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4/5/75 - Evacuation of Vietnamese Refugees (3)
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4/5/75 - Evacuation of Vietnamese Refugees (3)
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This file contains material relating to Operation Babylift, orphan airlift.
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John O. Marsh Files (Ford Administration)
John Marsh's War Powers Notifications Files
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The original documents are located in Box 122, folder "4/5/75 - Evacuation of Vietnamese
Refugees (3)" of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
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Digitized from Box 122 of The John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APRIL 5, 1976
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Palm Springs, California)
THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
RALD GE R. FORD UBRART
THE INTERNATIONAL HOTEL
9:20 A.K. PDT
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, I
just want to bring you up to date on the discussions that
have been taking place.
The President, General Weyand and I met for
about an hour and one half this morning. General Weyand
gave US a report about the military situation in South
Vietnam, as he sees it, and some of the options which
he believes should be considered,
The President invited General Weyand to return
this afternoon, and on that occasion he will bring along with
him two intelligence experts, a8 well as the Defense
Department expert who has been handling military supplies.
We will then go into the question of the political
cituation and the long-term supply situation in detail.
The President has also ordered an NSC meeting
for probably Tuesday afternoon. It could slip until
Wednesday morning, to permit General Weyand and his team
to report to the entire NSC.
In the meantime, he has ordered that the NSC
staff, in close cooperation with the other agencies,
develop for their HSC meeting a statement of the various
options before us.
These are the procedures that are going to
be followed. I make these points in order to indicate
that we are at the very early stages of considering
the report of General Weyand. No decisions will be
taken while the President is in Palm Springs.
Rather, we will use this opportunity for the
fullest possible briefing of the President, and then
the staffs in Washington are going to analyze the reports,
prepare the options and then the entire NSC will consider
the matter.
I mieht also point out that we are considering
releasing the report of General Weyand, after the
President has had an opportunity to study it with just
some minor deletions by the middle of the week 80 the
public can have the general appreciation. This is where
- 2 -
0
Mr. Secretary, considering the enormous
amount of military equipment that has been lost in
South Vietnam by the deterioration of the South Viet-
namese Army, do you see any conceivable way that you
can justify sending additional military equipment to
South Vietnam until at least the South Vietnamese Army
shows it can stand and hold its own territory?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The determination that
has to be made is with respect to the military capacity
of the South Vietnamese Army to defend the remaining
territories. We have received another detailed analysis
from General Weyand as to some estimates of what would
be required to effect this.
The loss of territory in the North --- I
think it is important to understand what the military
situation was. In flagrant violation of Article 7 of
the Paris accords, the North Vietnamese have introduced
almost their entire army into South Vietnam so that
there are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in South Vietnam
at this moment leaving only two or three divisions in
North Vietnam and this is in flagrant, total violation of
solemn agreements which were endorsed by the international
community.
That created an unbalanced military situation
in the North in which whatever the South Vietnamese
did it would be wrong. If they stood, they were
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going to be defeated piecemeal. If they retreated,
they ran the risk of disintegration of the units
that were retreating which 18 in fact what happened.
GERALD
LIBRARY
But one of the aspects of our examination is,
of course, what the military situation is and what degree
of American help can be significant.
Q
Mr. Secretary, can the South Vietnamese
Army defend the remaining territory and what are the
requirements of their army now to defend that territory?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I pointed out, this
is, of course, one of the issues that has to be looked
at. There in a possibility for the South Vietnamese
military forces to stabilize the situation. The next
question is for what length of time and against what
level of attack.
Then, there is also the moral question for the
United States, whether when an ally with which it has been
associated for ten years wishes to defend itcelf, whether
it is the United States that should make the decision
for it by withholding supplies, that it should no longer
defend itself. These are all questions that are involved
in the examination that is now going on.
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1. - 3 **
Q
Kr. Secretary, General Thieu seems to
have adopted some of the Administration's language in
explaining about why he retreated; namely, that the U.S.
failed to supply him with aid. In fact, he said it
would be an act of betrayal if we continued to fail to
supply aid.
HOW, how is that going to help your problems
with the U.S. Congress?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think, Mr. Lisagor,
that one of the most important things that all of us
can do--the Administration, Congress, and if I may eay
so, the prees as well is to recognize that we are ...
facing a great human tragedy and that we don't try to
gloat over arguments that may have been made or to
try to pick on things that men, who obviously are in
despair, now may be saying.
