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    "title": "Intelligence Oversight Board - Status",
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        "President (1974-1977 : Ford). Intelligence Oversight Board. (2/19/1976 - 1/20/1977)",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 1, folder \"Intelligence Oversight Board -\nStatus\" of the White House Records Office: Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford\nPresidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nExact duplicates within this folder were not digitized.\nDigitized from Box 1 of the White House Records Office Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nEMBARGOED UNTIL 8:01 PM, EST\nFebruary 17, 1976\nOffice of the White House Press Secretary\nFORD\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSTATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT\nGERALD\nAMERIA\nFor over a year, the Nation has engaged in exhaustive investigations into\nthe activity of the CIA and other intelligence units of our government.\nFacts, hearsay, and closely held secrets all have been spread out on\nthe public record.\nWe have learned many lessons from this experience, but we must not\nbecome obsessed with the deeds of the past. We must act for the future.\nTonight, I am announcing plans for the first major reorganization of the\nIntelligence Community since 1947:\nFirst, I am establishing by Executive Order a new command structure\nfor foreign intelligence. Henceforth, overall policy directions for in-\ntelligence will rest in only one place: the National Security Council,\nconsisting of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State\nand Secretary of Defense. Management of intelligence will be conducted\nby a single new committee. That committee will be chaired by the Director\nof Central Intelligence, George Bush.\nTo monitor the performance of\nour intelligence operations, I am creating a new independent Oversight\nBoard to be made up of private citizens. Former Ambassador Robert D.\nMurphy will chair the Board and two other distinguished citizens --\nStephen Ailes and Leo Cherne will serve as members. All three of\nthese units the National Security Council, the Commitee on Foreign\nIntelligence and the Oversight Board will be responsible to me, so that\nthe President will continue to be ultimately accountable for our intelligence\nactivities.\nSecond, to improve the performance of the intelligence agencies and\nto restore public confidence in them, I am issuing a comprehensive set\nof public guidelines which will serve as legally binding charters for our\nintelligence agencies. The charters will provide stringent protections\nfor the rights of American citizens. I will soon meet with Congressional\nleaders to map out legislation to provide judicial safeguards against\nelectronic surveillance and mail openings. I will also support legislation\nthat would prohibit attempts on the lives of foreign leaders.\nThird, tomorrow I will send to the Congress special legislation to\nsafeguard critical intelligence secrets. This legislation would make it a\ncrime for a government employee who has access to certain highly\nclassified information to reveal that information improperly.\nIn taking these actions, I have been guided by two imperatives.\nAs Americans, we must not and will not tolerate actions by our government\nwhich abridge the rights of our citizens. At the same time, we must\nmaintain a strong and effective intelligence capability in the United States.\nI will not be a party to the dismantling of the CIA and the other intelligence\nagencies.\n(MORE)\n(OVER)\n-2-\nTo be effective, our foreign policy must be based upon a clear under-\nstanding of the international environment. To operate without adequate and\ntimely intelligence information will cripple our security in a world\nthat is still hostile to our freedoms.\nNor can we confine our intelligence to the question of whether there will\nbe an imminent military attack. We also need information about the\nworld's economy, about political and social trends, about food supply\nand population growth, and certainly about terrorism. To protect our\nsecurity diplomatically, militarily and economically, we must have a\ncomprehensive intelligence capability.\nThe United States is a peace-loving nation, and our foreign policy is\ndesigned to lessen the threat of war and of aggression. In recent years,\nwe have made substantial progress toward that goal in the Middle East,\nin Europe, in Asia and elsewhere around the world. Yet we also recognize\nthat the best way to secure/the peace is to be fully prepared to defend our\ninterests. I believe in peace through strength.\nA central pillar of our strength is, of course, our armed forces. But\nanother great pillar must be our Intelligence Community - the dedicated\nmen and women who gather vital information around the world and carry\nour missions that advance our interests in the world.\nThe overriding task now is to rebuild the confidence and capability of our\nintelligence services 80 that we can live securily in peace and freedom.\nThat is my goal.\n# # #\nFOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE\nFEBRUARY 18, 1976\nOFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nPRESS CONFERENCE\nOF\nGEORGE BUSH, DIRECTOR,\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,\nEDWARD H. LEVI,\nATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,\nBRENT SCOWCROFT,\nASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT\nFOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,\nJOHN O. MARSH,\nCOUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT,\nAND\nMICHAEL DUVAL,\nASSISTANT TO THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT\nBERALD FORD LICKARY\n450 EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING\n11:05 A.M. EST\nMR. NESSEN: I think you have had by now the Executive\nOrder and fact sheet, I hope, long enough to read it and make\nsome sense out of it. As you know, that material and this\nbriefing are embargoed for noon release, the time at which the\nmaterial will be delivered to Congress.\nFor the briefing today, we have Jack Marsh, Counsellor\nto the President, who coordinated the President's efforts to\nstudy and reorganize the intelligence community; Attorney\nGeneral Levi, Brent Scowcroft, the Assistant to the President\nfor National Security Affairs; Mike Duval, who was the\nExecutive Director of the group here at the White House which\nstudied the matter and proposed options for reorganizing the\nintelligence community; and George Bush, the Director of\nCentral Intelligence.\nThe first thing we would like to do is to give you\nprecisely what the President gave to the Members of Congress\nlast evening at 6 o'clock without removing anything but\nshowing you exactly the presentation that he made to the\nMembers of Congress.\nNow this requires the presentation of some slides\non the screen and a narration by Jack Marsh. We will do that\nfirst and then I think open it up for your questions.\nMR. MARSH: Thank you, Ron.\nWhat I would like to do is to give you a sort of\na summary of the package that you have. This is the\npresentation that Ron mentioned that was given to Members\nof the Congress last evening in positions of leadership\nunder jurisdiction of the committee. This is the same presentation\nthat was given to the Members of the House and Senate last\nevening.\nMORE\n(OVER)\n- 2 -\nThis is also the same presentation that the President\ngave--substantially the same as he gave to members of the\nintelligence coordinating group which, of course, included\nthe Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Director of the\nCIA, Attorney General and other members of that committee.\nThe objectives, as are noted on the slide there,\nthe twofold objectives -- one to strengthen the United States\nintelligence community and at the same time observe these\ntraditional constitutional liberties -- were the two overriding\nconsiderations that were part of the President's program.\nThe President decided to try and do this principally\nthrough the means of the Executive Order as opposed 'to a major\nemphasis on legislation. Traditionally, in the intelligence\ncommunity, a great deal of the management of the intelligence\ncommunity has been achieved by internal memorandum, by\nExecutive Orders and this was the approach that the President\ndecided that he would use.\nHe also would set out in the Executive Order, which\nI am sure you have noticed, a portion of that which we refer to\nas the restrictions order that provides the guidelines and also\nstates the prohibitions of those things the community. are not\nsupposed to do.\nIn there, as a part of this Omnibus Executive Order\nis the new command structure which he mentioned last evening.\nIt is significant to note also that he has charged the NSC to\nconduct semi-annual reviews of the intelligence operation and\nparticularly as to the adequacy of the intelligence problem.\nAlso, significantly. he decided to go outside of\nBERALD FORD\nGovernment, to go outside of the Administration and set up\na three member Intelligence Oversight Board. Those are\nthe three individuals chaired by former Ambassador Robert\nMurphy, former Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes, and Leo\nCherne, who serves on the PFIAB. These three individuals\nwill also be members of the President's Foreign Intelligence\nAdvisory Board.\nNow, in order for you to have an understanding of\njust what was being addressed, it is frequently not known\nas to what is the American intelligence community. The\nintelligence community of the United States is made up of the\nagencies you see on the slides -- the CIA the Department of\nDefense. It has four subordinate subdivisions in the intelligence\narea: one, the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National\nSecurity Agency; third, the various intelligence agencies of\nthe respective services -- those that you have in the Army,\nNavy and the Air Force -- and then the special offices for\nreconnaissance in the Department of Defense.\nMORE\n- 3 -\nThe Department of State has an intelligence capability\nin the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, as does the Department\nof Justice; of course we know, particularly in the field of\ncounter-intelligence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.\nThere is an intelligence capability in the Department of Treasury\nand also one that is likely to be overlooked in the field of the\nnuclear energy, ERDA, which has a responsibility for atomic and\nnuclear intelligence.\nIn order to address the intelligence matter, the\nPresident decided in September that he would establish an\nIntelligence Coordinating Group. The mission of that group would\nbe twofold: One, to deal in a day-to-day manner with the requests\nand requirements of the Select Committees that were investigating\nand holding hearings on the intelligence community, and, secondly,\nwhile it was engaged in that process, to also begin a second\ntry to develop a management program to address a number of\nthe areas that he has addressed in the Omnibus Executive\nOrder.\nThe members of the Intelligence Coordinating Group\nwere the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the\nAttorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the\nAssistant to the President for National Security Affairs,\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nthe Director of OMB, the Counsel to the President, the\nCounsellor to the President as Chairman, and as the\nExecutive Director, Michael Duval.\nThis group met quite frequently and at times back in\nOctober and November and December almost on a daily basis.\nThe principals did not always attend, but very frequently they\nwould, particularly the Attorney General, who attended many\nof those meetings or they were represented, if they were not\nthere, by one of their principal deputies.\nThe President's Executive actions really encompass\nthree broad areas of action -- his Omnibus Executive Order that\nprovides both guidelines and restrictions, a new command\nstructure, and an oversight mechanism.\nHe also will suggest a minimum of legislation\nprincipally aimed at protecting the security or secrecy of\nclassified information, He will endorse legislation that would\nprohibit assassination of foreign leaders in times of peace and\nhe will also ask the Congress and meet with them to discuss\nlegislation that will relate to two areas: One, electronic\nsurveillance, and, secondly, the unauthorized opening of\nmail.\nHe is also suggesting to the Congress a form of\noversight to hopefully reduce the proliferation of Congressional\ncommittees that do address themselves in the intelligence\narea.\nIt is interesting, his decision was that he felt there\nshould be a summary of the activities of the departments and\nagencies in the intelligence area and to that extent has\nproposed a type of policy guidelines or modified charters for\npublication in order not only that the American people would\nknow what these agencies are and what their general missions were,\nbut, secondly, that the agencies themselves would have certain\nparameters that would be the areas of their principal\nresponsibilities.\nMORE\n- 4 -\nNow, let's look at the first major area that the President\nhas addressed and this is in the NSC. The NSC does continue\nand will continue to have the principal responsibility for the\nintegration of domestic and foreign policies and military\npolicies as they relate to the national security. It has its\nfour statutory members with whom you are familiar, but it will\nconduct now,at the direction of the President, a semi-annual\nreview:\nOne, as to the needs of policymakers for adequate\nintelligence as to whether it is timely, whether it addresses\nthe problem as to its quality; secondly, the NSC will be charged\nto be certain that the intelligence community is operating\nboth effectively and efficiently in the collection of intelligence\nand also they will review the appropriateness of ongoing covert\ntypes of operations and other sensitive collection missions\nthat may have been authorized.\nThe Assistant to the President for National Security\nAffairs, Brent Scowcroft, will have the principal responsibility\nfor the conduct of the semi-annual reviews.\nNow this is an area that should be of considerable\ninterest. It is an effort that has been made by the President\nto address the question of management and resource control or\nresource allocation inside the intelligence community. For the\npurpose of budget review and control and resource allocation\nthe President has established a three member committee.\nThe Chairman of that committee will be the Director of Central\nIntelligence. The other two members of that committee will\nbe the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Ellsworth, who will\nhave a principal authority in the Department of Defense for\nintelligence, and the third member will the Deputy Assistant\nto General Scowcroft, Bill Hyland.\nThis three member committee will have budget\npreparation, they will prepare the budget before it goes to\nOMB for review. Also, they will handle re-programming\nrequests. They will establish the management policies inside\nthe community and they will carry out the NSC policy decisions.\nNow, in the event there is disagreement inside\nthe three member committee chaired by Director Bush, they\nmay make an appeal from a decision of the three member committee;\nthe committee itself may make an appeal, or any member of the\nNSC, and particularly the Secretary of Defense, who is a member\nof the NSC, if he has a question about a decision of that three\nmember committee, they may pull the decision into the NSC on an\nautomatic review.\nNow over in the field of the production of intelligence,\nthe production of the intelligence after it is collected, this\nremains the principal responsibility, however, of the DCI.\nThe Director of Central Intelligence will still have the\nresponsibility for doing that. The Director of Central\nIntelligence, it is iterated and restated that he will be and\nwill continue to be the President's principal advisor in the\nfield of foreign intelligence.\nMORE\n- 5 -\nThe DCI, in undertaking his responsibilities, may\nestablish such committees or subcommittees as he deems\nrequisite.\nNow, this is the old 40 Committee, a revamping\nand a restructuring of the old 40 Committee, and there are\nseveral areas that I think you will find of interest here.\nOne, the name of this group will be called the Operations\nAdvisory Group. The membership will be changed and the\nmembership will be principals. It will be the Secretary of\nState, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of CIA,\nthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and two observers -- the\nAttorney General and the Director of OMB -- and in the latter,\ntwo such individuals as they might designate to attend the\nmeeting.\nIt is anticipated, however, that the meetings will be\nattended by principals. The meeting will be chaired by\nBrent Scowcroft, this particular group will be chaired by\nBrent Scowcroft, and it is expected the principals will attend\nunless, for some reason, they are out of the city or there is\nsome other conflict that they have that makes it impossible for\nthem to be there.\nMORE\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\n- 6 -\nThey shall undertake these duties that are assigned\nhere. They will consider and make recommendations together\nwith dissents to the President on the proposals for covert\noperations and all sensitive collection systems, and they\nwill make a periodic review and submit a report to the\nNSC of these ongoing operations and missions. They will\nmeet as a group and will conduct formal meetings as a group\nin the consideration of their efforts.