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Annual Convention, American Legion Department of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA, July 16, 1971
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Annual Convention, American Legion Department of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA, July 16, 1971
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Gerald R. Ford Congressional Papers
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The original documents are located in Box D31, folder "Annual Convention, American
Legion Department of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA, July 16, 1971" of the Ford
Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
AN ADDRESS BY REP. GERALD R. FORD BEFORE THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION
DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, AT 7 P.M. FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1971, AT PITTSBURGH, PA.
EXCERPTS MADE FROM
THIS TEXT. SEE EXCEPTS
JULY 16, 1971
Good evening. It is a great pleasure for me to be here. It is always good to
talk with members of the American Legion. Since I myself am a Legionnaire, I am
intimately familiar with the objectives of the Legion and I subscribe wholeheartedly
to them. I have always felt that the Legion performs a distinct service not only for
ibs members
but for the Nation, inasmuch as the Legion is dedicated to promoting
peace and good will on earth and to the safeguarding of justice and freedom
in our democracy.
taken
The words I have just spoken were, of course, from the Preamble to the
American Legion Constitution. And, incidentally, it might interest you to know that
the Legion's
Preamble is cont ained in a recently-published book of patriotic quotations
and songs
entitled, "I Am An American. "
The same volume contains words written by columnist Walter Lippmann, who declared:
"Whether we wish it or not we are involved in the world's
problems, and all
the winds of heaven blow through our land."
Those words of Lippmann's were uttered in 1913-but
they are just as true
today as they were 58 years ago.
Yes, wer are involved in the world's problems. And recently great light was shed
a massive land war in
on how we became involved in the most vexing of these problems
Southeast Asia.
We can thank the so-called Pentagon Papers for our enlightenment.
I know the immediate reaction of many was to condemn the newspapers which printed
storie S based on the
Pentagon Papers. This was the natural reaction of those who
felt
there might be some advantage to the enemy from publication of the purloined
documents.
Digitized from Box D31 of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
-2-
I do not see that the Pentagon Papers are of any particular use to the enemy.
But I do believe the historical information they contain has illuminated a great
lesson for the American people and for all those in positions of authority in the
United States Government.
That
le
sson
is that if the United States is to become involved as a Nation
grave
matter
in
a
international
then the American people must also become
involved. The American people must be made knowledgeable atthetime/ fact
of
involvement-- and that involvement must be based on truth.
Too,
partism
What have the Pentagon Papers shown us? They have shown us with sheeking
olarity how the Kennedy previous and Johnson Administrations/ took the limited-risk commitments
our
of the Eisenhower Administration in Southeast Asia and made them into a large-scale
high-casualty war, which President Nixon is liquidating.
I submit that in liquidating
and
the Victnam War Mr. Nixon is be truthful with the American people.
Presi dent Nixon has turned the course of U.S. participation in the Vietnam War
around. He has committed this Nation to ending its participation in that war. And
he should be allowed all the options he needs in order to accomplish that withdrawal
as safely and with as much lasting benefit as possible.
The President now is making the most crucial decisions of his term in office. He
deserves maximum latitude in making those decisions. I do not urge that Congress
be excluded from the decision-making process. On the contrary. I believe
Congress should be informed to the fullest extent possible, and so should the American
people. But the Congress and the people should give the President their utmost support
in this most trying of times since the beginning of our involvement in Vietnam. It is
only with t hat kind of support that the President can make declisions which will serve
our Nation and posterity well.
GERALD R
LIBRARY
-3-
The Vietnam War is a great n tragedy. And the most tragic aspect of it is the
failure of the Kennydy previous and Administrations to mobilize American public
opinion behind it.
The reason public commitment was lacking a nd is lecking is made sbundantly clear
by the Pentagon Papers. There was e consolous desire on the pert of the Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations to keep the American people ignorant of our deepening involvement
in Vie tram.
There was a conscious decision to keep information from the American people and
to mislead the United States Congress. The Pentagon Papers have
sonfirmed this, and their publication is therefore enlightening to YOUR
allow except to hose who took part in this conscious decision to deceive.
