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The original documents are located in Box 52, folder "1975/10/09 - Henry Cashen and Bill Seidman" of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Digitized from Box 52 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library MEETING WITH HENRY CASHEN AND BILL SEIDMAN Thursday, October 9, 1975 4:00 p.m. Mr. Cannon's Office p.m DICKSTEIN, SHAPIRO & MORIN CHARLES H. MORIN THE OCTAGON BUILDING DAVID 1. SHAPIRO SIDNEY DICKSTEIN NEW YORK OFFICE WILLIAM J. O'HARA* 1735 NEW YORK AVENUE, N. W. 745 FIFTH AVENUE ARTHUR J. GALLIGAN JUDAH BEST WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022 HENRY C. .CASHEN II 212 832-1900 JAMES VANR. SPRINGER RICHARD LITTELL 202 785-9700 THOMAS W. MACK GORDON P. RAMSEY BOSTON OFFICE ARTHUR D. MASON September 17, 1975 ONE BOSTON PLACE FREDERICK M. LOWTHER ROBERT J. HIGGINS BOSTON, MASS. 02108 SEYMOUR GLANZER M. J. MINTZ 617 723-8100 IRA H. POLON KENNETH L.ADAMS ALAN B PICK IRA R. MITZNER WILLIAM SILVERMAN RICHARD P. PERRIN GEORGE T BOGGS JOEL B. KLEINMAN * (NOT ADM. IN D.C.) Hon. James Cannon Director Domestic Council The White House Washington, D.C. 20500 Dear Jim: Two of our clients, Tennessee Gas Transmission (Tenneco) and Texas Eastern Transmission, are deeply involved in a number of projects to supplement declin- ing U.S. natural gas reserves. One focus of their attention is LNG imports, as to which they are pursu- ing projects in the Soviet Union, Nigeria, Trinidad and Iran. As are all members of the U.S. LNG industry, Tenneco and Texas Eastern are greatly concerned over the complete absence of a U.S. policy with regard to LNG imports. At various points over the past nine months, there have been informal proposals from FEA and other agencies recommending policies pro and con on LNG imports and particularly on Ex-Im Bank and Marad partici- pation in LNG projects. It is now our understanding that, within three to four weeks, these proposals will culminate in a formal presentation of options to the Energy Resources Council, on which you sit. Messrs. Jack Ray and Nevil Proes, the respective Presidents of Tennessee Gas and Texas Eastern LNG, would very much appreciate the opportunity to discuss briefly with you their views of the LNG industry and an appro- priate LNG import policy. 15-30 minutes would be adequate for their purposes. Their schedules would best accommodate a meeting any time on October 9, or October 10, 1975. Hon. James Cannon Director Domestic Council The White House September 17, 1975 Page 2 Our clients view the LNG issue as one of major significance for them and for the country. They would be most grateful for the opportunity to discuss it with you. Best personal regards, ch Henry C. Cashen II Tennessee Gas Transmission TENNECO A Tenneco Company Jack H. Ray Tenneco Building President P.O. Box 2511 Houston, Texas 77001 (713) 229-2811 NEVIL M. E. PROES PRESIDENT PHONE TEXAS EASTERN LNG, INC. AREA CODE 713 P.O BOX 2521 . HOUSTON, TEXAS 77001 224-7961 Tennessee Gas Transmission TENNECO A Tenneco Company Ewell H. Muse III 1100 Milam Building Director Economic Planning P.O. Box 2511 Houston, Texas 77001 (713) 229 - 2883 October 7, 1975 LNG POLICY PAPER 1.00 GENERAL COMMENTS 1.01 The continuing apparent inability of the United States to develop and implement a cohesive and realistic overall energy policy increasingly plays into the hands of the owners of exportable non-U.S. energy resources making for their attaching no credibility to "Project Independence." 1.02 The down-turn in the level of U.S. industrial activity, and recent winters which have been warmer than the norm have resulted in the U.S. energy consumer being lulled into a false sense of energy security unaware of the serious problems we face due to: - Diminishing domestic oil and gas production; - Failure to price such diminishing domestic production at competitive market price levels; and - The absence of adequate economic incentives for exploration and development of additional energy resources which increasingly have to be sought for in the more expensive and difficult frontier areas of the United States. 