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The original documents are located in Box 24, folder "Nuclear Policy Statement (11)" of the
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Digitized from Box 24 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
file
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 22, 1976
MEMORANDUM TO:
DICK CHENEY
FROM:
JIM CANNON Jun
Jim Mitchell for Jim Lynn -- comments on the Nuclear
Policy Report:
1.
It has to go out before the election.
2. Today would look like the last minute.
3.
As to why it is not out already -- need
for State Department consultations with
other countries. This matter is too
important to be pushed by a political
campaign here.
4.
Practical reason not to do it today --
the President is not sufficiently briefed
on his own report.
FORD LIBRARY is 9ERALD
Cannon FYI
THE WHITE HOUSE
SEND TO DICK CHENEY
WASHINGTON
ON AIR FORCE ONE Tortland
October 25, 1976
976 OCT 26 AM 11 06
MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM:
JIM CAVANAUGH
SUBJECT:
Release of Statement on Nuclear Policy
Jim Reichley is working with the technical people on
editing the statement on nuclear policy. He is not
making any substantive changes just making sure
that the report is readable.
We also have a fact sheet that should be ready later
tonight.
I will get to you tomorrow the final copies of the
nuclear policy statement (30-plus pages) as well as
the detailed fact sheet.
Our plan is to release them on Wednesday here and
in Chicago simultaneously. I will work out the time
with you, Nessen and the press people here. Scowcroft
needs a 12-hour advance for the notifications they have
to make internationally.
Our plan is to have Chuck Robson and Bob Fri brief
at the State Department on the technical aspects of
the statement when it is released.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
1026
file
was deped
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 25, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Nuclear JIM CANNON Policy Jm.
Statement
Attached is your statement on Nuclear Policy which has
now been reviewed by NSC, OMB, State, ERDA and other
related departments and agencies.
Brent Scowcroft, OMB, (Jim Mitchell) and I recommend
you approve the release of this policy statement on
Wednesday, October 27, 1976.
Approve
Disapprove
attachment
FORD & LIBRARY 0ERALD
NNCITY
PRECEDENCE
CLASSIFICATION
DEX
FROM: JIM CANNON
DAC
012
GPS
LDX
TO CHENEY
PAGES 23
R. NESSEN
TTY
CITE
(CHICAGO)
INFO:
DTG: 2621157
RELEASED BY: to
TOR: 2622342
SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS: DEliVER IMMEDIATELY upon
PARTY'S ARRIVAL)
-3
FORD & LIBRARY
WHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON NUCLEAR POLICY
We have known since the age of nuclear energy began
more than 30 years ago that this source of energy had the
potential for tremendous benefits for mankind and the potential
for unparalleled destruction.
On the one hand, there is no doubt that nuclear energy
represents one of the best hopes for satisfying the rising
world demand for energy with minimum environmental impact and
with the potential for reducing dependence on uncertain and
diminishing world supplies of oil.
On the other hand, nuclear fuel, as it produces power
also produces plutonium, which can be chemically separated from
the spent fuel. The plutonium can be recycled and used to
generate additional nuclear power, thereby partially offsetting
the need for additional energy resources. Unfortunately -- and
this is the root of the problem -- the same plutonium produced
in nuclear power plants can, when chemically separated, also be
used to make nuclear explosives.
The world community cannot afford to let potential nuclear
weapons material or the technology to produce it proliferate
uncontrolled over the globe. The world community must ensure
that production and utilization of such material by any nation
is carried out under the most stringent security conditions
and arrangements.
Developing the enormous benefits of nuclear energy while
simultaneously developing the means to prevent proliferation
is one of the major challenges facing all nations of the world
today.
The standards we apply in judging most domestic and
international activities are not sufficiently rigorous to deal
with this extraordinarily complex problem. Our answers
FORD, & LIBRARY
2
cannot be partially successful. They will either work,
in which case we shall stop proliferation; or they will
fail and nuclear proliferation will accelerate as
nations initially having no intention of acquiring nuclear
weapons conclude that they are forced to do so by the actions
of others. Should this happen, we would face a world in which
the security of all is critically imperiled. Maintaining
international stability in such an environment would be
incalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of regional
or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation would be
immeasurably increased -- if not through direct attack, then
through a process of ever expanding escalation.
The problem can be handled as long as we understand it
clearly and act wisely in concert with other nations. But we
are faced with a threat of tragedy if we fail to comprehend
it or to take effective measures.
Thus, the seriousness and complexity of the problem place
a special burden on those who propose ways to control prolifera-
tion. They must avoid the temptation for rhetorical gestures,
empty threats, or righteous posturing. They must offer policies
and programs which deal with the world as it is, not as we might
wish it to be. The goal is to prevent proliferation, not simply
to deplore it.
The first task in dealing with the problem of proliferation
is to understand the world nuclear situation.
More than 30 nations have or plan to build nuclear power
plants to reap the benefits of nuclear energy. The 1973
energy crisis dramatically demonstrated to all nations not
only the dangers of excessive reliance on oil imports, but
also the reality that the world's supply of fossil fuels is
running out. As a result, nuclear energy is now properly
seen by many nations as an indispensable way to satisfy rising
energy demand without prematurely depleting finite fossil fuel
resources. We must understand the motives which are leading
3
these nations, developed and developing, to place even greater
emphasis than we do on nuclear power development. For unless
we comprehend their real needs, we cannot expect to find ways
of working with them to ensure satisfaction of both our and
their legitimate concerns.
Moreover, several nations besides the United States have
the technology needed to produce both the benefits and the
destructive potential of nuclear energy. Nations with such
capabilities are able to export their technology and facilities.
Thus, no single nation, not even the United States, can
realistically hope -- by itself -- to control effectively the
spread of reprocessing technology and the resulting avail-
ability of plutonium.
The United States once was the dominant world supplier
of nuclear material equipment and technology. While we remain
a leader in this field, other suppliers have come to share the
international market -- with the U.S. now supplying less than
half of nuclear reactor exports.
In short, for nearly a decade the U.S. has not had a
monopoly on nuclear technology. Although our role is large,
we are not able to control worldwide nuclear development.
For these reasons, action to control proliferation must
be an international cooperative effort involving many nations,
including both nuclear suppliers and customers. Common standards
must be developed and accepted by all parties. If this is not
done, unrestrained trade in sensitive nuclear technology and
materials will develop -- with no one in a position to stop it.
We in the United States must recognize that interests in
nuclear energy vary widely among nations. We must recognize
that some nations look to nuclear energy because they have no
acceptable energy alternative. We must be sure that our efforts
to control proliferation are not viewed by such nations as an
act to prevent them from enjoying the benefits of nuclear
4
energy. We must be sure that all nations recognize that the
U.S. believes that non-proliferation objectives must take
precedence over economic and energy benefits if a choice must
be made.
PREVIOUS ACTION
During the past 30 years, the U.S. has been the unques-
tioned leader in worldwide efforts to assure that the benefits
of nuclear energy are made available widely while its destruc-
tive uses are prevented. I have given special attention to
these objectives during the past two years, and we have made
important new progress, particularly in efforts to control
the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability among the
nations of the world.
In 1974, soon after I assumed office, I became concerned
that some nuclear supplier countries, in order to achieve
competitive advantage, were prepared to offer nuclear exports
under conditions less rigorous than we believed prudent. In
the fall of that year, at the United Nations General Assembly,
the United States proposed that non-proliferation measures be
strengthened materially. I also expressed my concern directly
to my counterparts in key supplier and recipient nations. I
directed the Secretary of State to emphasize multilateral
action to limit this dangerous form of competition.
At U.S. initiative, the first meeting of major nuclear
suppliers was convened in London in April 1975. A series of
meetings and intensive bilateral consultations followed.
As a result of these meetings, we have significantly
raised international standards through progressive new guide-
lines to govern nuclear exports. These involve both improved
safeguards and controls to prevent diversion of nuclear
materials and to guard against the misuse of nuclear technology
and physical protection against theft and sabotage. The
United States has adopted these guidelines as policy for nuclear
exports.
In addition, we have acted to deal with the special
dangers associated with plutonium.
5
We have prohibited export of reprocessing and other
nuclear technologies that could contribute to
proliferation.
We have firmly opposed reprocessing in Korea and
Taiwan. We welcome the decisions of those nations
to forego such activities. We will continue to
discourage national reprocessing in other locations
of particular concern.
We negotiated agreements for cooperation with Egypt
and Israel which contain the strictest reprocessing
provisions and other nuclear controls ever included
in the twenty-year history of our nuclear cooperation
program.
In addition, the United States recently completed
negotiations to place its civil nuclear facilities
under the safeguards of the International Atomic
Energy Agency -- and the IAEA has approved a proposed
agreement for this purpose.
NEW INITIATIVES
Last summer, I directed that a thorough review be under-
taken of all our nuclear policies and options to determine what
further steps were needed. I have considered carefully the
results of that review, held discussions with Congressional
leaders, and benefited from consultations with leaders of other
nations. I have decided that new steps are needed, building
upon the progress of the past two years. Today, I am announcing
a number of actions and proposals aimed at:
-- strengthening the commitment of the nations of the
world to the goal of non-proliferation and building an
effective system of international controls to prevent
proliferation;
changing and strengthening U.S. domestic nuclear
policies and programs to support our non-proliferation
goals; and
6
establishing, by these actions, a sound foundation
for the continued and increased use of nuclear
energy in the U.S. and in the world in a safe and
economic manner.
The task we face calls for an international cooperative
venture of unprecedented dimensions. The U.S. is prepared
to work with all other nations.
PRINCIPAL POLICY DECISIONS
I have concluded that the reprocessing and recycling of
plutonium should not proceed unless there is sound reason to
conclude that the world community can effectively overcome
the associated risks of proliferation. I believe that
avoidance of proliferation must take precedence over eco-
nomic interests. I have also concluded that the United States
and other nations can and should increase their use of nuclear
power for peaceful purposes even if reprocessing and recycling
of plutonium are found to be unacceptable.
Vigorous action is required domestically and internation-
ally to make these judgments effective.
-- I have decided that the United States should greatly
accelerate its diplomatic initiatives, in conjunction
with nuclear supplier and consumer nations, to control
the spread of plutonium and technologies for separating
plutonium.
Effective non-proliferation measures will require the
participation and support of nuclear suppliers and consumers.
There must be coordination in restraints so that an effective
non-proliferation system is achieved and there must be coopera-
tion in assuring reliable fuel supplies so that peaceful
energy needs are met.
-- I have decided that the United States should no
longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to
produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable
step in the nuclear fuel cycle, and that we should
pursue reprocessing and recycling in the future
only if they are found to be consistent with our
international objectives.
