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Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 28, 1973
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Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 28, 1973
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Gerald R. Ford Congressional Papers
Speeches
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Soviet Union
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (4/4/1949 - )
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1973-06-30
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1973
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The original documents are located in Box D35, folder "Center for Strategic and
International Studies, June 28, 1973" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary
and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
m
OFFICE COPY
Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, International Club Bldg.,
1800 K Street, N.W., at 9:15 a.m. Thursday, June 28, 1973. Topic: Defense and Detente.
Discussion scheduled to last from 9:15 until 12m noon.
The word, detente, has a magic ring to it. It has a most appealing sound. Apart
from that, from a substantive point of view, detente is most ardently to be desired--
provided that from the standpoint of the American people it is a condition achieved without
loss of vigilance.
We are moving steadily
toward detente. The summit meetings last week between
President Nixon and Soviet Leader Brezhnev produced a definite improvement in relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union, an Agreement for the Prevention of
Nuclear War,
a pledge that the two nations would work together to maintain world
peace and to avoid serious international confrontations, and a Declaration of Principles
which promises to pave the way for a treaty next year
limiting offensive nuclear
weapons and
even a reduction of strategic weapons. Meantime it has been announced that
East-West
the conference on mutaal balance force reductions will begin Oct. 30 in Vienna.
Then
era of negotiations
is well
under way with the agreements
we have
already concluded--such as SALT I and Berlin--and with SALT II and MBFR talks to
continue.
There is a
tendency on the part of some Americans to see in the new era of
negotiations a reason or excuse to reduce U.S. and NATO defense efforts. Yet it must
be apparent to all westerners that we still
have a long way to go on the road to
detente--and that it was U.S. military strength which helped bring the new era of
negotiations about and produced the agreements we already can point to.
It should also be apparent that western positions and interests cannot be adequately
protected and advanced in upcoming negotiations unless the West shows continued will and
ability to maintain its military strength.
FORD
Do not misunderstand me. I look forward to the day when genuine detente, manifested
LIBRARY
Digitized from Box D35 of The Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
-2-
by concrete actions on the part of the Soviet Union, makes it possible for the United
States and NATO to lower their military profile. I honestly do not know if that day
will ever come. Certainly detente without what I would regard as an adequate defense
is delusion, whatever actions are taken by the other side.
It is all very well to talk about improving relations between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union--and we should do that. But we cannot, despite Mr. Brezhnev's outward
show of great friendliness, ignore the fact that the Soviet
military buildup-conventional
as well as nuclear--continuew with vigorous momentum.
We should be honest with ourselves and the rest of the world. We should face up
to reality and make this recognition a starting point for our further negotiating efforts.
Unless We do this, we jeopardize the chances for achieving peace whiler subjecting our
vital interests to serious danger.
In that connection, we must not view possible results in the MBFR talks as a reason
for reducing defense expenditures over the longer term. MBFR will not obviate the need
to maintain and improve our conventional capabilities, overall. On the contrary, reduction
of our forces in Europe will mean we must make the most efficient possible use of our
defense resources. However, MBFR can be the vehicle which lowers the level of
confromation between East and West. Our objective in
MBFR is a more stable
military balance at lower levels of forces.
Negotiated mutual reductions, East
and West, are the only prudent path to this objective.
Our NATO allies have made a commendable effort to maintain and improve their forces.
In the period, 1970-73, allied defense expenditures increased 30 per cent. Significant
improvements to allied forces also are taking place as the equipment program established
by the Europroup continue on schedule. But there is an excessive amount of duplication
with the NATO Alliance in research and development of weapons systems.
Progress
-3-
in NATO armaiments has been slow, particularly in the fields of armor and anti-armor
and naval modernization. The overall process has been inefficient because of national
attempts to maintain a wide range of similar defense industries. We have been trying to
encourage greater cooperation and rationalization among our NATO allies. We are offering
our latest designs to other NATO nations and are testing theirdesigns for possible
adoption by our forces.
There is potential for greater NATO progress in the exercise field, particularly
in the maritime area. Our allies possess important naval assets whose capabilities are
not fully realized because the ships spend so much time in port. If certain allies
operated these
ships more often, their training, readine and ability to work
together with other allied naval forces would be greatly enhanced. This could lead
to creation of an Allied Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean, as a counterpart
to the Atlantic force which has been so successful.
we cooperative measures among our allies in such areas as the
need
organization, command and control of our NATO Air
Forces in the center region;
better use of manpower, both active and reserve; and R&D to achieve truly effective
armament opoperation.
For a
quarter of a century we and our Allies have operated on the basic
belief that it was fitting and feasible for the United States to assume primary
responsibility for countering all threats to the common security. The le sson both we
and our Allies have to learn is that partnership, not predominance- sharing, not
supremacy--is in our common interest.
