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    "title": "1976/05/07 S2662 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (vetoed) (3)",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 44, folder \"1976/05/07 S2662 International\nSecurity Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (vetoed) (3)\" of the White House\nRecords Office: Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nExact duplicates within this folder were not digitized.\nDigitized from Box 44 of the White House Records Office Legislation Case Files\nat the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nattached material\nwas superseded !\n(per C.Finley of\nR Lundera office)\nFORD s LIBRARY GERALD\nTO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:\nI am returning, without my approval, S. 2662, a bill\nthat would unwisely and improperly obstruct the exercise of\nthe President's constitutional responsibilities for the con-\nduct of foreign affairs and do serious harm to the long-term\nforeign policy interests of the United States.\nThis legislation authorizes appropriations for security\nassistance programs for fiscal year 1976. These programs\nare of great importance to our efforts to promote a more\nstable and secure world in which constructive international\ncooperation can flourish. However, the numerous restrictions\nand cumbersome procedures contained in the bill would seriously\nimpair the ability of the Executive Branch to perform its\nproper functions.\nConstitutional Objections\nS. 2662 contains an array of constitutionally objectionable\nrequirements whereby virtually all significant arms transfer\ndecisions would be subjected on a case-by-case basis to a\nperiod of delay for Congressional review and possible dis-\napproval by concurrent resolution of the Congress. These\nprovisions are incompatible with the express provision in\nthe Constitution that a resolution having the force and effect\nof law must be presented to the President and, if disapproved,\nrepassed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House\nof Representatives. They extend to the Congress the power to\nprohibit specific transactions authorized by law without\nchanging the law -- and without following the constitutional\nprocess such a change would require. Moreover, they would\ninvolve the Congress directly in the performance of Executive\nfunctions in disregard of the fundamental principle of sepa-\nration of powers. Congress can, by duly adopted legislation,\nauthorize or prohibit such actions as the execution of\ncontracts or the issuance of export licenses; but Congress\nFORD\n2\ncannot itself participate in the Executive functions of\ndeciding whether to enter into a lawful contract or issue\na lawful license, either directly or through the disapproval\nprocedures contemplated in this bill.\nThe erosion of the basic distinction between legislative\nand Executive functions which would result from the enactment\nof S. 2662, displays itself in an increasing volume of similar\nlegislation which this Congress has passed or is considering.\nSuch legislation would pose a serious threat to our system of\ngovernment, and would forge impermissible shackles on the\nPresident's ability to carry out the laws and conduct the\nforeign relations of the United States. The President cannot\nfunction effectively in domestic matters, and speak for the\nnation authoritatively in foreign affairs, if his decisions\nunder authority previously conferred can be reversed by a\nbare majority of the Congress. Also, the attempt of Congress\nto become a virtual co-administrator in operational decisions\nwould seriously distract it from its proper legislative role.\nInefficiency, delay, and uncertainty in the management of our\nnation's foreign affairs would eventually follow.\nApart from these basic constitutional deficiencies\nwhich appear in six sections of the bill, S. 2662 is faulty\nlegislation, containing numerous unwise restrictions.\nTrade with Vietnam\nThe bill would suspend for 180 days the President's\nauthority to control certain trade with North and South\nVietnam, thereby removing a vital bargaining instrument\nfor the settlement of a number of differences between the\nUnited States and these countries. I have the deepest\nsympathy for the intent of this provision, which is to\nobtain an accounting for Americans missing in action in\nVietnam. However, the enactment of this legislation would\nnot provide any real assurances that the Vietnamese would\nnow fulfill their long-standing obligation to provide such\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n3\nan accounting. Indeed, the establishment of a direct\nlinkage between trade and accounting for those missing in\naction might well only perpetuate Vietnamese demands for\ngreater and greater concessions.\nThis Administration is prepared to be responsive to\nVietnamese action on the question of Americans missing in\naction. Nevertheless, the delicate process of negotiations\nwith the Vietnamese cannot be replaced by a legislative\nmandate that would open up trade for a specified number of\ndays and then terminate that trade as a way to achieve our\ndiplomatic objectives. This mandate represents an unacceptable\nattempt by Congress to manage the diplomatic relations of the\nUnited States.\nAnnual Ceiling on Arms Sales\nA further objectionable feature of S. 2662 is an annual\nceiling of $9.0 billion on the total of government sales and\ncommercial exports of military equipment and services. In\nour search to negotiate mutual restraints in the prolifera-\ntion of conventional weapons, this self-imposed ceiling would\nbe an impediment to our efforts to obtain the cooperation of\nother arms-supplying nations. Such an arbitrary ceiling\nwould also require individual transactions to be evaluated,\nnot on their own merits, but on the basis of their relation-\nship to the volume of other, unrelated transactions. This\nprovision would establish an arbitrary, overall limitation\nas a substitute for case-by-case analyses and decisions based\non foreign policy priorities and the legitimate security\nneeds of our allies and friends.