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The original documents are located in Box D26, folder "Why a Missile Defense?", 1969"
of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box D26 of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., Minority Leader, U.S. House of
Representatives.
WHY A MISSILE DEFENSE?
Whether or not to deploy the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System has
become a national issue. This is reflected in letters I have received.
There apparently is considerable confusion about the issue. I therefore
would like to make some points which may clarify the situation.
1. The Institute for Strategic Studies in London, England, an independent
and admittedly authoritative agency that keeps an account of the military
capabilities of all nations, recently reported that by mid-1969 Russia
would overtake the United States in intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and achieve equal status in strategic power.
2. The Soviet Union has already deployed an ABM system which largely
protects Moscow and its surrounding area.
3. The Soviet Union is continuing the deployment of very large ICBMs
(the SS-9) which are capable of destroying our 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs
despite their location in "hardened" sites.
4. The Soviet Union is substantially increasing the size of its submarine-
launched ballistic missile force.
5. The Soviet Union is developing anti-submarine measures which are a
threat to our 656-missile Polaris deterrent force.
6. The Soviet Union has developed a semi-orbital nuclear weapons system
(FOBS), which threatens to rain nuclear destruction down on us from outer
space.
7. Since the Soviet Union apparently will surpass the United States in
numbers of ICBMs by the middle of this year or at least attain equal
status, the American people are faced with a fresh decision on how best
to avoid nuclear war or how best to survive a nuclear holocaust should
it occur.
8. Former Defense Secretary McNamara responded to Soviet deployment of
an ABM system by scheduling an increase in U.S. offensive missilry forces.
There was no public outcry in the United States.
9. Former Defense Secretary McNamara initially opposed U.S. deployment
of an ABM system because he believed a go-ahead on ABM would cause the
Soviet Union to expand its offensive nuclear power. The Soviet Union
greatly increased its offensive nuclear power in any case.
10. In the April 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs, Dr. D. G. Brennan, dean
of U.S. arms control experts, states that U.S. funds committed to increase
our offensive missile forces might better be used to increase our
Page 2/Why a Missile Defense?
defenses. Dr. Brennan argues that an American ballistic missile defense
system such as President Nixon has proposed obviously reduces the
Soviet threat to our national security. At the same time, he asserts,
by concentrating on a missile defense system instead of expanding our
nuclear offensive capability we "reduce both the extent to which the
Soviets might gain by attacking us, and the extent to which we are
intensely motivated to deter the attack."
11. The chief argument made against President Nixon's Safeguard ABM
System or BMD (ballistic missile defense) is that it makes the U.S.
appear provocative and endangers the possibility of arms control talks
and a possible meaningful arms limitation. The facts indicate that the
opposite is true.
12. After the Johnson-McNamara decision to deploy the Sentinel ABM system
was announced in September 1967, some of our allies and neutral friends
attacked the decision on the grounds it threatened approval of the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty. The Soviet Union declared that prospects for
the nonproliferation treaty were not damaged by the U.S. ABM decision, and
this proved accurate.
13. On Feb. 9, 1967, Soviet Premier Kosygin was asked at a press
conference in London, England: "Do you believe it is possible to agree
on a moratorium on the (deployment) of an anti-missile defense system
(then being discussed in the United States) and if possible on what
condition?" Kosygin replied in part: "I believe that defensive systems,
which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute
a factor preventing the death of people. Some argue like this: What is
cheaper, to have offensive weapons which can destroy towns and whole
states or to have defensive weapons which can prevent this destruction?
At present the theory is current somewhere that the system which is
cheaper should be developed. Such so-called theoreticians argue as to
the cost of killing a man -- $500,000 or $100,000. Maybe an anti-missile
system is more expensive than an offensive ysstem, but it is designed
not to kill people but to preserve human lives. I understand that I
do not reply to the question I was asked, but you can draw yourselves
the appropriate conclusions." And in comment on that Kosygin statement,
Dr. Brennan says: "Indeed, one can."
