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House Speech Preserving Peace, January 20, 1960
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House Speech Preserving Peace, January 20, 1960
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The original documents are located in Box D15, folder "House Speech Preserving Peace,
January 20, 1960" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at
the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
the genen by Kep. Ford
(Speech No. 3)
Republem Peace Power
THE CHALLENGE OF PRESERVING PEACE: THE SEVEN DYNAMIC SPEARHEADS OF OUR
Mr. Speaker, the Gentleman from
,
in the second speech of
this series, outlined the Sino-Soviet peril to peace and freedom. Now I ask:
In the decade of the 1960's, can we meet this dire peril? Can we preserve a
peace based on justice? Can we move even one step beyond and enlarge freedom
throughout the world?
We can. But, I firmly believe that we will, only if we remold seven dynamic
spearheads of our free society, the very spearheads which the Republicans already
have used to preserve peace since 1953. Because the peril has deppened, these
spearheads must be continually sharpened.
1. The first of these spearheads is a consistent and firm American foreign
policy designed to clarify our vital commitments in advance, in order that no
opponent will be drawn into war through miscalculations.
Twice in this century the absence of such positive diplomacy has produced
wars. In 1908, when conflict between Austro-Hungary and Serbia was imminent,
Russia backed down on its obligations to come to the aid of Serbia. In 1914, when
a similar crisis developed, Austro-Hungary expected Russia to back down again.
But Russia did not. Thus, the way to World War I was paved by the Austro-Hungary
miscalculation of Russia's position.
California, Mr. Whom,
As the Gentleman from
noted in the previous speech, the
American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in 1950 outlined the perimeter which
Communicate
America would defend in the Far East. Korea was excluded. Therefore, North
calculated Korean Communists that initiated ne unite war States on South Korea woul as a not result entervene of their calculation if They
attached South Kerea
that America would not intervem
FORD i LIBRARY 0.E.ALD
-2-
Here, then, are examples of two prolonged wars, bred in an atmosphere of
miscalculation. Had diplomats made clear, in advance, the positions of their
countries, war could have been prevented.
X
IfTX and grown a flows As 1914 an $1950 erat become were
a aum to become in in ne 1960's suckands
the of future policy, the snept)
was result
hour +
Apparently, Russians today recognize all-out war as nuclear suicide.
If so, the most likely possibility of nuclear war during the decade we have just
entered would be Russia believed that, when confronted with
Through Russia miscaleulatedy. that could occur if
Soreet leaders beleived That, when conformented with)
the brink of war, - Administration in Washington would retreat. Our Adiplomass
an
must avoid inviting a Russian or Red Chinese bluff which could tumble war
[Consequently miscalculation we must OI never our aims, introduce into our foreign policy
which might Today, s bask Russia the knows the United into States new cannot be blackmailed. But free a was.
ambe guitees and appearances communicated of softness calmetations and domestic That are devisions
throughout the 1960's we must continue to have a President, Vice President,
and Secretary of State, who understand the Soviet strategy and who will not
return employ these defensive and ambiguous policies, which produced
Korea or World War
approaches of M Denoriatic Admay
Is there a difference between the abtitudes two parties-envisia
Connol issue and of Me the Republuons need for a consistent. to Mis and firm area of foreign porticy
Fearfully, I must conclude that unfortunately the same differences the Gentleman from
Cahfrma
noted in his speech still exist today. The Democratic
It seems that,
Advisory Council and its spokesmen, Adlai Stevenson and Dean Acheson, are
constantly making statements which often give Red Russia and Red China the picture
make
of a divided America with ambiguous will and zigzagging deplomacy,
It almost seems that they advocate a return to the 1g-zags which brought
on the Korean War and guaranteed its indecisive contingance. This is the Same
GERALD LIBRARY
-3-
apparently Rey want to
old policy stand up to the Communists on one issue, but not
we
shall always
we believe
on the next.
The Republicans abhor this attitude, for It breeds miscalculations.
2. The second dynamic spearhead is an effective, flexible, military
deterrent system which employs a secure retaliatory capacity to respond
vigorously at placessand with means of our own choosing.
There has developed an increasing tendency among critics of the Adminis,
tration to judge our deterrent capacity burely in arithmetical terms 11 This
resing only a part rather than the whole 7 or vetalistory our determent
defensive attitude of trying to match and copy everything Russia does would
In contract we must dook to the total deteasent frace
leave the initiative with Russia. It would isolate particular aspecto of our
capability comparative for
of planned system from to determine the whole. non military protune.
personses.
In order to reverse the pronounced Communist successes throughout the
world, the Eisenhower Administration inaugurated a new foreign policy which was
the antithesis of the containment strategy of the previous administration.
As was noted in the previous speech, containment had resulted in the
United States trying to spread its ground strength around the world so thinly
that it became ineffective. During this same period, we had a virtual atomic
monopoly. Yet, so poorly was this source of potential strength integrated into
our foreign policy that Communist aggression abounded.
Vice President Nixon explained the plight of the new administration when
it took office in 1953:
"We found that economically their (the Russians) plan, apparently,
was to force the United States to stay armed to the teeth, to be prepared
to fight anywhere - anywhere in the world - that they, the men of the
Kremlin chose."
The solution of the new administration was expressed by Mr. Dulles:
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-4-
"The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be
willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of
its own choosing."
This policy demanded a reshaping of our military forces in order to obtain
a mobile retaliatory capacity. Many administration critics were slow, however, to
grasp the true implications of this new strategy. They still do not understand
it. They insist on saying that the term "massive mobile retaliatory capacity"
invesions exclusively
means only atomic retaliation aimed at cities like Moscow or Peiping.
n
They maintain that Mr. Dulles inaugurated a one-weapon strategy, an all
or nothing at all approach. Ironically, his critics attack, for political reasons,
a policy which they fabricated for attack, a straw man which exists only in their
own thinking, a ghost of their imaginations which never existed in the thinking
of the State Department and the White House.
Mr. Dulles often explained the fallacy of such an interpretation. For
example, in a 1954 article published in Foreign Affairs, the late Secretary of
State noted that the new policy, in relation to Korea, did not mean renewed
Communist aggression would result in the United Nations dropping atomic bombs
on Peiping or Moscow. It did mean that we will respond, not defensively, but with
initiative, at times and places of our own choosing. Of course, we will never
alert an opponent in advance to the particular weapon or the particular place
we will respond. Keeping him guessing as to the means -- whether we would use
naval forces, conventional land forces, tactical atomic weapons, or what -- is
part of the psychology of our deterrence. But we will make crystal-clear our
aim to defend an area through an initiative which allowed no privileged sanctuaries
like Manchuria in the Korean War. can a purcle red sanctualy.
