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The original documents are located in Box D16, folder "House Speech Defense, August 19,
1964" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R.
Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box D16 of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library,
TEXT OF REMARKS BY REP. GERALD R. FORD (R.-MICH.)
Mr. Speaker:
I wish to associate myself with the remarks made by the distinguished gentleman
from Wisconsin, Mr. Laird on the floor of this House yesterday concerning the testimony of
Defense Secretary McNamara before the Democratic Platform Committee on Monday of this
week.
1 too would like to discuss the Secretary's statement because I believe it constituted,
among other things, a partisan political attack on the Eisenhower Administration and contained
statements that undoubtedly created misleading conclusions or impressions. Some comments
were less than objective.
As ranking minority member of the Defense Appropriations Committee which has
been my committee through the Administrations of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson, I believe I can speak with first-hand knowledge on the defense policies of all three
Administrations.
I was amazed to hear the Secretary of Defense make the following misleading
statement about the Eisenhower Administration:
"The defense establishment we found in 1961 was based on
a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation as the answer to all military
and political aggression. We, however, were convinced that our
enemies would never find credible a strategy which even the American
people did not believe."
Mr. Speaker, in the first place the nuclear policy of the Eisenhower Administration
was one of selective nuclear retaliation. The option of massive nuclear retaliation was
merely one aspect of a comprehensive defense and foreign policy which encompassed other
approaches to both political and military situations. Examples which clearly illustrate the
broad range and strength of the Eisenhower posture include the successful operations in
Lebanon and Quemoy-Matsu. Above all, this comprehensive Eisenhower-Dulles policy was
credible to our own people as well as to friend and foe. NATO knew that our commitment
was sound; Communism knew that our position was firm. The Gulf of Tonkin incident would
never have happened under the Eisenhower-Dulles policy and never did because our adver-
saries knew clearly before any probing action that any direct attack upon the United States,
its forces or possessions, would receive a response unacceptable to the adversary. This has
not been clear under the present Administration's policy. Our Communist enemies also knew
that if U.S. retaliation were necessary no advanced warning to the aggressor would be
forthcoming.
Further on in his statement, the Secretary continues to distort the record of the
Eisenhower Administration. He says:
"In 1961, we found military strategy to be the stepchild of a
predetermined budget. A financial ceiling was placed on national
security and funds were allocated not on the basis of military require-
ments, but according to the dictates of an arbitrary fiscal policy."
I have personally discussed this matter with former Secretary of Defense Thomas
Gates and he has confirmed my own belief that under the Eisenhower Administration, no
essential military requirements were neglected on the basis of budgetary considerations, nor
was there a budgetary ceiling imposed upon our national security. This matter was probed
specifically by Congress, and in pulbished testimony former Secretary of Defense Neil
McElroy also stated in answer to a direct question that there was no budgetary ceiling imposed
by former President Eisenhower.
It is true that less was spent annually on defense than in the last four years by
some 10 billion dollars per year. It is also true, that underEisenhower more security based
on results was provided for less money. This was posssible because Eisenhower's decisions
were based upon intelligent understanding of the problems of our national security and military
affairs not only for that immediate period but for the forseeable future. Proof of this is that
(over)
-2-
today the overwhelming majority of our defense forces are the fruition of the development efforts
begun in the Eisenhower years. Projecting present policies and developments into the 1970's ,
one will find serious deficiencies in our defense posture.
Mr. McNamara then went on to state:
"The nonnuclear force we found was weak in combat-ready divisions,
weak in airlift capability, weak in tactical air support."
Mr. Speaker I categorically deny this charge based on results in successfully
meeting international crises wherever they developed. Statistical support and testimony
of experts could be amassed to refute this charge. More importantly, however, all crises during
the Eisenhower years were met. Despite so-called improvements under this Administration they
did not prevent the erection of the Berlin Wall the introduction of Soviet military hardware and
personnel into Cuba, and our flag was attacked in Panama and our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Mr. Speaker, the so-called improvement under this administration -- the increase
in manpower has cost the American taxpayer additional billions of dollars and many military
authorities contend it was not needed. The basis for growth in airlift ability and tactical air
support had already started and was growing during the Eisenhower years.
A little later in his statement, the Secretary discusses the role of the military.
I would like to quote the Secretary at some length. He said:
"We could not have instituted the integrated system by which
we have increased our strength without the wholehearted cooperation
and support of our men and women in uniform. Neither this system
nor any system will ever be a substitute for sound military judgment.
