Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "16988102",
    "label": "Nuclear Policy Statement (9)",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/16988102"
}

{
    "id": "16988102",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/16988102",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Nuclear Policy Statement (9)",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/16988102",
    "collections": [
        "James M. Cannon Files (Ford Administration)",
        "James Cannon's Issues Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Exports",
        "Nuclear energy",
        "Presidential campaign, 1976"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0039/635863/16988102.pdf",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0039/635863/16988102.pdf",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0039/635863/16988102.pdf",
    "imageCount": 1,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/16988102",
    "naId": 16988102,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1976-11-30",
        "month": 11,
        "year": 1976
    },
    "coverageStartDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1976-06-01",
        "month": 6,
        "year": 1976
    },
    "levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0039/635863/16988102.pdf",
    "mediaId": "24a9a2752a4998cd",
    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 24, folder \"Nuclear Policy Statement (9)\" of the\nJames M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\n[10/21/1976]\nShere packagewel\nMEMORANDUM\nto Dane\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\n8PM nuckar\nOctober 19, 1976\nJIM CANNON\nf.\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nJIM CONNOR\nJIM MITCHELL\nGLENN SCHLEEDE\nFROM:\nDAVID ELLIOTT D.E.\nSUBJECT:\nLatest Version of a Presidential\nNuclear Statement\nFollowing up on the directions of yesterday, State has produced a\nrevised draft statement on nuclear policy. It is intended to take into\naccount the three themes discussed yesterday, viz:\n-- more emphasis to our commitment to support the nuclear power\nprogram in other nations,\n-- more stress to the international rationale for the U.S.\ndemonstration reprocessing plant (possible foreign participation,\nadvanced consultations, safeguards test bid, and availability\nof reprocessing services when required),\n-- the need for supplier cooperation because our market position\ndoes not permit us to dictate solutions.\nState did feel, however, that we ought to pitch this primarily as the\nPresident's response to his concern over the potential for proliferation,\nand not as an upbeat view of the promise of nuclear power once the\nproliferation problem is dealt with. Apparently after a brief scan of this\ndraft, Kissinger \"liked\" its approach.\nFORD & LIBRARY QERALD\nDigitized from Box 24 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n101918\nNEXT TO FINAL\nOctober 21, 1976\nNUCLEAR POLICY\nA STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD\nWe have known since the age of nuclear energy began\nmore than 30 years ago that this source of energy had the\npotential for tremendous benefits for mankind and the po-\ntential for destruction.\nOn the one hand, there is no doubt that nuclear energy\nrepresents one of the best hopes for satisfying the rising\nworld demand for energy with minimum environmental impact\nand with the potential for reducing dependence on uncertain\nand diminishing world supplies of oil.\nOn the other hand, nuclear fuel, as it produces power\nalso produces plutonium, which can be chemically separated\nfrom the spent fuel. The plutonium can be recycled and used\nto generate additional nuclear power without the need for\nadditional energy resources. Unfortunately -- and this is the\nroot of the problem -- the same plutonium, when chemically\nseparated, is also a key ingredient of nuclear explosives.\nThe world community cannot afford to let potential\nnuclear weapons material or the technology to produce it\nproliferate uncontrolled over the globe. The world community\nmust ensure that when such material is produced and utilized\nby any nation it is done so under the most stringent\nsecurity conditions and arrangements.\n2\nDeveloping the means to prevent proliferation while\npreserving the enormous benefits of nuclear energy is one of\nthe major challenges facing all nations of the world today.\nThis is a problem of extraordinary complexity and\nseverity and the policies and programs we need to solve this\nproblem cannot be judged by standards applied to most domestic\nand international activities. Our answers cannot be partially\nsuccessful. They will either work, in which case we shall\nstop proliferation, or they will fail and nuclear proliferation\nwill accelerate as nations initially having no intention of\nacquiring nuclear weapons conclude that they are forced to do\nso by the actions of others. Should this happen, we would\nface a world in which the security of all is imperiled.\nMaintaining international stability in such an environment\nwould be incalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of\nregional or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation would\nbe immeasurably increased -- if not through direct attack,\nthen through a process of ever expanding escalation.\n3\nThe problem can be handled as long as we understand it\nclearly and act wisely in concert with other nations. But we\nare faced with a threat of\ntragedy if we fail\nto comprehend it or fail to take effective measures.\nThus, the seriousness and the complexity of the problem\nplaces a special burden on those who propose ways to control\nproliferation. They must avoid the temptation for rhetorical\ngestures, empty threats or righteous posturing. They must\noffer policies and programs which deal with the world as it\nis, not as we might wish it. The goal is to prevent pro-\nliferation, not simply to deplore it.\nThe first task in dealing with the problem of prolifer-\nation is to understand the world nuclear situation.\n4\nMore than 30 nations have or plan to build nuclear\npower plants to reap the benefits of nuclear energy. The\n1973 energy crisis dramatically demonstrated to all nations\nnot only the dangers of excessive reliance on oil imports,\nbut also the reality that the world's supply of fossil fuels\ninevitably is dwindling. As a result, nuclear energy is now\nproperly seen by many nations as an indispensable way to\nsatisfy rising energy demand without prematurely depleting\nfinite fossil fuel resources. We must understand the motives\nwhich are leading these states to place even greater emphasis\nthan we do on nuclear power development. For unless we com-\nprehend their real needs we cannot expect to find ways of\nworking with them to ensure that their legitimate concerns\nand ours are both met.\nHowever, several nations also have all the technology\nneeded to produce both the benefits and the destructive\npotential of nuclear energy, and they have the capability\nto supply such technology and facilities to other nations.\nThus no single nation, not even the United States, can\nhope by itself to control effectively the spread of repro-\ncessing technology and the resultant availability of pluto-\nnium. The United States once was the predominant supplier\nof worldwide nuclear material equipment and technology. While\n5\nwe remain a leader in this field, today other suppliers have\ncome to share the international market -- with the U.S. now\nsupplying less than half of nuclear reactor exports.\nIn short, the U.S. no longer has a monopoly on nuclear\ntechnology. Although our role is large, we are not able to\ncontrol worldwide nuclear development.\nAction to control proliferation must be an international\ncooperative effort involving many nations, including both\nnuclear suppliers and customers. Common standards must be\ndeveloped and accepted by all parties. If this is not done,\nunrestrained trade in sensitive nuclear technology and\nmaterials will develop -- with no one in a position to stop\nit.\nWe must recognize that interests in nuclear energy vary\nwidely among nations. We must recognize that some look to\nnuclear energy because they have no acceptable energy alter-\nnative. We must be sure that our efforts to control pro-\nliferation are not viewed by such nations as an act to\nprevent them from enjoying the benefits of nuclear energy.\nWe must be sure that all nations recognize that the U.S. be-\nlieves that non-proliferation objectives must take precedence\nover economic and energy benefits if a choice must be made.\n6\nPREVIOUS ACTION\nDuring the past 30 years, the U.S. has been the unquestioned\nleader in worldwide efforts to assure that the benefits of nuclear\nenergy are made available widely while its destructive uses are\nprevented. I have given special attention to these objectives\nduring the past two years, and we have made important new progress,\nparticularly in efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear\nweapons capability among the nations of the world.\nIn 1974, soon after I assumed office, I proposed strengthening\nand standardizing non-proliferation measures at the United Nations\nGeneral Assembly. In the fall of that year, I became concerned\nthat some nuclear supplier countries, in order to achieve com-\npetitive advantage, were prepared to offer nuclear exports under\nconditions less rigorous than we believed prudent. I expressed\nthis concern directly to my counterparts in key supplier and\nrecipient nations. I directed the Secretary of State to\nemphasize multilateral action to limit this dangerous form of\ncompetition.\n6\nPREVIOUS ACTION\nDuring the past 30 years, the U.S. has been the unquestioned\nleader in worldwide efforts to assure that the benefits of nuclear\nenergy are made available widely while its destructive uses are\nprevented. I have given special attention to these objectives\nduring the past two years, and we have made important new progress,\nparticularly in efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear\nweapons capability among the nations of the world.\nIn 1974, soon after I assumed office, I proposed strengthening\nand standardizing non-proliferation measures at the United Nations\nGeneral Assembly. In the fall of that year, I became concerned\nthat some nuclear supplier countries, in order to achieve com-\npetitive advantage, were prepared to offer nuclear exports under\nconditions less rigorous than we believed prudent. I expressed\nthis concern directly to my counterparts in key supplier and\nrecipient nations. I directed the Secretary of State to\nemphasize multilateral action to limit this dangerous form of\ncompetition.\n7\nAt our initiative, the first meeting of major nuclear suppliers\nwas convened in London in April 1975. And a series of meetings\nand intensive bilateral consultations followed.\nAs a result of these meetings, we have significantly raised\ninternational standards through progressive new guidelines to govern\nnuclear exports. These involve both improved safeguards and controls\nto prevent diversion, and physical protection against theft and\nsabotage. The United States has adopted these guidelines as policy\nfor nuclear exports.\nIn addition, we have acted to deal with the special dangers\nassociated with plutonium.\nWe have prohibited export of reprocessing and other\nnuclear technologies that could contribute to\nproliferation.\nWe have firmly opposed reprocessing in Korea and\nTaiwan. We welcome the decisions of those nations\nto forego such activities; we will continue to\ndiscourage national reprocessing in other locations\nof particular concern.\nWe negotiated agreements for cooperation with Egypt\nand Israel which contain the strictest reprocessing\nprovisions and other nuclear controls ever included\nin the twenty-year history of our nuclear cooperation\nprogram.\n8\nIn addition, the United States recently offered to\nplace its civil nuclear facilities under the safeguards\nof the International Atomic Energy Agency -- and the\nIAEA has approved a proposed agreement for this purpose.\nNEW INITIATIVES\nLast summer, I directed that a thorough review be undertaken\nof all our nuclear policies and options to determine what further\nsteps were needed. I have considered carefully the results of\nthat review, held discussions with Congressional leaders, and\nbenefited from consultations with leaders of other nations. On\nthe basis of those activities, I am today announcing an important\nnew U.S. policy that will:\n--\nstrengthen commitment of the nations of the world\nto the goal of non-proliferation and build an\neffective system of international controls to\nprevent proliferation.\n--\nchange and strengthen U.S. domestic nuclear policies\nand programs to contribute to our non-proliferation\ngoals.\n--\nby these actions, establish a sound foundation for\nthe continued and increased use of nuclear energy\nin the U.S. and in the world in a safe and economic\nmanner.\n9\nThe task we face calls for an international cooperative\nventure of unprecedented dimensions. The U.S. is prepared\nto work with all others.\nPRINCIPAL POLICY DECISIONS\nIn forging my new nuclear policy initiatives, I have\nproceeded in the conviction that avoidance of proliferation\nmust take precedence over economic interests.\nAs a result of my nuclear policy review, I have\nconcluded\nthat the reprocessing and recycling of\nplutonium ought not proceed until there is confidence that\nthe world community can effectively overcome the associated\nrisks of proliferation. The review also confirmed the major\nrole that nuclear power must play in meeting both domestic\nand foreign energy needs, regardless of whether plutonium is\neventually found to be acceptable as fuel. To reach this\nfundamental judgment requires vigorous action on both the\ninternational and domestic fronts.\n--\nInternationally, I have decided that the United\nStates will undertake diplomatic initiatives, in\nconjunction with nuclear suppliers and consumers,\nto control the spread of plutonium and technologies\nfor separating plutonium. I am, therfore, directing\nthe Secretary of State to seek the support of other\n10\nnations for strengthened non-proliferation approaches\nincluding the coordination of restraints and assuring\nreliable fuel supplies in ways which prevent these\nfrom becoming elements of commercial competition.\nThis effort requires the cooperation and support of suppliers\nand consumers alike. Indeed peaceful uses of nuclear energy\ncan only prosper within a credible international system which\nreduces nuclear risks for all nations and enables legitimate\nenergy needs to be met. In pursuing global approaches to non-\nproliferation, the United States recognizes the responsibility\nto cooperate with other states in realizing the peaceful benefits\nof nuclear energy. And we will do so with nations prepared to\ndedicate themselves to non-proliferation.\nDomestically, we must ensure that our programs and\npolicies are compatible with our international\nposition on reprocessing. I have therefore\ndetermined that the United States should no longer\nregard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce\nplutonium as a necessary additional step in the nuclear\nfuel cycle, and that it should be pursued only if the\neconomic, and above all, nonproliferation uncertainties are\nresolved. I am directing the Administrator of the\nEnergy Research and Development Administration to develop\nprograms to conform with this policy.\n11\nTo implement these overall policy positions, I have decided\non a number of policy decisions that are necessary and appro-\npriate to meet our non-proliferation and energy objectives.\n--\nFirst, I have concluded that Government policies must\nbe changed to conform to my decision on deferral of\ncommercial scale chemical reprocessing of nuclear\nfuel which results in the separation of plutonium.\nSecond, I call upon all nations to join with us\nin exercising maximum restraint in the transfer of\nreprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities\nby avoiding or deferring such sensitive exports\nfor a period of at least three years.\nThird, I have concluded that new cooperative steps\nare needed to help assure\nthat all nations have an adequate and reliable supply\nof energy for their needs. I believe, most importantly,\nthat nuclear supplier nations have a special obligation\nto assure that customer nations have an adequate supply\nof fuel for their nuclear power plants, if those customer\nnations forego the acquisition of reprocessing and\nuranium enrichment capabilities and accept effective\nproliferation controls.\nFourth, I have concluded that the U.S. must maintain\nits role as a major and reliable world supplier of\nnuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes.\nOur strong position as a competitive supplier has\nprovided the principal basis for our influence\nand leadership in worldwide non-proliferation efforts.\n12\nA strong position will be\nequally important in the future. While reaffirming\nthis nation's intent to be a reliable supplier, the\nU.S. seeks no competitive advantage by virtue of\nthe worldwide system of effective non-proliferation\ncontrols that I am calling for today.\n-- Fifth, I have concluded that new efforts must be made\nto urge all nations to join in a full-scale inter-\nnational cooperative effort -- which I shall outline\nin detail -- to develop a\nsystem of effective\ncontrols to prevent proliferation.\n-- Sixth' I have concluded that the U.S. will take new\nsteps with respect to its own exports to control\nproliferation, while seeking to improve multilateral\nguidelines.\n-- Seventh, I have concluded that the U.S. should continue\nto increase its use of nuclear energy in the years\nahead. Even with strong efforts to conserve, we\nwill have increasing demands for energy for a growing\neconomy. To satisfy these needs, we must rely on\nincreased use of both nuclear energy and coal until\nmore acceptable alternatives are developed. We will\npush ahead with work on all promising alternatives\ntechnologies but it is clear that we cannot expect a\nmajor contribution to our energy supply from any of\nthese alternatives until late in this century.