\nDiscrimination and Human Rights\nThis bill also contains well-intended but misguided\nprovisions to require the termination of military coopera-\ntion with countries which engage in practices that dis-\ncriminate against United States citizens or practices\nconstituting a consistent pattern of gross human rights\nFORD\n4\nviolations. This Administration is fully committed to a\npolicy of actively opposing and seeking the elimination of\ndiscrimination by foreign governments against United States\ncitizens on the basis of their race, religion, national\norigin or sex, just as the Administration is fully supportive\nof internationally recognized human rights as a standard for\nall nations to respect. The use of the proposed sanctions\nagainst sovereign nations is, however, an awkward and in-\neffective device for the promotion of those policies. These\nprovisions of the bill represent further attempts to ignore\nimportant and complex policy considerations by requiring\nsimple legalistic tests to measure the conduct of sovereign\nforeign governments. If Congress finds such conduct deficient,\nspecific actions by the United States to terminate or limit\nour cooperation with the government concerned would be man-\ndated. By making any single factor the effective determinant\nof relationships which must take into account other considera-\ntions, such provisions would add a new element of uncertainty\nto our security assistance programs and would cast doubt upon\nthe reliability of the United States in its dealings with\nother countries. Moreover, such restrictions would most\nlikely be counterproductive as a means for eliminating\ndiscriminatory practices and promoting human rights. The\nlikely result would be a selective disassociation of the\nUnited States from governments unpopular with the Congress,\nthereby diminishing our ability to advance the cause of\nhuman rights through diplomatic means.\nTermination of Grant Military Assistance and\nAdvisory Groups\nThe legislation would terminate grant military assis-\ntance and military assistance advisory groups after fiscal\nyear 1977 except where specifically authorized by Congress,\nthus creating a presumption against such programs and\nmissions. Such a step would have a severe impact on our\nrelations with other nations whose security and well-being\n5\nare important to our own national interests. In the case of\ngrant assistance, it would limit our flexibility to assist\ncountries whose national security is important to us but which\nare not themselves able to bear the full cost of their own\ndefense. In the case of advisory groups, termination of\nmissions by legislative fiat would impair close and long-\nstanding military relationships with important allies.\nMoreover, such termination is inconsistent with increasing\nCongressional demands for the kind of information about and\ncontrol over arms sales which these groups now provide.\nSuch provisions would insert Congress deeply into the\ndetails of specific country programs, a role which Congress\nhas neither the information nor the organizational structure\nto play.\n*****\nI particularly regret that, notwithstanding the spirit\nof genuine cooperation between the Legislative and Executive\nBranches that has characterized the deliberations on this\nlegislation, we have been unable to overcome the major\npolicy differences that exist.\nIn disapproving this bill, I act as any President would,\nand must, to retain the ability to function as the foreign\npolicy leader and spokesman of the Nation. In world affairs\ntoday, America can have only one foreign policy. Moreover,\nthat foreign policy must be certain, clear and consistent.\nForeign governments must know that they can treat with the\nPresident on foreign policy matters, and that when he speaks\nwithin his authority, they can rely upon his words.\nAccordingly, I must veto the bill.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE,\nTO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES\nI am returning, without my approval, S. 2662, a bill that\nwould make unacceptable encroachments upon the constitutional\nresponsibilities of the President for the conduct of foreign\naffairs and do serious harm to the long-term foreign policy\ninterests of the United States.\nThis legislation authorizes appropriations for security\nassistance programs for fiscal year 1976. These programs\nare of great importance to our efforts to promote a more stable\nand secure world in which constructive international coopera-\ntion can flourish. However, the numerous restrictions and\ncumbersome procedures contained in the bill would seriously\nimpair the ability of the Executive Branch to perform its\nproper functions.\nConstitutional Objections\nS. 2662 contains an array of constitutionally objectionable\nrequirements whereby virtually all significant arms transfer\ndecisions would be subjected on a case-by-case basis to a\nperiod of delay for Congressional review and possible dis-\napproval by concurrent resolution of the Congress. These pro-\nvisions are incompatible with the express provision in the\nConstitution that a resolution having the force and effect\nof law must be presented to the President and, if disapproved,\nrepassed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House\nof Representatives. They extend to the Congress the power to\nprohibit specific transactions authorized by law without\nchanging the law -- and without following the constitutional\nprocess such a change would require. Moreover, they would\ninvolve the Congress directly in the performance of Executive\nfunctions in disregard of the fundamental principle of sepa-\nration of powers. Congress can, by duly adopted legislation,\nauthorize or prohibit such actions as the execution of con-\ntracts or the issuance of export licenses; but Congress\ncannot itself participate in the Executive functions of\ndeciding whether to enter into a lawful contract or issue\na lawful license, either directly or through the disapproval\nprocedures contemplated in this bill.\nThe erosion of the basic distinction between legisla-\ntive and Executive functions that would result from the\nenactment of .2662, and that displays itself in an in-\ncreasing volume of similar legislation which this Congress\nhas passed or is considering, would pose a serious threat\nto our system of government, and would forge impermissible\nshackles on the President's ability to carry out the laws\nand conduct the foreign relations of the United States.