inter-
national terrorist act
Current status
Significant transnational
Significant direct or
indirect support from
links?
state actors?
Name, description, or
Parent country or
Kidnapping
Barricade and
hostage
Bombing
Armed assault or
ambush
Hijacking
Assassination
Incendiary attack
or arson
category of group
Primary location
territory
Ethos
Comment
Other
Total
ELF (Eritrean Liberation
Ethiopia
Eritrea
Particularist (Separatist)
Yes
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Primarily rural, strength
11
1
6
4
1
23
Front) Factions:
Radical Left
estimated at over 6,000
ELF-General Command
members
PLF (Popular Libera-
tion Forces)
Popular Revolutionary Party
Zaire
Zaire
Radical Left
No
1975
Active
Unknown
Unknown
Rural-based crossed over
1
into Tanzania for cited
kidnapping operation
Tobou Rebels (Self-styled
Chad
Chad
Particularist (Muslim)
Yes
1974
Active
Unknown
Unknown
Were still holding a
1
"Armed Forces of the
French national hos-
Chadian Revolution,"
tage at the close of 1975
believed to be associated
despite Paris' earlier
with FROLINAT-the
partial accession to
National Liberation Front
their ransom demands
of Chad)
Region: North America
Known or suspected transnational or
international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975
Established prior to 1968?
Date of most recent
transnational/inter-
national terrorist act
Significant transnational
Significant direct or
indirect support from
Name, description, or
Current status
links?
state actors?
Parent country or
Kidnapping
Barricade and
hostage
Bombing
Armed assault or
ambush
Hijacking
Assassination
Incendiary attack
or arson
category of group
Primary location
territory
Ethos
Comment
Other
Accion Cubana
U.S.
Cuba
Nationalist, Anti-
No
1974
Unknown
No
No
Urban-based
2
1
3
Communist
El Alacran (The Scorpion)
U.S.
Cuba
Nationalist, Anti-
No
1975
Active
No
No
Urban-based
3
3
Communist
El Poder Cubano (Cuban
U.S.
Cuba
Nationalist, Anti-
Yes
1968
Inactive
No
No
Urban-based
20
1
1
22
Power)
Communist
FLNC: Cuban National
U.S.
Cuba
Nationalist, Anti-
No
1975
Active
No
No
Urban-based
9
2
Liberation Front
Communist
FLQ: Front de Liberation du
Canada
Canada (Quebec)
Particularist/Radical
Yes
1970
Inactive
Yes
Unknown
Urban-based, about 100
2
Québec (Quebec Liberation
Left (French
members at peak
Front)
separatist, Marxist/
Maoist)
Region: Asia
Known or suspected transnational or
international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975
Established prior to 1968?
Date of most recent
transnational/inter-
national terrorist act
Significant transnational
Name, description, or
Parent country or
Current status
links?
Significant direct or
indirect support from
state actors?
Kidnapping
Barricade and
hostage
Bombing
Armed assault or
ambush
Hijacking
Assassination
Incendiary attack
or arson
category of group
Primary location
territory
Ethos
Comment
Other
Total
Maruseido Marxist Youth
Japan
Japan
Radical Left
No
1974
Active
Unknown
Unknown
3
League
Okinawa Liberation League
Okinawa
Okinawa
Particularist
No
1975
Active
Unknown
Unknown
1
(Separatist)
Philippine Muslim Rebels
Philippines
Southern Philippines
Particularist (Muslim)
Present
1975
Active
Unknown
Yes
2
(including Moro National
groups,
Liberation Front)
No
NOTEWORTHY GROUPS:
APPENDIX C
Most Publicized Practitioners of International and
nsnational Terrorism*
Region: Latin America
Known or suspected transnational or
international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975
Established prior to 1968?
Date of most recent
transnational/inter-
national terrorist act
Current status
Significant transnational
Significant direct or
indirect support from
links?
state actors?
Name, description, or
Parent country or
Kidnapping
Barricade and
hostage
Bombing
Armed assault or
ambush
Hijacking
Assassination
Incendiary attack
or arson
category of group
Primary location
territory
Ethos
Comment
Other
Total
ALN: Ação Libertadora
Brazil
Brazil
Radical Left (once
No
1970
Inactive
Unknown
Yes
Kidnappers of U.S.
