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This file contains materials relating to a Stanton report on restructuring.
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United States Information Agency
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1563224
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United States Information Agency
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This file contains materials relating to a Stanton report on restructuring.
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John O. Marsh Files (Ford Administration)
John Marsh's General Subject Files
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U.S. Information Agency. (8/1/1953 - 4/1/1978)
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1975
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The original documents are located in Box 42, folder "United States Information Agency"
of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 42 of The John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
APR 16 1375
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 16, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
MAX FRIEDERSDORF m.b.
SUBJECT:
Stanton Report on USIA
Jim Keogh has given me a copy of his critique on the recent
Stanton report which would restructure USIA. Jim asked me
to pass this on to you and I believe it will be of interest.
To: Mar-
This appears to be
throwing the baby out with the
both water.
CERALO R. FORD
UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON 20547
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
A Critique of the Stanton Report
on Information, Education and Cultural Relations
The United States Information Agency welcomes the study
and attention that a number of official and unofficial groups are
giving the U.S. Government's overseas information and cultural
programs. The American public and even many officials of the
Federal Government know far too little about the work of USIA.
If these studies lead to a broader understanding of the Agency's
function and a general consensus as to its mission the public inter-
est will be well served. If they also lead to an improved structure
that will increase effectiveness and efficiency much will be gained.
In its recent report, the Stanton Panel on Information, Edu-
cation and Cultural Relations reaffirmed the vital importance of
the information and cultural programs to the U.S. Government and
stated that they "have demonstrated their success and are therefore
an exceptional investment of governmental energy and the taxpayer's
dollar. 11 The Panel found that these programs are working well
despite an imperfect structure and urged that they be given greater
support.
-2-
The Stanton Panel concluded that new factors in the inter-
national situation make public diplomacy more important than
ever. One of the consequences of growing international interde-
pendence noted by the Panel is "the need to explain the societal
context in which U.S. policies and actions are generated." Pointing
out that detente both requires and enables a fuller international
expression of American ideas, the Panel makes the observation
that detente does not mean an end to the sharp East-West struggle.
In fact, there is clear evidence that the East is committed to that
struggle by ideology and policy. The report asserts that the growing
importance of countries whose cultures differ greatly from the
United States requires that the U.S. make an intensive effort to
explain what lies behind American commitments. The "diminished
capacity of the United States to dictate the course of international
events" means that the United States will have to count more than
ever on explanation and persuasion.
After making these perceptive general points, the Stanton
report turns to structure. Making three broad recommendations,
it would:
- -3-
1.) Combine the long-range "general" information, education
and cultural programs of the Cultural Affairs Bureau (CU) of the
Department of State and the USIA into a new Information and Cultural
Agency (ICA).
2.) Transfer the foreign policy information function from
USIA to an enlarged bureau of press and public affairs in the State
Department.
3.) Remove the Voice of America from USIA and set it up as
a separate federal agency under a Board of Overseers.
Let us examine the consequences of these proposed changes.
1.) A New Information and Cultural Agency
Under the Stanton plan, the new ICA would absorb all of CU
and those parts of USIA dealing with "general" or long-range infor-
mation and cultural programs. The mission of the new agency,
according to the report, would be "the promotion of mutual and
reciprocal understanding of the United States abroad and of other
countries here, both as an end in itself and as an essential basis for
a peaceful world. 11 It would not be concerned with U.S. foreign
policy issues.
-4-
The report projects the new ICA as a "clearly separate
and autonomous" entity which should be detached" from the day-
to-day conduct of foreign policy. " This concept of the new agency
and its stated purpose raises some serious questions. How is
mutual understanding to be achieved and what would it be worth if
the current problems and day-to-day issues which form much of
the substance of relations between countries are intentionally
avoided? There is real danger that the programs of ICA would
lack substance and realism and would not be taken seriously either
by the State Department or by members of Congress who might
well regard such programs as unnecessary luxuries. The taxpayers
would be justified in questioning whether they should be paying for
programs that are insulated from American policy. Our information
and cultural programs should be coordinated with U.S. policy, and
the agency which runs them should have close and cooperative
relations with the Department of State - -as USIA does at present.