\nThe President cannot function effectively in domestic matters,\nand speak for the nation authoritatively in foreign affairs,\nif his lawful operational decisions under authority previ-\nously conferred can be reversed by a bare majority of the\nCongress. Also, the attempt of Congress to become a virtual\nco-administrator in operational decisions would seriously\ndistract it from its proper legislative role. Inefficiency,\ndelay, and uncertainty in the management of our nation's\nforeign affairs would eventually follow.\nApart from these basic constitutional deficiencies\nwhich appear in six sections of the bill, S. 2662 is faulty\nlegislation, containing numerous unwise restrictions.\nTrade with Vietnam\nThe bill would suspend for 180 days the President's\nauthority to control certain trade with North and South\nVietnam, thereby removing a vital bargaining instrument for\nthe settlement of a number of differences between the United\nStates and these countries. I have the deepest sympathy for\nthe intent of this provision, which is to obtain an accounting\n3\nfor Americans missing in action in Vietnam. However, the\nenactment of this legislation would not provide any real\nassurances that the Vietnamese would now fulfill their long\nstanding obligation to provide such an accounting. Indeed,\nthe establishment of a direct linkage between trade and\naccounting for those missing in action might well only\nperpetuate Vietnamese demands for greater and greater con-\ncessions.\nThis Administration is prepared to be responsive to\nVietnamese action on the question of Americans missing in\naction. Nevertheless, the delicate process of negotiations\nwith the Vietnamese cannot be replaced by a legislative\nmandate that would open up trade for a specified number of\ndays and then terminate that trade as a way to achieve our\ndiplomatic objectives. This mandate represents an unac-\nceptable attempt by Congress to manage the diplomatic rela-\ntions of the United States.\nAnnual Ceiling on Arms Sales\nA further objectionable feature of S. 2662 is an annual\nceiling of $9.0 billion on the total of government sales and\ncommercial exports of military equipment and services. In\nour search to negotiate mutual restraints in the prolifera-\ntion of conventional weapons, this self-imposed ceiling would\nbe an impediment to our efforts to obtain the cooperation of\nother arms-supplying nations. Such an arbitrary ceiling\nwould also require individual transactions to be evaluated,\nnot on their own merits, but on the basis of their relation-\nship to the volume of other, unrelated transactions. This\nprovision would establish an arbitrary, overall limitation\nas a substitute for case-by-case analyses and decisions based\non foreign policy priorities.\nDiscrimination and Human Rights\nThis bill also contains well intended but misguided\nprovisions to require the termination of military coopera-\ntion with countries which engage in practices that dis-\ncriminate against United States citizens or practices\nconstituting a consistent pattern of gross human rights\nviolations. This Administration is fully committed to a\npolicy of actively opposing and seeking the elimination of\ndiscrimination by foreign governments against United States\ncitizens on the basis of their race, religion, national\norigin or sex, just as the Administration is fully sup-\nportive of internationally recognized human rights as a\nstandard for all nations to respect. The use of the pro-\nposed sanctions against sovereign nations is, however, an\nawkward and ineffective device for the promotion of those\npolicies. These provisions of the bill represent further\nattempts to ignore important and complex policy considera-\ntions by requiring simple legalistic tests to measure the\nconduct of sovereign foreign governments. If Congress finds\nsuch conduct deficient, specific actions by the United States\nto terminate or limit our cooperation with the government\nconcerned would be mandated. By making any single factor\nthe effective determinant of relationships which must take\ninto account other considerations, such provisions would\nadd a new element of uncertainty to our security assist-\nance programs and would cast doubt upon the reliability of\nthe United States in its dealings with other countries.\nMoreover, such restrictions would most likely be counter-\nproductive as a means for eliminating discriminatory\npractices and promoting human rights. The likely result\nwould be a selective disassociation of the United States\nfrom governments unpopular with the Congress, thereby\ndiminishing our ability to advance the cause of human rights\nthrough diplomatic means:\nTermination of Grant Military Assistance and\nAdvisory Groups\nThe legislation would terminate grant military assist-\nance and military assistance advisory groups after fiscal\nyear 1977 except where specifically authorized by Congress,\nthus creating a presumption against such programs and\nmissions. In the case of grant assistance, this would\nlimit our flexibility to assist countries whose national\nsecurity is important to us but which are not themselves\nable to bear the full cost of their own defense. In the\ncase of advisory groups, termination of missions by legis-\nlative fiat would impair close and long standing military\nrelationships with important allies. Moreover, such\ntermination is inconsistent with increasing Congressional\ndemands for the kind of information about and control over\narms sales which these groups now provide. Such provisions\nwould insert Congress deeply into the details of specific\ncountry programs, a role which Congress has neither the in-\nformation nor the organizational structure to play.\nI particularly regret that, notwithstanding the spirit\nof genuine cooperation between the Legislative and Executive\nBranches that has characterized the deliberations on this\nlegislation, we have been unable to overcome the major policy\ndifferences that exist.\nIn disapproving this bill, I act as any President would,\nand must, to retain the ability to function as the foreign\npolicy leader and spokesman of the Nation. In world affairs\ntoday, America can have only one foreign policy. Moreover,\nthat foreign policy must be certain, clear and consistent.\nForeign governments must know that they can treat with the\nPresident on foreign policy matters, and that when he speaks\nwithin his authority, they can rely upon his words.\nAccordingly, I must veto the bill.\nTHE WHITE. HOUSE\nMay\n, 1976\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT\nOFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20503\n7.30p.m.