7
We must ensure that our domestic policies and programs
are compatible with our international position on reprocessing
and that we work closely with other nations in evaluating
nuclear fuel reprocessing.
-- The steps I am announcing today will assure that the
necessary increase in our use of nuclear energy will
be carried on with safety and without aggravating
the danger of proliferation.
Even with strong efforts to conserve, we will have in-
creasing demands for energy for a growing American economy.
To satisfy these needs, we must rely on increased use of both
nuclear energy and coal until more acceptable alternatives are
developed. We will continue pushing ahead with work on all
promising alternatives such as solar energy but now we must
count on the technology that works. We cannot expect a major
contribution to our energy supply from alternative technologies
until late in this century.
To implement my overall policy decisions, I have decided
on a number of policies that are necessary and appropriate to
meet our non-proliferation and energy objectives.
-- First, our domestic policies must be changed to
conform to my decision on deferral of the commercializa-
tion of chemical reprocessing of nuclear fuel which
results in the separation of plutonium.
-- Second, I call upon all nations to join us in exercising
maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and
enrichment technology and facilities by avoiding such
sensitive exports or commitments for a period of at
least three years.
-- Third, new cooperative steps are needed to help assure
that all nations have an adequate and reliable supply
of energy for their needs. I believe, most importantly,
that nuclear supplier nations have a special obligation
to assure that customer nations have an adequate supply
8
of fuel for their nuclear power plants, if those
customer nations forego the acquisition of repro-
cessing and uranium enrichment capabilities and
accept effective proliferation controls.
Fourth, the U.S. must maintain its role as a major
and reliable world supplier of nuclear reactors and
fuel for peaceful purposes. Our strong position as
a supplier has provided the principal basis for our
influence and leadership in worldwide non-prolifera-
tion efforts. A strong position will be equally
important in the future. While reaffirming this
nation's intent to be a reliable supplier, the
U.S. seeks no competitive advantage by virtue of
the worldwide system of effective non-proliferation
controls that I am calling for today.
-- Fifth, new efforts must be made to urge all nations
to join in a full-scale international cooperative
effort -- which I shall outline in detail -- to
develop a system of effective controls to prevent
proliferation.
-- Sixth, the U.S. must take new steps with respect
to its own exports to control proliferation, while
seeking to improve multilateral guidelines.
Seventh, the U.S. must undertake a program to
evaluate reprocessing in support of the international
policies I have adopted.
Finally, I have concluded that new steps are needed
to assure that we have in place when needed, both
in the U.S. and around the world, the facilities for
the long-term storage or disposal of nuclear wastes.
ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT OUR NUCLEAR POLICIES
In order to implement the nuclear policies that I have
outlined, major efforts will be required within the United States
and by the many nations around the world with an interest in
9
nuclear energy.
To move forward with these efforts, I am.
today taking a number of actions and making a number of
proposals to other nations.
I. Change in U.S. Policy on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
With respect to nuclear fuel reprocessing, I am directing
agencies of the Executive Branch to implement my decision to
delay commercialization of reprocessing activities in the
U.S. until uncertainties are resolved. Specifically, I am:
-- Directing the Administrator of the Energy Research
and Development Administration (ERDA) to:
change ERDA policies and programs which heretofore
have been based on the assumption that reprocessing
would proceed;
encourage prompt action to expand spent fuel
storage facilities, thus assuring utilities that
they need not be concerned about shutdown of
nuclear reactors because of delays; and
identify the research and development efforts
needed to investigate the feasibility of re-
covering the energy value from used nuclear
fuel without separating plutonium.
II. Restraint in the Transfer of Sensitive Nuclear Technology
and Facilities
Despite the gains in controlling proliferation that have
been made, the dangers posed by reprocessing and the prospect
of uncontrolled availability of plutonium require further,
decisive international action. Effective control of the
parallel risk of spreading uranium enrichment technology is
also necessary. To meet these dangers:
-- I call upon all nations to join with us in exercising
maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and
enrichment technology and facilities by avoiding such
sensitive exports or commitments for a period of at
least three years.
10
This will allow suppliers and consumers to work together
to establish reliable means for meeting nuclear needs with
minimum risk, as we assess carefully the wisdom of plutonium
use. As we proceed in these efforts, we must not be influenced
by pressures to approve the export of these sensitive facilities.
III. Assuring an Adequate Energy Supply for Customer Nations
-- I urge nuclear suppliers to provide nuclear consumers
with fuel services, instead of sensitive technology
or facilities.
Nations accepting effective nonproliferation restraints
have a right to expect reliable and economic supply of nuclear
reactors and associated, nonsensitive fuel.
All such nations would share in the benefits of an assured
supply of nuclear fuel, even though the number and location of
sensitive facilities to generate this fuel is limited to meet
nonproliferation goals. The availability of fuel cycle
services in several different nations can provide ample
assurance to consumers of a continuing and stable source
of supply.
It is also desirable to continue studying the idea of a
few suitably-sited multinational fuel cycle centers to serve
regional needs, when effectively safeguarded and economically
warranted. Through these and related means, we can minimize
incentives for the spread of dangerous fuel cycle capabilities.
The United States stands ready to take action, in
cooperation with other concerned nations, to assure reliable
supplies of nuclear fuel at equitable prices to any country
accepting responsible restraints on its nuclear power program
with regard to reprocessing, plutonium disposition, and
enrichment technology.
I am directing the Secretary of State to initiate
consultations to explore with other nations arrange-
ments for coordinating fuel services and for
developing other means of ensuring that suppliers
will be able to offer, and consumers will be able to
receive, an uninterrupted and economical supply of
low-enriched uranium fuel and fuel services.
11
These discussions will address ways to ensure against
economic disadvantage to cooperating nations and to remove
any sources of competition which could undermine our common
nonproliferation efforts.
To contribute to this initiative, the U.S. will offer
binding letters of intent for the supply of nuclear fuel to
current and prospective customers willing to accept such
responsible restraints.
-- In addition, I am directing the Secretary of State
to enter into negotiations or arrangements for
mutual agreement on disposition of spent fuel with
consumer nations that adopt responsible restraints.
Where appropriate, the United States will provide
consumer nations with either fresh, low-enriched uranium
fuel or make other equitable arrangements in return for
mutual agreement on the disposition of spent fuel where such
disposition demonstrably fosters our common and cooperative
nonproliferation objectives. The United States seeks no
commercial advantage in pursuing options for fuel disposition
and assured fuel supplies.
-- Finally, the U.S. will continue to expand cooperative
efforts with other countries in developing their
indigenous non-nuclear energy resources.
The U.S. has proposed and continues to advocate the
establishment of an International Energy Institute, specifically
designed to help developing countries match the most economic
and readily available sources of energy to their power needs.
Through this Institute and other appropriate means, we will
offer technological assistance in the development of indigenous
energy resources.
IV. Strengthening the U.S. Role as a Reliable Supplier
If the U.S. is to continue its leadership role in world-
wide non-proliferation efforts, it must be a reliable supplier
of nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes. There are
two principal actions we can take to contribute to this objective.
GERALD
12
I will submit to the new Congress proposed legislation
that will permit the expansion of capacity in the
United States to produce enriched uranium, including
the authority needed for expansion of the Government-
owned plant at Portsmouth, Ohio. I will also work
with Congress to establish a framework for a private,
competitive industry to finance, build, own and
operate enrichment plants.
U.S. capacity has been fully committed since mid-1974
with the result that no new orders could be signed. The
Congress did not act on my full proposal and provided only
limited and temporary authority for proceeding with the
Portsmouth plant. We must have additional authority to
proceed with the expansion of capacity without further delay.
-- I will work closely with the Congress to ensure that
legislation for improving our export controls re-
sults in a system that provides maximum assurance
that the U.S. will be a reliable supplier to other
nations for the full period of agreements.
One of the principal concerns with export legislation
proposed in the last Congress was the fear that foreign
customers could be subjected to arbitrary new controls im-
posed well after a long-term agreement and specific contracts
for nuclear power plants and fuel had been signed. In the
case of nuclear plants and fuel, reliable long-term agreements
are essential and we must adopt export controls that provide
reliability while meeting non-proliferation objectives.
V. International Controls Against Proliferation
To reinforce the foregoing policies, we must develop
means to establish international restraints over the accumu-
lation of plutonium itself, whether in separated form or in
unprocessed spent fuel. The accumulation of plutonium under
national control, especially in a separated form, is a primary
proliferation risk.
13
I am directing the Secretary of State to pursue
vigorously discussions aimed at the establishment
of a new international regime to provide for storage
of civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel.
The United States made this proposal to the International
Atomic Energy Agency and other interested nations last spring.
Creation of such a regime will greatly strengthen world
confidence that the growing accumulation of excess plutonium
and spent fuel can be stored safely, pending reentry into the
nuclear fuel cycle or other safe disposition. I urge the IAEA,
which is empowered to establish plutonium depositories, to
give prompt implementation to this concept.
Once a broadly representative IAEA storage regime is in
operation, we are prepared to place our own excess civil plu-
tonium and spent fuel under its control. Moreover, we are
prepared to consider providing a site for international storage
under IAEA auspices.
The inspection system of the IAEA remains a key element
in our entire nonproliferation strategy. The world community
must make sure that the Agency has the technical and human
resources needed to keep pace with its expanding responsi-
bilities. At my direction, we have recently committed sub-
stantial additional resources to help upgrade the IAEA's
technical safeguards capabilities, and I believe we must
strengthen further the safeguard functions of the IAEA.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State and Administrator
of ERDA to undertake a major international effort to
ensure that adequate resources for this purpose are
made available, and that we mobilize our best scientific
talent to support that Agency. Our principal national
laboratories with expertise in this area have been
directed to provide assistance, on a continuing basis,
to the IAEA Secretariat.
14
The terrible increase in violence and terrorism
throughout the world has sharpened our awareness of the need
to assure rigorous protection for sensitive nuclear materials
and equipment. Fortunately, the need to cope with this
problem is now broadly recognized. Many nations have re-
sponded to the initiatives which I have taken in this area
by materially strengthening their physical security and by
cooperating in the development of international guidelines
by the IAEA. As a result of consultations among the major
suppliers, provision for adequate physical security is be-
coming a normal condition of supply.
We have an effective physical security system in the
United States. But steps are needed to upgrade physical
security systems and to assure timely international col-
laboration in the recovery of lost or stolen materials.
-- I have directed the Secretary of State to address
vigorously the problem of physical security at
both bilateral and multilateral levels, including
exploration of a possible international convention.
The United States is committed to the development of
the system of international controls that I have here out-
lined. Even when complete, however, no system of controls
is likely to be effective if a potential violator judges
that his acquisition of a nuclear explosive will be re-
ceived with indifference by the international community.