There are certain facts in the situation which
may be difficult and unpleasant, but which are, neverthe-
less, true. It is a fact that the aid levels to Vietnam
were cut by a third the first year and by another 50
percent the following year.
This coincided with a worldwide inflation, and
a fourfold increase in fuel prices, 00 that a situation
was created for a variety of reasons, in which almost
all of the American military aid had to be given for
ammunition and for fuel, very little for spare parts, and
none for new equipment.
Even the ammunition had to be rationed,
according to General Weyand, and 80 that individual
A
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guns could, for example, fire only two rounds a day.
To what extent did such a situation contribute to the
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demoralization of the Army; and to what extent the
certainty, as they were looking at the situation of
constantly declining aid levels, produced a decision to
withdraw, which in turn produced a panic, I think is
fairly evident.
This is far from uaying this was the intention
of those who cut the aid, and I think it is safe to say
that you can tell from the public statements that senior
Administration officials made, that there was no
expectation of a massive North Vietnamese attack this
year.
So, there were a number of factors involved
here, and I think there is some merit in what General
Thieu is saying now. I think some of the adjectives he
used are those of a desperate man who is in great anguish
and I think it is also fair to say that the United States,
for ten years, put in a great deal of its efforts and of
its blood and of its treasure, and that, too, should weigh
in the scale and that we made & very great effort through
a long period of time. So, we have to evaluate it over
an extended period of time.
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- 5 -
In terms of a strategic assessment, it made a
lot of sense. The trouble was that in executing it, it
was not planned with sufficient care, with sufficient
understanding of the logistic cystem of South Vietnam,
and it was compounded by the fact that the South
Vietnamese divisions have their dependents living with
them BO that when a South Vietnamese division moved, all
of their dependents moved with them, which, in turn,
triggered a mase exodus of refugees, immobilizing these
armies and at some point along this retreat, that turned
into a panic where the soldiers were trying to take
care of their families.
So, the decision was triggered by a correct
evaluation of his prospects, the prospects being
that if he kept his units strung out, they would probably
be defeated by this massive North Vietnamese invasion
and to try to get to a more consolidated line, in executing
what was probably a correct strategic decision, he, of
course, brought about consequences with which we are
familiar, which are tragic. I am just trying to explain
our best understanding of what happened.
Q
Mr. Secretary, the United States has spent
about $140 to $150 billion in South Vietnam, What is
it that makes the Administration think that $300 million
or even an amount somewhat larger than that would do any
good? What is it that makes you think additional money
is ever going to be able to make the South Vietnamese
Army fight or solve the situation, when you spend $140
to $150 billion and you are in the situation you are in
now?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, as I
LIBRARY RALD R. FORD
pointed out, this whole situation is going to be
reviewed by the National Security Council on Tuesday,
and I do not want to prejudge all of these decisions.
There is, however, also involved a question of
the obligations a country has that for ten years has
fought somewhere, which has encouraged millions of people
to associate themselves with the United States, and
whether it should then refuse to let them defend themselves
if they want to defend themselves.
This is one argument on the military side. On
the humanitarian side, I think jt is important and
decisive that the United States has an obligation to the
hundreds of thousands who were closely associated with
it and must make a maximum effort won the level of refugees
and otherwise.
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6 -
Q
I AM not talking about the humanitarian
side, Kr. Secretary. I am asking, in effect, whether $140
to $150 billion is not as much moral obligation as the
United States can undertake?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is the decision
that will have to be made by first the President and
then the Congress.
Q
Mr. Secretary, would you anticipate that
the President would make these decisions in time to tell
us about them in the so-called State of the World address
Thursday?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not had an opportunity
to discuss with the President in great detail what he
intends to say in this address. My impression is he will
deal with the immediate foreign policy situation that he feels the
United States is confronting, and I would think it is
extremely probable that he would put before the Congress
on that occasion at least come preliminary ideas of at
least some immediate measures that in his judgment have
to be taken,
Q
Dr. Kissinger, the New York Times has a
report from Paris this morning that the French government
has initiated plans to implement the Paris peace accords
and to reach a settlement on that basis. Also, that the
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French are going to be active in all of Vietnam in humani-
tarian and refugee work.