2.00 THE NEED FOR IMPORTS 2.01 The United States has the potential to meet its energy needs from domestic resources. However, many of the resources have yet to reach the economic feasi- bility stage. U.S. oil and gas are likely to continue to be large contributors to domestic supply for many years, but rapid escalation of finding costs and the recent reduction in the U.S. resource base, point to an inability to depend on domestic oil and gas to sustain their percentage of the market. Taken together, these factors mean that supplemental imported energy will be needed for at least the remainder of this century to satisfy demand. 2.02 The need for supplemental imports has been clearly recognized in the case of oil. Indeed, it is probable that by 1980, we will be importing more than 9 million barrels/day. 2.03 Other than for imports of gas from Canada, the need for supplemental natural gas imports has not been clearly recognized. The U.S. will have a shortfall of domestic gas supplies for at least the remainder of -2- this century, and this will be aggravated due to Canada's own supply problems which have resulted in the Canadian Government indicating to the U.S. that such exports will be phased out. 2.04 Some consider that the gas shortfall can and should be made up by switching the market to electricity and/or oil. A switch to electricty would at least double the cost of energy to the consumer and increase for the nation both the energy input demand and its investment needs to provide the necessary generating facilities. Switching to oil is clearly inadvisable since it would increase our already large vulnerability to oil exporting nations whilst imposing enormous conversion costs (including the idling of an existing large, efficient gas distribution network) on the U.S. energy consumer. Accordingly imports of LNG are essential to minimize the adverse impact on the nation that will result from a gas shortage. -3- 3.00 ADVANTAGES OF LNG IMPORTS 3.01 The advantages of LNG imports can be summarized as follows: --- LNG provides access to proven world gas reserves and so provides insurance against disappointments encountered by U.S. efforts to find and develop in a timely manner new domestic gas reserves; LNG represents an alternative to additional oil imports and thus permits increased diversification of foreign energy supply sources; --- LNG permits continued use of the major, efficient U.S. gas distribution network which, in the absence of gas supply, would fall increasingly into disuse at great cost to gas consumers; LNG avoids imposition of extraordinary fuel conversion costs on residential and commercial gas consumers; LNG can be priced competitively with oil and other supplemental energy resources; --- LNG involves significantly less balance-of- payments drain than oil imports; -4- --- LNG has enhanced security of supply because LNG projects involve significant investment and credit exposure by the source country in capital facilities which have no short-term alternative use. 4.00 MAJOR PROBLEMS HINDERING LNG IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES 4.01 LNG import projects have been hindered by the lack of an integrated U.S. LNG policy governing both the extent of permissible imports and the availability of financing supports (viz., Ex-Im, Marad). The energy exporting countries are aware that a U.S. LNG import policy paper is under consideration. Leaks as to its contents are contradictory with a result that the exporting countries consider no useful purpose is served by pursuing serious discussions with interested U.S. gas importers while the present uncertainty exists. 4.02 LNG import projects are further hindered by the inordinate time required to obtain FPC approval for an import license. The process of review and final decision seems to take a minimum of 3 years. The U.S. is not the only market for LNG in the world -5- and it is unreasonable to expect any energy exporting country to take its gas off the world market for the long period of time required to get a non-challengeable decision from the FPC, and with no assurance that at the end a favorable import decision will be forthcoming. 