\n--\nEighth, I have decided that the U.S. will sponsor\na program to evaluate reprocessing in support of\nthe international policies I have adopted.\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n13\nFinally, I have concluded that new steps are needed\nto assure that we have in place when needed, both\nin the U.S. and around the world, the facilities for\nthe long-term storage or disposal of nuclear wastes.\nACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT OUR NUCLEAR POLICIES\nIn order to implement the nuclear policies that I have\noutlined, a major effort will be required within the United\nStates and by the many nations around the world with an interest\nin nuclear energy. To move forward with that effort I am today\nannouncing a number of actions that I am taking and a number of\nproposals that I am making to other nations.\nI.\nChange in U.S. Policy on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing\nFirst, with respect to nuclear fuel reprocessing, I am\ndirecting agencies of the Executive Branch to implement my decision\nto delay commercial-scale reprocessing activities in the U.S.\nuntil significant economic uncertainties are resolved:\nSpecifically:\n--\nI am directing the Administrator of the Energy\nResearch and Development Administration (ERDA) to:\nchange his agency's policies and programs which,\nheretofore have been based on the assumption that\nreprocessing would proceed\n14\nencourage industry to proceed immediately with\nthe expansion of spent fuel storage facilities,\nthus assuring utilities that they need not be\nconcerned about shut down of nuclear reactors\nbecause of delays.\nidentify the research and development efforts\nneeded to investigate alternatives to reprocessing\nto include means of recovering the energy value\nfrom used nuclear fuel without separating out\nplutonium.\nII. RESTRAINT IN THE TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY\nAND FACILITIES\nDespite the gains that have been made, the dangers posed by\nreprocessing and the prospect of uncontrolled plutonium demand\nfurther, decisive international action. There is, in addition,\nthe parallel risk of spreading uranium enrichment technology\nwhich must continue to be effectively controlled, and is included\nin the concepts proposed throughout this statement.\nTo meet these dangers I propose the following comprehensive\ninternational program which flows directly from the fundamental\npolicy decisions I have announded today:\n--\nI call upon all nations to join with us in exercising\nmaximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and enrich-\nment technology and facilities by avoiding or deferring such\nsensitive exports for a period of at least three years.\n-15\nThis will allow suppliers and consumers to work together\nto establish reliable means for meeting nuclear needs with\nminimum risk, as we assess carefully the wisdom of plutonium\nuse. As we proceed in these efforts, we must not be influenced\nby pressures to approve the export of these sensitive facilities.\nIII. ASSURING AN ADEQUATE ENERGY SUPPLY FOR CUSTOMER NATIONS\n--\nI urge nuclear suppliers to provide nuclear consumers\nwith nuclear fuel services, in place of sensitive nuclear\ntechnology.\nNations accepting effective nonproliferation restraints\nhave a right to expect reliable and economic supply of nuclear\nreactors and associated, nonsensitive fuel.\nAll such nations would share in the benefits of an assured\nsupply of nuclear fuel, even though the number and location of\nsensitive facilities to generate this fuel is limited to meet\nnonproliferation goals. The availability of diverse fuel cycle\nservices is several different nations can provide ample assurance\nto consumers of a continuing and stable source of supply.\nIt is also desirable to continue studying the idea of a few\nsuitably-sited multinational fuel cycle centers to serve\nregional needs, when effectively safeguarded and economically\nwarranted. Through these and related means, we can minimize\nincentives for the spread of dangerous fuel cycle capabilities.\n16\n--\nThe United States stands ready to take action, in\ncooperation with other concerned nations, to assure\nreliable supplies of nuclear fuel at equitable prices\nto any country accepting responsible restraints on its\nnuclear power program with regard to reprocessing,\nplutonium disposition, and enrichment technology.\nAt my direction, the Secretary of State will initiate consul-\ntations to explore arrangements for coordinating fuel service\nsupply resources and for developing other means of ensuring\nthat suppliers will be able to offer, and consumers will be\nable to receive, an uninterrupted and economical supply of low-\nenriched uranium fuel and fuel services. These discussions will\naddress ways to ensure against economic disadvantage to\ncooperating nations and to remove any sources of competition\nwhich could undermine our common nonproliferation efforts.\nTo contribute to this initiative, with regard to current\nU.S. recipients, and in new agreements for cooperation, the\nU.S. will offer binding letters of intent for the supply of\nnuclear fuel to countries willing to accept such responsible\nrestraints.\nIn addition, the United States is prepared to enter\ninto negotiations or arrangements for mutual agreement\non disposition of spent fuel with consumer nations\nthat adopt responsible restraints.\n17\nWhere appropriate and where it can demonstrably foster\nour common and cooperative nonproliferation objectives, in\nreturn for mutually agreed on disposition of spent fuel, the\nUnited States will provide consumer nations with either fresh,\nlow-enriched uranium fuel of equivalent energy value or reim-\nbursement. The United States seeks no commercial advantage\nin pursuing options for fuel disposition and assured fuel\nsupplies.\n--\nFinally, the U.S. will continue to expand cooperative\nefforts with other countries in developing their\nindigenous energy resources.\nThe U.S., in its world leadership role, has proposed the\nestablishment of an International Energy Institute, specifically\ndesigned to help developing countries match the most economic\nand readily available sources of energy to their power needs.\nIn many cases, this source will be nonnuclear. Through this\nInstitute and other appropriate means, we will offer technological\nassistance in the development of indigenous energy resources.\nIV\nStrengthening the U.S. Role as a Reliable Supplier.\nIf the U. S. is to continue its leadership role in world-\nwide non-proliferation efforts, it must be a reliable and\ncompetitive supplier of nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful\npurposes. There are two principal actions we can take to\ncontribute to this objective:\n18\n--\nI will submit to the new Congress, proposed\nlegislation that will permit the expansion of\ncapacity in the United States to produce enriched\nuranium, including the authority needed for ex-\npansion of the Government-owned plant at Portsmouth,\nOhio and authority to enter into cooperate agree-\nments with private firms that are prepared to\nfinance, build, own and operate enrichment plants.\nU.S. capacity has been fully committed since mid-1974\nwith the result that no new orders could be signed. The Congress\ndid not act on my full proposal and provided only limited and\ntemporary authority for proceeding with the Portsmouth plant.\nWe must have additional authority to proceed with the expansion\nof capacity without further delay.\n--\nI will work closely with the Congress to assure that\nthe legislation referred to above for improving our\nexport controls results in a system that provides\nmaximum assurance that the U.S. will be a reliable\nsupplier to other nations for the full period of\nagreements.\nOne of the principal concerns of opponents of export\nlegislation was the fear that foreign customers could be\nsubjected to arbitrary new controls imposed well after a\nlong-term agreement for nuclear power plants and fuel had\nbeen signed. In the case of nuclear plants and fuel, reliable\nlong-term agreements are essential and we must adopt export\n19\ncontrols that provide realiability while meeting non-proliferation\nobjectives.\nV.\nInternational Controls Against Proliferation\nTo reinforce the foregoing policies, we must develop means\nto establish international restraints over the accumulation of\nplutonium itself, whether in separated form or in unprocessed\nspent fuel. The accumulation of plutonium under national\ncontrol is a major destabilizing influence and, as such, a\nprimary proliferation risk.\n---\nThe United States will, in the immediate future,\npursue discussions aimed at the establishment of\na new international regime to provide for storage\nof excess civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel.\nI am directing that we vigorously pursue this proposal\nwhich we made to the International Atomic Energy Agency and\nother interested nations last spring.\nCreation of such a regime will greatly strengthen world\nconfidence that the growing accumulation of excess plutonium\nand spent fuel can be stored safely, pending reentry into the\nnuclear fuel cycle or other safe disposition. I urge the IAEA,\nwhich is empowered to establish such a depository, to give\nprompt implementation to this concept.\n20\nOnce a broadly representative IAEA storage regime is in\noperation, we are prepared to place our own excess civil plu-\ntonium and spent fuel under its control. Moreover, we are\nprepared to consider providing a site for international storage\nunder IAEA auspices.\nThe inspection system of the IAEA remains a key element\nin our entire nonproliferation strategy. The world community\nmust make sure that the Agency has the technical and human\nresources needed to keep pace with its expanding responsibili-\nties. At my direction, we have recently committed substantial\nadditional resources to help upgrade the IAEA's technical\nsafeguards capabilities, and I believe we must strengthen\nfurther the safeguards functions of the IAEA.\n--\nI am directing that a major international effort\nbe undertaken to ensure that adequate resources for\nthis purpose are made available, and that we mobilize\nour best scientific talent to support that Agency.\nTwo of our principal national laboratories have been\ndirected to provide assistance, on a continuing basis,\nto the IAEA Secretariat.\nThe terrible increase in violence and terrorism throughout\nthe world has sharpened our awareness of the need to assure\nrigorous protection for sensitive nuclear materials and equip-\nment. Fortunately, the need to cope with this problem is now\nbroadly recognized. Many nations have responded to the initiatives\n21\nwhich I have taken in this area by materially strengthening\ntheir physical security and by cooperating in the development\nof international guidelines by the IAEA. As a result of con-\nsultations among the major suppliers, provision for adequate\nphysical security is becoming a normal condition of supply.\nSteps are still urgently needed, however, to upgrade international\nprent high U.S. staudards,\nphysical security systems to meet international norms, and to\nassure timely international collaboration in the recovery of\nlost or stolen materials.\n---\nI have directed that the United States vigorously\naddress the problem of physical security at both\nbilateral and multilateral levels, including explora-\ntion of a possible international convention.\nThe United States is prepared to embark with all its\nresources on development of the system of international controls\nthat I have here outlined. Even when complete, however, no\nsystem of controls is likely to be effective, if a potential\nviolator judges that his acquisition of a nuclear explosive\nwill be received with indifference by the international\ncommunity.\nDERALO FORD LIBRARY\n22\nAny material violation of a nuclear safeguards agreement\n-- especially the diversion of nuclear material for use in\nmaking explosives -- must be universally judged to be an\nextremely serious affront to the world community, calling\nfor the immediate imposition of drastic sanctions.\n-- I serve notice today that the United States\nwill respond to violation by any nation of any safe-\nguards agreement to which we are a party with, at a\nminimum. immediate cut off of our supply of nuclear\nfuel and cooperation to that nation.\nWe would consider further steps, not necessarily confined\nto the area of nuclear cooperation, against the violator\nnation. Nor will our actions be limited to violations of\nagreements in which we are directly involved. In the event\nof material violation of any safeguards agreement, particularly\nagreements with the IAEA, we will initiate immediate consulta-\ntions with all interested nations.\nUniversal recognition of the total unacceptability of\nthe abrogation or violation of any nonproliferation agreements\nis one of the most important steps which can be taken to pre-\nvent further proliferation. We invite all concerned govern-\nments to affirm publicly that they will regard nuclear wrong-\ndoing as an intolerable violation of acceptable norms of in-\nternational behavior, which would set in motion strong and\nimmediate countermeasures.\n23\nVI CHANGES IN U.S. NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES\nDuring the past two years, the United States has\nstrengthened its own national nuclear export policies. Our\ninterests, however, are not limited to controls alone. The\nUnited States has a special responsibility to share the\nbenefits of peaceful nuclear energy with other countries.\nWe have sought to serve other nations as a reliable Supplier\nof nuclear fuel and equipment. Given the choice between\neconomic benefits and progress toward our nonproliferation\ngoals, we have given, and will continue to give, priority to\nnonproliferation. But there should be no incompatibility\nbetween nonproliferation and assistign other nations in en-\njoying the benefits of peaceful nuclear power, if all supplier\ncountries pursue common nuclear export policies. There is\nneed, however, for even more rigorous controls than those\nnow commonly accepted, and for policies that favor nations\naccepting responsible nonproliferation limitations.\n-- I have decided that we will henceforth\napply new criteria in judging whether to\nenter into new or expanded nuclear coopera-\ntion with a nonnuclear weapon state:\nAdherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty\nwill be a strong positive factor favoring\ncooperation.\nNations that have not yet adhered to the\nNon-proliferation Treaty will receive posi-\ntive recognition if they are prepared to\n24\nsubmit to full fuel cycle safeguard, pending\nadherence.\nRecipient nations prepared to forego, or\npostpone for a substantial period, the\nestablishment of national reprocessing or\nenrichment activities or, in certain cases,\nprepared to shape and schedule their re-\nprocessing and enriching facilities to foster\nnonproliferation needs, will be favored.\nPositive recognition will also be given to\nnations prepared to participate in an inter-\nnational storage regime, under which excess\nfuel and any separated plutonium would be\nplaced pending use.\nExceptional cases may occur in which nonproliferation\nwill best be served by cooperating with states not yet meeting\nthese tests. However, new agreements which are exceptions to\nthese criteria will require my personal approval prior to\ntheir submission to the Congress\n.\nWith respect to countries that are current recipients of\nUS Nuclear supply, I am directing the Secretary of State to\nenter into negotiations with the objective of conforming these\nagreements to established international guidelines, and to\nseek through diplomatic initiatives to obtain their acceptance\nof our new criteria.\n- 25 -\nWe must recognize the need for effective multilateral\napproaches to nonproliferation and prevent nuclear export\ncontrols from becoming an element of commercial competition.\n-- I am directing the Secretary of State to\nintensify discussions with other nuclear\nsuppliers aimed at expanding common guide-\nlines for peaceful cooperative agreements\nso that they conform with these criteria.\nIn this regard, the United States would discuss ways of\ndeveloping incentives that can lead to acceptance of these\ncriteria, such as assuring reliable fuel supplies for nations\naccepting new restraints.\n- 26 -\nThe reliability of American assurances to other nations\nis an asset that few, if any. nations of the world can match.\nIt must not be eroded in the nuclear, or any other, area.\nIndeed, nothing could more prejudice our efforts to strengthen\nour existing nonproliferation understandings that arbitrary\nsuspension or unwarranted delays in meeting supply commitments\nto countries which are dealing with us in good faith regarding\neffective safeguards and restraints.\nDespite intensive personal efforts on my part, the 94th\nCongress adjourned without passing nuclear export legislation\nwhich would have strengthened our effectiveness in dealing\nwith other nations on nuclear matters. In the absence of\nsuch legislation, I am directing the Secretary of State to\nwork closely with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure\nproper emphasis on nonproliferation concerns in the nuclear\nexport licensing process.\nI will continue to work with Congress to achieve improve-\nments in our nuclear export laws, with due account for the\nneed for broad-based nultilateral support. I will work to\ndevelop bipartisan support for new legislation in their field\nduring the next session of Congress.