14. Dr. Brennan asserts in his "Foreign Affairs" article that "the
attitude exemplified by the Kosygin quotation is very widely held in
the Soviet Union."
15. Four days after former President Johnson announced a decision to
ring major American cities with ABM installations, the Soviet Union pro-
posed U.S.-Soviet arms control talks.
16. Dr. Brennan declares in the highly respected publication, "Foreign
Affairs:" "The primary objectives of arms control have often been stated
to be reduction of the likelihood of war or mitigation of its consequences
if it occurs. It seems to me highly probable that deployment of missile
defenses will contribute to both of these objectives, while abstaining
Page 3/Why A Missile Defense?
from defenses will likely contribute to neither. If the deployments
(of missile defenses) are managed with at least modest intelligence on
both sides, there need not be an arms race nor appreciably higher
expenditures.'
17. To rule out any kind of missile defense is to assume that nuclear
war is so unthinkable and therefore impossible that the United States
need not concern itself about either Russian or Red Chinese nuclear
capabilities
or to assume that the United States must forever concern
itself with nuclear offensive superiority relative to the Soviet Union.
The latter is a dubious position because of the tremendously powerful
and accurate Soviet SS-9 missile and the fact that the Soviets already
have deployed a defense against our missiles.
18. The United States has already proposed reductions in strategic
offensive forces, but the Soviet Union has consistently opposed inspection
as a guarantee of compliance.
19. Deployment of a U.S. missile defense might reduce the need for such
inspection and thus hasten an actual reduction in offensive missile
forces.
20. Critics say the Safeguard system would not be reliable and might
not work in event of nuclear war, but all tests of the component parts
of the system indicate it should work as planned.
21. The Safetuard system would employ Spartan and Sprint ABMs. The
Spartans would be used to break up high density raids while the Sprint
would operate on an one-on-one basis. Only those enemy warheads coming
within a very limited area would have to be considered for attack. Low
altitude intercepts by Sprint would allow the U.S. to take full advantage
of the separation of real warheads from chaff and decoys by the atmos-
phere. Since the Sprint warheads can be of relatively low yield, radar
blackout problems are minimized.
22. As Freeman Dyson of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study points
out, what is certain is that a missile defense system saves those targets
which are not attacked. An offense generally is based on the theory
that if a target cannot be destroyed with 95 per cent probability, it
is better not to attack it. As a result, says Dyson, the attacker "passes
over" certain targets and "the defense works independently of whether it
does well in the technical sense."
23. In the case of our Minuteman missiles, Dyson notes, there are a
thousand targets. He comments, "A good defense of the Minuteman force
would be one in which, say, 500 of these survived and it doesn't matter
which 500. So you can concentrate your defenses on particular places,
you can allow a wide margin of uncertainty in the effectiveness of the
defense and you will still have a good defense of your military force."
Page 4/Why A Missile Defense?
24. The best that we can expect from a missile defense is that the
number of people who would be killed in a nuclear war would be tens
of millions on each side instead of hundreds of millions.
25. But the possibility of even that outcome should be a sufficient
deterrent, Dyson declares. President Nixon's objective is to deter
nuclear war, to use the Safeguard System as a weapon for peace.
26. The choice currently is whether to put our money into offensive or
defensive nuclear weapons, not whether the United States should engage
in unilateral disarmament.
The Safeguard System is estimated to cost $6 to $7 billion over a period
of years. Roughly $800 million would be spent on the system during
fiscal 1970, as compared with the $1.8 billion requested by President
Johnson for the Sentinel ring-around-the-cities system. There are those
who contend all funds programmed for missile defense should be spent on
social needs. I believe both our national security and our social needs
must be met within a balanced framework of fiscal responsibility. The
needs of domestic social programs must be balanced against the threat of
enemy missile attack.
I support President Nixon's Safeguard System because I believe it is a
deterrent to nuclear war. I believe it will facilitate an arms control
agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and that failure to
deploy at least a limited missile defense would be to take an unaccept-
able gamble with the national security of the United States.