\nAPR 30 1376\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nSubject: Enrolled Bill S. 2662 - International Security\nAssistance and Arms Export Control Act\nSponsor - Senator Humphrey (D) Minnesota\nLast Day for Action\nMay 11, 1976 - Tuesday\nPurpose\n(a) Authorizes appropriations of $3,958.7 million for\nsecurity assistance and certain other programs for fis-\ncal year 1976 and the transition quarter and places\nindividual country limitations on the use of certain\nfunds; (b) provides authority to stockpile defense\narticles for foreign military forces and drawdown\nDefense stocks to meet emergency requests; (c) ter-\nminates the general authority for grant military\nassistance and military assistance advisory groups\nafter fiscal year 1977; (d) establishes a separate\nforeign military training program; (e) expands the\ncongressional role in the foreign military sales\nprogram; and (f) contains a number of other sig-\nnificant policy revisions as noted below.\nAgency Recommendations\nOffice of Management and\nDisapproval (Veto Message\nBudget\nattached)\nNational Security Council\nDisapproval (Informally)\nArms Control and Disarmament\nDisapproval\nAgency\nDepartment of Defense\nApproval\nAgency for International\nApproval\nDevelopment\nDepartment of State\nForesees potentially\nserious consequences\nof a veto\nDepartment of Justice\nObjects on constitu-\ntional grounds but\ndefers to other\nagencies on foreign\npolicy and other\nconsiderations\nFORD\nDepartment of Commerce\nDefers to other agencies\nDepartment of the Treasury\nWould not recommend veto\n2\nDiscussion\nAmounts Authorized to be Appropriated\nThe tables attached to this memorandum summarize\nthe amounts authorized for fiscal year 1976 and\nthe transition quarter. For the transition\nquarter, the bill provides for \"appropriation of\none-fourth of any amount authorized for fiscal\nyear 1976\nin accordance with the authorization\napplicable to operation and activities authorized\nunder this act\n\"\nAuthorizations of appropriations for the 15-month\nperiod for all accounts exceed the Administration's\nrequest by $368 million. Foreign military sales\n(FMS) credit funds are increased by $203.8 million\nand security supporting assistance by $301.3\nmillion primarily for aid to Israel during the\ntransition quarter. For fiscal year 1976, aid for\nIsrael is authorized substantially as requested includ-\ning an FMS credit program of $1.5 billion with\nrepayments on one-half of this amount to be for-\ngiven.\nThe grant military assistance program (MAP) is\nreduced by $135.8 million. This reduction is not\nas severe as it appears because $63 million of the\ncut was taken from Greece and Turkey for which\nseparate authorization is to be sought when\nCongress approves base agreements with these\ncountries. Thus, only Jordan suffers a severe\ncut from the $100 million in grant MAP requested to\nthe $67.5 million authorized under this bill. The\nbill also contains a number of individual country\nlimitations on the use of grant MAP, FMS credit\nand security supporting assistance funds.\nSpecial Authorities\nThe bill contains permanent authority for the\nPresident to determine that there is an emergency\nrequirement for military assistance and to order\nthe use of Department of Defense stocks or services\nof value up to $67.5 million in any fiscal year\nto meet such an emergency. Obligations incurred\nare authorized to be liquidated by future grant\nMAP appropriations, but the entire authority is\nFORD\nLIBRARY\n3\ncontingent on the inclusion of language in annual\nappropriation acts making the authority effective\nin the same amount.\nThe bill permits reinstitution of the stockpiling\nprogram, suspended in December of 1974 by Congress,\nunder which defense articles are held in U.S.\ninventories as war reserves for foreign nations.\nLimits of $75 million and $18.8 million are set\non the value of additions to such stockpiles in\n1976 and the transition quarter, respectively.\nTermination of Grant MAP and MAAGs\nBeginning with fiscal year 1978, the general\nauthority for grant MAP is terminated. Each\ncountry program thereafter must be authorized\nseparately. Authority is provided until the end\nof fiscal 1980 for wind up costs of programs\nexisting before September 30, 1977.\nDuring fiscal year 1977, the number of military\nassistance advisory groups (MAAGs) and similar\nmilitary groups is limited to 34, a reduction of\n10 from current levels. In fiscal year 1978, no\nMAAG or similar mission may continue unless\nspecifically authorized by Congress. However, the\nPresident would be permitted to assign no more than\nthree military personnel to the chief of a\ndiplomatic mission to perform MAAG functions.\nMilitary attachés are specifically prohibited from\nperforming such functions.\nInternational Military Education and Training\nAs requested by the Administration, the bill\nestablishes the military training program as a\nprogram separate from grant MAP. No termination\ndate is established for this program.\nExpanded Congressional Role in Foreign Military Sales\nA. Restriction on commercial sales. The bill\nR. FORD\n4\nrequires that all sales of major defense equipment\nof $25 million or more must be on a government-to-\ngovernment (FMS) basis except for sales to NATO\ncountries which can continue through commercial\nchannels. Major defense equipment is defined as any\nitem of significant combat equipment having a non-\nrecurring research and development cost of more than\n$50 million or a total estimated production cost of\nmore than $200 million.\nB. Congressional review and veto by concurrent\nresolution. Under current law, all proposed\ngovernment-to-government (FMS) sales of defense\narticles and services valued over $25 million must\nbe submitted to the Congress and the Congress may\nforbid such sales by passage of a concurrent\nresolution within 20 days. There is no similar\nexisting provision affecting export licenses for\ncommercial sales. This bill extends the existing\nreporting requirement and Congressional veto to\ncover all proposed sales of \"major defense equip-\nment\" of $7 million or more, whether FMS or\ncommercial, and also extends the waiting period for\nCongressional action to 30 calendar days. The\nPresident can exempt a sale from Congressional\nveto by certifying to Congress that an \"emergency\nexists which requires such sale in the national\nsecurity interests of the United States.