\nNow this is a schematic diagram of the American\nintelligence community as it exists today. Now I will\nshow you a diagram of the new system, but under the old\nsystem the American intelligence community has operated\non a series of interlocking committees, executive committees,\nthat sought to achieve a number of things that the President\nhas sought to accomplish by this streamlined system and\nfocusing into the Committee on Foreign Intelligence. This\nis the old schematic diagram and the next slide will show\nyou the new schematic diagram.\nAs I mentioned, a part of this operation is\nright here, your three-member committee chaired by Director\nBush, and then you have our Advisory Operation Group here\nwhich is the old 40 Committee.\nI should point out that it is envisioned that\nunder this system it may be necessary, or Mr. Bush may\nwant to set up certain committees or subcommittees in\norder to accomplish the functions that are necessary to\nbe achieved.\nNow let's move over into the areas that focus\non some of the charters that we can read into your Omnibus\nExecutive Order. There are several points that I would\nlike to make.\nThe President is expecting that the senior officer\nof each department or agency will be the responsible officer,\nthe accountable officer for the conduct of that agency\nand its compliance with this Executive Order which includes\nthe restrictions that are set out in that order.\nDirector Bush and those who work with him will\nhave the responsibility to establish a system of Inspector\nGenerals for, not monitoring but auditing of the activities\nof the community; and the NSC, the Committee on Foreign\nIntelligence and the Intelligence Oversight Board will also\nhave a responsibility as to the strengthening of those\nInspector Generals systems inside the departments and\nagencies.\nAs I mentioned to you, the President felt that\nit would be helpful to make a disclosure, to the extent\nthat it could be done, of the role and function and duties\nof the various components of the intelligence community.\nMORE\n- 7 -\nThere will, of course, still remain some areas\nin which there will be classified instructions or matters\nthat relate to their activities and functions, but this\nis probably the first time that there has been laid out\nfor public disclosure an establishment of certain parameters\nand modified guidelines or policy charters that we have\nhad in the intelligence community today.\nI will not go through these because they are\nset out there for you more fully in the material that you\nhave, but we will run through them just very quickly.\nThe areas you will see--the State, the Treasury--\nwill be over in the field of economic intelligence, State\nthrough its Bureau of Intelligence and research -- these\nFORD\nare spelled out more fully.\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nI would want to point out the defense. You will\nfind in your Executive Order a discussion of the role and\nfunction and mission of the National Security Agency.\nAdditionally set out are the duties and functions of the\nDIA Defense Intelligence Agency, which has been set out\nitself publicly at an earlier time; ERDA, which I mentioned\nto you; the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In this area\nwe are principally talking in terms of their role in\nespionage and sabotage and collecting foreign intelligence\nin the United States.\nNow let me give you a little background here\nwhen you read into your Restrictions Order. The Restrictions\nOrder is one of the most complex documents that you will\nread. It represents literally months and months of work,\ninterdepartmental staff work. The restrictions that are\nthere are the joint product of the departments and agencies\nrepresented in the Coordinating Group -- that is, Defense\nand State and CIA -- and this chart here simply in a very\ngeneric way assigns the areas addressed but you have to\ngo into the Restrictions Order and read it precisely to\nidentify each of these subjects.\nBut it restricts or prohibits in the following\nareas -- the collection of analysis and information on\ndomestic activities of United States citizens, and it\npoints out there how that can be done through either as\nauthorized by law and with the procedures established by\nthe Attorney General and I am sure there may be questions\nhere that he will want to respond to--and it does address\nthe question of unconsented physical searches of electronic\nsurveillance of U.S. persons; it reiterates the prohibition\nagainst illegally obtaining Federal tax returns in order\nto obtain information; it places restrictions in reference\nto the infiltration of groups to influence or report on\nthem and severely prohibits that activity to the CIA except\nin a very narrow exception of where the members of the\ngroup are principally non-U.S. persons and where that group\nis believed reasonably to be controlled by a foreign power.\nMORE\n- 8 -\nExperimenting with drugs on humans without\ninformed consent is prohibited unless the consent is obtained\nvoluntarily in the presence of a third party and that\nresearch is conducted according to standards established\nby the Commission on Biomedical Research. The correct\nname of that Commission is more fully set out.\nIt does spell out and limit the manner in which\ninformation might be shared internally in the intelligence\ncommunity. It places restrictions on the assignment of\npersonnel, in that personnel in the intelligence community\ncannot be assigned without disclosures being made as to\nwho those individuals are and also places certain restraints\non what they may report back to their parent agency.\nIt sets up prohibitions against providing assistance\nto law enforcement agencies in violation of law unless\nauthorized by statute and with the approval of the Attorney\nGeneral.\nIt places severe limitations on the testing of\nelectronic surveillance equipment in the United States\nunless authorized by law and with procedures established\nby the Attorney General. As you read through this, you\nwill see in many, many instances the words \"as established,\"\n\"procedures established by the Attorney General,\" and it\nmakes reference to U.S. statutes.\nThe exceptions there are also set out. They\nare quite limited on the collecting of information on\nactivities of U.S. persons and in many instances I think\nyou will find that these relate to the employees of, for\nexample, the Central Intelligence Agency or the contractors\nor people who might be seeking to deal with them, and also\nthe question of counterintelligence and counterespionage\nactivities which, of course, moves over into the field of\nthe FBI.\nIt should be pointed out here that in those\nparticular areas where there are normal law enforcement\nresponsibilities of an agency -- for example, there are law\nenforcement responsibilities in Treasury and in the Department\nof Justice, through the FBI -- in that particular area\nthese restrictions are not applicable. These are\nrestrictions on foreign intelligence agencies and activities.\nNow the President has mentioned to you his\nOversight Board that will be separate and apart, This\nsets out in general terms what he expects that Board to do.\nIt is spelled out more fully in the materials that you\nhave, but he does expect them to receive and consider\nreports of the IGs about questionable activities that are\neither improper or illegal, to make periodic reports either\nto the Attorney General and, in certain instances, to the\nAttorney General and to the President, and hey will\nreceive their staff report from the Executive Office of\nthe President.\nMORE\n- 9 -\nThe President is also seeking in the Executive\nBranch that individuals in the Executive Branch who\nreceive classified information would be required to sign\nwhat we would call a secrecy agreement against non-disclosure\nof classified information.\nIn his requests to the Congress, first to point\nout to them the areas that he has sought to address, many\nof these things that he has done are based on the inputs of\nthe Rockefeller Commission, the Murphy Commission; it is\ndrawn from the discussions and the hearings of the Select\nCommittees of the House and Senate, from discussions that\nhave occurred in the media on the question of intelligence\nfrom outside witnesses and experts who have given advice\nto the Executive Branch and also from his own personal\nknowledge because you should recall the President did serve\nas a Member of the Appropriations Committee on the subcommittee\nthat did handle the intelligence oversight.\nHe is asking the Congress to consider a form of\nCongressional oversight that hopefully would be a joint\ntype of committee to reduce the proliferation of the\nnumber of committees. He is asking that they consider\nrules that would insure the safeguard of intelligence, the\nmaterials there, and establish procedures there that would\nalso protect the requests of the President when he indicates\nthat the information that is sent is sensitive.\nFORD\nHe also expects to keep that committee apprized\nof the information that they need in the exercise of their\nlegislative function and he would like that the Hughes\nAct or Hughes amendment, section 662, be appended on the\nreporting requirement to reduce the number of reports that\nyou would have to make pursuant to that statute.\nI would also point out on the proposed legislation\nthe secrecy of intelligence sources and methods. This\nstatute goes to those who unlawfully disclose information;\nit does not apply to people who receive information. It\nis not, of course, intended to be directed toward the\nFourth Estate. It applies to people in Government who\nwould disclose information and that would be similar in\ncriminal penalties in reference to that. It is not an\nofficial secrets act.\nAs I mentioned earlier, he has endorsed the\nproposal to prohibit, in times of peace, assassination and\nhe does expect to meet with Members of the Congress to\ndiscuss further electronic surveillance and mail opening\nand legislation to address that area.\nMR. NESSEN: That, as I said, was the presentation\nmade to the Members of Congress last night. I don't think\nany of the others here have any opening statements.\nDo you, Mr. Attorney General?\nMORE\n- 10 -\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: No.\nMR. NESSEN: Brent?\nGENERAL SCOWCROFT: No.\nMR. NESSEN: George?\nMR. BUSH: No.\nMR. NESSEN: Why don't we get right on to the\nquestions.\nQ\nCould I ask a question of the Attorney\nGeneral?\nMr. Attorney General, since there is no\nproposal to change the original legislation of 1947 and since\nthe original legislation makes no reference to covert\noperations, under what legal basis can covert operations\ncontinue to be conducted?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I think there are\nConstitutional powers that are sufficient to justify the legal\nbasis for covert actions as well as the frequent appropriations,\nso it is not a subject which Congress has not recognized\nthrough statutory authorization.\nQ\nMr. Attorney General, I wonder if you could\nsay a couple of things on the secrecy legislation. The\nsecrecy legislation uses the phrase \"intelligence sources\nand methods and classified\" and various other phrases. In\nyour opinion, would it be a crime under that statute for\nsomeone to inform the press of the fact that the United\nStates is giving arms and money to a faction in Angola?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: No, I don't think SO. I\ndon't think that would be covered by that.\nQ\nAnother question on that. You have said\nthe press is exempt from the coverage. Just to be sure,\ndoes that mean that no injunction would lie against the\npress under the injunctive provision of the statute?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: As the legislation is\ndrafted it would not lie against the press but the injunction\nmight prohibit the person who was going to reveal the\ninformation to the press from revealing it.\nQ\nNow if the press in fact published something\nthat was regarded as a violation of the statute, would it\nnot, however, be possible for a grand jury to call the\npublisher, editor or reporter involved with the story and\nask for the source of information since it would have been\na crime in view of this statute, and to require an answer\nand in failure of an answer to punish the person who attempted\nit?\nMORE\n- 11 -\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I think that would be\npossible under this statute and under the present statute.\nQ\nMr. Attorney General, could a Member of\nCongress or a Member of a Congressional committee be put\nin jail or fined for disclosing secrets unlawfully or\nillegally?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Not under this proposed\nsection.\nQ\nCould I follow up on an earlier question?\nAre you saying that if this law is passed and it is a crime\nfor a Government employee or a contractor to divulge a\nsecret that you would permit U.S. attorneys to call before\ngrand juries reporters to whom secrets had been leaked\nand to require that they answer and if they failed to charge\nthem with contempt?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: No, I didn't say that.\nThat was not the question that was asked me. The question\nwas whether the grand jury could call them. They could be\ncalled now actually under a variety of statutes.\nAs you know, the Department of Justice operates\nwith the rule where the Attorney General's permission is\nrequired and where there has to be a particular reason\nfor calling and where the effect on First Amendment right\nor related rights is taken into account. We have been\nvery careful about that and we would continue to be careful\nabout that.\nQ\nI think what I am asking you is, would it\nbe your policy if you felt that the leak had been serious\nenough to call the reporter and require him to answer\nthe questions?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Yes, I understood the\nquestion and I think that one would have to see what kind\nof a case that is. We have been very careful in handling\nthe department's policy on this matter and we have not\ncalled many reporters who were not willing, in fact, to\ncome before a grand jury. We have been very careful about\nthat and we would continue to be, but I do not want to\nmake the statement that there is no circumstance in which\nwe might not do it.\nQ\nI would like to follow up on questions on\ncovert operations.\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Yes.\nMORE\nGERALD FORD VIBRARY\n- 12 -\nQ\nDoes the President envision approving\nlegislation which would allow this joint committee to\nhave the right of prior approval over covert operations?\nHas he spelled out his thoughts within the Executive\nBranch on that subject?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I doubt whether I am the\nperson to answer that. I could tell you something but I\nam not going to do it. (Laughter)\nQ\nWould you sit down. He has not answered\nthe question.\nMR, MARSH: The President's position is one that\nis opposed to prior notification and that view has been\ncommunicated to Members of the Senate Government Operations\nCommittee.\nQ\nThen I would like to ask the Attorney General\na Constitutional question.\nSince we do have a Constitution which embodies\nchecks and balances as a method of controlling Government\nactivity and since the absence of Congressional checks on\nCongress is widely interpreted to be a cause of abuses\nthat have taken place by the intelligence establishment --\nthat is, lack of oversight --\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Congressional checks on\nCongress?\nQ\nNo, Congressional checks on the intelligence\ncommunity -- how is it that in an effort to reform the\nintelligence community the recourse is to stronger\nPresidential action, if anything, unless there is Congressional\noversight and an absence of checks and balances? Would\nyou answer that on a Constitutional basis?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I don't think that is a\nConstitutional question at all; it is a policy question.\nThe Constitutional implications are really moved in the\nother direction; that is, as to what extent the management\nof an enterprise can be carried on by the Congress rather\nthan by the Executive which has that function.\nBut, assuming that there is an interrelationship --\nand that is what you are assuming -- you are asking me\nthe question as to why the President chose the particular\nroad that he did here in terms of Executive power and I\ndon't know whether the question specifically related to\ncovert action or not.\nQ\nPerhaps Director Bush or Mr. Marsh could\ngive us the rationale as to why you decided to go that route.\nMORE\n- 13 -\nMR. BUSH: On what aspect of it?\nQ\nWell, why can't you notify Congress of\ncovert activities? Why does he oppose that? That is what\nthe argument is going to be all about.\nMR. BUSH: It is a policy decision of the\nPresident.\nQ\nWell, I mean, does he have some reason for\nit, Mr. Bush?\nMR. BUSH: Let's look at it from the intelligence\nend of it. I think that people have felt that operationally\nit would be better to be under the inherent powers for\nthe President to retain the right to make these decisions.\nI do think it is appropriate to note that there has been\na formalization of procedures of the old 40 Committee and\nthey have stepped up the level of the membership and\npeople are going to sign off on decisions and they are\ngoing to meet to do it, and I think those should be\nreported as I think progress over the way it has been in\nthe past.\nQ\nMr. Bush, if Congress completely disagrees\nwith the President's proposals, do they have any recourse\nwhatsoever?\nMR. BUSH: Congress has a lot of power, ma'am.\nBERALO R.FORD LIBRARY\nYes, they have got a lot of recourse.\nQ Would you tell us how this joint committee\nwould ever find out about what was going on?\nQ Also, would you outline exactly how?\nMR. BUSH: I feel an obligation to keep in close\ntouch with Congress and to inform them, and hopefully\nsimplified oversight procedures will mean more full\ninformation going to the Congress certainly from our agency\nand certainly from any part of the intelligence community\nthat I have something to say about.