Any material violation of a nuclear safeguards agree-
ment -- especially the diversion of nuclear material for use
in making explosives -- must be universally judged to be an
extremely serious affront to the world community, calling
for the immediate imposition of drastic sanctions.
15
-- I serve notice today that the United States will,
at a minimum, respond to violation by any nation of
any safeguards agreement to which we are a party
with an immediate cutoff of our supply of nuclear
fuel and cooperation to that nation.
We would consider further steps, not necessarily confined
to the area of nuclear cooperation, against the violator
nation. Nor will our actions be limited to violations of
agreements in which we are directly involved. In the event
of material violation of any safeguards agreement, particu-
larly agreements with the IAEA, we will initiate immediate
consultations with all interested nations to determine
appropriate action.
Universal recognition of the total unacceptability of
the abrogation or violation of any nonproliferation agree-
ments is one of the most important steps which can be taken
to prevent further proliferation. We invite all concerned
governments to affirm publicly that they will regard nuclear
wrongdoing as an intolerable violation of acceptable norms
of international behavior, which would set in motion strong
and immediate countermeasures.
16
VI. U.S. Nuclear Export Policies
During the past two years, the United States has
strengthened its own national nuclear export policies.
Our interests, however, are not limited to controls alone.
The United States has a special responsibility to share the
benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with other countries.
We have sought to serve other nations as a reliable supplier
of nuclear fuel and equipment. Given the choice between
economic benefits and progress toward our nonproliferation
goals, we have given, and will continue to give, priority to
nonproliferation. But there should be no incompatibility
between nonproliferation and assisting other nations in
enjoying the benefits of peaceful nuclear power, if all
supplier countries pursue common nuclear export policies.
There is need, however, for even more rigorous controls than
those now commonly employed, and for policies that favor
nations accepting responsible nonproliferation limitations.
-- I have decided that we will henceforth apply
new criteria in judging whether to enter into
new or expanded nuclear cooperation:
Adherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty
will be a strong positive factor favoring
cooperation with a nonnuclear weapon state.
Nonnuclear weapons states that have not yet
adhered to the Non-proliferation Treaty will
receive positive recognition if they are
prepared to submit to full fuel cycle safeguards,
pending adherence.
17
We will favor recipient nations that are prepared
to forego, or postpone for a substantial period
the establishment of national reprocessing or
enrichment activities or, in certain cases, pre-
pared to shape and schedule their reprocessing
and enriching facilities to foster nonproliferation
needs.
Positive recognition will also be given to
nations prepared to participate in an inter-
national storage regime, under which spent
fuel and any separated plutonium would be
placed pending use.
Exceptional cases may occur in which nonproliferation will
be served best by cooperating with nations not yet meeting these
tests. However, I pledge that the Congress will not be asked
to approve any new or amended agreement not meeting these new
criteria unless I personally determine that the agreement is
fully supportive of our non-proliferation goals. In case of
such a determination, my reasons will be fully presented to the
Congress.
-- With respect to countries that are current recipients
of U.S. nuclear supply, I am directing the Secretary
of State to enter into negotiations with the objective
of conforming these agreements to established inter-
national guidelines, and to seek through diplomatic
initiatives and fuel supply incentives to obtain
their acceptance of our new criteria.
We must recognize the need for effective multilateral
approaches to nonproliferation and prevent nuclear export
controls from becoming an element of commercial competition.
18
I am directing the Secretary of State to intensify
discussions with other nuclear suppliers aimed at
expanding common guidelines for peaceful cooperative
agreements so that they conform with these criteria.
In this regard, the United States would discuss ways of
developing incentives that can lead to acceptance of these
criteria, such as assuring reliable fuel supplies for nations
accepting new restraints.
The reliability of American assurances to other nations
is an asset that few, if any, nations of the world can match.
It must not be eroded. Indeed, nothing could more prejudice
our efforts to strengthen our existing nonproliferation under-
standings than arbitrary suspension or unwarranted delays in
meeting supply commitments to countries which are dealing with
us in good faith regarding effective safeguards and restraints.
Despite my personal efforts, the 94th Congress adjourned
without passing nuclear export legislation which would have
strengthened our effectiveness in dealing with other nations on
nuclear matters.
-- In the absence of such legislation, I am directing
the Secretary of State to work closely with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure proper
emphasis on nonproliferation concerns in the nuclear
export licensing process.
I will continue to work to develop bipartisan support in
Congress for improvements in our nuclear export laws.
VII. Reprocessing Evaluation Program
The world community requires an aggressive program to build
the international controls and cooperative regimes I have just
outlined. I am prepared to mount such a program in the
United States.
19
I am directing the Administrator of ERDA to:
Begin immediately to define a reprocessing
and recycle evaluation program consistent
with meeting our international objectives out-
lined earlier in this statement. This program
should complement the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (NRC) ongoing considerations of
safety safeguards and environmental requirements
for reprocessing and recycling activities,
particularly its Generic Environmental Statement
on Mixed Oxide Fuels.
Investigate the feasibility of recovering the
energy value from used nuclear fuel without
separating our plutonium.
-- I am directing the Secretary of State to invite
other nations to participate in designing and
carrying out ERDA's reprocessing and recycle
evaluation program, consistent with our inter-
national energy cooperation and non-proliferation
objectives. I will direct that activities carried
out in the U.S. in connection with this program
be subjected to full IAEA safeguards and
inspections.
VIII. Nuclear Waste Management
The area of our domestic nuclear program dealing with
long-term management of nuclear wastes from our commercial
nuclear power plants has not in the past received sufficient
attention. In my 1977 Budget, I proposed a four-fold increase
in funding for this program, which involves the activities of
several Federal agencies. We recently completed a review to
determine what additional actions are needed to assure
availability in the mid-1980's of a Federally-owned and managed
repository for long-term nuclear wastes, well before significant
quantities of wastes begin to accumulate.
20
I have been assured that the technology for long-term
management or disposal of nuclear wastes is available but
demonstrations are needed.
-- I have directed the Administrator of ERDA to
take the necessary action to speed up this
program so as to demonstrate all components
of waste management technology by 1978 and to
demonstrate a complete repository for such
wastes by 1985.
I have further directed that the first demonstration
depository for high-level wastes which will be
owned by the Government be submitted for licensing
by the independent NRC to assure its safety and
acceptability to the public.
In view of the decisions announced today, I have also
directed the Administrator of ERDA to assure that the waste
repository will be able to handle spent fuel elements as well
as the separated and solidified waste that would result if we
proceed with nuclear fuel reprocessing.
The United States continues to provide world leadership
in nuclear waste management. I am inviting other nations to
participate in and learn from our programs.
I am directing the Secretary of State to discuss
with other nations and the IAEA the possibility
of establishing centrally located, multinationally
controlled nuclear waste repositories so that the
number of sites that are needed can be limited.
INCREASED USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES
Even with strong conservation efforts, energy demands in
the United States will continue to increase in response to the
needs of a growing economy. The only alternative over the next
15 to 20 years to increased use of both nuclear energy and coal
is greater reliance on imported oil which will jeopardize our
nation's strength and welfare.
21
We now have in the United States 62 licensed nuclear
plants, providing about 9 percent of our electrical energy.
By 1985 we will have from 145 to 160 plants, supplying
20 percent or more of the Nation's electricity.
In many cases, electricity from nuclear plants is
markedly cheaper than that produced from either oil or coal-
fired plants. Nuclear energy is environmentally preferable
in a number of respects to other principal ways of generating
electricity.
Commercial nuclear power has an excellent safety record,
with nearly 200 plant years of experience (compiled over 18
chronological years) without a single death from a nuclear
accident. I have acted to assure that this record is maintained
in the years ahead. For example, I have increased funds for
the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission and for the
Energy Research and Development Administration for reactor
safety research and development.
The decisions and actions I am announcing today will
help overcome the uncertainties that have served to delay the
expanded use of nuclear energy in the United States. While
the decision to delay reprocessing is significant, it will not
prevent us from increasing our use of nuclear energy. We are
on the right course with our nuclear power program in America.
The changes I am announcing today will ensure that we continue.
My decisions today do not effect the U.S. program of
research and development on the breeder reactor. That program
assumes that no decision on the commercial operations of
breeder reactors, which require plutonium fuel, will be made
before 1986.
CONCLUSION
I do not underestimate the challenge represented in the
creation of a world-wide program that will permit capturing
the benefits of nuclear energy while maintaining needed
protection against nuclear proliferation. The challenge is
one that can be managed only partially and temporarily by
technical measures.
22
It can be managed fully if the task is faced realistically
by nations prepared to forego perceived short-term advantages
in favor of fundamental long-term gains. We call upon all
nations to recognize that their individual and collective
interests are best served by internationally assured and
safeguarded nuclear fuel supply, services and storage. We
ask them to turn aside from pursuing nuclear capabilities
which are of doubtful economic value and have ominous
implications for nuclear proliferation and instability in
the world.
The growing international consensus against the proliferation
of nuclear weapons is a source of encouragement. But it is
certainly not a basis for complacency.
Success in meeting the challenge now before us depends
on an extraordinary coordination of the policies of all nations
toward the common good. The U.S. is prepared to lead, but we
cannot succeed alone. If nations can work together construc-
tively and cooperatively to manage our common nuclear problems
we will enhance our collective security. And we will be better
able to concentrate our energies and our resources on the great
tasks of construction rather than consume them in increasingly
dangerous rivalry.
11:30 -
handout THE WHITE HOUSE
1 pay Attent
12:00
WASHINGTON
at cui, lost
October 27, 1976
pier and
m
MEMORANDUM TO:
DICK CHENEY
FROM:
JIM 20
nich of to that
1
SUBJECT: Antounth Nuclear Policy Statement Plan
in emarls
In order to make certain that the President's statement
at Marly I/
on nuclear policy is properly understood and reported
by the media representatives who cover nuclear matters,
we propose this schedule:
1:30
pu
-
At 9.30 a.m., Thursday, October 28, the press
-- both the press traveling with the President
and the Washington press -- will be given copies
of the President's statement and fact sheet,
2 pm
embargoed for 11:00 a.m.
- At 10:00 a.m., Bob Fri, Chuck Robinson and Jim
sub
Connor will brief in the White House Press Room.
3 pin
- At 11:00 a.m. the statement will become public.
When the President speaks at noon in Cincinnati, he
could refer to the fact that he had made an announcement
which would mean 6,000 jobs and a $4 billion plant in
Portsmouth, Ohio.
Jack Marsh, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Cavanaugh and I recommend
this schedule.
