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    "title": "Nuclear Policy Statement (1)",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 24, folder \"Nuclear Policy Statement (1)\" of the\nJames M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 24 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nMuclean\nJune 3, 1976\n110 file Nuto quote\nINTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT\nBY\non\nOHIO NEWSPAPER EXECUTIVES\nBasing (m\nTHE STATE DINING ROOM\nNatebook)\n11:20 A.M. EDT\nand Partsmonth\nTHE PRESIDENT: There are no prepared remarks.\nIt is very informal. I welcome you here to the State Dining\nRoom. It is a pleasure to see some old friends and make some\nnew acquaintances. I think we might as well start with the\nquestions right off.\nQUESTION: Mr. President, the rubber strike has gone\nnow about April 27. Do you have any intention of invoking\nthe Taft-Hartley Act and when will you make such a decision?\nTHE PRESIDENT: We have no plans to invoke the Taft-\nHartley Act. It is my understanding that the two sides got\ntogether a day or two ago, resumed their negotiations, we are\nmonitoring the situation very closely. We believe the\nresumption of negotiations is a positive step forward and we\nwould hope that the matter could be solved by free collective\nbargaining.\nQUESTION: We are a little bit concerned about our\ndefense situation. Some like Schlesinger say we are not\nstrong enough and some say we are. What is our position in\ndefense?\nTHE PRESIDENT: The present position is one of\nstrength. The budget that I submitted a year ago was the\nlargest defense budget in the history of the United States in\neither war or in peace.\nMALD FORD LIBRARY\nPage 9\nTHE PRESIDENT: I don't think we have been making\nannouncements for any political purposes. The Government has\nto go on. You know, supposing -- to take theother side of\nthe coin -- we held the Government in limbo from January of\nthis year until November of this year, with no activity. I\ndon't believe the American people would approve of that.\nWe have to make decisions. We have to make certain\nthat programs are carried out. We make them based on the\nneeds of the people and the right thing to do as far as the\nFederal Government is concerned. I have no individual\nprojects in mind as far as Ohio is concerned. If some come up\nbetween now and June 8 and it is proper under the regular\nprocedure to announce them, I will announce them. (Laughter)\nWe are not going to stop the Government just because\nof some political campaign.\nNow, of course, you may be familiar with the fact\nthat last week when I was in Ohio I announced the plans of\nthis Government as far as the Portsmouth uranium enrichment\nproject is concerned. I said then that if the Congress\napproved the bill that the Joint Committee had recommended,\nthat I would immediately request $170 million for plans\nand design and long lead time procurement for the Portsmouth\nfacility.\nThat was a decision made at the request of the\nJoint Committee because they are going to the floor of the\nHouse and/or Senate sometime I think this week or next and\nthey wanted to know my views.\nI made the announcement at their request, not at\ntherequest of any political person involved.\nPage 10\nQUESTION: On that same question, Mr. President,\nhow about money to build the facility? Are you going to also\nask for a sum to go ahead with construction and operating\nfunds?\nTHE PRESIDENT: That is the next step. But until\nwe see the two track proposal which is one for Portsmouth\nand theother for the possibility of private parties coming in\nwith their proposals, we have to hold our options open. But\nthe legislation has to be passed. We are not going to delay\non the things that we can do right away as far as Portsmouth\nis concerned and then the parties that are involved in the\nprivate sector have to submit their proposals to the Executive\nBranch and we have to submit them to the Congress.\nBut we can't delay in the interim so we are moving as\nrapidly as we can with the Portsmouth project for very good\nand sufficient reasons.\nQUESTION: Do you prefer that the government operate\nthis facility or that the private facility be built if that works\nout.\nTHE PRESIDENT: It depends on what kind of\npropositions we get from the private sector.\nQUESTION: Mr. President, speaking of your trip to\nWestern Ohio, by any chance has the schedule been completed?\nI happen to be from one of the towns along Route 75 and I\nwonder whether we might expect you on Monday.\nTHE PRESIDENT: You will have to check with the\nscheduling people. I was not sure, as I indicated, whether the\nprecise announcement --\nQUESTION: We are north of Dayton. I know you were\ncoming that far. Lima. We are right between.\nTHE PRESIDENT: I hope I can stop in every town.\nPage 11\nBusing\nQUESTION: Sir, have you given any specific thought--\nhas your Administration given any specific thought to making\nDayton or any other Ohio city the target city in your busing\ntest case?\nTHE PRESIDENT: That is a decision that will be made\nby the Attorney General. He made the decision involving Boston.\nI think that is his responsibility and I would not pre-judge\nhim until --\nQUESTION: The question was whether your Administration\nnot you personally, but whether your Administration might give\nthis any consideration.\nTHE PRESIDENT: That is a decision that has been left\nsolely to the Attorney General and I would not want to preempt\nby what I say here what his legal opinion might be at some\nsubsequent time.\nQUESTION: Mr. President, you will be coming through\nthe rich agricultural area of Northwestern Ohio. What will\nyou say to the farmers there?\nTHE PRESIDENT: I will say several things. One,\nthis Administration believes in the full production program\nthat we have had for American agriculture which has resulted\nin the highest net income for farmers in this country in the\nhistory of the United States. It is a policy that has\nresulted in $22 billion of exports. last year and probably\nmore than $22 billion in the current year of American agricultural\nproducts sent abroad.\nIn addition, I will say to the farmers of Ohio\nI believe in the family farm concept and I believe in it being\ntransferred from the one generation to another so that they\ndon't get the adverse impact of the estate taxes as they are\ntoday.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nACTION\nWASHINGTON\nJune 22, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nB\nJIM CANNON\nJune\nSUBJECT:\nPOSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND NEW\nU.S. INITIATIVES TO REDUCE PROLIFERATION\nDUE TO COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER ACTIVITIES\nERDA Administrator Seamans has recommended (letter at Tab A)\nundertaking a major program to provide nuclear fuel reprocessing\nin the U.S., permitting foreign participation in this activity,\nand using this program as the centerpiece of a major\nPresidential statement on non-proliferation.\nThe problem of weapons proliferation -- because of greater\navailability of plutonium from commercial nuclear power\nplants -- is gaining steadily increasing attention in the\nCongress, the media, and in the public. There are growing\nconcerns that current U.S. activities to safeguard against\ndiversion of materials from U.S. exports are inadequate.\nAdditional attention will be focused on potential proliferation\nproblems when controversy within the Nuclear Regulatory\nCommission over exports to Spain and India becomes public\nnext week.\nWe agree that the time has come for considering new\ninitiatives and, probably, for a major Presidential\nstatement on nuclear export policy and perhaps on nuclear\nenergy. However, we also believe that other aspects of the\nproblem leading to Dr. Seamans' letter need to be considered\nand that other proposals should also be evaluated as part of\na complete response to the current situation.\nTab B provides a broader treatment of the matters raised by\nDr. Seamans. It summarizes:\n- The current problems;\n-\nExisting measures and activities to control\nproliferation;\n- Recent and upcoming events suggesting the need\nfor action;\n- Administration response thus far;\n-\nPossible additional responses.\nFORD LIBRARY\n2\nTab C is a preliminary outline of the content of a possible\nPresidential statement.\nIn view of the complex nature of the issues involed, covering\nboth domestic and foreign policy interests, a number of\nagencies will need to be involved in developing and evaluating\npossible initiatives and in drafting a proposed statement.\nThese include: ERDA, State, Defense, NRC, OMB, Commerce,\nand possibly some other members of the Energy Resources\nCouncil.\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n1. That you direct that work begin immediately to develop\nand evaluate the potential initiatives described briefly\nin Tab B, with decision papers presented to you by\nmid-July.\nAPPROVE\nDISAPPROVE\n2. That you tentatively decide to issue a statement or\nsend a message to Congress in late July or early\nAugust on nuclear matters. Depending on the evaluation\nof possible initiatives, it could be limited to nuclear\nexports and non-proliferation or a more general nuclear\nstatement.\nAPPROVE\nDISAPPROVE\n3. That you assign responsibility jointly to us (Brent\nScowcroft and Jim Cannon) to develop and carry out\na plan to accomplish the necessary work, in cooperation\nwith OMB, the ERC, and all of the agencies concerned.\nAPPROVE\nDISAPPROVE\nENF.R. RESEARCH MASSACHUSETTS\nUNITED STATES\nENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20545\nUSA\nJune 9, 1976\nThe President\nThe White House\nDear Mr. President:\nI believe there is an opportunity and a need for the United\nStates to take a major initiative to resolve uncertainties\nthat now exist in the nuclear fuel cycle and to reduce the\nrisk of international proliferation of special nuclear\nmaterials. This opportunity, if successfully pursued, would\ncomplete your evolving nuclear policy and could be the central\nfeature of a major Presidential Message.\nBackground:\nUntil recently, Federal nuclear policy: (1) stressed Government\nfunding of enrichment plants; (2) assumed that reprocessing of\nspent nuclear fuel and recycling of plutonium and uranium would\nbe accomplished in the private sector without Government support;\nand (3) placed less stress on safeguards against theft or diver-\nsion of nuclear material than now seems wise.\nYour initiatives in the past two years have substantially re-\nformed this policy. Specifically you have:\nLimited the Federal role in enrichment by supporting\nprivate entry as the best means for assuring addi-\ntional enrichment capacity;\nIncreased Government research in reprocessing and\nrecycling so that safe and secure private facilities\ncould be demonstrated;\nSponsored a major Government program to demonstrate\nthe safe management and disposal of nuclear waste;\nand\nIncreased stress on materials and physical safeguards\nat both Government-owned and private facilities\nlicensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.\nREVOLUTION\nSUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF\nNATIONAL SECURITY\nEXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED\nINFORMATION\nAT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31\nUnauthorized Disclosure Subject to\nCriminal Sanctions.\n(inserf year)\n1776-1976\ne\nCONFIDENTIAL\nKBH 8/6/92\nCONFIDENTIAL\n-2- -\nThese measures will greatly strengthen the nuclear fuel\ncycle and our controls over the handling and utilization of\nplutonium in this country. Yet, despite substantial progress,\na final and crucial issue remains unresolved -- the need to\ncontrol carefully the world's supply of plutonium. Among\nthe factors bearing on this issue are:\nA recent court decision most likely will prevent the\nNuclear Regulatory Commission from licensing private\nreprocessing facilities that would produce plutonium\nfor recycled use until approval of the generic\nenvironmental statement on mixed oxide fuels probably\nyears from now:\nUncertainty is growing among other nations about the\nUnited States as a reliable supplier of reactors and\nfuel because of (1) final decisions on export licenses\nnow rest with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and\n(2) recent amendments to nuclear legislation indicating\nfirm Congressional intent to review individual nuclear\ninitiatives with the private sector.\nOther supplier nations are developing national re-\nprocessing and recycling capabilities, and some are\nunder pressure commercially to sell plants to other\ncountries desiring to build an integrated indigenous\nnuclear power capability, for example, Iran and Brazil.\nThis trend could multiply the chances of theft or\ndiversion of plutonium and could lead to a dramatic\nincrease in the number of nations with nuclear weapons.\nMultinational regional reprocessing centers have been\nsuggested as a means for minimizing this proliferation.\nHowever, the technical; logistical and political\nfeasibility of the idea has yet to be demonstrated.\nRecommendation:\nI believe the time is at hand for the United States to address\nthis basic issue with a major initiative. Such an initiative\nmight have the following features:\nGENELO FORD LIBRARY\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\n-3-\nAn offer to supplier and consumer states to join\nwith the United States to demonstrate the viability\nof a multinational reprocessing approach using the\nUnited States as the demonstration site. The question\nof excess plutonium and disposal of nuclear waste\nresulting from the reprocessing requires further\nexploration to optimize the attractiveness to both\nthe host and participating nations.\nA call upon supplier nations to suspend temporarily\nthe export of reprocessing technology until the\nmultinational centers or other effective controls\nhave been agreed to. I have already suggested this\nto the Secretary of State in a letter dated May 13\n1976:\nA commitment to employ in the multinational centers\nand to make available advanced United States safe-\nguards and security technology.