\"\nC. $9.0 billion arms sales ceiling. The bill\nincorporates a worldwide $9 billion (in 1975\nconstant dollars) annual ceiling on all arms sales\n(FMS and commercial) beginning in fiscal year 1977.\nThe ceiling would be computed according to\ncontract price of equipment actually delivered in\nany fiscal year. Thus, the full value of long-term\ncontracts signed in fiscal year 1977 will not be\ncounted against the ceiling in that year, but\nincrementally as deliveries are made. The\nPresident may waive the ceiling if he determines\na particular sale to be in the national security\ninterest and so certifies to Congress.\nis\nFORD\nLIBRARY\n5\nD. Reporting. The bill requires the President\nto submit an annual report to Congress which includes\nan arms control impact statement prepared by the\nDirector of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency\nfor each purchasing country. This statement is\nrequired to address the impact of sales on our\narms control efforts with that country and on the\nstability of the region in which the country is\nlocated.\nE. Arms sales policy. The bill requires the\nPresident to conduct a comprehensive study of arms\nsales policy \"in order to determine whether such\npolicies and practices should be changed.\" A report\nto Congress is due in one year.\nF. Sales affecting U.S. combat readiness. The\nPresident is required to report to the Congress any\nsale if in his judgment such sale \"could have a\nsignificant adverse effect on combat readiness of\nthe Armed Forces of the United States.\" The\nreport would have to contain a \"certification that\nsuch sale is important to the security of the United\nStates.\n\"\nG. Repayment period. The maximum repayment\nperiod for foreign military credit sales is extended\nfrom 10 years to 12 years except in the case of\nIsrael where a repayment period of \"not less than\ntwenty years following a grace period of ten years\non repayment of principal\" is mandated for fiscal\nyear 1976.\nH. Deferred payment on cash sales from stock.\nCurrent law permits the President to defer payment\non cash sales from Department of Defense stocks by\nup to 120 days after delivery without interest\ncharge. This bill requires that interest be\ncharged on any net amount due on such sales not\npaid within 60 days of delivery unless the President\ndetermines that \"the emergency requirements of the\npurchaser exceed the ready availability to the\nFORD\n6\npurchaser of funds,\" in which case he may defer\npayment for a total of 120 days.\nI. Agent Fees. The bill mandates reports\nto the Congress by the Secretary of State on\npolitical contributions, gifts, commissions, and\nfees in connection with foreign military sales or\ncommercial sales licensed or approved under the\nAct. It also requires the Secretary of State\nto establish recordkeeping and reporting\nrequirements for such fees, authorizes the President\nto establish regulations prohibiting or limiting\nfees, and provides criminal penalties for private\nindividuals not complying with these regulations.\nOther Policy Provisions\nA. Congressional power to terminate military\nassistance. The bill establishes the right of\nCongress to terminate assistance and deliveries of\nassistance (grants or credits) whenever it finds\nby concurrent resolution that a recipient country is\nin substantial violation of the eligibility criteria\nfor foreign assistance or the international\nagreements under which assistance is provided.\nAssistance would remain terminated until the\nPresident determined that the violation had ceased.\nand the country had given assurances that the\nviolation would not recur.\nB. Congressional power to prevent third-\ncountry transfers. The bill prevents the President\nfrom giving his consent to the transfer of defense\narticles and services from aid recipients to third\ncountries without first certifying certain infor-\nmation to Congress concerning the intended transfer.\nCongress may prevent the proposed transfer by\nconcurrent resolution within 30 calendar days unless\nthe President certifies that an emergency exists which\nrequires such transfer in the national security\ninterest.\nC. Human rights. The bill establishes a yearly\nreporting procedure on the human rights situation\n7\nin all countries receiving security assistance and\nallows Congress to ask for more detailed reports on\nparticular countries. It also creates the\nposition of Coordinator for Human Rights within\nthe Department of State as a Presidential appointment\nrequiring Senate confirmation. The legislation\nallows Congress, within 90 days of receiving a report\non a particular country from the Coordinator for\nHuman Rights, to terminate or restrict assistance\nto that country by concurrent resolution. No waiver\nauthority is provided.\nD. Prohibition against discrimination. The bill\nmandates the cut-off of any FMS project if a U.S.\ncitizen is prevented by a foreign government from\nparticipating in that project by reason of race,\nreligion, sex, or national origin. However, it\ndoes provide prior opportunity for the President to\nmake private efforts to reverse an instance of\ndiscrimination before any action to terminate must\nbe taken. The President can waive the cut-off if he\ndetermines it would have \"a significant adverse\nimpact on the. security of the United States.\"\nE. Angola. The bill contains a provision\nexpressing the concern of the Congress with respect\nto Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola.\nF. Chile. All security assistance is prohibited;\nthus, only cash sales of defense articles and\nservices are possible after enactment.\nG. Military forces in the Indian Ocean. The\nbill expresses the sense of Congress that the\nPresident should initiate negotiations with the\nSoviet Union regarding control of military forces\nin the Indian Ocean and report to the Congress not\nlater than December 1, 1976.\nH. Turkey. The bill authorizes $31 million in\ngrant MAP for Turkey (as compared with the budget\nrequest of $75 million), but continues the\nR. FORD\n8\nprohibitions of existing law with respect to such\nassistance. Thus, grant assistance cannot be\nprovided unless the President certifies as to\nsubstantial progress toward a Cyprus agreement and\nTurkish compliance with U.S. law and implementing\nagreements. On the other hand, the legislation\npermits the sale of $125 million in defense articles\nand services to Turkey during the balance of fiscal\nyear 1976 and the transition quarter, a softening\nof the present total prohibition on grants or\nsales.