It is the gransees grossest of errors to blame the military for what happened
during the Sixties. Civilians were writing the book. Civilians
were in charge It is they who made our top-level foreign
policy and military decisions. And they made them without being accountable to the
American people, even through their elected representatives. They made those decisions
in unhealthy secrecy.
There must never be another Vietnam. It was George Santayana who said, "Those
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." I am sure none of us will
ever forget Vietnam. We are all determined never to repeat it.
avoid amother Vietnam
The best way to do that is to deverlop mechanisms that will bring the people into
Executive Branch decisi -making and the best way to do that is through their
people's
chosen representatives.
Part t of the reason that provious us secretly
into the War, stop by step is that Congra the not directly enter
LIBRARY
-4-
the decisions on when and where to involve our troops
There is a power vacuum in the Congress within which h as left almost all
the war-making powers to the White House. It is this which makes a tragedy like
Vietnam not only possible but likely.
This is a situation which must be corrected at the earliest possible moment.
create
a
I therefore urge that Congress approve legislation which would
meaningful schock roin on for the the President Congress in
limited or undeclared war situations.
Under the terms of this legislation, a military action by the President would
byth Congress
have to be approved within 30 days or U.S. Troops would have to be withdrawn.
This legislation would creater a new Joint Congressional Committee on National
Security to consult with the President and his national security miximum advisors
on military decisions.
This joint committee would include the majority and minority
leaders of both houses of Congress and the chairmen and ranking minority members of
all the House and Senate committees directly concerned with foreign and military
policy.
Prior to military action or no later than 24 hours subsequent to it, this
Joint Committee on National Security would consult with the President or his advisors
and obtain information on the circumstances surrounding the military action.
The Joint Committee would then transmit reports to the appropriate committees
of both Houses of Congress, and those committees would draft and send to the House
and Senate legislation to ratify or sinange alter the President's action.
This legisla tionnew would not tie the President's hands.
But it would
bring the
Congress,
into the decision-making proce SB in all
foreign
LIBRAR
military actions involving the dispatch of U.S. troops into any theater of operation.
-5-
This would be
a prompt and responsible way for Congress to exercise its power
over the deployment of U.S. troops abroad and could help guarantee that the United
States will not again be drawn into an undeclared
war without the support of the
merican people.
The legisla tive branch of the Government must play a larger fole in decisions of
war and peace the role delegated to the Congress by the Constitution of the United
Satates.
In situations where the Congress in effect endorses a military: action taken by
the President, the Congre SS must set forth the United States commitment
in
precise terms--not hand the Executive a blank check of the Tonkin Gulf variety.
Coincidentally with its action on war powers or separately, I would like to see
the Congress adopt a policy resolution on Vietnam supporting President Nixon in his
goal of total
withdr awal within the
earliest practicable date. I do not,
however, believe that congressional any/ resolution on Vietnam should a date.
set
This would deprive the President of the flexibility he needs to negotiate the best
possible agreement with the other side.
Our goal is to get all Americ ans out of Vietnam by negotiation if possible, and,
if not, through our withdrawal
and Vietnamization programs.
I am heartened by the latest North Vietnamese offer at Paris. I think it provides
a basis for negotiation.
It indicate S some movement by the other side. However, in
at Paris.
my view, some items are non-negotia bleA I am opposed to simply abandoning South
Vietnam to Communist conquest. Even with the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vie tnam,
other forms of aid
to South Vietnam must continue. We mus leave behind a South Vietnam which has
a chance to survive as an independent,
non-Communist nation.
LIBRARY
This was our original objective in Vietnam. If we cannot guarantee the achievement
-6-
of that objective, at
least we should retain some
hope
that our incredibly
costly investment in Vietnam will pay off.
The best we can hope for is to salvage something from our
Vietnam
investment. Victory in the classic military sense is impossible in a limited war of
the Vietnam stripe.
We must adjusts to a world in which military victory is sometimes beyond
reach. Wₑ must adjust to a world in
which American idealism is thwarted.
We went into Vietnam with the noble st of motives, in my view. We are coming
out of Vietnam with our
heads held high. We have nothing to be ashamed of. On
did the best we could, within reason,
the contrary, we can be proud that we
to keep a humble peasant people
from being ground under the heel of a totalitarian aggressor.