\nDaniel?\nQ\nMr. Bush, this question has to be addressed\npeculiarly to you as Director of Central Intelligence.\nThe system that has been explained to us is one\nin which lines of authority appear to have been smoothed\nout, made somewhat more orderly but, if you would agree with\nme, centralized much more in the President who has said\nlast night that he is ultimately accountable, but the record\nin the investigations of the past year have, among other\nthings, raised the question of what happens when a secret\napparatus with the intelligence collection and capacity\nfor covert operations is misused by a President.\nMORE\n- 14 -\nIf the centralization is carried on it places\na great problem on the one who is the Director of Central\nIntelligence. I think one of your predecessors, Mr. Helms,\nonce said, \"I serve only one President at a time.\"\nHave you thought about the problems and\nresponsibilities -- not for you as a person nor for the\nPresident as a person -- that happens when you increase\ncentralization and make the President almost solely\naccountable? What happens to the one who serves him?\nMR. BUSH: I think the President -- this President\nand any President -- has been solely accountable to the\nCongress for actions in the intelligence field. I have\nread that this means that the Director of Central Intelligence\nis now some kind of czar. Really what this program does,\nand why I think it will be well received in the intelligence\ncommunity and I hope on the Hill and across this country,\nis give the Director certain authority to go with\nresponsibility that has been there since the inception,\ncertainly since the 1971 letter. What it does is not\ncreate a czar but it streamlines the machinery in such a\nway that the Director can execute authority that he has had.\nFor example, in the whole field of resource\ncontrol on paper the Director has had a certain responsibility\nfor this but he has not had the authority to act. Now in\nconjunction with the Deputy Secretary of the Defense\nDepartment and in conjunction with General Scowcroft's\nDeputy Assistant to the President you have a much more\norderly management system.\nI respectfully suggest that that has not\nincreased the President's power or clutched to his breast\nmore power in the whole field of intelligence. What I\nhope it does is result in a more effective intelligence\noperation.\nQ\nMr. Bush, if we can be more specific about\nthe role of Congress and the joint committee that the\nPresident has proposed, I gather what it is effectively\nis window dressing because you will go to that joint\ncommittee only after a covert operation is already underway;\nis that not correct?\nMR. BUSH: Well, I don't know that that has been\ndetermined. That will largely be determined, I think, by\nthe Congress. I think the President's suggestion would be\nthat he has the right -- and, Jack, you correct me because\nthis is a policy matter and that decision is the President's,\nnot the intelligence community's -- my view is, as the\nPresident indicated yesterday, there would be prompt and\nfull disclosure to these proper oversight committees of\nthe Congress. So I don't think there is any effort here\nto hold back. I just simply feel that in his view he\ndetermined that you don't have to run the proposal by\nCongress before it is enacted.\nMORE\n- 15 -\nQ\nBut that is the point. It will go to\nCongress only after the decision has been made and theoretically\nat least the operation is underway; is that not correct?\nMR. BUSH: I think that is what the intention\nis -- maybe not the operation underway because it depends\non how much lead time there is on these things.\nQ\nWhat, then, is the influence of that\ncommittee in terms of oversight on intelligence activity?\nMR. BUSH: Well, I think, one, you have to wait\nand see what the Congress itself does and I think one\nmust input a certain amount of intention to fully inform\nas these operations are approved and that would be my\nintention to the degree I would have responsibility for\nsome of this information to Congress.\nQ\nAs you see it as it has been outlined, what\nkind of control then would that Congressional committee have\non the operation or on the intelligence policy?\nMR. BUSH: They have a large control on the\nbudget of these operations for one thing, just as that is\nthe major control on all programs in the Government. So\nthey do have control there.\nQ\nMr. Bush, I was wondering, in your oath,\nas I recall, you said you defend the Constitution against\nall enemies foreign and domestic. Does the term \"domestic\nenemy\" in your judgment preclude all U.S. citizens?\nMR. BUSH: Could I get help from the Attorney\nGeneral on this? I need legal help and I know it and so\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nplease --\nMR. NESSEN: I am not sure it is a question that\nneeds an answer.\nQ\nWait a minute.\nQ\nMr. Bush, would you ask Mr. Nessen if you\ncould answer the question?\nMR. BUSH: All I know is when I get asked --\nQ\nCould I ask Mr. Levi?\nMR. BUSH: Maybe this will give a little insight\ninto how I plan to run the intelligence community. When I\nam asked a highly technical, and I feel appropriately good\nquestion, that --\nQ\nCould I address the question to Mr. Levi?\nMORE\n- 16 -\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I think the Constitutional\noath taken by the appointee of the President is not defined\nin the jurisdiction of his office if I understand your\nquestion and, therefore, it does not relate to the\njurisdiction in terms of the foreign intelligence.\nQ\nThe reason I ask this, sir, is because\nit says here \"never aimed at our own citizens.\" Now does\nthat mean that the oath means that no U.S. citizen could\nbe a domestic enemy?\nMR. BUSH: I don't think there is anything in\nthe language that I have seen that would prohibit the\nDirector from policing his own organization, you might say,\nto be sure that people are not divulging classified\ninformation, for example. Our employees sign a secrecy\nagreement that I strongly support and I think they should\nand they are willing to do it and I think it is an\nimportant thing. I think I have responsibilities under the\n1947 Act to protect sources and methods and I intend to do\nit and I intend to live very carefully within what is mandated\nand what will be legislated here.\nQ Sir, in addition to your own organization,\nif you suspect that there are U.S. citizens involved in\nforeign espionage do you feel that you are not supposed\nto or what?\nMR. BUSH: I think the FBI takes over at that\npoint.\nQ Mr. Levi, on page 5 of your fact sheet,\nin subsection 3, Restrictions on Intelligence Activities,\nit says \"The Executive Order prohibits or severely\nrestricts the following activities by U.S. foreign\nintelligence agencies,\" and then lists the 10 including\nwiretapping and all these other worthwhile objectives.\nMy question, addressed to anyone who can answer\nit, probably the Attorney General, is, it says, \"foreign\nintelligence agencies,\" and what about these restrictions\nfor the FBI and other agencies engaged in the domestic\nmatters? Will these restrictions be placed on domestic\nactivities at all?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: The general answer would\nbe that they are applicable. They are not covered by\nthis particular order in view of the foreign intelligence.\nAs I understand it, your question is that you\ngo beyond foreign intelligence, purely domestic intelligence --\nfor example, towards the regular FBI work.\nQ Right. Is there any set of guidelines?\nMORE\n- 17 -\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: There are guidelines, as\nyou well know, being developed. Many of the items mentioned\nhere, however, are now in the statutory law.\nMR. DUVAL: Could I just add one point, and that\nis that the Executive Order requires the Attorney General\nto issue regulations covering the domestic activities of\nthe FBI within 90 days.\nQ\nMr. Marsh, on that secrecy protection\nclause I just want to pin it down again. Does that apply\nto the secrecy agreement for all Federal employees? Does\nit apply only to the disclosure of sources and methods of\nintelligence or also to substantive matters such as what\nwe think our foreign policy is or a factual situation\nor only to sources and methods of intelligence?\nMR. MARSH: The present plan is sources and methods.\nThe proposed legislation that we have in mind is sources\nand methods.\nQ\nI am sorry, sir, not the legislation but\nyour requirement that all Executive Branch employees be\nrequired to sign a secrecy agreement against what you\ncalled non-disclosure of classified information. Precisely\nwhat does that mean and how does it differ from where we\nare now?\nMR. MARSH: Secrecy agreements are required in\nsome agencies and not in others and it is felt that it should\nbe Government-wide and to impose it in areas where it is\npresently not being imposed.\nQ\nAll Executive agencies will have such an\nagreement?\nMR. MARSH: If it is an individual who is\nauthorized to receive classified information, if in the\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nnature of his duties he has to use that information,\nbefore he receives it he signs a secrecy agreement.\nQ\nIs that a legally binding effect?\nMR. MARSH: Yes, I think it is. I think it does\nbecome enforceable.\nQ\nHow would it become enforceable? Would\nyou explain that? Maybe the Attorney General could\nexplain it.\nMR. MARSH: The agency uses that type of an\nagreement now and it has been used and I think it has\nbeen applied and tested in the courts--the Marchetti case.\nMORE\n- 18 -\nQ\nHow do you keep it from being abused? I\nasked this question of the President last night and in\nhis statement today he says, \"Moreover, this legislation\ncould not be used to cover up abuses and improprieties.\"\nNow, as perhaps you know, the House Intelligence\nCommittee report strongly suggested that the Secretary of\nState was guilty of abuse and improprieties of the\nclassified and security label system, as the news account\nsaid, to cover up policy errors. Now, how are you going\nto prevent this from being abused?\nMR. MARSH: In two ways. Number one, this is\none reason that the President has directed that the\nInspector Generals system in the departments and agencies\nbe strengthened. Secondly, this is the reason that he\nhas established the Intelligence Oversight Board because\nif an individual, if an employee, feels that something\nhas been arbitrarily classified in a manner to disclose\nan impropriety or an illegality he can go to the IOB with\nthat, he can go to his Inspector General with it. The\npurpose of this is if somebody has a highly sensitive piece\nof information which is a regular publication, like one of\nthe daily reports from the Central Intelligence Agency,\nhe goes over to another department or agency where an\nindividual has it, and he is going to use that, he signs\na secrecy agreement against its non-disclosure. That is\nthe main purpose. It is not intended for the purpose of\nconcealing improper activity and, indeed, if it is, that\nis the type of thing that you want brought into the IOB.\nQ\nIt seems to me the net effect of what you\nare doing, specifically with regard to reducing what you\ncall the proliferation of Congressional oversight committees,\nis to indeed reduce the Congressional oversight centralizing\nit, if you will, but nonetheless reducing Congressional\noversight and putting more and more power into the hands\nof the Executive. If you would consider the example of\nthe previous Administration, wouldn't you consider that\na little risky?\nMR. MARSH: The purpose on reducing the number\nof oversight committees in Congress is simply for the\npurpose of safeguarding the information that moves up to\nthe Hill. The situation that we find ourselves in now\nfrequently is that information has to be given to make 6\nor 8 different committees and by the extension of risks of\nthat disclosure you are contributing to the public disclosure\nof that information.\nIt is envisioned that the oversight committees\nof the Congress that are established, whatever they may be,\nwhether it is a suggestion along the lines of the\nAdministration or whether it is the proposals of the\nCongress, to furnish those committees with the information\nthat they need\nto perform their oversight function.\nMORE\n- 19 -\nThere is no real problem with the disclosure\nof the information to the Congress but we feel from the\nstandpoint of safeguarding the information that it is\nto their benefit as well as ours and the Nation's to reduce\nthe number of committees that receive it.\nQ\nI want to ask the Attorney General about\nthe proposed legislation. Mr. Attorney General, last April\nMr. Colby, who was then Director of Central Intelligence,\nmade some proposals for legislation. Reading this draft\nI see that it is rather tougher and more restrictive on\ninformation than Mr. Colby's proposals. For example, it\nomits a scienter requirement, a requirement Mr. Colby had\nincluded, that the disclosure be knowing and it restricts\nthe right to an in camera proceeding to discover whether\nthe matter was lawfully classified and it removes the\nclause allowing the parties to be represented in the in\ncamera proceeding.\nCan you tell me why you would want something\nmore restricted than the Central Intelligence Agency Director\nproposed?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I think this legislation is\nextremely carefully protected. On the issues you raise,\nfor example, the classification has to be certified to\nas appropriate before the case can be brought. If there\nis an improper classification, that can be itself a bar\nso that I do not find this a harsh statute.\nFORD\nAs to a scienter requirement and as to whether\nit applies to an accidental disclosure, I don't think it\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\napplies to a disclosure which is entirely accidental.\nQ\nI want to clarify the security business.\nYour law is directed, as you said earlier, to the disclosure\nof sources and methods which is a term of art, the specific\nsources and the specific methods, and that relates to\nintelligence sources.\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Yes.\nQ\nIn this Executive Order on page 26, when\nyou are talking about restriction you talk about physical\nsurveillance which can be directed against employees, former\nemployees, protecting foreign intelligence or counter-\nintelligence sources or methods or national security\ninformation. Now that is a much broader category so\ndoes this permit investigation of the disclosure of national\nsecurity information under an Executive Order as against\nthe law?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: No. It is quite different.\nThe passage you just read means observing people as far\nas I can --\nMORE\n- 20 -\nQ\nIs what you are saying the Government now\ncan carry on observing as to an investigation under\nthis order?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Yes, but the order\nitself limits the forms of investigation. It is quite\ndifferent from the statute.\nQ\nBut if it is not illegal under the law to\ndisclose national security information, how do you lawfully\nsurveil?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I have to know what is\nmeant by \"national security information.\"\nQ\nIt is not in the Executive Order.\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: But the Executive Order\nwould say, for example, that you can use electronic\nsurveillance only under certain conditions. If you are\ngoing to have mail openings for some such purpose, it would\nonly be under statute and so on and so forth.\nQ\nThe final one is, Mr. Bush has been charged\nin the program with getting signed agreements to broaden\nthat to cover people who have access to classified\nintelligence information. That is on page 36, which seems\nto be another category.\nAre there going to be any definitions of this?\nThe problem is, you are going to define what intelligence\nis as against just normal classification programs that\nare coming up?\nMR. DUVAL: The answer is yes.\nQ\nMr. Marsh, under this new streamline plan\nwhere the President would have greater control and where\nthe Congress would have a smaller number of committees\non oversight, where secrets would be punishable if they\nwere released, where classified information could not be\nreleased from the Congress without the President's\nauthority, could the Administration have continued to provide\ncovert aid to Angola?\nMR. MARSH: Quite frankly, I can't respond to\na specific type of question like that but I can say this:\nthat it is envisioned that the oversight that the Congress\nwould have would certainly be as good as the oversight\nthat they currently have and, indeed, we would seek to\nimprove it.\nMORE\n- 21 -\nIt should be remembered that there has been a\nCongressional oversight in a number of committees over\na period of years. The Congress only last year has discussed\nthe improvement of that or they seek to make changes in\nit themselves. They are going to make changes. We would\nlike to see them make those changes in a way that is\neffective for them and effective for us.\nThe basic guideline is that we don't want the\nintelligence community to engage in activities that are\nbeyond the reach of the Congressional authorization, and\nwe don't want to do the things that are not consistent with\nour own form of Government, and I think that will be a\nbasic consideration in trying to cooperatively establish\na method of oversight that suits them and us and that the\nAmerican people are satisfied with.\nQ\nMr. Marsh, on that same point, on page 7\nof the fact sheet you refer to \"there should be no require-\nment for prior notification of specific activities.