Under this Administration, as never before, professional military judg-
ment from all four services has been a critical factor in the planning of
our defense strategy.
As General Taylor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, stated in 1963: 'The voice of the American soldier is entitled
to a serious hearing in our national councils -- and I am happy to
report that today he is receiving that hearing. 111
The question of the deteriorating condition of our civilian-military relationship
has been too obvious to be refuted by a brief quote for the former Chief of Staff. This is shown
in various congressional hearings and in the press -- not to mention the former Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Anderson's speech before the National Press Club in the same year, 1963.
General Taylor of practical necessity, would have had to make some such statement during his
tenure in office. This is obviously a self-serving statement. One would be hard put to find a
high ranking retired officer who served under this Administration and who would corroborate
General Toylor's statement.
No military man who is not ordered to do so will say that the military views have
been heard and heeded by the Secretary of Defense. In fact, military men vehemently assert
the opposite and deplore the degradation of military advice. The sad history of the TFX con-
troversy, as one example, proves this. Both the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of
Naval Operations backed by the proceedings of four joint military boards recommended the
Boeing aircraft and this recommendation was overthrown by an arbitrary decision of the Secretary
of Defense.
Mr. Speakr, there are so many statistics that can lead to erroneous impressions in
this statement that it is hard to single out any particular one for special attention. One that
particularly struck me because I have had a long interest in the subject is contained in the
following quote:
"(This Administration) turned back to the private sector of our
economy I, 100 square miles of real estate which is now tax-producing
instead of tax consuming."
Mr. Speaker, this is a particularly fitting example of the loose use of figures by
(more)
-3-
this Administration to enhance its image. They make a claim that is impressive on its face,
realizing the average American has no way of checking. I felt an obligation to check this out
with the defense department and found the following to be the true facts in the case:
At my request the Defense department supplied a document that contained a listing
of the "Military Installations having the largest area which have been closed or reduced during
the period 3I January, 1961 thru 30 June, 1964. That list contained roughly three-quarters of the
1100 square mile figure used by the Secretary in his statement.
You will notice that the description in the title states that this is land that had been
"closed or reduced." You will also notice that the Secretary, in his statement, clearly stated
that this land plus about 25% more had been "turned back to the private sector" and had become
"tax-producing instead of tax-consuming."
Since the Secretary's statement and the information supplied by the defense depart-
ment were not compatible, I requested clarification.
I was informed that the list which I had been supplied was the basis for the figure
in the Secretary's statement. I was further informed that it was not possible to determine
whether this land had become "tax-producing" without conducting a costly survey which had not
been conducted. In orther words, Mr. Speaker, an impressive claim was made that, if allowed to
go unchallenged, would be politically advantageous to the Administration, without any supporting
evidence.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I cannot leave this subject without making some reference
to a fundamental aspect of our defense policy. In trying to assure the American people that our
defenses are adequate for today and the future, the Secretary said:
"Let me assure you that our strategic forces are and will remain
in the 1960's and the seventies, sufficient to insure the destruction of
both the Soviet Union and Communist China, under the worst imaginable
circumstances accompanying the outbreak of war."
Let me just say that this is not a sufficient goal for the defense of this country. We
need forces that are sufficient today and will be sufficient in the future not only to destroy the
enemy but, far more important, that will deter the enemy from unleashing war. The defense
establishment of this country has only one primary goal: to maintain the peace by effectively
deterring war.
One final note, Mr. Speaker. I understand that Cabinet members have broken
precedent by appearing before the Democratic Platform Committee because the subjects they
discuss are so serious that the American people should have the true facts from the highest sources
in our government. The remarks of the Gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Laird, and my remarks
today as well as the discussion that will follow in the days ahead claerly demonstrate that the
American people have been swamped with statistical data that can mislead them into inaccurate
conclusions. This is a situation which I , as ranking minority member of the Defense Appropriations
Committee, find deplorable. The record must be set straight and I intend to do so on other
occasions when the necessary factual information can be obtained from the Department of Defense.
As of this moment I have not gotten all of the cooperation I would expect on this important
subject.
In the days ahead, I intend to set the record straight on at least one additional
subject, that of nuclear control.
###
From the Office of:
Thursday, August 19, 1964
Rep. Gerald R. Ford (R.-Mich.)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
351 House Office Building
Washington 25, D.C.