3
3
Nacional (Action for
Castroite, now eclectic)
since
Ambassador Elbrick
National Liberation)
1973
ELN: Ejercito de Liberación
Bolivia
Bolivia
Radical Left (Guevarist)
Yes
1970
Active
Yes
Unknown
Much weakened by gov-
1
1
2
Nacional (National Libera-
ernment counter-
tion Army)
measures
ERP: Ejército de Revolu-
Argentina
Argentina
Radical Left (Marxist)
No
1974
Active
Yes
Yes
Both urban and rural.
11
2
2
2
5
23
cionario del Pueblo
Ransomed an Ameri-
(People's Revolutionary
can corporation
Army)
executive for $14.2
million in 19741
FAL: Frente Argentino de
Argentina
Argentina
Radical Left
Yes
1974
Active
Unknown
Yes
Primarily urban
1
1
-
3
Liberacion (Argentine
Liberation Front)
FAR: Fuerzas Armadas
Guatemala
Guatemala
Radical Left (Castroite)
Yes
1973
Active
Unknown
Unknown
Both urban and rural
4
1
5
Revolucionarias (Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces)
FAP: Fuerzas Armadas
Argentina
Argentina
Radical Left (Pseudo-
Yes
1974
Active
Unknown
Unknown
Primarily urban. Has
1
2
3
Peronistas (Peronist Armed
Peronist, Marxist)
frequently collaborated
Forces)
with ERP.
FER (Federation of Revolu-
Mexico
Mexico
Radical Left
No
1975
Relatively
Unknown
Unknown
Primarily urban
3
3
tionary Students)
inactive
FSLN: Frente Sandinista de
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
Radical Left (Castroite)
Yes
1974
Active
Yes
Yes
Staged spectacular barri-
1
1
2
Liberación Nacional
cade and hostage
(Sandinist Front of
operation in Managua
National Liberation)
in December 1974
MANO: Movimiento
Argentina
Argentina
Extreme Right
No
1970
Unknown
Unknown
Yes2
Targetted Soviet officials
1
1
2
Argentino Nacional Organi-
zación (Argentine National
Organization Movement)
MLN-Tupamaros: Movi-
Uruguay, Argentina
Uruguay
Radical Left (once
Yes
1973
Active
Yes
Yes
Urban, decimated in
6
1
1
1
3
12
miento de Liberacion
Castroite, now eclectic)
1972-73, ca 4,000
Nacional (National Libera-
members at peak.
tion Movement)
MONTONEROS: "Juan
Argentina
Argentina
Populist Left (Peronist
Yes
1975
Active
Unknown
Unknown
Primarily urban, merged
5
2
1
1
3
12
Jose Valle" Montoneros
with Marxist leanings)
with radical left,
Peronist Revolutionary
Armed Forces (FAR)
in 1973. Holds ransom
record of over $60
million for single
action.
OPR-33 (Organization of the
Uruguay
Uruguay
Radical Left/Anarchist
No
1972
Inactive
Unknown
Unknown
Small, primarily urban,
3
3
Popular Revolution-33)
badly weakened by
arrests in 1972
23rd of September Com-
Mexico
Mexico
Radical Left
No
1975
Active
Unknown
Yes
Small, primarily urban
2
1
4
munist League
VPR: Vanguarda Popular
Brazil
Brazil
Radical Left (Castroite)
No
1970
Inactive
Unknown
Yes
Primarily urban, deci-
4
1
5
Revolucionaria (Popular
mated in 1971
Revolutionary Vanguard)
1 Of especial significance as primary moving force behind the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR: see Transregional category).
2 Established links with Argentine police authorities.
Region: Middle East and North Africa
Known or suspected transnational or
international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975
Established prior to 1968?
Date of most recent
transnational/inter-
national terrorist act
Current status
Significant transnational
links?
Significant direct or
indirect support from
state actors?