The ICA would retain some of the media services and program
resources now found in USIA, but under the Stanton proposal they
would be considerably reduced from present levels. It urges a "new
-5-
reliance" on the public sector for program resources with a
consequent reduction in Agency media production. The report
specifically mentions that Agency production of "feature motion
pictures and motion picture and TV series could be curtailed
private media product acquisition should be strengthened. "
In the past two years USIA has curtailed its own production
and placed new emphasis on acquisition. Does the Stanton group
want to force USIA to drop such productions as its two film and
TV series that are highly successful? Science Report, portraying
the latest American scientific advances, is regularly shown on
local TV stations in 79 foreign countries; Vision, a film magazine
of contemporary American life and personalities, is seen on more
than 500 TV stations in 72 countries. Nothing similar to either
series is produced commercially.
In the past two years, the number of USIA magazines has
been reduced from 56 to 16. While praising a number of Agency
publications, the Stanton report calls for "further selective cur-
tailment, " which it says "will also bring into question the need for
retaining the three Regional Service printing plants in Manila, Beirut
and Mexico City 11
While USIA periodicals should continue to be critically
reviewed, there are substantial reasons why the Regional Service
Centers should be retained. The main reason is the cost advantage
to the U.S. Government. On the average, the Centers can deliver
printed products to USIS posts at costs 30 to 50 percent lower than
commercial prices. Because of their location, the Centers can
bulk ship the products to the overseas posts more quickly and
cheaper than could be done from the United States. The quality of
the Centers' printing is extremely high. They also provide Arabic,
French and Spanish translation services which are not available in
many posts. The Washington staff would have to be greatly increased
if the Centers were not available to provide these services.
2. ) Foreign Policy Information
The Stanton report recommends that the foreign policy infor-
mation function--the task of explaining U.S. foreign policy to overseas
audiences - be transferred to the State Department. USIA would give
up its press officers and those elements of its media service whose
present job it is to interpret and defend American foreign policy
abroad. These people and this function would be merged into an enlarged
-7-
bureau of public affairs (to be known as the Office of Policy Infor-
mation) within the State Department. Some important activities
which now enjoy an appropriately high priority within USIA would
be submerged as minor activities within the large structure of
the State Department.
Congressman John Slack, Chairman of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee that oversees the State Department and cultural and
information programs, believes this would be unwise. He recently
stated that "It is only realistic to assume that the job of explaining
U.S. policies to foreign audiences would have a much lower priority
under the proposed scheme than it does now under USIA. 11 Columnist
Carl Rowan, a former Director of USIA and once a high-level State
Department official, says Slack is "absolutely right. " Both men
conclude that USIA is both more interested and professionally better
prepared to do the job than the State Department.
Since USIA's daily Wireless File regularly carries texts of
major policy speeches and statements to U.S. missions abroad, the
Stanton report proposes that it be transferred to the State Department.
No change in this essential and much admired service is envisioned
except in its location. That, however, could have serious consequences,
for the Wireless File has additional functions in support of Agency
-8-
programs that would be lost under the proposed move. The File
is the Agency's major, fast communications link with the field
posts. It is available to all USIA elements for the transmission
of information and program materials. For example, it regularly
carries book lists to expedite post selection and orders for USIS
libraries: biographic and background information for which posts
often have urgent, unanticipated needs in programming American
speakers and cultural groups; VOA program schedules; notices
concerning new film productions and acquisitions, and responses
to post requests for specialized materials to exploit short-run
targets of opportunity. If the Wireless File were shifted as the
Panel recommends, a valuable facility would be lost to the program
elements remaining outside the Department.