I will never believe that the United States was
guilty of
an
arrogance of
power in Vietnam. We acted in the name of justice and freedom. We strove to keep a
people free from the iron hand of Communist rule.
We made mistakes, but no people is perfect. Our nation is still the greatest
in the world.
distribution Full.
Hallines 7/15/71 p.m.
to-Fulton's office atm pillsburgh
office copy
15 Copies to Mr. F.
a.m 7/16/71
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY--
7 P.M. FRIDAY
Excerpts from an address by Rep. Gerald R. Ford before the annual convention of the
American Legion Department of Pennsylvania, Friday, July 16, 1971, at Pittsburgh, Pa.
There must never be another Vietnam. It was George Santayana who said, "those
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." I am sure none of us will
ever forget Vietnam. We are all determined never to repeat it.
The best way to avoid another Vietnam is to develop mechanisms that will bring
the people into Executive Branch decision-making--and the best way to do that is
through the people's chosen representatives, the Congress of the United States.
The Constitution clearly grants to Congress the power to declare war. But we
are now living in a world where wars are fought but not declared. We are living in
an age of limited and undeclared wars. This circumstance has stripped Congress of
its war-making power and delegated it solely to the Executive. It is this which
makes a tragedy like Vietnam not only possible but likely.
This is a situation which should be corrected at the earliest possible moment.
I therefore urge that Congress approve legislation which would create a new and
meaningful role for Congress in limited war or undeclared war situations.
Under terms of this legislation, a military action by the President would have
to be approved by the Congress within 30 days or U.S. troops dispatched to a foreign
station would have to be withdrawn.
This legislation also would create a new Joint Congressional Committee on
National Security which would consult with the President and his national security
advisors on military decisions.
This joint committee would include the majority and minority leaders of both
houses of Congress and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the House and
Senate committees directly concerned with foreign and military policy.
Prior to military action or no later than 24 hours subsequent to it, this
Joint Committee on National Security would consult with the President or his advisors
and obtain information on the circumstances surrounding the military action.
The Joint Committee would then transmit reports to the appropriate committees
of both houses of Congress, and those committees would draft and send to the House
and Senate legislation to ratify or alter the President's action.
(more) GERAIL FORD LIBRARY
-2-
This legislation would not tie the President's hands. He still would have the
freedom to act promptly in an emergency situation. But his action would be subject
to immediate review by the Congress--and this is as it should be. This would bring
the Congress into the decision-making process in all military actions involving the
dispatch of U.S. troops into any foreign theater of operations.
This would be a responsible way for Congress to exercise its power over the
deployment of U.S. troops abroad and could help guarantee that the United States
will not again be drawn into an undeclared war without the support of the American
people.
The legislative branch of the Federal Government must play a larger role in
decisions of war and peace--the role clearly delegated to the Congress by the
Constitution of the United States.
I would also emphasize this. In situations where the Congress endorses a
military action taken by the President, the Congress should set forth the United
States commitment in precise terms--not hand the Executive a blank check of the
Tonkin Gulf variety.
Currently there is another policy resolution pencing before the Congress--the
so-called Mansfield resolution adopted as an amendment to a draft extension bill in
the Senate. This resolution or amendment would declare it the policy of the United
States to withdraw all of its troops from Vietnam within nine months, contingent
on release of American prisoners of war.
I endorse the goal of total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. The
President has set that goal for the Nation. But I do not think it serves a useful
purpose at this time to set a date definite for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops.
This is a matter for negotiation, not a matter for Congress unilaterally to make a
judgment on.
We want to withdraw all of our troops from Vietnam. And the goal is to with-
draw them by the earliest practicable date. We should give the President that kind
of flexibility. He needs it to negotiate the best possible agreement with the other
side.
I am heartened by the latest North Vietnamese offer at Paris. It provides a
basis for negotiation if the other side will follow it up with private talks. It
indicates some movement by the other side. However, in my view, some items are non-
negotiable at Paris. I am opposed to leaving South Vietnam to shift completely for
itself, without arms or logistical aid. This would be to abandon South Vietnam to
Communist conquest. Even with the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam, other
forms of aid to South Vietnam must continue. We must leave behind a South Vietnam
which has a chance to survive as an independent, non-Communist nation.