\nI. Trade with Vietnam. The bill suspends\ncertain restrictions on trade with Vietnam for 180\ndays. The suspension would automatically expire\nunless the President certifies to the Congress\nthat the Vietnamese have been forthcoming in\naccounting for MIAs.\nJ. International narcotics control. The\nbill prohibits U.S. personnel from engaging or\nparticipating in direct police arrest actions in\nany foreign country in connection with narcotics\ncontrol efforts.\nK. Report on Korea. The bill requires the\nPresident to report 90 days after enactment and\nannually for the next 5 years on (1) progress made\nby the Republic of Korea in modernizing its\narmed forces so as to achieve military self-\nsufficiency, (2) the role of the United States in\nmutual security efforts in Korea, and (3) prospects\nfor phased reduction of United States armed\nforces assigned to Korea, in coordination with the\ntimetable of the Republic of Korea for military\nself-sufficiency.\nL. U.S. citizens imprisoned in Mexico. The\nbill declares the intent of Congress \"that\nefforts to secure stringent international law\nenforcement measures with respect to dangerous\ndrugs shall be combined with efforts to secure\nfair and humane treatment for, citizens of foreign\n9\ncountries who are imprisoned.\" The provision requests\nthe President to communicate directly to the President\nof Mexico the continuing concern of the United\nStates over the treatment of United States citizens\narrested in Mexico. The Secretary of State is required\nto submit quarterly reports to Congress on progress\nachieved toward full respect of the human and legal\nrights of all United States citizens detained in\nMexico.\nM. Strife in Lebanon. The bill expresses the\nsense of the Congress that the situation in Lebanon\nposes a serious danger to Middle East peace, and\nthat the Congress views with grave concern outside\nefforts to exploit the current strife for the purpose\nof transforming Lebanon into a radical state in\nconfrontation with Israel. This provision also\ncontains a request that the President use his good\noffices to bring about peace.\nN. Portugal. There is a sense of Congress\nstatement that the President should take action to\nalleviate food shortages in Portugal using existing\nstatutes.\nO. Middle East policy. The bill declares the\nsense of Congress that the United States will\ncontinue to determine Middle East policy as\ncircumstances may require. It further declares the\nauthority contained in the joint resolution\napproving the early warning system in Sinai and\nthe authorizations contained in this bill shall\nnot be construed \"to constitute congressional\napproval, acceptance, or endorsement (1) of any\noral or written commitment, understanding, assurance,\npromise, or agreement, whether expressed or\nimplied, or any other expression, oral or written\n(other than the 'United States Proposal for\nthe Early Warning System in Sinai'), made by any\nofficial of the United States which Israel, Egypt, or\nany other nation or organization might construe\nor interpret as a basis on which it could rely or\nact, or (2). of any characterization of any such\n10\ncommitment, understanding, assurance, promise, or\nagreement, or other expression, as constituting a\n'codification' of existing, congressionally\napproved United States policy.\n\"\nP. International terrorism. The bill\nrequires the President to terminate all assistance\nto any government which aids or abets international\nterrorism by granting sanctuary to terrorists. A\nPresidential waiver on national security grounds\nis possible, but Congress within 30 days of such\naction could adopt a concurrent resolution\nreversing the waiver action.\nThe Department of Justice informally advises that\nthe bill is objectionable on constitutional grounds\ndue to the inclusion of the several provisions for\ncongressional override of Presidential actions by\nconcurrent resolution. Justice defers to the views\nof other agencies, however, as to whether foreign\npolicy and other considerations outweigh these\nconstitutional objections.\nIn its enrolled bill letter, Defense states:\n\"Apart from the concurrent resolution\nveto aspect of S. 2662, the Department\nof Defense is of the view that its\nprovisions can be implemented without\nsignificant detriment to the foreign\npolicy and national security of the\nUnited States. In general, the Depart-\nment of Defense believes that the\nfinal text of these other provisions\nrepresents a genuine effort by the\nCongress to accommodate objections\nraised by the Executive Branch during\nmarkup by the International Relations\nand Foreign Relations Committees and\nby the Conference Committee. For\nexample, adequate provision has been\nmade for a waiver of limitations by\nthe President. Accordingly, the\nDepartment of Defense does not\nbelieve that a veto of S. 2662 is warranted\nbecause of those provisions.\"\n11\nDefense also believes that a veto of the enrolled\nbill based on the concurrent resolution override\nprovisions it contains also would be inappropriate\nbecause the fiscal year 1975 foreign aid authoriza-\ntion bill and numerous other bills presented to the\nPresident over the past 30 years containing similar\nprovisions have been approved. The Department\nrecommends approval and a strong signing statement\nciting the constitutional objections to the bill\nand welcoming a speedy and decisive judicial\ntest of the concurrent resolution provisions.\nIts enrolled bill letter includes language that\ncould be used in such a signing statement.\nAlternatively, Defense recommends that, should\nyou decide to signify your dissatisfaction with\nthe bill in a stronger fashion, you announce\nyour intention to permit the bill to become law\nwithout your signature and issue a statement\nsimilar to that recommended above.\nState advises us informally that, while it\nunderstands you intend to disapprove S. 2662, it\nforesees some potentially serious consequences\narising from a veto, if sustained. Principally,\nthe Department is concerned about the ability\nto carry out security supporting assistance and\nforeign military sales, credit and guarantee\nprograms during the remainder of fiscal year\n1976 and the transition quarter and believes it\ncould be difficult to obtain an amendment to the\nexisting continuing resolution that would provide\nadequate funds for these programs. Furthermore,\nState believes a veto, if sustained, could impair\nefforts to obtain congressional approval of\nagreements with Turkey, Spain, Greece and the\nPhilippines.