# # #
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., Minority Leader, U.S. House of
Representatives.
WHY A MISSILE DEFENSE?
Whether or not to deploy the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System has
become a national issue. This is reflected in letters I have received.
There apparently is considerable confusion about the issue. I therefore
would like to make some points which may clarify the situation.
1. The Institute for Strategic Studies in London, England, an independent
and admittedly authoritative agency that keeps an account of the military
capabilities of all nations, recently reported that by mid-1969 Russia
would overtake the United States in intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and achieve equal status in strategic power.
2. The Soviet Union has already deployed an ABM system which largely
protects Moscow and its surrounding area.
3. The Soviet Union is continuing the deployment of very large ICBMs
(the SS-9) which are capable of destroying our 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs
despite their location in "hardened" sites.
4. The Soviet Union is substantially increasing the size of its submarine-
launched ballistic missile force.
5. The Soviet Union is developing anti-submarine measures which are a
threat to our 656-missile Polaris deterrent force.
6. The Soviet Union has developed a semi-orbital nuclear weapons system
(FOBS), which threatens to rain nuclear destruction down on us from outer
space.
7. Since the Soviet Union apparently will surpass the United States in
numbers of ICBMs by the middle of this year or at least attain equal
status, the American people are faced with a fresh decision on how best
to avoid nuclear war or how best to survive a nuclear holocaust should
it occur.
8. Former Defense Secretary McNamara responded to Soviet deployment of
an ABM system by scheduling an increase in U.S. offensive missilry forces.
There was no public outcry in the United States.
9. Former Defense Secretary McNamara initially opposed U.S. deployment
of an ABM system because he believed a go-ahead on ABM would cause the
Soviet Union to expand its offensive nuclear power. The Soviet Union
greatly increased its offensive nuclear power in any case.
10. In the April 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs, Dr. D. G. Brennan, dean
of U.S. arms control experts, states that U.S. funds committed to increase
our offensive missile forces might better be used to increase our
Page 2/Why a Missile Defense?
defenses. Dr. Brennan argues that an American ballistic missile defense
system such as President Nixon has proposed obviously reduces the
Soviet threat to our national security. At the same time, he asserts,
by concentrating on a missile defense system instead of expanding our
nuclear offensive capability we "reduce both the extent to which the
Soviets might gain by attacking us, and the extent to which we are
intensely motivated to deter the attack."
11. The chief argument made against President Nixon's Safeguard ABM
System or BMD (ballistic missile defense) is that it makes the U.S.
appear provocative and endangers the possibility of arms control talks
and a possible meaningful arms limitation. The facts indicate that the
opposite is true.
12. After the Johnson-McNamara decision to deploy the Sentinel ABM system
was announced in September 1967, some of our allies and neutral friends
attacked the decision on the grounds it threatened approval of the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty. The Soviet Union declared that prospects for
the nonproliferation treaty were not damaged by the U.S. ABM decision, and
this proved accurate.
13. On Feb. 9, 1967, Soviet Premier Kosygin was asked at a press
conference in London, England: "Do you believe it is possible to agree
on a moratorium on the (deployment) of an anti-missile defense system
(then being discussed in the United States) and if possible on what
condition?" Kosygin replied in part: "I believe that defensive systems,
which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute
a factor preventing the death of people. Some argue like this: What is
cheaper, to have offensive weapons which can destroy towns and whole
states or to have defensive weapons which can prevent this destruction?
At present the theory is current somewhere that the system which is
cheaper should be developed. Such so-called theoreticians argue as to
the cost of killing a man -- $500,000 or $100,000. Maybe an anti-missile
system is more expensive than an offensive ysstem, but it is designed
not to kill people but to preserve human lives. I understand that I
do not reply to the question I was asked, but you can draw yourselves
the appropriate conclusions." And in comment on that Kosygin statement,
Dr. Brennan says: "Indeed, one can."