RALD GE
LIBRARY
Do you have any comment on that? Have you been
informed of this, and, what is the outlook of this taking
place?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We would gratefully welcome
any attempt by any nation, including France, to participate
in the humanitarian effort. Secondly, we have attempted
to encourage all of the signatories of the Paris accords
to bring about their implementation and therefore, if
France is attempting to bring about an implementation of
the Paris accords, we would certainly look at their
proposals with sympathy.
We have not received an official French
proposal and, indeed, I was not aware of this particular
report, but the United States strongly favors the
implementation of the Parie accords, which have been
grossly and outrageously violated by Hanoi, and it would
support the efforts of any country that would attempt to
bring about an implementation of those accords.
Helen?
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- 7 -
Q
Mr. Secretary, we have heard around here
that this is not our war, We have also Been some pretty
pessimistic reports from everywhere that the ball game
is over. And also, you seem to neglect the area while
you are concentrating on the Middle Last. What do you
have to say for that? Do you think Southeast Asia is
still as viable a8 you thought it was two years ago?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, my trip to
the Middle East to deal with the question that I was
dealing with, other problems, had been scheduled for
many months and when I left on the trip to the Middle
East, we had a crisis in Cambodia, the nature of which was
well understood and which really required a Congressional
decision. It did not require decisions by the Administration.
We did not expect an imminent crisis in Vietnam,
and you remember that the Secretary of Defense stated
B view which, all of us shared, that the attacks this
year would not be of a critical nature, so that the
disintegration of the situation in the Northern half of
Vietnam was quite unexpected to us in the sense that
we were not told in advance of the decision to evacuate.
It really did not reach the proportions it has
until after my return from the Middle East. There is
no question that South Vietnam faces an extremely grave
situation. There are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in
South Vietnam in blatant violation of the Paris accords,
and there is no agreement in history that is self-enforcing.
If the signatories of the agreement cannot enforce
it, either by actions of their own or by aid to the aggrieved
parties, then a difficult situation is inevitable.
Under the Paris accords, North Vietnam. was
A
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not permitted to infiltrate or to add any additional
forces to those it already had in South Vietnam. At
that time, it had something like 80,000 to 100,000
ABRARY
people in South Vietnam. Today, it has closer to 400,000
in South Vietnam.
Under the Paris accords, North Victnam was not
permitted to introduce new equipment except through
ICCS checkpoints and in replacement on a one-to-one
basis for equipment that had been lost, damaged and destroyed.
The North Vietnamese never even permitted the
establishment of these checkpoints and totally disregarded
the agreement. This is what brought about the change
in the military situation which was compounded by the fact
that the South Vietnamese Army inventories were running
down while the North Vietnamese inventories were increasing.
This is the objective structure of what happened in the
last two years.
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- 8 -
Q
Mr. Secfetary, has the Administration
any indication from the Democratic leadership of Congress
that Congress will be any more receptive to providing
more military aid now than they were before they went
into recees?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: A6 you. know, the Congress
is in recess right now and I sun confident that the President
is going in be in touch with the Congressional leadership.
He has not had an opportunity, to the best of my
knowledge, to be in otuch with the Congressional leadership,
but again, let me make one point: It is unavoidable that
when one analyzes the causes of a situation, that it may
be taken as a criticism of this or that group.
I think, in the history of Vietnam, there
is enough criticism to 80 around. There have been mistakes
made by the Executive Branch and there have been mis
judgments made by the legislative,
I think the major requirement for the United
States, recognizing that we will now have a difficult
set of decision, and a difficult set of debates, is to
come out of this with dignity and without adding to the
bitterness and viciousness which has so drained us
over the years.
We will try to do our best to contribute to
this, Whether we will always succeed, I don't know.
Q
Mr. Secretary, you said at your last
press conference in some very strong language, that
the problem was that this was now a question of what
kind of people we are and whether or not We will
destroy deliberately an ally.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right.
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LIBRARY RALD R. FORD
GE
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Q
The scenario that you gave US today
indicates that while that $300 million would have been
needed, there was a proper, comprehensible decision to
make, yet it was poorly executed, and that is why we
have the problem. Your scenario does not really seem
to back up the question of laying the blame.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Wait just a minute,
It is not just B question of $300 million. It is a
question that since 1973, the combination of declining
aid levels, inflation and rising fuel prices has led
to a constant attrition of the South Vietnamese Army.