It is indeed unfortunate if the constant literature produced about
so-called massive retaliation beclouds the true strategy of the present adminis-
Re meant admiss Thalam
FORD
tration. That strategy ended the Korean War. It deterred war in the Formosa area
GERAL
LIBRARY
-5-
It foiled Communist designs on West Berlin. Throughout the decade ahead, this
strategy can preserve the peace, not through appeasement, but through taking the
initiative. It involves a system of deterrence where our entire arsenal - from
conventional to the most unconventional weapons - is combined with just the
right selectivity to apply force exactly calculated to check the specific case
of aggression.
Throughout the 1960's, our responses must be affirmative - not just negative
and defensive. Our vision must be forward-looking and sensitive to the constantly
changing weapons of our military system. Our perspective must consider the
intra-relationship of our deterrent system. The energy for our national security
must not be wasted on duplication and over-concentration of what is no longer
essential.
When it becomes necessary to increase the proportionate share of budget
spending to maintain this type of security, the American people, through curtailment
of subsidy and non-defense spending programs, must make personal sacrifices.
We can afford the defense we need. But we Republicans believe that we must afford
it through sacrifice, and not through deficit spending. Democrats like those
in their Advisory Council want to afford that defense through charging it to
the next generation and bankrupting their freedom. With splintered vision,
they want to build up our missile defenses by lowering our economic defenses.
power;
3. And this leads us to consider our next spearhead
maintaining
peace with justice in the coming decade: a strong, free, and rapidly growing
American economy.
On May 24, 1957, Khrushchev pronounced:
"We do not intend to blow up the capitalist world with bombs. If
we catch up with the United States in per capita production of
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-6-
meat, butter and milk we will have hit the pillar of capitalism
with the most powerful torpedo yet. If
The Gentleman from Cabferna (Speech No. 2) described how the
Eisenhower policy of using with initiative the total potentialities of our
strength ended the Korean War and blocked major aggression by Communists since.
As a result, the Communists have shifted their major hopes to an economic offensive.
Their success will depend to a large degree upon the fiscal policies and
productive forces within America. For at the base of this Soviet-American economic
conflict is the ruble versus the dollar. The fundamentals of the conflict are
not new to the Communists. Lenin said:
"The best way to destroy the capitalist system is to
debauch the currency."
Plainly, Communist theorists believe that eventually democratic
nations will debauch their own cuffency. There seems to be a mounting danger
of this Communist expectation turning into a reality within America.
Our impoverished overseas neighbors, however, have learned through
bitter experience an economic lesson in survival. They have adopted balanced
budgets and sound economic policies which have produced unprecedented prosperity.
The austerity program in England has yielded budget surpluses and a six per cent
tax cut. Because of hard money policies in France, her economic stability has
greatly increased. The common market has accelerated Europe's over-all economic
rise. Japan is enjoying swift recovery and booming industries. And the economic
growth of West Germany equals that of Red Russia.
And how do these countries view the United States? I quote from some
remarks of William McChesney Martin, Jr.
GERALDA FORD LIBRARY
-7-
"To the foreigner, much more than to Americans, the dollar
is a symbol of this country's strength. A decline in the value
of the dollar would suggest to him a decline in the faith and
credit of the United States, signaling in his mind a decline
not only in American economic strength but also in moral force."
As we enter the 1960's, the Democratic Advisory Council and liberal
Democrats in Congress still scoff at the economic laws which are producing fiscal
health overseas. They vigorously oppose efforts to balance the budget.
What makes their complacency over fiscal policies so perilous?
The industrial revolution, which reached its peak years ago in the
United States, is just going into full swing in many areas abroad. Especially
is this true in the iron curtain countries where the labor force has been
reduced to slavery.
This cheap labor market becomes an acute factor in East-West trade
compeition, since in the United States wages often climb more rapidly than
profits. Thus, the final cost of our products has priced us out of many foreign
markets. This places us at a disadvantage in a trade war with Russia. Must we
add to this the handicap of a decadent dollar?
Because of the importance of the dollar in our foreign policy, fiscal
soundness at home has become essential in meeting the Communist peril abroad.
This and the other economic essentials will be treated in more detail in a
subsequent speech of this series.
spearhead of pean power
4. The fourth dynamic force is collective security and solidarity
throughout the free world. Mr. Herter said recently:
"Our greatest advantage in the world struggle is that
we are not alone. Many countries are with us wholeheartedly
and confidently. Many others are with us in spirit, even though
they cannot say so."
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
-8-
To maintain this advantage, we must continue to foster our collective
security system. In certain respects, this system is an economy measure, for it
enables our allies to supplement our own military forces.
The numerous bases in those friendly countries not only provide needed
facilities for our air and naval forces, but also afford us missile sites. This
dispersion of bases throughout the world makes it impossible for Soviet aircraft
and missiles to destroy our retaliatory capacity.
The other vital military contribution of our allies is in terms of manpower.
The United States is able to devote primary emphasis to strategic striking forces,
to missiles, and to space developments because of this supplementary manpower.
So, our conventional war strength can be only partly appraised in terms of U.S.
Army combat divisions. It can be fully evaluated in terms of the allied
divisions our forces support and train. The technical, logistical and missile
capabilities perform a vital function for numerous military assistance groups
and provide tactical support to many allies.
Paradoxically, many representatives of the opposition have shouted
that our army divisional strength is too small, and then have voted to cut
mutual security funds and hence the strength of our allies, which comes at
less cost.
At the same time, our entire foreign aid program must be subject to
periodic reappraisal. A decade ago the economy of many of our major allies
was in a depressed state, and this required us to bear the major burden of
both military and general economic aid to the free world. We rejoice in the
startling recovery that many of those allies have made, and we call upon
-9-
them to accept their full share of responsibility in fostering both the defense
and economic health of the free world.
As a result of economic transactions with other countries last year,
the United States had a deficit in balance payments of about $3,400,000,000.
Why has this deficit resulted? We currently have a surplus of $3,500,000,000
in exports of goods and services. But we have an annual expenditure of about
$3,000,000,000 to maintain our military forces overseas. Our loans, grants, and
capital outflow that increase our exports amount to about $2,500,000,000 annually,
and we have a private capital investment outflow of about $2,000,000,000 a year.
Obviously, it is necessary to our economic health that the prosperous free nations
bear more of the burden in maintaining efficient defenses, of encouraging private
investment and in assisting the less developed areas.
Solidarity of the free world involves more than just the economic
aspect. It has a psychological and diplomatic side, too.