\nThe key to the initiative is a willingness of the United States\nto offer reprocessing and recycling services to other nations\nand to open our facilities to international inspection. The\nfacility could well be a new plant or a partially completed\nprivate plant at Barnwell, South Carolina that was financed\nby a consortium composed of Allied Chemical, Gulf Oil Corpora-\ntion and Royal Dutch Shell. Arrangements for serving foreign\nneeds from this facility would, of course, have to be worked\nout, however, it is anticipated that the consortium will have\nan interest in a governmentally-encouraged demonstration.\nIn any event, the United States could provide some funding and\nappropriate technical assistance and guarantees for the\nestablishment of an international reprocessing facility in\nthe United States and invite those nations which would utilize\nthe services of such a facility to provide a pro rata share\nof operating expenses. Of course, a successful international\ndemonstration, under the auspices of the United States, would\nalso materially assist in the development of our domestic\nreprocessing capability over the long run as increasing nuclear\npower production results in needed new reprocessing facilities.\nGLEALD FORD VIBRARY\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- -4-\nSuch an initiative could become the centerpiece of a truly\ncomprehensive Presidential policy on nuclear power and non-\nproliferation.\nDecision:\nIf you approve, I will pursue and intensify work with appro-\npriate departments and agencies to develop a recommended\nnuclear reprocessing initiative to be available to you as\nsoon as possible.\nRespectfully yours,\nB.b Senas\nRobert C. Seamans, Jr.\nAdministrator\ncc: - Elliott Richardson\nGERAL FORD LIBRARY\nCONFIDENTIAL\n(Suggested Presidential response\nto letter of June 9, 1976 from\nRobert C. Seamans, Jr.)\nHonorable Robert C. Seamans, Jr.\nAdministrator\nEnergy Research and Development\nAdministration\nWashington, D. C. 20545\nDear Bob:\nI agree in principle with the concepts outlined in your letter\nto me of June 9, 1976, and direct you to proceed on an accelerated\nbasis and in coordination with the Energy Resources Council to\nreview and develop in further detail the policy initiatives that\nI should undertake with respect to nuclear reprocessing and related\nnon-proliferation matters.\nIn this regard, you should include in your analyses (1) a re-\nexamination of the validity, necessity, and desirability of\nreprocessing spent nuclear fuel; (2) further definition of how\na multinational reprocessing demonstration center in the United\nStates would be established and operated, including the role of\nIAEA; and (3) optimum means for handling excess plutonium\nresulting from the reprocessing.\nIn addition, it would be well to address other nuclear problems\nsuch as waste management which, alongwith reprocessing initiatives,\ncould provide the framework for a comprehensive nuclear policy\nto be adopted and enunciated in 2-3 months.\nFORD LIBRANK\n-2-\nPlease strive to complete this review and forward your\nrecommendations to me by August 15, 1976.\nSincerely,\nThe President\ncc: Elliott Richardson\nNEED FOR A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON NUCLEAR\nEXPORT POLICY OR NUCLEAR ENERGY IN GENERAL\nI. CURRENT PROBLEMS\nA. Growing Congressional, press, and public concern\nabout nuclear weapons proliferation.\nConcern is focused primarily upon the greater\navailability of plutonium which is extracted from\n\"spent\" fuel elements removed from nuclear power\nreactors (i.e., referred to as reprocessing).\nConcern has continued to grow since India exploded\na nuclear device in 1974.\nB. Growing concern that current U.S. activities to\nsafeguard against diversion of plutonium for weapons\npurposes is not adequate.\nAttention is now focused on exports of nuclear\nmaterials and equipment. Some feel that existing\ncontrols (detailed below) have been barely adequate\nfor safeguarding reactors and are simply not adequate\nto guard against diversion of separated plutonium.\nC. The U.S. position in the foreign market for nuclear\nequipment and materials is weakening.\nThis is resulting from (a) the lack of uranium\nenrichment capacity, (b) growing strength of\nforeign competition for nuclear equipment and\nfuels, (c) uncertainty as to U.S. policy on\nnuclear exports, and (d) potentially, delays\nresulting from Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)\ncontrol of export licenses and growing Congressional\nreview requirements. As the U.S. loses foreign\norders to other suppliers, the U.S. also loses its\nleverage to obtain rigid safeguards agreements.\nD. Perception in the media that the Administration is\ncomplacent about potential diversion of plutonium\nfrom commercial nuclear power plants abroad.\nBy contract, Canada recently cut off nuclear\nrelationships with India and appears to be imposing\nstrong safeguards controls in connection with its\nexports.\nE. Events immediately ahead will exacerbate the above\nproblems, involving NRC and Congress -- particularly\nwith respect to exports to Spain and India. (detailed\nbelow.)\n-2-\nII. EXISTING MEASURES AND ACTIVITIES TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION\nA. NPT\nApproximately 100 nations have signed the\nNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) foreswearing\nactivities leading to the proliferation of\nweapons. Several important nations have not\nsigned, including France and India.\nB. Bilateral \"Agreements for Cooperation\" between\nthe U.S. and about 30 other nations importing\nnuclear equipment and materials from the U.S.\nThese agreements specify safeguards that are\nto be maintained.\nC. IAEA\nInternational Atomic Energy Agency establishes\nsafeguards standards and has some inspection\ncapability.\nD. Supplier Discussions\nState Department is leading negotiations with\nother supplier nations, seeking agreement to\nimpose more rigid safeguards. There has been some\nsuccess achieved, but no agreement from other suppliers\nto restrict their export of reprocessing facilities.\nE. New International Convention\nThe U.S. is leading an attempt to gain agreement\non a new international nuclear physical security\nconvention.\nF. Pressure on Customer Nations\nThe U.S. brought pressure on the Government of\nSouth Korea to cancel its order with the French\nfor a reprocessing plant and is applying similar\npressure on Pakistan to forego acquisition of a\nreprocessing plant.\nIII. RECENT AND UPCOMING EVENTS SUGGESTING THE NEED FOR ACTION\nA. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)\nThe independent NRC now plays a major role in\nnuclear exports and will attract considerable\nattention to the international safeguards issue\nsoon.\n-3-\n1. Inadvertently, the final responsibility for approving\nnuclear exports was allowed to be vested in the\nindependent NRC rather than the Executive Branch.\nThis resulted from the September 1974 law which\ncreated ERDA and NRC.\n2. The NRC now has before it for approval proposed\nlicenses to export additional fuel for reactors\nin Spain and India. There appears to be agreement\nwithin NRC that additional controls are needed, but\nthere is sharp dispute as to whether additional\ncontrols -- beyond those in existing agreements --\nshould not be imposed as a condition of the exports.\nThe Commission decision apparently will be accompanied\nby written opinion, making public the strong\nviews of one Commissioner that safeguards in\nsome agreements for cooperation and U.S. vigilance\nhave not been adequate.\nB. Congressional\nThe Congress is asking more questions and\ntightening controls which will introduce\ndelays and uncertainties. Examples include:\n1. In 1974, a law was enacted requiring that\nall future bilateral \"agreements for\ncooperation\" involving significant nuclear\nexports be submitted to the Congress for a\n60-day period of review.\n2. Senate Government Operations Committee\nrecently reported a bill (S. 1439) which\n(a) shifts additional Executive Branch\nnuclear export responsibility to State\nDepartment and the independent Nuclear\nRegulatory Commission from ERDA and\nCommerce Department, and (b) makes the\nCongress the referee in disputes between\nState and NRC. Bill referred to JCAE\nand Foreign Relations for 60 days. It\ncould come to a vote this session.\n3. The Senate version of the Military Aid\nBill includes a prohibition (the \"Symington\nAmendment\") against military assistance\nto countries which furnish or receive\nnuclear reprocessing or enrichment facilities\nnot under multinational control and which\ndo not have IAEA safeguards on all nuclear\nfacilities. House-Senate Conferees agreed\non June 16 to accept the Symington Amendment\nwith a proviso that restrictions could be waived\nin specific cases upon a finding by the President\nof overriding national interest, but Congress would\nthen have an opportunity to disapprove.\n-4-\n4. The ERDA 1977 Authorization Bill was amended\non the House floor to provide for Congressional\nreview of the first export to any nation that\nis neither a signer of the NPT nor covered\nby any agreement for cooperation approved by\nthe Congress under the provisions of the 1974\nlaw listed above.\n5. A House International Relations Subcommittee\n(Zablocki) held hearings on June 10 on an\namendment to the Export Administration Act\ndesigned to prohibit nuclear exports unless\nsafeguards are tightened.\n6. Senator Ribicoff is asking hard questions\nof the State Department as to whether (a) any\nU.S. materials were used by India in producing\nthe plutonium used in the device exploded in\n1974, and (b) why the U.S. did not respond\nmore vigorously to that event. This whole\nissue will get even more attention as NRC\nconsiders pending export license for India\n(mentioned in II (a) (1) above).\nC. Executive Branch\nDr. Fred Ikle, Director of the Arms Control and\nDisarmament Agency (ACDA), recently gave a speech\nrevealing his concerns about the adequacy of\nsafeguards to prevent the diversion of plutonium.\nD. Other\nPresidential Candidate Carter outlined his\nconcerns about nuclear exports and proliferation\nat the same forum in which Ikle's speech was\ndelivered.\nIV. ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE THUS FAR\nA. The Executive Branch has responded to the above\nin several ways, but the actions (a) have been\npiecemeal and largely defensive, and (b) appear\ninadequate in the face of current Congressional\nand public attitudes. Responses include:\n1. Secretary Kissinger summarized U.S. non-\nproliferation efforts in testimony in\nopposition to the Glenn-Percy Bill before\nthe Senate Government Operations Committee.\nERDA, ACDA, and other Administration witnesses\ngave supporting testimony.\n-5-\n2. Informal attempts are being made by State, ERDA,\nand others to limit the scope of restrictions and\nof Congressional review requirements in pending\nbills (e.g., Military Aid and ERDA Authorization)\n3. An Executive Order was recently issued setting up\nprocedures for getting a coordinated Executive\nBranch position (State, ERDA, DOD, ACDA, and\nCommerce) on nuclear export licenses pending before\nthe NRC. (State Department notifies NRC of the\ncorrdinated Executive Branch position.)\nV. POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL RESPONSES\nSeveral ideas have surfaced for possible additional\nresponses to the current situation. Each involves\nsignificant issues that require evaluation and decision.\nPossible actions include:\nA. Significant hardening of U.S. attitude on nuclear\nexports safeguards required before exports are permitted.\nThere appears to be divided views on this.\nSome probably will argue that past and current\ncontrols are as good as can be achieved and/or\nthat tougher U.S. positions, taken unilaterally\nwill not be effective. Others will argue that\nanything the U.S. can do unilaterally or in\ncooperation with others that will help reduce the\nopportunity for proliferation is worth doing,\nrecognizing the threat. Steps that might be considered to\nachieve a harder and consistent policy include:\n1. Strong public message to other supplier nations\n(France and Germany) emphasizing the need to\ncurb proliferation and urging them to (a) stop\nsupplying reprocessing or enrichment technology\nto other nations, and (b) adopting more rigorous\nsafeguards requirements.\n2. Move to renegotiate safeguards controls under\nexisting agreements for cooperation as a\ncondition for further exports, particularly\ngiving the U.S. a veto on whether and where\nU.S. -supplied fuel is reprocessed and\nresulting plutonium retained.\n3. Appoint a panel of experts not now involved\nin U.S. nuclear export activities to review\npast and current practices and submit recom-\nmendations to you for improvements.\n-6--\nB. Discourage reprocessing (in the U.S. and abroad) until\nbetter controls (technological and institutional) can\nbe worked out.\nIf this policy approach were to be taken, consideration\nwould have to be given to:\n1. Expanding storage for \"spent\" fuel elements,\npossibly making storage available to other\ncountries.\n2. \"Buy back\" of spent fuel elements from other\ncountries.\n3. Finding ways to replace the energy value of the\nplutonium and unused uranium in the spent fuel\nelements (which is in the range of 10-30% of the\ntotal energy value if reprocessing and recycle\nof plutonium was permitted).\n4. Other incentives to discourage the separation\nof plutonium through reprocessing.\nC. As a means to discourage the spread of reprocessing\ncenters, provide U.S. reprocessing services to foreign\ncountries.\nNo U.S. capacity in operation now.\n1. Assist U.S. industry in demonstrating\nreprocessing and related technology\n(plutonium conversion, waste handling,\nsafeguards) Such a program is con-\ntemplated in the President's 1977 Budget\nfor coverage in a 1977 Supplemental\nRequest.