\n27\nVII. INCREASED USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES\nI believe that we must increase the use of nuclear energy\nin the United States in the years ahead. Even with strong\nefforts to conserve, energy demands will increase in response\nto the needs of a growing economy. The only alternative over\nthe next 15 to 20 years to increased use of both nuclear\nenergy and coal is greater reliance on imported oil which\nwill jeopardize our nation's strength and welfare.\nWe now have 62 nuclear plants licensed to operate in the\nUnited States providing about 9 percent of our electrical\nenergy. By 1985, we will have about 150 plants, supplying\nabout 20 percent of the Nation's electricity.\nIn most cases, electricity from nuclear plants is cheaper\nthan that produced from either oil or coal-fired plants. My\nenvironmental advisers believe that nuclear energy is pre-\nferable from an environmental point-of-view to other\nprincipal ways of generating electricity.\nCommercial nuclear power has an excellent safety record,\nwith nearly 200 plant years of experience (over 18 years)\nwithout a single death from a nuclear accident. I have acted\nto assure that the record continues in the years ahead. I\nincreased funds for the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commis-\nsion and for the Energy Research and Development Administration\nfor reactor safety R&D.\nThe decisions I have announced today to do not effect\nthe U.S. program of research and development on the breeder\nreactor. That program assumes that no decision on the\n28\ncommercial operations of breeder reactors, which require\nplutonium fuel, will be made before 1986. Nor will my\ndecision on reprocessing affect our ability to use nuclear\npower in the U.S.\nI believe that, with the changes I am announcing today,\nwe are on the right track with our nuclear power program in\nAmerica.\nVIII. Reprocessing Evaluation Program\nThe world community requires an aggressive program\nto build the international controls and cooperative regimes\nI have just outlined. I am prepared to mount such a program\nin the United States.\n--- I am directing the Administrator of\nERDA to:\n-- Begin immediately to define a repro-\ncessing and recycle program aimed at\nmeeting our international objectives.\nThis program should complement the\nNuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)\nongoing considerations of safety safe-\nguards and environmental requirements\nfor reprecessing and recycling activities,\nparticularly its Generic Environmental\nStatement on Mixed Oxide Fuels.\n29\n-- Investigate the feasibility of re-\ncovering the energy value from used\nnuclear fuel without separating out\nplutonium.\n-- I am directing the Secretary of State\nto invite other nations and the Inter-\nnational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)\nto participate in designing and carrying\nout ERDA's reprocessing and recycle\nprogram, in order to ensure that inter-\nnational energy cooperation and non-\nproliferation objectives are met.\nI will direct that activities carried out\nin the U.S. in connection with this program\nare subject to full IAEA safeguards and\ninspections.\n30\nIX. Nuclear Waste Management\nThere is one area of our domestic nuclear program that,\nin the past, did not receive the attention it warranted. That\nis the area of long-term management of nuclear wastes from\nour commercial nuclear power plants. This is an area that has\nconcerned me as it has others. In my 1977 Budget, I proposed\na four-fold increase in funding for this program, which involves\nthe activities of several Federal agencies, to see what addi-\ntional actions might be needed to assure that a Federally-owned\nand managed repository for long-term nuclear wastes would be\navailable in the mid-1980's, well before significant wastes\nbegin to accumulate.\nI have now been assured that the technology for long-term\nmanagement or disposal of nuclear wastes is available but\ndemonstrations are needed.\n--\nI have directed the Administrator of ERDA to take\nthe necessary action to speed up this program so as\nto demonstrate all components of waste management\ntechnology by 1978 and to demonstrate a complete\nrepository for such wastes by 1985.\n--\nI have further directed that the first demonstration\ndepository which will be owned by the Government be\nsubmitted for licensing by the independent NRC to\nassure its safety and acceptability to the public.\n31\nIn view of the decisions announced today, I have also\ndirected the Administrator of ERDA to assure that the waste\nrepository will be able to handle spent fuel elements\nas well as the separated and solidified waste that would\nresult if we proceed with nuclear fuel reprocessing.\nThe United States continues to provide world leadership\nin nuclear waste management. I am inviting other nations to\nparticipate in and learn from our programs. I am also\ndirecting the Secretary of State to discuss with other\nnations and the IAEA the possibility of centrally located\nmultinationally controlled nuclear waste repositories so\nthat the number of sites that are needed can be limited.\nI do not underestimate the challenge represented in the\ncreation of a world-wide program that will permit capturing\nthe benefits of nuclear energy while protecting against nuclear\nproliferation. The challenge is one that can be managed\nonly partially and temporarily by technical measures.\nIt can be managed fully if the task is faced realistically\nwith determination and foresight of leaders who will resist\nperceived short-term advantages in favor of fundamental long-\nterm gains. We call upon all leaders to recognize that their\nindividual and collective interests are best served by inter-\nnationally assured and safeguarded nuclear fuel supply, services\nand storage. We ask them to turn aside from pursuing nuclear\ncapabilities which are of doubtful economic value and have\nominous implications for nuclear proliferation and instability\nin the world.\n32\nThe record to date is not perfect. The broad consensus\nagainst the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a source of\nencouragement, but it is certainly not a basis for complacency.\nI do not underestimate the scope and complexity of the\nchallenge and the program I have just put forward to meet it.\nSuccess depends on an extraordinary coordination of the\npolicies of all nations toward the common good. The U.S. is\nprepared to lead, but we cannot succeed alone. If nations can\nwork together constructively and cooperatively to manage our\ncommon nuclear problems we will enhance our collective security.\nAnd we will be better able to concentrate our energies and our\nresources on the great tasks of construction rather than\nconsume them in increasingly dangerous rivalry.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nREQUEST\nWASHINGTON\nOctober 21, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nJIM CANNON\nFROM:\nGLENN Sleen SCHLEEDE\nSUBJECT:\nNON-PROLIFERATION STATEMENT\nAttached at TAB A is a copy of the State-Fri draft marked\nup to include OMB comments and those that I considered\nmost critical in order to limit damage. You should be\naware, however, that this marked up draft does not:\nReflect changes to the extremely negative tone at\nthe beginnong of the statement.\nBalance the treatment of international and domestic\nmatters (because that requires major structural changes).\nInclude a desirable description of domestic actions (we\nsought only to remove inaccuracies).\nAttached at TAB B is the version that I understand Dave\nElliott sent to Brent Scowcroft. I have not had time to\ncompare the two to see how many changes it includes. I\nunderstand from OMB that it does not deal with some of\nthe problems that Jim Mitchell feels are important but\nwhich Dave Elliott told him he would have to take up with\nthe State Department (those discussions are unknown).\nIn case it has been lost in confusion over the last two\ndays, I would like to take this opportunity to summarize\nmy principal concerns about the State-Fri draft:\nIt is unnecessarily negative in tone. I believe an\neffective system of proliferation controls can exist\nalong side a program of expanded domestic use of\nnuclear energy.\nI believe it is unbalanced in its treatment of inter-\nnational concerns compared to domestic policies, programs\nand actions.\nBERALD FORD VIBRARY\n102104\n-2-\nI believe its tone will lend support to passage of\nthe 6-7 nuclear initiatives that are on the State\nballots for November 2.\nI believe the negative tone -- particularly when\ncontrasted to past Presidential statements about\nnuclear energy -- will now make it impossible for\nall but the most sophisticated to distinguish between\nthe positions of the two candidates.\nThere are statements in the unchanged State-Fri draft\nthat would make it difficult for any nuclear power\nplants to be built in the State of California, given\nlaws recently passed in that State.\nThe process used in developing the statement has\nprecluded the normal consultation with heads of\ndomestic agencies concerned or their designated\nrepresentatives. Only Bob Fri and perhaps one NRC\nstaffer has seen or participated in developing the\nState-Fri draft.\nAttachments.\nTAB A\nto\nFINAL OMB\nA STATEMENT BY PR\nFIDENT\nORD\nToday the peoples of the world face a threat unlike\nany in history. It is the threat of nuclear weapons\ndonetes\nproliferation, the threat that nuclear explosives will\nnew\nnew regions of the world,\nspread -- to large nations, to small nations and even\nto terrorists. who have no natior at all It is a threat\nthat is the more formidable because it arises from the\npromise of nuclear power as a realistic alternative to\ncontinuing dependence on diminishing and uncertain\nsupplies of imported oil.\nIf we fail to comprehend and contain this. threat,\nthe result, inevitably, will be tragedy. But we can --\nand we will -- end this danger by understanding it\nclearly and acting wisely in concert with other responsible\nnations. 91 For a world in which the possession of nuclear\narms becomes increasingly widespread would be a world\nin which the security of all is imperiled. Maintaining\ninternational stability in such an environment would be\nincalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of\nregional or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation\nwould be immeasurably increased -- if not through direct\nattack, then through a process of ever expanding escalation.\nNor can we ignore the perils of theft or seizure which\nVERALD VUBIT FORD\n- 2 -\nincreased availability of nuclear weapons must entail.\nThe problem of nuclear proliferation has been a\nmajor concern of my Administration since I first took\noffice. Last summer I directed that our efforts be\n.\nbrought to their culmination by a complete review of\nour nuclear policies. I received the results of this\nreview before Labor Day, and have since deliberated\nwith great care on its recommendations.\nToday, I am announcing an important new American polices\npolicy based on those recommendations. We have\napproached the major supplier countries to begin\ndiscussion of these policiés, and I am convinced that\nour new policy will benefit not only the national\ninterest of the United States, but also the welfare\nof all nations for generations to come.\nMy policy deals with the world as it is, not as\nwe might wish it; it is a policy that reconciles legitimate\nnational interests in nuclear power with non-\nproliferation imperatives. Indeed, developing the\npolicies and the programs to prevent proliferation\nwithout eliminating the enormous benefit of nuclear\nenergy is one of the major challenges facing all the\nnations of the world today.\nFORD is LIBRARY OFRALD\n- 3 -\n-- There are legitimate interests in nuclear\npower. The 1973 energy crisis dramatically demon-\nstrated to all nations not only the dangers of\nexcessive reliance on oil imports, but also the\nreality that their and} the world's supply of fossil\nfuels inevitably is dwindling. As a result, nuclear\nenergy is now seen by many nations as an indispensable\nway to satisfy rising energy demands without prematurely.\ndepleting finite fossil fuel resources. Nuclear energy\ncan lessen their deepening dependence on foreign energy\nsources, and diminish the world economy's vulnerability\nto fluctuations in the supply of oil. And for nations\nwith no fossil fuel reserves of their own, nuclear\npower can be central to their economic well being.\nWe must understand the motives which are leading these\neven\nstates to place greater emphasis than we do on nuclear\nA\npower development. For unless we comprehend their real\nneeds we cannot expect to find ways of working with\nthem to ensure that their legitimate concerns and ours\nare both met.\n-- Yet the peaceful application of nuclear energy\nconfronts us with a dilemma. Nuclear fuel, once it has\nbeen burned to produce power, contains plutonium, which\ncan be chemically separated from the spent fuel. That\nFORD i LIBRARY 038470\n- 4 -\nplutonium can then be used to help generate additional\npower. Unfortunately -- and this is the root of the\nproblem --- plutonium is a key ingredient of nuclear\nexplosives. The world community simply cannot afford\nto let this dangerous material and or the its technics related reparted melded to\ntechnology spread uncontrolled over the globe. We\nit Reor\nwast\nshould not permit it to be produced and utilized unless\nand until the most stringent conditions and arrangements\nand advised to\nfor avoiding proliferation are developed, and observed.\n-- But no single nation, not even the United States,\ncan hope by itself to control effectively the spread of\nansthe revel availability\nplutonium and reprocessing technology. The United States\nmeterialsonef\nonce was the predominant supplier of. worldwide nuclear\ntechnology energy\ngivenent fultrences\nWhile we remainia leader in this field, today\nother suppliers have come to share the international\nmarket --- with the US now supplying about (half of\nthe international market. We cannot impose our preferences.\nTherefore it is essential that we exercise our leadership\nthrough catalyzing cooperative international action,\nnot through futile attempts to impose our preferences\non suppliers and consumers. We must avoid the temptation\nfor rhetorical gestures, empty threats or righteous\nposturing.\nFrom the outset of the nuclear age, the United\nStates has recognized the dangers of proliferation. And\nGERALD\n- 5 -\nwe have been a leader in efforts to bring them under\ncontrol. We took steps to share the benefits of the\npeaceful atom, while acting to control its spread for\nmilitary purposes when President Eisenhower proposed\nestablishment of the International Atomic Energy\nAgency. We took the leading role in negotiating the\nNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.\nSince according type privity to non-putiferstion\nNon proliferation has been 2 top priority concern\nshortly after\nof my Administration since I took office in 1974, Since\nthen we have made considerable progress in reducing the\npossibility that of increasingly widespread possession of\nwhich could\ntone\natomic weapons would eventually spark the holocaust that\nall mankind fears.\nBut the urgency of our task has become even more\npressing. We and other nations now face critical\nnuclear policy decisions.\nIn forging my new nuclear policy initiatives, I\nhave proceeded in the conviction that anvironmental:\nsafety and avoidance of proliferation must take precedence\nas\nover economic and commercial interests. Great though\nare\nthe economic benefits of nuclear energy Rray be, they\n15\ncannot justify the dangers that may threaten a world\nMo\nfaced with the uncontrolled availability of plutonium\nand other nuclear explosive capabilities.\nFORD & LIBRARY 938470\n- 6 -\nAs a result of my nuclear policy review, I have\nToo neg\nbelieve strongly\ntherefore concluded that the reprocessing and recycling\nof plutonium onght should not proceed until we are confident\nthereis confidence\nthat the world community can effectively overcome the\nisach this\nassociated risks of proliferation, To implement my\nfundamental secision judgement requires vigorous dusert action on both\nthe international and domestic fronts.\nInternationally, I have decided that, (while continuing\nenergy\nto assure the availability of efficiently produced and\naccepted\nand safecuardable nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes\nclitibing\nour\nthe United States, will undertake a major diplomatic\ncortio\neffort to reduce the worldwide risks of plutonium access,\nand associated technology. Indeed, peaceful nuclear\ncooperation can. only prosper within a credible international\nsystem which reduces nuclear risks for all nations and\nX\nenables legitimate energy needs to be met. This effort\nX\nrequires the cooperation and support of suppliers and\nInsertB\nconsumers alike.\nH\nam directing the Secretary of State\nto, seek the support of other nations for strengthened\nnon proliferation approaches and for preventing controls\nfrom becoming elements of commercial competition\nIn\npursuing global approaches to non-proliferation, the\nUnited States recognizes the responsibility to cooperate\nwith other states in realizing the peaceful benefits\nof nuclear energy.. And we will do so with all nations\nFORD\ni LIBRARY 9ERALD\nSouth west edering commercial\ncompetition goals. Whick can undermine all\nInsert A - page 6\nThe review also confirmed the major role that nuclear\npower must play in mating pe both domestic and foreign energy\nneeds regardless of whether plutonium is to be separated\nand used as more fuel.\nInternationally, I have decided that the United States\nadditional\nwill undertake a major acceleration of our efforts to\ncontrol the spread of plutonium and technologies for\nseparating plutonium with a view toward reducing\ncommercial competition which can undermine our non-\nproliferation goals.