It is indeed tragic that the leading foreign policy spokesman of the
forate
Democratic Advisory Council, Mr. Dean Acheson, seems to seeff our efforts to
promote moral solidarity throughout the world. On the eve of the President's
departure for an unprecedentedly long and strenuous trip among our many allies
and friends, Mr. Acheson publicly said that little good would come from the trip.
While the President tries to promote unity, Acheson
to promote disunity.
Has he no awareness of the importance attached to statements of a former
Secretary of State?
Will he never learn a lesson? About a year ago he was the principal
author of an Advisory Council pamphlet which painted a picture of disunity
within the free world and claimed that our position in the world and our
alliances were dissolving - "as just a hundred years ago men watched the Union
GERALD FORD
-10-
dissolve under the weak and palsied hand of Buchanan." The release of this
vindictive pamphlet was timed to coincide with the week that the NATO ministers
were meeting in Washington to reaffirm unity and solidarity. The Berlin crisis
had begun, and it was necessary to our diplomacy to present Khrushchev with the
picture of a united NATO. And yet, the Democratic Advisory Council used its
efforts to propagandize the line of disunity.
When supporting and promoting collective security and solidarity among our
allies, the parties should make a constructive contribution. During the 1960's,
we call upon responsible Democrats to do something, somehow, to control these
non-constructive spokesmen of their Advisory Council. Indeed, we sympathize
with those Members on the other side of the aisle who deplore this irresponsibility.
The dilemmas of their party disunity, however, in no way relieve them from the
duty to curtail this council when its members jeopardize unity in our defenses
against the Sino-Soviet peril. For, in the decade ahead, cooperation among
our political parties to promote allied unity will be as important as cooperation
among the allies themselves.
5. Science and technology is the fifth spearhead of a free society which
we must vastly sharpen.
The deepest peril we face is that the Russians will concentrate on a
few given, but quite decisive areas and develop superior technological skills.
In the area of rocket technology, we have seen what they have accomplished in
outer space. This did not happen by luck. They had enormous vision and great
drive. By 1947, the rocket theories of the German scientist, Sanger, had
created a tidal wave of excitement in the Kremlin.
So that a top priority could be set up for the rocket program, Stalin
ordered an aerodynamics expert, Colonel Gugori Tokaev, to his office. Tokaev,
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-11-
who later defected, said that the Kremlin leaders were in almost "an hysterical
clamor" for greater details about a super rocket. Neither were the diplomatic
implications of this technological adventure lost on Stalin. He told Tokaev
that the rocket "would make it easier to talk to the gentleman shopkeeper, Truman."
As Dr. von Braun pointed out at the time Russia shot up her first
sputnik, "the United States had no ballistic missile program worth mentioning
between 1945 and 1951 These six years, during which the Russians obviously
laid the groundwork for their large rocket program, are irretrievably lost."
At the outset of the 1960's, we must launch into this field of
technology with renewed determination to make up for the lost years. We must
surpass Russia. Erratic programming and crash measures are not the answer.
Clear lines of leadership, however, are essential. And I hail it as a great
step forward that all space projects, including the brilliant team of Dr. von
Braun, have now been placed under the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration. The news that the Saturn Project may cut two years from Russia's
lead time is most heartening.
In the decade ahead, however, we must meet a much broader challenge
yet in the fields of science and technology. Many spokesmen of the Democratic
Advisory Council appear to advocate responses which exclusively involve
greater appropriations of money and greater bureaucratic controls. Paradoxically,
Russia has made profound progress in science and technology because in this
area she abandoned Marxian centralism and control and inaugurated freedom and
incentive. Did not Khrushchev, during his visit to America, boast to the
President that Russia used incentives more extensively than did the United States?
In contrast to the approach of the Democratic Advisory Council, the
Percy Committee Report emphasized that there are three essentials to the
-12-
creation of a strong science and technology:
"The maintenance of an environment of freedom and public
understanding in which creativity can flourish.
"The maintenance of a superior educational system which
stresses the value of excellence for its own sake and which
makes a special effort to search out the most gifted minds,
wherever found, and to make available to them the most
advanced training which they are capable of absorbing.
"The provision of scientists and engineers with the economic
resources with which to pursue their search with the utmost
aggressiveness."
This approach will indeed grant our nation a new lease on its heritage,
and a renewed faith in its capacity.
And this leads to a consideration of the next dynamic force.
6. The sixth dynamic spearhead is the increased use of the psychological,
moral and spiritual resources of a free society.
The Communists have made a god of Karl Marx and a religion of
scientific materialism. Undoubtedly, the Marxian gospel exploits the
weaknesses of human nature. Its breeding ground is in discontent and in
frustrated hopes.
So, we are dealing with a dangerous peril, one involving far more
deadly consequences that just missiles, military strategy and geographical
battlefields. The peril is not solely from without. It threatens from within
as well. It will prey on our every lack of faith in ourselves.
During this age of conflict, the decisive battleground will be in
the minds of men.
by
The static lie of Russian Communism can be met only/the dynamic
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-13-
truth of American freedom. Unfortunately, many Americans have not awakened to
the basis of the big lie even within their own country. The big lie is found
in the materialistic interpretation of man and man's destiny. Of this, Communism
is merely a ruthless manifestation. This materialism is often called, simply,
socialism. Our ideas and faith can never be victorious over Communistic ideas
through a greater application of materialism, statism, and socialism.
I fear that the Democratic Advisory Council exerts an influence to
convert our foreign policy into a materialistic program, to purge it of all
principle. Is this not a repetition of the pattern of allowing the Soviet to
control the initiative and to choose the framework for conflict?
A strong faith and ideology within America is essential. It isjust
as essential to carry it to the Russian people themselves. This leads to the
next force.
7. The seventh dynamic spearhead is a people-to-people approach. The
Vice President's visit to Soviet Russia last summer was a creative, dynamic and
timely breakthrough of the Soviet iron curtain. I say it was creative because
it challenged the Communists as never before into a contest of ideas. I say
it was dynamic for it was a giant step forward toward a long standing aim of
the Eisenhower foreign policy of liberating minds and restoring freedom within
the Sino-Soviet bloc.
The Percy Report has splendidly summed up our policy of liberation:
"Our policy of non-violent emancipation, with its long-run
perspectives, would spell out the policy of peaceful liberation
which some have either not understood or deliberately distorted
out of all proportions. The emancipation policy promises to
establish much-needed facilities for the peaceable creation of
pressures for gradual expansion of freedom within the Communist
empire.'
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-14-
During his visit to Russia, Vice President Nixon superbly dramatized
American superiority in the production of consumer goods. Granted, much of
what he said never got to the Russian masses. But some of what he said had a
marked effect. A continued program of this nature, with increased cultural and
scientific exchanges will bring to the Russian people and to the satellites
the American story of the benefits from a free economy. In turn, this story
will create upward pressures on the Soviet rulers. This could deter Soviet
aggression and expand Russian and satellite freedoms.