On the technical side, the Stanton report said, 'it is hoped
that the new and modern communications facilities of the Department
can be used for the transmission (of the Wireless File) in lieu of the
comparatively outdated USIA Wireless File system. 11 The tele-
communications facilities of the Department have not changed
appreciably since July 9, 1973, when Acting Deputy Under Secretary
of State for Management William O. Hall wrote that "the broadcast
technique currently employed by USIA is the most efficient and cost
-9-
effective method of delivering the type of traffic contained in the
Wireless File. " Mr. Hall added that in comparing the State and
USIA systems, "it is not practical to add the Wireless File broad-
cast on top of a limited capacity special purpose teletypewriter
network without unacceptable degradation of both. "
3.) Voice of America
The Presidential directive to the Voice of America charges
the VOA with three tasks: to serve as a reliable, objective source
of news; to present U.S. policy, and to portray American society.
The Stanton Panel believes this places the VOA in "a tenuous position
at the crossroads of journalism and diplomacy, " and it would resolve
this "anomaly" by detaching the Voice from other information and
cultural activities and setting it up as a separate agency under a
Board of Overseers. The intention conveyed by the Stanton report
is to insulate the Voice of America from government policy to the
greatest degree possible.
It is true that the requirements of VOA's several tasks are
complex. Comprehensive news coverage is sometimes not the best
diplomacy. But this inherent fact is nothing that can be removed by
-10-
any reorganizational sleight of hand. Making the Voice a separate
agency will exacerbate the problem, not resolve it. As Henry
Loomis, former VOA Director, ex-Deputy Director of USIA and
now President of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, wrote:
"The Voice should remain within the Agency
What the Director
of the VOA needs is strong support in resisting undue and unwarranted
pressure and yet recognizing and being responsive to constructive
suggestions. The mechanism of the Director of the Information
Agency plus the policy mechanism, area directors and so forth,
provide a pretty good shield. It is not perfect. but it has worked
surprisingly well over the years. "
Under the Stanton proposal, foreign policy commentaries and
analyses on VOA would be written within the State Department. To
anyone familiar with the State Department clearance process, it is
difficult to imagine that the Department would be able to produce a
steady and timely stream of policy commentaries and news analysis
for VOA broadcasts. Commenting on this aspect of the Stanton plan,
Edmund A. Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
and retired career Foreign Service Officer, in his dissent from the
-11-
Stanton report, wrote, "the difficulties that might arise in trying to
reconcile fast moving news coverage with Department clearances
boggle the mind. "
It would be difficult to coordinate the programs of a separate
Voice with those of the new Information and Cultural Agency. As
Henry Loomis wrote, "It is important that the Voice be viewed as
one of the tools available to an Ambassador and a Public Affairs
Officer in a country. The Voice's programs can supplement the
programs in the Cultural Center, they can advertise them, they can
extend their reach and, vice versa, USIS activities can enhance the
awareness of the Voice among the general population. " Under the
Stanton plan, this mutual support would be lost.
There may well be resistance on the part of some members of
Congress to the creation of one more presidentially-appointed board.
There ultimately would be justifiable resistance from the American
people to use of their tax funds to support a kind of international CBS.
The greatest problem in a separate Voice of America as envisioned
by the Stanton Panel is this: Without a closely-felt need to serve the
national interest, it would--like much of the private sector media --
project too little of the fundamental, long-range, positive side of
-12-
American life and too much of the hot, negative and sensational.
The result could well be a situation in which American taxpayers'
money would be spent on a broadcasting service which would
devote too much of its time telling the rest of the world the worst
about America.
The establishment of the VOA as a separate agency would
add significantly to its present operating expenses. USIA budget
and administrative experts have looked into this and have concluded
that to set up the support elements now provided by USIA -- for
example, a budget and finance unit, administrative services,
security office, training, audience research, inspection and audits,
legal services, the new Executive Director, and a secretariat --
would involve the addition of approximately 200 people to the VOA
staff. Their review indicates that this would add several million
dollars annually to the present VOA budget of about $61. 8 million
just to continue the present level of programming. The only alternative
would be to sharply reduce the Voice of America.