There would have been no shooting in the Gulf of Tonkin under the Eisenhower-
Dulles policy, because would-be aggressors well knew what the response would have been, Rep.
Gerald R. Ford (R. of Mich.) told the House today.
His statement was part of a point-by-point refutation of claims about the defense
establishment presented by Secretary of Defense McNamara before the Democratic Platform
Committee.
Ford, who is a member of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, pointed
out that no such incident occurred during the Eisenhower Administration "because our adversaries
knew clearly before any probing action that any direct attack upon the United States, its forces
or possessions, would receive a response unacceptable to the adversary. This has not been clear
under the present Administration's policy," Ford added.
Ford also refuted McNamara's claim that "The (Eisenhower) nonnuclear force we
found was weak in combat-ready divisions, weak in airlift capability, weak in tactical air support.
The Michigan legislator pointed out that "all crises during the F:senhower years were
met", while "Despite the so-called improvements under this Administration they did not prevent
the erection of the Berlin Wall, the introduction of Soviet military hardware and personnel into
Cuba, and our flag was attacked in Panama and our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin."
Ford was particularly concerned that McNamara tried to claim that: "Under this
Administration, as never before, professional military judgment from all four services has been
a critical factor in the planning of our deferse strategy."
Ford said this claim must collapse of its own weight. He said: "No military man
who is not ordered to do so will say that military views have been heard and heeded by the
Secretary of Defense, In fact, military men vehemently assert the opposite and deplore the
degradation of military advice."
Ford cited the "sad history of the TFX controversy" wherein the military recommended
the Boeing aircraft which was rejected by an arbitrary decision of the Secretary of Defense.
Another McNamara claim to which Ford objected was the Secretary's statement
that "our strategic forces are and will remain in the 1960's and the seventies, sufficient to
insure the destruction of both the Soviet Union and Communist China under the worst
imaginable circumstances accompanying the outbreak of war."
Ford replied: this is not a sufficient goal for the defense of this Country. We
need forces that are sufficient today and will be sufficient in the future, not only to destroy the
enemy, but, far more important, that will deter the enemy from unleashing war. The defense
establishment
has only one primary goal: to maintain the peace by effectively deterring
war."
#####
(Text of remarks is attached)
From the Office of:
Thursday, August 19, 1964
Rep. Gerald R. Ford (R.-Mich.)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
351 House Office Building
Washington 25, D.C.
There would have been no shooting in the Gulf of Tonkin under the Eisenhower-
Dulles policy, because would-be aggressors well knew what the response would have been, Rep.
Gerald R. Ford (R. of Mich.) told the House today.
His statement was part of a point-by-point refutation of claims about the defense
establishment presented by Secretary of Defense McNamara before the Democratic Platform
Committee.
Ford, who is a member of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, pointed
out that no such incident occurred during the Eisenhower Administration "because our adversaries
knew clearly before any probing action that any direct attack upon the United States, its forces
or possessions, would receive a response unacceptable to the adversary. This has not been clear
under the present Administration's policy," Ford added.
Ford also refuted McNamara's claim that "The (Eisenhower) nonnuclear force we
found was weak in combat-ready divisions, weak in airlift capability, weak in tactical air support..¹
The Michigan legislator pointed out that "all crises during the F:senhower years were
met", while "Despite the so-called improvements under this Administration they did not prevent
the erection of the Berlin Wall, the introduction of Soviet military hardware and personnel into
Cuba, and our flag was attacked in Panama and our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin."
Ford was particularly concerned that McNamara tried to claim that: "Under this
Administration, as never before, professional military judgment from all four services has been
a critical factor in the planning of our deferse strategy."
Ford said this claim must collapse of its own weight. He said: "No military man
who is not ordered to do so will say that military views have been heard and heeded by the
Secretary of Defense, In fact, military men vehemently assert the opposite and deplore the
degradation of military advice."
Ford cited the "sad history of the TFX controversy" wherein the military recommended
the Boeing aircraft which was rejected by an arbitrary decision of the Secretary of Defense.
Another McNamara claim to which Ford objected was the Secretary's statement
that "our strategic forces are and will remain in the 1960's and the seventies, sufficient to
insure the destruction of both the Soviet Union and Communist China under the worst
imaginable circumstances accompanying the outbreak of war."