\n2. Urge or require U.S. firms planning to\nprovide reprocessing services to dedicate\na portion of their capacity to serve\nforeign needs, thereby potentially\nsatisfying foreign needs for many years\nwithout the construction of reprocessing\nplants abroad.\n3. Go beyond #2 above by offering to allow\nother governments to participate in the\noperation of the first expected reprocessing\nplant (Barnswell, South Carolina) as a\ndemonstration of the concept of a multi-\nnational reprocessing center.\n-7-\nD. Propose international storage for excess plutonium\nIAEA has authority to establish repositories for\nexcess nuclear materials. The U.S. could propose\nthat this authority be implemented, that all\nnations store excess plutonium in such repositories\nand indicate that the U.S. would participate with\na deposit of its excess plutonium.\nE. Strengthen IAEA Safeguards\n1. Make available advanced U.S. safeguards\ntechnology to other nations and the IAEA.\n2. Consider further strengthening of IAEA\nsafeguards, expanding the proposal for\na $5 million - 5 year voluntary U.S.\ncontribution announced by the President\non February 26, 1976.\nDRAFT OUTLINE FOR THE CONTENT OF A STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR\nEXPORTS (WHICH COULD BE EXPANDED TO\nA STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR ENERGY)\nA. BASIC OBJECTIVES\n1. Prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons.\n2. Make nuclear energy available for peaceful uses\nparticularly to reduce the current excessive,\nreliance on petroleum.\nB. POLICIES WE HAVE FOLLOWED\n1. Promote signing of the NPT.\n2. Require safeguards in agreements for copperation\nwith countries seeking nuclear equipment and\nmaterials from the U.S.\n3. Serve as a reliable and competitive supplier\nof nuclear reactors and fuel, which provides\nleverage for imposing rigid safeguards\nrequirements.\n4. Urge other supplier nations to impose rigid\nsafeguards as conditions of export.\nC. STEPS NOW BEING TAKEN\n1. Urging other supplier nations to withdraw\nfrom any plans to provide enrichment or\nreprocessing plants or technology to\nother countries.\n2. Urging nations that have ordered or are\nseeking to order reprocessing plants to\ndiscontinue such activities.\n3. Promoting the concept of a \"multinational\nreprocessing center\" in a effort to forestall\nthe spread of reprocessing plants, particularly\nin non-nuclear weapons nations.\n4. Ask Congress to approve a $5 million contribution\nto IAEA over the next 5 years to strengthen\nsafeguards.\n2\nD. RECENT ADVANCES\n1. Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act, providing framework\nfor expansion of uranium enrichment capacity\nin the United States (assuming the bill passes).\n2. Agreements by other supplier nations to tighten\nsafeguards.\n3. South Korean cancellation of order for a\nreprocessing plant.\n4. Japanese signing of NPT.\nE.\nPOSSIBLE NEW INITIATIVES\n(Outline in more detail on pages 5 to 7 of the paper\ndescribing the need for a Presidential message.)\n1. Significant hardening of U.S. attitude on nuclear\nexport safeguards, with a clear statement of U.S.\npolicy.\nStrong message to other supplier nations\nurging (a) moratorium on reprocessing and\nenrichment technology exports and (b) more\nrigorous safeguards.\nNegotiate tighter safeguard controls over\nexisting agreements for cooperation.\nAppoint a panel of experts to review U.S.\nnuclear export policy.\n2.\nDiscourage reprocessing (in the U.S. and abroad)\nuntil better controls (technological and institutional)\ncan be worked out.\nExpand storage for spent fuel elements.\nBuy back of spent fuel elements from other countries.\nReplace energy value of plutonium and uranium\nin spent fuel.\n3. As a means to discourage the spread of reprocessing\ncenters, provide U.S. reprocessing services to\nforeign countries.\nAssist U.S. industry in demonstrating reprocessing.\nUrge or require U.S. reprocessing firms to serve\nforeign needs.\n3\nOffer to allow other Governments to participate\nin the operation of U.S. reprocessing facility --\nas a multinational reprocessing center.\n4. Propose international storage for excess plutonium.\n5.\nStrengthen IAEA safeguards.\nMake available advanced U.S. safeguards technology.\nFurther strengthening of IAEA safeguards resources.\nSIGNATURE\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 8, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nJIM CANNON\nFROM:\nGLENN Home\nSUBJECT:\nNUCLEAR POLICY PAPER FOR\nTHE PRESIDENT\nHere is the finally typed version of the memo which Jim\nMitchell, Dave Elliott and I are recommending that you,\nJim Lynn and Brent Scowcroft sign and send to the\nPresident.\nI'm forwarding a copy to you now with the hope that this\nmight help expedite the reviewing and signing process\n(if you find it acceptable).\nThe original is now with Jim Lynn and I'll get that to\nyou and Brent in turn.\nJim Connor is pushing hard to have the paper by noon\non Friday with the objective of getting the President's\nreview and approval on Friday afternoon. Connor reviewed\nthe paper in draft and recommends it.\nAssuming the President approves the paper, Connor is\nrecommending a meeting of Cannon, Lynn, Scowcroft and\nConnor on Monday to get agreement on how the enterprise\nwill be carried out. I'm prepared to discuss my ideas\non this with you at any time you wish.\nRecommendation\nThat you sign the original of the attached memorandum\nas soon as we can deliver it to you.\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nDECISION\nWASHINGTON\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nJIM CANNON\nJIM LYNN\nSUBJECT:\nNUCLEAR POLICY - ISSUES AND PROBLEMS\nREQUIRING ATTENTION AND POTENTIAL\nPOLICY STATEMENT\nThis memorandum:\n-\nIdentifies nuclear export and weapons proliferation,\nreprocessing and waste management problems requiring\nearly attention.\n-\nSummarizes growing Congressional, public and media\nconcern about these problems, including restrictive\nlegislation now moving through the Congress, criticism\nof the Administration and the potential for more of\nboth in the months ahead.\n-\nSuggests the need for a major effort over the next\nsix weeks to develop and evaluate several potential\npolicy and program actions, followed by a Presidential\nstatement on nuclear policy by mid-September.\nISSUES\nThe principal issues presented for your consideration are:\n-\nWhether you wish to direct that the necessary effort\nbe undertaken over the next six weeks to develop and\nevaluate proposals and present them for your con-\nsideration;\n-\nWhether you wish to approve, tentatively, the concept\nof a major nuclear policy statement in September; and\n-\nIf so, where to assign responsibility for assuring that\nall necessary work is carried out and issues and a draft\nstatement are presented for your consideration.\n2\nBACKGROUND AND STATUS - NUCLEAR POLICY\nThe acceptability of commercial nuclear power passed a major\ntest with the defeat of Proposition 15 in California. Also,\nwe expect that your uranium enrichment proposal will soon\nbe approved by the Congress, paving the way for expansion\nof capacity and thus resolving the principal remaining un-\ncertainty at the \"front end\" of the commercial nuclear power\ncycle. Some questions continue to be raised about the\nadequacy of uranium supply, mining and milling capacity\nand nuclear safety, but these appear to be manageable\nproblems -- with primary responsibility in industry and\nthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). However, these\nfront-end problems are aggravated by the uncertainties\nassociated with nuclear fuel reprocessing and waste handling\nand storage as described below. The development of advanced\nnuclear technologies (e.g., breeder) is adequately funded in\nyour budget proposals.\nHowever, several major interrelated nuclear power and pro-\nliferation issues are now facing us and these are drawing\nincreased attention in the Congress, public and media. These\ninvolve:\n-\nU.S. policy on nuclear exports and safeguards to reduce\nthe potential for weapons proliferation.\n-\nU.S. policy with respect to reprocessing of spent fuel\nfrom commercial power plants to recover plutonium and\nunused uranium, and the commercial demonstration of\ntechnology.\n-\nThe adequacy of U.S. plans for the safe handling and\nstorage of nuclear wastes, particularly assurances\nthat repositories will be available for long-term\nstorage of long-lived and high-level wastes.\nThe potential solution for these problems are intertwined;\ne.g., we cannot resolve policy on reprocessing by other\nnations until we know how we are going to handle the problem\nin the U.S. The issues involve both domestic and national\nsecurity considerations and they affect both the continued\nacceptability of nuclear power in the U.S. and our position\nas a major free-world supplier of nuclear equipment and fuel\nfor peaceful purposes. Maintaining our strong position as\na free-world supplier is one of our best means of controlling\nproliferation.\n3\nPUBLIC, PRESS AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS AND OUTLOOK\nWhile the California Proposition failed, other referenda\ninvolving restrictions on commercial nuclear power have\nqualified for November ballots in Washington, Oregon, and\nColorado. These referenda together with three restrictive\nlaws passed in California prior to the moratorium vote, will\nkeep attention focused on unresolved reprocessing, waste\nmanagement and proliferation issues.\nConcern about proliferation has lead to a number of restric-\ntive provisions in bills now moving through the Congress --\nmost of which require additional Congressional review of\nnuclear exports. These requirements will introduce more\nuncertainty and delay, give potential foreign customers new\ndoubts about the reliability of the U.S. as a supplier of\nnuclear equipment and materials, and thus hamper U.S. efforts\nto impose rigid safeguards against proliferation.\nCongressional developments, including recent strong criticism\nfrom Congressman John Anderson is summarized at Tab A.\nThe number of press articles is increasing and the tone is\ngrowing more critical. Press attention focused particularly\non the recent actions by the NRC on export licenses involving\nSpain and India. (The role and activities of the NRC is also\nsummarized at Tab A.)\nNATURE OF THE EFFORT NEEDED\nERDA Administrator Seamans has recommended (letter at Tab B)\nundertaking a major program to provide nuclear fuel repro-\ncessing in the U.S., permitting foreign participation in\nthis activity, and using this program as the centerpiece of\na major Presidential statement on non-proliferation.\nWe agree that actions on reprocessing should be considered\nbut we believe that a more comprehensive approach should\nbe taken when developing proposals and a draft statement\nfor your consideration. The paper at Tab C outlines in\nmore detail the scope of the problems requiring considera-\ntion and identifies a number of possible actions, all of\nwhich require further development and evaluation before\nthey are presented to you for consideration. We also\nbelieve that an effort should be undertaken immediately,\nparticularly in view of the growing concern in the Congress.\nIn view of the complex nature of the issues involved, a\nnumber of agencies will need to be involved and will need\nto devote resources to the effort. These include: ERDA,\nState, ACDA, NRC and, to a lesser extent, Interior, EPA,\nCommerce, FEA and CEQ.\n4\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n1.\nThat you direct that work begin immediately to develop\nand evaluate the potential initiatives described\nbriefly in Tab C (and others subsequently identified),\nwith decision papers presented to you by August 30.\nAPPROVE\nDISAPPROVE\n2.\nThat you tentatively decide to issue a major statement\non nuclear policy or send a message to Congress in\nmid-September.\nAPPROVE\nDISAPPROVE\n3.\nThat you assign responsibility jointly to us (Brent\nScowcroft, Jim Cannon, and Jim Lynn) to develop and\ncarry out a plan to accomplish the necessary work\nin cooperation with all the agencies concerned.\nAPPROVE\nDISAPPROVE\nA\nPRINCIPAL CONGRESSIONAL AND NUCLEAR\nREGULATORY COMMISSIONS (NRC) ACTIONS RELATING\nTO NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND REPROCESSING\nI. CONGRESSIONAL. Principal Congressional actions --\nincluding legislation passed and pending and a sampling\nof recent criticism -- are as follows:\nA. A 1974 law requires all bilateral \"agreements for\ncooperation\" involving significant nuclear exports\nbe submitted to Congress for a 60-day period of\nreview. This was stimulated by concern over Israeli\nand Egyptian nuclear accords.\nB. The Military Aid Bill includes a prohibition (the\nSymington Amendment) against military assistance\nto countries which furnish or receive nuclear\nreprocessing or enrichment facilities not under\nmultinational control or IAEA safeguards.\nRestrictions could be waived by the President\nin individual cases upon specific findings -\nsubject to disapproval by a joint resolution of\nthe Congress within 30 days.\nC. The ERDA 1977 Authorization bill includes an amend-\nment (still subject to final wording in conference\nafter July recess) requiring Congressional approval\nof the first exports of nuclear fuel or equipment\nto any country that has not signed the NPT or is\nnot covered by a Congressionally-approved agreement\nfor cooperation.\nD. The House International Relations Committee is\nexpected to report an amendment to the Export\nAdministration Act which would require prohibi-\ntions against reprocessing of fuel exported by\nU.S. or burned in U.S.-supplied reactors, unless\nthe Secretary of State certifies that there would\nbe at least a 90-day warning before material could\nbe used in a nuclear device.