\" Can\nyou tell me where I can find a more elaborate explanation\nof that in the documents?\nMR. MARSH: In the bigger document?\nWhere does that appear? What page?\nHe has asked for more elaboration on the --\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nQ\nOr even the same language.\nMR. DUVAL: The message to Congress, page 3.\nMR. MARSH: Mike says it is on page 3 of\nthe message to Congress.\nQ\nYou have suggested but you never actually\nsaid that the Intelligence Oversight Board has the power\nto declassify. Does it, in fact?\nMR. MARSH: No. That Board is directed more to\nimproprieties and illegal types of activities.\nQ\nI am curious, then, sir, since the\nrestrictions on Government officials are clearly more\nsevere than they have ever been in the past, who does have\nthe power to declassify and has that group been enlarged?\nMR. MARSH: The declassification procedures\nwere established by an Executive Order, I believe in 1971\nor 1972. The Director of Central Intelligence, I believe,\nunder this Executive Order is directed to implement the\noperation of those declassification procedures and to\nexpedite them, if I am not mistaken.\nMORE\n- 22 -\nQ\nHas that group been enlarged?\nGENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes. As a matter of fact,\nthere is an NSC review going on right now of the\nclassification procedures that were put into effect in\n1972.\nQ\nCould I follow up on Tom Jarriel's question?\nIf everyone who has access to classified information has\nthe problem of a penalty for releasing it, how would the\npublic ever know what the CIA was doing and if there was\nany abuse and not any abuse?\nGENERAL SCOWCROFT: On the Angola question\nspecifically there would be nothing to prevent a Member\nof the oversight committee or a Member of Congress from\nmoving to bar the expenditure of funds for Angola which\nis in fact what happened.\nQ\nWouldn't they be revealing a covert operation\nby doing so?\n'GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Not necessarily. They would\nnot have to be with respect to anything ongoing as the\npresent law was.\nQ\nCould I just ask this one question?\nFrom time to time officials have had off-the-\nrecord briefings for the press, for responsible press. How\nwill this affect off-the-record background briefings in\nthe future?\nMR. DUVAL: I think one important point is that\nthe President considered carefully whether to ask for\nlegislation covering all intelligence secrets, legislation\nsuch as is embodied in S. 1. He rejected that course. He\nwent to the much more narrow sources and methods and that\nshould solve that problem.\nQ\nMr. Bush, could I just ask you one more\nquestion? It goes back to what I asked earlier.\nWithout making it personal, under this system,\nwhat does a DCI do when a President says, \"I want to know\nwhat is going on in the headquarters of the other party,\"\nor \"I want to help a friendly head of a foreign government\nby organizing some covert operation that the State Department\nand the Pentagon and others don't like\"? What does a future\nDCI do in order to do something about a President that\ndoes not seem to him to be wise, judicious, legal or moral?\nMORE\n- 23 -\nMR, BUSH: Well, I cannot answer for other DCIs\nbut I answered that question, I think, to the satisfaction\nof the Senate and that is simply that clearly the first\none is absolutely out and the second one without\nauthorization of this committee that has been set up\nwould be out as well. So I think you are referring to\nthis double track thing that has happened under different\nAdministrations in the past. I think that the machinery\nthat has been set up here eliminates any danger of that.\nHopefully, sir, I have the integrity that I would not be\napproached on a double track.\nQ I am not asking about you. I am asking\nwhat is the institutional protection?\nMR. BUSH: The institutional protection is the\nformalization of the procedures of the old 40 Committee,\nfor one thing, and I think that is a very important step.\nIt is not gathering more power to the President. It seems\nto me it is formalizing a necessary check, you might say,\nbefore the operation gets to him. And it won't be done\nwithout meetings of a higher level -- Special Operations\nCommittee, whatever it is called.\nThe operations will not be approved. So I do\nthink there are more safeguards for the American people\nin this respect while keeping the right for the President\nto approve operations.\nGLRALD БОНД LIBRARY\nQ\nMr. Bush, with all due respect --\nMR. DUVAL: If I might, Mr. Schorr, could I just\nexpand for one second because it goes to a question that\nI think Mr. Brokaw had also.\nWhat the President did by putting into an Executive\nOrder what the agencies must do and importantly, specifically,\nwhat they must not do, it has the effect of being binding.\nIt is public. It can't be changed unless it is changed\npublicly. It establishes an iron clad process whereby\nif you take the example you use, that would be a domestic\nviolation of the Restrictions Order. If such a command\nwent out, then under the procedures that President Ford\nhas put into Executive Order, anybody in the CIA would\nhave a command under Executive Order to report that to\nthe Intelligence Oversight Board made up of independent\ncitizens.\nIf, for example, a future Director of the Central\nIntelligence Agency ordered his employees not to report it,\nthe simple fact of giving that order under the express\ncommand of the Restrictions Order, the employee would have\nto go to the Intelligence Oversight Board.\nMORE\n- 24 -\nSo what you have done and what the President has\ndone is he has set up the commandments of what they must\nnot do in writing and in an Executive Order that cannot be\nchanged unless it is changed publicly. Then he has\nestablished a mechanism for getting any deviation from\nthat to the Intelligence Oversight Board for its handling.\nIf it is against the law, that Board must report it to\nthe Attorney General.\nQ\nMr. Levi, could I ask one question to\nclarify something?\nQ\nMr. Duval, could you specify just what the\nprocedures are by which the agency would inform the over-\nsight committees of a covert action; that is, the timing and\nalso the procedures by which that would be done?\nMR. DUVAL: Well, again I know it has taken Jack\nand myself and all of us a long time to get to understand\nand work out that Executive Order -- it is extremely complex.\nThe reporting to the Intelligence Oversight Board of abuses\nis specified specifically, the procedures in the Executive\nOrder.\n#\nQ\nThese are on covert actions?\nMR. DUVAL: On covert action. It is not the\nIntelligence Oversight Board.\nMR. BUSH: Congressional oversight committees\nof Congress.\nMR. DUVAL: Well, we start where we are, start\nwith the state of the law today.\nUnder the state of the law today you have section\n662 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the so-called Hughes-\n'Brien amendment that sets out the reporting requirements.\nWhat the President says in his message and what he said\nto the leadership last night was centralize the committee\nstructure to perform so that you can bring together the\noversight at one place -- it will be better oversight.\nWe can provide it more information, full information. And\nonce you have done that then modify section 662 so that\nthe notification of any covert operations would be given\nto that group.\nQ\nIt now says \"in a timely fashion\" which\nadmittedly is ambiguous. Would that continue as the\ngoverning?\nMORE\n- 25 -\nMR. DUVAL: The President again has set forth\ncertain principles. One of the principles that the Executive\nBranch acting under Article 2 has to exercise is its\nfunctions. The Congress is oversight. If Congress is\ninvolved in specific operations and the decision-making\nfor specific operations, then who does the oversight? So\nwhat he envisions is to find the ground rules for the\naction, full notification to Congress after the action\nand they conduct the oversight.\nQ\nIs there any place in these documents where\nhe spells that out? I mean, it seems like it is a fairly\ncritical point.\nMR. DUVAL: Dick, he made a very strong point --\nand I think Jack ought to get up here and rescue me on this --\nand that is that when you are defining the specific\nrelationship, that point where the Executive functions and\nthe Congressional functions come together, that needs\ndiscussion with the Congress and he has laid out principles\nand guidelines but, as he told the leadership last night,\nhe wants to work with them in defining the specifics.\nQ\nCould I ask one question of the Attorney\nGeneral? I am still not clear on the legal effect of\nthis oath that all Executive Branch employees who have\naccess to classified information will sign.\nSuppose a functionary in the State Department\nhaving signed that oath then reveals classified information,\nwhat is the effect of the oath? I mean, can he be sued?\nCan he be prosecuted?\nFOR\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Yes, a civil suit.\nQ\nA civil suit brought by whom?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, it can be brought\nby the Government.\nQ\nBut only a civil suit, not a criminal suit?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: It does in itself\nprovide for the criminal remedy.\nQ\nBut is a criminal remedy possible?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, not on the basis\nof that agreement alone.\nQ\nAre there any limits to the amount of the\ncivil liability?\nMORE\n- 26 -\nThe point is that although the claim has been\nmade that this is not an official secrets act, yet every\nExecutive Branch employee in the entire Government is\nrequired to sign an oath stating that he will not reveal\nclassified information and, furthermore, action can lie\nas a result of his failure to comply.\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: It would be one of the\nfew ways that the Government under present law might proceed\nto enjoin the disclosure by that person of information.\nI must say that the combination of that and the intelligence\nmethods and sources legislation which is proposed here,\nwhich by the way was arrived at through an agreement between\nMr. Colby and myself and really was not a question of\none\nrunning after the other to see who would be\ntougher, it seemed to us to be the minimum steps if you\nare going to have whatsoever any effective legislation\nagainst any and all disclosures.\nThe fact of the matter is that the present law,\nexcept for the signing of the agreement in the Marchetti\ncase, is practically in that shape now. If one considers\nthat the best policy and program for this country, then\nobviously one should have no legislation whatsoever. If\none assumes that some secrecy should be enforceable by\nlaw, some minimum amount, our judgment was that this\nwas that minimum amount and certainly is, I think, much\nless than one would find in any other country.\nIf one refers to the official Secrets Act, it\nreally would be fantastically different and it is fantastically\ndifferent than S. 1. So we thought this was a minimum\namount.\nQ\nHave any standards been applied to determine\nwhen classified information is revealed by someone in an\nunauthorized way when a civil suit would be brought? What\nare the standards for which secrets will be let out?\nATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: It is exactly the same\ntoday as when these agreements are there. The most useful\nthing about the agreement would be that if one knew that\na revelation was in process, one could get an injunction\nagainst it.\nQ\nHow do I insure the independence of an\nInspector Generalship when it is lodged within each of\nthe agencies? This is perhaps for Mr. Duval or Mr. Marsh.\nWhy did you go that route rather than an independent\nInspector General for intelligence where you would not\nhave these internal agency loyalties?\nMORE\n- 27 -\nMR. MARSH: Well, it was felt that ha ng the IOB\nand giving them a very broad responsibility and requiring\nthe agency heads and their general counsels and inspector\ngenerals to report to them and they could make recommendations,\ntoo, that that will be far, far more effective to achieve\noversight than having a Government-wide Inspector General.\nQ\nMr. Marsh, am I right in thinking that the\nonly substantive limit on the kind of covert operation\ncould be carried out, either proposed in the President's\nmessage to Congress to be embodied in legislation or\nincluded in the Executive Order as a prohibition on\nassassinations? That is the only type of covert operation\nthat is, specifically excluded,\nMR. MARSH: I think some of the collection\nsystems -- electronic surveillance systems -- are covert\ntypes of surveillances, they are excluded.\nQ\nI was thinking of some of the foreign ones\nwe have learned about lately such as President Nixon's\norder to the CIA or Mr. Helms' to carry out or encourage\na military coup in Chile, various things of that kind.\nFORD\nThey would not be excluded under this proposal, or the\npayment of bribes or subventions to foreign politicians\nLIBRA\nAll of those would not be covered?\nMR. MARSH: I think that the standards that you\nwould have in the Restrictions Order and the Congressional\noversight and the Inspector General's operation and the\nIOB or the Oversight Board's examination of the activities\nwould quickly flush out and bring out any type of abuse\nlike that that would occur.\nQ\nWhy is it an abuse? I don't find any language\nin either the Executive Order or the legislation that leads\nme to think it is regarded as an abuse. Could you point\nme to any language that would lead a board of this kind you\ndescribe to regard it as an abuse? I say I can only find\nthe reference to the assassinations.\nMR. MARSH: Actually the Order is directed to\nthe foreign intelligence agencies in the manner in which\nthey conduct their operations and a provision for the over-\nview of how they conduct it and the standards that they\nwill be tested by will be the standards of their own\nInspector Generals or the Attorney General and of the\nIntelligence Oversight Board and those items that they find\nthat are abuses, that we should not be engaged in, they\nwill report those to the Attorney General. I think that\nis the best oversight you can have because I don't think\nyou can anticipate some of the things that may occur in\nthis or any other type of operation.\nMORE\n- 28 -\nQ\nHow would that be an abuse?\nMR. NESSEN: Why don't we have two more questions?\nQ\nMr. Bush, I would like to ask this since\nMr. Colby has --\nMR. NESSEN: Dick had a question half out of\nhis mouth, Les, and then Walt and then Ford and that\nwill be it.\nQ\nThank you, Ron. I mean, I was standing and\nI had a question half out of my mouth, too.\nMR. NESSEN: Dick.\nQ\nI am just not clear from your answer,\nMr. Marsh. Would that be an abuse?\nMR. MARSH: Would what be?\nQ\nThe situation described in Chile, for\nexample? Under the President's Order, would that be an\nabuse?\nMR. MARSH: I can't say that I can answer that.\nI would say this, that the standards that would be applied\nin the covert operations will have to meet the standards\nthat are acceptable to the Intelligence Oversight Board and\nthere will be a question in my mind whether that would meet\nthe standards.\nQ\nWho sets those standards? The Board?\nMR. MARSH: The Board themselves will set\nstandards and these are men --\nQ\nDo they have any experience in covert\noperations? I mean, for example, don't some of these\nmembers have some past experience with regard to covert\noperations?\nMR. MARSH: Yes, they do.\nQ\nMr. Cherne was the first to be overseeing\non the President's Foreign Policy Advisorv Board, wasn't he?\nIt didn't seem to work very well.\nThese are not exactly fresh new faces. Ambassador\nMurphy has been around this town for a little while.\nMR. MARSH: That is right, and Mr. Ailes was the\nSecretary of the Army.\nHORE\n- 29 -\nQ\nGeneral Scowcroft, may I ask one question,\nplease, relative to national security leaks? I was\nwondering, sir, if, in your experience at the White House,\nyou could give us an example of one or more leaks that\nhave damaged the national security and, if so, how and why?\nGENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, just offhand I don't\nthink of one specifically that I can tell you a), b), and c)\nhas damaged national security. I think, though, you have\nto say that there has been at the very minimum a cumulative\neffect on the efficiency and effectiveness of our\nintelligence collection and our cooperation with other\nintelligence organizations in the free world. Their\ncooperation with us has, in some cases, been limited by\nthe fact that they do have some doubts about our ability\nto safeguard the information that they have been willing\nto share with us. That is one specific example.\nMR. NESSEN: One last question.\nQ\nCould I ask a question of either Mr. Marsh\nor Mr. Duval.\nFORD\nSometimes we have short memories. The last\ntime we had a major scandal about spying inside of the\nGERALD R\nUnited States was by the military and out of that came\ninternal reforms which are not unlike these. They were not\nPresidentially ordered but they were ordered by the\nSecretary of Defense, called DIRK, in 1971 or 1970.\nTo what extent do these change DIRK -- some\nof them seem stronger and some of them seem weaker. What\nhave you rescinded about the Defense Department's own\nregulations restricting spying on Americans by the military?\nHave you done a study on that?\nMR. DUVAL: The Secretary of Defense has an\nobligation under this Executive Order to insure that the\nDefense Department regulations are consistent with the\nprohibitions and the commands in that Executive Order.\nThe President faced up to this. He grabbed it straight\non and put it down in the Executive Order. So having it\nout there, that is the point.\nNow clearly the Secretary of Defense, as it states\nin the order, must have internal regulations that implement\nand are consistent with the President's restrictions.