Ford replied: this is not a sufficient goal for the defense of this Country. We
need forces that are sufficient today and will be sufficient in the future, not only to destroy the
enemy, but, far more important, that will deter the enemy from unleashing war. The defense
establishment has only one primary goal: to maintain the peace by effectively deterring
war."
#####
(Text of remarks is attached)
TEXT OF REMARKS BY REP. GERALD R. FORD -MICH.)
Mr. Speaker:
I wish to associate myself with the remarks made by the distinguished gentleman
from Wisconsin, Mr. Laird on the floor of this House yesterday concerning the testimony of
Defense Secretary McNamara before the Democratic Platform Committee on Monday of this
week,
I too would like to discuss the Secretary's statement because I believe it constituted,
among other things, a partisan political attack on the Eisenhower Administration and contained
statements that undoubtedly created misleading conclusions or impressions. Some comments
were less than objective.
As ranking minority member of the Defense Appropriations Committee which has
been my committee through the Administrations of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson, I believe I can speak with first-hand knowledge on the defense policies of all three
Administrations.
I was amazed to hear the Secretary of Defense make the following misleading
statement about the Eisenhower Administration:
"The defense establishment we found in 1961 was based on
a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation as the answer to all military
and political aggression. We, however, were convinced that our
enemies would never find credible a strategy which even the American
people did not believe."
Mr. Speaker, in the first place the nuclear policy of the Eisenhower Administration
was one of selective nuclear retaliation. The option of massive nuclear retaliation was
merely one aspect of a comprehensive defense and foreign policy which encompassed other
approaches to both political and military situations. Examples which clearly illustrate the
broad range and strength of the Eisenhower posture include the successful operations in
Lebanon and Quemoy-Matsu. Above all, this comprehensive Eisenhower-Dulles policy was
credible to our own people as well as to friend and foe. NATO knew that our commitment
was sound; Communism knew that our position was firm. The Gulf of Tonkin incident would
never have happened under the Eisenhower-Dulles policy and never did because our adver-
saries knew clearly before any probing action that any direct attack upon the United States,
its forces or possessions, would receive a response unacceptable to the adversary. This has
not been clear under the present Administration's policy. Our Communist enemies also knew
that if U.S. retaliation were necessary no advanced warning to the aggressor would be
forthcoming.
Further on in his statement, the Secretary continues to distort the record of the
Eisenhower Administration. He says:
"In 1961, we found military strategy to be the stepchild of a
predetermined budget. A financial ceiling was placed on national
security and funds were allocated not on the basis of military require-
ments, but according to the dictates of an arbitrary fiscal policy."
I have personally discussed this matter with former Secretary of Defense Thomas
Gates and he has confirmed my own belief that under the Eisenhower Administration, no
essential military requirements were neglected on the basis of budgetary considerations, nor
was there a budgetary ceiling imposed upon our national security. This matter was probed
specifically by Congress, and in pulbished testimony former Secretary of Defense Neil
McElroy also stated in answer to a direct question that there was no budgetary ceiling imposed
by former President Eisenhower.
It is true that less was spent annually on defense than in the last four years by
some 10 billion dollars per year. It is also true, that underEisenhower more security based
on results was provided for less money. This was posssible because Eisenhower's decisions
were based upon intelligent understanding of the problems of our national security and military
affairs not only for that immediate period but for the forseeable future. Proof of this is that
(over)
-2-
today the overwhelming majority of our defense forces are the fruition of the development efforts
begun in the Eisenhower years. Projecting present policies and developments into the 1970's ,
one will find serious deficiencies in our defense posture.
Mr. McNamara then went on to state:
"The nonnuclear force we found was weak in combat-ready divisions,
weak in airlift capability, weak in tactical air support."
Mr. Speaker I categorically deny this charge based on results in successfully
meeting international crises wherever they developed. Statistical support and testimony
of experts could be amassed to refute this charge. More importantly, however, all crises during
the Eisenhower years were met. Despite so-called improvements under this Administration they
did not prevent the erection of the Berlin Wall the introduction of Soviet military hardware and
personnel into Cuba, and our flag was attacked in Panama and our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Mr. Speaker, the so-called improvement under this administration -- the increase
in manpower has cost the merican taxpayer additional billions of dollars and many military
authorities contend it was not needed. The basis for growth in airlift ability and tectical air
support had already started and was growing during the Eisenhower years.
A little later in his statement, the Secretary discusses the role of the military.