4.03 LNG import projects are also hindered by the inordinate time required to obtain a final decision from the FPC on the matter of LNG terminal siting. The gas exporting countries accordingly prefer to limit their business with U.S. companies that already have approved LNG terminal sites (now limited to Distrigas (Boston), Columbia/Consolidated (Cove Point) and Southern Natural (Savannah) ) 4.04 A large part of the FPC obstacle is attributable to the absence of guidelines from Congress and the Administration as to acceptable price and volume for LNG imports. Because of this vacuum, the FPC tends to focus on the examination of environmental matters related to terminal siting SO imparting -6- some semblance of motion to an LNG import application. The absence of Congressional and Administration guidelines in the pricing and volume areas are part of the larger problem of realistic pricing of energy in the market place. -7- - Attachment I. CONSUMPTION OF PRIMARY ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES ( trillions of Btu's ) 1974 1980 (est.) 1985 (est.) OIL 34,511 42,200 46,900 GAS* 22,533 18,400 19,000 COAL 12,866 18,000 21,000 HYDROELECTRIC 3,285 3,400 3,700 NUCLEAR 1,015 4,600 10,600 TOTAL 74,210 86,600 101,200 A selection of recent forecasts of estimated U.S. energy consumption is given for comparative purposes: Source and Date 1980 1985 (in trillions of BTUS) S. Clark (1975) 86,400 97,700 First National City Bank (1974) 91,200 - Shell (1974) 88,900 104,200 O E C D (1974) ($9 oil) 85,800 100,100 Exxon (1975) 87,400 102,300 FEA (1974) ($11 oil) W.O. conservation 86,200 103,000 with conservation 82,100 94,000 * The markets gas served in 1974 were as follows: Market Trillions of BTU's Percent Residential 5,016.5 22.3 Commercial 2,639.6 11.7 Industrial 8,165.9 36.2 Power Plants 3,356.0 14.9 Transportation 945.0 4.2 Raw Materials 710.0 3.2 Miscellaneous 1,700.0 7.5 TOTAL 22,533.0 100.0 Attachment II. ESTIMATED U.S. ENERGY SUPPLY (trillions of Btu's) 1980 1985 OIL Production - Lower 48 18,900 19,100 - Arctic 4,000 6,000 Sub Total 22,900 25,100 (million barrels/day) (11.4) (12.5) Imports 19,300 21,800 (million barrels/day) ( 9.6) (10.8) Total Supply 42,200 46,900 (million barrels/day) (21.0) (23.3) Possible Possible GAS Range Range Production - Lower 48 17,100 (16,500-18,500) 15,500 (15,000-18,000) - Arctic - 1,500 ( 1,000- 1,500) Sub Total 17,100 (16,500-18,500) 17,000 (16,000-19,500) Imports - Canada 600 ( 500- 750) 500 ( 350- 500) - LNG 400 ( 400- 450) 1,000 ( 950- 1,450) SNG 300 ( 300- 400) 500 ( 400- 850) Total Supply 18,400 (17,700-20,100) 19,000 (17,700-22,300) COAL 18,000 21,000 (million tons) ( 780) ( 950) NUCLEAR 4,600 10,600 HYDROELECTRIC 3,400 3,700 TOTAL ENERGY SUPPLY 86,600 101,200 Attachment III. POTENTIAL LNG IMPORT PROJECTS Project Gas Source Volume Est. Start (trillions of Btu's) APPROVED Distrigas Algeria 60 operating El Paso I Algeria 360 1977 Sub Total 420 PENDING Eascogas Algeria 240 1980 Trunkline Algeria 180 1980 El Paso II Algeria 360 early 1980's Pacific Lighting Indonesia 200 1980 Sub Total 980 POSSIBLE Unnamed Nigeria 360 early 1980's North Star USSR 720 early 1980's Yakutsk USSR 360 early 1980's Various Unnamed Persian Gulf 950 mid 1980's Sub Total 2,390 TOTAL ALL CATEGORIES 3,790 Not all of the pending and possible projects listed will materialize. However, now that imported crude and fuel oil prices landed on the U.S. East Coast are in the range of $12.50 to $13.50 per barrel, LNG imports from any of the above sources can be expected to be priced competitively at U.S. port with low sulphur fuel oils (about $13.10 per barrel or $2.10 per million BTU's). The question of price is therefore no longer the prime consideration. The opportunity to get a reliable supply source of imported energy, be it fuel oil or LNG is now the major factor. Given a reasonable U.S. policy on LNG imports, LNG projects competitively priced and sufficient to provide gas imports indicated in Attachment II will materialize.