######
O OFFICE
COPY
Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, International Club Bldg.,
1800 K Street, N.W., at 9:15 a.m. Thursday, June 28, 1973. Topic: Defense and Detente.
Discussion schedule to last from 9:15 until 12n noon.
The word, detente, has a magic ring to it. It has a most appealing sound. Apart
from
that, from a substantive point of view, detente is most ardently to be desired--
provided that from the standpoint of the American people it is a condition achieved without
loss of vigilance.
We are moving steadily
toward detente. The summit meetings last week between
President Nixon and Soviet Leader Brezhnev produced a definite improvement in relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union, an Agreement for the Prevention of
Nuclear War,
a pledge that the two nations would work together to maintain world
peace and to avoid serious international confrontations, and a Declaration 6f Principles
which promises to pave the way for a treaty next year
limiting offensive nuclear
weapons and even a reduction of strategic weapons. Meantime it has been announced that
East-West
the conference on mutaal balance force reductions will begin Oct. 30 in Vienna.
The
era of negotiati ons
is well
under way with the agreements
we have
already concluded such as SALT I and Berlin and with SALT II and MBFR talks to
continue.
There is a tendency on the part of some Americans to see in the new era of
negotiations a reason or excuse to reduce U.S. and NATO defense efforts. Yet it must
be apparent to all westerners that we still
have a long way to go on the road to
detente and that it was U.S. military strength which helped bring the new era of
negotiations about and produced the agreements we already can point to.
It should also be apparent that western positions and interests cannot be adequately
protected and advanced in upcoming negotiations unless the West shows continued will and
ability to maintain its military strength.
FORD
1817
Do not misunderstand me. I look forward to the day when genuine detente, manifested
-2-
by concrete actions on the part of the Soviet Union, makes it possible for the United
States and NATO to lower their military profile. I honestly do not know if that day
will ever come. Certainly detente without what I would regard as an adequate defense
is delusion, whatever actions are taken by the other side.
It is all very well to talk about improving relations between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union--and we should do that. But we cannot, despite Mr. Brezhnev's outward
show of great friendliness, ignore the fact that the Soviet military buildup conventional
as well as nuclear--continuew with vigorous momentum.
We should be honest with ourselves and the rest of the world. We should face up
to reality and make this recognition a starting point for our further negotiating efforts.
Unless WB do this, we jeopardize the chances for achieving peace, while subjecting our
vital interests to serious danger.
In that connection, we must not view possible results in the MBFR talks as a reason
for reducing defense expenditures over the longer term. MBFR will not obviate the need
to maintain and improve our conventional capabilities, overall. On the contrary, reduction
of our forces in Europe will mean we must make the most efficient possible use of our
defense resources. Howdver, MBFR can be the vehicle which lowers the level of
confromation between East and West. Our objective in M. MBFR is a more stable
military balance at lower levels of forces.
Negotiated mutual reductions, East
and West, are the only prudent path to this objective.
Our NATO al ies have made a commendable effort to maintain and improve their forces.
In the period, 1970-73, allied defense expenditures increased 30 per cent. Significant
improvements to allied forces also are taking place as the equipment program established
by the EuroGroup continue on schedule. But there is an excessive amount of duplication
ith the NATO Alliance in research and development of weapons systems.
Progress
-3-
in NATO armatments has been slow, particularly in the fields of armor and anti-armor
and naval modernization. The overall process has been inefficient because of national
attempts to maintain a wide range of similar defense industries. We have been trying to
encourage greater cooperation and rationalization among our NATO allies. We are offering
our latest designs to other NATO nations and are testing theirdesigns for possible
adoption by our forces.
There is potential for greater NATO progres SS in the exercise field, particularly
in the maritime area. Our allies possess important naval assets whose capabilities are
not fully realized because the ships spend 8 much time in port. If certain allies
operated these
ships more often, their training, readiness, and ability to work
together with other allied naval forces a would be greatly enhanced. This could lead
to creation of an Allied Standing Navbl Force in the Mediterranean, as a counterpart
to he Atlantic force which has been so successful.
apr
we need cooperative measures among our allies in such areas as the
organization, command and control of our NATO Air Forces in the center region;
better use of manpower, both active and reserve; and R&D to achieve truly effective
armements cooperation.
For
2
quarter
of a century we and our Allies have operated on the basic
belief that it was fitting and feasible for the United States to assume primary
responsibility for countering all threats to the common security. The le soon both we
and our Allies have to learn is that partnership, not predominance--sharing, not
supremacy--is in our common interest.
#####..
& FORD LIBRARY