\nFORD it LIBRARY 078870\ndnsertB\nPage 6: Third sentence after the underlined portion change to read\nas follows:\n\"I am directing the Secretary of State to seek the support of other\nnations for strengthened nonproliferation [approaches] actions, including\nthe coordination of export restraints and assuring reliable fuel supplies\nin ways which prevent these from becoming elements of commercial competition.\"\nDERALD FORD LIBRARY\nprepared to dedicate the elves to non-proliferation.\nDomestically, we\nensure that our programs\nand policies are compatible with our international\nposition on reprocessing. I have therefore determined\nthat the United States should no longer regard reprocessing\nof used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a justifiable\n$)\nnecessary additional step in the nuclear fuel cycle,\nand should be sursued only if the\neconomic, envirommental and above all non-proliferation\nA\nuncertainties are can ba successfull resolved. On the\ncontrary Before we decide whether to apply this\ntechnology for commercial purposes, we must be convinced\nthat our course is not only technically sound but that\n28 supports our vital non-proliferation objectives.\nI am directing the Administrator of the Energy Research\nand Development Administration to develop scordent energy\nprograms programs to conform with this policy.\nthe\nWe are committed to construct a new era of global\nin nuclear\ncooperation founded on strong US support. From this\nbasis, Dasis, I am authorizing puposing a nuclear policy to deal:\nspecifically with the three major areas, of concern:\ncoordinated WF international action; strengthened my national\nexport policies; and ffective domestic programs reprocessing needs is\ndiveloping slimpen\nFirst, I am directing new and accelerated-international\ninitiatives to;\ncomplement there\nFORD & LIBRA 076870\n+ -1 8\n-- persuade other supplier nations to join us in\n-\nexercising maximum restraint in the transfer of\nreprocessing and enrichment technology and equipment;\nordisadvantal\nCoolder the the\npersuade suppliers to offer, and consumers to\nwithout\naccept, Anuclear fuel services instead of sensitive\nEarl\ntechnology, so that countries accepting responsible\nrestraints in connection with US nuclear assistance\n1\nwill have an assured supply of nuclear fuel;\n--- assume responsibility for accepting the spent\nfuel of consuming nations, as appropriate, in return\n91 pursui the stathsburent of\ninternational regime for the 5 things of\nexcess civil platonium and spent\nfor financial reimbursement or fresh reactor fuel of\nequivalent energy value;\nto, explore arrangements for coordinating the\nresources of suppliers SO, that they can offer assured\nand economical fuel services without commercial.\nadvantage or disadvantage;\nreactorsfull;\n--- urge a major- commitment of financial and scientific\nresources to strengthen the sefeguards capabilities of\nthe International Atomic- Energy Agency and to vigorously\npursue cooperative international efforts to upgrade\nphysical security standards; and\n--.- set a firm policy of international penalties -yen\nfor safeguards violations.\nSecond, in recognition of the continuing need to\nexercise leadership in our own national export policies,\nFORD & GERALD LIBRARI\nInsutA\nPage 8: Combine the second and fourth bullets, as follows\n-- Explore arrangements for coordinating the resources of suppliers\nso that they can offer to countries accepting responsible restraints\nassured nuclear fuel services, instead of sensitive technology, at\nequitable prices without commercial advantage or disadvantage.\nFORD is GERALD LIBRARI\nreway I\nwear - 9 - alvadymede $15 to supply\nam directing that the United States take into account\nthe edu following new criteria for coo perative agreements expeaceful\nnuclear cooporation with non-nuclear-weapon states:\n-- whether technologies recipients are parties to the Non-\nProliferation Treaty or are prepared to accept IAEA\nsafeguards on all nuclear facilities;\n-- whether they are prepared to forego or postpone\nnational reprocessing and sensitive enrichment activities;\nand\n-- whether recipients are willing to participate\nin an international spent fuel and plutonium storage\nregime.\nconsideration that would\nThird, to support our overriding non-proliferation\nprograms, I authorizing ERPA ah to developprograms experimental forwy\nobjectives, and in consultation with other interested\nexpanded\nstates, taking full account of their policies and\nno\nLO assess the feasibility, benefits, and safety\nof commercial reprocessing and waste disposal,\n--\nto develop and test new safeguards approaches;\nand\nby pursue technology alternatives to reprocessing.\nThese are the foundations of our new approach, and\nthe three areas which our policy will address. Let me\nnow turn in more detail to these three central areas of\nconcern.\nsumin increase am understanding fand helpts umove\nLARD FORD LIBRARY\nremaining uncertainties with,\nthe economics, safequards and energy benefits\nof recycle (Flese would\ncomplement NPr! X evaluations the necessity lot\nInsert A pq\nPage 9: Rewrite the first half of the paga, 35 follows:\n[Fix 2: Refer to spacific criteria]\nI am directing that the Secretary of State urgently pursue negotiations\nwith other supplier nations to expand the common nonproliferation criteria\nto be applied to agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with non-\nexpanded\nshould\nnuclear weapon states. These criteria include the following:\n-- Whether recipients are parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty\nor are prepared to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities;\n-- Whether they are prepared to forego or postpone national reprocessing\nand sensitive enrichment activities; and\n-- Whether recipients are willing to participate in an international\nspent fuel and plutonium storage regime.\nThese criteria [ when agreed upon for addition to the common supplier OPTion OP\nguidelines will be applied by the United States to all agreements to\nexport peaceful nuclear materials, and I will submit to the Congress\nlegislation to give these criteria the force of law.\nGERALD R. FORD\n-\nInternational Initiative\nA successful policy of reducing the worldwide\nrisks associated with plutonium will require the\nsupport and cooperation of both supplier and consumer\ncountries. To secure such support and cooperation,\nwe must demonstrate to other nations that concurrence\nwith the initiatives I am launching today will not\nharm their legitimate economic interests, while\nenhancing the future safety of all nations and all\npeoples. We will work at solving economic problems\nwith all nations that join us in giving precedence\nto non-proliferation and environmenta goals.\nA\nunilateral decision by the United States to\ndefer commitment to reprocessing would serve no\nuseful purpose if other nuclear supplier nations\nplunged ahead with the export of reprocessing technology.\nMy second major decision today -- to undertake a major\nshould\ndiplomatic effort to reduce the worldwide risks of\naccess to plutonium and sensitive technology\n-- therefore flows directly from the first.\nFORD & LIBRARY 07V839\nDuring the past two years, I have vigorously\npursuednon-proliferation through multilateral cooperation\nwith other nations. Because of the growth of nuclear\ncapabilities among several potential supplier nations,\nI have rejected highly publicized or unilateral\napproaches, which not only would be futile, but also\ncould easily alienate both supplier and consumer nations\nwhose cooperation is essential to the success .of our\nnon-proliferation efforts.\nMy most immediate concern has been to improve\ninternational safeguards and controls. In 1974, soon\nafter I assumed office, we proposed strengthening and\nstandardizing non-proliferation measures at the United\nNations General Assembly.\nIn the fall of 1974, I became concerned that some\nnuclear supplier countries appeared to be prepared to\noffer nuclear exports under conditions less rigorous\nthan we believed prudent, in order to achieve\ncompetitive advantage. I communicated these concerns\ndirectly to my counterparts in key supplier and\nrecipient nations. I directed the Secretary of State\nto explore ways of emphasizing multilateral action\nFORD i 078830 LIBRAR\n- 12 -\nx\nto limit this dangerous form of competition.\nAt our initiative, the first meeting of major\nnuclear suppliers was convened in London in April,\n1975. Additional meetings and intensive bilateral\nconsultations followed.\nAs a result of these meetings, we have developed\napplied\nto govern nuclear exports --\ninvolving both improved safeguards and controls to\nprevent diversion, and physical protection against\ntheft and sabotage. This achievement has significantly\nraised international norms. The United States has\nadopted these guidelines as policy for nuclear exports.\nIn addition, we have acted to deal with the\nspecial dangers associated with plutonium. Even prior\nto today's decisions, the United States took the\nfollowing steps:\n-- We have prohibited export of reprocessing and\nother nuclear technologies that could contribute to\nproliferation.\n-- We have firmly opposed reprocessing in Korea\nand Taiwan. We welcome their significant decisions\nto forego such activities and we will continue our\nefforts to discourage national reprocessing\nFrom\narea\nExconeern\nGERALD FORD\n- 13 -\n-- We have negotiated agreements for cooperation\nwith Egypt and Israel which contain the strictest\nreprocessing provisions and other nuclear controls\never included in the twenty-year history of our\nnuclear cooperation program.\nOther important gains in the effort against\nproliferation have been made during the two years of\nmy Administration. Last year, the Federal Republic of\nGermany, Italy, and other European states completed\nratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.\nThis\nyear, Japan also ratified the Treaty\nstep after many years of serious debate\nIn addition, last month, at my direction, we\nproposed to the International Atomic Energy Agency\nan agreement placing US civil nuclear facilities under\nthe safeguards of the IAEA, following extensive negotiations.\nThis has now been approved by that Agency.\nDespite the gains that have been made, the dangers\nthe passpect of\nposed by reprocessing and n uncontrolled plutonium demand\nfurther, decisive international action. There is, in\naddition, the parallel risk of spreading uranium\ncl\nenrichment technology which must continue to be\neffectively controlled\nTo meet these dangers I propose the following\ncomprehensive international program which flows directly\nDERALD FORD LEDRAS\n- 14\nfrom the fundamental policy decisions I have announced\ntoday:\nI call upon all nations to join with us in\nexercising maximum restraint in the transfer of\nreprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities\nby avoiding or deferring such sensitive exports for a\nperiod of at least three years. This will allow\nsuppliers and consumers to find reliable ways of\nmeeting nuclear needs with minimum risk, as we assess\ncarefully the wisdom of plutonium use. As we proceed\nin these efforts, we must not be influenced by\npressures to approve the export of these sensitive\nfacilities.\nIn addition, I urge nuclear suppliers to provide\nnuclear consumers with nuclear fuel services in place\nof sensitive nuclear technology. Nations accepting\neffective non-proliferation restraints have a right\nto expect reliable and economic supply of nuclear\nreactors and associated, non-sensitive fuel.\nAll such nations should share in the benefits of\nan assured supply of nuclear fuel, even though the\nnumber and location of sensitive facilities to\ngenerate this fuel is limited to meet non-proliferation\ngoals. The availability of diverse fuel cycle services\nA. work tagether to address adminity\napproceding will\nFORD i LIBRAR 076880\n15 -\nin several different nations can provide ample\nassurance to consumers of a continuing and stable\nsource of supply.\nIt is also desirable to continue studying the\nidea of a few suitably-sited multinational fuel cycle\ncenters to serve regional needs, when effectively --\ndount A\nsafeguarded and economically warranted. Through\nthese and related means, we can minimize incentives\nfor the spread of dangerous fuel cycle capabilities.\nThe United States will do its part to ensure\nthat any country accepting responsible restraints\non its nuclear power program with regard to enrichment,\nreprocessing and plutonium disposition will have an\nassured supply of nuclear fuel. To this end, I have\ndirected the Secretary of State with regard to current\nUS recipients, and in new agreements for cooperation,\nto offer binding letters of intent for the supply of\nnuclear fuel to countires willing to accept such\nresponsible restraints. These would be fulfilled\neither by new government capacity or by private\nsuppliers, at our discretion.\nThe United States is now\nprepared to enter into negotiations or arrangements\nthat adopt responsible\nwith consumer nations, adapting restraints under which\nLX winld matually agree on\nthey would accord us rights of disposition over their\nspent fuel, where appropriate and where it can demonstrably\nfoster our non-proliferation objectives. In return,\nIRALD FORD\nKnoertA\nPage 15 and top of Page 16 (through \"supply of nonsensitive nuclear\nfuel \"): Refocus, starting with first underlined sentence, as\nfollows:\nThe United States stands ready to take action, in cooperation with\nother concerned nations, to assure reliable supplies of nuclear fuel\nat equitable prices to any country accepting responsible restraints\non its nuclear power program. At my direction, the Secretary of State\nwill initiate consultations to explore arrangements for coordinating\nfuel service supply resources and for developing other means of ensuring\nthat suppliers will be able to offer, and consumers will be able to\nreceive, an uninterrupted and economical supply of low-enriched uranium\nfuel and fuel services. These discussions will address ways to remove\nany sources of competition which could undermine our common nonproliferation\nefforts.\nIn addition, the United States, in cooperation with other supplier\nnations, is prepared to enter into negotiations or arrangements with\nconsumer nations that adopt responsible restraints to buy-back spent\nnuclear fuel. Where appropriate and where it can demonstrably foster\nour nonproliferation objectives, in return for mutually agreed on disposition\nof spent fuel, the United States will provide consumer nations with either\nfresh, low-enriched ùranium fuel of equivalent energy value or reimbursement.\nIn pursuing a program of assured fuel supply and fuel exchange, the\nUnited States seeks the cooperation of all nations in coordinating provision\nof these services. The United States seeks no commercial advantage.\nFORDO is GERALD LIBRARY\n- 16 -\nthese nations would be assured\nof either reimbursement or fresh, low-enriched fuel\nof equivalent energy value. In any such arrangement, our\nobjective will be to ensure against any economic\ndisadvantage to the cooperating nation.\nIn pursuing a program of assured fuel supply\nand fuel exchange, the United States seeks no commercial\nadvantage over other suppliers. The program can and\nwill be administered in a way which avoids unfair\nadvantage in the sale of reactors or related services.\nin\nthe\nSCIC\nAt my direction, the Secretary of State will initiate\nstion,\nconsultations to explore arrangements for coordinating\nsuch resources and developing other means of ensuring\nnots\nthat suppliers will be able to offer, and consumers\nwill be able to receive an interrupted and economical\nDe\nto\nsupply of non-sensitive nuclear fuel and fuel services.\nnon\nTo reinforce these policies, we must develop means\neinforce\nrestrients\naccumitation of\nto establish international control over the plutonium\nish\nitself, whether in separated form or in unprocessed\nspent fuel. The accumulation of plutonium under national\n1.\nThe\naccumulation\ncontrol is a major destabilizing influence and, as such,\na\na primary proliferation risk.\nThe United States will, in the immediate future,\npursue discussions aimed at the establishment of a new\ninternational regime to provide for storage of excess\ncivil plutonium and spent reactor fuel. I am directing\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n- 17 -\nthat we vigorously pursue this proposal which we made\nto the International Atomic Energy Agency and other\ninterested nations last spring.\nCreation of such a regime will greatly strengthen\nworld confidence that the growing accumulation of excess\nplutonium and spent fuel can be stored safely, pending\nreentry into the nuclear fuel cycle or other safe dis-\nposition. I urge the IAEA, which is empowered to\nestablish such a depository, to give prompt implementation\nto this concept.\nOnce a broadly representative IAEA storage regime\nis in operation, we are prepared to place our own excess\ncivil plutonium and spent fuel under its control.\nMoreover, we are prepared to consider providing a site\nfor international storage under IAEA auspices.\nThe inspection system of the IAEA remains a key\nelement in our entire non-proliferation strategy. The\nworld community must make sure that the Agency has the\ntechnical and human resources needed to keep pace with\nits expanding responsibilities\nI therefore DL have directed & major commitment of\nadditions esources to the TABA, and assuated\na mobilization of our best scientific talent to support\nthe Agency. Two of our principal national laboratories\nnitho fearetary gettoleto initiate evlichwill discussions seek with the\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nAE to expernatheir\nand have\n- 18 -\nhave been directed to provide assistance, on a continuing\nbasis, to the IAEA Secretariat.