\nQ\nSo is it your view that this does not rescind\nany part of DIRK?\nMR. DUVAL: That order in your hand supersedes\nanything else in the Defense Department.\nMORE\n- 30 -\nTHE PRESS: Thank you.\nMR. NESSEN: Let Jack Marsh say one word here in\ngeneral terms about the President's views of covert\noperations when they are conducted according to all\nthese restrictions and regulations when they have been\nreviewed and approved by the appropriate bodies set up\nhere. I think some of you perhaps are leaving without\nthat point quite clear in your mind.\nMR. MARSH: There are no restrictions on the\nconduct of covert operations except those restrictions,\nof course, that might be applied by the Congress or\ndecisions that are made internally in the Executive\nBranch of Government as to whether it was a wise thing\nto do or not to do. Other than the Congressional oversight\nthere are no restrictions in this Executive Order that\nhas been issued here that relate to covert operations.\nTHE PRESS: Thank you.\nEND (AT 12:25 P.M. EST)\nGERRALO FURD LIBRARY\nEMBARGOED FOR RELEASE\nFebruary 18, 1976\nUNTIL 12:00 Noon (EST)\nOffice of the White House Press Secretary\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nFOR\nFACT SHEET\nThe President's Actions Concerning\nthe Foreign Intelligence Community\nSUMMARY\nThe President has today taken the following comprehensive\nactions to strengthen the United States foreign intelligence\ndepartments and agencies: (1) issued an Omnibus Executive\nOrder establishing policy guidelines and restrictions for the\nintelligence agencies and a new command structure and over-\nsight mechanism for the intelligence community; (2) proposed\nnew legislation to protect the secrecy of particularly sensi-\ntive intelligence information, announced that he will meet with\nCongressional leaders to develop legislation concerning elec-\ntronic surveillance and to prevent unauthorized opening of\nmail, and he endorsed legislation to prohibit assassinations of\nforeign leaders; and, (3) proposed a framework in which con-\nstructive Congressional oversight can be established without\ndisclosing intelligence secrets.\nOBJECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS\nThe President's actions are designed to insure that:\n(1) The United States has a strong and effective capa-\nbility to gather and evaluate foreign intelligence\nand conduct necessary covert operations; and\n(2) These activities are conducted in a Constitutional\nand lawful manner and never aimed at our own citizens.\nThe President's actions will strengthen our foreign intelligence\ncapability and establish an effective process to prevent abuses\nby:\n(A) Setting forth in Executive Order, policy guidance for\nthe foreign intelligence agencies which define what\nfunctions they are supposed to carry out and which\nclearly states what they are not permitted to do.\n(B) Creating a streamlined command structure for\nintelligence community leadership which makes\nspecifically designated individuals accountable.\n(c) Requiring the NSC to conduct semi-annual reviews\nof the adequacy of the foreign intelligence\nproduct and establishing the Intelligence\nOversight Board to monitor compliance with the\nrestrictions which have been placed on the\nintelligence community's activities.\nmore\n(OVER)\n2\nOMNIBUS EXECUTIVE ORDER\n(1) Control and Direction of Intelligence Organizations\n(A) Overall Policy Development\n1.\nThe National Security Council (NSC) will con-\ntinue to exercise overall policy control over\nthe foreign intelligence community.\n2.\nStatutory members are:\nThe President\n... Vice President\n-- Secretary of State\n-- Secretary of Defense\n3.\nThe NSC will conduct a semi-annual policy review\nof foreign intelligence activities focused on,\nbut not limited to, the following:\nNeeds of government foreign policy-makers\nand the responsiveness of foreign intelli-\ngence to these needs, including the quality,\nscope and timeliness of the intelligence\nproduct,\nThe effective and efficient use of resources\nin the collection of intelligence informa-\ntion; and\nThe continued appropriateness of ongoing\ncovert operations and sensitive intelligence\ncollection missions.\nThe Assistant to the President for National\nSecurity Affairs will have staff responsibility\nfor the semi-annual policy reviews. Heads of the\ndepartments and agencies which use foreign\nintelligence will be consulted.\n(B) Management and Resource Control\n1.\nResponsibility for management and resource control\nof the foreign intelligence community is vested by\nExecutive Order in the Committee on Foreign\nIntelligence (CFI), which reports directly to\nthe NSC.\n2.\nMembership of the CFI is:\nThe Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),\nChairman\n- Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence\n- Deputy Assistant to the President for\nNational Security Affairs\n(NOTE: Staff support shall be provided by the\nintelligence community staff.)\n3.\nThe Committee on Foreign Intelligence shall:\nControl budget preparation and resource\nallocation for the National Foreign Intelli-\ngence Program (defined as excluding tactical\nintelligence).\nmore\n3\nEstablish management policies for the\nForeign Intelligence Program.\nCarry out policy decisions of the NSC with\nparticular emphasis on collection and pro-\nduction of national intelligence.\n4.\nDecisions of the CFI may be reviewed by the NSC\nupon appeal by the Director of Central Intelligence\nor any member of the NSC.\n(C) Production of National Intelligence\n1.\nResponsibility for the production of substantive\nnational (i.e., not tactical or departmental)\nintelligence is vested in the Director of Central\nIntelligence. The DCI is the President's primary\nadvisor on foreign intelligence.\n2.\nTo assist in developing national intelligence\nrequirements and priorities, and in developing\nfinished national intelligence, the DCI shall\nestablish such boards and committees (similar to\nthe former USIB) of the intelligence community\nas will enable him most effectively to utilize\nthe talent of the community to produce the best\npossible intelligence product.\n(D) Covert Action and Other Special Operations\n1.\nResponsibility to review and advise the President\non covert operations and certain sensitive foreign\nintelligence collection missions is assigned by\nExecutive Order to the Operations Advisory Group\n(Operations. Group).\n2.\nNew membership is:\nAssistant to the President for National\nSecurity Affairs, Chairman\n-- Secretary of State\n-- Secretary of Defense\n-- Director of Central Intelligence\n-- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nGERALD, FORD VIGRARY\nObservers are:\nAttorney General\nDirector of OMB\n3.\nThe Special Intelligence Operations Group shall:\nConsider and make recommendations to the\nPresident on all proposals for covert\naction and certain sensitive intelligence\ncollection missions.\nSubmit to the NSC a periodic review of\nongoing covert operations and sensitive\nintelligence collection missions.\nMeet formally to carry out its responsi-\nbility to make recommendations to the\nPresident.\nmore\n4\n(E) The following existing committees or organizations\nare abolished:\n(1) United States Intelligence Board\n(2) Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee\n(3) National Security Council Intelligence\nCommittee\n(4) Executive Committee for resource control\nof certain intelligence collection\nactivity\n(5) 40 Committee\n(2) Responsibilities and Duties of the Intelligence Community\n(A) The Senior Official of each organization of the\nintelligence community shall insure his organization\noperates in accordance with the Executive Order. He\nshall establish a system of independent inspection\nwithin the organization and provide information to\nthe NSC, CFI and Intelligence Oversight Board. Other\nresponsibilities as designated in Section IV of the\nOrder.\n(B) CIA is responsible, among other duties as defined\nin Section IV of the Order, for:\nProduction of national intelligence\nMaintaining and improving a national intel-\nligence analytic base\nCollection by other than normal, overt means\nForeign counterintelligence activities\nUndertaking activities defined in the\nExecutive Order necessary to implement\nthe above\n(C) The Department of State is primarily responsible for\novert collection of foreign, non-military information.\nIts Bureau of Intelligence and Research shall also\nproduce departmental intelligence and contribute\nto national intelligence production.\n(D) The Department of Treasury is responsible for overt\ncollection of foreign, economic information.\n(E) The Department of Defense is responsible for:\nOvert collection outside the United States\nof foreign military and military-related\ninformation.\nProducing that intelligence required to fulfill\nthe responsibilities of DOD.\nManaging the Defense Attache system.\nProviding intelligence staff support to the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff.\nmore\n5\nThe National Security Agency is responsible for:\nFull control over signals intelligence\ncollection activities.\nProduction and dissemination of signals\nintelligence.\nProviding communications security services\nto the U.S. Government.\nResearch and development related to signals\nintelligence.\n(F) The Energy Research and Development Administration\nis responsible for producing intelligence relating\nto atomic and nuclear matters.\n(G) The Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible\nfor:\nMaking available to foreign intelligence\nagencies foreign intelligence and foreign\ncounterintelligence which it collects.\nConducting foreign counterintelligence\nactivities within the United States.\n(3) Restrictions on Intelligence Activities\nThe Executive Order prohibits or severely restricts the\nfollowing activities by United States foreign intelligence\nagencies:\nCollection and analysis of information on the\ndomestic activities of United States citizens,\ncorporations and organizations and permanent\nresident aliens (referred to as U.S. persons).\nPhysical or electronic surveillance or physical\nsearches of United States persons.\nOpening of United States mail in violation of\nlaw.\nDERALO, FORD LIBRARY\nIllegally obtaining federal tax returns or\ninformation.\nInfiltration of domestic groups for the purpose\nof influencing or reporting on them.\nExperimentation with drugs on humans without the\nsubject's informed consent.\nSharing among agencies information on the\ndomestic activities of United States persons\nexcept in compliance with stringent safeguards.\nAssignment of personnel to other agencies.\nProviding assistance to law enforcement agencies\nin violation of law.\nTesting of electronic surveillance equipment\nwithin the United States.\nmore\n6\nLimited exceptions are permitted to allow the agencies\nto meet the legitimate foreign intelligence needs of the\nNation. These narrow exceptions are expressed in detail\nin the Order. They are designed to permit the following\nactivities under carefully defined circumstances:\nCollection of information on the domestic activi-\nties of U.S. persons in order to: conduct security\nchecks on intelligence agency employees, contrac-\ntors, people who are given access to classified\ninformation and persons who may assist the agency\nin the future. Overt collection of certain\nforeign intelligence information from other\ngovernment agencies.\nCounterintelligence and counterespionage activities.\n(4) Oversight of Intelligence Activities\n1.\nResponsibility to assist the President, the\nNSC and the Attorney General in overseeing\nthe intelligence community is assigned by\nExecutive Order to the Intelligence Oversight\nBoard (Oversight Board).\n2.\nNew membership consists of three members from\nthe private sector designated by the President.\nOne of these will be designated by the President\nto be Chairman. They will also be made members\nof the PFIAB.\n3.\nThe Board shall:\nReceive and consider reports by Inspectors\nGeneral and General Counsels of the\nintelligence community concerning activi-\nties that raise questions of legality or\npropriety.\nReview periodically the practices and\nprocedures of the intelligence community\nInspectors General and General Counsels\ndesigned to assist the Oversight Board.\nReport periodically and in a timely manner,\nas appropriate, to the Attorney General\nand the President on any activities that\nraise serious questions about legality.\nIt shall report to the President on\nactivities that raise questions of pro-\npriety of intelligence community activities.\nReceive staff support from persons not\nconnected with the intelligence community.\n(5) Secrecy Protection\nAll persons given access to information containing intel-\nligence sources and methods shall be required to sign an\nagreement that they will not disclose that information to\npersons not authorized to receive it.\nmore\n7\nMESSAGE TO CONGRESS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION\n(A) Message\nToday the President sent a message to the Congress which:\n(1) Advised the Congress of the actions he has taken\nby Executive Order.\n(2) Transmitted the legislative proposal as indicated\nbelow.\n(3) Urged Congress to establish effective oversight\nconsistent with the following general objectives:\nThe oversight functions should be centralized\nin a Joint House-Senate Committee to provide\nbetter security.\nBoth the House and Senate should adopt rules\nto insure that secrets will not be improperly\ndisclosed.\nThe President's injunction of secrecy over\nforeign intelligence information provided to\nthe Congress by the Executive Branch should be\nrespected.\nThe Executive Branch should keep the Joint\nOversight Committee fully informed of foreign\nintelligence matters, but there should be no\nrequirement for prior notification of specific\nactivities.\n(4) Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act should be\nmodified. This requires the intelligence agencies\nto brief over six committees of Congress on covert\nactions and has resulted in unauthorized disclosures\nof classified information.\n(B) Legislation\nThe President submitted the following proposed legislation:\nSecrecy of Sources and Methods\nThis bill provides for:\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nCriminal penalties for the disclosure\nto unauthorized persons of information\nrelating to intelligence sources and\nmethods.\nLimits its coverage to persons whose\naccess to such information arise out of\ntheir relationship to the Government\n(Government employees, contractors and\ncontractor employees).\nInjunctive relief where unauthorized\ndisclosure is threatened and serious\ndamage to the intelligence collection\neffort would result.\nmore\n8\nThe President endorsed the objectives of the legislation\nproposed by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee\nto prohibit the assassination of foreign officials in\npeacetime.\nThe President also will meet with Congressional leaders\nto develop acceptable proposed legislation to control\nelectronic surveillance in the United States and mail\nopenings for foreign intelligence purposes.\nACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN\nThe following are examples of agency actions:\nCIA directives implementing the recommendations of\nthe Rockefeller Commission and other reforms have\nbeen issued internally.\nNSA reform directives have been issued internally.\nFBI guidelines are being drafted. Some have already\nbeen made public.\n# # #\nEMBARGOED FOR RELEASE\nFebruary 18, 1976\nUNTIL 12 P.M. (EST)\nWEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1976\nOffice of the White House Press Secretary\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nEXECUTIVE ORDER\nUNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES\nBy virtue of the authority vested in me by the\nConstitution and statutes of the United States, includ-\ning the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and\nas President of the United States of America, it is\nhereby ordered as follows:\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nSection\nDescription\nPage\n1\nPURPOSE\n2\n2\nDEFINITIONS\n2\n3\nCONTROL AND DIRECTION OF INTELLIGENCE\nORGANIZATIONS\n4\n(a)\nNational Security Council\n4\n(b)\nCommittee on Foreign Intelligence\n5\n(c)\nOperations Advisory Group\n6\n(d)\nDirector of Central Intelligence-\n7\n4\nRESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF THE\nINTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY\n11\n(a)\nSenior Official of Each Organi-\nzation of the Intelligence\nCommunity\n12\n(b)\nCentral Intelligence Agency\n14\n(c)\nDepartment of State\n16\n(d)\nDepartment of the Treasury\n17\n(e)\nDepartment of Defense\n18\n(f)\nEnergy Research and Development\nAdministration\n21\n(g)\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\n22\n5\nRESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES\n23\n6\nOVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS\n31\n7\nSECRECY PROTECTION\n35\n8\nENABLING DATA\n35\n2\nSection 1. Purpose. The purpose of this Order\nis to establish policies to improve the quality of\nintelligence needed for national security, to clarify\nthe authority and responsibilities of the intelligence\ndepartments and agencies, and to establish effective\noversight to assure compliance with law in the manage-\nment and direction of intelligence agencies and depart-\nments of the national government.\nSec. 2. Definitions. For the purpose of this\nOrder, unless otherwise indicated, the following terms\nshall have these meanings:\n(a) Intelligence means:\n(1) Foreign intelligence which means informa-\ntion, other than foreign counterintelligence, on the\ncapabilities, intentions and activities of foreign\npowers, organizations or their agents; and\n(2) Foreign counterintelligence which means\nactivities conducted to protect the United States and\nUnited States citizens from foreign espionage, sabotage,\nsubversion, assassination or terrorism.