\nE. The Senate Government Operations Committee reported\na bill (S. 1439) on May 14 sponsored by Senators\nGlenn, Ribicoff and Percy, which (a) shifts addi-\ntional executive branch nuclear export responsibility\nto State Department and the independent Nuclear\nRegulatory Commission from ERDA and Commerce\n2\nDepartment and (b) makes the Congress the referee\nin disputes between State and NRC over the granting\nof export licenses. This bill was referred to the\nJCAE and Foreign Relations for 60 days, which\nperiod has now been extended through the end of\nAugust. Several Administration witnesses have\ntestified against the bill and Secretary Kissinger\nwas expected to testify on June 29 but his testi-\nmony has been delayed. The JCAE is pressing the\nAdministration for alternative proposals.\nF. On June 25, Congressman John Anderson publicly\nblasted \"the White House\" for not moving fast enough\nto resolve problems relating to reprocessing, nuclear\nexports and proliferation. (This occurred despite\nour attempts to keep his staff thoroughly informed\nof Administration efforts.)\nG. Congressman Anderson has since written to JCAE\nChairman Pastore urging extensive hearings over\nthe next two months -- with the objective of\npressing the Administration for answers on re-\nprocessing, nuclear exports and proliferation\nissues. (We have been advised informally by\nAnderson's staff that he probably would agree\nto urge Senator Pastore to delay hearings if\nthe Administration plans to come forward with\nnew proposals.)\nH. Senator Ribicoff has been a persistent critic for\nthe past two years of what he believes is inadequate\nexecutive branch action on reprocessing, nuclear\nexports and proliferation. Over the past four weeks\nhe has been pressing particularly hard with respect\nto U.S.-supplied materials (heavy water) in the\nIndian reactor used to produce material for the\ndevice exploded by India in 1974. He will almost\ncertainly use the State Department responses to\npress his case even more.\nII. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. The NRC now plays a\nmajor role in nuclear exports and will decide whether,\nwhen, and under what conditions reprocessing will be\npermitted in the U.S. The NRC role has become particu-\nlarly important because:\n3\nA.\nInadvertently, the final responsibility for approving\nnuclear exports was allowed to be vested in the\nindependent NRC rather than the executive branch.\nThis resulted from the September 1974 law which\ncreated ERDA and NRC.\nB. The NRC has just announced decisions on licenses\nto export a reactor to Spain and an interim supply\nof fuel for the Tarapur reactor in India. The\nNRC decisions, including the strong dissent of one\nCommissioner have been made public. There appears\nto be agreement within the NRC that additional\ncontrols are needed but there is sharp dispute as\nto whether additional controls -- beyond those in\nexisting agreements -- should now be imposed as\na condition of licenses issued under existing\nagreements. The view of the dissenting Commissioner\nis getting support in the press and from some members\nof Congress.\nC. The NRC is now working on an environmental impact\nstatement necessary to its decision -- expected in\nearly 1977 -- as to whether to permit wide scale\nuse of plutonium as reactor fuel. This and sub-\nsequent decisions on the licensing of reprocessing\nfacilities will have a major impact on the desir-\nability, feasibility and economics of nuclear fuel\nreprocessing. (The decision will also have an\nimpact on the viability of the liquid metal fast\nbreeder reactor (LMFBR) which would be fueled with\nplutonium and which is a major factor in the\neconomic justification for reprocessing of spent\nfuel elements to recover plutonium and unused\nuranium.)\nB\nSEAMANS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT\nPROVIDED EARLIER. IT'S CLASSIFIED\nCONFIDENTIAL\nSUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR POWER PROBLEMS\nAND POSSIBLE RESPONSES: NUCLEAR EXPORTS,\nREPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT\nContents\nPage\nI.\nNuclear Exports\n1\nA.\nCurrent Problems\n1\nB. Principal Existing Measures Affecting\nNuclear Export Policy and Control of\nProliferation\n2\nC. Administration Responses thus Far\n3\nD. Additional Actions for Development\nand Evaluation\n4\nII.\nNuclear Fuel Reprocessing\n6\nA. Background\n6\nB.\nCurrent Problems\n7\nC. Actions Taken or Underway\n9\nD. Additional Actions for Development\nand Evaluation\n10\nIII.\nNuclear Waste Management\n10\nA. Background\n10\nB.\nCurrent Problems\n11\nC. Actions Taken or Underway\n12\nD. Additional Actions For Development\nand Evaluation\n13\nSUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR PROBLEMS\nAND POSSIBLE RESPONSES: NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND\nPROLIFERATION, REPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT\nI. NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND PROLIFERATION\nA. Current Problems\n1. Growing Congressional, press, and public concern\nabout nuclear weapons proliferation.\nConcern is focused primarily upon the greater\navailability of plutonium which is extracted\nfrom \"spent\" fuel elements (i.e., the process\nreferred to as \"reprocessing\"). Once separated\nplutonium is available, very little time --\nhours to days -- is needed to make a nuclear\nweapon. Concern has continued to grow since\nIndia exploded a nuclear device in 1974.\n2. Growing concern that current U.S. activities to\nsafeguard against diversion of plutonium for\nweapons purposes is not adequate.\nAttention is now focused on exports of nuclear\nmaterials and equipment. Some feel that existing\ncontrols (detailed below) have been barely ade-\nquate for safeguarding reactors and are simply\nnot adequate to guard against diversion of\nseparated plutonium, particularly if it is\naccumulated in excess amounts.\n3. The U.S. position in the foreign market for nuclear\nequipment and materials is weakening.\nThis is resulting from (a) the lack of uranium\nenrichment capacity, (b) growing strength of\nforeign competition for nuclear equipment and\nfuels, (c) uncertainty as to U.S. policy on\nnuclear exports due to our divisive internal\ndebate, and (d) potentially, delays resulting\nfrom Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) control\nof export licenses and growing Congressional\nreview requirements. As the U.S. loses foreign\norders to other suppliers, the U.S. also loses\nits leverage to obtain rigid safeguards agreements.\n2\n4.\nPerception in the media that the Administration is\ncomplacent about potential diversion of plutonium\nfrom commercial nuclear power plants abroad.\nOverall, our controls generally are more rigorous\nthan those applied by most other suppliers, but\nthis has not helped in the current debate. Also,\nCanada's recent action in cutting off nuclear\nrelationships with India and imposing strong\nsafeguard controls in connection with its exports\nhas set a tough standard of comparison.\nB. Principal Existing Measures Affecting Export Policy\nand the Control of Proliferation.\n1. NPT\nApproximately 100 nations have signed the Non-\nProliferation Treaty (NPT) foreswearing activities\nleading to the proliferation of weapons. Several\nimportant nations have not signed, including\nFrance, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa\nand Brazil.\n2. Bilateral \"Agreements for Cooperation\" between\nthe U.S. and about 30 other nations importing\nnuclear equipment and materials from the U.S.\nThese agreements specify safeguards that are to\nbe maintained.\n3. IAEA\nInternational Atomic Energy Agency establishes\nsafeguards standards and has some inspection\ncapability.\n4. Supplier Discussions\nState Department is leading negotiations with\nother supplier nations, seeking agreement to\nimpose more rigid safeguards. There has been\nsome success achieved, but no agreement to\ndefer the export of reprocessing facilities\nuntil more effective controls are developed.\n5. New International Convention\nThe U.S. is exploring a new international nuclear\nphysical security convention and other steps to\nupgrade physical security standards worldwide.\n3\n6. Pressure on Customer Nations\nThe U.S. brought pressure on the Government of\nSouth Korea to cancel its order with the French\nfor a reprocessing plant and is applying similar\npressure on Pakistan to forego acquisition of a\nreprocessing plant, but with less success.\nCongressional and press criticism of export\npolicies of West Germany and France continues\nstrong even though both countries claim they\nare conforming to guidelines recently developed\njointly by supplier nations. Germany still has\na commitment to supply enrichment and reprocessing\ntechnology to Brazil and France is committed to\nsupply a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Nature\nof commitments to others, such as South Africa,\nare unclear.\nC. Administration Response Thus Far\nThe Executive Branch has responded to the above in\nseveral ways, but the actions (a) have been piece-\nmeal and largely defensive, and (b) appear inadequate\nin the face of current Congressional and public\nattitudes. Responses include:\n1. Secretary Kissinger summarized U.S. non-\nproliferation efforts in testimony in opposi-\ntion to the Glenn-Percy Nuclear Export\nReorganization Bill (S. 1439) before the Senate\nGovernment Operations Committee. ERDA, ACDA,\nand other Administration witnesses gave sup-\nporting testimony. Administration witnesses\nhave also testified before JCAE, except for\nSecretary Kissinger who is expected to appear\nsoon.\n2. Informal attempts are being made by State, ERDA,\nand others to limit the scope of restrictions\nand of Congressional review requirements in\npending bills (e.g., Military Aid and ERDA\nAuthorization).\n3. An Executive Order was recently issued setting\nup procedures for getting a coordinated Executive\nBranch position (State, ERDA, DOD, ACDA, and\nCommerce) on nuclear export licenses pending\nbefore the NRC. (State Department notifies\nNRC of the coordinated Executive Branch position.)\n4\nD. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation\nSeveral ideas have surfaced for possible alternative\nresponses to the current situation. Each involves\nsignificant issues that require development and\nevaluation before being presented for decision.\nPossible actions identified thus far include:\n1. Significant hardening of U.S. attitude on nuclear\nexports safeguards required before exports are\npermitted.\nThere appears to be divided views on this. Some\nprobably will argue that past and current controls\nare as good as can be achieved and/or that tougher\nU.S. positions, taken unilaterally will not be\neffective recognizing that the requirements we\nimpose are already tougher than those of most\nother suppliers with whom the U.S. competes for\nnuclear markets. Others will argue that anything\nthe U.S. can do unilaterally or in cooperation\nwith others that will help reduce the opportunity\nfor proliferation is worth doing, recognizing the\nthreat. Steps that might be considered to achieve\na harder and consistent policy include:\na. Strong public message -- to supplement\ndiplomatic channel efforts now underway ----\nto other supplier nations (France and\nGermany) emphasizing the need to curb\nproliferation and urging them to: (1)\nstop supplying reprocessing or enrichment\ntechnology to other nations, and (2)\nadopting more rigorous safeguards\nrequirements.\nb. Head of State meetings to carry out (a),\nabove.\nC. Move to renegotiate safeguards controls\nunder existing agreements for cooperation\nas a condition for further exports, par-\nticularly giving the U.S. a veto on whether\nand where any fuel irradiated in U.S.\nreactors is reprocessed.\n5\nd. In addition to other actions, but not a\nsubstitute for, appoint a panel of experts\nnot now involved in U.S. nuclear export\nactivities to review past and current\npractices and submit recommendations to\nyou for improvements.\n2. Intensify efforts to discourage reprocessing\n(in the U.S. and abroad) until better controls\n(technological and institutional) can be worked\nout. (This needs to be considered in connection\nwith domestic reprocessing issues, discussed in\nII, below.)\nIf this policy approach were to be taken,\nconsideration would have to be given to:\na. Expanding storage for \"spent\" fuel elements,\npossibly making storage available to other\ncountries.\nb. \"Buy back\" of spent fuel elements.\nC. Finding ways to replace the energy value of\nthe plutonium and unused uranium in the spent\nfuel elements (which is in the range of 10-30%\nof the total energy value if reprocessing and\nrecycle of plutonium was permitted).\nd. Other incentives to discourage the separation\nof plutonium through reprocessing.\n3. As a means to discourage the spread of reprocessing\ncenters, provide U.S. reprocessing services to\nforeign countries.\nThis depends on development of reprocessing in\nthe U.S. since we currently have no commercial\nreprocessing in operation.\na. Assist U.S. industry in demonstrating\nreprocessing and related technology\n(plutonium conversion, waste handling,\nsafeguards), as discussed in II, below.\n6\nb. Urge or require U.S. firms planning to\nprovide reprocessing services to dedicate\na portion of their capacity to serve\nforeign needs, thereby potentially\nsatisfying foreign needs for many years\nwithout the construction of reprocessing\nplants abroad.\nC. Go beyond #2 above by offering to allow\nother governments to participate in the\noperation of the first expected reprocessing\nplant (Barnwell, South Carolina) as a demon-\nstration of the concept of a multi-national\nreprocessing center.\nd. Determine alternatives to returning plutonium\nto foreign reprocessing customers -- such as\nsubstituting energy equivalent of reprocessed\nfuel in the form of enriched uranium.\n4. Propose international storage for excess plutonium.\nIAEA has authority to establish repositories for\nexcess nuclear materials. The U.S. could propose\nthat this authority be implemented, that all\nnations store excess plutonium in such repositories\nand indicate that the U.S. would participate with\nthe deposit of its excess plutonium.\n5. Intensify efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards.\na. Make available advanced U.S. safeguards\ntechnology to other nations and the IAEA.