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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 52, folder \"1975/10/09 - Henry Cashen and Bill\nSeidman\" of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 52 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nMEETING WITH HENRY CASHEN AND\nBILL SEIDMAN\nThursday, October 9, 1975\n4:00 p.m.\nMr. Cannon's Office\np.m\nDICKSTEIN, SHAPIRO & MORIN\nCHARLES H. MORIN\nTHE OCTAGON BUILDING\nDAVID 1. SHAPIRO\nSIDNEY DICKSTEIN\nNEW YORK OFFICE\nWILLIAM J. O'HARA*\n1735 NEW YORK AVENUE, N. W.\n745 FIFTH AVENUE\nARTHUR J. GALLIGAN\nJUDAH BEST\nWASHINGTON, D. C. 20006\nNEW YORK, N.Y. 10022\nHENRY C. .CASHEN II\n212 832-1900\nJAMES VANR. SPRINGER\nRICHARD LITTELL\n202 785-9700\nTHOMAS W. MACK\nGORDON P. RAMSEY\nBOSTON OFFICE\nARTHUR D. MASON\nSeptember 17, 1975\nONE BOSTON PLACE\nFREDERICK M. LOWTHER\nROBERT J. HIGGINS\nBOSTON, MASS. 02108\nSEYMOUR GLANZER\nM. J. MINTZ\n617 723-8100\nIRA H. POLON\nKENNETH L.ADAMS\nALAN B PICK\nIRA R. MITZNER\nWILLIAM SILVERMAN\nRICHARD P. PERRIN\nGEORGE T BOGGS\nJOEL B. KLEINMAN\n* (NOT ADM. IN D.C.)\nHon. James Cannon\nDirector\nDomestic Council\nThe White House\nWashington, D.C. 20500\nDear Jim:\nTwo of our clients, Tennessee Gas Transmission\n(Tenneco) and Texas Eastern Transmission, are deeply\ninvolved in a number of projects to supplement declin-\ning U.S. natural gas reserves. One focus of their\nattention is LNG imports, as to which they are pursu-\ning projects in the Soviet Union, Nigeria, Trinidad and\nIran.\nAs are all members of the U.S. LNG industry,\nTenneco and Texas Eastern are greatly concerned over\nthe complete absence of a U.S. policy with regard to\nLNG imports. At various points over the past nine\nmonths, there have been informal proposals from FEA and\nother agencies recommending policies pro and con on LNG\nimports and particularly on Ex-Im Bank and Marad partici-\npation in LNG projects. It is now our understanding\nthat, within three to four weeks, these proposals will\nculminate in a formal presentation of options to the\nEnergy Resources Council, on which you sit.\nMessrs. Jack Ray and Nevil Proes, the respective\nPresidents of Tennessee Gas and Texas Eastern LNG, would\nvery much appreciate the opportunity to discuss briefly\nwith you their views of the LNG industry and an appro-\npriate LNG import policy. 15-30 minutes would be adequate\nfor their purposes. Their schedules would best accommodate\na meeting any time on October 9, or October 10, 1975.\nHon. James Cannon\nDirector\nDomestic Council\nThe White House\nSeptember 17, 1975\nPage 2\nOur clients view the LNG issue as one of major\nsignificance for them and for the country. They would\nbe most grateful for the opportunity to discuss it with\nyou.\nBest personal regards,\nch Henry C. Cashen II\nTennessee Gas Transmission\nTENNECO\nA Tenneco Company\nJack H. Ray\nTenneco Building\nPresident\nP.O. Box 2511\nHouston, Texas 77001\n(713) 229-2811\nNEVIL M. E. PROES\nPRESIDENT\nPHONE\nTEXAS EASTERN LNG, INC.\nAREA CODE 713\nP.O BOX 2521 . HOUSTON, TEXAS 77001\n224-7961\nTennessee Gas Transmission\nTENNECO\nA Tenneco Company\nEwell H. Muse III\n1100 Milam Building\nDirector Economic Planning\nP.O. Box 2511\nHouston, Texas 77001\n(713) 229 - 2883\nOctober 7, 1975\nLNG POLICY PAPER\n1.00\nGENERAL COMMENTS\n1.01\nThe continuing apparent inability of the United\nStates to develop and implement a cohesive and\nrealistic overall energy policy increasingly plays\ninto the hands of the owners of exportable non-U.S.\nenergy resources making for their attaching no\ncredibility to \"Project Independence.\"\n1.02\nThe down-turn in the level of U.S. industrial\nactivity, and recent winters which have been warmer\nthan the norm have resulted in the U.S. energy consumer\nbeing lulled into a false sense of energy security\nunaware of the serious problems we face due to:\n- Diminishing domestic oil and gas production;\n- Failure to price such diminishing domestic production\nat competitive market price levels; and\n- The absence of adequate economic incentives for\nexploration and development of additional energy\nresources which increasingly have to be sought for\nin the more expensive and difficult frontier areas\nof the United States.