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Science and Defense - Press Release, December 11, 1957
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Science and Defense - Press Release, December 11, 1957
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Gerald R. Ford Congressional Papers
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The original documents are located in Box D15, folder "Science and Defense - Press
Release, December 11, 1957" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and
Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box D15 of The Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Release to Wednesday PMs
From the Office of
December 11, 1957
Congressman Gerald R. Ford, Jr.
of Michigan
"The Truman Administration cancellation in June of 1947 of the only
U. S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile contract for the design and construc-
tion of a test vehicle prevented our nation from having an operational ICBM
by 1953, " Representative Gerald R. Ford, Republican of Michigan, stated
following a review of the House appropriation hearings and a study of Defense
Department information.
President Truman ordered the impounding of $75 million of vital
research and development funds in fiscal 1947 that resulted in the entire
elimination of work on long-range supersonic guided missile types. In
April 1946 an initial research and development contract for the design and
construction of an ICBM test vehicle had been awarded to Convair which is
the contractor for the current ICBM Atlas. Approximately 14 months later
this important contract was cancelled as a consequence of the impounding of
research and development funds by President Truman. Senator Stuart
Symington, Democratic of Missouri, one of the critics of the missile program
today, at that time was Assistant Secretary of the Army for Air. He also
served as Secretary of the Air Force from September 18, 1947, to April 26,
1950.
This ICBM contract was not renewed with Convair until January 1951
after the start of the Korean War and then only on a limited or study basis.
According to Congressman Ford, "if the original ICBM program had been
pushed instead of cancelled for a three and one half year period, the United
States would have had an operational ICBM by 1953. 11
President Eisenhower on February 19, 1947, then Chief of Staff for
the War Department, in testifying before the subcommittee of the House
Committee on Appropriations said the following:
"In the field of guided missiles, electronics and supersonic aircraft,
we have no more than scratched the surface of possibilities which we must
explore in order to keep abreast of the rest of the world. Neglect to do so
could bring our country to ruin and defeat in an appallingly few hours. Those
of us who were in Europe in the black days when Hitler was making his last
desperate gamble with the V-I and V-2, know how close to success that
gamble came. Yet those weapons, terrible and effective as they were, were
child's toys in comparison with those which can be produced. "
Despite this strong testimony by General Eisenhower in early 1947 as
to the need to explore guided missiles, the Truman Administration impound
funds Congress had previously appropriated for research and development
GERALD
Ford - 2
It is also pertinent to point out that in the same testimony before the
committee General Eisenhower said,
"But there does exist, most emphatically, the necessity for a
practical, farsighted, well-balanced, and forceful program for research and
development. This program must be planned and operated on a continuing
basis with authorizations available over a period of 4 or 5 years, if
necessary, so that the most economical results can be obtained."
Representative Ford said, "It is obvious from the subsequent
cancellation of the Convair ICBM contract, only 14 months after its initiation,
that the Truman Administration was acting contrary to Eisenhower's
military advice for the effective handling of research and development
programs for modern weapons."
In addition Major General H. S. Aurand, Director of Research and
Development for the War Department in the hearings on the military budget
for fiscal year 1948 said on February 18, 1947, only a few months before the
cancellation of this important ICBM contract by the Truman Administration,
"To continue with the subject of funds required for research and development,
we would like to repeat that, as an example the V-2 indicates, this is a very
expensive undertaking. But, in addition, for efficient operation of research
and development activity, it is essential that there be long-range continuity
of effort. As you gentlemen realize, the accomplishment of long-range
research objectives cannot be attained by a series of disconnected hand-to-
mouth efforts. There is no scientific supermarket where one can drop in and
casually purchase a new can of radar today and a pound of countermeasure
tomorrow. Our ability to operate successfully is therefore dependent not only
on the actual amount of funds in our hands at any given time, but also on the
stability of our future."
Despite General Aurand's warning, the Truman Administration after
the initiation of an ICBM contract in April of 1946 cancelled the same contract
in the summer of 1947. The contract was not renewed until January of 1951.
According to Congressman Ford, "this break in continuity in the funding of
our research and development work on the ICBM by the Truman Adminis-
tration resulted in the U. S. failure to have the long-range supersonic
missiles ahead of the Soviet Union."
On March 6, 1947, Major General C. E. LeMay, then Assistant Chief
of Air Staff Research and Development testified before the Military
Establishment Appropriations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives
that "When the $75 million cut came it was the straw that broke the camel's
back. It meant a cut of 20 to 30 per cent. "
This withholding of research and development funds and the subse-
quent cancellation of the ICBM contract with Convair by the Truman
Administration was made despite the emphatic statements of then General
Eisenhower, General Aurand and General LeMay that continuity in military
research and development was vital in the new weapon field, including
missiles.