Name, description, or
Parent country or
Kidnapping
Barricade and
hostage
Bondbing 7
Armed assault or
ambush
Hijacking
Assassination
Incendiary attack
or arson
category of group
Primary location
territory
Ethos
Comment
Other
Total
ACO: Arab Communist
Lebanon, Syria
Lebanon
Radical Left (Scorns both
No
1975
Deci-
Unknown
Unknown
Subject of region-wide
1
8
Organization
Soviet and Chinese-
mated
crackdown in 1975
style Communism)
Al Fatah: Haarakat Tahrir
Lebanon, Syria
Palestine
Nationalist (anti-Zionist, Yes
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Both urban and rural,
1
3
1
2
1
8
Falastin (Movement for the
anti-Imperialist
most significant of
Liberation of Palestine)
Fedayeen groups,
strength estimated at
over 6,000
BSO: Black September
Lebanon, Syria
Palestine
Nationalist (extreme
No
1974
Active
Yes
Yes
Originally an arm of Al
1
5
8
7
3
6
2
5
37
Organization
anti-Zionist, anti-
Fatah. Revamped in
Imperialist)
1975, it may no longer
be under Fatah control
Israel Military, Paramilitary, Israel
Israel
Nationalist
Yes
1973
Active
No
Yes
Sponsorship overt,
2
1
1
1
51
or Agent Personnel
actions generally
retaliatory or directed
against Fedayeen
leaders
People's Strugglers
Iran
Iran
Nationalist, Muslim
No
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Relationship to Iran's
2
2
Traditionalists,
other currently most
nominal Marxists
active terrorist group
(the Marxist People's
Sacrifice Guerrillas) is
unclear. Urban
PFLP: Popular Front for the
Lebanon, Syria
Palestine
Nationalist, Radical Left Yes
19752
Active
Yes
Yes
Both urban and rural.
1
1
5
5
8
2
1
3
26
Liberation of Palestine
(Eclectic Marxism)
Strength estimated at
over 1,000³
OANY: Organization of Libya
Palestine
Nationalist, Radical
No
1974
Active
Unknown
Yes
Libyan-sponsored, closely
2
2
1
5
Arab Nationalist Youth
Left
linked to PFLP
for the Liberation of
Palestine
PFLP-GC: Popular Front for
Lebanon, Syria
Palestine
Nationalist
No
1974
Active
Yes
Yes
Broke away from PFLP
1
1
1
2
5
the Liberation of Pales-
in 1968³
tine-General Command
Saiqa: Vanguard of the
Syria
Palestine
Nationalist, Leftist
Yes
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Founded by Syrian
1
1
2
Popular Liberation War
(Baathist)
Baath Party, acts as
extension of Syrian
regime
23rd of September Com-
Mexico
Mexico
Radical Left
No
1975
Active
Unknown Yes
Small, primarily urban
2
1
4
munist League
VPR: Vanguarda Popular
Brazil
Brazil
Radical Left (Castroite) No
1970
Inactive
Unknown Yes
Primarily urban, deci-
4
1
5
Revolucionaria (Popular
mated in 1971
Revolutionary Vanguard)
1 Of especial significance as primary moving force behind the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR: see Transregional category).
2 Established links with Argentine police authorities.
Region: Middle East and North Africa
Known or suspected transnational or
international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975
Established prior to 1968?
Date of most recent
transnational/inter-
national terrorist act
Name, description, or
Current status
Significant transnational
links?
Significant direct or
indirect support from
state actors?
Kidnapping
Barricade and
hostage
Bombing
Armed assault or
ambush
Hijacking
Assassination
Incendiary attack
or arson
Parent country or
Other
category of group
Primary location
territory
Ethos
Comment
Total
ACO: Arab Communist
Lebanon, Syria
Lebanon
Radical Left (Scorns both
No
1975
Deci-
Unknown
Unknown
Subject of region-wide
7
1
8
Organization
Soviet and Chinese-
mated
crackdown in 1975
style Communism)
Al Fatah: Haarakat Tahrir
Lebanon, Syria
Palestine
Nationalist (anti-Zionist, Yes
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Both urban and rural,
1
3
1
2
1
8
Falastin (Movement for the
anti-Imperialist
most significant of
Liberation of Palestine)
Fedayeen groups,
strength estimated at
over 6,000
BSO: Black September
Lebanon, Syria
Palestine
Nationalist (extreme
No
1974
Active
Yes
Yes
Originally an arm of Al
1
5
8
7
3
6
2
5
37
Organization
anti-Zionist, anti-
Fatah. Revamped in
Imperialist)
1975, it may no longer
be under Fatah control
Israel Military, Paramilitary, Israel
Israel
Nationalist
Yes
1973
Active
No
Yes
Sponsorship overt,
2
1
1
1
51
or Agent Personnel
actions generally
retaliatory or directed
against Fedayeen
leaders
People's Strugglers
Iran
Iran
Nationalist, Muslim
No
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Relationship to Iran's
2
2
Traditionalists,
other currently most
nominal Marxists
active terrorist group
(the Marxist People's
Sacrifice Guerrillas) is
unclear. Urban
PFLP: Popular Front for the
Lebanon, Syria
Palestine
Nationalist, Radical Left Yes
1975²
Active
Yes
Yes
Both urban and rural.