\nIn addition to the Arms Control and Disarmament\nAgency, the National Security Council and the\nOffice of Management and Budget recommend dis-\napproval for the reasons set forth in the attached\n12\nproposed veto message. The message has been con-\ncurred in by Mr. Buchen, Mr. Scalia, Mr. Scowcroft\nand Mr. Lynn.\nJames m. Trey\nJames M. Frey\nAssistant Director for\nLegislative Reference\nEnclosure\nFOR\nFISCAL YEAR 1976\n(appropriations in millions of dollars)\nAuthorization\nEnrolled\nRequest\nBill\nDifference\nGrant Military Assistance\n394.5\n228.7\n165.8\nForeign Military Training\n30.0\n27.0\n-3.0\nForeign Military Credit Sales\n1,065.0\n1,039.0\n-26.0\n(Program)\n(2,374.7)\n(2,374.7)\n(---)\n(Authority to forgive\nIsraeli repayments)\n(750.0)\n(750.0)\n(---)\nSecurity Supporting Assistance\n1,873.31/\n1,766.2\n-107.1\nMiddle East Special Requirement\nFund\n50.0\n50.0\n---\nNarcotics Control\n42.5\n40.0\n-2.5\nContingency Fund\n10.0\n5.0\n-5.0\nAid to Cypriot Refugees\n---\n10.02/\n+10.0\nInternational Atomic Energy\nAgency\n---\n1.03/\n+1.0\nTotal\n3,465.3\n3,166.9\n-298.4\n1/ Of the total request, $25.0 million was for Cyprus relief. This amount\nhas been authorized as a separate account, Aid to Cypriot Refugees.\n2/ In addition to $30.0 million authorized in the development assistance\nbill.\n3/ In addition to a voluntary contribution of $3.5 million authorized in\nthe development assistance bill; earmarked for safeguards activities.\nTRANSITION QUARTER (JULY 1, 1976 - SEPTEMBER 30, 1976)\n(appropriations in millions of dollars)\nAuthorization\nEnrolled\nRequest\nBill\nDifference\nGrant Military Assistance\n27.2\n57.2\n+30.0\nForeign Military Training\n7.0\n6.8\n-.2\nForeign Military Credit Sales\n30.0\n259.8\n+229.8\n(Program)\n(55.5)\n(593.7)\n(+538.2)\n(Authority to forgive\nIsraeli repayments)\n(---)\n(187.5)\n(+187.5)\nSecurity Supporting Assistance\n33.21/\n441.6\n+408.4\nMiddle East Special Requirement\n-\nFund\n10.0\n12.5\n+2.5\nNarcotics Control\n13.0\n10.0\n-3.0\nContingency Fund\n5.0\n1.2\n-3.8\nAid to Cypriot Refugees\n---\n2.52/\n+2.5\nInternational Atomic Energy\nAgency\n---\n.2\n+.2\nTotal\n125.4\n791.8\n+666.4\n1/ Of the total request, $5.0 million was for Cyprus relief.\nThis amount\nhas been authorized in a separate account, Aid to Cypriot Refugees.\n2/ In addition to $5.0 million authorized in the development assistance\nbill.\nNSC changes\nTO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES\nI am returning, without my approval, S. 2662, a bill that\nwould make unacceptable encroachments upon the constitutional\nresponsibilities of the President for the conduct of foreign\naffairs and do serious harm to the long-term foreign policy\ninterests of the United States.\nThis legislation authorizes appropriations for security\nassistance programs for fiscal year 1976. These programs\nare of great importance to our efforts to promote a more stable\nand secure world in which constructive international coopera-\ntion can flourish. However, the numerous restrictions and\ncumbersome procedures contained in the bill would seriously\nimpair the ability of the Executive Branch to perform its\nproper functions.\nConstitutional Objections\nS. 2662 contains an array of constitutionally objectionable\nrequirements whereby virtually all significant arms transfer\ndecisions would be subjected on a case-by-case basis to a\nperiod of delay for Congressional review and possible dis-\napproval by concurrent resolution of the Congress. These pro-\nvisions are incompatible with the express provision in the\nConstitution that a resolution having the force and effect\nof law must be presented to the President and, if disapproved,\nrepassed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House\nof Representatives. They extend to the Congress the power to\nprohibit specific transactions authorized by law without\nchanging the law -- and without following the constitutional\nprocess such a change would require. Moreover, they would\nGERALD FORD VIBRARY\ninvolve the Congress directly in the performance of Executi\nfunctions in disregard of the fundamental principle of sepa-\nration of powers. Congress can, by duly adopted legislation,\nCREATE UNWISE IMPROPERTANT STRUCT\nTHE EXERCISE or THE PRESIDENTS CONSITUTIONAL\nRESPONSIBILITIES\nauthorize or prohibit such actions as the execution of con-\ntracts or the issuance of export licenses; but Congress\ncannot itself participate in the Executive functions of\ndeciding whether to enter into a lawful contract or issue\na lawful license, either directly or through the disapproval\nprocedures contemplated in this bill.\nThe erosion of the basic distinction between legisla-\ntive and Executive functions that which would result from the\nenactment of S.2662, and what that displays itself in an in-\ncreasing volume of similar legislation which this Congress\nsuch ligisation\nhas passed or is considering. would pose a serious threat\nCONGRESS AS ABODY SIMPLY DOES NOT HAVE\nTHE INFORMATION AND EXPERTISE CAN IT DEVOTE THE\nto our system of government, and would forge impermissible\nCONSTANT ATTENTION WHICH SUCH OPERATIONAL\nRESPONSIBILITY FOR THE THEMANAGYMENT ON ASSISTANCE\nPROGRAMS REQUIRES.COULD not properly be given by\nshackles on the President's ability to carry out the laws\nand conduct the foreign relations of the United States.\nThe President cannot function effectively in domestic matters,\nand speak for the nation authoritatively in foreign affairs,\nif his lawful operational decisions under authority previ-\nously conferred can be reversed by a bare majority of the\nCongress. Also, the attempt of Congress to become a virtual\nco-administrator in operational decisions would seriously\ndistract it from its proper legislative role. Inefficiency,\ndelay, and uncertainty in the management of our nation's\nthe Congress.\nforeign affairs would eventually follow.\nM\nApart from these basic constitutional deficiencies\nwhich appear in six sections of the bill, S. 2662 is faulty\nlegislation, containing numerous unwise restrictions.