It is not just a decision of this Congress to
delay $300 million. It is a process that has been going
on for a period of two years,
The statement I made in the press conference,
which was under slightly different military conditions,
at least 88 they were then perceived in Washington, was
in terms of those decisions, but nevertheless, 1t is a
very important moral question for the United States,
whether when people who, with its encouragement, have
fought for many years, should in their hour of extremity
be told by the United States that while they want to
continue fighting that the United States would no longer
help them defend themselves against an enemy who has
never been told by its allies that there is a limit
beyond which they won't support them.
I maintain that is a question that we ought to
ask ourselves as & people. Regardless of the probable
outcome of the war, I think it is a serious question.
It is not meant necessarily as a criticism of anybody,
and I really believe that at this moment, having paid
60 much in OUT national unity on this issue, we should
conduct this debate, not with an attitude of who is going
to pin the blame on whom, but with an attitude that we
are facing a great tragedy in which there is involved
something of American credibility. something of
American honor, comething of how WE are perceived by
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other people in the world, on which serious people may
have different questions but in which, for God's bake,
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We ought to stop talking as if one side had the monopoly
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of wisdom, morality and insight and that serious people
trying to deal with this problem are trying to run a
confidence game. This is all that I am trying to euggest.
Q
Mr. Secretary, if I may continue, my
question really was getting toward, are you personally
convinced that if we had voted that extra $300 million
that was requested for the emergency supplemental, or if
we had actually appropriated the full amount requested
in the beginning -- $1.4 billion -- that we would not
have faced the situation we now face, either at this
time or sometime down the road?
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- 10 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe, personally, that
it is not just the $300 million. It is the $300 million
coming on top of a lot of other things. I believe
that if it had not been for the moralities of Executive
authority resulting from Watergate, if the aid levels
had been appropriate over the years and if we had been
freer to conduct foreign policy than was possible
under these circumstances -- partly for reasons in which
the Executive shares a responsibility -- I believe that
certainly the difficulties we face this year could have
been avoided for a number of years.
For how long, it is hard to say, but very often,
if we look over the postwar period, a period of time
gain gets a possibility of things developing. But I
would add, moreover, that it would have made a lot of
difference to us as a people, that if it happened,
if it had more clearly happened as a result of actions,
not so much under our control. But I would finally
add, since you asked the question, and I did not
volunteer this statement, that at some point in thes
discussion -- we now cannot avoid the discussion -- at
some point in this discussion we ought to stop this inquiry
and ask ourselves where We 8.0 from here.
Q
Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. One
is, you keep referring to the massive violations by the
North Vietnamese, and in view of their record, I wonder
why you thought at the time the agreements were negotiated,
or at any other time, that they were going to abide by them?
We knew very early, as you said, they did not
allow us to establish checkpoints.
My other question is, do you think there would
be any benefit if the United States were able to provide
some military aid now, through bombing or any other measure,
to stem the tide of what is going on?
I
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: The first thing I think
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the people ought to remember is the kind of national
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LIBRARY
debate that was going on in the Untied States in 1371 and
1972. I think it is indisputable that there was over-
whelming consensus developing that the United States
should end its participation in the war.
And you may remember that before I went on my
last negotiation, the Democratic caucus had already voted
to set B terminal date to our participation in the war,
That is January, 1973.
Let me point out this did not affect the actual
terms of the negotiations which were substantially agreed
to before that, So, I am simply trying to reconstruct
the national mood which was that the American military
participation in the war had to be ended.
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- 11 -
The major debate that then occurred was whether
the United States should deliberately overthrow the
government with which it was associated, and that we
refused to do.
Now, that the North Vietnamese would press
against the edges of the agreement was to be expected.
What was not to be expected was, that partly through
legislative action and partly through our internal
Givisions we would find ourselves in a position where
a forceful diplomacy became extremely difficult, and
this certainly accelerated the violations and made them
substantially free,
So, we had no illusions that we were dealing
with a country other than one that had violated every
other agreement that it had made, but under the con-
ditions in which the agreement was made of a strong
period in American foreign policy we believe that we would
be able to exercise sufficient influence on the situation
to keep the violations to manageable proportions, and
also to obtain sufficient Aid to permit the South Viet-
namese to handle the problem.