Other Problems
There are other problems that would arise from the Stanton
plan. A major problem would develop in the field operations, where
the position of the Public Affairs Officer who now coordinates the
-13-
activities of the press and cultural sections would be abolished.
The two sections would be completely separate and independent
from each other, and would receive instructions from and report
to two different agencies in Washington. A divided field operation
would reduce mission effectiveness in utilizing and coordinating
all the information and cultural tools available in support of
mission objectives.
Special thematic programs utilizing a range of communications
methods would be infinitely more difficult to plan and carry out
under the proposed system than at present. Who would be responsible
for the new and important multimedia program of export and tourist
promotion? Who would be responsible for placing Agency films or
video tapes with local TV stations -- the Cultural Officer whose
Agency supplied them, or the Press Officer who normally handles
contacts with the media? How can a clear distinction be made between
current foreign policy issues (the exclusive province of the State
Department under the Stanton plan) and longer range aspects of the
government actions and policies (presumably the responsibility of
ICA)?
-14-
The Stanton proposals would complicate the problems of the
Congressional committees that oversee the information and cultural
programs. USIA's current budget is approximately $238, 000, 000.
CU's current budget is about $53, 000, 000. The Stanton Panel would
divide this between three agencies and would merge policy informa-
tion activities and personnel into an enlarged bureau in State, making
it difficult to know exactly how much was actually being spent by the
U.S. Government for information, cultural and educational exchange
activities.
One of the officials most concerned with this problem,
Congressman John Slack, expressed this view in a recent statement
in the House: "I would point out that fragmenting the function, staff,
and resources of these activities into three different agencies makes
the task of effective congressional oversight vastly more difficult.
How much more easily and how much more efficiently could the
committee carry out its oversight responsibilities, " he asked, "if
these programs were consolidated into one agency?"
(Substantial objections to the Stanton report's recommendations
have also been expressed by former Secretary of State Dean Rusk.)
-15-
Conclusion
Just as "information, 11 "culture, 11 and "education" are not
separable and mutually exclusive, neither should the so-called
fast media be divorced from long-range information efforts.
All are valuable tools in what should be a unified, coherent,
continuing effort of our government to communicate with people
abroad. Similarly, the function of interpreting U.S. foreign policy
should not be seen as something apart from the effort to promote
mutual understanding. These functions are not mutually exclusive;
they are complementary and support one another.
The Stanton Panel was eminently correct in asserting that
the new conditions of international life require that our country have
a strong and effective information-cultural-educational communications
capability. Given the United States position in the world of the mid-70s
explanation and persuasion are indeed more important than ever. But
to be effective these activities must be planned and carried out as
coordinated elements of a unified program operating under a coherent
plan. Under the Stanton proposals there could be no central planning
and coordination for there would be no central management.
-16-
There is no perfect structure for the complex mission of
public diplomacy. The Stanton Panel concluded that the present
organization is working well, but sought to design a plan that would
be an improvement. Instead, the Stanton proposal would scatter
USIA activities among three agencies. It would fragment rather
than consolidate and thereby weaken rather than strengthen. It
would result in confusion, disruption and division of purpose. It
is reasonable to expect that it would cost more rather than less.
If there is to be a reorganization, the elements of our overseas
communications program should be consolidated into one unified
agency. By far the most effective arrangement would be to unite
the cultural, educational and information programs of CU, USIA
and other agencies in a new and strong agency with direct policy ties
to the White House and the Department of State, with close communica-
tion with other branches and departments of the government and
continued responsiveness to Congressional oversight. One strong
agency would ensure that our efforts are coordinated in support of the
national interest and that the United States would have the effective
public diplomacy that the times require.
James Keogh
Director, USIA
April 8, 1975