\n(b) Intelligence Community refers to the following\norganizations:\n(1) Central Intelligence Agency;\n(2) National Security Agency;\n(3) Defense Intelligence Agency;\n3\n(4) Special offices within the Department\nof Defense for the collection of\nspecialized intelligence through\nreconnaissance programs;\n(5) Intelligence elements of the military\nservices;\n(6) Intelligence element of the Federal\nBureau of Investigation;\n(7) Intelligence element of the Department\nof State;\n(8) Intelligence element of the Department\nof the Treasury; and\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\n(9) Intelligence element of the Energy\nResources and Development Administration.\n(c) Special activities in support of national\nforeign policy objectives means activities, other than\nthe collection and production of intelligence and related\nsupport functions, designed to further official United\nStates programs and policies abroad which are planned and\nexecuted so that the role of the United States Government\nis not apparent or publicly acknowledged.\n(d) National Foreign Intelligence Program means\nthe programs of the Central Intelligence Agency and the\nspecial offices within the Department of Defense for\nthe collection of specialized intelligence through recon-\nnaissance programs, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program,\nand those elements of the General Defense Intelligence\nProgram and other programs of the departments and\nagencies, not including tactical intelligence, desig-\nnated by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence as part\nof the Program.\n4\nSec. 3. Control and Direction of National\nIntelligence Organizations.\n(a) National Security Council.\n(1) The National Security Council was\nestablished by the National Security Act of 1947 to\nadvise the President with respect to the integration\nof domestic, foreign, and military policies relating\nto the national security. Statutory members of the\nNational Security Council are the President, the Vice\nPresident, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary\nof Defense.\n(2) Among its responsibilities, the National\nSecurity Council shall provide guidance and direction\nto the development and formulation of national intelli-\ngence activities.\n(3) The National Security Council shall\nconduct a semi-annual review of intelligence policies\nand of ongoing special activities in support of national\nForeign policy objectives. These reviews shall con-\nsider the needs of users of intelligence and the timeli-\nness and quality of intelligence products and the con-\ntinued appropriateness of special activities in support\nof national Foreign policy objectives. The National\nSecurity Council shall consult with the Secretary of\nthe Treasury and such other users of intelligence as\ndesignated by the President as part of these reviews.\n5\n(b) Committee on Foreign Intelligence.\n(1) There is established the Committee on\nForeign Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the\nCFI), which shall be composed of the Director of\nCentral Intelligence, hereinafter referred to as the\nDCI, who shall be the Chairman; the Deputy Secretary\nof Defense for Intelligence; and the Deputy Assistant\nto the President for National Security Affairs. The\nCFI shall report directly to the National Security Council.\n(2) The CFI shall (i) control budget prepara-\ntion and resource allocation for the National Foreign\nIntelligence Program.\n(A) The CFI shall, prior to submission\nto the Office of Management and Budget, review, and\namend as it deems appropriate, the budget for the\nNational Foreign Intelligence Program.\nFORD j LIBRARY GERALD\n(B) The CFI shall also adopt rules\ngoverning the reprogramming of funds within this budget.\nSuch rules may require that reprogrammings of certain\ntypes or amounts be given prior approval by the CFI.\n(ii) Establish policy priorities for the col-\nlection and production of national intelligence.\n(iii) Establish policy for the management of\nthe National Foreign Intelligence Program.\n6\n(iv) Provide guidance on the relationship between\ntactical and national intelligence; however, neither\nthe DCI nor the CFI shall have responsibility for\ntactical intelligence.\n(v) Provide continuing guidance to the Intelli-\ngence Community in order to ensure compliance with\npolicy directions of the NSC.\n(3) The CFI shall be supported by the\nIntelligence Community staff headed by the Deputy to\nthe Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelli-\ngence Community.\n(4) The CFI shall establish such subcommittees\nas it deems appropriate to ensure consultation with\nmembers of the Intelligence Community on policies and\nguidance issued by the CFI.\n(5) Decisions of the CFI may be reviewed\nby the National Security Council upon appeal by the\nDirector of Central Intelligence or any member of the\nNational Security Council.\n(c) The Operations Advisory Group.\n(1) There is established the Operations\nAdvisory Group (hereinafter referred to as the Opera-\ntions Group), which shall be composed of the Assistant\nto the President for National Security Affairs; the\nSecretaries of State and Defense; the Chairman of the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of Central\nIntelligence. The Chairman shall be designated by the\nPresident. The Attorney General and the Director\n7\nof the Office of Management and Budget or their repre-\nsentatives, and others who may be designated by the\nPresident, shall attend all meetings as observers.\n(2) The Operations Group shall (i) consider\nand develop a policy recommendation, including any\ndissents, for the President prior to his decision on\neach special activity in support of national foreign\nFORD i LIBRARY 933470\npolicy objectives.\n(ii) Conduct periodic reviews of programs previ-\nously considered by the Operations Group.\n(iii) Give approval for specific sensitive intelli-\ngence collection operations as designated by the Opera-\ntions Group.\n(iv) Conduct periodic reviews of ongoing sensitive\nintelligence collection operations.\n(3) The Operations Group shall discharge\nthe responsibilities assigned by subparagraphs (c) (2) (i)\nand (c) (2) (iii) of this section only after consideration\nin a formal meeting attended by all members and observers;\nor, in unusual circumstances when any member or observer\nis unavailable, when a designated representative of\nthe member or observer attends.\n(4) The staff of the National Security Council\nshall provide support to the Operations Group.\n(d) Director of Central Intelligence.\n(1) The Director of Central Intelligence,\n8\npursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, shall\nbe responsible directly to the National Security Council\nand the President. He shall:\n(i) Chair the CFI.\n(ii) Act as executive head of the CIA and Intelli-\ngence Community staff.\n(iii) Ensure the development and submission of\na budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program\nto the CFI.\n(iv) Act as the President's primary adviser on\nforeign intelligence and provide him and other officials\nin the Executive branch with foreign intelligence,\nincluding National Intelligence Estimates; develop\nnational intelligence requirements and priorities;\nand supervise production and dissemination of national\nintelligence.\n(v) Ensure appropriate implementation of special\nactivities in support of national foreign policy\nobjectives.\n(vi) Establish procedures to ensure the propriety\nof requests, and responses thereto, from the White House\nStaff or other Executive departments and agencies to\nthe Intelligence Community.\n(vii) Ensure that appropriate programs are\ndeveloped which properly protect intelligence sources,\nmethods and analytical procedures. His responsibility\nwithin the United States shall be limited to:\n9\n(A) Protection by lawful means against\ndisclosure by present or former employees of the\nCentral Intelligence Agency or persons, or employees\nof persons or organizations, presently or formerly\nunder contract with the Agency;\n(B) providing leadership, guidance\nand technical assistance to other government depart-\nments and agencies performing foreign intelligence\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nactivities; and\n(c) in cases involving serious or con-\ntinuing security violations, recommending to the\nAttorney General that the case be referred to the Federal\nBureau of Investigation for further investigation.\n(viii) Establish a vigorous program to downgrade\nand declassify foreign intelligence information as\nappropriate and consistent with Executive Order No. 11652.\n(ix) Ensure the existence of strong Inspector\nGeneral capabilities in all elements of the Intelligence\nCommunity and that each Inspector General submits\nquarterly to the Intelligence Oversight Board a report\nwhich sets forth any questionable activities in which\nthat intelligence organization has engaged or is engaged.\n(x) Ensure the establishment, by the Intelligence\nCommunity, of common security standards for managing\nand handling foreign intelligence systems, information\nand products, and for granting access thereto.\n10\n(xi) Act as the principal spokesman to the Congress\nfor the Intelligence Community and facilitate the use\nof foreign intelligence products by Congress.\n(xii) Promote the development and maintenance by\nthe Central Intelligence Agency of services of common\nconcern to the Intelligence Community organizations,\nincluding multi-discipline analysis, national level\nintelligence products, and a national level current\nintelligence publication.\n(xiii) Establish uniform criteria for the identi-\nfication, selection, and designation of relative prior-\nities for the transmission of critical intelligence,\nand provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing\nguidance as to the communications requirements of the\nIntelligence Community for the transmission of such\nintelligence.\n(xiv) Establish such committees of collectors,\nproducers and users of intelligence to assist in his\nconduct of his responsibilities as he deems appropriate.\n(xv) Consult with users and producers of intelli-\ngence, including the Departments of State, Treasury,\nand Defense, the military services, the Federal Bureau\nof Investigation, the Energy Resources and Development\nAdministration, and the Council of Economic Advisors,\nto ensure the timeliness, relevancy and quality of\nthe intelligence product.\n11\n(2) To assist the Director of Central Intelli-\ngence in the supervision and direction of the Intelli-\ngence Community, the position of Deputy to the Director\nof Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community\nis hereby established (Committee on Foreign Intelligence).\n(3) To assist the Director of Central Intelli-\ngence in the supervision and direction of the Central\nIntelligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence\nshall, to the extent consistent with his statutory\nresponsibilities, delegate the day-to-day operation of\nthe Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director\nof Central Intelligence (50 U.S.C. 403 (a) )\nGLRALOR FORD LIBRARY\n(4) To assist the DCI in the fulfillment of\nhis responsibilities, the heads of all departments and\nagencies shall give him access to all information\nrelevant to the foreign intelligence needs of the United\nStates. Relevant information requested by the DCI shall\nbe provided, and the DCI shall take appropriate steps\nto maintain its confidentiality.\nSec. 4. Responsibilities and Duties of the\nIntelligence Community. Purpose. The rules of operation\nprescribed by this section of the Order relate to the\nactivities of our foreign intelligence agencies. In\nsome instances, detailed implementation of this Executive\norder will be contained in classified documents because\nof the sensitivity of the information and its relation\n12\nto national security. All such classified instructions\nwill be consistent with this Order. Unless otherwise\nspecified within this section, its provisions apply\nto activities both inside and outside the United States,\nand all references to law are to applicable laws of the\nUnited States. Nothing in this section of this Order\nshall be construed to interfere with any law-enforcement\nresponsibility of any department or agency.\n(a) Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community.\nThe senior officials of the CIA, Departments of State,\nTreasury and Defense, ERDA and the FBI shall ensure\nthat, in discharging the duties and responsibilities\nenumerated for their organizations which relate to\nforeign intelligence, they are responsive to the needs\nof the President, the National Security Council and\nother elements of the Government. In carrying out their\nduties and responsibilities, senior officials shall\nensure that all policies and directives relating to\nintelligence activities are carried out in accordance\nwith law and this Order, including Section 5, and shall:\n(1) Make appropriate use of the capabilities\nof the other elements of the Intelligence Community in\norder to achieve maximum efficiency.\n(2) Contribute in areas of his responsibility\nto the national intelligence products produced under\nauspices of the Director of Central Intelligence.\n13\n(3) Establish internal policies and guide-\nlines governing employee conduct and ensuring that\nsuch are made known to, and acknowledged by, each\nemployee.\n(4) Provide for a strong and independent\norganization for identification and inspection of, and\nreporting on, unauthorized activity.\n(5) Report to the Attorney General that informa-\ntion which relates to detection or prevention of possible\nviolations of law by any person, including an employee\nof the senior official's department or agency.\nFORD i LIBRARY 07V839\n(6) Furnish to the Director of Central Intelli-\ngence, the CFI, the Operations Group, the President's\nForeign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Intelligence\nOversight Board all of the information required for\nthe performance of their respective duties.\n(7) Participate, as appropriate, in the\nprovision of services of common concern as directed by\nthe Director of Central Intelligence and provide other\ndepartments and agencies with such mutual assistance\nas may be within his capabilities and as may be required\nin the interests of the Intelligence Community for\nreasons of economy, effectiveness, or operational\nnecessity.\n14\n(8) Protect intelligence and intelligence\nsources and methods within his department or agency,\nconsistent with policies and guidance of the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n(9) Conduct a continuing review of all classi-\nfied material originating within his organization and\npromptly declassifying such material consistent with\nExecutive Order No. 11652, as amended.\n(10) Provide administrative and support functions\nrequired by his department or agency.\n(b) The Central Intelligence Agency. All duties\nand responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency\nshall be related to the foreign intelligence functions\noutlined below. As authorized by the National Security\nAct of 1947, as amended, the CIA Act of 1949, as amended,\nand other laws, regulations, and directives, the Central\nIntelligence Agency shall:\n(1) Produce and disseminate foreign intelli-\ngence relating to the national security, including\nforeign political, economic, scientific, technical,\nmilitary, sociological, and geographic intelligence,\nto meet the needs of the President, the National Security\nCouncil, and other elements of the United States\nGovernment.\n(2) Develop and conduct programs to collect\npolitical, economic, scientific, technical, military,\ngeographic, and sociological information, not otherwise\n15\nobtainable, relating to foreign intelligence, in\naccordance with directives of the National Security\nCouncil.\n(3) Collect and produce intelligence on\nforeign aspects of international terrorist activities\nand traffic in narcotics.\n(4) Conduct foreign counterintelligence\nactivities outside the United States and when in the\nUnited States in coordination with the FBI subject\nto the approval of the Attorney General.\n(5) Carry out such other special activities\nin support of national foreign policy objectives as\nmay be directed by the President or the National\nGERALD FORD\nSecurity Council and which are within the limits of\napplicable law.\n(6) Conduct, for the Intelligence Community,\nservices of common concern as directed by the National\nSecurity Council, such as monitoring of foreign public\nradio and television broadcasts and foreign press\nservices, collection of foreign intelligence informa-\ntion from cooperating sources in the United States,\nacquisition and translation of foreign publications\nand photographic interpretation.\n(7) Carry out or contract for research,\ndevelopment and procurement of technical systems and\ndevices relating to the functions authorized in this\nsubsection.\n16\n(8) Protect the security of its installations,\nactivities, information and personnel. In order to\nmaintain this security, the CIA shall conduct such investi-\ngations of applicants, employees, and other persons with\nsimilar associations with the CIA as are necessary.\n(9) Conduct administrative, technical and support\nactivities in the United States or abroad as may be neces-\nsary to perform the functions described in paragraphs (1)\nthrough (8) above, including procurement, maintenance\nand transport; communications and data processing;\nrecruitment and training; the provision of personnel,\nfinancial and medical services; development of essential\ncover and proprietary arrangements; entering into con-\ntracts and arrangements with appropriate private companies\nand institutions to provide classified or unclassified\nresearch, analytical and developmental services and\nspecialized expertise; and entering into similar arrange-\nments with academic institutions, provided CIA sponsor-\nship is known to the appropriate senior officials of\nthe academic institutions and to senior project officials.