So, those expectations, for reasons that no one
could possibly predict at that time, were not fulfilled.
Q Mr. Secretary, n look it the future rather
than the past. I have two questions. One, isn't it
likely that if we provided the $300 million at this
point, the likelihood would be that it would only protons
the fighting, cost more lives, and end in the same
result? Two, the President and General Weyand have said
they think the situation in salvageable, I wonder what
evidence you have to give any hope that it is ealvageable?
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FORD A. LIBRAR
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President will study
all the recommendatione of General Weyand, plus the
judgment of all of his senior advisers over the next days,
and I think it is for the President then to make the
judgment and to state it in his press conference.
I would like also to point out that even if
this situation should finally wind up in some negotiation,
it is not a matter of indifference whether it is done
in such a way that permits the maximum extraction of
refugees and of those whose very lives are at stake in
the present situation.
So, there are very many levels of objectives
that can be set, There is a point of view, which we will
be examining, that the situation can be stabilized by a
combination of the shortened lines, infusion of American
aid, and other measures.
That point of view, together with other
points of view, will be considered over the next few days,
and the President will report his conclusions to the
Congress on Thursday.
Ky point in appearing here is to tell you
primarily what the status of our discussion 16 at this
moment and at this moment the President has really done
nothing but spend about 90 percent of his time
listening and asking questions to the purely military
aspect of Generay Weyand's report.
He will get a further discussion of that this
afternoon, together with the intelligence appraisal,
and then this whole matter will be submitted to the
National Security Council, 80 I do not want to pre-empt
his decisions.
a
Mr. Secretary, it would seem time is of
the. essence, and with the events happening as quickly
a8 they are over there, isn't time being wasted with
the President being out here? Ion't this whole policy-
making process being delayed because of the distances
between here and Washington?
R.
FORD
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not going to answer
that question. Isn't time being wasted?
GERALD
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Isn't time being wasted in the policy-
making decision with NSC being all back in Washington,
you are here, General Weyand is here, the President is
here. Couldn't it be done faster 15 everything was
concentrated back there. It seems the middle of the week
is awfully late for something 00 important.
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- 13 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are about $175
million left in the pipeline in the current appro-
priations. We are expediting the shipment of that
equipment to Vietnam. No matter what decision is made
by the President, it could not take effect for a number
of weeks.
Therefore, we believe in decisions of this
importance, it is extremely crucial that there be a very
careful and a very prayerful examination of all the
choices before US, and there is no effective delay, no
matter what decisions the President eventually decides.
Q
Dr. Kissinger, could you answer the other
part of that question about whether bombing is still an
option and whether that would be of any assistance,
help to the South Vietnamese?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: As you know, the intro-
duction of American military forces in or over
Vietnam is prohibited by specific legislation that
was passed in July 1973, which was, I may say, another
complicated factor in the enforcement of the agreement.
It is not. 00 much a question of what we would
have done. It is a question of what the other side
knew we could not possibly do. Therefore, before any
such action could be contemplated, the President would
have to ask authority from the Congress to do that,
and I do not anticipate that.
Q
Mr. Secretary, one of the questions that
is troubling many Americans and some people in
this room, a8 you have already judged, is that what is
happening in Vietnam today was foreseen by many people
once the American troops withdrew.
Ky question is, why then inuet the Nation be
asked to wear a hair shirt because of what has happened?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The problem is not
whether the Nation must be made to wear a hair shirt.
The President is trying, to the beet of his abilities,
to make clear what he takes to be the causes of that
situation.
We will never know whether it would have
happened if enforcement had been carried out more
aggressively and aid had been given more substantially.
He is simply trying to point out his analysis of what
brought about the present situation. After all, the
a
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people who predicted this could have been wrong. Maybe
they could have been right. We do not know now.
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- 14 -
Q
You do acknowledge that a great
many people did prediot it?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: oh, yes, and I an saying,
of course, there were many people who made that argument,
and that still does not change the question of whether
the United States, having made all these investments,
should not have carried out at least its moral obligations
more fully.