The follow-up to the initial people to people approach has been the
personal diplomacy of President Eisenhower. For some time before his death,
Secretary of State Dulles had pointed out to the President his tremendous
prestige throughout the world. The time might come, insisted Dulles, for the
President to use fully this prestige and influence through a series oftours.
Obviously, it would have been a cardinal blunder to embark in this personal
diplomacy at the wrong time. But, was the time not ideal, before a summit
meeting, towards the end of the President's term in office? This would further
steal the initiative from Mr. Khrushchev. It would cast the setting for the
conflict where we want it -- in the arena of world opinion . that would make
it a battle of ideas and not of missiles.
The casual observer will ask: Have not some of the members of the
Democratic Advisory Council been calling for a summit meeting year after year?
And is the Republican leadership not now taking us to a summit? So, is there
any difference in attitudes in this particular regard?
Most certainly, yes. The difference is in timing and in preparation.
Yalta and Potsdam were failures. We tried a summit in 1955 and it became
clearly evident that Khrushchev was not yet thoroughly convinced that the
GEBALD FORD LIBRARY
-15-
Eisenhower Administration had irrevocably inaugurated a new foreign policy which
would not bow to blackmail and to duplicity. It took four more years to
educate the Soviet leaders, during crisis after crisis, that America would
not compromise vital issues. And the final part of Khrushchev's education
was during the Berlin crisis of 1959. He gave America a deadline. He was
determined to humiliate us into a summit, when the entire world knew it was
blackmail. America stood her ground, despite the fact that a former Truman
advisor, George Kennan, declared we should withdraw from Europe altogether.
Khrushchev's education was complete. He was confronted with a new
foreign policy, far different from that of the Truman Administration.
He had the alternative of plunging his country into an all-out war, or
seeking a peaceful means of competition. At this decisive moment, the
President took the initiative. He sought to avoid a condition mentioned in
the speech of the gentleman from
(Speech No. 2),
where a Soviet leader might see no way out and irrationally tumble towards
war. Without retreating from the Berlin issue, Mr. Eisenhower invited Mr.
Khrushchev to the United States. The Soviet Chairman was further diverted
towards peaceful means of compeition.
Now we do hold the initiative.
The greatest single challenge of the 1960's is to bring the people to
people approach closer and closer to every member of the Communist empire.
This policy, however, can backfire if executed by unskilled men with limited
ability and limited vision. We must continue to have as President, Vice
President and Secretary of State, leaders with judgment and knowledge of
world affairs. The future of this country, indeed, the future of freedom
throughout the world, cannot be risked, either to rank amateurs in
international relations, or to those who produced the ambiguous and faltering
diplomacy of the late 1940's.
GERALD FORD VIRBARA
-16-
As we enter the decade of the 1960's, a profound difference emerges
between the foreign policy approaches of the Republicans and of the Democratic
Advisory Council. Basically, it is this. While the Republicans are looking
forward, members of the Democratic Advisory Council, the Stevensons and the
Achesons, are looking backward. Against the Russian peril, they still do not
understand the need for a consistent, clear policy of firmness. They have
splintered vision, and see the Soviet peril only in parts. Their reactions
are defensive.
The Republicans undertook the campaign of 1952 with two important
foreign policy aims: to end the war in Korea, and to initiate a policy of
liberation. Peace in Korea, the Republicans knew, could only come from
reshaping a policy of the initiative, which outlawed the privileged sanctuary.
Liberation of those in Soviet slavedom could only come by maneuvering the
Russian leaders into a climate of exchange of ideas, culture, and competition
in consumer production.
This year the Republicans undertake another campaign. More than just
political, it is a campaign to promulgate a philosophy for maintaining peace
with justice and extending freedom here and throughout the world.
We have summed up this policy for the 1960's in terms of seven spearheads
of a free society.
Why is the Republican Party capable of promoting this dynamic policy?
Because as a party it possesses the four qualities which the Chairman of the
Republican Policy Committee mentioned in the initial speech: unity; philosophy
based on principle; representation within party organizations; and vision towards
future generations.
With these qualities, the Republicans uniquely are equipped to furnish
foreign policy leadership to turn the age ahead from peril to promise.
GERALD FORD STBRARY
FOR RELEASE
Wednesday PMs
January 20, 1960
From the office of Representative Gerald Ford (R-Mich)
Rep. Gerald Ford (R-Mich) told the House today that Republicans
"uniquely are equipped to furnish foreign policy leadership to turn the age
ahead from peril to promise."
Delivering the third in a series of House speeches on Republican policy,
Rep. Ford declared that the Republican Administration since 1953 had
implemented "seven dynamic spearheads of peace power."
"Because the peril has deepened," he said, "these spearheads must con-
tinually be sharpened."
He said that Democratic foreign policy had resulted in "an atmosphere
of miscalculation" which Republican foreign policy has avoided. And he
cited the unity of the Republican Party which has enabled it to devise and
put into effect "a consistent and firm foreign policy."
Charging Democratic spokesmen, particularly the Democratic Advisory
Council, with making "statements which often give Red. Russia and Red
China the picture of a divided America with ambiguous will, " Rep. Ford
listed these seven Republican spearheads of peace power:
1. "A consistent and firm American policy," as opposed to the Demo-
cratic performance of "stand up to theCommunists on one issue, but not
on the next."
2. "An effective, flexible military deterrent system," which enables
America to select the places and means of retaliation. The Democratic
alternative, he said, is "a defensive attitude of trying to match and copy
everything Russia does."
3. "A strong, free and rapidly growing American economy." Rep. Ford
said that foreign nations had learned "through bitter experience an economic
lesson in survival" but he added that, at home, Democrats "still scoff at
the economic laws which are producing fiscal health overseas. Most of
them vigorously oppose efforts to balance the budget."
4. "Collective security and solidarity throughout the free world." In
contrast to Republican efforts, Rep. Ford said, "while the President tries
to promote unity, Acheson seems to promote disunity." Rep. Ford cited
Mr. Acheson's advance criticism and doubt of the President's
smash-hit visit to 11 nations.
5. "Science and technology," which the United States "must vastly
sharpen." Rep. Ford said that the United States "must make up for the
lost years" of 1945-51 but he added that "erratic programming and crash
measures are not the answer."
6. "Increased use of the psychological, moral and spiritual resources of
a free society." Rep. Ford accused the Democratic Advisory Council of
exerting "an influence to convert our foreign policy into a materialistic
program."