\n(c) The Department of State. The Secretary of\nState shall:\n(1) Collect, overtly, foreign political,\npolitical-military, sociological, economic, scientific,\ntechnical and associated biographic information.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJune 18, 1976\nMEMO FOR MR. LINDER:\nFROM: TOM JONES\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nSUBJECT: Attached Certificate for\nIntelligence Oversight Board\nFrom the material issued at the time this\nBoard was established (Executive Order,\nPresident's statement and the press briefing\ngiven at the time) I don't think there can\nbe much doubt that there was every intention\nto make sure publicly that this Board was\nto be independent in both its construction\nand its operation.\nSince it was set up as an independent part\nof the government and the Executive Order\nfailed to state in no uncertain terms that it\nwas to be a part of the Executive Office of\nthe President, such as the President's Foreign\nIntelligence Advisory Board, OMB, OTP, Domestic\nCouncil, etc., I think the issuance of such a\nCertificate would not be in keeping, or correct,\nwith the public expression of the Board's\nindependence.\nIn the final analysis it certainly is not part\nof the White House Office.\nCould not the NSC staff and the Foreign Intelligence\nAdvisory Board also expect something like this if\nit is issued??\n17\n(2) Produce and disseminate foreign intelli-\ngence relating to United States foreign policy as\nrequired for the execution of his responsibilities\nand in support of policy-makers involved in foreign\nrelations within the United States Government.\n(3) Disseminate within the United States\nGERALD LIBRARY GERALDR. FORD\nGovernment, as appropriate, reports received from\nUnited States diplomatic missions abroad.\n(4) Coordinate with the Director of Central\nIntelligence to ensure that United States intelligence\nactivities and programs are useful for and consistent\nwith United States foreign policy.\n(5) Transmit reporting requirements of the\nIntelligence Community to our Chiefs of Missions abroad\nand provide guidance for their collection effort.\n(6) Contribute to the Intelligence Community\nguidance for its collection of intelligence based on\nthe needs of those responsible for foreign policy decisions.\n(7) Support Chiefs of Missions in discharging\ntheir responsibilities to direct and coordinate the\nactivities of all elements of their missions.\n(d) The Department of the Treasury. The Secre-\ntary of the Treasury shall:\n(1) Collect, overtly, foreign financial and\nmonetary information.\n18\n(2) Participate with the Department of State\nin the overt collection of general foreign economic\ninformation.\n(3) Produce that intelligence required for the\nexecution of the Secretary's interdepartmental respon-\nsibilities and the mission of the Department of the\nTreasury.\n(4) Contribute intelligence and guidance\nrequired for the development of national intelligence.\n(5) Disseminate within the United States\nGovernment, as appropriate, foreign intelligence informa-\ntion acquired.\n(e) Department of Defense.\n(1) The Secretary of Defense shall:\n(i) Collect foreign military intelligence inform-\nation as well as military-related foreign intelligence\ninformation, including scientific, technical, political\nand economic information as required for the execution\nof his responsibilities.\n(ii) Produce and disseminate, as appropriate,\nintelligence emphasizing foreign military capabilities\nand intentions and scientific, technical and economic\ndevelopments pertinent to his responsibilities.\n(iii) Conduct such programs and missions necessary\nto fulfill national intelligence requirements as\ndetermined by the CFI.\n19\n(iv) Direct, fund and operate the National\nSecurity Agency, and national, defense and military\nintelligence and reconnaissance entities as required.\n(v) Conduct, as the executive agent of the United\nStates Government, signals intelligence activities and\ncommunications security.\n(vi) Provide for the timely transmission of\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\ncritical intelligence, as defined by the Director of\nCentral Intelligence, within the United States Govern-\nment, except as otherwise approved by the CFI.\n(2) In carrying out these assigned respon-\nsibilities, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to\nutilize the following:\n(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency (whose functions,\nauthorities and responsibilities are currently publicly\nassigned by Department of Defense Directive No. 5105.21)\nto:\n(A) Produce or provide military intelli-\ngence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs\nof Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate,\nnon-Defense agencies.\n(B) Coordinate all Department of Defense\nintelligence collection requirements and manage. the\nDefense Attache system.\n(c) Establish substantive intelligence\npriority goals and objectives for the Department of\nDefense and provide guidance on substantive intelligence\nmatters to all major Defense intelligence activities.\n20\n(D) Review and maintain cognizance over\nall plans, policies and procedures for noncryptologic\nintelligence functions of the Department of Defense.\n(E) Provide intelligence staff support\nas directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\n(ii) The National Security Agency, whose functions,\nauthorities and responsibilities shall include:\n(A) Establishment and operation of an effective\nunified organization for the signals intelligence activities\nof the United States Government, except for certain opera-\ntions which are normally exercised through appropriate\nelements of the military command structure, or by the CIA.\n(B) Exercise control over signals intelli-\ngence collection and processing activities of the Govern-\nment, delegating to an appropriate agent specified re-\nsources for such periods and tasks as required for the\ndirect support of military commanders.\n(c) Collection, processing and dissemination\nof signals intelligence in accordance with objectives,\nrequirements, and priorities established by the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n(D) Dissemination of signals intelligence\nto all authorized elements of the Government, including\nthe Armed Services, as requested.\n(E) Serving under the Secretary of Defense\nas the central communications security authority of the\nUnited States Government.\n21\n(F) Conduct of research and development\nto meet the needs of the United States for signals\nintelligence and communications security.\n(iii) Special offices for the collection of\nspecialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs,\nwhose functions, authorities, and responsibilities shall\ninclude:\n(A) Carrying out consolidated programs\nGERALD R. LIBRARY FORD\nfor reconnaissance.\n(B) Assigning responsibility to the various\ndepartments and agencies of the Government, according\nto their capabilities, for the research, development,\nprocurement, operations and control of designated means\nof collection.\n(iv) Such other offices within the Department\nof Defense as shall be deemed appropriate for conduct\nof the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned\nto the Secretary of Defense.\n(f) Energy Research and Development Administration.\nThe Administrator of the Energy Research and Development\nAdministration shall:\n(1) Produce intelligence required for the\nexecution of his responsibilities and the mission of\nthe Energy Research and Development Administration, herein-\nafter referred to as ERDA, including the area of nuclear\nand atomic energy.\n22\n(2) Disseminate such intelligence and provide\ntechnical and analytical expertise to other Intelligence\nCommunity organizations and be responsive to the guidance\nof the Director of Central Intelligence and the Committee\non Foreign Intelligence.\n(3) Participate with other Intelligence Community\nagencies and departments in formulating collection require-\nments where its special technical expertise can contribute\nto such collection requirements.\n(g) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under\nthe supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to\nsuch regulations as the Attorney General may establish,\nthe Director of the FBI shall:\n(1) Detect and prevent espionage, sabotage,\nsubversion, and other unlawful activities by or on behalf\nof foreign powers through such lawful counterintelligence\noperations within the United States, including electronic\nsurveillance, as are necessary or useful for such purposes.\n(2) Conduct within the United States and its\nterritories, when requested by officials of the Intelli-\ngence Community designated by the President, those lawful\nactivities, including electronic surveillance, authorized\nby the President and specifically approved by the Attorney\nGeneral, to be undertaken in support of foreign intelli-\ngence collection requirements of other intelligence agencies.\n23\n(3) Collect foreign intelligence by lawful\nmeans within the United States and its territories when\nrequested by officials of the Intelligence Community\ndesignated by the President to make such requests.\n(4) Disseminate, as appropriate, foreign\nintelligence and counterintelligence information which\nit acquires to appropriate Federal agencies, State and\nlocal law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign\ngovernments.\n(5) Carry out or contract for research,\nFORD LIBRARY is SERALD\ndevelopment and procurement of technical systems and\ndevices relating to the functions authorized above.\nSec. 5. Restrictions on Intelligence Activities.\nInformation about the capabilities, intentions and\nactivities of other governments is essential to informed\ndecision-making in the field of national defense and\nforeign relations. The measures employed to acquire\nsuch information should be responsive to the legitimate\nneeds of our Government and must be conducted in a manner\nwhich preserves and respects our established concepts\nof privacy and our civil liberties.\nRecent events have clearly indicated the desirability\nof government-wide direction which will ensure a proper\nbalancing of these interests. This section of this Order\ndoes not authorize any activity not previously authorized\n24\nand does not provide exemption from any restrictions\notherwise applicable. Unless otherwise specified, the\nprovisions of this section apply to activities both\ninside and outside the United States. References to\nlaw are to applicable laws of the United States.\n(a) Definitions. As used in this section of this\nOrder, the following terms shall have the meanings\nascribed to them below:\n(1) \"Collection\" means any one or more of\nthe gathering, analysis, dissemination or storage of\nnon-publicly available information without the informed\nexpress consent of the subject of the information.\n(2) \"Counterintelligence\" means information\nconcerning the protection of foreign intelligence or\nof national security information and its collection\nfrom detection or disclosure.\n(3) \"Electronic surveillance\" means acquisition\nof a non-public communication by electronic means,\nwithout the consent of a person who is a party to, or,\nin the case of a non-electronic communication, visibly\npresent at, the communication.\n(4) \"Employee\" means a person employed\nby, assigned or detailed to, or acting for a United\nStates foreign intelligence agency.\n25\n(5) \"Foreign intelligence\" means information\nconcerning the capabilities, intentions and activities\nof any foreign power, or of any non-United States\nperson, whether within or outside the United States, or\nconcerning areas outside the United States.\n(6) \"Foreign intelligence agency\" means the\nCentral Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency,\nand Defense Intelligence Agency; and further includes\nany other department or agency of the United States\nGERALD R. LIBNARY FORD\nGovernment or component thereof while it is engaged\nin the collection of foreign intelligence or counter-\nintelligence, but shall not include any such department,\nagency or component thereof to the extent that it is\nengaged in its authorized civil or criminal law enforce-\nment functions; nor shall it include in any case the\nFederal Bureau of Investigation.\n(7) \"National security information\" has the\nmeaning ascribed to it in Executive Order No. 11652,\nas amended.\n(8) \"Physical surveillance\" means continuing\nvisual observation by any means; or acquisition of a\nnon-public communication by a person not a party thereto\nor visibly present thereat through any means which does\nnot involve electronic surveillance.\n26\n(9) \"United States person\" means United\nStates citizens, aliens admitted to the United States\nfor permanent residence and corporations or other organ-\nizations incorporated or organized in the United States.\n(b) Restrictions on Collection. Foreign intelli-\ngence agencies shall not engage in any of the follow-\ning activities:\n(1) Physical surveillance directed against a\nUnited States person, unless it is a lawful surveillance\nconducted pursuant to procedures approved by the head\nof the foreign intelligence agency and directed against\nany of the following:\n(i) A present or former employee of such agency,\nits present or former contractors or their present or\nformer employees, for the purpose of protecting foreign\nintelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods\nor national security information from unauthorized\ndisclosure; or\n(ii) a United States person, who is in contact\nwith either such a present or former contractor or\nemployee or with a non-United States person who is the\nsubject of a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence\ninquiry, but only to the extent necessary to identify\nsuch United States person; or\n(iii) a United States person outside the United\nStates who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf\n27\nof a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist\nor narcotics activities or activities threatening the\nnational security.\n(2) Electronic surveillance to intercept\na communication which is made from, or is intended by\nthe sender to be received in, the United States, or directed\nagainst United States persons abroad, except lawful\nelectronic surveillance under procedures approved by the\nAttorney General; provided, that the Central Intelligence\nAgency shall not perform electronic surveillance within\nFORD LIBRARY & GFRALD\nthe United States, except for the purpose of testing\nequipment under procedures approved by the Attorney General\nconsistent with law.\n(3) Unconsented physical searches within the\nUnited States: or unconsented physical searches directed\nagainst United States persons abroad, except lawful\nsearches under procedures approved by the Attorney General.\n(4) Opening of mail or examination of envelopes\nof mail in United States postal channels except in accord-\nance with applicable statutes and regulations.\n(5) Examination of Federal tax returns or tax\ninformation except in accordance with applicable statutes\nand regulations.\n(6) Infiltration or undisclosed participation\nwithin the United States in any organization for the\npurpose of reporting on or influencing its activities\n28\nor members; except such infiltration or participation\nwith respect to an organization composed primarily of\nnon-United States persons which is reasonably believed\nto be acting on behalf of a foreign power.\n(7) Collection of information, however\nacquired, concerning the domestic activities of United\nStates persons except:\n(i) Information concerning corporations or other\ncommercial organizations which constitutes foreign\nintelligence or counterintelligence.\n(ii) Information concerning present or former\nemployees, present or former contractors or their present\nor former employees, or applicants for any such employ-\nment or contracting, necessary to protect foreign\nintelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods\nor national security information from unauthorized\ndisclosure; and the identity of persons in contact with\nthe foregoing or with a non-United States person who\nis the subject of a foreign intelligence or counter-\nintelligence inquiry.\n(iii) Information concerning persons who are\nreasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts,\nbut only for the purpose of determining the suitability\nor credibility of such persons.\n29\n(iv) Foreign intelligence or counterintelligence\ngathered abroad or from electronic surveillance conducted\nin compliance with Section 5 (b) (2) ; or foreign intelli-\ngence acquired from cooperating sources in the United\nStates.\n(v) Information about a United States person who\nis reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nforeign power or engaging in international terrorist\nor narcotics activities.\n(vi) Information concerning persons or activities\nthat pose a clear threat to foreign intelligence agency\nfacilities or personnel, provided, that such information\nis retained only by the foreign intelligence agency\nthreatened and that proper coordination with the Federal\nBureau of Investigation is accomplished.\n(c) Dissemination and Storage. Nothing in this\nsection of this Order shall prohibit:\n(1) Lawful dissemination to the appropriate\nlaw enforcement agencies of incidentally gathered\ninformation indicating involvement in activities which\nmay be in violation of law.\n(2) Storage of information required by law\nto be retained.\n(3) Dissemination to foreign intelligence\nagencies of information of the subject matter types\nlisted in Section 5 (b) (7) .\n30\n(d) Restrictions on Experimentation. Foreign\nintelligence agencies shall not engage in experimenta-\ntion with drugs on human subjects, except with the\ninformed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinter-\nested third party, of each such human subject and in\naccordance with the guidelines issued by the National\nCommission for the Protection of Human Subjects for\nBiomedical and Behavioral Research.