Q Hr. Secretary, could you tell US what some
of the options are that are being considered? We are
not going to get a chance to talk to General Weyand, so
we don't know what the suggestions are.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I really cannot properly
go into it. Partly this is due to the fact that this
morning General Weyand concentrated, I would say,
exclusively on two things: His analysis of the reasons
for the development of the military situation, and
secondly, his analysis of the military prospects.
We have not yet covered the humanitarian
problems, the evacuation problems of refugees, the
possibilities that were alluded to of which we have
no formal indication of restoration of the Paris accords.
So, all of these will have to be issues that
will have to be examined in developing the options, but
what we are planning 10 to go over that this afternoon,
to sketch out Dome of the main options as IPC see them.
Then, the NSC 'staff, together with General
Weyand, the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence
Agency will pull them together into 6 more comprehensive
option paper, which will then be put before the National
Security Council on Tuesday or, at the latest, Wednesday
morning.
Q
Kr. Secretary, the President spoke in
his press conference of solemn commitments we had made to
South Vietnam. This, I am sure you are aware, has
raised many questions of secret agreements or tacit under-
standings or that kind of thing.
First of all, what solemn commitments was the
President referring to? Was he referring only to the
one-for-one replacement, which, as I understand it, was
not a commitment but an option, and if he was not
referring to that, what was he talking about?
A.
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RALD
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I have explained,
I think, at 0 previous press conference, he was not
talking of a legal commitment. He was talking of a
moral commitment. I believe that the South Vietnamese
had every reason to think that if they permitted
American troops to withdraw and if they enabled US to
retrieve our prisoners, that we would carry out what
we had celled the Vietnamization process in enabling them
to defend themselves,
We did not give them any specific figures, and
we did not give them any definite promises, except to
indicate that obviously, having signed the Paris agree-
ment, we would have an interest in its enforcement.
But, I believe that what the President was
talking about was & moral obligation, not a legal
commitment. He was talking about something growing out
of a ten-year engagement of the United States ended
by our withdrawal, not about secretclauses in particular
documents.
There is no question that when we were nego-
tiating the agreement We, ourselves, believed that the
American debate had not concerned economic or military
sid, and I think if you check the record, there was no
debate on that subject at the time.
The American debate had concerned the question
of whether enough Americans had died there and whether
the South Vietnamese should not be able to defend
themselves, and I believe, in all fairness, we all have
to admit to ourselves, that we all believe that if the
South Vietnamese would make the effort to defend them-
selves, there would be great receptivity in this country
to help them do it 86 long a8 our prisoners could come
back and Americans could stop dying there.
That was the assumption within which we were
operating, and I think if you read the back filee of news-
papers and Congressional debates, that was the essence
of our debate at the time.
Therefore, it was never put in the form of a
legal commitment, and it is not that we are violating &
legal commitment, It is the President's perception of
the moral obligation growing out of the context of events.
I just want to say again, many of you have heard
me brief on this subject now for six years, and I think
none of you have ever heard me question the travail and
A.
concern of those who have opposed the war, and all we can
ask is that those of you who have been critical,
RALD
FORD
ought to keep in mind that there is a great human tragedy
that those in the Administration are viewing, and
13
LIBRAR
they are trying to deal with it in the best interest of
the United States and in the best interests of world
peace.
Thank you.
END
(AT 10:10 A.M. PDT)
2:21
This Copy For
NEWS CONFERENCE
#184
WITH RON NESSEN
AT THE WHITE HOUSE
AT 11:10 A.M. PDT
APRIL 5, 1975
SATURDAY
(Palm Springs, California)
MR. NESSEN: You have been given a packet of
relatively routine announcements concerning two intentiese
to nominate and an appointment, and two proclamations,
one of Maritime Day and one of Trade Week.
The President, as the pool has reported to
you, is playing golf this afternoon. He will resume
his meeting with Secretary Kissinger and General Wayand
somewhere around 2:30 or 3 o'clock. I cannot tell you
how long the meeting will last.
The President's plans for this evening are
to stay at home it the moment and to have dinner with
some members of his staff.
General Weyand will be returning to Washington
tomorrow, sometime early in the day, Dr. Kissinger will
be staying and will go back to Washington on Monday.
Q
With the President?
MR. NESSEN: Probably with the President.
Q
Is he going to church tomorrow?