\nb. Consider further strengthening of IAEA\nsafeguards, expanding the proposal for\na $5 million - 5 year voluntary U.S.\ncontribution announced by the President\non February 26, 1976.\nII. NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING AND SPREAD OF REPROCESSING\nTECHNOLOGY\nA. Background\n1. The principal driving forces behind the desire\nto establish a U.S. industry to reprocess \"spent\"\nfuel elements from commercial power reactors\nare to:\n7\na. recover and reuse the plutonium and unused\nuranium from elements (with energy value of\n10-30% of initial fuel input).\nb. provide plutonium to fuel liquid metal fast\nbreeder (LMFBR) reactors once they are used\ncommercially.\nC. reduce irradiated fuel and associated waste\nproducts to most manageable forms.\n2. Technology for reprocessing has been demonstrated\nin AEC (now ERDA) operations.\n3. Consistent policy followed that the reprocessing\nstep in the nuclear fuel cycle is the responsi-\nbility of industry. Government sponsors R&D.\n4. The principal driving forces behind the spread of\nreprocessing technology and equipment worldwide\nare:\na. Competition among the suppliers of nuclear\nenergy reactors for sales in third countries;\nb. Desire on the part of recipients of the\ntechnology and equipment to place as large\na part of the nuclear fuel cycle as possible\nunder their own national control;\nC. desire by some for a nuclear weapons\ncapability.\nB. Current Problems\n1. Demonstrating Technology in Commercial Operations\nThere is not now any commercial reprocessing\ncapacity in the U.S.:\na. One plant that was operational (Nuclear Fuel\nServices) in Western, N.Y., is closed down\nand probably will not reopen.\nb. A $70 million plant built at Morris, Illinois\nby GE is never expected to operate due to\ntechnological problems.\n8\nC. A $260 million plant, including only initial\nstorage and separations stages of reprocessing,\nhas been built in South Carolina by Allied\nChemical and General Atomics (AGNES) Its\nactual operation depends upon:\n- obtaining an NRC license;\n- either (a) storage of separated plutonium\nin liquid form, or (b) construction of a\n$150 million conversion facility, for\nwhich Government assistance may be needed;\n- construction of a $350 million waste\nsolidification and packaging facility.\n2. Licensing\nLicensing of reprocessing facility depends upon\nresolution of a number of issues now pending\nbefore the NRC in one major and several other\nissues. The principal issue is whether to allow\nwidespread recycling of plutonium. This depends\nupon resolving safety, environmental, economic,\nand safeguards issues -- which are being covered\nin a Generic Environmental Impact Statement which\nshould be completed by early 1977, with an NRC\ndecision in mid-1977.\n3. Alternatives\nThe NRC statement almost certainly will have to\ndeal with alternatives to reprocessing, some of\nwhich (such as indefinite storage of irradiated\nfuel) have not been fully studied. Also, the\nextent of the economic advantages of reprocessing\ndepend upon the likelihood and timing of com-\nmercial breeder reactors. (The construction of\nthe first demonstration reactor at Clinch River,\nTennessee, has not begun, is behind schedule and\nis growing in cost.) Assuming reprocessing and\nrecycle is permitted, NRC will have to issue\ncomplex safety, environmental and safeguards\nstandards and guidelines. A thorough assessment\nof these factors has not been completed.\n9\n4.\nDecisions needed\nDecisions are needed on whether and when to\nreprocess so that investment decisions can be\nmade by industry to build either: (a) reprocessing\nfacilities, or (b) additional storage facilities\nfor spent fuel elements. One or the other and\nmaybe both are needed to handle spent fuel from\nplants already in operation. The absence of\nfirm plans is a factor in utility and utility\ncommission decisions on nuclear power and in\nnuclear moratoria referenda.\n5. Barnwell Facility\nThe consortium building the Barnwell reprocessing\nfacility is experiencing financial problems due\nto higher costs and uncertainty about the future\nof reprocessing. Abandonment of the operation\nis conceivable.\nC. Actions Taken or Underway\n1. ERDA\na. 1977 Budget. The President's 1977 Budget\nincluded funds for additional R&D needed\nfor reprocessing. It also contemplated a\nsupplemental to fund some kind of assistance\nprogram to encourage construction of repro-\ncessing facilities, once the right course\nof action was decided upon. (In practice,\nit may not be possible to implement a program\nuntil NRC decides on recycling of plutonium.)\nb. Program Development. In February, ERCA\nsolicited expressions of interest from\nindustry on plans for providing reprocessing\nand on the types of assistance that might be\nnecessary or appropriate (with emphasis on a\nminimum Federal role). Over 30 reponses\nwere received and ERDA is now considering\nthose in the development of its proposed\nprogram.\n2. NRC is proceeding with hearings on the completed\nportions of the plutonium recycle generic impact\nstatement and is completing the remaining\nportions -- all headed toward a decision in\nmid-1977.\n10\n3. ACDA, ERDA, and State are working to define the\nconcept of a multinational reprocessing center\nand considering the possibility of some kind of\nforeign participation in the Barnwell facility.\nThe desire for non-proliferation benefits has\nalready attracted some Congressional support\nfor assisting Barnwell to serve foreign users.\nD. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation.\nResolution of questions about domestic reprocessing\nis key to any major nuclear policy announcements.\nA major effort will be needed to sort out reprocessing\nissues.\n1. Immediate action to complete the development,\nanalysis, and evaluation of the following:\na. The need for, timing of, and alternatives\nto reprocessing. This should provide a\nbasis for executive branch (non-regulatory)\ndecisions as to whether and when reprocessing\nshould be encouraged. (Note that a decision\nto defer reprocessing might influence other\ncountries to do the same.)\nb. Alternative ways for the Government to work\nwith industry to provide reprocessing\ncapacity, assuming that we will proceed\ndomestically with reprocessing.\n2. Explore the potential for various forms of\nforeign involvement in domestic reprocessing\nfacilities -- as outlined in I (D) (3) (pg. 5).\nIII. NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT\nA. Background\n1. Government policy has, since early 1970's, been\nthat the Federal Government would take responsi-\nbility for long-term storage of high level wastes.\nPrivate industry is responsible (subject to\nregulation) for handling and packaging of wastes\nand delivering them in a prescribed form to a\nFederal repository for long-term storage.\n11\n2.\nGovernment policy has regarded the handling and\nstorage of lower level radioactive wastes as an\nindustry task, subject to Federal or State\nregulation. Some problems have emerged but\nthese probably can be resolved within existing\narrangements.\n3. Approaches to long-term storage have been\nconsidered and then rejected: storage in the\nsalt mine in Kansas and a temporary near\nsurface storage facility. The program for\ndeveloping acceptable approaches and providing\na permanent repository heretofore has had\nrelatively low priority.\n4. There seems to be general agreement that\ntechnology is available to permit safe long-\nterm storage, but there is a long way to go\nbefore a respository is in place and ready\nto receive wastes.\n5. International plans and standards for disposal\nof nuclear wastes have not been adequately\naddressed.\nB. Current Problems\n1. The major task facing the Federal Government\nis finding an acceptable location (s) for a\nrepository, constructing it, and opening it\nto receive wastes. Current assessments sug-\ngest that such a repository should be in place\nby 1985 and it is not clear that current plans --\nwhich involve at least five Federal agencies --\nwill result in achieving this objective.\n2. Finding a location for a repository acceptable\nto residents of the region selected will be\na difficult task.\n3. Related problems involve sorting out the roles\nand responsibilities of the several agencies\ninvolved; particularly, ERDA, NRC, EPA, and\nGeological Survey, and providing some continuing\nneeds for inter-agency coordination.\n12\n4. The absence of convincing plans to have a\nhigh-level repository in place are contributing\nto: (a) the efforts by nuclear power opponents\nto slow down nuclear power, and (b) questions\nby utilities and utility commissions as to the\ndesirability of committing to more nuclear\nplants.\n5. Expected increase in nuclear wastes worldwide\nbetween now and 1990 will require development\nof international plans standards.\nC. Actions Taken or Underway\n1. ERDA\na. 1977 Budget. The President's 1977 Budget\nincludes $65 million in outlays (compared\nto $12 million in FY 1976) to proceed with\na waste management program. A large share\nof these funds will be used for exploratory\ndrilling of various kinds of geologic forma-\ntions around the country in order to find a\nsuitable location for a pilot repository\nand operational repositories.\nb. Technical Alternatives and Generic Environmental\nImpact Statement. ERDA has published an\nextensive technical alternatives document and\nis proceeding with development of the necessary\ngeneric environmental impact statement covering\nwaste management with the objective of issuing\na draft statement early in 1977 and a final\nstatement late in 1977.\n2. NRC is working on waste handling, packaging,\ntransportation, and storage regulations and\nan associated environmental impact statement\nwith the objective of completing work in 1978.\n3. Interagency Task Force. An OMB-lead interagency\ntask force is evaluating the schedules and the\ninteragency relationships among the five agencies\nprincipally involved: ERDA, NRC, EPA, Geological\nSurvey, and CEQ. This group's work has already\nidentified potential obstacles that would prevent\n13\nhaving a repository available when needed. The\nproblems include: (a) sequencing of each agency's\nactivities so that information will be available\nto others when needed, (b) overlapping functions\nbetween NRC and EPA, and (c) continuing inter-\nagency coordination.\nD. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation\n1. Develop a firm plan setting out all major\nactions which must be taken over the next\nten years and when they will occur -- covering\nall forms of nuclear waste.\n2. Develop a clear statement of roles and\nresponsibilities (including solution of\noverlap in EPA and NRC functions), and\ndevelop arrangements for continuing inter-\nagency coordination.\n3. Consider the extension of our domestic waste\nmanagement plans and solutions internationally,\nperhaps through one or more of the following:\na. Offer to make waste handling and storage\ntechnology available to other nations.\nb. Offer to investigate international waste\ndisposal sites, either independent of or\nin conjunction with reprocessing arrangements.\nThis will require consideration of controversial\nissues such as the storage in one country of\nwastes resulting from nuclear energy used in\nanother country.\nENDA STATE\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nDECISION\nWASHINGTON\nJuly10,1976\nMEMORANDUM\nPRESIDENT\nFROM:\nNRC\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nCANNON\nJIM LYNN\nSUBJECT:\nNUCLEAR POLICY - ISSUES AND PROBLEMS\nREQUIRING ATTENTION AND POTENTIAL\nPOLICY STATEMENT\n-\nwastenwing\nM\nThis memorandum:\n3)evport\n-\nIdentifies nuclear export and weapons proliferation,\nreprocessing and waste management problems requiring\nearly attention.\nSummarizes growing Congressional, public and media\nconcern about these problems, including restrictive\nlegislation now moving through the Congress, criticism\nof the Administration and the potential for more of\nboth in the months ahead.\n-\nSuggests the need for a major effort over the next\nsix weeks to develop and evaluate several potential\npolicy and program actions, followed by a Presidential\nstatement on nuclear policy by mid-September.\nISSUES\nThe principal issues presented for your consideration are:\n-\nWhether you wish to direct that the necessary effort\nbe undertaken over the next six weeks to develop and\nevaluate proposals and present them for your con-\nsideration;\nFORD LIBRARY i 938839\nWhether you wish to approve, tentatively, the concept\nof a major nuclear policy statement in September; and\nIf so, where to assign responsibility for assuring that\nall necessary work is carried out and issues and a draft\nstatement are presented for your consideration.\n2\nBACKGROUND AND STATUS - NUCLEAR POLICY\nThe acceptability of commercial nuclear power passed a major\ntest with the defeat of Proposition 15 in California. Also,\nwe expect that your uranium enrichment proposal will soon\nbe approved by the Congress, paving the way for expansion\nof capacity and thus resolving the principal remaining un-\ncertainty at the \"front end\" of the commercial nuclear power\ncycle. Some questions continue to be raised about the\nadequacy of uranium supply, mining and milling capacity\nand nuclear safety, but these appear to be manageable\nproblems -- with primary responsibility in industry and\nthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). However, these\nfront-end problems are aggravated by the uncertainties\nassociated with nuclear fuel reprocessing and waste handling\nand storage as described below. The development of advanced\nnuclear technologies (e.g., breeder) is adequately funded in\nyour budget proposals.\nHowever, several major interrelated nuclear power and pro--\nliferation issues are now facing us and these are drawing\nincreased attention in the Congress, public and media. These\ninvolve:\n-\nU.S. policy on nuclear exports and safeguards to reduce\nthe potential for weapons proliferation.\nU.S. policy with respect to reprocessing of spent fuel\nfrom commercial power plants to recover plutonium and\nunused uranium, and the commercial demonstration of\ntechnology.