7. "A people to people approach." Rep. Ford cited the Russian journey
of Vice President Nixon and the "personal diplomacy of President Eisenhower
as dramatic means which "challenged the Communists as never before into
a contest of ideas." As a result of these activities plus our firm stand on
Berlin, Rep. Ford said, "now we do hold the initiative."
(The text of Rep. Ford's speech is attached.)
Lee Shade
RELEASE
Saturday, a.m.'s
January 16, 1960
From the office of Charles A. Halleck (R-Ind.), House Minority Leader
Republican House Leader Charles A. Halleck today announced that an
aggressive group of Republicans will initiate on the House Floor next week a
series of speeches about the ways the two major political parties "face the
perils and promises of the Sixties."
Halleck said the speeches represent the results of discussions and re-
search conducted by the Congressmen over the past several months.
"These colleagues of mine feel strongly that the Republican Party is the
party best equipped and qualified to face the key challenges of the decade we
have just entered, 11 Halleck said.
The Minority Leader said the speeches were designed to spell out why
four qualities are essential to any political organization "which seeks to serve
the country by meeting the issues critical to the survival of freedom."
He said these qualities were party unity, party philosophy based on prin-
ciples, party democracy and party concern for future generations of Americans.
Rep. Halleck said the group was convinced that the two-party system in
America was not working as it should because the Democrat party lacked each
of these qualities.
He said the speeches would support charges that "Democrat squabbling
forces that party to compromise and blur the issues. They shrink before
challenges which could cause their political house to split apart.
"A party that does not have some sort of unity and togetherness just can't
face successfully the issues of the Sixties," Halleck said.
FORD
&
"On the other hand, 11 he added, "Republicans are moving into this new
OF
- 2 -
with greater unity than ever before in party history. And united, we have dem-
onstrated our ability to preserve the peace and promote abundance.
First speech in the series, dealing with how democracy works-or doesn't
work--in the two parties, will be delivered by Rep. John Byrnes, Chairman of
the Republican Policy Committee.
Reps. John Rhodes and Tom Curtis will speak on what Mr. Halleck de-
scribed as, "the Republican battle for more prosperity for every breadwinner,
housewife and child. This is the fight for America's families."
The party's campaign for "preserving peace with justice and avoiding
future Koreas" will be told by Reps. Bob Wilson and Jerry Ford, Halleck said.
Republican efforts to promote the economy and maintain good labor-
management relations will be the subject of a speech by Rep. Bob Griffin.
Rep. Halleck commended the efforts of his colleagues in sparking this
vigorous effort to get across to the public the role and philosophy of the
Republicans in the House of Representatives.
"I have felt for a long time that we just haven't done a selling job on the
accomplishments for the country's good that have come about under a Repub-
lican Administration," Halleck commented.
He said that he had been asked to make the final speech in the series and
would do so.
"Out of such efforts," Halleck said, "I hope the public will become better
informed, our two-party system restored and our government improved."
January 20, 1960
TEXT OF ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.ON JANUARY 20,
1960, BY REPRESENTATIVE GERALD R. FORD, JR. (R.-MICH.).
THE CHALLENGE OF PRESERVING PEACE: THE SEVEN
DYNAMIC SPEARHEADS OF PEACE POWER
Mr. Speaker, the Gentleman from California, in the second speech of
this series, outlined the Sino-Soviet peril to peace and freedom. Now I ask:
In the decade of the 1960's, can we meet this dire peril?
Can we preserve a peace based on justice?
Can we move even one step beyond and enlarge freedom throughout the
world?
We can. But, I firmly believe that we will, only if we remold seven
dynamic spearheads of peace power, the very spearheads which the Republicans
already have used to preserve peace since 1953. Because the peril has deepened,
these spearheads must be continually sharpened.
1. The first of these spearheads is a consistent and firm American foreign
policy designed to clarify our vital commitments in advance, in order that no
opponent will be drawn into war through miscalculations.
Twice in this century the absence of such positive diplomacy has pro-
duced wars. In 1908, when conflict between Austro-Hungary and Serbia was
imminent, Russia backed down on its obligations to come to the aid of Serbia. In
1914, when a similar crisis developed, Austro-Hungary expected Russia to back
down again. But Russia did not. Thus, the way to World War I was paved by the
Austro-Hungary miscalculation of Russia's position.
As the Gentleman from California (Mr. Wilson) noted in the previous
speech, the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in 1950 outlined the
perimeter which America would defend in the Far East. Korea was excluded.
Therefore, the Communists calculated that the United States would not intervene
if they attacked South Korea.
Here, then, are examples of two prolonged wars, bred in an atmosphere
of miscalculation. Had diplomats made clear, in advance, the positions of their
countries, war could have been prevented.
Apparently, Russians today recognize all-out war as nuclear suicide. If
so, the most likely possibility of nuclear war during the decade we have just en-
tered would be through Russia miscalculating. That could occur if Soviet leaders
-2-
believed that, when confronted with the brink of war, an Administration in Wash.
ington would retreat.
Consequently, we must never introduce into our foreign policy ambigu-
ities and appearances of softness and domestic divisions which might spark the
Communists into a miscalculation that could fuse a war.
Today, Russia knows the United States cannot be bluffed or blackmailed.
Throughout the decade ahead we must continue to have a President, Vice Presi-
dent, and Secretary of State, who understand the Soviet strategy and who will
not employ defensive and ambiguous policies.
Is there a difference between the approaches of the Democratic Advisory
Council and the Republicans to this area of foreign policy?
Unfortunately the same differences the Gentleman from California
(Mr. Wilson) noted in his speech exist today. The Democratic Advisory Council
and its spokesmen, Adlai Stevenson and Dean Acheson, make statements which
often give Red Russia and Red China the picture of a divided America with
ambiguous will and zig zagging diplomacy. Apparently they want to stand up
to the Communists on one issue, but not on the next.
We Republicans shall always abhor this attitude. For we believe it
breeds miscalculations.
2. The second dynamic spearhead of peace power is an effective, flexi-
ble, military deterrent system. It must employ a secure retaliatory capacity
to respond vigorously at places and with means of our own choosing.
There has developed an increasing tendency among critics of the Admin-
istration to judge our deterrent capacity purely in arithmetical terms using only
a part rather than the whole of our deterrent or retaliatory capability for com-
parative purposes. This defensive attitude of trying to match and copy every-
thing Russia does would leave the initiative with Russia. In contrast, we must
look to the total deterrent force in being and planned to determine our real
military posture.
In order to reverse the pronounced Communist successes throughout the
world, the Eisenhower Administration inaugurated a new foreign policy which
&
was the antithesis of the containment strategy of the previous administration.