Approve
Disapprove
CC: Ron Nessen
vpm. full statemt cum
fort that the
that wz
REQUEST
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
1976 OCT 27 PM 3 46
October 27, 1976
TO:
JIM CANNON
FROM:
GLENN SCHLEEDE
SUBJECT:
PARAGRAPH FOR JACK MARSH
OR JOE JENCKS
Here is a proposed paragraph for use as
talking points in a conversation with John
Anderson, Howard Baker, Chuck Percy and
Javits.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
AT 11 AM. Thusday OCT 28,
Tomorrow (later today) the President will be issuing a major
statement on nuclear policy.
It focuses on two major objectives:
preserving the energy benefits of nuclear energy.
preventing nuclear proliferation.
and, we believe, balanced
It's a comprehensive tatement in that it deals with all the
outstanding nuclear policy issues: proliferation, exports,
reprocessing of nuclear fuel, and nuclear waste management.
It reflects three major policy positions:
First, the U.S. will step up diplomatic activities to
get all nations to help control proliferation, principally
by avoiding the spread of reprocessing technology and
controlling plutonium.
Second, U.S. policy on reprocessing must change. Specifically,
we should proceed with nuclear fuel reprocessing only
if we can safely conclude that the world can overcome
the associated risks of proliferation.
Third, the U.S. and other nations can and should increase
the use of nuclear energy -- whether or not reprocessing
is later approved.
The policy decisions are then followed up in the statement with
a comprehensive set of implementing actions -- domestically
and internationally.
FORD is GERALD LIBRARY
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
October 27, 1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
FACT SHEET
PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN
As one part of his comprehensive statement on nuclear policy,
the President today announced new steps to assure that the
U.S. has in place when needed, the facilities for long-term
management of nuclear wastes from our commercial power plants.
BACKGROUND
In his 1977 Budget, the President proposed a four-fold
increase in the funding of the Energy Research and
Development Administration's program for dealing with
the long-term management of nuclear wastes.
In March 1976, a review of Federal nuclear waste management
activities was undertaken by an interagency task force.
The President's actions today were based on the findings
of that review.
THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT
In one part of his comprehensive nuclear policy statement, the
President directed that actions be taken to speed up the pro-
gram to demonstrate all components of waste management technology
by 1978, and to demonstrate a complete respository by 1985. He
also directed that plans for the repository be submitted to the
NRC for licensing to assure its safety and acceptability.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND DETAILS OF THE PLAN
A.
Nuclear Waste Requiring Long-Term Management
U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors "burn" low
enriched uranium fuel and produce in spent fuel rods
a mixture of plutonium, low enriched uranium and waste
products. Certain of these waste products are highly
radioactive and could constitute a hazard for tens of
thousands of years if they escaped to the biosphere.
If spent fuel rods are reprocessed, the wastes
would be separated from the uranium and plutonium
(which could be saved and recycled as fuel), put
into solid form and encased in metal canisters,
and sent to a repository for disposal.
If there is no reprocessing, the spent fuel rods
themselves must be packaged and disposed of in a
repository.
Under either alternative, nuclear wastes must be isolated
from the environment for centuries and the President's plan
will accommodate both alternatives.
more
2
B.
The Nuclear Waste Problem and Alternatives for Dealing
With It That Have Been Considered.
The principle problem in safely managing the waste is
confining the radioactivity rather than finding enough
storage space. Recent calculations using realistic
assumptions regarding numbers of reactors and disposal
technology indicate the total volume of solidified
high-level wastes produced by commercial nuclear power
in the U.S. through 2000 will be equivalent to a cube
about 70 feet on each side.
Technology or means for nuclear waste disposal and manage-
ment have been developed and demonstrated on a small scale.
However, we do not yet have available a repository for
nuclear waste disposal. Most spent fuel rods are continuing
to be stored safely in temporary storage basins at reactor
sites.
A wide variety of methods for permanent disposal of these
wastes has been considered:
Experts have concluded that the most practical method
is geologic storage in repositories in stable formations
deep underground.
Other methods under study, but which do not seem practical
at present, are deep geologic disposal under the ocean
floor, transmutation, and launching them into space.
Considerable public concern has been expressed that the
Federal Government has not yet demonstrated that it can
fulfill its responsibility to provide a repository for
safe disposal of nuclear waste.
Tasks ahead include further demonstration of the technology,
selecting an acceptable site, and proceeding with a coordinate
program to assure that a facility will be available, when
needed, about 1985.
C.
The Federal Government's Waste Management Responsibility.
The Federal Government has assumed the responsibility for
long-term disposal of high-level wastes because of the
limited incentives for private parties to engage in
commercial storage of these wastes. Private industry
is responsible for packaging and delivering the waste
in a prescribed form to a Federal repository.
D.
Principal Actions Needed and the Status of Those Actions
1. Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS)
Because the program to build and operate a repository
will represent a major Federal action with potentially
significant environmental impact, the ERDA is required
to prepare a generic environmental impact statement
(GEIS) on its waste management program.
- The GEIS will examine the impacts of all the major
waste management alternatives.
- Statement will cover all types of nuclear wastes
from the light water reactor fuel cycle.
- Other environmental impact statements (EIS's) will
be required when (i) regulations are proposed, and
(ii) when construction funds are requested from
Congress.
more
3
Status - ERDA has been at work for some time on the
GEIS. No major problems are anticipated in completing
the statement by late 1977.
2. General Environmental Standards
The Atomic Energy Act, as amended, requires the EPA
to issue general environmental standards for releases
to the biosphere from nuclear facilities. These
standards will include a numerical limit to long-term
radiation releases outside the boundaries of the
repository -- above the natural background radiation.
The standards need to be available as early as possible
during the process of locating and constructing the
repository.
Status - EPA will propose the general standards covering
high level waste in 1977 and publish them in final form
by mid-1978, in time for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to issue its regulations and prior
to site selection and construction.
3. Licensing of Waste Repository
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 requires that
high-level commercial waste repositories be licensed
by the NRC prior to operation. The NRC is also
responsible for issuing the appropriate criteria
and standards to assure that the respository is
constructed and operated in a safe and environmentally
acceptable manner.
Status - ERDA has been directed to ask the NRC to
subject the repository to a licensing procedure before
the first commercial wastes are shipped. NRC will
produce criteria and standards by 1978 governing the
construction and operation of the repository prior to
the time the site is finally determined and construc-
tion begins.
4. Construction and Operation of a Repository
ERDA, supported by other Federal agencies, has the
responsibility to construct and operate the repository,
including:
- finding an acceptable site
- acquiring the land
- designing the repository
- constructing, operating, and sealing the repository
Status
- FY 1977 appropriations increased funding for this
program to $66 million, up from $12 million in
FY 1976.
- The President today directed the Administrator to
assure the small scale demonstration by 1978 of
the process technologies (such as waste solidifica-
tion, transuranic volume reduction, canister design,
etc.), and by 1985 to have the repository in operation.
more
4
E.
Timetable for Actions
The principle actions and dates for their accomplishment
are listed below.
1976 - ERDA issued for public review the Technical
Alternatives Document which explains the current
state of waste management technology.
1977 - ERDA issues draft generic environmental impact
statement on waste management no later than the
early part of the year and begins extensive
program to identify, test and select a site.
- EPA proposes draft generally applicable standards
for permanent storage of high-level wastes.
- NRC publishes draft standards for solidified
high-level wastes and draft siting, engineering
and operating criteria for repositories for high-
level wastes. Each element will include the
appropriate draft environmental impact statements.
1978 - ERDA will complete initial demonstration work on
canister design, waste solidification, and pre-
liminary repository design, and continue site
selection process.
- NRC finalizes proposed site selection criteria,
solidification criteria, waste definitions and
operating criteria and regulations.
- EPA issues final general ambient standards for
high level waste disposal.
1979
- ERDA selects a particular repository site, issues
a draft site specific EIS, and begins intensive
site and design work.
- NRC performs early site review of ERDA repository;
issues next phase of draft regulations for canister
design, transportation, etc.
1980 - ERDA completes site and design studies, submits
preliminary safety analysis and environmental
report to NRC in support of construction permit.
1981 - ERDA begins construction with approval of NRC.
1984
- Construction completed, repository tested with
"cold" wastes.
1985 - NRC issues repository license.
- Repository begins initial commercial-scale
operations.
F.
The Interagency Review of Nuclear Waste Management.
The review of nuclear waste management was completed by
an interagency Task Force led by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and including participants from the
agencies having a role in nuclear waste management.
Specifically: the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),
the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA),
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Geological
Survey (Interior Department), and the National Science
Foundation (NSF). The independent Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) participated as an observer.