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Release to Wednesday PMs
From the Office of
December 11, 1957
Congressman Gerald R. Ford, Jr.
of Michigan
"The Truman Administration cancellation in June of 1947 of the only
U. S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile contract for the design and construc-
tion of a test vehicle prevented our nation from having an operational ICBM
by 1953, 11 Representative Gerald R. Ford, Republican of Michigan, stated
following a review of the House appropriation hearings and a study of Defense
Department information.
President Truman ordered the impounding of $75 million of vital
research and development funds in fiscal 1947 that resulted in the entire
elimination of work on long-range supersonic guided missile types. In
April 1946 an initial research and development contract for the design and
construction of an ICBM test vehicle had been awarded to Convair which is
the contractor for the current ICBM Atlas. Approximately 14 months later
this important contract was cancelled as a consequence of the impounding of
research and development funds by President Truman. Senator Stuart
Symington, Democratic of Missouri, one of the critics of the missile program
today, at that time was Assistant Secretary of the Army for Air. He also
served as Secretary of the Air Force from September 18, 1947, to April 26,
1950.
This ICBM contract was not renewed with Convair until January 1951
after the start of the Korean War and then only on a limited or study basis.
According to Congressman Ford, "if the original ICBM program had been
pushed instead of cancelled for a three and one half year period, the United
States would have had an operational ICBM by 1953. 11
President Eisenhower on February 19, 1947, then Chief of Staff for
the War Department, in testifying before the subcommittee of the House
Committee on Appropriations said the following:
"In the field of guided missiles, electronics and supersonic aircraft,
we have no more than scratched the surface of possibilities which we must
explore in order to keep abreast of the rest of the world. Neglect to do so
could bring our country to ruin and defeat in an appallingly few hours. Those
of us who were in Europe in the black days when Hitler was making his last
desperate gamble with the V-I and V-2, know how close to success that
gamble came. Yet those weapons, terrible and effective as they were, were
child's toys in comparison with those which can be produced. 11
Despite this strong testimony by General Eisenhower in early 1947 as
to the need to explore guided missiles, the Truman Administration impounded
funds Congress had previously appropriated for research and development
Ford - 2
It is also pertinent to point out that in the same testimony before the
committee General Eisenhower said,
"But there does exist, most emphatically, the necessity for a
practical, farsighted, well-balanced, and forceful program for research and
development. This program must be planned and operated on a continuing
basis with authorizations available over a period of 4 or 5 years, if
necessary, so that the most economical results can be obtained."
Representative Ford said, "It is obvious from the subsequent
cancellation of the Convair ICBM contract, only 14 months after its initiation,
that the Truman Administration was acting contrary to Eisenhower's
military advice for the effective handling of research and development
programs for modern weapons."
In addition Major General H. S. Aurand, Director of Research and
Development for the War Department in the hearings on the military budget
for fiscal year 1948 said on February 18, 1947, only a few months before the
cancellation of this important ICBM contract by the Truman Administration,
"To continue with the subject of funds required for research and development,
we would like to repeat that, as an example the V-2 indicates, this is a very
expensive undertaking. But, in addition, for efficient operation of research
and development activity, it is essential that there be long-range continuity
of effort. As you gentlemen realize, the accomplishment of long-range
research objectives cannot be attained by a series of disconnected hand-to-
mouth efforts. There is no scientific supermarket where one can drop in and
casually purchase a new can of radar today and a pound of countermeasure
tomorrow. Our ability to operate successfully is therefore dependent not only
on the actual amount of funds in our hands at any given time, but also on the
stability of our future. 11
Despite General Aurand's warning, the Truman Administration after
the initiation of an ICBM contract in April of 1946 cancelled the same contract
in the summer of 1947. The contract was not renewed until January of 1951.
According to Congressman Ford, "this break in continuity in the funding of
our research and development work on the ICBM by the Truman Adminis-
tration resulted in the U. S. failure to have the long-range supersonic
missiles ahead of the Soviet Union."
On March 6, 1947, Major General C. E. LeMay, then Assistant Chief
of Air Staff Research and Development testified before the Military
Establishment Appropriations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives
that "When the $75 million cut came it was the straw that broke the camel's
back. It meant a cut of 20 to 30 per cent."
This withholding of research and development funds and the subse-
quent cancellation of the ICBM contract with Convair by the Truman
Administration was made despite the emphatic statements of then General
Eisenhower, General Aurand and General LeMay that continuity in military
research and development was vital in the new weapon field, including
missiles.