1
1
5
5
8
2
1
3
26
Liberation of Palestine
(Eclectic Marxism)
Strength estimated at
over 1,000³
OANY: Organization of Libya
Palestine
Nationalist, Radical
No
1974
Active
Unknown Yes
Libyan-sponsored, closely
2
2
1
5
Arab Nationalist Youth
Left
linked to PFLP
for the Liberation of
Palestine
PFLP-GC: Popular Front for Lebanon, Syria
Palestine
Nationalist
No
1974
Active
Yes
Yes
Broke away from PFLP
1
1
1
2
5
the Liberation of Pales-
in 1968³
tine-General Command
Saiqa: Vanguard of the
Syria
Palestine
Nationalist, Leftist
Yes
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Founded by Syrian
1
1
2
Popular Liberation War
(Baathist)
Baath Party, acts as
extension of Syrian
regime
1 Figures exclude bombing, shelling, and incursions by conventional forces as well as the sort of localized cross-border operations and selective assassination attempts omitted from Fedayeen statistics.
2
No actions under its own name in 1975, but PFLP has acknowledged responsibility for the activities of the "Carlos" Group through mid-1975 (see Transregional category).
3 Benefits from Lybian support.
Region: Transregional
Known or suspected transnational or
international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975
Established prior to 1968?
Date of most recent
transnational/inter-
national terrorist act
Current status
Significant transnational
Parent country or
links?
Significant direct or
indirect support from
state actors?
Name, description, or
Kidnapping
Barricade and
hostage
Bombing
Armed assault or
ambush
Hijacking
Assassination
Incendiary attack
or arson
category of group
Primary location
territory
Ethos
Comment
Other
Total
Armenian Emigre Terrorist
Western Europe,
Armenia
Nationalist
Present
1975
Active
Unknown
Unknown
Have claimed credit for
1
2
3
6
Groups
Middle East, and
Groups,
a number of actions
North America
No
against Turkish offi-
cials and installations
that have not yet been
proven to be theirs
"Carlos" Group, AKA
Western Europe
Multi-National
Radical Left (anti-
No
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Subordinate to PFLP;
2
1
2
2
7
Mohammed Boudia
and Middle East
imperialist, anti-
claims 40 members;
Commando, AKA Arm
Zionist)
responsible for OPEC
of the Arab Revolution
operation in Vienna
JCR: Revolutionary
Latin America,
Multi-National
Radical Left
No
See
Active
Yes
Yes
Becoming more active,
Planning, Funding, Coordination,
Coordination Junta³
Western Europe
(Latin America)
member
thanks to ERP riches
Operational Support
(Paris, Lisbon)
organi-
zations
JDL: Jewish Defense League
U.S., Israel,
Israel
Nationalist (Zionist)
No
1975
Active
No
Unknown Especially active in U.S.