\n(e) Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities.\n(1) No foreign intelligence agency shall,\nexcept as expressly authorized by law (i) provide services,\nequipment, personnel or facilities to the Law Enforcement\nAssistance Administration or to State or local police\norganisations of the United States or (ii) participate\nin or fund any law enforcement activity within the United\nStates.\n(2) These prohibitions shall not, however,\npreclude: (i) cooperation between a foreign intelligence\nagency and appropriate law enforcement agencies for the\npurpose of protecting the personnel and facilities of\nthe foreign intelligence agency or preventing espionage or\nother criminal activity related to foreign intelligence\nor counterintelligence or (ii) provision of specialized\nequipment or technical knowledge for use by any other\nFederal department or agency.\n31\n(f) Assignment of Personnel. An employee of a\nforeign intelligence agency detailed elsewhere within\nthe Federal Government shall be responsible to the\nhost agency and shall not report to such employee's\nparent agency on the affairs of the host agency, except\nas may be directed by the latter. The head of the\nhost agency, and any successor, shall be informed of the\ndetailee's association with the parent agency.\n(g) Prohibition of Assassination. No employee of\nthe United States Government shall engage in, or con-\nspire to engage in, political assassination.\n(h) Implementation.\nNERALD\nLIBRARY\n(1) This section of this Order shall be\neffective on March 1, 1976. Each department and agency\naffected by this section of this Order shall promptly\nissue internal directives to implement this section\nwith respect to its foreign intelligence and counter-\nintelligence operations.\n(2) The Attorney General shall, within ninety\ndays of the effective date of this section of this\nOrder, issue guidelines relating to activities of the\nFederal Bureau of Investigation in the areas of foreign\nintelligence and counterintelligence.\nSec. 6. Oversight of Intelligence Organizations.\n(a) There is hereby established an Intelligence\nOversight Board, hereinafter referred to as the Over-\nsight Board.\n32\n(1) The Oversight Board shall have three\nmembers who shall be appointed by the President and who\nshall be from outside the Government and be qualified\non the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of back-\nground and experience. The members of the Oversight\nBoard may also serve on the President's Foreign Intelli-\ngence Advisory Board (Executive Order No. 11460 of\nMarch 20, 1969). No member of the Oversight Board\nshall have any personal contractual relationship with\nany agency or department of the Intelligence Community.\n(2) One member of the Oversight Board shall\nbe designated by the President as its Chairman.\n(3) The Oversight Board shall:\n(i) Receive and consider reports by Inspectors\nGeneral and General Counsels of the Intelligence Com-\nmunity concerning activities that raise questions of\nlegality or propriety.\n(ii) Review periodically the practices and pro-\ncedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsels\nof the Intelligence Community designed to discover and\nreport to the Oversight Board activities that raise\nquestions of legality or propriety.\n(iii) Review periodically with each member of\nthe Intelligence Community their internal guidelines\nto ensure their adequacy.\n33\n(iv) Report periodically, at least quarterly,\nto the Attorney General and the President on its findings.\n(v) Report in a timely manner to the Attorney\nGeneral and to the President any activities that raise\nserious questions about legality.\n(vi) Report in a timely manner to the President\nany activities that raise serious questions about propriety.\n(b) Inspectors General and General Counsels within\nthe Intelligence Community shall:\n(1) Transmit to the Oversight Board reports\nof any activities that come to their attention that raise\nquestions of legality or propriety.\n(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly,\nto the Oversight Board on its findings concerning\nGERALOR FORD LIBRARY\nquestionable activities, if any.\n(3) Provide to the Oversight Board all informa-\ntion requested about activities within their respective\ndepartments or agencies.\n(4) Report to the Oversight Board any occasion\non which they were directed not to report any activity\nto the Oversight Board by their agency or department\nheads.\n(5) Formulate practices and procedures\ndesigned to discover and report to the Oversight Board\nactivities that raise questions of legality or propriety.\n(c) Heads of intelligence agencies or depart-\nments shall:\n34\n(1) Report periodically to the Oversight\nBoard on any activities of their organizations that\nraise questions of legality or propriety.\n(2) Instruct their employees to cooperate\nfully with the Oversight Board.\n(3) Ensure that Inspectors General and\nGeneral Counsels of their agency have access to any\ninformation necessary to perform their duties assigned\nby paragraph (4) of this section.\n(d) The Attorney General shall:\n(1) Receive and consider reports from the\nOversight Board.\n(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly,\nto the President with respect to activities of the\nIntelligence Community, if any, which raise questions\nof legality.\n(e) The Oversight Board shall receive staff support.\nNo person who serves on the staff of the Oversight Board\nshall have any contractual or employment relationship\nwith any department or agency in the Intelligence\nCommunity.\n(f) The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory\nBoard established by Executive Order No. 11460 of\nMarch 20, 1969, remains in effect.\n35\nSec. 7. Secrecy Protection.\n(a) In order to improve the protection of sources\nand methods of intelligence, all members of the Executive\nbranch and its contractors given access to information\ncontaining sources or methods of intelligence shall, as\na condition of obtaining access, sign an agreement that\nthey will not disclose that information to persons not\nauthorized to receive it.\n(b) In the event of any unauthorized disclosure\nof information concerning sources or methods of intelli-\ngence, the names of any persons found to have made\nunauthorized disclosure shall be forwarded (1) to the\nhead of applicable departments or agencies for appropriate\ndisciplinary action; and (2) to the Attorney General\nfor appropriate legal action.\nGERALOR FORD LIBRARY\n(c) In the event of any threatened unauthorized\ndisclosure of information concerning sources or methods\nof intelligence by a person who has agreed not to make\nsuch disclosure, the details of the threatened disclosure\nshall be transmitted to the Attorney General for appro-\npriate legal action, including the seeking of a judicial\norder to prevent such disclosure.\n(d) In further pursuit of the need to provide\nprotection for other significant areas of intelligence,\nthe Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to\npromulgate rules and regulations to expand the scope\n36\nof agreements secured from those persons who, as an\naspect of their relationship with the United States\nGovernment, have access to classified intelligence\nmaterial.\nSec. 8. Enabling Data.\n(a) The Committee on Foreign Intelligence and\nthe Director of Central Intelligence shall provide for\ndetailed implementation of this Order by issuing\nappropriate directives.\n(b) All existing National Security Council and\nDirector of Central Intelligence directives shall be\namended to be consistent with this Order within ninety\ndays of its effective date.\n(c) This Order shall supersede the Presidential\nMemorandum of November 5, 1971, on the \"Organization\nand Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community.\"\n(d) Heads of departments and agencies within the\nIntelligence Community shall issue supplementary directives\nto their organizations consistent with this Order within\nninety days of its effective date.\n(e) This Order will be implemented within current\nmanning authorizations of the Intelligence Community.\nTo this end, the Director of the Office of Management\nand Budget will facilitate the required realignment of\npersonnel positions. The Director of the Office of\nManagement and Budget will also assist in the allocation\nof appropriate facilities.\nGERALD R. FORD\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nEMBARGOED FOR RELEASE\nFEBRUARY 18, 1976\nUNTIL 12:00 NOON (EST)\nOffice of the White house Press Secretary\nR: EQRO\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nTO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:\nBy virtue of the authority vested in me by Article II,\nSections 2 and 3 of the Constitution, and other provisions\nof law, I have today issued an Executive Order pertaining\nto the organization and control of the United States\nforeign intelligence community. This order establishes\nclear lines of accountability for the Nation's foreign\nintelligence agencies. It sets forth strict guidelines\nto control the activities of these agencies and specifies\nas well those activities in which they shall not engage.\nIn carrying out my Constitutional responsibilities to\nmanage and conduct foreign policy and provide for the\nNation's defense, I believe it essential to have the best\npossible intelligence about the capabilities, intentions\nand activities of governments and other entities and in--\ndividuals abroad. To this end, the foreign intelligence\nagencies of the United States play a vital role in col--\nlecting and analyzing information related to the national\ndefense and foreign policy.\nIt is equally as important that the methods these\nagencies employ to collect such information for the legitimate\nneeds of the government conform to the standards set out in\nthe Constitution to preserve and respect the privacy and\ncivil liberties of American citizens.\nThe Executive Order I have issued today will insure a\nproper balancing of these interests. It establishes\ngovernment wide direction for the foreign intelligence\nagencies and places responsibility and accountability on\nindividuals not institutions.\nI believe it will eliminate abuses and questionable\nactivities on the part of the foreign intelligence agencies\nwhile at the same time permitting them to get on with their\nvital work of gathering and assessing information. It is\nalso my hope that these steps will help to restore public\nconfidence in these agencies and encourage our citizens to\nappreciate the valuable contribution they make to our\nnational security.\nBeyond the steps I have taken in the Executive Order,\nI also believe there is a clear need for some specific\nlegislative actions. I an today submitting to the\nCongress of the United States proposals which will go\nfar toward enhancing the protection of true intelligence\nsecrets as well as regularizing procedures for intelligence\ncollection in the United States.\nMy first proposal deals with the protection of\nintelligence sources and methods. The Director of Central\nIntelligence is charged, under the National Security Act\nof 1947, as amended with protecting intelligence sources\nand methods. The Act, however, gives the Director no\nauthorities commensurate with this responsibility.\nmore\n(OVER)\n2\nTherefore, I am proposing legislation to impose\ncriminal and civil sanctions on those who are authorized\naccess to intelligence secrets and who willfully and\nwrongfully reveal this information. This legislation\nis not an \"Official Secrets Act\", since it would affect\nonly those who improperly disclose secrets, not those to\nwhom secrets are disclosed. Moreover, this legislation\ncould not be used to cover up abuses and improprieties.\nIt would in no way prevent people from reporting ques-\ntionable activities to appropriate authorities in the\nExecutive and Legislative Branches of the government.\nIt is essential, however, that the irresponsible and\ndangerous exposure of our Nation's intelligence secrets\nbe stopped. The American people have long accepted the\nprinciples of confidentiality and secrecy in many dealings --\nsuch as with doctors, lawyers and the clergy. It makes\nabsolutely no sense to deny this same protection to our\nintelligence secrets. Openness is a hallmark of our\ndemocratic society, but the American people have never\nbelieved that it was necessary to reveal the secret war\nplans of the Department of Defense, and I do not think\nthey wish to have true intelligence secrets revealed\neither.\nI urge the adoption of this legislation with all\npossible speed.\nSecond, I support proposals that would clarify\nand set statutory limits, where necessary, on the activi-\nties of the foreign intelligence agencies. In particular,\nI will support legislation making it a crime to assassinate\nor attempt or conspire to assassinate a foreign official\nin peacetime. Since it defines a crime, legislation is\nnecessary.\nThird, I will meet with the appropriate leaders of\nCongress to try to develop sound legislation to deal with\na critical problem involving personal privacy --- electronic\nsurveillance. Working with Congressional leaders and the\nJustice Department and other Executive agencies, we will\nseek to develop a procedure for undertaking electronic\nsurveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. It should\ncreate a special procedure for seeking a judicial warrant\nauthorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the\nUnited States for foreign intelligence purposes.\nI will also seek Congressional support for sound\nlegislation to expand judicial supervision of mail\nopenings. The law now permits the opening of United States\nmail, under proper judicial safeguards, in the conduct of\ncriminal investigations. We need authority to open mail\nunder the limitations and safeguards that now apply in\norder to obtain vitally needed foreign intelligence\ninformation.\nThis would require a showing that there is probable\ncause to believe that the sender or recipient is an agent\nof a foreign power who is engaged in spying, sabotage or\nterrorism. As is now the case in criminal investigations,\nthose seeking authority to examine mail for foreign intel-\nligence purposes will have to convince a federal judge of\nthe necessity to do so and accept the limitations upon\ntheir authorization to examine the mail provided in the\norder of the court.\nmore\n3\nFourth, I would like to share my views regarding\nappropriate Congressional oversight of the foreign intel-\nligence agencies. It is clearly the business of the\nCongress to organize itself to deal with these matters.\nCertain principles, however, should be recognized by both\nthe Executive and Legislative Branches if this oversight\nis to be effective. I believe good Congressional over--\nsight is essential so that the Congress and the American\npeople whom you represent can be assured that the foreign\nintelligence agencies are adhering to the law in all of\ntheir activities.\nCongress should seek to centralize the responsibility\nfor oversight of the foreign intelligence community. The\nmore committees and subcommittees dealing with highly\nsensitive secrets, the greater the risks of disclosure. I\nrecommend that Congress establish a Joint Foreign Intelligence\nOversight Committee. Consolidating Congressional oversight\nin one committee will facilitate the efforts of the\nAdministration to keep the Congress fully informed of\nFORD\nforeign intelligence activities.\nIt is essential that both the House and the Senate\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nestablish firm rules to insure that foreign intelligence\nsecrets will not be improperly disclosed. There must be\nestablished a clear process to safeguard these secrets\nand effective measures to deal with unauthorized disclosures.\nAny foreign intelligence information transmitted by\nthe Executive Branch to the Oversight Committee, under an\ninjunction of secrecy, should not be unilaterally disclosed\nwithout my agreement. Respect for the integrity of the\nConstitution requires adherence to the principle that no\nindividual member, nor committee, nor single House of\nCongress can overrule an act of the Executive. Unilateral\npublication of classified information over the objection\nof the President, by one committee or one House of Congress,\nnot only violates the doctrine of separation of powers, but\nalso effectively overrules the actions of the other House\nof Congress, and perhaps even the majority of both Houses.\nFinally, successful and effective Congressional over-\nsight of the foreign intelligence agencies depends on mutual\ntrust between the Congress and Executive. Each branch must\nrecognize and respect the rights and prerogatives of the\nother if anything is to be achieved.\nIn this context, a Congressional requirement to keep\nthe Oversight Committee \"fully\" informed is more desirable\nand workable as a practical matter than formal requirements\nfor notification of specific activities to a large number\nof committees. Specifically, Section 662 of the Foreign\nAssistance Act, which has resulted in over six separate\ncommittee briefings, should be modified as recommended by\nthe Commission on the Organization of the Government for\nthe Conduct of Foreign Policy, and reporting should be\nlimited to the new Oversight Committee.\nmore\n4\nBoth the Congress and the Executive Branch recognize\nthe importance to this Nation of a strong intelligence\nservice. I believe it urgent that we take the steps I\nhave outlined above to insure that America not only has\nthe best foreign intelligence service in the world, but\nalso the most unique --- one which operates in a manner fully\nconsistent with the Constitutional rights of our citizens.\nGERALD R. FORD\nTHE WHITE HOUSE,\nFebruary 18, 1976.\n# # # # #"
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