#
#
#
#
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
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"ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 24, folder \"Nuclear Policy Statement (11)\" of the\nJames M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 24 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nfile\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nOctober 22, 1976\nMEMORANDUM TO:\nDICK CHENEY\nFROM:\nJIM CANNON Jun\nJim Mitchell for Jim Lynn -- comments on the Nuclear\nPolicy Report:\n1.\nIt has to go out before the election.\n2. Today would look like the last minute.\n3.\nAs to why it is not out already -- need\nfor State Department consultations with\nother countries. This matter is too\nimportant to be pushed by a political\ncampaign here.\n4.\nPractical reason not to do it today --\nthe President is not sufficiently briefed\non his own report.\nFORD LIBRARY is 9ERALD\nCannon FYI\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSEND TO DICK CHENEY\nWASHINGTON\nON AIR FORCE ONE Tortland\nOctober 25, 1976\n976 OCT 26 AM 11 06\nMEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY\nFROM:\nJIM CAVANAUGH\nSUBJECT:\nRelease of Statement on Nuclear Policy\nJim Reichley is working with the technical people on\nediting the statement on nuclear policy. He is not\nmaking any substantive changes just making sure\nthat the report is readable.\nWe also have a fact sheet that should be ready later\ntonight.\nI will get to you tomorrow the final copies of the\nnuclear policy statement (30-plus pages) as well as\nthe detailed fact sheet.\nOur plan is to release them on Wednesday here and\nin Chicago simultaneously. I will work out the time\nwith you, Nessen and the press people here. Scowcroft\nneeds a 12-hour advance for the notifications they have\nto make internationally.\nOur plan is to have Chuck Robson and Bob Fri brief\nat the State Department on the technical aspects of\nthe statement when it is released.\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\n1026\nfile\nwas deped\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nOctober 25, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nSUBJECT:\nNuclear JIM CANNON Policy Jm.\nStatement\nAttached is your statement on Nuclear Policy which has\nnow been reviewed by NSC, OMB, State, ERDA and other\nrelated departments and agencies.\nBrent Scowcroft, OMB, (Jim Mitchell) and I recommend\nyou approve the release of this policy statement on\nWednesday, October 27, 1976.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nattachment\nFORD & LIBRARY 0ERALD\nNNCITY\nPRECEDENCE\nCLASSIFICATION\nDEX\nFROM: JIM CANNON\nDAC\n012\nGPS\nLDX\nTO CHENEY\nPAGES 23\nR. NESSEN\nTTY\nCITE\n(CHICAGO)\nINFO:\nDTG: 2621157\nRELEASED BY: to\nTOR: 2622342\nSPECIAL\nINSTRUCTIONS: DEliVER IMMEDIATELY upon\nPARTY'S ARRIVAL)\n-3\nFORD & LIBRARY\nWHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74\nSTATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT\nON NUCLEAR POLICY\nWe have known since the age of nuclear energy began\nmore than 30 years ago that this source of energy had the\npotential for tremendous benefits for mankind and the potential\nfor unparalleled destruction.\nOn the one hand, there is no doubt that nuclear energy\nrepresents one of the best hopes for satisfying the rising\nworld demand for energy with minimum environmental impact and\nwith the potential for reducing dependence on uncertain and\ndiminishing world supplies of oil.\nOn the other hand, nuclear fuel, as it produces power\nalso produces plutonium, which can be chemically separated from\nthe spent fuel. The plutonium can be recycled and used to\ngenerate additional nuclear power, thereby partially offsetting\nthe need for additional energy resources. Unfortunately -- and\nthis is the root of the problem -- the same plutonium produced\nin nuclear power plants can, when chemically separated, also be\nused to make nuclear explosives.\nThe world community cannot afford to let potential nuclear\nweapons material or the technology to produce it proliferate\nuncontrolled over the globe. The world community must ensure\nthat production and utilization of such material by any nation\nis carried out under the most stringent security conditions\nand arrangements.\nDeveloping the enormous benefits of nuclear energy while\nsimultaneously developing the means to prevent proliferation\nis one of the major challenges facing all nations of the world\ntoday.\nThe standards we apply in judging most domestic and\ninternational activities are not sufficiently rigorous to deal\nwith this extraordinarily complex problem. Our answers\nFORD, & LIBRARY\n2\ncannot be partially successful. They will either work,\nin which case we shall stop proliferation; or they will\nfail and nuclear proliferation will accelerate as\nnations initially having no intention of acquiring nuclear\nweapons conclude that they are forced to do so by the actions\nof others. Should this happen, we would face a world in which\nthe security of all is critically imperiled. Maintaining\ninternational stability in such an environment would be\nincalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of regional\nor global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation would be\nimmeasurably increased -- if not through direct attack, then\nthrough a process of ever expanding escalation.\nThe problem can be handled as long as we understand it\nclearly and act wisely in concert with other nations. But we\nare faced with a threat of tragedy if we fail to comprehend\nit or to take effective measures.\nThus, the seriousness and complexity of the problem place\na special burden on those who propose ways to control prolifera-\ntion. They must avoid the temptation for rhetorical gestures,\nempty threats, or righteous posturing. They must offer policies\nand programs which deal with the world as it is, not as we might\nwish it to be. The goal is to prevent proliferation, not simply\nto deplore it.\nThe first task in dealing with the problem of proliferation\nis to understand the world nuclear situation.\nMore than 30 nations have or plan to build nuclear power\nplants to reap the benefits of nuclear energy. The 1973\nenergy crisis dramatically demonstrated to all nations not\nonly the dangers of excessive reliance on oil imports, but\nalso the reality that the world's supply of fossil fuels is\nrunning out. As a result, nuclear energy is now properly\nseen by many nations as an indispensable way to satisfy rising\nenergy demand without prematurely depleting finite fossil fuel\nresources. We must understand the motives which are leading\n3\nthese nations, developed and developing, to place even greater\nemphasis than we do on nuclear power development. For unless\nwe comprehend their real needs, we cannot expect to find ways\nof working with them to ensure satisfaction of both our and\ntheir legitimate concerns.\nMoreover, several nations besides the United States have\nthe technology needed to produce both the benefits and the\ndestructive potential of nuclear energy. Nations with such\ncapabilities are able to export their technology and facilities.\nThus, no single nation, not even the United States, can\nrealistically hope -- by itself -- to control effectively the\nspread of reprocessing technology and the resulting avail-\nability of plutonium.\nThe United States once was the dominant world supplier\nof nuclear material equipment and technology. While we remain\na leader in this field, other suppliers have come to share the\ninternational market -- with the U.S. now supplying less than\nhalf of nuclear reactor exports.\nIn short, for nearly a decade the U.S. has not had a\nmonopoly on nuclear technology. Although our role is large,\nwe are not able to control worldwide nuclear development.\nFor these reasons, action to control proliferation must\nbe an international cooperative effort involving many nations,\nincluding both nuclear suppliers and customers. Common standards\nmust be developed and accepted by all parties. If this is not\ndone, unrestrained trade in sensitive nuclear technology and\nmaterials will develop -- with no one in a position to stop it.\nWe in the United States must recognize that interests in\nnuclear energy vary widely among nations. We must recognize\nthat some nations look to nuclear energy because they have no\nacceptable energy alternative. We must be sure that our efforts\nto control proliferation are not viewed by such nations as an\nact to prevent them from enjoying the benefits of nuclear\n4\nenergy. We must be sure that all nations recognize that the\nU.S. believes that non-proliferation objectives must take\nprecedence over economic and energy benefits if a choice must\nbe made.\nPREVIOUS ACTION\nDuring the past 30 years, the U.S. has been the unques-\ntioned leader in worldwide efforts to assure that the benefits\nof nuclear energy are made available widely while its destruc-\ntive uses are prevented. I have given special attention to\nthese objectives during the past two years, and we have made\nimportant new progress, particularly in efforts to control\nthe proliferation of nuclear weapons capability among the\nnations of the world.\nIn 1974, soon after I assumed office, I became concerned\nthat some nuclear supplier countries, in order to achieve\ncompetitive advantage, were prepared to offer nuclear exports\nunder conditions less rigorous than we believed prudent. In\nthe fall of that year, at the United Nations General Assembly,\nthe United States proposed that non-proliferation measures be\nstrengthened materially. I also expressed my concern directly\nto my counterparts in key supplier and recipient nations. I\ndirected the Secretary of State to emphasize multilateral\naction to limit this dangerous form of competition.\nAt U.S. initiative, the first meeting of major nuclear\nsuppliers was convened in London in April 1975. A series of\nmeetings and intensive bilateral consultations followed.\nAs a result of these meetings, we have significantly\nraised international standards through progressive new guide-\nlines to govern nuclear exports. These involve both improved\nsafeguards and controls to prevent diversion of nuclear\nmaterials and to guard against the misuse of nuclear technology\nand physical protection against theft and sabotage. The\nUnited States has adopted these guidelines as policy for nuclear\nexports.\nIn addition, we have acted to deal with the special\ndangers associated with plutonium.\n5\nWe have prohibited export of reprocessing and other\nnuclear technologies that could contribute to\nproliferation.\nWe have firmly opposed reprocessing in Korea and\nTaiwan. We welcome the decisions of those nations\nto forego such activities. We will continue to\ndiscourage national reprocessing in other locations\nof particular concern.\nWe negotiated agreements for cooperation with Egypt\nand Israel which contain the strictest reprocessing\nprovisions and other nuclear controls ever included\nin the twenty-year history of our nuclear cooperation\nprogram.\nIn addition, the United States recently completed\nnegotiations to place its civil nuclear facilities\nunder the safeguards of the International Atomic\nEnergy Agency -- and the IAEA has approved a proposed\nagreement for this purpose.\nNEW INITIATIVES\nLast summer, I directed that a thorough review be under-\ntaken of all our nuclear policies and options to determine what\nfurther steps were needed. I have considered carefully the\nresults of that review, held discussions with Congressional\nleaders, and benefited from consultations with leaders of other\nnations. I have decided that new steps are needed, building\nupon the progress of the past two years. Today, I am announcing\na number of actions and proposals aimed at:\n-- strengthening the commitment of the nations of the\nworld to the goal of non-proliferation and building an\neffective system of international controls to prevent\nproliferation;\nchanging and strengthening U.S. domestic nuclear\npolicies and programs to support our non-proliferation\ngoals; and\n6\nestablishing, by these actions, a sound foundation\nfor the continued and increased use of nuclear\nenergy in the U.S. and in the world in a safe and\neconomic manner.\nThe task we face calls for an international cooperative\nventure of unprecedented dimensions. The U.S. is prepared\nto work with all other nations.\nPRINCIPAL POLICY DECISIONS\nI have concluded that the reprocessing and recycling of\nplutonium should not proceed unless there is sound reason to\nconclude that the world community can effectively overcome\nthe associated risks of proliferation. I believe that\navoidance of proliferation must take precedence over eco-\nnomic interests. I have also concluded that the United States\nand other nations can and should increase their use of nuclear\npower for peaceful purposes even if reprocessing and recycling\nof plutonium are found to be unacceptable.\nVigorous action is required domestically and internation-\nally to make these judgments effective.\n-- I have decided that the United States should greatly\naccelerate its diplomatic initiatives, in conjunction\nwith nuclear supplier and consumer nations, to control\nthe spread of plutonium and technologies for separating\nplutonium.