\nTrade with Vietnam\nThe bill would suspend for 180 days the President's\nauthority to control certain trade with North and South\nFORD & LIBRAR GERALD\nVietnam, thereby removing a vital bargaining instrument for\nthe settlement of a number of differences between the United\nStates and these countries. I have the deepest sympathy for\nthe intent of this provision, which is to obtain an accounting\nfor Americans missing in action in Victnam. However, the\nenactment of this legislation would not provide any real\nassurances that the Victnamese would now fulfill their long\nstanding obligation to provide such/an accounting. Indeed,\nthe establishment of a direct linkage between trade and\naccounting for those missing in action might well only\nperpetuate Vietnamese demands for greater and greater con-\ncessions.\nThis Administration is prepared to be responsive to\nVietnamese action on the question of Americans missing in\naction. Nevertheless, the delicate process of negotiations\nwith the Vietnamese cannot be replaced by a legislative\nmandate that would open up trade for a specified number of\ndays and then terminate that trade as a way to achieve our\ndiplomatic objectives. This mandate represents an unac-\nceptable attempt by Congress to manage the diplomatic rela-\ntions of the United States.\nAnnual Ceiling on Arms Sales\nA further objectionable feature of S. 2662 is an annual\nceiling of $9.0 billion on the total of government sales and\nno\ncommercial exports of military equipment and services. In\nour search to negotiate mutual restraints in the prolifera-\nag\ntion of conventional weapons, this self-imposed ceiling would\nbe an impediment to our efforts to obtain the cooperation of\nother arms-supplying nations. Such an arbitrary ceiling\nwould also require individual transactions to be evaluated,\nnot on their own merits, but on the basis of their relation-\nship to the volume of other, unrelated transactions. This\nprovision would establish an arbitrary, overall limitation\nas a substitute for case-by-case analyses and decisions based\non foreign policy priorities and the legitimate security\nneeds of our allies and friends\nIT is THIS ADMINISTRATIONS POLICY TO EXERCISE AND work FOR\nno\nRESTRAINT IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES, WHILE AT THE\nSAME TIME RECOGNIZING ,HAT NE mvst REMAIN\nRESPONSIVE TO THE LEG.TIMATE SECURITY NEEDS OF OUR\nALLIES AND FRIENDS.\nDiscrimination and Human Rights\nThis bill also contains well intended but misguided\nprovisions to require the termination of military coopera-\ntion with countries which engage in practices that dis-\ncriminate against United States citizens or practices\nconstituting a consistent pattern of gross human rights\noviolations. This Administration is fully committed to a\npolicy of actively opposing and seeking the elimination of\ndiscrimination by foreign governments against United States\ncitizens on the basis of their race, religion, national\norigin or sex, just as the Administration is fully sup-\nportive of internationally recognized human rights as a\nstandard for all nations to respect. The use of the pro-\nposed sanctions against sovereign nations is, however, an\nawkward and ineffective device for the promotion of those\npolicies. These provisions of the bill represent further\nattempts to ignore important and complex policy considera-\ntions by requiring simple legalistic tests to measure the\nconduct of sovereign foreign governments. If Congress finds\nsuch conduct deficient, specific actions by the United States\nto terminate or limit our cooperation with the government\nconcerned would be mandated. By making any single factor\nthe effective determinant of relationships which must take\ninto account other considerations, such provisions would\nadd a new element of uncertainty to our security assist-\nance programs and would cast doubt upon the reliability of\nthe United States in its dealings with other countries.\nMoreover, such restrictions would most likely be counter-\nFORD\nproductive as a means for eliminating discriminatory\npractices and promoting human rights. The likely result\nwould be a selective disassociation of the United States\nfrom governments unpopular with the Congress, thereby\ndiminishing our ability to advance the cause of human rights\nthrough diplomatic means:\nTermination of Grant Military Assistance and\nAdvisory Groups\nThe legislation would terminate grant military assist-\nance and military assistance advisory groups after fiscal\nyear 1977 except where specifically authorized by Congress,\nthus creating a presumption against such programs and\nit\nmissions In the case of grant assistance, this would\nlimit our flexibility to assist countries whose national\nsecurity is important to us but which are not themselves\nable to bear the full cost of their own defense. In the\ncase of advisory groups, termination of missions by legis-\nlative fiat would impair close and long standing military\nrelationships with important allies. Moreover, such\ntermination is inconsistent with increasing Congressional\ndemands for the kind of information about and control over\narms sales which these groups now provide. Such provisions\nwould insert Congress deeply into the details of specific\ncountry programs, a role which Congress has neither the in-\nformation nor the organizational structure to play.\nI particularly regret that, notwithstanding the spirit\nof genuine cooperation between the Legislative and Executive\nBranches that has characterized the deliberations on this\nlegislation, we have been unable to overcome the major policy\ndifferences that cxist.\nSUCH A STEP would HAVE A SEUERE IMPACT\nXA\nON OUR RECATIONS W.TH OTHER NATIONS WHOSE\nSECURITY AND WELL BEING ARE IMPORTANT TO\nOUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS.\nIn disapproving this bill, I act as any President would,\nand must, to retain the ability to function as the forcign\npolicy leader and spokesman of the Nation. In world affairs\ntoday, America can have only one foreign policy. Moreover,\nthat foreign policy must be certain, clear and consistent.\nForeign governments must know that they can treat with the\nPresident on foreign policy matters, and that when he speaks\nwithin his authority, they can rely upon his words.\nAccordingly, I must veto the bill.\nTHE WHITE. HOUSE\nMay\n, 1976\nFORD )"
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