As was noted in the previous speech, containment had resulted in the
GERAED
- 3 -
United States trying to spread its ground strength around the world so thinly
that it became ineffective. During this same period, we had a virtual atomic
monopoly. Yet, so poorly was this source of potential strength integrated into
our foreign policy that Communist aggression abounded.
Vice President Nixon explained the plight of the new administration when
it took office in 1953:
"We found that economically their (the Russians) plan, ap-
parently, was to force the United States to stay armed to the
teeth, to be prepared to fight anywhere - - anywhere in the world -
that they, the men of the Kremlin chose."
The solution of the new administration was expressed by Mr. Dulles:
"The way to deter aggression is for the free community to
be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means
of its own choosing."
This policy demanded a reshaping of our military forces in order to ob-
tain a mobile retaliatory capacity. Many administration critics were slow,
however, to grasp the true implications of this new strategy. They still do not
understand it. They insist on saying that the term "massive mobile retaliatory
capacity" envisions exclusively atomic retaliation aimed at cities like Moscow
or Peiping.
They maintain that Mr. Dulles inaugurated a one-weapon strategy, an all
or nothing at all approach. Ironically, his critics attack, for political reasons,
a policy which they fabricated for attack, a straw man which exists only in
their own thinking, a ghost of their imaginations which never existed in the
thinking of the State Department and the White House.
Mr. Dulles often explained the fallacy of such an interpretation. For
example, in a 1954 article published in Foreign Affairs, the late Secretary of
State noted that the new policy, in relation to Korea, did not mean that renewed
Communist aggression would result in the United Nations dropping atomic bombs
on Peiping or Moscow. It did mean that we will respond, not defensively, but
with initiative, at times and places of our own choosing.
Of course, we will never alert an opponent in advance to the particular
weapon or the particular place we will respond. Keeping him guessing as to the
means whether we would use naval forces, convengional land forces, tactical
atomic weapons, or what - is part of the psychology of our deterrence. But we
- 4 -
will make crystal-clear our aim to defend an area through an initiative which
allowed no privileged sanctuaries. Manchuria in the Korean War was a
privileged sanctuary.
It is unfortunate indeed if the constant literature produced about so-
called massive retaliation beclouds the true strategy of the present administra-
tion. That strategy of the present Administration ended the Korean War. It
deterred war in the Formosa area. It foiledCommunist designs on West Berlin.
Throughout the decade ahead, this same strategy of initiative can preserve the
peace.
It involves a system of deterrence where our entire arsenal - from
conventional to the most unconventional weapons is combined with just the
right selectivity to apply force exactly calculated to check the specific case of
aggression.
Throughout the 1960's, our responses must be affirmative not just
negative and defensive. Our vision must be forward-looking and sensitive to
the constantly changing weapons of our military system. Our perspective must
consider the intra-relationship of our deterrent system. The energy for our
national security must not be wasted on duplication and over-concentration of
what is no longer essential.
When it becomes necessary to increase the proportionate share of
budget spending to maintain this type of security, the American people, through
curtailment of subsidy and non-defense spending programs, must make personal
sacrifices. We can afford the defense we need. But we Republicans believe
that we must afford it through sacrifice, and not through deficit spending.
Democrats like those in their Advisory Council want to afford that de-
fense through charging it to the next generation and bankrupting their freedom.
With splintered vision, they want to build up our missile defenses by lowering
our economic defenses.
3. And this leads us to consider our next spearhead of peace power: a
strong, free, and rapidly growing American economy.
On May 24, 1957, Khrushchev pronounced:
"We do not intend to blow up the capitalist world with bombs.
If we catch up with the United States in per capita production of
meat, butter and milk we will have hit the pillar of capitalism
with the most powerful torpedo yet."
- 5 -
The Gentleman from California (Speech No. 2) described how the
Eisenhower policy of using with initiative the total potentialities of our strength
ended the Korean War and blocked major aggression by Communists since. As
a result, the Communists have shifted their major hopes to an economic of-
fensive.
Their success will depend to a large degree upon the fiscal policies and
productive forces within America. For at the base of this Soviet-American
economic conflict is the ruble versus the dollar. The fundamentals of the con-
flict are not new to the Communists. Lenin said:
"The best way to destroy the capitalist system is to
debauch the currency."
Plainly, Communist theorists believe that eventually democratic nations
will debauch their own currency. There seems to be a mounting danger of this
Communist expectation turning into a reality within America.
Our impoverished overseas neighbors, however, have learned through
bitter experience an economic lesson in survival. They have adopted balanced
budgets and sound economic policies which have produced unprecedented pros-
perity. The austerity program in England has yielded budget surpluses and a
six per cent tax cut. Because of hard money policies in France, her economic
stability has greatly increased. The common market has accelerated Europe"s
over-all economic rise. Japan is enjoying swift recovery and booming indus-
tries. And the economic growth of West Germany equals that of Red Russia.
And how do these countries view the United States? I quote from some
remarks of William McChesney Martin, Jr.
"To the foreigner, much more than to Americans, the dollar
is a symbol of this country strength. A decline in the value
of the dollar would suggest to him a decline in the faith and credit
of the United States, signaling in his mind a decline not only in
American economic strength but also in moral force."
As we enter the 1960's, the Democratic Advisory Council and liberal
Democrats in Congress still scoff at the economic laws which are producing
fiscal health overseas. They vigorously oppose efforts to balance the budget.
What makes their complacency over fiscal policies so perilous?
The industrial revolution, which reached its peak years ago in the
United States, is just going into full swing in many areas abroad. Especially
is this true in the iron curtain countries where the labor force has been
- 6 -
reduced to slavery.
This cheap labor market becomes an acute factor in East-West trade
competition, since in the United States wages often climb more rapidly than
profits. Thus, the final cost of our products has priced us out of many foreign
markets. This places us at a disadvantage in a trade war with Russia. Must
we add to this the handicap of a decadent dollar?
Because of the importance of the dollar in our foreign policy, fiscal
soundness at home has become essential in meeting the Communist peril
abroad. This and the other economic essentials will be treated in more detail
in a subsequent speech of this series.
4. The fourth dynamic spearhead of peace power is collective security
and solidarity throughout the free world. Mr. Herter said recently:
"Our greatest advantage in the world struggle is that
we are not alone. Many countries are with us wholeheartedly
and confidently. Many others are with us in spirit, even though
they cannot say so."
To maintain this advantage, we must continue to foster our collective
security system. In certain respects, this system is an economy measure,
for it enables our allies to supplement our own military forces.
The numerous bases in those friendly countries not only provide needed
facilities for our air and naval forces, but also afford us missile sites. This
dispersion of bases throughout the world makes it impossible for Soviet aircraft
and missiles to destroy our retaliatory capacity.