# # #
Full Distribution
a Ofsec Copy
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY--
7 P.M. FRIDAY
Excerpts from an address by Rep. Gerald R. Ford before the annual convention of the
American Legion Department of Pennsylvania, Friday, July 16, 1971, at Pittsburgh, Pa.
There must never be another Vietnam. It was George Santayana who said, "those
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." I am sure none of us will
ever forget Vietnam. We are all determined never to repeat it.
The best way to avoid another Vietnam is to develop mechanisms that will bring
the people into Executive Branch decision-making--and the best way to do that is
through the people's chosen representatives, the Congress of the United States.
The Constitution clearly grants to Congress the power to declare war. But we
are now living in a world where wars are fought but not declared. We are living in
an age of limited and undeclared wars. This circumstance has stripped Congress of
its war-making power and delegated it solely to the Executive. It is this which
makes a tragedy like Vietnam not only possible but likely.
This is a situation which should be corrected at the earliest possible moment.
I therefore urge that Congress approve legislation which would create a new and
meaningful role for Congress in limited war or undeclared war situations.
Under terms of this legislation, a military action by the President would have
to be approved by the Congress within 30 days or U.S. troops dispatched to a foreign
station would have to be withdrawn.
This legislation also would create a new Joint Congressional Committee on
National Security which would consult with the President and his national security
advisors on military decisions.
This joint committee would include the majority and minority leaders of both
houses of Congress and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the House and
Senate committees directly concerned with foreign and military policy.
Prior to military action or no later than 24 hours subsequent to it, this
Joint Committee on National Security would consult with the President or his advisors
and obtain information on the circumstances surrounding the military action.
The Joint Committee would then transmit reports to the appropriate committees
FORD
of both houses of Congress, and those committees would draft and send to the House
and Senate legislation to ratify or alter the President's action.
(more)
LIBRARY
-2-
This legislation would not tie the President's hands. He still would have the
freedom to act promptly in an emergency situation. But his action would be subject
to immediate review by the Congress--and this is as it should be. This would bring
the Congress into the decision-making process in all military actions involving the
dispatch of U.S. troops into any foreign theater of operations.
This would be a responsible way for Congress to exercise its power over the
deployment of U.S. troops abroad and could help guarantee that the United States
will not again be drawn into an undeclared war without the support of the American
people.
The legislative branch of the Federal Government must play a larger role in
decisions of war and peace--the role clearly delegated to the Congress by the
Constitution of the United States.
I would also emphasize this. In situations where the Congress endorses a
military action taken by the President, the Congress should set forth the United
States commitment in precise terms--not hand the Executive a blank check of the
Tonkin Gulf variety.
Currently there is another policy resolution pencing before the Congress--the
so-called Mansfield resolution adopted as an amendment to a draft extension bill in
the Senate. This resolution or amendment would declare it the policy of the United
States to withdraw all of its troops from Vietnam within nine months, contingent
on release of American prisoners of war.
I endorse the goal of total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. The
President has set that goal for the Nation. But I do not think it serves a useful
purpose at this time to set a date definite for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops.
This is a matter for negotiation, not a matter for Congress unilaterally to make a
judgment on.
We want to withdraw all of our troops from Vietnam. And the goal is to with-
draw them by the earliest practicable date. We should give the President that kind
of flexibility. He needs it to negotiate the best possible agreement with the other
side.
I am heartened by the latest North Vietnamese offer at Paris. It provides a
basis for negotiation if the other side will follow it up with private talks. It
indicates some movement by the other side. However, in my view, some items are non-
negotiable at Paris. I am opposed to leaving South Vietnam to shift completely for
itself, without arms or logistical aid. This would be to abandon South Vietnam to
Communist conquest. Even with the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam, other
forms of aid to South Vietnam must continue. We must leave behind a South Vietnam
which has a chance to survive as an independent, non-Communist nation.
# # #