\n2.00\nTHE NEED FOR IMPORTS\n2.01\nThe United States has the potential to meet its\nenergy needs from domestic resources. However, many\nof the resources have yet to reach the economic feasi-\nbility stage. U.S. oil and gas are likely to continue\nto be large contributors to domestic supply for many\nyears, but rapid escalation of finding costs and the\nrecent reduction in the U.S. resource base, point to\nan inability to depend on domestic oil and gas to\nsustain their percentage of the market. Taken\ntogether, these factors mean that supplemental imported\nenergy will be needed for at least the remainder of\nthis century to satisfy demand.\n2.02\nThe need for supplemental imports has been clearly\nrecognized in the case of oil. Indeed, it is probable\nthat by 1980, we will be importing more than 9 million\nbarrels/day.\n2.03\nOther than for imports of gas from Canada, the\nneed for supplemental natural gas imports has not been\nclearly recognized. The U.S. will have a shortfall of\ndomestic gas supplies for at least the remainder of\n-2-\nthis century, and this will be aggravated due to\nCanada's own supply problems which have resulted\nin the Canadian Government indicating to the U.S.\nthat such exports will be phased out.\n2.04\nSome consider that the gas shortfall can and\nshould be made up by switching the market to\nelectricity and/or oil. A switch to electricty\nwould at least double the cost of energy to the\nconsumer and increase for the nation both the energy\ninput demand and its investment needs to provide the\nnecessary generating facilities. Switching to oil\nis clearly inadvisable since it would increase our\nalready large vulnerability to oil exporting nations\nwhilst imposing enormous conversion costs (including\nthe idling of an existing large, efficient gas\ndistribution network) on the U.S. energy consumer.\nAccordingly imports of LNG are essential to minimize\nthe adverse impact on the nation that will result\nfrom a gas shortage.\n-3-\n3.00\nADVANTAGES OF LNG IMPORTS\n3.01\nThe advantages of LNG imports can be summarized\nas follows:\n--- LNG provides access to proven world gas reserves\nand so provides insurance against disappointments\nencountered by U.S. efforts to find and develop in\na timely manner new domestic gas reserves;\nLNG represents an alternative to additional oil\nimports and thus permits increased diversification\nof foreign energy supply sources;\n--- LNG permits continued use of the major, efficient\nU.S. gas distribution network which, in the absence\nof gas supply, would fall increasingly into disuse\nat great cost to gas consumers;\nLNG avoids imposition of extraordinary fuel\nconversion costs on residential and commercial\ngas consumers;\nLNG can be priced competitively with oil and\nother supplemental energy resources;\n--- LNG involves significantly less balance-of-\npayments drain than oil imports;\n-4-\n--- LNG has enhanced security of supply because\nLNG projects involve significant investment\nand credit exposure by the source country in\ncapital facilities which have no short-term\nalternative use.\n4.00 MAJOR PROBLEMS HINDERING LNG IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED\nSTATES\n4.01\nLNG import projects have been hindered by the\nlack of an integrated U.S. LNG policy governing both\nthe extent of permissible imports and the availability\nof financing supports (viz., Ex-Im, Marad). The\nenergy exporting countries are aware that a U.S. LNG\nimport policy paper is under consideration. Leaks as\nto its contents are contradictory with a result that\nthe exporting countries consider no useful purpose is\nserved by pursuing serious discussions with interested\nU.S. gas importers while the present uncertainty exists.\n4.02\nLNG import projects are further hindered by the\ninordinate time required to obtain FPC approval for\nan import license. The process of review and final\ndecision seems to take a minimum of 3 years. The\nU.S. is not the only market for LNG in the world\n-5-\nand it is unreasonable to expect any energy\nexporting country to take its gas off the world\nmarket for the long period of time required to\nget a non-challengeable decision from the FPC,\nand with no assurance that at the end a favorable\nimport decision will be forthcoming.