I would like to quote the Secretary at some length. He said:
"We could not have instituted the integrated system by which
we have increased our strength without the wholehearted cooperation
and support of our men and women in uniform. Neither this system
nor any system will ever be a substitute for sound military judgment.
Under this Administration, as never before, professional military judg-
ment from all four services has been a critical factor in the planning of
our defense strategy.
As General Taylor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, stated in 1963: 'The voice of the American soldier is entitled
to a serious hearing in our national councils -- and I am happy to
report that today he is receiving that hearing."
The question of the deteriorating condition of our civilian-military relationship
has been too obvious to be refuted by a brief quote for the former Chief of Staff. This is shown
in various congressional hearings and in the press -- not to mention the former Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Anderson's speech before the National Press Club in the same year, 1963.
General Taylor of practical necessity, would have had to make some such statement during his
tenure in office. This is obviously a self-serving statement. One would be hard put to find a
high ranking retired officer who served under this Administration and who would corroborate
General Teylor's statement.
No military man who is not ordered to do so will say that the military views have
been heard and heeded by the Secretary of Defense. In fact, military men vehemently assert
the opposite and deplore the degradation of military advice. The sad history of the TFX con-
troversy, as one example, proves this. Both the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of
Naval Operations backed by the proceedings of four joint military boards recommended the
Boeing aircraft and this recommendation was overthrown by an arbitrary decision of the Secretary
of Defense.
Mr. Speakr, there are 50 many statistics that can lead to erroneous impressions in
this statement that it is hard to single out any particular one for special attention. One that
particularly struck me because I have had a long interest in the subject is contained in the
following quote:
"(This Administration) turned back to the private sector of our
economy 1,100 square miles of real estate which is now tax-producing
instead of tax consuming."
Mr. Speaker, this is a particularly fitting example of the loose use of figures by
(more)
-3-
this Administration to enhance its image. They make a claim that is impressive on its face,
realizing the average American has no way of checking. I felt an obligation to check this out
with the defense department and found the following to be the true facts in the case:
At my request the Defense department supplied a document that contained a listing
of the "Military Installations having the largest area which have been closed or reduced during
the period 3I January, 1961 thru 30 June, 1964.' That list contained roughly three-quarters of the
1100 square mile figure used by the Secretary in his statement.
You will notice that the description in the title states that this is land that had been
"closed or reduced." You will also notice that the Secretary, in his statement, clearly stated
that this land plus about 25% more had been "turned back to the private sector" and had become
"tax-producing instead of tax-consuming."
Since the Secretary's statement and the information supplied by the defense depart-
ment were not compatible, I requested clarification.
I was informed that the list which I had been supplied was the basis for the figure
in the Secretary's statement. I was further informed that it was not possible to determine
whether this land had become "tax-producing" without conducting a costly survey which had not
been conducted. In orther words, Mr. Speaker, an impressive claim was made that, if allowed to
go unchallenged, would be politically advantageous to the Administration, without any supporting
evidence.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I cannot leave this subject without making some reference
to a fundamental aspect of our defense policy. In trying to assure the American people that our
defenses are adequate for today and the future, the Secretary said:
"Let me assure you that our strategic forces are and will remain
in the 1960's and the seventies, sufficient to insure the destruction of
both the Soviet Union and Communist China, under the worst imaginable
circumstances accompanying the outbreak of war."
Let me just say that this is not a sufficient goal for the defense of this country. We
need forces that are sufficient today and will be sufficient in the future not only to destroy the
enemy but, far more important, that will deter the enemy from unleashing war. The defense
establishment of this country has only one primary goal: to maintain the peace by effectively
deterring war.
One final note, Mr. Speaker. I understand that Cabinet members have broken
precedent by appearing before the Democratic Platform Committee because the subjects they
discuss are so serious that the American people should have the true facts from the highest sources
in our government. The remarks of the Gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Laird, and my remarks
today as well as the discussion that will follow in the days ahead claerly demonstrate that the
American people have been swamped with statistical data that can mislead them into inaccurate
conclusions. This is a situation which I , as ranking minority member of the Defense Appropriations
Committee, find deplorable. The record must be set straight and I intend to do so on other
occasions when the necessary factual information can be obtained from the Department of Defense.
As of this moment I have not gotten all of the cooperation I would expect on this important
subject.
In the days ahead, I intend to set the record straight on at least one additional
subject, that of nuclear control.
###