The other vital military contribution of our allies is in terms of man-
power. The United States is able to devote primary emphasis to strategic
striking forces, to missiles, and to space developments because of this supple-
mentary manpower. So, our conventional war strength can be only partly ap-
praised in terms of U.S. Army combat divisions. It can be fully evaluated in
terms of the allied divisions our forces support and train. The technical,
logistical and missile capabilities perform a vital function for numerous mili-
tary assistance groups and provide tactical support to many allies.
Paradoxically, many representatives of the opposition have shouted
that our army divisional strength is too small, and then have voted to cut
mutual security funds and hence the army divisional strength of our allies,
- 7 -
which comes at less cost to us in dollars and American manpower.
At the same time, our entire foreign aid program must be subject to
periodic reappraisal. A decade ago the economy of many of our major allies
was in a depressed state, and this required us to bear the major burden of
both military and general economic aid to the free world. We rejoice in the
startling recovery that many of those allies have made, and we call upon them
to accept their full share of responsibility in fostering both the defense and
economic health of the free world.
As a result of economic transactions with other countries last year, the
United States had a deficit in balance payments of about $3, 400, 000, 000. Why
has this deficit resulted? We currently have a surplus of $3, 500, 000, 000 in
exports of goods and services. But we have an annual expenditure of about
$3, 000, 000, 000 to maintain our military forces overseas. Our loans, grants,
and capital outflow that increase our exports amount to about $2, 500, 000, 000
annually, and we have a private capital investment outflow of about :
$2, 000, 000, 000 a year. Obviously, it is necessary to our economic health
that the prosperous free nations bear more of the burden in maintaining
efficient defenses, of encouraging private investment and in assisting the less
developed areas.
Solidarity of the free world involves more than just the economic aspect.
It has a psychological and diplomatic side, too.
It is indeed tragic that the leading foreign policy spokesman of the Demo-
cratic Advisory Council, Mr. Dean Acheson, seems to berate our efforts to
promote moral solidarity throughout the world. On the eve of the President's
departure for an unprecedentedly long and strenuous trip among our many
allies and friends, Mr. Acheson publicly said that little good would come from
the trip. While the President tries to promote unity, Acheson seems to promote
disunity. Has he no awareness of the importance attached to statements of a
former Secretary of State?
Will he never learn a lesson? About a year ago he was the principal
author of an Advisory Council pamphlet which painted a picture of disunity
within the free world and claimed that our position in the world and our
alliances were dissolving - "as just a hundred years ago men watched the Union
- 8 -
dissolve under the weak and palsied hand of Buchanan." The release of this
vindictive pamphlet was timed to coincide with the week that the NATO ministers
were meeting in Washington to reaffirm unity and solidarity. The Berlin
crisis had begun, and it was necessary to our diplomacy to present Khrushchev
with the picture of a united NATO. And yet, the Democratic Advisory Council
used its efforts to propagandize the line of disunity.
When supporting and promoting collective security and solidarity among
our allies, both political parties should make a constructive contribution.
During the 1960's, we call upon responsible Democrats to do something, some-
how, to control these non-constructive spokesmen of their Advisory Council.
Indeed, we sympathize with those Members on the other side of the aisle who
deplore this irresponsibility.
The dilemmas of their party disunity, however, in no way relieve them
from the duty to curtail this council when its members jeopardize unity in our
defenses against the Sino-Soviet peril. For, in the decade ahead, cooperation
among our political parties to promote allied unity will be as important as CO-
operation among the allies themselves.
5. Science and technology is the fifth spearhead of peace power which
we must vastly sharpen.
The deepest peril we face is that the Russians will concentrate on a few
given, but quite decisive areas and develop superior technological skills. In
the area of rocket technology, we have seen what they have accomplished in
outer space. This did not happen by luck. They had enormous vision and great
drive. By 1947, the rocket theories of the German scientist, Sanger, had
created a tidal wave of excitement in the Kremlin.
So that a top priority could be set up for the rocket program, Stalin
ordered an aerodynamics expert, Colonel Gugori Tokaev, to his office. Tokaev,
who later defected, said that the Kremlin leaders were in almost "an hysterical
clamor" for greater details about a super rocket. Neither were the diplomatic
implications of this technological adventure lost on Stalin. He told Tokaev
that the rocket "would make it easier to talk to the gentleman shopkeeper,
Truman."
- 9 -
As Dr. von Braun pointed out at the time Russia shot up her first
sputnik, "the United States had no ballistic missile program worth mentioning
between 1945 and 1951
These six years, during which the Russians obviously
laid the groundwork for their large rocket program, are irretrievably lost. "
At the outset of the 1960's, we must launch into this field of technology
with renewed determination to make up for the lost years. We must surpass
Russia. Erratic programming and crash measures are not the answer. Clear
lines of leadership, however, are essential. And I hail it as a great step for-
ward that all space projects, including the brilliant team of Dr. von Braun,
have now been placed under the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
The news that the Saturn Project may cut two years from Russia's lead time
is most heartening.
In the decade ahead, however, we must meet a much broader challenge
yet in the fields of science and technology. Many spokesmen of the Democratic
Advisory Council appear to advocate responses which exclusively involve
greater appropriations of money and greater bureaucratic controls. Paradoxi-
cally, Russia has made profound progress in science and technology because in
this area she abandoned Marxian centralism and control and inaugurated
freedom and incentive. Did not Khrushchev, during his visit to America, boast
to the President that Russia used incentives more extensively than did the
United States?
In contrast to the approach of the Democratic Advisory Council, the
Percy Committee Report emphasized that there are three essentials to the
creation of a strong science and technology:
"The maintenance of an environment of freedom and public
understanding in which creativity can flourish.
"The maintenance of a superior educational system which
stresses the value of excellence for its own sake and which
makes a special effort to search out the most gifted minds,
wherever found, and to make available to them the most
advanced training which they are capable of absorbing.
"The provision of scientists and engineers with the economic
resources with which to pursue their search with the utmost ag-
gressiveness."
This approach will indeed grant our nation a new lease on its heritage,
FORD
is
and a renewed faith in its capacity.
- 10 -
And this leads to a consideration of the next dynamic spearhead.
6. The sixth dynamic spearhead of peace power is the increased use of
the psychological, moral and spiritual resources of a free society.
The Communists have made a god of Karl Marx and a religion of
scientific materialism. Undoubtedly, the Marxian gospel exploits the weak-
nesses of human nature. Its breeding ground is in discontent and in frustrated
hopes.