\nI\nThe adequacy of U.S. plans for the safe handling and\nstorage of nuclear wastes, particularly assurances\nthat repositories will be available for long-term\nstorage of long-lived and high-level wastes.\nThe potential solutions for these problems are intertwined;\ne.g., we cannot resolve policy on reprocessing by other\nnations until we know how we are going to handle the problem\nin the U.S. The issues involve both domestic and national\nsecurity considerations and they affect both the continued\nacceptability of nuclear power in the U.S. and our position\nas a major free-world supplier of nuclear equipment and fuel\nfor peaceful purposes. Maintaining our strong position as\na free-world supplier is one of our best means of controlling\nproliferation.\n3\nPUBLIC, PRESS AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS AND OUTLOOK\nWhile the California Proposition failed, other referenda\ninvolving restrictions on commercial nuclear power have\nqualified for November ballots in Washington, Oregon, and\nColorado. These referenda together with three restrictive\nlaws passed in California prior to the moratorium vote, will\nkeep attention focused on unresolved reprocessing, waste\nmanagement and proliferation issues.\nConcern about proliferation has lead to a number of restric-\ntive provisions in bills now moving through the Congress --\nmost of which require additional Congressional review of\nnuclear exports. These requirements will introduce more\nuncertainty and delay, give potential foreign customers new\ndoubts about the reliability of the U.S. as a supplier of\nnuclear equipment and materials, and thus hamper U.S. efforts\nto impose rigid safeguards against proliferation.\nCongressional developments, including recent strong criticism\nfrom Congressman John Anderson is summarized at Tab A.\nThe number of press articles is increasing and the tone is\ngrowing more critical. Press attention focused particularly\non the recent actions by the NRC on export licenses involving\nSpain and India. (The role and activities of the NRC is also\nsummarized at Tab A.)\nNATURE OF THE EFFORT NEEDED\nERDA Administrator Seamans has recommended (letter at Tab B)\nundertaking a major program to provide nuclear fuel repro-\ncessing in the U.S., permitting foreign participation in\nthis activity, and using this program as the centerpiece of\na major Presidential statement on non-proliferation.\nWe agree that actions on reprocessing should be considered\nbut we believe that a more comprehensive approach should\nbe taken when developing proposals and a draft statement\nfor your consideration. The paper at Tab C outlines in\nmore detail the scope of the problems requiring considera-\ntion and identifies a number of possible actions, all of\nwhich require further development and evaluation before\nthey are presented to you for consideration. We also\nbelieve that an effort should be undertaken immediately,\nparticularly in view of the growing concern in the Congress.\nIn view of the complex nature of the issues involved, a\nnumber of agencies will need to be involved and will need\nto devote resources to the effort. These include: ERDA,\nState, ACDA, NRC and, to a lesser extent, Interior, EPA,\nCommerce, FEA and CEQ.\nFORD LIBRARY is GERALD\n4\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n1.\nThat you direct that work begin immediately to develop\nand evaluate the potential initiatives described\nbriefly in Tab C (and others subsequently identified),\nwith decision papers presented to you by August 30.\nAPPROVE\nDISAPPROVE\n2.\nThat you tentatively decide to issue a major statement\non nuclear policy or send a message to Congress in\nmid-September.\nAPPROVE\nDISAPPROVE\n3.\nThat you assign responsibility jointly to us (Brent\nScowcroft, Jim Cannon, and Jim Lynn) to develop and\ncarry out a plan to accomplish the necessary work\nin cooperation with all the agencies concerned.\nAPPROVE\nDISAPPROVE\nPRINCIPAL CONGRESSIONAL AND NUCLEAR\nREGULATORY COMMISSIONS (NRC) ACTIONS RELATING\nTO NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND REPROCESSING\nI.\nCONGRESSIONAL. Principal Congressional actions --\nincluding legislation passed and pending and a sampling\nof recent criticism -- are as follows:\nA. A 1974 law requires all bilateral \"agreements for\ncooperation\" involving significant nuclear exports\nbe submitted to Congress for a 60-day period of\nreview. This was stimulated by concern over Israeli\nand Egyptian nuclear accords.\nB. The Military Aid Bill includes a prohibition (the\nSymington Amendment) against military assistance\nto countries which furnish or receive nuclear\nreprocessing or enrichment facilities not under\nmultinational control or IAEA safeguards.\nRestrictions could be waived by the President\nin individual cases upon specific findings -\nsubject to disapproval by a joint resolution of\nthe Congress within 30 days.\nC. The ERDA 1977 Authorization bill includes an amend-\nment (still subject to final wording in conference\nafter July recess) requiring Congressional approval\nof the first exports of nuclear fuel or equipment\nto any country that has not signed the NPT or is\nnot covered by a Congressionally-approved agreement\nfor cooperation.\nD. The House International Relations Committee is\nexpected to report an amendment to the Export\nAdministration Act which would require prohibi-\ntions against reprocessing of fuel exported by\nU.S. or burned in U.S.-supplied reactors, unless\nthe Secretary of State certifies that there would\nbe at least a 90-day warning before material could\nbe used in a nuclear device.\nE. The Senate Government Operations Committee reported\na bill (S. 1439) on May 14 sponsored by Senators\nGlenn, Ribicoff and Percy, which (a) shifts addi-\ntional executive branch nuclear export responsibility\nto State Department and the independent Nuclear\nRegulatory Commission from ERDA and Commerce\nFORD & LIBRARY 93RVLD\n2\nDepartment and (b) makes the Congress the referee\nin disputes between State and NRC over the granting\nof export licenses. This bill was referred to the\nJCAE and Foreign Relations for 60 days, which\nperiod has now been extended through the end of\nAugust. Several Administration witnesses have\ntestified against the bill and Secretary Kissinger\nwas expected to testify on June 29 but his testi-\nmony has been delayed. The JCAE is pressing the\nAdministration for alternative proposals.\nF. On June 25, Congressman John Anderson publicly\nblasted \"the White House\" for not moving fast enough\nto resolve problems relating to reprocessing, nuclear\nexports and proliferation. (This occurred despite\nour attempts to keep his staff thoroughly informed\nof Administration efforts.)\nG. Congressman Anderson has since written to JCAE\nChairman Pastore urging extensive hearings over\nthe next two months -- with the objective of\npressing the Administration for answers on re-\nprocessing, nuclear exports and proliferation\nissues. (We have been advised informally by\nAnderson's staff that he probably would agree\nto urge Senator Pastore to delay hearings if\nthe Administration plans to come forward with\nnew proposals.)\nH. Senator Ribicoff has been a persistent critic for\nthe past two years of what he believes is inadequate\nexecutive branch action on reprocessing, nuclear\nexports and proliferation. Over the past four weeks\nhe has been pressing particularly hard with respect\nto U.S. -supplied materials (heavy water) in the\nIndian reactor used to produce material for the\ndevice exploded by India in 1974. He will almost\ncertainly use the State Department responses to\npress his case even more.\nII. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. The NRC now plays a\nmajor role in nuclear exports and will decide whether,\nwhen, and under what conditions reprocessing will be\npermitted in the U.S. The NRC role has become particu-\nlarly important because:\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\n3\nA.\nInadvertently, the final responsibility for approving\nnuclear exports was allowed to be vested in the\nindependent NRC rather than the executive branch.\nThis resulted from the September 1974 law which\ncreated ERDA and NRC.\nB.\nThe NRC has just announced decisions on licenses\nto export a reactor to Spain and an interim supply\nof fuel for the Tarapur reactor in India. The\nNRC decisions, including the strong dissent of one\nCommissioner have been made public. There appears\nto be agreement within the NRC that additional\ncontrols are needed but there is sharp dispute as\nto whether additional controls -- beyond those in\nexisting agreements - should now be imposed as\na condition of licenses issued under existing\nagreements. The view of the dissenting Commissioner\nis getting support in the press and from some members\nof Congress.\nC.\nThe NRC is now working on an environmental impact\nstatement necessary to its decision -- expected in\nearly 1977 --- as to whether to permit wide scale\nuse of plutonium as reactor fuel. This and sub-\nsequent decisions on the licensing of reprocessing\nfacilities will have a major impact on the desir-\nability, feasibility and economics of nuclear fuel\nreprocessing. (The decision will also have an\nimpact on the viability of the liquid metal fast\nbreeder reactor (LMFBR) which would be fueled with\nplutonium and which is a major factor in the\neconomic justification for reprocessing of spent\nfuel elements to recover plutonium and unused\nuranium.)\nFORD LIBRARY & 02RALD\nSEAMANS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT\nPROVIDED EARLIER. IT'S CLASSIFIED\nCONFIDENTIAL\nFORD\nSUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR POWER PROBLEMS\nAND POSSIBLE RESPONSES: NUCLEAR EXPORTS,\nREPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT\nPage\nI. Nuclear Exports and Proliferation\n1\nA. Current Problems\n1\nB. Principal Existing Measures Affecting\nNuclear Export Policy and Control of\nProliferation\n2\nC. Administration Response Thus Far\n3\nD. Additional Actions for Development\nand Evaluation\n4\nII. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and Spread of\nReprocessing Technology\n6\nA. Background\n6\nB. Current Problems\n7\nC. Actions Taken or Underway\n9\nD. Additional Actions for Development\nand Evaluation\n10\nIII. Nuclear Waste Management\nA. Background\n10\nB. Current Problems\n11\nC. Actions Taken or Underway\n12\nD. Additional Actions for Development\nand Evaluation\n13\nFORD is LIBRARY 028876\nSUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR PROBLEMS\nAND POSSIBLE RESPONSES: NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND\nPROLIFERATION, REPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT\nI. NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND PROLIFERATION\nA. Current Problems\n1. Growing Congressional, press, and public concern\nabout nuclear weapons proliferation.\nConcern is focused primarily upon the greater\navailability of plutonium which is extracted\nfrom \"spent\" fuel elements (i.e., the process\nreferred to as \"reprocessing\"). Once separated\nplutonium is available, very little time --\nhours to days -- is needed to make a nuclear\nweapon. Concern has continued to grow since\nIndia exploded a nuclear device in 1974.\n2. Growing concern that current U.S. activities to\nsafeguard against diversion of plutonium for\nweapons purposes is not adequate.\nAttention is now focused on exports of nuclear\nmaterials and equipment. Some feel that existing\ncontrols (detailed below) have been barely ade-\nquate for safeguarding reactors and are simply\nnot adequate to guard against diversion of\nseparated plutonium, particularly if it is\naccumulated in excess amounts.\n3. The U.S. position in the foreign market for nuclear\nequipment and materials is weakening.\nThis is resulting from (a) the lack of uranium\nenrichment capacity, (b) growing strength of\nforeign competition for nuclear equipment and\nfuels, (c) uncertainty as to U.S. policy on\nnuclear exports due to our divisive internal\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\ndebate, and (d) potentially, delays resulting\nfrom Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) control\nof export licenses and growing Congressional\nreview requirements. As the U.S. loses foreign\norders to other suppliers, the U.S. also loses\nits leverage to obtain rigid safeguards agreements.\n2\n4. Perception in the media that the Administration is\ncomplacent about potential diversion of plutonium\nfrom commercial nuclear power plants abroad.\nOverall, our controls generally are more rigorous\nthan those applied by most other suppliers, but\nthis has not helped in the current debate. Also,\nCanada's recent action in cutting off nuclear\nrelationships with India and imposing strong\nsafeguard controls in connection with its exports\nhas set a tough standard of comparison.\nB. Principal Existing Measures Affecting Export Policy\nand the Control of Proliferation.\n1. NPT\nApproximately 100 nations have signed the Non-\nProliferation Treaty (NPT) foreswearing activities\nleading to the proliferation of weapons. Several\nimportant nations have not signed, including\nFrance, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa\nand Brazil.\n2. Bilateral \"Agreements for Cooperation\" between\nthe U.S. and about 30 other nations importing\nnuclear equipment and materials from the U.S.\nThese agreements specify safeguards that are to\nbe maintained.\n3. IAEA\nInternational Atomic Energy Agency establishes\nsafeguards standards and has some inspection\ncapability.\n4. Supplier Discussions\nState Department is leading negotiations with\nother supplier nations, seeking agreement to\nimpose more rigid safeguards. There has been\nsome success achieved, but no agreement to\ndefer the export of reprocessing facilities\nuntil more effective controls are developed.\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\n5. New International Convention\nThe U.S. is exploring a new international nuclear\nphysical security convention and other steps to\nupgrade physical security standards worldwide.