5
2
4
12
JRA: Nippon Sekigun
Middle East,
Japan
Radical Left (eclectic
No
1975
Active
Yes
Yes
Very limited domestic
3
1
3
1
8
(Japanese Red Army)
Western Europe,
mix of most extreme
base, perhaps 30-40
Asia
elements of Trotskyite,
members operating
Maoist & Guevarist
abroad
beliefs)
Yugoslav Emigre Terrorist
North America,
Yugoslavia
Predominantly
Some
1975
Active
Yes
See
1
5
1
1
3
11
Groups⁴
Western Europe,
Particularist (Croat,
yes,
(pre-
note5
Latin America, and
Serb, Slovene,
but
domi-
Australia
Macedonian), ideo-
mostly
nantly
logically mixed from
no
among
Stalinist to Fascist
them-
selves)
1 Includes so-called "Armenian Liberation Front" and "Secret Armenian Army."
2 A multi-national grouping led by Venezuelan Illich Ramirez-Sanchez (alias "Carlos") under aegis of PFLP with some support from Libya.
3 The JCR is composed of Argentina's Revolutionary People's Army (ERP), Bolivia's National Liberation Army (ELN), Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), Paraguay's National Liberation Front
(FREPALINA), and the remnants of Uruguay's National Liberation Movement (MLN/Tupamaros).
4 Includes Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organization (HIRO), Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP), Croatian National Resistance (HNO), Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB), Various Croatian
Ustashi groups, the League of Serbian Volunteers (LSD), and the Union of Croatian Communists Abroad.
5 None except for possible Soviet or Soviet-sponsored assistance to a very few.
*Active groups considered to be of particular current or potential significance are highlighted in red.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
May 1976
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM:
DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
David L. Milbank
NOTE: Comments and suggestions of other agencies and CIA
offices were sought and utilized in this study. There has been
no attempt to reach a consensus, however; OPR is aware that
the matters discussed lend themselves to other interpretations.
PETAR
1. FORD LEBRARY
PR 76 10044
JUN 25 1976
# -
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I.
INTRODUCTION
The separately published study on which this overview is
based integrates a considerable body of new statistical data
into a multi-disciplinary assessment of terrorism as a factor in
international politics.* For analytical purposes, the subject of
inquiry is broken down into two general types of activity, inter-
national and transnational terrorism, which are defined as
follows:
Common Characteristics: The threat or use of
violence for political purposes when (1) such
action is intended to influence the attitudes
and behavior of a target group wider than its
immediate victims, and (2) its ramifications
transcend national boundaries (as the result,
for example, of the nationality or foreign
ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the
identity of its institutional or human victims,
its declared objectives, or the mechanics of
its resolution).
International Terrorism: Such action when
carried out by individuals or groups controlled
by a sovereign state.
Transnational Terrorism: Such action when
carried out by basically autonomous non-state
actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree
of support from sympathetic states.
*
OPR Research Study No. 76-10030, April 1976 (UNCLASSIFIED).
Broadly stated, the paper's objectives are to gain a
--
The technological advances that have provided
better understanding of the dynamics and consequences of inter-
terrorists with new mobility, new weaponry,
national and transnational terrorism since 1965, to identify
and (through the introduction of TV-capable
those factors likely to promote or inhibit such activity in
satellite communications) the near certain
the years ahead, and to assess the implications of these
prospect that their more dramatic actions will
findings with respect to US interests and policies.
receive prompt and worldwide publicity;
--
The growth, of global and regional ties,
II. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT
dependencies, and obligations that have
(1) provided terrorists with a host of poten-
There has been a marked and enduring upsurge in trans-
tially highly disruptive targets for attack
national terrorism since 1967 that has been characterized by:
(e.g., power grids and jumbo aircraft) and
(2) fostered a reactive upsurge in nationalism
--
A substantial increase in the number of
and ethnicity);
terrorist groups involved as well as in
the number of countries in which they are
-- An increasingly permissive political environ-
operating;
ment born of the challenge raised to the
postwar order by the developing nations of
--
A trend toward greater international contact
the Third World, the "maverick" Communist
and cooperation among terrorist groups;
regimes, various dissatisfied second rank
powers, and a broad array of social forces
--
A trend toward bolder and more dramatic
fired, with differing degrees of responsibility,
actions;
by a new sense of "social conscience";
--
The general popularity of American targets;
The persistent if uneven support rendered by
and
those states, less than a score in number,
that have furnished practicing or potential
--
A number of significant regional differences
terrorists with funds, arms, training, docu-
in the intensity and nature of such violence.