\nThe terrible increase in violence and terrorism\nthroughout the world has sharpened our awareness of the\nneed to assure rigorous protection for sensitive nuclear\nmaterials and equipment. Fortunately, the need to cope\nwith this problem is now broadly recognized. Many\nnations have responded to the initiatives which I have\ntaken in this area by materially strengtening their\nphysical security and by cooperating in the dévelopment\nof international guidelines by the IAEA. As a result\nof consultations among the major suppliers, provision\nfor adequate physical security is becoming a normal\ncondition of supply.\nSteps are still urgently needed, however, to up-\ngrade physical security systems to meet international\nnorms, and to assure timely international collaboration\nin the recovery of lost or stolen materials. On the\nbasis of my review of nuclear policies, I have directed\nthat the United States vigorously address the problem\nof physical security at both bilateral and multilateral\nlevels, including exploration of a possible international\nconvention.\n- 19 -\nThe United States is prepared to embark with all\nits resources on development of the system of inter-\nnational controls that I have here outlined. Even\nwhen complete, however, no system of controls is\nlikely to be effective, if a potential violator judges\nthat his acquisition of a nuclear explosive will be\nreceived with indifference by the international\ncommunity.\nAny material violation of a nutlear safeguards\nagreement -- especially the diversion of nuclear\nmaterial for use in making explosives -- must be\nuniversally judged. to be. an extremely serious affront\nto the world community, calling for the immediate\nimposition of drastic sanctions. I serve notice\ntoday that the United States will respond to violation\nby any nation of any safeguards agreement to which we\nare a party with, at a minimum, immediate cut off of\nour supply of nuclear fuel and cooperation to that\nnation. We would consider further steps, not necessarily\nconfined to the area of nuclear cooperation, against\nthe violator nation. Nor will our actions be limited\nto violations of agreements in which we are directly\ninvolved. In the event of material violation of any\nsafeguards agreement, particularly agreements with the\nLIBRARY GERALD R. FORD\n- 20 -\nIAEA, we will initiate immediate consultations with\nall interested nations.\nUniversal recognition of the total unacceptability\nof the abrogation or violation of any non-proliferation\nagreements is one of the most important steps which\ncan be taken to prevent further proliferation. We\ninvite all concerned governments to affirm publicly\nthat they will regard nuclear wrongdoing as an intoler-\nable violation of acceptable norms of international\nbehavior, which would set in motion strong and immediate\ncounter-measures. thell pursue is expane cooperative\nFinally we sure that nuclear power is\neffortain must make their indidenous refored Cuerty\nnot adopted unnecessarily in cases where alternative\nsweet\nsources of energy would serve just as well\nTo this\nend, the United States is placing increased emphasis\non the development of non nuclear sources of power.\nWe have proposed the establishment of an International\nin its Bodership role has\nEnergy Institute, specifically designed to help develop-\nAstrias\ning countries match the most economic and readily avail-\nable sources of energy to their power needs. In many\ncases, this source will be non-nuclear. Through this\nInstitute and other appropriate means, we will offer\ntechnological assistance in the development of\nindigenous energy resources as an alternative to nuclear\npower\nR. FORD NOT\nLIBRARY GERALD\nInsert, page 20\nFinally, the U.S. will continue to expand cooperative\nefforts with other countries in developing their indigenous\nenergy resources.\nPages 21/22/23: Rewrite as follows:\nNational Export Policy\nDuring the past two years, the United States has strengthened its\nown national nuclear export policies. Our interests, however, are not\nlimited to controls alone. The nuclear weapons states, including the\nUnited States, have a special responsibility under the Nuclear Non-\nProliferation Treaty to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy\nwith non-nuclear countries. We have sought to serve other nations as\na reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment. Given the choice\nbetween commercial benefits and progress toward our non-proliferation\ngoals, we have given, and will continue to give, priority to non-pro-\nliferation. But there should be no incompatibility between non-pro-\nliferation and assisting other nations in enjoying the benefits of peaceful\nnuclear power, if all supplier countries pursue common nuclear export\npoli\nThere is need, however, for even more rigorous controls than\nthose now commonly accepted, and for policies that favor nations accepting\nresponsible non-proliferation limitations.\nOn the basis of my recently completed study of nuclear policies,\nI have decided to direct the Secretary of State to urgently pursue\nnegotiations with other supplier nations to broaden our common guide-\nlines for nonproliferation criteria required for the export of peaceful\nnuclear materials and facilities. These criteria should include the\nfollowing:\n-- Whether recipients are parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty\nor are prepared to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities;\nDERALD FORD LIBRARY\n-- Whether they are prepared to forego or postpone national\nreprocessing and sensitive enrichment activities; and\n-- Whether recipients are willing to participate in an international\nspent fuel and plutonium storage regime.]\nWith respect to countries that are current recipients of U.S. nuclear\nsupply, I am directing the Secretary of State to enter into negotiations\nwith the objective of conforming these agreements to agreed international\nguidelines, and to seek through diplomatic initiatives to obtain their\nacceptance of the new criteria.\nThese criteria, when agreed upon for addition to The\nCOMMON supplier guidelines, will be applied by The\nUnited States to aLL agreements to export\npeaceful Nuclear materials, and I will submit to\nThe Congress legislation to give these criteria the\nforce of law.\nExceptional cases may occur in which NON-\nproliberation will Best be served By cooperating\nwith states NOT yet meating theme Tests. Howowar, New agason\nwhich are exceptions to these criteria will require my personal\napproval prior to Their submission X The Congress.\nFORD is 03RALD LIBRARY\n- 21\nNational Export Policy\nDuring the past two years, the United States\nhas strengthened its own national nuclear export\npolicies. Our interests, however, are not limited\nweakens title includence\nto controls alone. The United States has a special\nresponsibility tas as one of our obligations have under the\nNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] to share the\nSTET\nbenefits of peaceful nuclear energy with non-nuclear\ncountries. We have sought to serve other nations as\na reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment.\nGiven the choice between commercial benefits and\nprogress toward our non-proliferation goals, we have\ngiven, and will continue to give, priority to non-\nproliferation. But there should be no incompatibility\nassisting other notions in\nbetween non-proliferation and a vigorous export trade\nAt\nenjoying the becausets of placeful nuclear person,\nif all, supplier countries pursue common nuclear export\npolicy. need, however, for even more rigerous\nthat all There effective is Vn controlling nuclear proferation\ncontrols, and for policies that favor nations accepting\nresponsible non-proliferation limitations. The United\nStates will move in this direction.\nOn the basis of my recently completed study of\nnuclear policies, I have decided that we will henceforth\napply new criteria in judging whether to enter into new\nor expanded nuclear cooperation with a non-nuclear\nweapon state\nCo\nFORD & GERALD LIBRARY\n- 22 -\nThese new criteria are:\n-- Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will\nbe a strong positive factor favoring cooperation.\nNations that have not yet adhered to the Non-\nProliferation Treaty will receive positive recognition\nif they are prepared to submit to full fuel cycle\nsafeguards, pending adherence.\n-- Recipient nations prepared to forego, or post-\npone for 2 substantial period, the establishment of\nSTET\nnational reprocessing or enrichment activities or, in\ncertain cases, prepared to shape and schedule their\nreprocessing and enriching facilities to foster non-\nproliferation needs, will be favored.\n-- Positive recognition will also be given to\nnations prepared to participate in an international\nstorage regime, under which excess fuel and any\nseparated plutonium would be placed pending use.\nExceptional cases may occur in which non-proliferation\nwill best be served by cooperating with states not yet\nmeeting these tests. However, I have decided to go\nbeyond the requirement in present law which requires\nPresidential approval of all new agreements for nuclear\ncooperation with other nations. Henceforth, negotiation\nof any new agreement with a nation which does not now\nLakallnot recommend FORD to\nthe congress\nLISTRE GERALD\n- 23 -\nmeet these strict standards will not even be initiated\nwithout my personal approval in advance\nThe above criteria would provide the norm in\nnegotiating all new or amended Agreements for Cooperation.\nout\nI have also directed the Secretary of State to continue open\ndiscussions with the other nuclear suppliers nowaimed to shape texpanding\ncommon guidelines so that they conform with these\nprinciples. With respect to countries that are current\nrecipients of US nuclear supply, I am directing the\nthe\nSecretary of State to enter into negotiations with the\nobjective of conforming these agreements to agreed\ninternational guidelines, and to seek through diplomatic\ninitiatives to obtain their acceptance of our new\ncriteria\nThe reliability of American assurances to other\nnations is an asset that few, if any, nations of the\nworld can match. It must not be eroded in the nuclear,\nor any other, area. Indeed, nothing could more\nprejudice our efforts to strengthen our existing non-\nproliferation understandings than arbitrary suspension\nor unwarrantéd delays in meeting supply commitments to\ncountries which are dealing with us in good faith\nregarding effective safeguards and restraints. The\nimportance of this principle requires that final\nauthority over the licensing of nuclear exports be\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n- 24:-\nreturned to the President.\nDespite intensive personal efforts on my part,\nthe 94th Congress adjourned without passing nuclear\nexport legislation which would have strengthened\nour effectiveness in dealing with other nations on\nnuclear matters. In the absence of such Name legislation,\nI am directing the Secretary of State to work closely\nwith the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure increase proper\nemphasis on non-proliferation concerns in the nuclear\nexport licensing process.\nI will continue to work with Congress to achieve\nimprovements in our nuclear export laws, with due\naccount for the need for broad-based multilateral\nsupport. I welcome in particular the constructive\nproposals made by Senator Pastore, Congressmen Anderson\nand Price, and their colleagues on the Joint Commission\nfor Atomic Energy. On the basis of their suggestions\nand my initiatives, I will work to develop bipartisan\nsupport for new legislation in this field during the\nnext session of Congress.\nImplications for Domestic Policy\nWe must not underestimating\nincreasetic make the mistake use of of\nserve\nthe current importance of nuclear energy to our own\nnational well-being. If there are scourity risks\nand this can be done safely\nGERALD FORD CLORARY\n25 -\nassociated with the use of nuclear energy Tunere there would\nbe risks almost as grave in abandoning this new energy\nsource.\nOur dependence on imported oil has risen 20 percent\nsince 1973, largely due to the failure of Congress to\nact on my Administration's energy program. The dangers\nin this situation are obvious.\nWe must conservation, and\ncontinuemplasing achieve ing more effective eneagh\ndigerously pursue development of solar energy and other\nnew non-nuclear energy sources. Under my Administration,\nconservation research has more than quadrupled. Solar\nfrom $ Bmillionto716 million\nenergy research has increased 700 percent, and research\non other non-nuclear resources has A correspondingly\nalso been substantially\nraised. £ I am now recommending that we de even more\nBut we must recognize that these new energy sources are\nin their infancy. No responsible scientific authority\nholds that they can significantly contribute to meeting\n2000\nour energy needs before 1990, at the very earliest.\nNuclear energy must fill much of the gap that\nLandcoal as wellos further levelopment\nremains.\nThe key question that remains 2n development\nweare now addressing\nour domestic nuclear energy program is whether we can\nsafely allow plutonium to be separated from used nuclear\nfuel on a commercially exploitable scale. The development\nin the U.S. regardless of whether plutonium @ eaple\nnuclear power can and must continued to expand\ndo approved now.\nERALD FORD LIBRAN\nInsert, page 25\nIn light of this, we cannot think of abandoning\nnuclear energy. We are relying on nuclear energy to\nhelp us meet our domestic energy needs at least through\nthe end of this century.\n- 26- -\nof nuclear energy is approaching a point at which\nthis question must be definitively answered. We\nmust no. the-answer to be reached by default.\nEqually important, we must, formulate a national\nnuclear policy\nfir thes which is exponsional responsive to nuclear our non- power\nproliferation concerns and is not driven by narrow\nperceptions of domestic needs. If we are to play\na leading role in influencing global plutonium\ndecisions, we must examine objectively the crucial\nand and seek to\nissues related to reprocessing and seek to resolved\nresolve the uncertainties associated with it.\nthe many certainties Only by so doing can we\nThis is\nkeep faith not just with future generations of\nconsistent\nAmerican, but with our friends and partners aborad without\nrequest\nwho will look to us to provide a credible justification other\nif asked to refrain from reprocessing 3\nI am any\ntherefore citiesting FRP authorizing A to develop experimental Herograming\nprogram to determine answers to the following questions\nof interest to the United States and all nations pursuing\nnuelear\naimsdatismoung Whether power/ programs. safe means of Alsmoining reprocessing uncertainties used nuclear\nfuel and\ndisposing desarding 00 the the remaining economics waste sofiety be and\nX\ndeveloped, refeguarding of upwerssing andocycle facilita\nwhether means can be developed to provide\nadequate safeguards against the use of plutonium to\nmanufacture nuclear weapons;\n:\nGERALD FORD Creater\n27\n-- whether technological alternatives to\nand to explore the feasibility R\ndest\nreprocessing can be found\nConsistent with asking other supplier and consumer\nnations to join us in avoiding export of reprocessing\ntechnology, we will explore means to include appropriate\nparticipation by other nations in this experimental\nprogram, in such a manner as to support our non-proliferation\nobjectives. To ensure that this program serves non-\nproliferation objectives, taking into account the\nnuclear programs and policies of other, I have directed\nthe Secretary of State and the Administrator of ERDA\nto consult with the IAEA and with interested states\nin before defining we finalize the scapeand the nature and of\nprecise scope nature of our\nexperimental effort.\nThe experimental program will fit into the frame-\nwork of our recently approved safeguard arrangement\nwith the IAEA, serving as a testing ground for the\ndevelopment and demonstration of techniques to provide\nsafeguards against diversion of pure plutonium for\nuse in nuclear weapons. In this connection, we will\nurge the IAEA to test and apply the most vigorous\npossible safeguards to the experimental program Secility itself\ns\nFinally, this experimental program will serve to\neffectively complement the ongoing Nuclear Regulatory\nCommission proceedings concerning the wide-scale use\nof mixed oxide fuel in nuclear reactors.\nGERALD LIBRAR FORD\neffect the M.H program 28 af\nIn light of the decisions I have made today, I am\nable to confirm my Administration's earlier assessment permit\nthat we can defer for ten years any decision toplace on\nto be stared in commercial\nbreeder reactors, which would require plutonium fuel,\nin commercial operation. We know from experience that\nthe lead time for the development of complex technologies\nin the nuclear field is prolonged. The experimental\nl\nprogram that I am authorizing will provide the\nmake\nknowledge of reprocessing that will be needed to go\na second decision to\nahead with the breeder if the responsible authorities\n6 proper Find in the of\nshould decide then years from now to do so\n10/77\nBudget\non the basis of the study of nuclear policy recently\nconducted my Adminis Trations have quadrupled the\nbudget for our program to dispose of nuclear waste.\nWe expect to demonstrate a complete depository for such\nwaste by 1985. I have recently directed, however,\na speed-up of the program to demonstrate the components\nof waste disposal technology by the end of 1978. I\nhave also directed that the first demonstration\ndepository be submitted for licensing by the Nuclear\nRegulatory Commission to assure its safety and\nacceptability to the public.\nAmy wastes shedaly to assore\nof thit sourd long term moved disposed\nPersonizing they cutiol importance\nDERALD R. FORD LIBRARA of\nthis to provide and in cxn my effectives FY 1977 program have\nInsert p28\nThe decision I have made today does not effect the U.S.\nprogram of research and development on the breeder reactor.