\n4.03\nLNG import projects are also hindered by the\ninordinate time required to obtain a final decision\nfrom the FPC on the matter of LNG terminal siting.\nThe gas exporting countries accordingly prefer to\nlimit their business with U.S. companies that\nalready have approved LNG terminal sites (now\nlimited to Distrigas (Boston), Columbia/Consolidated\n(Cove Point) and Southern Natural (Savannah) )\n4.04\nA large part of the FPC obstacle is attributable\nto the absence of guidelines from Congress and the\nAdministration as to acceptable price and volume\nfor LNG imports. Because of this vacuum, the FPC\ntends to focus on the examination of environmental\nmatters related to terminal siting SO imparting\n-6-\nsome semblance of motion to an LNG import\napplication. The absence of Congressional and\nAdministration guidelines in the pricing and\nvolume areas are part of the larger problem\nof realistic pricing of energy in the market\nplace.\n-7- -\nAttachment I.\nCONSUMPTION OF PRIMARY ENERGY IN\nTHE UNITED STATES\n( trillions of Btu's )\n1974\n1980 (est.)\n1985 (est.)\nOIL\n34,511\n42,200\n46,900\nGAS*\n22,533\n18,400\n19,000\nCOAL\n12,866\n18,000\n21,000\nHYDROELECTRIC\n3,285\n3,400\n3,700\nNUCLEAR\n1,015\n4,600\n10,600\nTOTAL\n74,210\n86,600\n101,200\nA selection of recent forecasts of estimated U.S. energy\nconsumption is given for comparative purposes:\nSource and Date\n1980\n1985\n(in trillions of BTUS)\nS. Clark (1975)\n86,400\n97,700\nFirst National City Bank (1974)\n91,200\n-\nShell (1974)\n88,900\n104,200\nO E C D (1974) ($9 oil)\n85,800\n100,100\nExxon (1975)\n87,400\n102,300\nFEA (1974) ($11 oil)\nW.O. conservation\n86,200\n103,000\nwith conservation\n82,100\n94,000\n*\nThe markets gas served in 1974 were as follows:\nMarket\nTrillions of BTU's\nPercent\nResidential\n5,016.5\n22.3\nCommercial\n2,639.6\n11.7\nIndustrial\n8,165.9\n36.2\nPower Plants\n3,356.0\n14.9\nTransportation\n945.0\n4.2\nRaw Materials\n710.0\n3.2\nMiscellaneous\n1,700.0\n7.5\nTOTAL\n22,533.0\n100.0\nAttachment II.\nESTIMATED U.S. ENERGY SUPPLY\n(trillions of Btu's)\n1980\n1985\nOIL\nProduction - Lower 48\n18,900\n19,100\n- Arctic\n4,000\n6,000\nSub Total\n22,900\n25,100\n(million barrels/day) (11.4)\n(12.5)\nImports\n19,300\n21,800\n(million barrels/day)\n(\n9.6)\n(10.8)\nTotal Supply\n42,200\n46,900\n(million barrels/day) (21.0)\n(23.3)\nPossible\nPossible\nGAS\nRange\nRange\nProduction - Lower 48\n17,100\n(16,500-18,500)\n15,500\n(15,000-18,000)\n- Arctic\n-\n1,500\n( 1,000- 1,500)\nSub Total\n17,100\n(16,500-18,500)\n17,000\n(16,000-19,500)\nImports - Canada\n600\n(\n500-\n750)\n500\n(\n350-\n500)\n- LNG\n400\n(\n400-\n450)\n1,000\n(\n950- 1,450)\nSNG\n300\n(\n300-\n400)\n500\n(\n400-\n850)\nTotal Supply\n18,400 (17,700-20,100)\n19,000\n(17,700-22,300)\nCOAL\n18,000\n21,000\n(million tons)\n( 780)\n( 950)\nNUCLEAR\n4,600\n10,600\nHYDROELECTRIC\n3,400\n3,700\nTOTAL ENERGY SUPPLY\n86,600\n101,200\nAttachment III.\nPOTENTIAL LNG IMPORT PROJECTS\nProject\nGas Source\nVolume\nEst. Start\n(trillions\nof Btu's)\nAPPROVED\nDistrigas\nAlgeria\n60\noperating\nEl Paso I\nAlgeria\n360\n1977\nSub Total\n420\nPENDING\nEascogas\nAlgeria\n240\n1980\nTrunkline\nAlgeria\n180\n1980\nEl Paso II\nAlgeria\n360\nearly 1980's\nPacific Lighting\nIndonesia\n200\n1980\nSub Total\n980\nPOSSIBLE\nUnnamed\nNigeria\n360\nearly 1980's\nNorth Star\nUSSR\n720\nearly 1980's\nYakutsk\nUSSR\n360\nearly 1980's\nVarious Unnamed\nPersian Gulf\n950\nmid 1980's\nSub Total\n2,390\nTOTAL ALL CATEGORIES\n3,790\nNot all of the pending and possible projects listed will\nmaterialize. However, now that imported crude and fuel oil prices\nlanded on the U.S. East Coast are in the range of $12.50 to $13.50\nper barrel, LNG imports from any of the above sources can be expected\nto be priced competitively at U.S. port with low sulphur fuel oils\n(about $13.10 per barrel or $2.10 per million BTU's).\nThe question of\nprice is therefore no longer the prime consideration.\nThe opportunity\nto get a reliable supply source of imported energy, be it fuel oil or\nLNG is now the major factor. Given a reasonable U.S. policy on LNG\nimports, LNG projects competitively priced and sufficient to provide\ngas imports indicated in Attachment II will materialize."
}