mentation, and other operational aid; and
This upsurge is attributable in part to the dynamics of
Changes in the overall economic environment
the Middle East conflict, an imbroglio which affects the interests
that have fanned local dissidence and fed the
of a large number of nations and is attended by particularly
communities of emigre workers that can pro-
deep-seated feelings of bitterness and frustration. But the
vide terrorists with cover, recruits, and
problem of transnational terrorism would not have mushroomed
various forms of operational support.
to its present dimensions were it not for the concurrent con-
vergence and acceleration of a number of changes in the global
There has not, however, been a parallel upsurge in inter-
environment that had begun to take shape much earlier, e.g.:
national terrorism. Although there has been a good deal of
such activity associated with the Middle East conflict over the
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past decade, the dimensions of the problem are essentially no
to a host of legal obligations and practical
greater today than they were in 1968.
constraints that they can ignore only at
considerable risk.
For its practitioners, terrorism's principal drawback is
that its consequences are to a considerable degree unpredictable.
--
The potential implications of the various
As demonstrated in Jordan in 1970 and in Uruguay between 1970
state-sponsored terrorist incidents that have
and 1972, even what seem to be dramatic tactical successes can
been associated with the Middle East conflict
lead to strategic reverses of major proportions. All told,
notwithstanding, it seems likely that the
however, the record to date shows that the personal risks that
employment of terrorist groups in a surrogate
have been incurred by international and transnational terrorists
warfare role will continue to be more the
have been relatively low, and that their chances of achieving
exception than the rule for some time to come.
at least some of their near-term objectives have been strong.
Moreover, because the impact of their activity has been magni-
Despite the potentially salutary impact of some recent or
fied by publicity and by its interaction with other destabilizing
likely developments (including the tougher stance toward terrorists
trends and forces, its disruptive effects have been grossly dis-
that has been adopted by a number of states and the probability
proportionate to the actual damage done in terms of the cost to
that technical innovations in the security field will make terror-
life and property.
ism a more risky affair), the outlook for transnational terrorism
is considerably less encouraging. Specifically, the following
With the exception of a number of bilateral agreements of
factors and trends hold promise of aggravating the problem:
proven utility (most notably the US-Cuban accord of 1973), the
international response to terrorism has been relatively weak
--
The combined effects of technological
and ineffective. The principal obstacles to greater progress
advance, modernizing social and economic
in this field have been the controversy over justifiable versus
change, and growing "interdependence" will
illegal political violence, a broad resistance to such further
probably generate further increases in (1)
infringement of national sovereignty as would be implied in any
divisive ethnicity and nationalism, (2)
inflexible curtailment of the right to grant political asylum,
urban unrest, (3) societal vulnerabili-
and a natural reluctance on the part of many states to commit
ties, and (4) terrorist opportunities and
themselves to any course of action that might invite retribution --
capabiities.
either by terrorist groups or by states sympathetic to the
terrorists' cause.
--
The widespread erosion of established insti-
tutions of authority -- manifested in multiple
challenges to the postwar international order
III. THE OUTLOOK
and the increasing difficulties of governance
encountered at the national level -- that has
International terrorism seems unlikely to pose much more of
both invited and facilitated terrorist activity
a threat to world order or US interests in the decade ahead
in recent years seems likely to persist through-
than it does today.
out much of the decade ahead.
--
Even in its currently rather fluid condition,
--
Since the net thrust of the forces at work
the international system subjects states to a
within the international community promises
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to remain more centrifugal than centripetal,
would be involved in the acquisition, storage, transport, and
it seems unlikely that efforts to combat
employment of a nuclear device, a more likely scenario -- at
terrorism through binding worldwide conven-
least in the short term would be a terrorist seizure of a
tions will prove to be much more effective
nuclear weapons storage facility or a nuclear power plant to
than in the past.
exploit the publicity and the bargaining power inherent in the
attendant threat of radiological pollution.