\n3\n6. Pressure on Customer Nations\nThe U.S. brought pressure on the Government of\nSouth Korea to cancel its order with the French\nfor a reprocessing plant and is applying similar\npressure on Pakistan to forego acquisition of a\nreprocessing plant, but with less success.\nCongressional and press criticism of export\npolicies of West Germany and France continues\nstrong even though both countries claim they\nare conforming to guidelines recently developed\njointly by supplier nations. Germany still has\na commitment to supply enrichment and reprocessing\ntechnology to Brazil and France is committed to\nsupply a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Nature\nof commitments to others, such as South Africa,\nare unclear.\nC. Administration Response Thus Far\nThe Executive Branch has responded to the above in\nseveral ways, but the actions (a) have been piece-\nmeal and largely defensive, and (b) appear inadequate\nin the face of current Congressional and public\nattitudes. Responses include:\n1. Secretary Kissinger summarized U.S. non-\nproliferation efforts in testimony in opposi-\ntion to the Glenn-Percy Nuclear Export\nReorganization Bill (S. 1439) before the Senate\nGovernment Operations Committee. ERDA, ACDA,\nand other Administration witnesses gave sup-\nporting testimony. Administration witnesses\nhave also testified before JCAE, except for\nSecretary Kissinger who is expected to appear\nsoon.\n2. Informal attempts are being made by State, ERDA,\nand others to limit the scope of restrictions\nand of Congressional review requirements in\npending bills (e.g., Military Aid and ERDA\nAuthorization).\nFORD i LIBRARY\n3. An Executive Order was recently issued setting\nup procedures for getting a coordinated Executive\nBranch position (State, ERDA, DOD, ACDA, and\nCommerce) on nuclear export licenses pending\nbefore the NRC. (State Department notifies\nNRC of the coordinated Executive Branch position.)\n4\nD. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation\nSeveral ideas have surfaced for possible alternative\nresponses to the current situation. Each involves\nsignificant issues that require development and\nevaluation before being presented for decision.\nPossible actions identified thus far include:\n1. Significant hardening of U.S. attitude on nuclear\nexports safeguards required before exports are\npermitted.\nThere appears to be divided views on this. Some\nprobably will argue that past and current controls\nare as good as can be achieved and/or that tougher\nU.S. positions, taken unilaterally will not be\neffective recognizing that the requirements we\nimpose are already tougher than those of most\nother suppliers with whom the U.S. competes for\nnuclear markets. Others will argue that anything\nthe U.S. can do unilaterally or in cooperation\nwith others that will help reduce the opportunity\nfor proliferation is worth doing, recognizing the\nthreat. Steps that might be considered to achieve\na harder and consistent policy include:\na. Strong public message -- to supplement\ndiplomatic channel efforts now underway --\nto other supplier nations (France and\nGermany) emphasizing the need to curb\nproliferation and urging them to: (1)\nstop supplying reprocessing or enrichment\ntechnology to other nations, and (2)\nadopting more rigorous safeguards\nrequirements.\nb. Head of State meetings to carry out (a),\nabove.\nC. Move to renegotiate safeguards controls\nunder existing agreements for cooperation\nas a condition for further exports, par-\nticularly giving the U.S. a veto on whether\nand where any fuel irradiated in U.S.\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nreactors is reprocessed.\n5\nd. In addition to other actions, but not a\nsubstitute for, appoint a panel of experts\nnot now involved in U.S. nuclear export\nactivities to review past and current\npractices and submit recommendations to\nyou for improvements.\n2. Intensify efforts to discourage reprocessing\n(in the U.S. and abroad) until better controls\n(technological and institutional) can be worked\nout. (This needs to be considered in connection\nwith domestic reprocessing issues, discussed in\nII, below.)\nIf this policy approach were to be taken,\nconsideration would have to be given to:\na. Expanding storage for \"spent\" fuel elements,\npossibly making storage available to other\ncountries.\nb. \"Buy back\" of spent fuel elements.\nC. Finding ways to replace the energy value of\nthe plutonium and unused uranium in the spent\nfuel elements (which is in the range of 10-30%\nof the total energy value if reprocessing and\nrecycle of plutonium was permitted).\na. Other incentives to discourage the separation\nof plutonium through reprocessing.\n3. As a means to discourage the spread of reprocessing\ncenters, provide U.S. reprocessing services to\nforeign countries.\nThis depends on development of reprocessing in\nthe U.S. since we currently have no commercial\nreprocessing in operation.\na. Assist U.S. industry in demonstrating\nreprocessing and related technology\n(plutonium conversion, waste handling,\nsafeguards), as discussed in II, below.\nFORD i LIBRARY 078870\n6\nb. Urge or require U.S. firms planning to\nprovide reprocessing services to dedicate\na portion of their capacity to serve\nforeign needs, thereby potentially\nsatisfying foreign needs for many years\nwithout the construction of reprocessing\nplants abroad.\nC. Go beyond #2 above by offering to allow\nother governments to participate in the\noperation of the first expected reprocessing\nplant (Barnwell, South Carolina) as a demon-\nstration of the concept of a multi-national\nreprocessing center.\nd. Determine alternatives to returning plutonium\nto foreign reprocessing customers -- such as\nsubstituting energy equivalent of reprocessed\nfuel in the form of enriched uranium.\n4. Propose international storage for excess plutonium.\nIAEA has authority to establish repositories for\nexcess nuclear materials. The U.S. could propose\nthat this authority be implemented, that all\nnations store excess plutonium in such repositories\nand indicate that the U.S. would participate with\nthe deposit of its excess plutonium.\n5. Intensify efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards.\na. Make available advanced U.S. safeguards\ntechnology to other nations and the IAEA.\nb. Consider further strengthening of IAEA\nsafeguards, expanding the proposal for\na $5 million - 5 year voluntary U.S.\ncontribution announced by the President\non February 26, 1976.\nII. NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING AND SPREAD OF REPROCESSING\nTECHNOLOGY\nA. Background\n1. The principal driving forces behind the desire\nto establish a U.S. industry to reprocess \"spent\"\nfuel elements from commercial power reactors\nare to:\nFORD is LIBRARY 07/030\n7\na. recover and reuse the plutonium and unused\nuranium from elements (with energy value of\n10-30% of initial fuel input),\nb. provide plutonium to fuel liquid metal fast\nbreeder (LMFBR) reactors once they are used\ncommercially.\nC. reduce irradiated fuel and associated waste\nproducts to most manageable forms.\n2. Technology for reprocessing has been demonstrated\nin AEC (now ERDA) operations.\n3. Consistent policy followed that the reprocessing\nstep in the nuclear fuel cycle is the responsi-\nbility of industry. Government sponsors R&D.\n4. The principal driving forces behind the spread of\nreprocessing technology and equipment worldwide\nare:\na. Competition among the suppliers of nuclear\nenergy reactors for sales in third countries;\nb. Desire on the part of recipients of the\ntechnology and equipment to place as large\na part of the nuclear fuel cycle as possible\nunder their own national control;\nc. desire by some for a nuclear weapons\ncapability.\nB. Current Problems\n1. Demonstrating Technology in Commercial Operations\nThere is not now any commercial reprocessing\ncapacity in the U.S.:\na. One plant that was operational (Nuclear Fuel\nServices) in Western, N.Y., is closed down\nand probably will not reopen.\nb. A $70 million plant built at Morris, Illinois\nby GE is never expected to operate due to\ntechnological problems.\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n8\nC. A $260 million plant, including only initial\nstorage and separations stages of reprocessing,\nhas been built in South Carolina by Allied\nChemical and General Atomics (AGNES). Its\nactual operation depends upon:\n- obtaining an NRC license;\n- either (a) storage of separated plutonium\nin liquid form, or (b) construction of a\n$150 million conversion facility, for\nwhich Government assistance may be needed;\n- construction of a $350 million waste\nsolidification and packaging facility.\n2. Licensing\nLicensing of reprocessing facility depends upon\nresolution of a number of issues now pending\nbefore the NRC in one major and several other\nissues. The principal issue is whether to allow\nwidespread recycling of plutonium. This depends\nupon resolving safety, environmental, economic,\nand safeguards issues --- which are being covered\nin a Generic Environmental Impact Statement which\nshould be completed by early 1977, with an NRC\ndecision in mid-1977.\n3. Alternatives\nThe NRC statement almost certainly will have to\ndeal with alternatives to reprocessing, some of\nwhich (such as indefinite storage of irradiated\nfuel) have not been fully studied. Also, the\nextent of the economic advantages of reprocessing\ndepend upon the likelihood and timing of com-\nmercial breeder reactors. (The construction of\nthe first demonstration reactor at Clinch River,\nTennessee, has not begun, is behind schedule and\nis growing in cost.) Assuming reprocessing and\nrecycle is permitted, NRC will have to issue\ncomplex safety, environmental and safeguards\nstandards and guidelines. A thorough assessment\nof these factors has not been completed.\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\n9\n4.\nDecisions needed\nDecisions are needed on whether and when to\nreprocess so that investment decisions can be\nmade by industry to build either: (a) reprocessing\nfacilities, or (b) additional storage facilities\nfor spent fuel elements. One or the other and\nmaybe both are needed to handle spent fuel from\nplants already in operation. The absence of\nfirm plans is a factor in utility and utility\ncommission decisions on nuclear power and in\nnuclear moratoria referenda.\n5.\nBarnwell Facility\nThe consortium building the Barnwell reprocessing\nfacility is experiencing financial problems due\nto higher costs and uncertainty about the future\nof reprocessing. Abandonment of the operation\nis conceivable.\nC.\nActions Taken or Underway\n1.\nERDA\na. 1977 Budget. The President's 1977 Budget\nincluded funds for additional R&D needed\nfor reprocessing. It also contemplated a\nsupplemental to fund some kind of assistance\nprogram to encourage construction of repro-\ncessing facilities, once the right course\nof action was decided upon. (In practice,\nit may not be possible to implement a program\nuntil NRC decides on recycling of plutonium.)\nb. Program Development. In February, ERDA\nsolicited expressions of interest from\nindustry on plans for providing reprocessing\nand on the types of assistance that might be\nnecessary or appropriate (with emphasis on a\nminimum Federal role). Over 30 reponses\nwere received and ERDA is now considering\nthose in the development of its proposed\nprogram.\n2.\nNRC is proceeding with hearings on the completed\nportions of the plutonium recycle generic impact\nstatement and is completing the remaining\nportions -- all headed toward a decision in\nmid-1977.\nFORD : LIBRARY 07VU30\n10\n3. ACDA, ERDA, and State are working to define the\nconcept of a multinational reprocessing center\nand considering the possibility of some kind of\nforeign participation in the Barnwell facility.\nThe desire for non-proliferation benefits has\nalready attracted some Congressional support\nfor assisting Barnwell to serve foreign users.\nD. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation.\nResolution of questions about domestic reprocessing\nis key to any major nuclear policy announcements.\nA major effort will be needed to sort out reprocessing\nissues.\n1. Immediate action to complete the development,\nanalysis, and evaluation of the following:\na. The need for, timing of, and alternatives\nto reprocessing. This should provide a\nbasis for executive branch (non-regulatory)\ndecisions as to whether and when reprocessing\nshould be encouraged. (Note that a decision\nto defer reprocessing might influence other\ncountries to do the same.)\nb. Alternative ways for the Government to work\nwith industry to provide reprocessing\ncapacity, assuming that we will proceed\ndomestically with reprocessing..\n2. Explore the potential for various forms of\nforeign involvement in domestic reprocessing\nfacilities -- as outlined in I (D) (3) (pg. 5).\nIII. NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT\nA. Background\n1. Government policy has, since early 1970's, been\nthat the Federal Government would take responsi-\nbility for long-term storage of high level wastes.\nPrivate industry is responsible (subject to\nregulation) for handling and packaging of wastes\nand delivering them in a prescribed form to a\nFederal repository for long-term storage.\nBEIALD FORD LIBRARY\n11\n2.\nGovernment policy has regarded the handling and\nstorage of lower level radioactive wastes as an\nindustry task, subject to Federal or State\nregulation. Some problems have emerged but\nthese probably can be resolved within existing\narrangements.\n3. Approaches to long-term storage have been\nconsidered and then rejected: storage in the\nsalt mine in Kansas and a temporary near\nsurface storage facility. The program for\ndeveloping acceptable approaches and providing\na permanent repository heretofore has had\nrelatively low priority.\n4. There seems to be general agreement that\ntechnology is available to permit safe long-\nterm storage, but there is a long way to go\nbefore a respository is in place and ready\nto receive wastes.