So, we are dealing with a dangerous peril, one involving far more
deadly consequences than just missiles, military strategy and geographical
battlefields. The peril is not solely from without. It threatens from within
as well. It will prey on our every lack of faith in ourselves.
During this age of conflict, the decisive battleground will be in the
minds of men.
The static lie of Russian Communism can be met only by the dynamic
truth of American freedom. Unfortunately, many Americans have not
awakened to the basis of the big lie even within their own country. The big lie
is found in the materialistic interpretation of man and man' S destiny. Of this,
Communism is merely a ruthless manifestation. This materialism is often
called, simply, socialism. Our ideas and faith can never be victorious over
Communistic ideas through a greater application of materialism, statism, and
socialism.
I fear that the Democratic Advisory Council exerts an influence to con-
vert our foreign policy into a materialistic program, to purge it of all
principle. Is this not a repetition of the pattern of allowing the Soviet to control
the initiative and to choose the framework for conflict?
A strong faith and idealogy within America is essential. It is just as
essential to carry it to the Russian people themselves. This leads to the next
force.
7. The seventh dynamic spearhead of peace power is a people-to-people
approach. The Vice President's visit to Soviet Russia last summer was a crea-
tive, dynamic and timely breakthrough of the Soviet iron curtain. I say it was
creative because it challenged the Communists as never before into a contest of
ideas. I say it was dynamic for it was a giant step forward toward a long
- 11 -
standing aim of the Eisenhower foreign policy of liberating minds and restoring
freedom within the Sino-Soviet bloc.
The Percy Report has splendidly summed up our policy of liberation:
"Our policy of non-violent emancipation, with its long-run
perspectives, would spell out the policy of peaceful liberation
which some have either not understood or deliberately distorted
out of all proportions. The emancipation policy promises to
establish much-needed facilities for the peaceable creation of
pressures for gradual expansion of freedom within the Communist
empire."
During his visit to Russia, Vice President Nixon superbly dramatized
American superiority in the production of consumer goods. Granted, much of
what he said never got to the Russian masses. But some of what he said had a
marked effect. A continued program of this nature, with increased cultural and
scientific exchanges will bring to the Russian people and to the satellites the
American story of the benefits from a free economy. In turn, this story will
create upward pressures on the Soviet rulers. This could deter Soviet
aggression and expand freedom within Russia and her satellites.
The follow-up to the initial people to people approach has been the
personal diplomacy of President Eisenhower. For some time before his death,
Secretary of State Dulles had pointed out to the President his tremendous
prestige throughout the world. The time might come, insisted Dulles, for the
President to use fully this prestige and influence through a series of tours.
Obviously, it would have been a cardinal blunder to embark in this personal
diplomacy at the wrong time. But, was the time not ideal, before a summit
meeting, towards the end of the President's term in office? This would further
steal the initiative from Mr. Khrushchev. It would cast the setting for the
conflict where we want it in the arena of world opinion -- that - Juld make
it a battle of ideas and not of missiles.
The casual observer will ask: Have not some of the members of the
Democratic Advisory Council been calling for a summit meeting year after
year? And is the Republican leadership not now taking us to a summit? So, is
there any difference in attitudes in this particular regard?
Most certainly, yes. The difference is in timing and in preparation.
Yalta and Potsdam were failures. We tried a summit in 1955 and it became
clearly evident that Khrushchev was not yet thoroughly convinced that the
- 12 -
Eisenhower Administration had irrevocably inaugurated a new foreign policy
which would not bow to blackmail and to duplicity.
It took four more years to educate the Soviet leaders, during crisi S
after crisis, that the new Administration would not compromise vital issues.
And the final part of Khrushchev's education was during the Berlin crisis of
1959. He gave America a deadline. He was determined to humiliate us into a
summit, when the entire world knew it was blackmail. America stood her
ground, despite the fact that a former Truman advisor, George Kennan,
declared we should withdraw from Europe altogether.
Khrushchev's education was complete. He realized that he was con-
fronted with a new foreign policy, far different from that of the Truman Ad-
ministration. He had the alternative of plunging his country into an all-out
war, or seeking a peaceful means of competition. At this decisive moment, the
President took the initiative. He sought to avoid a condition mentioned in the
speech of the gentleman from California (Speech No. 2), where a Soviet leader
might see no way out, feel that he was boxed in, and irrationally tumble towards
war. Without retreating from the Berlin issue, Mr. Eisenhower invited Mr.
Khrushchev to the United States. Thus the Soviet Chairman, at the decisive
moment, was led towards the ways of peaceful competition. The timing of our
President was brilliant.
Now we do hold the initiative.
The greatest single challenge of the 1960's is to bring the people to
people approach closer and closer to every member of the Communist empire.
This policy, however, can backfire if executed by unskilled men with limited
ability and limited visision.
We must continue to have as President, Vice President and Secretary
of State, leaders with judgment and knowledge of world affairs. The future of
this country - indeed, the future of freedom throughout the world - cannot be
risked, either to rank amateurs in international relations, or to those who pro-
duced the ambiguous and faltering diplomacy of the late 1940's.
As we enter the decade of the 1960's, a profound difference emerges
between the foreign policy approaches of the Republicans and of the Democratic
Advisory Council. Basically, it is this. While the Republicans are looking
- 13 - -
forward, members of the Democratic Advisory Council, the Stevensons and the
Achesons, are looking backward. Against the Russian peril, they still do not
understand the need for a consistent, clear policy of firmness. They have
splintered vision, and see the Soviet peril only in parts. Their reactions are
defensive.
The Republicans undertook the campaign of 1952 with two important
foreign policy aims: to end the war in Korea, and to initiate a policy of
liberation. Peace in Korea, the Republicans knew, could only come from re-
shaping a policy of the initiative, which outlawed the privileged sanctuary.
Liberation of those in Soviet slavedom could only come by maneuvering the
Russian leaders into a climate of exchange of ideas, culture, and competition
in consumer production.
This year the Republicans undertake another campaign. More than just
political, it is a campaign to promulgate a philosophy for maintaining peace
with justice and extending freedom here and throughout the world.
We have summed up this policy for the 1960's in terms of seven spear-
heads of peace power. Not just one, but all seven are needed to spearhead the
progress of freedom throughout the world.
Why is the Republican Party capable of promoting this dynamic policy?
Because as a party it possesses the four qualities which the Chairman of the
Republican Policy Committee mentioned in the initial speech: Party unity;
Party philosophy based on principle; Party democracy and Party foresight
toward the needs of future generations.
With these qualities, the Republicans uniquely are equipped to see the
Sino-Soviet challenge as a whole and not in parts. Uniquely are the Republicans
qualified to marshal all the forces and resources of our nation and turn the age
ahead from peril to promise.
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