--
The likelihood (1) that national liberation
and leftist revolutionary formations will
A more pressing threat, however, would seem to lie in the
continue to receive both moral and material
field of chemical, biological, and radiological agents of mass
support from a wide variety of transnational
destruction. Not only are many of these agents relatively easy
and international organizations and (2) that
to acquire, but (because small -- sometimes minute -- quantities
transnational contact and cooperation among
are usually all that are needed for potentially devastating
terrorist groups will gain further momentum
effect) they also tend to be easy to conceal, easy to transport,
raises the ominous prospect of the emergence
and easy to introduce into the target area.
of a complex support base for transnational
terrorist activity that is largely independent
All told, transnational terrorism promises to pose a con-
of -- and quite resistant to control by --
tinuing and potentially gravely unsettling problem for the world
the state-centered international system.
community until such time -- possibly years hence -- that the
international system gels into new and generally accepted contours.
-- Under such circumstances, any governmental
Although the frequency and intensity of violence in some current
assistance rendered to terrorist groups
trouble spots will probably decline, it seems likely that:
could have an even more deleterious impact
than in the past, for it would risk simply
-- The overall number of terrorist groups
increasing the recipients' potential for
engaged in transnational terrorist activity
autonomous action.
will, at best, remain at about the present
level;
-- The problems of (1) extensive and sometime
sympathetic publicity for terrorist acts
-- The number of countries in which these groups
and (2) the diffusion of terrorist-adaptable
are operating will increase;
technological know-how are likely to persist
in most parts of the world and thus to rein-
-- Because of their symbolic value, their avail-
force the risks associated with the wholesale
ability, and the embarrassment they can
deployment of sophisticated (and in many cases,
create, the popularity of American targets
man-portable) weaponry and the race to sell
will remain high;
nuclear technology and modern armaments to
developing countries.
-- The world will witness steadily greater
sophistication in terrorist targetting,
The prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists can, in fact, no
execution, and weaponry; and
longer be dismissed. But because of the major problems that
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Although most terrorist groups will probably
continue to be deterred by both moral con-
Although the dimensions of the threat posed by inter-
siderations and calculations of the risks
nationalized terror should not be overdrawn, the factors bearing
involved, the danger that a fanatic few might
on this phenomenon and its potential ramifications are, in fact,
resort to weapons of mass destruction will
so numerous and cut across so many jurisdictional and disciplinary
increase accordingly.
lines that the development of more effective national and inter-
national countermeasures is likely to be a particularly demanding
task. Moreover, there are no sure guidelines for endowing any
IV. IMPLICATIONS
given government's approach to the problem of terrorism with
the qualities required to meet this challenge. Depending on
The phenomenon of widespread internationalized terror is
local circumstances, any number of alternative courses of
not only likely to persist for at least the next several years,
action could prove equally effective. Nonetheless, it bears
but also to evolve in ways that could pose a more substantial
emphasis that together with timely intelligence and sound multi-
threat to US interests -- and, under certain circumstances, to
disciplinary analytical support, flexibility and extensive
world order -- than in the recent past.
coordination (both intra and inter-state) would seem to be
critical to devising and implementing a counterterrorist
Whether or not weapons of mass destruction
strategy that is both internally consistent and minimally
are actually brought into play, the odds are
disruptive to national values and foriegn policy objectives
that the impact of transnational terror will
in terms of "hidden" social, political, and economic costs.
be more sharply felt in the US in the years
just ahead primarily as the result of
Obviously, such a strategy cannot be framed in isolation.
periodic increases in attacks on American
Among other things, its architects would need ready access to
targets abroad, but possibly through more
top policymakers in both the foreign and domestic fields as
frequent terrorist demands on the US Government
well as to the advice of a broad range of government and non-
and occasional operations on US soil by foreign-
government experts or interested parties. Moreover, the
based groups as well.
necessity to maintain some freedom of maneuver (since every
new terrorist incident will probably have its unique aspects)
--
Even if the problem of internationalized terror
is likely to constitute a particularly delicate problem --
is not brought closer to home in the ways
one that could easily generate costly misunderstandings. Hence
suggested above, it promises to impinge more
routine pre-crisis coordination of terrorism-related policies
directly on US interests and options with
and contingency plans with all the key domestic and foreign
respect to a broad range of critical issue
actors whose interests and options they could effect becomes
areas, including both East-West and North-
all the more important.
South relations, the sensitive questions of
arms sales and the transfer of advanced tech-
nology, and the resolution of problems associated
with the dependence of Western industrialized
countries on foreign energy sources.
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