14. Dr. Brennan asserts in his "Foreign Affairs" article that "the
attitude exemplified by the Kosygin quotation is very widely held in
the Soviet Union."
15. Four days after former President Johnson announced a decision to
ring major American cities with ABM installations, the Soviet Union pro-
posed U.S. Soviet arms control talks.
16. Dr. Brennan declares in the highly respected publication, "Foreign
Affairs:" "The primary objectives of arms control have often been stated
to be reduction of the likelihood of war or mitigation of its consequences
if it occurs. It seems to me highly probable that deployment of missile
defenses will contribute to both of these objectives, while abstaining
Page 3/Why A Missile Defense?
from defenses will likely contribute to neither. If the deployments
(of missile defenses) are managed with at least modest intelligence on
both sides, there need not be an arms race nor appreciably higher
expenditures.'
17. To rule out any kind of missile defense is to assume that nuclear
war is so unthinkable and therefore impossible that the United States
need not concern itself about either Russian or Red Chinese nuclear
capabilities
or to assume that the United States must forever concern
itself with nuclear offensive superiority relative to the Soviet Union.
The latter is a dubious position because of the tremendously powerful
and accurate Soviet SS-9 missile and the fact that the Soviets already
have deployed a defense against our missiles.
18. The United States has already proposed reductions in strategic
offensive forces, but the Soviet Union has consistently opposed inspection
as a guarantee of compliance.
19. Deployment of a U.S. missile defense might reduce the need for such
inspection and thus hasten an actual reduction in offensive missile
forces.
20. Critics say the Safeguard system would not be reliable and might
not work in event of nuclear war, but all tests of the component parts
of the system indicate it should work as planned.
21. The Safetuard system would employ Spartan and Sprint ABMs. The
Spartans would be used to break up high density raids while the Sprint
would operate on an one-on-one basis. Only those enemy warheads coming
within a very limited area would have to be considered for attack. Low
altitude intercepts by Sprint would allow the U.S. to take full advantage
of the separation of real warheads from chaff and decoys by the atmos-
phere. Since the Sprint warheads can be of relatively low yield, radar
blackout problems are minimized.
22. As Freeman Dyson of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study points
out, what is certain is that a missile defense system saves those targets
which are not attacked. An offense generally is based on the theory
that if a target cannot be destroyed with 95 per cent probability, it
is better not to attack it. As a result, says Dyson, the attacker "passes
over" certain targets and "the defense works independently of whether it
does well in the technical sense."
23. In the case of our Minuteman missiles, Dyson notes, there are a
thousand targets. He comments, "A good defense of the Minuteman force
would be one in which, say, 500 of these survived and it doesn't matter
which 500. So you can concentrate your defenses on particular places,
you can allow a wide margin of uncertainty in the effectiveness of the
defense and you will still have a good defense of your military force.
Page 4/Why A Missile Defense?
24. The best that we can expect from a missile defense is that the
number of people who would be killed in a nuclear war would be tens
of millions on each side instead of hundreds of millions.
25. But the possibility of even that outcome should be a sufficient
deterrent, Dyson declares. President Nixon's objective is to deter
nuclear war, to use the Safeguard System as a weapon for peace.
26. The choice currently is whether to put our money into offensive or
defensive nuclear weapons, not whether the United States should engage
in unilateral disarmament.
The Safeguard System is estimated to cost $6 to $7 billion over a period
of years. Roughly $800 million would be spent on the system during
fiscal 1970, as compared with the $1.8 billion requested by President
Johnson for the Sentinel ring-around-the-cities system. There are those
who contend all funds programmed for missile defense should be spent on
social needs. I believe both our national security and our social needs
must be met within a balanced framework of fiscal responsibility. The
needs of domestic social programs must be balanced against the threat of
enemy missile attack.
I support President Nixon's Safeguard System because I believe it is a
deterrent to nuclear war. I believe it will facilitate an arms control
agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and that failure to
deploy at least a limited missile defense would be to take an unaccept-
able gamble with the national security of the United States.
# # #