\nEffective non-proliferation measures will require the\nparticipation and support of nuclear suppliers and consumers.\nThere must be coordination in restraints so that an effective\nnon-proliferation system is achieved and there must be coopera-\ntion in assuring reliable fuel supplies so that peaceful\nenergy needs are met.\n-- I have decided that the United States should no\nlonger regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to\nproduce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable\nstep in the nuclear fuel cycle, and that we should\npursue reprocessing and recycling in the future\nonly if they are found to be consistent with our\ninternational objectives.\n7\nWe must ensure that our domestic policies and programs\nare compatible with our international position on reprocessing\nand that we work closely with other nations in evaluating\nnuclear fuel reprocessing.\n-- The steps I am announcing today will assure that the\nnecessary increase in our use of nuclear energy will\nbe carried on with safety and without aggravating\nthe danger of proliferation.\nEven with strong efforts to conserve, we will have in-\ncreasing demands for energy for a growing American economy.\nTo satisfy these needs, we must rely on increased use of both\nnuclear energy and coal until more acceptable alternatives are\ndeveloped. We will continue pushing ahead with work on all\npromising alternatives such as solar energy but now we must\ncount on the technology that works. We cannot expect a major\ncontribution to our energy supply from alternative technologies\nuntil late in this century.\nTo implement my overall policy decisions, I have decided\non a number of policies that are necessary and appropriate to\nmeet our non-proliferation and energy objectives.\n-- First, our domestic policies must be changed to\nconform to my decision on deferral of the commercializa-\ntion of chemical reprocessing of nuclear fuel which\nresults in the separation of plutonium.\n-- Second, I call upon all nations to join us in exercising\nmaximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and\nenrichment technology and facilities by avoiding such\nsensitive exports or commitments for a period of at\nleast three years.\n-- Third, new cooperative steps are needed to help assure\nthat all nations have an adequate and reliable supply\nof energy for their needs. I believe, most importantly,\nthat nuclear supplier nations have a special obligation\nto assure that customer nations have an adequate supply\n8\nof fuel for their nuclear power plants, if those\ncustomer nations forego the acquisition of repro-\ncessing and uranium enrichment capabilities and\naccept effective proliferation controls.\nFourth, the U.S. must maintain its role as a major\nand reliable world supplier of nuclear reactors and\nfuel for peaceful purposes. Our strong position as\na supplier has provided the principal basis for our\ninfluence and leadership in worldwide non-prolifera-\ntion efforts. A strong position will be equally\nimportant in the future. While reaffirming this\nnation's intent to be a reliable supplier, the\nU.S. seeks no competitive advantage by virtue of\nthe worldwide system of effective non-proliferation\ncontrols that I am calling for today.\n-- Fifth, new efforts must be made to urge all nations\nto join in a full-scale international cooperative\neffort -- which I shall outline in detail -- to\ndevelop a system of effective controls to prevent\nproliferation.\n-- Sixth, the U.S. must take new steps with respect\nto its own exports to control proliferation, while\nseeking to improve multilateral guidelines.\nSeventh, the U.S. must undertake a program to\nevaluate reprocessing in support of the international\npolicies I have adopted.\nFinally, I have concluded that new steps are needed\nto assure that we have in place when needed, both\nin the U.S. and around the world, the facilities for\nthe long-term storage or disposal of nuclear wastes.\nACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT OUR NUCLEAR POLICIES\nIn order to implement the nuclear policies that I have\noutlined, major efforts will be required within the United States\nand by the many nations around the world with an interest in\n9\nnuclear energy.\nTo move forward with these efforts, I am.\ntoday taking a number of actions and making a number of\nproposals to other nations.\nI. Change in U.S. Policy on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing\nWith respect to nuclear fuel reprocessing, I am directing\nagencies of the Executive Branch to implement my decision to\ndelay commercialization of reprocessing activities in the\nU.S. until uncertainties are resolved. Specifically, I am:\n-- Directing the Administrator of the Energy Research\nand Development Administration (ERDA) to:\nchange ERDA policies and programs which heretofore\nhave been based on the assumption that reprocessing\nwould proceed;\nencourage prompt action to expand spent fuel\nstorage facilities, thus assuring utilities that\nthey need not be concerned about shutdown of\nnuclear reactors because of delays; and\nidentify the research and development efforts\nneeded to investigate the feasibility of re-\ncovering the energy value from used nuclear\nfuel without separating plutonium.\nII. Restraint in the Transfer of Sensitive Nuclear Technology\nand Facilities\nDespite the gains in controlling proliferation that have\nbeen made, the dangers posed by reprocessing and the prospect\nof uncontrolled availability of plutonium require further,\ndecisive international action. Effective control of the\nparallel risk of spreading uranium enrichment technology is\nalso necessary. To meet these dangers:\n-- I call upon all nations to join with us in exercising\nmaximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and\nenrichment technology and facilities by avoiding such\nsensitive exports or commitments for a period of at\nleast three years.\n10\nThis will allow suppliers and consumers to work together\nto establish reliable means for meeting nuclear needs with\nminimum risk, as we assess carefully the wisdom of plutonium\nuse. As we proceed in these efforts, we must not be influenced\nby pressures to approve the export of these sensitive facilities.\nIII. Assuring an Adequate Energy Supply for Customer Nations\n-- I urge nuclear suppliers to provide nuclear consumers\nwith fuel services, instead of sensitive technology\nor facilities.\nNations accepting effective nonproliferation restraints\nhave a right to expect reliable and economic supply of nuclear\nreactors and associated, nonsensitive fuel.\nAll such nations would share in the benefits of an assured\nsupply of nuclear fuel, even though the number and location of\nsensitive facilities to generate this fuel is limited to meet\nnonproliferation goals. The availability of fuel cycle\nservices in several different nations can provide ample\nassurance to consumers of a continuing and stable source\nof supply.\nIt is also desirable to continue studying the idea of a\nfew suitably-sited multinational fuel cycle centers to serve\nregional needs, when effectively safeguarded and economically\nwarranted. Through these and related means, we can minimize\nincentives for the spread of dangerous fuel cycle capabilities.\nThe United States stands ready to take action, in\ncooperation with other concerned nations, to assure reliable\nsupplies of nuclear fuel at equitable prices to any country\naccepting responsible restraints on its nuclear power program\nwith regard to reprocessing, plutonium disposition, and\nenrichment technology.\nI am directing the Secretary of State to initiate\nconsultations to explore with other nations arrange-\nments for coordinating fuel services and for\ndeveloping other means of ensuring that suppliers\nwill be able to offer, and consumers will be able to\nreceive, an uninterrupted and economical supply of\nlow-enriched uranium fuel and fuel services.\n11\nThese discussions will address ways to ensure against\neconomic disadvantage to cooperating nations and to remove\nany sources of competition which could undermine our common\nnonproliferation efforts.\nTo contribute to this initiative, the U.S. will offer\nbinding letters of intent for the supply of nuclear fuel to\ncurrent and prospective customers willing to accept such\nresponsible restraints.\n-- In addition, I am directing the Secretary of State\nto enter into negotiations or arrangements for\nmutual agreement on disposition of spent fuel with\nconsumer nations that adopt responsible restraints.\nWhere appropriate, the United States will provide\nconsumer nations with either fresh, low-enriched uranium\nfuel or make other equitable arrangements in return for\nmutual agreement on the disposition of spent fuel where such\ndisposition demonstrably fosters our common and cooperative\nnonproliferation objectives. The United States seeks no\ncommercial advantage in pursuing options for fuel disposition\nand assured fuel supplies.\n-- Finally, the U.S. will continue to expand cooperative\nefforts with other countries in developing their\nindigenous non-nuclear energy resources.\nThe U.S. has proposed and continues to advocate the\nestablishment of an International Energy Institute, specifically\ndesigned to help developing countries match the most economic\nand readily available sources of energy to their power needs.\nThrough this Institute and other appropriate means, we will\noffer technological assistance in the development of indigenous\nenergy resources.\nIV. Strengthening the U.S. Role as a Reliable Supplier\nIf the U.S. is to continue its leadership role in world-\nwide non-proliferation efforts, it must be a reliable supplier\nof nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes. There are\ntwo principal actions we can take to contribute to this objective.\nGERALD\n12\nI will submit to the new Congress proposed legislation\nthat will permit the expansion of capacity in the\nUnited States to produce enriched uranium, including\nthe authority needed for expansion of the Government-\nowned plant at Portsmouth, Ohio. I will also work\nwith Congress to establish a framework for a private,\ncompetitive industry to finance, build, own and\noperate enrichment plants.\nU.S. capacity has been fully committed since mid-1974\nwith the result that no new orders could be signed. The\nCongress did not act on my full proposal and provided only\nlimited and temporary authority for proceeding with the\nPortsmouth plant. We must have additional authority to\nproceed with the expansion of capacity without further delay.\n-- I will work closely with the Congress to ensure that\nlegislation for improving our export controls re-\nsults in a system that provides maximum assurance\nthat the U.S. will be a reliable supplier to other\nnations for the full period of agreements.\nOne of the principal concerns with export legislation\nproposed in the last Congress was the fear that foreign\ncustomers could be subjected to arbitrary new controls im-\nposed well after a long-term agreement and specific contracts\nfor nuclear power plants and fuel had been signed. In the\ncase of nuclear plants and fuel, reliable long-term agreements\nare essential and we must adopt export controls that provide\nreliability while meeting non-proliferation objectives.\nV. International Controls Against Proliferation\nTo reinforce the foregoing policies, we must develop\nmeans to establish international restraints over the accumu-\nlation of plutonium itself, whether in separated form or in\nunprocessed spent fuel. The accumulation of plutonium under\nnational control, especially in a separated form, is a primary\nproliferation risk.\n13\nI am directing the Secretary of State to pursue\nvigorously discussions aimed at the establishment\nof a new international regime to provide for storage\nof civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel.\nThe United States made this proposal to the International\nAtomic Energy Agency and other interested nations last spring.\nCreation of such a regime will greatly strengthen world\nconfidence that the growing accumulation of excess plutonium\nand spent fuel can be stored safely, pending reentry into the\nnuclear fuel cycle or other safe disposition. I urge the IAEA,\nwhich is empowered to establish plutonium depositories, to\ngive prompt implementation to this concept.\nOnce a broadly representative IAEA storage regime is in\noperation, we are prepared to place our own excess civil plu-\ntonium and spent fuel under its control. Moreover, we are\nprepared to consider providing a site for international storage\nunder IAEA auspices.\nThe inspection system of the IAEA remains a key element\nin our entire nonproliferation strategy. The world community\nmust make sure that the Agency has the technical and human\nresources needed to keep pace with its expanding responsi-\nbilities. At my direction, we have recently committed sub-\nstantial additional resources to help upgrade the IAEA's\ntechnical safeguards capabilities, and I believe we must\nstrengthen further the safeguard functions of the IAEA.\n-- I am directing the Secretary of State and Administrator\nof ERDA to undertake a major international effort to\nensure that adequate resources for this purpose are\nmade available, and that we mobilize our best scientific\ntalent to support that Agency. Our principal national\nlaboratories with expertise in this area have been\ndirected to provide assistance, on a continuing basis,\nto the IAEA Secretariat.