\nThat program assumes that no decision on the commercial\noperations of breeder reactors, which require plutonium\nfuel, will be made before 1986.\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\n29\nConsistent with my decision that reprocessing is no\nlonger to be viewed as inevitable, I am directing today\nthat the waste disposal program include careful study\nof the feasibility of long-term storage of spent fuel\nthat has not been reprocessed.\nThe challenge of nuclear proliferation demands\ncandor. It can perhaps be managed -- but only\npartially and temporarily by technical measures. It\ncan only be solved, however, if all of us face the\nproblem realistically. These realities are fundamentally\npolitical, relating to the determination and foresight\nof leaders in resisting perceived short-term advantages\nin favor of fundamental long-term gains. We ask all\nleaders to urognize SCG that their individual and collective\ninterests are best served by internationally assured\nand safeguarded nuclear fuel supply, services and\nstorage. We ask them to turn aside from pursuing nuclear\ncapabilities which are of doubtful economic value and\nhave ominous implications for nuclear proliferation\nand instability in the world.\nThe record to date is not perfect. The broad\nconsensus against the acquisition of nuclear weapons\nis a source of encouragement, but it is certainly\nnot a basis for complacency.\nDERALO FORD LIBRAR\n- 30\nI do not underestimate the scope and complexity\nof the challenge and the program I have just put forward\nto meet it. Success depends on an extraordinary\ncoordination of the policies of all nations toward the\ncommon good. The US is prepared to lead, but we cannot\nsucceed alone. If nations can work together constructively\nand cooperatively to manage our common nuclear problems\nwe will enhance our collective security. And we will\nbe better able to concentrate our energies and our\nresources on the great tasks of construction rather than\nconsume them in increasingly destructive rivalry.\nTAB\nn\nMEMORANDUM\nACTION\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nSUBJECT:\nStatement on Nuclear Policy\nThe Question at Hand\nA draft statement has been prepared by State and Bob Fri for release that\nwould lay out your new policies and implementing actions, domestic and\ninternational, to control the risk of nuclear proliferation. Although not\nintended to do so, by giving heavy acknowledgement to the risks of\nproliferation, the statement may be construed by some as being \"anti\nnuclear\", and conceivably could affect the nuclear moratoria votes in\nseven states on November 2. On the other hand, the media and Governor\nCarter have been making an issue over the lack of public action on the\nAdministration's part in this area, and Carter might be expected again\nto play on this theme in Friday night's debate. Also, there have been\na series of leaks and follow up stories misrepresenting your new policy\nposition by implying that you intend a $1 billion bail-out of the consortium\nowning the incomplete reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina.\nYour decision is needed on whether or not to release the nuclear statement\nnow (before the third debate) or to wait and rewrite the statement.\nBackground\nAs you recall, Bob Fri's report to you on nuclear non-proliferation,\nreprocessing, and waste disposal was submitted in early September.\nBased on your decisions, the following actions were to be taken:\n-- a new statement on U.S. nuclear policy would be made by you,\n-- we will indicate our continuing support of nuclear power abroad, while\ntaking specific new actions to control the sensitive aspects of the\nnuclear fuel cycle in other countries,\nFORD & LIBRARY 938870\n2\nwe will reorient our own approach to reprocessing, mainly because\nof the international risk of proliferation connected with a business-\nas-usual attitude toward reprocessing and the diffusion of reprocessing\ntechnology,\nrerpocessing in the U.S. would only proceed if the economics warrant it\nand if the proliferation risks can be demonstrably controlled,\nthe government will assist in a domestic commercial scale reprocessing\ndemonstration -- possibly with foreign participation and under IAEA\nsafeguards to test the questions of economic viability and safe-\nguardability, and\nthe government will undertake the responsibility for long-term\nstorage of radioactive wastes, and will construct a demonstration\nfacility to demonstrate the waste disposal system.\nFollowing your decision, State contacted the foreign ministers of the other\nmajor nuclear suppliers (France, UK, FRG, Canada, Japan, and the USSR)\nto notify them of your basic decisions, to outline the several specific inter-\nnational actions that we would propose to achieve greater nuclear restraints\nand controls, and to solicit their comments and a general indication of support.\nAlthough guarded in their responses, these states will not object to our in-\nitiatives and can be expected to support many after there is a fuller under-\nstanding of our proposals. Where there were specific sensitivities, State\nhas worded the draft statement to avoid an adverse reaction abroad.\nDraft Statement on Nuclear Policy\nA draft statement has been prepared to enunciate your decisions and the\nimplementing actions (Tab A). It has been approved by State (Kissinger)\nand ERDA (Fri). Based on the perception that our major problem with\nnuclear power, at least at this time, is concern over the proliferation risks,\nthe statement deals primarily with your attack on that problem. Your\ndecision to support U.S. reprocessing, including the possibility of\ndemonstration, must be carefully handled because it can be perceived as\nin conflict with our international thrust against reprocessing and because\nof public speculation that it is a \"bail-out\" for Barnwell. Domestic re-\nprocessing activities are mainly explained in the statement as a response to\nthe proliferation concerns, and not as a step by the government to facilitate\nthe development of the domestic nuclear fuel cycle. The non-proliferation\nemphasis of the statement is also in recognition of the fact that the current\npolitical focus is on non-proliferation, as evidenced by Congress' pre-\noccupation with the subject during the latter part of the session.\n3\nBy emphasizing the non-proliferation risks, you may be perceived by the\nnuclear industry as undercutting nuclear power's future in the U.S.\nAlthough your statement is intended to support nuclear power, per se, and only\nexpress grave reservations about reprocessing, the atmospherics may seem\n\"anti nuclear\". Unfortunately, some ambivalence is inherent in trying to\ndeal in the same paper with the different problems we have domestically and\ninternationally.\nYour Options\n1. Go ahead now with the statement as is.\nPros\n-- This will get you on record with a series of firm steps addressing\nnon-proliferation.\nIt will make clear that you are not committed to any specific\nreprocessing demonstration and halt the extreme statements about\nyour planned bail-out of the AGNS plant owners.\n- Through leaks here and official approaches abroad, the stage is set\nfor your statement. To delay will possibly raise public questions\nabout your commitment, and be anticlimatic when released later.\nCons\n-- Although some rewording can improve the anti nuclear ring to the\nstatement, any statement giving credence to a palpable proliferation\nrisk will be misrepresented by some to show that the U.S. cannot\nsafely proceed with nuclear power.\nThe arms control community, which favors no reprocessing, will\ncriticize any forward movement on domestic reprocessing.\nThere will be some who interpret any implied commitment to\nproceed with reprocessing activities as a secret intention to bail-\nout AGNS plant.\n-- The proposals in the draft statement will not be easy for\nuntutored readers to distinguish from those put forward by\nCarter. This presents the opportunity for a charge of (a) me\ntooism or (b) flip-flopon your support of nuclear energy. These\ncharges might be made, however, if a statement is made anytime\nbefore the election.\n4\n2.\nRewrite statement so as to deal in the most balanced possible way with\nboth domestic and international concerns. Issue it after the debate,\nif possible.\nPros\n-- Mitigates somewhat the risk of having your position confused with that\nof Governor Carter.\n-- You have a good record which you can discuss in debate even\nwithout a statement.\n-- Another rewrite might permit bringing balance into the statement,\nalthough State believes we cannot go very far in that direction\nwithout undercutting the strength of the non-proliferation com-\nmitment.\nCons\n-- You will not be on record at the time of the debate.\n-- You may find it difficult to justify the delay in issuing a statement.\n-- There may not be time to deal with the statement next week,\nmeaning that a delay until after the election is a virtual certainty.\n3. Postpone issuing the statement, probably until after the election.\nPros\n-- This will allow more time to try balancing the statement with more\nfocus on the actions to support the domestic nuclear power,\nalthough major changes in that direction may run the risk of\nmaking the statement seem weaker as a non-proliferation\ncommitment.\n-- The nuclear non-proliferation issue may not arise again in the\ncampaign. If your statement were badly received (which we do not\nexpect), you would be bringing the issue back to life to your own\ndetriment.\n-- Postponement will avoid any possible negative impact the statement\nmight have on the nuclear moratoria votes in seven states on\nNovember 2.\n5\n-- You would avoid charges of me-tooism and possibly seeming to\nchange your position on the support of nuclear power.\nCons\n- If the non-proliferation issue fires up again in the debate or\nduring the campaign, you will be able to point only to past\ndiplomatic actions and to studies underway -- - not to a recently\nenunciated, comprehensive action plan.\nSince this statement has been so prominently foreshadowed in the\npress, further delay may be interpreted by some as a falling back\nin your commitment.\n- State believes this statement will have a very positive effect\nabroad and will allow us to initiate a new international regime\nfor controlling proliferation. They are therefore anxious to have\nthe statement issued.\n4.\nRewrite the statement to make the focus entirely on non-proliferation,\nand issue a second statement regarding domestic nuclear power problems.\nThis would exclude the purely domestic actions from the current\ndialogue, thereby be less likely to be seen as biasing our domestic\nnuclear program.\nPros\n- This would put the focus where the concerns that were most\nprominently discussed in Congress and the press lie. Hopefully\nit would avoid tarring the domestic program in the process.\nIt would permit subsequent analysis before the commitment to a\nU.S. supported reprocessing plant and waste disposal facility.\nWe could put the new policies regarding radioactive waste\ndisposal into a separate statement, but the domestic and\ninternational implications of the reprocessing decision\nare entwined. We could not address international reprocessing\nmeaningfully without stating at least the key parts of our position\non domestic reprocessing.\nIt would not counter media criticism that the U.S. plans to\n\"bail-out\" the AGNS plant.\n6\nYour Decision\n1. Release the nuclear statement now.\nAPPROVE\n2.\nAlternatively, hold it for further rework, but release it before the\nelection.\nAPPROVE\n3.\nAlternatively, hold it for further rework and release after the election.\nAPPROVE\n4.\nOr alternatively, turn it into a non-proliferation statement by\nremoving the separable parts dealing with our domestic nuclear\nprogram, and release before the debate.\nAPPROVE\nNUCLEAR POLICY\nthey Debicete\nA STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD\nToday the peoples of the world face a threat unlike\nother\nany A in history. It is the threat of nuclear weapons\nproliferation, the threat that nuclear explosives will\nonew\nnew regions of the world,\nspread -- to large nations, to small nations and even\nto terrorists. who have no nation at all It is a threat\nthat is the more formidable because it arises from the\npromise of nuclear power as a realistic alternative to\ncontinuing dependence on diminishing and uncertain\nsupplies of imported oil.\nIf we fail to comprehend and contain this threat,\nthe result, inevitably, will be tragedy. But we can ---\nand we will -- end this danger by understanding it\nclearly and acting wisely in concert with other responsible\nnations. 91 For a world in which the possession of nuclear\narms becomes increasingly widespread would be a world\nin which the security of all is imperiled. Maintaining\ninternational stability in such an environment would be\nincalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of\nregional or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation\nwould be immeasurably increased - not through direct\nattack, then through a process of ever expanding escalation\nNor can we ignore the perils of theft or seizure which\nFORD i LIBRARY OERALD\nNUCLEAR POLICY\nA STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD\nToday the peoples of the world face a threat unlike\nother\nany in history. It is the threat of nuclear weapons\nA\nproliferation, the threat that nuclear explosives will\nnew\nnew regions of the world,\nspread -- to large nations, to small nations ^ and even\nto terrorists. who have no nation at all It is a threat\nthat is the more formidable because it arises from the\npromise of nuclear power as a realistic alternative to\ncontinuing dependence on diminishing and uncertain\nsupplies of imported oil.\nIf we fail to comprehend and contain this threat,\nthe result, inevitably, will be tragedy. But we can ---\nand we will --- end this danger by understanding it\nclearly and acting wisely in concert with other responsible\nnations. 91 For a world in which the possession of nuclear\narms becomes increasingly widespread would be a world\nin which the security of all is imperiled. Maintaining\ninternational stability in such an environment would be\nincalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of\nregional or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation\nwould be immeasurably increased\nif not through direct\nattack, then through a process of ever expanding escalation\nNor can we ignore the perils of theft or seizure which\nFORD & LIBRARY 07VW30\n- 2 -\nincreased availability of nuclear weapons must entail.\nThe problem of nuclear proliferation has been a\nmajor concern of my Administration since I first took\noffice. Last summer I directed that our efforts be\nthorough\nbrought to their culmination by a complete review of\nThat study has been completed\nour nuclear policies. I received the results of this\nI\nreview before Labor Day and A have since deliberated\nwith great care on its recommendations.\nToday I am announcing an important new American policies\npolicy based on those recommendations. We have\napproached the major supplier countries to begin\ndiscussion of these policiés, and I am convinced that\nour new policy will benefit not only the national\ninterest of the United States, but also the welfare\nof all nations for generations to come.\nMy policy deals with the world as it is, not as\nwe might wish it; it is a policy that reconciles legitimate\nnational interests in nuclear power with non-\nproliferation imperatives. Indeed, developing the\npolicies and the programs to prevent proliferation\nwithout eliminating the enormous benefit of nuclear\nenergy is one of the major challenges facing all the\nnations of the world today.\nGERALD FORD CIBRAST\n- 3 --\n-- There are legitimate interests in nuclear\npower. The 1973 energy crisis dramatically demon-\nstrated to all nations not only the dangers of\nexcessive reliance on oil imports, but also the\nreality that their and the world's supply of fossil\nfuels inevitably is dwindling. As a result, nuclear\nenergy is now seen by many nations as an indispensable\nway to satisfy rising energy demands without prematurely\ndepleting finite fossil fuel resources. Nuclear energy\ncan lessen their deepening dependence on foreign energy\nsources, and diminish the world economy's vulnerability\nto fluctuations in the supply of oil. And for nations\nwith no fossil fuel reserves of their own, nuclear\npower can be central to their economic well being.\nsome\nWe must understand the motives which are leading these\neven\nstates to place greater emphasis than we do on nuclear\npower development. For unless we comprehend their real\nneeds we cannot expect to find ways of working with\nthem to ensure that their legitimate concerns and ours\nare both met.\n- Yet the peaceful application of nuclear energy\nconfronts us with a dilemma. Nuclear fuel, once it has\nbeen burned to produce power, contains plutonium, which\ncan be chemically separated from the spent fuel. That\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\n- 4 -\nplutonium can then be used to help generate additional\npower. Unfortunately -- and this is the root of the\nproblem --- plutonium is a key ingredient of nuclear\nexplosives. The world community simply cannot afford\nthe\nto let this dangerous material and its related\nG to produce it from reactor wasted\ntechnolos spread uncontrolled over the globe. We\nshould not permit it to be produced and utilized unless\nand until the most stringent conditions and arrangements\nfor avoiding proliferation are developed and observed. 2 Moreever\nadhered to.\n-- But no single nation, not even the United States,\ncan hope by itself to control effectively the spread of\nplutonium and reprocessing technology. The United States\nonce was the predominant supplier of worldwide nuclear\nmaterials and technology.\nenergy. While we remain a leader in this field, today\nother suppliers have come to share the international\nless than half of the\nmarket -- with the US now supplying about (no) of\nnuclear reator exports.