FORD A. RACE LIBRAR
MR. NESSEN: There are no church plans for
tomorrow. I think we possibly could have comething to
post at 43 o'clook, 30 I suggest that you chack here at
4 o'clock.
Q
Does that concern the orphans?
MR. NESSEN: Lat's wait and see what it turns
out to be.
Q Ron, 4 o'clock 10 getting. late, Can you
give we any indication of the probability of A Travis
visit?
MORE
#184
Sex
- 2 may
#184-4/5
MR. NESSEN: There is still a possibility.
Q That will be a posting, not a briefing?
MR. NESSEN: A posting at H o'clock.
Q For guidanca, can you tell us whether
Travis would be Sunday or Monday?
MR. NESSEN: I just say that is a possibility,
John.
Q You don't know which day?
MR. NESSEN: I don't have anything further at
the moment.
Q
Ron, there 1a a plane due in Seattle
tonight. Can you rule that out?
MR. NESSEN: Yes, sir.
Q
Can you rule out any word any more today?
MR. NESSEN: Let's wait until we have it locked
up, Jim, and then we won't have to rule out or rule in.
Q Ron, will you be able to tell us within a
few minutes after this afternoon's meeting concludes?
MR. NESSEN: Yes.
Some of you may recall that last Saturday the
President announced that he was directing four Navy ships
to base themselves off the coast of Vietnam, in a
humanitarian effort to pick up refugees.
In the course of this humanitarian
affort, one of the ships; namely, a Durham --
Q
What type ship is this?
MR. NESSEN: An LKA.
Q A transport?
RALD the R. FORD LIBRA
MR. NESSEN: Navy transport ship.
Q What is an LKA?
MR. NESSEN: It is a transport ship.
In the course of the humanitarian affort, the
Durham, on the 3rd of April, entered the territorial
watera of South Vietnam and picked up a total of 1404
refugees in the area of Phan Rang.
MORE
#184
2:34
- 3 -
#184-4/5
In keeping with his desire to keep Congress
fully informed on this humanitarian effort, and taking
note of a provision ofthe war powers resolution, the
President has sent a message to the Speaker of the House
and to the President Pro Tem of the Senate, Senator
Eastland, and to the acting Speaker of the House, Congress-
man McPall, giving a report on the activities of the
Durham.
We also have a posting, as I say, or there is the
possibility of a posting at 4 o'clock.
MORE
FORD A. RALE LIBRA
- 4 -
#184-4/5
Q Ron, I came in late, but why was it
necessary to inform the Congress about the activities
of the Durham? Did they exceed their instructions
by going into the territorial waters?
MR. NESSEN: No, they did not exceed their
instructions,
Q Did they exceed the prohibition in the War
Powers Act is what I am getting at, Why did he feel
it necessary to inform the Congressional leaders?
MR. NESSEN: Primarily because he feels he
wants to keep Congress fully informed on this humanitarian
effort.
Q But we are doing a lot of things out there.
Is he keeping them informed about other things or just the
Durham?
MR. NESSEN: No, he is keeping them informed
on other things.
Q
Ron, under the War Powers Act, did they
go in to get Americans or South Vietnamese? Is that the
technical difference?
MR. NESSEN: No. There was a total of 1404
refugees. As far as I know, they were all Vietnamese,
but you need to check with the Pentagon on that.
Q
Where are they heading for?
Q
Where did thay take them?
RALO GE R. FORD JBRARZ
MR. NESSEN: The messages I have say they were
transported to safety, but I am sorry that I do not have
the location where they were taken,
Q
Ron, what is the provision of the War Powers
Act that you say the President acted under? What does
it require?
MR. NESSEN: No, wait a minute, Ralph. I
said, "taking note of a provision of the War Powers Act."
Q
What does that provision say?
MR, NESSEN: The government lawyers don't agree
that there is any requirement to make this report. The
President is doing it because he wants to keep Congress
fully informed on the humanitarian effort. The provision
he took note of was Section 4, which states that. "In name
united States Armed Forces are introduced into" and
then it lists a variety of situations.
MORE
#184
237P
** 5 -
#184-4/5
The situation that the President took note
of was subparagraph two. "The introduction of United
States Armed Forces into the territory, air space, or
waters of à foreign nation, while equipped for combat
except for deployments which relate solely to supply,
replacement, repair, or training of such forces."