\n14\nThe terrible increase in violence and terrorism\nthroughout the world has sharpened our awareness of the need\nto assure rigorous protection for sensitive nuclear materials\nand equipment. Fortunately, the need to cope with this\nproblem is now broadly recognized. Many nations have re-\nsponded to the initiatives which I have taken in this area\nby materially strengthening their physical security and by\ncooperating in the development of international guidelines\nby the IAEA. As a result of consultations among the major\nsuppliers, provision for adequate physical security is be-\ncoming a normal condition of supply.\nWe have an effective physical security system in the\nUnited States. But steps are needed to upgrade physical\nsecurity systems and to assure timely international col-\nlaboration in the recovery of lost or stolen materials.\n-- I have directed the Secretary of State to address\nvigorously the problem of physical security at\nboth bilateral and multilateral levels, including\nexploration of a possible international convention.\nThe United States is committed to the development of\nthe system of international controls that I have here out-\nlined. Even when complete, however, no system of controls\nis likely to be effective if a potential violator judges\nthat his acquisition of a nuclear explosive will be re-\nceived with indifference by the international community.\nAny material violation of a nuclear safeguards agree-\nment -- especially the diversion of nuclear material for use\nin making explosives -- must be universally judged to be an\nextremely serious affront to the world community, calling\nfor the immediate imposition of drastic sanctions.\n15\n-- I serve notice today that the United States will,\nat a minimum, respond to violation by any nation of\nany safeguards agreement to which we are a party\nwith an immediate cutoff of our supply of nuclear\nfuel and cooperation to that nation.\nWe would consider further steps, not necessarily confined\nto the area of nuclear cooperation, against the violator\nnation. Nor will our actions be limited to violations of\nagreements in which we are directly involved. In the event\nof material violation of any safeguards agreement, particu-\nlarly agreements with the IAEA, we will initiate immediate\nconsultations with all interested nations to determine\nappropriate action.\nUniversal recognition of the total unacceptability of\nthe abrogation or violation of any nonproliferation agree-\nments is one of the most important steps which can be taken\nto prevent further proliferation. We invite all concerned\ngovernments to affirm publicly that they will regard nuclear\nwrongdoing as an intolerable violation of acceptable norms\nof international behavior, which would set in motion strong\nand immediate countermeasures.\n16\nVI. U.S. Nuclear Export Policies\nDuring the past two years, the United States has\nstrengthened its own national nuclear export policies.\nOur interests, however, are not limited to controls alone.\nThe United States has a special responsibility to share the\nbenefits of peaceful nuclear energy with other countries.\nWe have sought to serve other nations as a reliable supplier\nof nuclear fuel and equipment. Given the choice between\neconomic benefits and progress toward our nonproliferation\ngoals, we have given, and will continue to give, priority to\nnonproliferation. But there should be no incompatibility\nbetween nonproliferation and assisting other nations in\nenjoying the benefits of peaceful nuclear power, if all\nsupplier countries pursue common nuclear export policies.\nThere is need, however, for even more rigorous controls than\nthose now commonly employed, and for policies that favor\nnations accepting responsible nonproliferation limitations.\n-- I have decided that we will henceforth apply\nnew criteria in judging whether to enter into\nnew or expanded nuclear cooperation:\nAdherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty\nwill be a strong positive factor favoring\ncooperation with a nonnuclear weapon state.\nNonnuclear weapons states that have not yet\nadhered to the Non-proliferation Treaty will\nreceive positive recognition if they are\nprepared to submit to full fuel cycle safeguards,\npending adherence.\n17\nWe will favor recipient nations that are prepared\nto forego, or postpone for a substantial period\nthe establishment of national reprocessing or\nenrichment activities or, in certain cases, pre-\npared to shape and schedule their reprocessing\nand enriching facilities to foster nonproliferation\nneeds.\nPositive recognition will also be given to\nnations prepared to participate in an inter-\nnational storage regime, under which spent\nfuel and any separated plutonium would be\nplaced pending use.\nExceptional cases may occur in which nonproliferation will\nbe served best by cooperating with nations not yet meeting these\ntests. However, I pledge that the Congress will not be asked\nto approve any new or amended agreement not meeting these new\ncriteria unless I personally determine that the agreement is\nfully supportive of our non-proliferation goals. In case of\nsuch a determination, my reasons will be fully presented to the\nCongress.\n-- With respect to countries that are current recipients\nof U.S. nuclear supply, I am directing the Secretary\nof State to enter into negotiations with the objective\nof conforming these agreements to established inter-\nnational guidelines, and to seek through diplomatic\ninitiatives and fuel supply incentives to obtain\ntheir acceptance of our new criteria.\nWe must recognize the need for effective multilateral\napproaches to nonproliferation and prevent nuclear export\ncontrols from becoming an element of commercial competition.\n18\nI am directing the Secretary of State to intensify\ndiscussions with other nuclear suppliers aimed at\nexpanding common guidelines for peaceful cooperative\nagreements so that they conform with these criteria.\nIn this regard, the United States would discuss ways of\ndeveloping incentives that can lead to acceptance of these\ncriteria, such as assuring reliable fuel supplies for nations\naccepting new restraints.\nThe reliability of American assurances to other nations\nis an asset that few, if any, nations of the world can match.\nIt must not be eroded. Indeed, nothing could more prejudice\nour efforts to strengthen our existing nonproliferation under-\nstandings than arbitrary suspension or unwarranted delays in\nmeeting supply commitments to countries which are dealing with\nus in good faith regarding effective safeguards and restraints.\nDespite my personal efforts, the 94th Congress adjourned\nwithout passing nuclear export legislation which would have\nstrengthened our effectiveness in dealing with other nations on\nnuclear matters.\n-- In the absence of such legislation, I am directing\nthe Secretary of State to work closely with the\nNuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure proper\nemphasis on nonproliferation concerns in the nuclear\nexport licensing process.\nI will continue to work to develop bipartisan support in\nCongress for improvements in our nuclear export laws.\nVII. Reprocessing Evaluation Program\nThe world community requires an aggressive program to build\nthe international controls and cooperative regimes I have just\noutlined. I am prepared to mount such a program in the\nUnited States.\n19\nI am directing the Administrator of ERDA to:\nBegin immediately to define a reprocessing\nand recycle evaluation program consistent\nwith meeting our international objectives out-\nlined earlier in this statement. This program\nshould complement the Nuclear Regulatory\nCommission's (NRC) ongoing considerations of\nsafety safeguards and environmental requirements\nfor reprocessing and recycling activities,\nparticularly its Generic Environmental Statement\non Mixed Oxide Fuels.\nInvestigate the feasibility of recovering the\nenergy value from used nuclear fuel without\nseparating our plutonium.\n-- I am directing the Secretary of State to invite\nother nations to participate in designing and\ncarrying out ERDA's reprocessing and recycle\nevaluation program, consistent with our inter-\nnational energy cooperation and non-proliferation\nobjectives. I will direct that activities carried\nout in the U.S. in connection with this program\nbe subjected to full IAEA safeguards and\ninspections.\nVIII. Nuclear Waste Management\nThe area of our domestic nuclear program dealing with\nlong-term management of nuclear wastes from our commercial\nnuclear power plants has not in the past received sufficient\nattention. In my 1977 Budget, I proposed a four-fold increase\nin funding for this program, which involves the activities of\nseveral Federal agencies. We recently completed a review to\ndetermine what additional actions are needed to assure\navailability in the mid-1980's of a Federally-owned and managed\nrepository for long-term nuclear wastes, well before significant\nquantities of wastes begin to accumulate.\n20\nI have been assured that the technology for long-term\nmanagement or disposal of nuclear wastes is available but\ndemonstrations are needed.\n-- I have directed the Administrator of ERDA to\ntake the necessary action to speed up this\nprogram so as to demonstrate all components\nof waste management technology by 1978 and to\ndemonstrate a complete repository for such\nwastes by 1985.\nI have further directed that the first demonstration\ndepository for high-level wastes which will be\nowned by the Government be submitted for licensing\nby the independent NRC to assure its safety and\nacceptability to the public.\nIn view of the decisions announced today, I have also\ndirected the Administrator of ERDA to assure that the waste\nrepository will be able to handle spent fuel elements as well\nas the separated and solidified waste that would result if we\nproceed with nuclear fuel reprocessing.\nThe United States continues to provide world leadership\nin nuclear waste management. I am inviting other nations to\nparticipate in and learn from our programs.\nI am directing the Secretary of State to discuss\nwith other nations and the IAEA the possibility\nof establishing centrally located, multinationally\ncontrolled nuclear waste repositories so that the\nnumber of sites that are needed can be limited.\nINCREASED USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES\nEven with strong conservation efforts, energy demands in\nthe United States will continue to increase in response to the\nneeds of a growing economy. The only alternative over the next\n15 to 20 years to increased use of both nuclear energy and coal\nis greater reliance on imported oil which will jeopardize our\nnation's strength and welfare.\n21\nWe now have in the United States 62 licensed nuclear\nplants, providing about 9 percent of our electrical energy.\nBy 1985 we will have from 145 to 160 plants, supplying\n20 percent or more of the Nation's electricity.\nIn many cases, electricity from nuclear plants is\nmarkedly cheaper than that produced from either oil or coal-\nfired plants. Nuclear energy is environmentally preferable\nin a number of respects to other principal ways of generating\nelectricity.\nCommercial nuclear power has an excellent safety record,\nwith nearly 200 plant years of experience (compiled over 18\nchronological years) without a single death from a nuclear\naccident. I have acted to assure that this record is maintained\nin the years ahead. For example, I have increased funds for\nthe independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission and for the\nEnergy Research and Development Administration for reactor\nsafety research and development.\nThe decisions and actions I am announcing today will\nhelp overcome the uncertainties that have served to delay the\nexpanded use of nuclear energy in the United States. While\nthe decision to delay reprocessing is significant, it will not\nprevent us from increasing our use of nuclear energy. We are\non the right course with our nuclear power program in America.\nThe changes I am announcing today will ensure that we continue.\nMy decisions today do not effect the U.S. program of\nresearch and development on the breeder reactor. That program\nassumes that no decision on the commercial operations of\nbreeder reactors, which require plutonium fuel, will be made\nbefore 1986.\nCONCLUSION\nI do not underestimate the challenge represented in the\ncreation of a world-wide program that will permit capturing\nthe benefits of nuclear energy while maintaining needed\nprotection against nuclear proliferation. The challenge is\none that can be managed only partially and temporarily by\ntechnical measures.\n22\nIt can be managed fully if the task is faced realistically\nby nations prepared to forego perceived short-term advantages\nin favor of fundamental long-term gains. We call upon all\nnations to recognize that their individual and collective\ninterests are best served by internationally assured and\nsafeguarded nuclear fuel supply, services and storage. We\nask them to turn aside from pursuing nuclear capabilities\nwhich are of doubtful economic value and have ominous\nimplications for nuclear proliferation and instability in\nthe world.