\nthe international market. We cannot impose our preferences.\nTherefore it is essential that we exercise our leadership\nthrough catalyzing cooperative international action,\nnot through futile attempts to impose our preferences\non suppliers and consumers. We must avoid the temptation\nfor rhetorical gestures, empty threats or righteous\nposturing.\nFrom the outset of the nuclear age, the United\nStates has recognized the dangers of proliferation. And\ntechnology for producing muchan fuel - uranium anrichment -\nFORD\nCan be trurned to the production of highly enriched uranium\nwhich, like plestonnim, can les used to make mucher wrapons\n- 5 -\nwe have been a leader in efforts to bring them under\ncontrol. We took steps to share the benefits of the\npeaceful atom, while acting to control its spread for\nmilitary purposes when President Eisenhower proposed\nestablishment of the International Atomic Energy\nAgency. We took the leading role in negotiating the\nNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.\nThere To\nNon proliferation has been a top priority concern\nStat\n/\nSince\nof my Administration since I took office in 1974 6\nSince\nthen\nthen we have made considerable progress in reducing the\nof\npossibility that increasingly widespread possession of\nwhich could\natomic weapons would eventually spark the holocaust that\nall mankind fears.\nBut the urgency of our task has become even more\npressing. We and other nations now face critical\nnuclear policy decisions.\nIn forging my new nuclear policy initiatives, I\nhave proceeded in the conviction that\nrevisonmental\nsafety and avoidance of proliferation must take precedence\nover economic and commercial interests. Great though\nThough there may be\nto\nrepresencing\nthe a economic benefits of nuclear energy stay beig they\nmay\ncannot justify the dangers that would threaten a world\nis\nfaced with the uncontrolled availability of plutonium\nand other nuclear explosive capabilities.\nFORD & LIBRARY 07VU30\n- 6 -\nAs a result of my nuclear policy review, I have\ntherefore concluded that the reprocessing and recycling\nbelieve stimply\nthere is\nof plutonium onget should not proceed until we are confidence\nthat the world community can effectively overcome the\nassociated risks of proliferation. To implement Carding out my this\nfundamental Recision jerdsment requires vigorous action on both\nthe international and domestic fronts.\nThe review also confirmed the major role that nuclear\npower must play in mating ee both domestic and foreign energy\nneeds regardless of whether plutonium is to be separated\nand used as more fuel.\nInternationally, I have decided that the United States\nadditional\nwill undertake a.major acceleration of our efforts to\ncontrol the spread of plutonium and technologies for\nseparating plutonium and with to a view toward reducing that\ncommercial competition which can undermine our non-\nproliferation goals.\nIndeed, peaceful nuclear\ncooperation can only prosper within a credible international\nsystem which reduces nuclear risks for all nations and\nenables legitimate energy needs to be met. This effort\nrequires the cooperation and support of suppliers and\nconsumers alike. I am directing the Secretary of State\nto seek the support of other nations for strengthened\nGERALD FORD\nnon-proliferation approaches and for preventing controls\nfrom becoming elements of commercial competition. In\npursuing global approaches to non-proliferation, the\nUnited States recognizes the responsibility to cooperate\nwith other states in realizing the peaceful benefits\nof nuclear energy. And we will do so with all nations\nGERALD R. FORD\n- 7 -\nprepared to dedicate themselves to non-proliferation.\nDomestically, we must ensure that our programs\nand policies are compatible with our international\nposition on reprocessing. I have therefore determined\nthat the United States should no longer regard reprocessing\nof used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a justifiable\nas a\n^\nadditional step in the nuclear fuel cycle, unless and\npursued only if the\neconomic environmental and above all non-proliferation\nare\nuncertainties can be successfully resolved. [- the\nHarry, before decide whether to upply this\ntechnology for commercial purposes, vernust does convinced\nthat own.course is nationly technically sound but that\nit suppor Isvear vital non proliferation objectives\nACCORDINGLY,\na I am directing the Administrator of the Energy Research\ndevelop\nand Development Administration to\nour\nprograms to conform with this policy.\nWe are committed to construct a new era of global\nwe muclear accergy\ncooperation founded on strong US support. From this\nA\nbasis, I am authorizing proposing a nuclear policy to deal\na\nspecifically with the three major areas of concern:\ncoordinated international action; strengthened national\nexport policies; and effective domestic programs meeded to\ncomplament these.\nFirst, I am directing new and accelerated international\ninitiatives to:\nFORD & 03RALD LIBRARY\n- 8 -\n-- persuade other supplier nations to join us in\nexercising maximum restraint in the transfer of\nfacilities by avoidina\nreprocessing and enrichment technology and\nor deferring such sensitive exports for & period of at least three year\n-- persuade suppliers to offer, and consumers to\naccept, nuclear fuel services instead of sensitive\ntechnology, so that countries accepting responsible\nrestraints\nwill have an assured supply of nuclear fuel; and also R\n-- assume responsibility for accepting the spent\nfuel of consuming nations, as appropriate, in return\nfor financial reimbursement or fresh reactor fuel of\nequivalent energy value;\nsuess and\nexplore arrangements for coordinating the\nresources of suppliers so. that they can offer assured\nand economical fuel services without commercial\nthe\nadvantage or disadvantage;\nX\n-- urge a major commitment of financial and scientific\nresources to strengthen the safeguards capabilities of\nthe International Atomic Energy Agency and to vigorously\npursue cooperative international efforts to upgrade\nphysical security standards; and\n-- set a firm policy of international penalties\nfor safeguards violations.\nSecond, in recognition of the continuing need to\nexercise leadership in our own national export policies,\nLIBRERY GERALD R. FORD\n- 9 -\nI am directing that the United States take into account\nthe following - criteria in conjunction with peaceful\nnuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states:\n-- whether recipients are parties to the Non-\nProliferation Treaty or are prepared to accept IAEA\nsafeguards on all nuclear facilities;\n-- whether they are prepared to forego or postpone\nnational reprocessing and sensitive enrichment activities;\nand\n-- whether recipients are willing to participate\nin an international spent fuel and plutonium storage\nregime.\nThird, to support our overriding non-proliferation\nobjectives and in consultation with other interested\nI have duristed then administrator of ERDA to\ndauclob Williaming expended knowness for mm that\nstates,\nwould:\ninvestigate the accurances, salaqueds, ands\nthe safety\nof commercial reprocessing and-waste disposal lepository\n- - provide asafe, long - term waste dispondy ley 1985;\n--- to develop and test new safeguards approaches;\nand\n-- 4 pursue technology alternatives to reprocessing.\nThese are the foundations of our new approach, and\nthe three areas which our policy will address. Let me\nnow turn in more detail to these three central areas of\nconcern.\nFORD & LIBRARY BERALD\n- 10 -\nInternational Initiatives\n(^i)\n($)\nA successful policy of]reducing the worldwide\nrisks associated with plutonium will require the\nsupport and cooperation of both supplier and consumer\ncountries. To secure such support and cooperation, (\ncome\nonly is\n012 confident that\nwe must demonstrate to other nations that concurrence\nrespect\nwith\nthe in tiatives I am launching today will not\nand\nharm their legitimate economic interests while\ne\nenhancing the future safety of all nations and [a11]\nI cun service\npeoples.\nWe will work at solving economic problems\nthose\nwith all nations that join us in giving precedence\nto non-proliferation and environmental goals not X will stand\nready to corport\nk]\n7\nunilateral decision by the United States to\nwith them\ndefer commit tment to reprocessing would serve no\n5 JING\nproblems which\nuseful purpose if other nuclear supplier nations\narise from\neffort\nplunged ahead with the export of reprocessing technology.\nMy second major decision today -- to undertake a major\ndiplomatic effort to reduce the worldwide risks of\naccess to plutonium and sensitive technology\n-- therefore flows directly from the first.\nn\nLIBRARY GERALD FORD\n- 11 --\nDuring the past two years, I have vigorously\npursucdnon-proliferation through multilateral cooperation\nwith other nations. Because of the growth of nuclear\nIN a world of\ncapabilities among several potential supplier nations,\nI have rejected highly publicized or unilateral\nwould be futile they could do well\napproaches which not only would be futile, but also\ncould easily alienate both supplier and consumer nations\nwhose cooperation is essential to the success of our\nnon-proliferation efforts. I therefre have rejected such approaches\nMy most immediate concern has been to improve\ninternational safeguards and controls. of In 1974, soon\ncooperation to strention\nafter I assumed office, we proposed strengthening and\nstandardizing non-proliferation measures at the United\nNations General Assembly\nthat\nIn the fall of 1974, I became concerned that some\nwere\nnuclear supplier countries appeared to be prepared to\noffer nuclear exports under conditions less rigorous\nthan we believed prudent in order to achieve\nexpresed\n9\ncompetitive advantage. I communicated these concerns\ndirectly to my counterparts in key supplier and\nrecipient nations. I directed the Secretary of State\nto explore ways of emphasizing multilateral action\nGERALD FORD\n- 12 -\nto limit this dangerous form of competition.\nAt our initiative, the first meeting of major\nnuclear suppliers was convened in London in April,\nand 3 Jeris B\n1975. Additional meetings and intensive bilateral\nconsultations followed.\nsumperity natiod\nAs a result of these meetings, we have developed\ninternational\nstandard\nmog essive\ntight new guidelines to govern nuclear exports\nThrough\nThese involving both improved safeguards and controls to\nwhich are\nprevent diversion, and physical protection against now being\ntheft and sabotage.\nThis achievement has significantly afflied.\nraised international norms.\nThe United States has\nadopted these guidelines as policy for nuclear exports.\nIn addition, we have acted to deal with the\nspecial dangers associated with plutonium. Even prior\nto today's decisions, the United States took the\nfollowing steps:\n-- We have prohibited export of reprocessing and\nother nuclear technologies that could contribute to\nproliferation.\n--- We have firmly opposed reprocessing in Korea\nand Taiwan. We welcome their significant decisions of those nations\nto forego such activities: and we will continue (our\nefforts to discourage national reprocessing in other locations\nareas of concern.\nparticular\nLIBRARY GERALD R. FORD\n- 12 -\n--\nWe\nhave negotiated agreements for cooperation\nwith Egypt and Israel which contain the strictest\nreprocessing provisions and other nuclear controls\never included in the twenty-year history of our\nnuclear cooperation program.\nAndthere have been\nOther important gains in the effort against\nproliferation have been made during the two years of\nmy Administcation. Last year, the Federal Republic of\nGermany, Italy, and other European states completed\nfond\nratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.\nThis\nyear, Japan also ratified the Treaty -- a significant\nstep after many years of serious debate. within Japan.\nThe United States\nIn addition, last month, at my direction,\nWe\nto piace is\nproposed to the International Atomic Energy Agency\nan agreement placing US civil nuclear facilities under\nthe IAEA has approved a proposed agreement for the purper\nthe safeguards of the IAEA This has now been approved\nby that Agency.\nPut Despite the gains, that have been made\nthe dangers\nThe prospect of\nstockpiles\nposed by reprocessing and uncontrolled plutonium demand\nfurther, decisive international action. There is, in\naddition, the parallel risk of spreading uranium\nThis too must be\nenrichment technology, which must continue to be\neffectively controlled, and in today included in the concepts proposed\nam\nis\na\nTo meet these dangers I propose the following\ncomprehensive international program. which flows directly\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n- 14 -\nfrom the fundamental policy decisions I have announced\ntoday:\nI call upon all nations to join with us in\nexercising maximum restraint in the transfer of\nreprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities\nby avoiding or deferring such sensitive exports for a\nperiod of at least three years. This will allow\nwork together to a astablish\nsuppliers and consumers to find click\nreliable incaus for\nmeeting nuclear needs with minimumi risk, as we assess\ncarefully the wisdom of plutonium use. As we proceed\nin these efforts, we must not be influenced by\npressures to approve the export of these sensitive\nfacilities.\nIn addition,\nI urge nuclear suppliers to provide\nnuclear: consumers with nuclear fuel services in place\nof sensitive nuclear technology. Nations accepting\neffective non-proliferation restraints have a right\nto expect reliable and economic supply of nuclear\nreactors and associated, non-sensitive fuel\nAll such nations should share in the benefits of\nan assured supply of nuclear fuel,\neven though the\nnumber and location of sensitive facilities to\nmustle\ngenerate this fuel is limited to meet non-proliferation\ngoals. The availability of diverse fuel cycle services\nFORD i 938870 LIBRARY\n- 15 -\nin several different nations can provide ample\nassurance to consumers of a continuing and stable\nsource of supply.\nIt is also desirable to continue studying the\nidea of a few suitably-sited multinational fuel cycle\ncenters to serve regional needs, when\neffectively\nmay also save\nsafeguarded and economically warranted\nThrough\nthese and related means, we can minimize incentives\nfor the spread of dangerous fuel cycle capabilities. We must\ncontinue to study this possibility\nThe United States will do its part to ensure\nthat any country accepting responsible restraints\non its nuclear power program with regard to enrichment,\nreprocessing and plutonium disposition will have an\nassured supply of nuclear fuel. To this end, I have\ndirected the Secretary of State\nwith regard to current\nUS recipients, and in new agreements for cooperation,\nto offer binding letters of intent for the supply of\ncurrent 0.2. well as pies pertive recepients\nnuclear fuel to countires willing to accept such\nresponsible restraints. These would be fulfilled Suchsupply\nreg wel be met\neither by new government capacity or by private\nsuppliers, at-our-discretion HS may b. termined\nThe United States is now\nprepared tc enter into negotiations or arrangements\nHut adopt responsible\nwith consumer nations, adapting restraints under which\nwe would maturity agree on the\nof\nthey would-aceord accord 1:3 rights of disposition (over) their\nspent fuel where appropriate and where it can demonstrably\nfoster our non-proliferation objectives. In return,\nGERALD ₹\n- 16 -\nthese nations would be assured\nof\neither reimbursement or fresh, lcw-enriched fuel\nto\nprimary\nof equivalent energy value. In any such arrangement, [our\nobjective will be to ensure against any economic\ndisadvantage to the cooperating nation.\nIn pursuing a program of assured fuel supply\nand fuel exchange, the United States seeks no commercial\nadvantage\nover other suppliers\nThe program can and\nwill be adm: nistered in a way which avoids unfair\nadvantage in the sale of reactors or related services.\nAt my direction, the Secretary of State will initiate\nconsultations; to explore arrangements for coordinating\n+2\nsuch resources and developing other means of ensurang)\nthat suppliers will be able to offer, and consumers CIN\nwill be able to receive an interrupted and economical\nsupply of non-sensitive nuclear fuel and fuel services.\nbe reintered by\nTo reinforce these policies, we must develop means\nrestrints\nof\nto establish\ninternational control over the plutonium\nitself,\nwhether in separated form or\nin]\nunprocessed\nspent fuel. The accumulation of plutonium under national\nF\ncontrol is a major destabilizing influence and, as such,\na primary proliferation risk. Than,\nThe United States will, in the immediate future,\npursue discussions aimed at the establishment of a new\ninternational regime to provide for storage of excess\ncivil plutonium and spent reactor fuel. I am directing\nFORD i GERALD LIBRARY\n- 17 -\nthat we viçorously pursue this proposal which we made\nto the International Atomic Energy Agency and other\ninterested nations last spring. be vigatorsly purened.\nCreation of such a regime will greatly strengthen\nworld confidence that the growing accumulation of excess\nplutonium and spent fuel can be stored safely, pending\nreentry into the nuclear fuel cycle or other safe dis-\nposition. I urge the IAEA, which is empowered to\nurient consideration to two,\nestablish such a depository, to give prompt implementation\nto this concept.\nOnce a broadly representative IAEA storage regime\nthe llinted States will\nis in operation, (we are prepared to place our own excess\ncivil plutonium and spent fuel under its control.\nMoreover, we are prepared to consider providing a site\nfor international storage under IAEA auspices.