\n5. International plans and standards for disposal\nof nuclear wastes have not been adequately\naddressed.\nB. Current Problems\n1. The major task facing the Federal Government\nis finding an acceptable location (s) for a\nrepository, constructing it, and opening it\nto receive wastes. Current assessments sug-\ngest that such a repository should be in place\nby 1985 and it is not clear that current plans --\nwhich involve at least five Federal agencies --\nwill result in achieving this objective.\n2. Finding a location for a repository acceptable\nto residents of the region selected will be\na difficult task.\n3. Related problems involve sorting out the roles\nand responsibilities of the several agencies\ninvolved; particularly, ERDA, NRC, EPA, and\nGeological Survey, and providing some continuing\nneeds for inter-agency coordination.\nFORD & LIBRARY\n12\n4. The absence of convincing plans to have a\nhigh-level repository in place are. contributing\nto: (a) the efforts by nuclear power opponents\nto slow down nuclear power, and (b) questions\nby utilities and utility commissions as to the\ndesirability of committing to more nuclear\nplants.\n5. Expected increase in nuclear wastes worldwide\nbetween now and 1990 will require development\nof international plans standards.\nC.\nActions Taken or Underway\n1. ERDA\na. 1977 Budget. The President's 1977 Budget\nincludes $65 million in outlays (compared\nto $12 million in FY 1976) to. proceed with\na waste management program. A large share\nof these funds will be used for exploratory\ndrilling of various kinds of geologic forma-\ntions around the country in order to find a\nsuitable location for a pilot repository\nand operational repositories.\nb. Technical Alternatives and Generic Environmental\nImpact Statement. ERDA has published an\nextensive technical alternatives document and\nis proceeding with development of the necessary\ngeneric environmental impact statement covering\nwaste management with the objective of issuing\na draft statement early in 1977 and a final\nstatement late in 1977.\n2. NRC is working on waste handling, packaging,\ntransportation, and storage regulations and\nan associated environmental impact statement\nwith the objective of completing work in 1978.\n3. Interagency Task Force. An OMB-lead interagency\ntask force is evaluating the schedules and the\ninteragency relationships among the five agencies\nprincipally involved: ERDA, NRC, EPA, Geological\nSurvey, and CEQ. This group's work has already\nidentified potential obstacles that would prevent\nFORD is LIBRARY QERALD\n13\nhaving a repository available when needed. The\nproblems include: (a) sequencing of each agency's\nactivities so that information will be available\nto others when needed, (b) overlapping functions\nbetween NRC and EPA, and (c) continuing inter-\nagency coordination.\nD. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation\n1. Develop a firm plan setting out all major\nactions which must be taken over the next\nten years and when they will occur -- covering\nall forms of nuclear waste.\n2. Develop a clear statement of roles and\nresponsibilities (including solution of\noverlap in EPA and NRC functions), and\ndevelop arrangements for continuing inter-\nagency coordination.\n3. Consider the extension of our domestic waste\nmanagement plans and solutions internationally,\nperhaps through one or more of the following:\na. Offer to make waste handling and storage\ntechnology available to other nations.\nb. Offer to investigate international waste\ndisposal sites, either independent of or\nin conjunction with reprocessing arrangements.\nThis will require consideration of controversial\nissues such as the storage in one country of\nwastes resulting from nuclear energy used in\nanother country.\nFORD is LIBRARY\nCc: Victean assude\nAMERICAN NUCLEAR ENERGY COUNCIL CC to\n1750 K STREET, N.W. 0 SUITE 300 $ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006\nConnon\n(202) 296-4520\nscraw croft\nCRAIG HOSMER\nPRESIDENT\nJuly 12, 1976\nFile wl\nMr. L. William Seidman\nAssistant for Economic Affairs\nThe White House\nFri study\nWashington, D.C. 20500\nDear Bill:\nThe Administration has lost the initiative on the nuclear pro-\nliferation/safeguards exports issue by neglect. Hardly a word\nhas been said since Henry Kissinger blessed the idea of multi-\nnational nuclear fuel reprocessing last September. Meanwhile,\nJimmy Carter sweeps into the vacuum with his U.N. speech, a\nproliferation study group, appropriate words in the Demo plat-\nform, etc., etc., etc.\nAnd, in the absence of strong Administration leadership, Congress\nis offering bills and amendments on the subject willy-nilly.\nSome of these are highly counterproductive from both a strategic\nnuclear defense standpoint and from the standpoint of any healthy\nU.S. nuclear exports policy.\nI will not waste your time with a long recitation of what should\nbe done. Henry Kissinger knows what should be done and it is im-\nportant both for the country and for the President's political\nfortunes that he get about doing it.\nTherefore I respectfully, but strongly, recommend that you nudge\nthe President to tell Henry to get busy on this one quickly and\nfollow through on it.\nAny continuing absence of strong Administration leadership here\ncan allow Congress to do a lot of strategic and commercial damage,\nand set up Carter rather than Ford as the man of vision and lead-\nership in this area.\nSincerely, 03\nCRAIG Craig HOSMER\nPresident\nCH:jh\nFORD is LIBRA, 07VN 076879\nTHE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20230\nJuly 14, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR JAMES E. CONNOR\nSECRETARY TO THE CABINET\nSUBJECT: NUCLEAR POLICY PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThank you for providing me a copy of the\nsubject memo for the President. Pursuant to our\nconversation on July 12, I provided copies to\nmembers of the ERC Executive Committee on an \"Eyes Only\"\nbasis for their prompt comment.\nAs of this point, no significant disagreement\nwith the memorandum for the President has been identified.\nAttached, for your information, are selected comments\nfrom ERC principals.\nFrank Zarb and I--along with other members\nof the ERC--do feel strongly on one bureaucratic point\nwhich is relevant to the follow-on work required. That\nis: given the subject, \"Nuclear Policy,\" and given that\nthe ERC has a working cabinet level committee on nuclear\npolicy, and given that this committee has been dealing\nspecifically with most of the issues raised in the\nsubject memorandum, we feel it would be appropriate,\nsensible, and in all likelihood more efficient, if the\nERC were to be intimately involved in the follow-on\nanalysis. We would hope that the memorandum for the\nPresident would be modified to reflect this view.\nW\nElliot L. Richardson\nAttachments\nFORD LIBRARY is BENALD\nTHE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 14, 1976\nSECRET\nDear Elliot:\nI have reviewed the draft memorandum to the\nPresident which you forwarded to ERC members on\nJuly 12th.\nThe Department of State places great importance\non strengthening US. non-proliferation policies, and\nboth Secretary Kissinger and I have personally sought\nto move these policies forward. As outlined in Tab\nC of the Presidential memorandum, the US has under-\nway or planned a wide range of bilateral, multilateral,\nand international non-proliferation efforts -- not\nonly in response to Congressional concerns, but as\ninitiatives aimed at reducing the dangers and insta-\nbilities associated with the further spread of nuclear\nexplosives capabilities.\nThe prospect of a Presidential nuclear policy\nstatement in mid-September can serve to provide\npolitical impetus at the highest level to our non-\nproliferation efforts. It can also demonstrate the\nrelationship between our domestic nuclear decisions\nand our international nuclear objectives. We have\nsome concern, however, that the intermingling of\ndomestic and international nuclear policy issues in\na Presidential statement could lead to a real or\nperceived emphasis on domestic issues, thereby weak-\nening the non-proliferation impact of such a statement.\nWe believe, therefore, that we should reserve our\njudgment, pending further study of concrete ideas, as\nto whether there should be a single statement covering\nboth areas, separate statements, or some other alter-\nnatives.\nThe Honorable\nElliot L. Richardson,\nSecretary of Commerce.\nSECRET\nDECLASSIMED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 39\nBy\nWHM State Dept. NARA, Guidelines Date 5/15/00\nSECRET\n- 2 -\nIt should be recognized that not every element\nof a non-proliferation strategy would be suitable\nfor inclusion in a possible Presidential statement.\nMany of the elements identified in Tab C of the\nPresidential memorandum are best pursued through\ndiplomatic channels and could be jeopardized by\npublic discussions, while others may not be ready\nfor the President to surface in September.\nOne of the central elements for potential in-\nclusion in a Presidential statement is the proposal\nby Dr. Seamans to provide nuclear fuel reprocessing\nservices for foreign customers in the US and possibly\nto permit foreign participation in such a facility.\nWhile this proposal has a number of positive aspects,\nthere remain key issues which must be resolved before\nthis initiative can be considered for a Presidential\nstatement. In this connection, I have attached for\nyour information my reply to Dr. Seamans' request for\ncomments on his June 9th letter to the President.\nUnder the arrangements recommended in the Memo-\nrandum to the President, the Department of State is\ntherefore prepared to support and participate in the\nproposed interagency endeavor which would evaluate\npotential nuclear policy initiatives suitable for\ninclusion in a possible Presidential statement, with\nparticular attention to exploring the question of\nhow our national reprocessing decisions can support\nour international non-proliferation objectives.\nWithin this context and working with other interested\nmembers of the National Security Council, we would\nof course continue to take the lead in developing\nnuclear non-proliferation policy initiatives for\nconsideration by the President.\nPersonal regards,\nSincerely,\nChich\nCharles W. Robinson\ncc: Brent Scowcroft\nSECRET\nUNITED STATES\nLATTON ENERGY RESEARCH\nENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20545\nUSA\nJuly 13, 1976\nHonorable Elliot L. Richardson\nSecretary of Commerce\nWashington, D. C. 20230\nDear Elliot:\nThis is with respect to the draft memorandum to the\nPresident concerning \"Nuclear Policy -- Issues and\nProblems Requiring Attention and Potential Policy\nStatement\" which you circulated to ERC Executive\nCommittee members for review and comment.\nIn my judgment, few matters are more essential to the\nsecurity of this nation and the world than prompt\nresolution of reprocessing and related nonproliferation\nissues. At the same time, however, few matters are more\ncomplex. For this reason, it is vital that the best\npossible effort be mounted within the Administration to\nexamine these interrelated issues in the most responsible\nand effective way. It is not clear from the draft\nmemorandum how such an effort would be managed but, for\nour part, ERDA fully supports the effort and stands ready\nto devote whatever resources are necessary to assure its\nswift and successful completion\nWith respect to the language of the draft memorandum, I\nbelieve a few changes, set forth in the attachment to\nthis letter, are necessary to correct a possible\nmisunderstanding of my June 9 letter to the President.\nThe draft implies that I recommended a \"major program in\nreprocessing.\" This is not the case. I recommended that\nthe U.S. undertake a major initiative in this area, listed\nseveral possible features of such an initiative, and\nrequested a Presidential direction for a speedy and\ncoordinated study which would become the centerpiece of a\ntruly comprehensive Presidential policy on nuclear power\nAMERICAN REVOLUTION INFENTENNAL\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n1776-1976\n®\n- -2-\nand nonproliferation, including such matters as nuclear\nexports and waste management. The language changes set\nforth in the Tab more accurately reflect my recommenda-\ntions to the President, and make clear that a policy\nwith respect to reprocessing is essential to -- and\ninterrelated with -- the disposition of related non-\nproliferation issues.\nSincerely,\nB.b\nRobert C. Seamans, Jr.\nAdministrator\nCC: Honorable James Connor\nSecretary to the Cabinet\nGERALD LIBRARY A FORD\nRequested Changes in Draft Memorandum\nto the President on Nuclear Policy\nPage 3, 4th paragraph:\nDelete paragraph\nInsert: \"ERDA Administrator Seamans has recommended\n(letter at Tab B) undertaking a major stud\nto develop reprocessing and related non-\nproliferation initiatives to b.e available\nto you as soon as possible. Such an\ninitiative could have several features\nincluding foreign participation and could\nbe used as the centerpiece of a major\nPresidential statement on nonproliferation,\"\nPage 3 5th paragraph\nDelete first sentence\nInsert: We agree that such a study is needed and\nwould recommend a more express inclusion\nof nuclear exports and other nonproliferation\napproaches in its scope. \"\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 19, 1976\nADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nJAMES M. CANNON\nJAMES T. LYNN\nFROM:\nJAMES E. CONNOR gee\nSUBJECT:\nNuclear Policy -- Issues and Problems\nRequiring Attention and Potential Policy\nStatement\nThe President has reviewed your memorandum (undated) on the\nabove subject and has directed that responsibility be assigned\njointly to Scowcroft, Cannon and Lynn to develop and carry out\na plan to accomplish the necessary work in cooperation with all\nthe agencies concerned.\nPlease follow-up with the appropriate action.\ncc: Dick Cheney\nFORD + LIBRARY DERALD"
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