\nThe growing international consensus against the proliferation\nof nuclear weapons is a source of encouragement. But it is\ncertainly not a basis for complacency.\nSuccess in meeting the challenge now before us depends\non an extraordinary coordination of the policies of all nations\ntoward the common good. The U.S. is prepared to lead, but we\ncannot succeed alone. If nations can work together construc-\ntively and cooperatively to manage our common nuclear problems\nwe will enhance our collective security. And we will be better\nable to concentrate our energies and our resources on the great\ntasks of construction rather than consume them in increasingly\ndangerous rivalry.\n11:30 -\nhandout THE WHITE HOUSE\n1 pay Attent\n12:00\nWASHINGTON\nat cui, lost\nOctober 27, 1976\npier and\nm\nMEMORANDUM TO:\nDICK CHENEY\nFROM:\nJIM 20\nnich of to that\n1\nSUBJECT: Antounth Nuclear Policy Statement Plan\nin emarls\nIn order to make certain that the President's statement\nat Marly I/\non nuclear policy is properly understood and reported\nby the media representatives who cover nuclear matters,\nwe propose this schedule:\n1:30\npu\n-\nAt 9.30 a.m., Thursday, October 28, the press\n-- both the press traveling with the President\nand the Washington press -- will be given copies\nof the President's statement and fact sheet,\n2 pm\nembargoed for 11:00 a.m.\n- At 10:00 a.m., Bob Fri, Chuck Robinson and Jim\nsub\nConnor will brief in the White House Press Room.\n3 pin\n- At 11:00 a.m. the statement will become public.\nWhen the President speaks at noon in Cincinnati, he\ncould refer to the fact that he had made an announcement\nwhich would mean 6,000 jobs and a $4 billion plant in\nPortsmouth, Ohio.\nJack Marsh, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Cavanaugh and I recommend\nthis schedule.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nCC: Ron Nessen\nvpm. full statemt cum\nfort that the\nthat wz\nREQUEST\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\n1976 OCT 27 PM 3 46\nOctober 27, 1976\nTO:\nJIM CANNON\nFROM:\nGLENN SCHLEEDE\nSUBJECT:\nPARAGRAPH FOR JACK MARSH\nOR JOE JENCKS\nHere is a proposed paragraph for use as\ntalking points in a conversation with John\nAnderson, Howard Baker, Chuck Percy and\nJavits.\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nAT 11 AM. Thusday OCT 28,\nTomorrow (later today) the President will be issuing a major\nstatement on nuclear policy.\nIt focuses on two major objectives:\npreserving the energy benefits of nuclear energy.\npreventing nuclear proliferation.\nand, we believe, balanced\nIt's a comprehensive tatement in that it deals with all the\noutstanding nuclear policy issues: proliferation, exports,\nreprocessing of nuclear fuel, and nuclear waste management.\nIt reflects three major policy positions:\nFirst, the U.S. will step up diplomatic activities to\nget all nations to help control proliferation, principally\nby avoiding the spread of reprocessing technology and\ncontrolling plutonium.\nSecond, U.S. policy on reprocessing must change. Specifically,\nwe should proceed with nuclear fuel reprocessing only\nif we can safely conclude that the world can overcome\nthe associated risks of proliferation.\nThird, the U.S. and other nations can and should increase\nthe use of nuclear energy -- whether or not reprocessing\nis later approved.\nThe policy decisions are then followed up in the statement with\na comprehensive set of implementing actions -- domestically\nand internationally.\nFORD is GERALD LIBRARY\nFOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE\nOctober 27, 1976\nOffice of the White House Press Secretary\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nFACT SHEET\nPRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN\nAs one part of his comprehensive statement on nuclear policy,\nthe President today announced new steps to assure that the\nU.S. has in place when needed, the facilities for long-term\nmanagement of nuclear wastes from our commercial power plants.\nBACKGROUND\nIn his 1977 Budget, the President proposed a four-fold\nincrease in the funding of the Energy Research and\nDevelopment Administration's program for dealing with\nthe long-term management of nuclear wastes.\nIn March 1976, a review of Federal nuclear waste management\nactivities was undertaken by an interagency task force.\nThe President's actions today were based on the findings\nof that review.\nTHE PRESIDENT'S ACTION ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT\nIn one part of his comprehensive nuclear policy statement, the\nPresident directed that actions be taken to speed up the pro-\ngram to demonstrate all components of waste management technology\nby 1978, and to demonstrate a complete respository by 1985. He\nalso directed that plans for the repository be submitted to the\nNRC for licensing to assure its safety and acceptability.\nBACKGROUND INFORMATION AND DETAILS OF THE PLAN\nA.\nNuclear Waste Requiring Long-Term Management\nU.S. commercial nuclear power reactors \"burn\" low\nenriched uranium fuel and produce in spent fuel rods\na mixture of plutonium, low enriched uranium and waste\nproducts. Certain of these waste products are highly\nradioactive and could constitute a hazard for tens of\nthousands of years if they escaped to the biosphere.\nIf spent fuel rods are reprocessed, the wastes\nwould be separated from the uranium and plutonium\n(which could be saved and recycled as fuel), put\ninto solid form and encased in metal canisters,\nand sent to a repository for disposal.\nIf there is no reprocessing, the spent fuel rods\nthemselves must be packaged and disposed of in a\nrepository.\nUnder either alternative, nuclear wastes must be isolated\nfrom the environment for centuries and the President's plan\nwill accommodate both alternatives.\nmore\n2\nB.\nThe Nuclear Waste Problem and Alternatives for Dealing\nWith It That Have Been Considered.\nThe principle problem in safely managing the waste is\nconfining the radioactivity rather than finding enough\nstorage space. Recent calculations using realistic\nassumptions regarding numbers of reactors and disposal\ntechnology indicate the total volume of solidified\nhigh-level wastes produced by commercial nuclear power\nin the U.S. through 2000 will be equivalent to a cube\nabout 70 feet on each side.\nTechnology or means for nuclear waste disposal and manage-\nment have been developed and demonstrated on a small scale.\nHowever, we do not yet have available a repository for\nnuclear waste disposal. Most spent fuel rods are continuing\nto be stored safely in temporary storage basins at reactor\nsites.\nA wide variety of methods for permanent disposal of these\nwastes has been considered:\nExperts have concluded that the most practical method\nis geologic storage in repositories in stable formations\ndeep underground.\nOther methods under study, but which do not seem practical\nat present, are deep geologic disposal under the ocean\nfloor, transmutation, and launching them into space.\nConsiderable public concern has been expressed that the\nFederal Government has not yet demonstrated that it can\nfulfill its responsibility to provide a repository for\nsafe disposal of nuclear waste.\nTasks ahead include further demonstration of the technology,\nselecting an acceptable site, and proceeding with a coordinate\nprogram to assure that a facility will be available, when\nneeded, about 1985.\nC.\nThe Federal Government's Waste Management Responsibility.\nThe Federal Government has assumed the responsibility for\nlong-term disposal of high-level wastes because of the\nlimited incentives for private parties to engage in\ncommercial storage of these wastes. Private industry\nis responsible for packaging and delivering the waste\nin a prescribed form to a Federal repository.\nD.\nPrincipal Actions Needed and the Status of Those Actions\n1. Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS)\nBecause the program to build and operate a repository\nwill represent a major Federal action with potentially\nsignificant environmental impact, the ERDA is required\nto prepare a generic environmental impact statement\n(GEIS) on its waste management program.\n- The GEIS will examine the impacts of all the major\nwaste management alternatives.\n- Statement will cover all types of nuclear wastes\nfrom the light water reactor fuel cycle.\n- Other environmental impact statements (EIS's) will\nbe required when (i) regulations are proposed, and\n(ii) when construction funds are requested from\nCongress.\nmore\n3\nStatus - ERDA has been at work for some time on the\nGEIS. No major problems are anticipated in completing\nthe statement by late 1977.\n2. General Environmental Standards\nThe Atomic Energy Act, as amended, requires the EPA\nto issue general environmental standards for releases\nto the biosphere from nuclear facilities. These\nstandards will include a numerical limit to long-term\nradiation releases outside the boundaries of the\nrepository -- above the natural background radiation.\nThe standards need to be available as early as possible\nduring the process of locating and constructing the\nrepository.\nStatus - EPA will propose the general standards covering\nhigh level waste in 1977 and publish them in final form\nby mid-1978, in time for the Nuclear Regulatory\nCommission (NRC) to issue its regulations and prior\nto site selection and construction.\n3. Licensing of Waste Repository\nThe Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 requires that\nhigh-level commercial waste repositories be licensed\nby the NRC prior to operation. The NRC is also\nresponsible for issuing the appropriate criteria\nand standards to assure that the respository is\nconstructed and operated in a safe and environmentally\nacceptable manner.\nStatus - ERDA has been directed to ask the NRC to\nsubject the repository to a licensing procedure before\nthe first commercial wastes are shipped. NRC will\nproduce criteria and standards by 1978 governing the\nconstruction and operation of the repository prior to\nthe time the site is finally determined and construc-\ntion begins.\n4. Construction and Operation of a Repository\nERDA, supported by other Federal agencies, has the\nresponsibility to construct and operate the repository,\nincluding:\n- finding an acceptable site\n- acquiring the land\n- designing the repository\n- constructing, operating, and sealing the repository\nStatus\n- FY 1977 appropriations increased funding for this\nprogram to $66 million, up from $12 million in\nFY 1976.\n- The President today directed the Administrator to\nassure the small scale demonstration by 1978 of\nthe process technologies (such as waste solidifica-\ntion, transuranic volume reduction, canister design,\netc.), and by 1985 to have the repository in operation.\nmore\n4\nE.\nTimetable for Actions\nThe principle actions and dates for their accomplishment\nare listed below.\n1976 - ERDA issued for public review the Technical\nAlternatives Document which explains the current\nstate of waste management technology.\n1977 - ERDA issues draft generic environmental impact\nstatement on waste management no later than the\nearly part of the year and begins extensive\nprogram to identify, test and select a site.\n- EPA proposes draft generally applicable standards\nfor permanent storage of high-level wastes.\n- NRC publishes draft standards for solidified\nhigh-level wastes and draft siting, engineering\nand operating criteria for repositories for high-\nlevel wastes. Each element will include the\nappropriate draft environmental impact statements.\n1978 - ERDA will complete initial demonstration work on\ncanister design, waste solidification, and pre-\nliminary repository design, and continue site\nselection process.\n- NRC finalizes proposed site selection criteria,\nsolidification criteria, waste definitions and\noperating criteria and regulations.\n- EPA issues final general ambient standards for\nhigh level waste disposal.\n1979\n- ERDA selects a particular repository site, issues\na draft site specific EIS, and begins intensive\nsite and design work.\n- NRC performs early site review of ERDA repository;\nissues next phase of draft regulations for canister\ndesign, transportation, etc.\n1980 - ERDA completes site and design studies, submits\npreliminary safety analysis and environmental\nreport to NRC in support of construction permit.\n1981 - ERDA begins construction with approval of NRC.\n1984\n- Construction completed, repository tested with\n\"cold\" wastes.\n1985 - NRC issues repository license.\n- Repository begins initial commercial-scale\noperations.\nF.\nThe Interagency Review of Nuclear Waste Management.\nThe review of nuclear waste management was completed by\nan interagency Task Force led by the Office of Management\nand Budget (OMB) and including participants from the\nagencies having a role in nuclear waste management.\nSpecifically: the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),\nthe Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA),\nthe Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Geological\nSurvey (Interior Department), and the National Science\nFoundation (NSF). The independent Nuclear Regulatory\nCommission (NRC) participated as an observer.\n#\n#\n#\n#\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY"
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