\nThe inspection system of the IAEA remains a key\nelement in our [entire] non-proliferation strategy. The\nworld community must make sure that the Agency has the\ntechnical and human resources needed to keep pace with\nits expanding responsibilities.\nI therefore have directed a major commitment of\nfor this purpose,\nadditional resources to the IAEA, and also\nAmerica.\na mobilization of our best scientific talent to support\nthe Agency. Two of our principal national laboratories\nI have instructed\nthe leartony of state to institute discussions with the\nUSA with a view to supending their safaguards\ncapabilities. is am prepared to make\nRALD V8/017 FORD\n- 18 -\nhave been directed to provide assistance, on a continuing\nbasis, to the IAEA Secretariat.\nThe terrible increase in violence and terrorism\nthroughout the world has sharpened our awareness of the\nneed to assure rigorous protection for sensitive nuclear\nmaterials and equipment. Fortunately, the need to cope\nwith this problem is now broadly recognized. Many\nnations have responded to the initiatives which I have\ntaken in this area by materially strengtening their\nphysical security and by cooperating in the development\ntrensancitive suchear materials\nof international guidelines by the IAEA. As a result.\nof consultations among the major suppliers, provision\nfor adequate physical security is becoming a normal\ncondition of supply.\nSteps are still urgently needed, however, to up-\ngrade physical security systems to meet international\nnorms, and to assure timely international collaboration b\nas a result,\nas\na\nin the recovery of lost or stolen materials. On the\nbasis of my review of nuclear policies,\nI have directed\nwill\nthat the United States vigorously address the problem\nof physical security at both bilateral and multilateral\nlevels, including exploration of a possible international\nconvention.\nGERALD FORD LIBRABA\n- 19 --\n+\nto\nmake\nthis\nsystem\nThe United States is prepared 1.0 embark with all\nits resources on development of the system of inter-\nwalk,\nBut\nnational controls that I have here outlined\nEven\nwhen complete, however, no system of controls is can\nFully\nlikely to be effective, if a potential violator judges\nthat his acquisition of a nuclear explosive will be.\nreceived with indifference by the irternational\ncommunity.\nThus\nAny material violation of a nuclear safeguards\nagreement --- especially the diversion of nuclear\nmaterial for use in making explosives --- must be\nuniversally judged to be an extremely serious affront\nto the world community, calling for the immediate\nimposition of drastic sanctions. I serve notice\ntoday that the United States will respond to violation\nby any nation of any safeguards agreement to which we\nare a party with, at a minimum immediate cut off of\nany in that violate\nour supply of nuclear fuel and cooperation to that\n3\nasaferciand,\nAnd\nlimover,\nnation\nWe would consider further steps, not necessarily to which\nvx are\nconfined to the area of nuclear cooperation, against\na\nparty\nthe violator nation. Nor will our actions be limited\nto violations of agreements in which we are directly\ninvolved. In the event of material violation of any\nsafeguards agreement, particularly agreements with the\nFORD is 038870 LIBRARY\n- 20 -\nIAEA, we will initiate immediate consultations with\nall interested nations arived appropriate and convincing\nwiter action.\nUniversal recognition of the total unacceptability\nof the abrogation or violation of any non-proliferation\nagreements .s one of the most important steps which\ncan be taken to prevent further proliferation. We callupon\ninvite all concerned governments to affirm publicly\nthat they w:.11 regard nuclear wrongdoing as an intoler-\nable violation of acceptable norms of international\naudone\nbehavior, which would set in motion strong and immediate\ncounter-measures.\nFinally, the U.S. will continue to expand cooperative\nefforts with other countries in developing their indigenous\nenergy resources.\nend, the United States is placing increased amphasis\non the development of nower.\nThe us in is would rose,\nWe have proposed the establishment of an International\nEnergy Institute, specifically designed to help develop-\ning countries match the most economic and readily avail-\nable sources of energy to their power needs. In many\ncases, this source will be non-nuclear. Through this\nInstitute and other appropriate means, we will offer\ntechnological assistance in the development of\nindigenous energy resources. at an atternative\npower\nFORD i 07V830 LIBRARY\n- 21 -\nNational Export Policy\ncop\nDuring the past two years, the United States\nhas strengthened its own national nuclear export\npolicies. Our interests, however, are not limited\n9\nto controls alone.\nThe United States has a special\nresponsibility as one of our obligations under the\nNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\ntc share the\nbenefits of peaceful nuclear energy with non-nuclear\ncountries.\nWe have sought to serve other nations as\na reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment.\nGiven the choice between commercial benefits and\nprogress toward our non-proliferation goals, we have\ngiven, and will continue to give, priority to non-\nproliferation. But there should be no incompatibility\nassisting this notions in\nbetween non-proliferation and a vigerous export trade\nenjoying the haspital plactful number perver,\nif all supplier countries pursue common nuclear export\npolicy.\nThere is need, however for even more rigorous\nBut we one aware, U well, of The need\ncontrols, and for policies that favor nations accepting\nresponsible non-proliferation limitations.\nThe United\nStates will move in this direction.\nThus,\nOn the basis of my recently completed study of\nto inted States\nnuclear policies\nI have decided that we will henceforth\napply new criteria in judging whether to enter into new\nor expanded nuclear cooperation with a non-nuclear\nweapon state.\nFORD & LIBRARY ORRALD\n22 I I\nThese new criteria are:\n-- Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will\nbe\na\nstrong lyand positive factor favoring cooperation.\n-- Nations that have not yet adhered to the Non-\nProliferation Treaty will receive positive recognition\nif they are prepared to submit to full fuel cycle\nsafeguards pending adherence.\nwhich undertake to\nRecipient nations prepared to forego, or post-\nWe will\npone / for a substantial period, the establishment of\nnational reprocessing or enrichment activities or\nFish\ncertain cases, prepared to shape and schedule their\nreprocessing and enriching facilities to foster non-\nproliferation needs will be favored.\nPositive recognition will also be given to\nWe\nwill\nPaver\nnations prepared to lparticipate in an international\nwhich\nwake to take\nstorage regime, under which excess fuel and any\nseparated plutonium would be placed pending use.\nOn\nsome\nExceptional cases may occur in which non-proliferation NN\nwill\nbest be served by cooperating with states not yet\nmeeting these tests. However, I have decided to go\nbeyond the requirement in present law which requires\nPresidential approval of all new agreements for nuclear\ncooperation with other nations. Henceforth, negotiation\nof any new agreement with a nation which does not now\nFORD s LIBRARY 07VU38\n- 23 -\nmeet these strict standards will not even be initiated\nwithout my personal approval in advance.\nThe above criteria would provide the norm in\nnegotiating all new or amended Agreements for Cooperation\nI have also directed the Secretary cf State to open\ndiscussions with the other nuclear suppliers to shape\ncommon guidelines so that they conform with these cutena\nprinciples\nWith respect to countries that are current\nrecipients of US nüclear supply I am directing the\nained at\nSecretary of State to enter into negotiations with the\nobjective of conforming these agreements to agreed\ninternational guidelines, and to seek through diplematic\ninitiatives to obtain their acceptance of These our new\ncriteria.\nThe reliability of American assurances to other\nnations is an asset that few, if any, nations of the\nwill\nworld can match. It must not be eroded in the nuclear\nI\nor any other, area. Indeed, nothing could more\nprejudice ourlefforts to strengthen our existing non-\nnon- proliferation understandings than arbitrary suspension\nor unwarranted delays in meeting supply commitments to\ncountries which are dealing with us in good faith and employing\nregarding\neffective safeguards and restraints. There we question\nthat cannot\nimportance of this principle requires that\nfinal\nsubject to\nauthority over the licensing of nuclear exports be\nto processing\ndobbyny between\nSpecial intere\nFORD & LIBRARY 07V930\nCL causes\n- 24 -\nmust be\nreturned to the President.\nDespite intensive personal efforts on my part,\nresponsible\nthe 94th Congress adjourned without passing nuclear\nexport legislation which would have strengthened\nour effectiveness in dealing with other nations on\nMissin\nnuclear matters. In the absence of such A legislation,\nI am directing the Secretary of State to work closely\nwith the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure increase proper\nemphasis on non-proliferation concerns in the nuclear\nexport licensing process.\nI will continue to work with Congress to achieve\nimprovements in our nuclear export laws, with due\naccount for the need for broad-based multilateral\nsupport. I welcome in particula the constructive\npreposals made by Senator Partore, Congressment Anderson\nand Price, and their colleagues on the Joint Commission\nfo Atomic Energy On the basis of their suggestions\nand my initiatives, I will work to develop bipartisan\nsupport for new legislation in this field during the\nnext session of Congress.\nImplications for Domestic Policy\ncaps\nWe must net make the whe of underestimating\nthe ourrent importanoe [es] of I energy to our\nGERALD LISBURY ? FORD\nStional well being. If there [ ecurity]\nWe must vicrease the use of muclear Fower to\nserve our our material such havig, and this\nCan lee done safely.\n- 25 -\nassociated with the use of nuclear unergy, there would\nbe risks almost as grave in abandon. mg this new energy\nsource!\nOur dependence on imported oil has risen 20 percent\nsince 1973, largely due to the failure of Congress to\nact on my Administration's energy program. The dangers\nin this situation are obvious.\ncontinue emphasizes every\nwe must\nWe must achieve more offective conservation; and/\nvigorously pursue development of solar energy and other\nnew non-nuclear energy sources. Under my Administration,\nconservation research has more than quadrupled. Solar\nfrom 415 million to & 116million,\nenergy research has increased 700 percent A and research\nalso\non other non-nuclear resources has been correopendingly.\nsubstantrially\nraised. I-em now -seecumending that We as even-mene.\nBut we must recognize that these new energy sources are\nin their infancy. No responsible scientific authority\nof\nholds that they can significantly contribute to meeting\n2000,\nour energy needs before 1000; at the very earliest.\nges\nThus,\nto\nNuclear energy must fill much of the gap that\nt and coal, as well as further\nremains.\nor\nThe key question that remains in development of\nThe has amountion LASS are new addissing,\nour dome the miclear energy program CIS whether we can\nsafely allow plutonium to be separated from used nuclear\nfuel on a commercially exploitable scale. The development\nmwentheless, nuclear power canany must continue to expand in theM.\nregardlessof whether platonium recycle is approved now.\nBERMLO FORD LIBRARY\n- 26 -\nof nuelear energy is approaching a point at which\nthis question must be definitively answered? ive\nmust not allow the answer to he reached by default.\nEqually important, we must formulate a national\nnuclear policy responsive our\nthis which is expansion nuclear to (hon- sower\nproliferation concerns and is not dr driven by narrow\nperceptions OI domestic needs. If we are to play\na leading role in influencing global plutonium\ndecisions, we must examine objectively the crucial\nissues related to reprocessing and seek to resolve\nthe many uncertainties)/ (Sirly by 63 loing can we\nkeep faith not just with future generations of\nAmerican, but with our Triends and partners abored\nwho [wi] look to to WE revide credible justification jus\nThis consistent without request toothers\n111 \"Coketr to refrain from reprocessing,\nreliecting the administrator of ERDA\nI am therefore antherizing\nprograms;\nprogram to anowers to the following questions\nof interest to the United States and all nations pursuing\nnuclear power programs\nis\nWhether safe means of reprecessing used nuclear\nTuel and disposing of the remaining waste can be\ndeveloped;\nwhether means can be developed to provide\nadequate safeguards against the use of plut anima to\nmanufacture nuslear\n- - to investigate weapons; and remove remaining uncertisities regarding\nFORD if LIBRARY GERALD\nthe economics salute and suffecuarding of aprolessing\n-\n- to and provide recycle from pacilities the demonstrated technologies nowavalable\na full scale by 1985\n27\nand technological alternatives to\nreprocessing can be found.\nConsistent with asking other supplier and consumer\nnations to join us in avoiding export: of reprocessing\ntechnology, we will explore means to include appropriate\nparticipation by other nations in this experimental\ntrained\nprogram, in such a manner as to support our non-proliferation\nobjectives.\nTo ensure that this program serves non-\nproliferation objectives, taking into account the\nnuclear programs and policies of other I have directed\nthe Secretary of State and the Administrator of ERDA\nto consult with the IAEA and with interested states 5.2\nindefening the\nbefore we finalize the L scope and nature of our\nexperimental effort.\ncontribute to\nThe experimental program will fit into the frame-\nwork of our recently approved safeguard arrangement\nwith the IAEA, serving as a testing ground for the\ndevelopment and demonstration of techniques to provide\n0\nsafeguards against diversion of pure plutonium for\n,\nuse in nuclear weapons. In this connection we will\nurge the IAEA to test and apply the most vigorous\npossible safeguards to the experimental Lucility program itself\nFinally, this experimental program will serve to\neffectively complement the ongoing Nuclear Regulatory\nCommission proceedings concerning the wide-scale use\nof mixed oxide fuel in nuclear reactors.\nFORD is LIBRARY 018870\n- 28 -\nneed\n1\nThe decision I have made today does not effect the U.S.\nprogram of research and development on the breeder reactor.\nThat program assumes that no decision on the commercial\noperations of breeder reactors, which require plutonium\nfuel, will be made before 1986.\nthe lead time for the development of complex technologies\n[in In the nuclwar field is prolonged The experimental\nERDA develop\nprogram tha: I am- will provide the\nsmoke\nknowledge of reprocessing that will be needed to go-\na second decision\nvactoss Thead with the brooder, if the weepons the authorities ties\nand proper time in 11. future.\nshould decisio from moreto 004\nOrr the basis of the study of nuclear policy recently\nconducted by my Administration I have quadrupled the\nbudget for our program to dispose of nuclear waste.\nWe expect to demonstrate a complete depository for such\nwaste by 1985. I have recently directed, however,\na speed-up of the program to demonstrate the components\nof waste disposal technology by the end of 1978. .I\nhave also directed that the first demonstration\ndepository be submitted for licensing by the Nuclear\nRegulatory Commission to assure its safety and\nacceptability to the public.\nRecognizing the critical importance of environmentally round\nadministration has already moved to provide con effective\nsound long term disposal of radioactive wastes my\nprogram to assurethis and my FY 1977 Budger\nGERALD FORD LIBRIBI\n- 29 -\nConsistent with my decision tha+ reprocessing is no\nlonger to be viewed as inevitable, I am directing today\nthat the waste disposal program include careful study\nof the feasibility of long-term storage of spent fuel\nthat has not been reprocessed.\nThe challenge of nuclear proliferation demands\ncandor. It can perhaps be managed -- but only\npartially and temporarily by technical measures. It\ncan only be solved, however, if all of us face the\nAnd\nproblem realistically. These realities are fundamentally\nThey\nrequire\npolitical; relating to the determination and foresight\nof leaders in resisting perceived short-term advantages\ncallupon\nyou\nin favor of fundamental long-term gains. We ask all\nuccopned\nleaders to see that their individual and collective\ninterests are best served by internationally assured\nand safeguarded nuclear fuel supply, services and\nstorage. We ask them to turn aside from pursuing nuclear\ncapabilities which are of doubtful economic value and\nhave ominous implications for nuclear proliferation\nand instability in the world.\nS\nThe record to date is not perfect. The broad\nconsensus against the acquisition of nuclear weapons\nis a source of encouragement, but it is certainly\nnot a basis for complacency.\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n- 30 -\nI do not underestimate the scope and complexity\nof the challenge and the program I have just put forward\nto meet it. Success depends on an e> traordinary\ncoordination of the policies of all rations toward the\ncommon good. The US is prepared to lead, but we cannot\nsucceed alone. If nations can work :ogether constructively\nand cooperatively to manage our common nuclear problems\nwe will enhance our collective security. And we will\nbe better able to concentrate our energies and our\nresources on the great tasks of construction rather than\ndauserons\nconsume them in increasingly destructive rivalry.\nFORD is LIBRARY 978829"
}