Q Ron, did the President suddenly discover
Light 110 had 0175 million 1n the pipeline, or what?
MR. NESSEN: Let's clear up whatever other
questions there may be on this matter.
Q Was this ship fired upon or something?
MR. NESSEN: No.
Q What prompte this?
MR. NESSEN: Nothing prompts it except the
President's desire to keep Congress informed and the fact
he is taking note of provisions of the War Powers Act.
n Have the other three ships not succeeded in
picking up any refugees?
MR. NESSEN: They have not entered Vietnamese
territorial waters.
Q
That is the point we are getting at.
MR, NESSEN: I am sorry, Peter. I know what
you are getting at, It was felt this ship did, on one
occasion, enter South Viatnam territorial waters, but
prior to then, and since then, as far as I know, all
four ships have remained outside of Vietnamese territorial
waters.
Q Was there enemy gunfire directed against
the Durham during this operation?
MR. NESSEN: There was not.
Q
Was the vessel escorted by U.S. aircraft
or surface vessels?
GE GERALD R. FORD
MR. NESSEN: Not that I know of, no.
Q In what you gave us here, I don't sea how
he had the authority to go in. Was ha going in to supply?
Q
Was this ship equipped for combat?
MORE
#184
- $ -
#184-4/5
HR. NEDDEN: Let JUE back up, This provision
of the Was Poware Act which the President takes noto
of and which government lawyers do not agree is a require-
ment provides that "if American Armed Forces are intro-
duced into" -- and then it lists the variety of conditions
and I have given the one that he is taking note of here.
Then, the remainder of that sentance reads, "the
President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of
the House of Rapresentatives and to the President Pro Tem
of the Senate, a report in writing." As I say, he ia
taking nota of that without agreeing that it is required.
MORE
FORD A. RALD LIBRARY
7 -
?
So, the combat thing 13 what bothers
him?
MR. NESSEN: No. It is the entire description,
"that forces equipped for combat go into an area of a
foreign nation while squipped for combat." The
equipment for combat -- they are equipped for combat
within the legal definition of the law, but I do want to
make the point that their whole purpose for being there is
to assist --
Q
Wa don't want to strain the point, Ron,
but the fact is that humanitarian purposes are not
included in subparagraph two.
MR. NESSEN: But that 1a the vary point. It
says "ships that go in for other reasons than those,"
Q
I did not get that from you.
Q
Would you read that again.
MR. NESSEN: The law reads, "In any case in
which United States Armed Forces are introduced," then
various subsections. The one he is taking note of here
is oubosotion two, "into the territory, air cpace ** waters
of a foreign nation while squipped for combat except
for deployment relating solely to supply," except for
those occasions.
Then the President shall submit a report. So,
since humanitarian reasons is not one of the exceptions,
he is taking note of the fact that there is a provision
for reporting.
Q
I asked about the $175 million.
MR. NESSEN: No, that 1a no great mystery.
In fact, it has come up here a number of times. As
you know, $700 million was appropriated for this
fiscal year, which lasts until July 1. What was the figure
Henry used, $175 million?
That means $525 million has been spent so far
and the other $175 million is in the process of being spent
between now and July 1.
Q
Has the President talked with David
Kennerly since he got back?
MR. NESSEN: Yes, he has.
MORE
#184
FORD A. GERALD LIBRARY
- B -
#184-4/5
Q Did Kennerly tell him in substance what
I guess he told the pool?
MR. NESSEN: I did not attend the meeting,
Marty.
Q Ron, where is the President playing golf
today?
MR. NESSEN: Didn't the pool report have that?
Q Is he playing golf tomorrow?
MR. NESSEN: Possibly.
THE PRESS: Thank you, Ron.
FORD A. GERALD LIBRARY
END
(AT 11:25 A.M. PDT)
April 5, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
This is the legal background which relates to the
President's report to the Speaker and President
pro tempore. This message was under the
Reporting Section of the Act.
There is a question as to whether the Act applies
and, therefore, the Report has been carefully
drafted to keep that question open.
Jack
FORD A LIBRAR RALD
30
IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS
FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY
RECEDENCE
CLASSIFICATION
DEX
ROM: JACK MARSH
DAC
142
GPS
O: Hoopss FOR Don RUMSFELD
LDX
PAGES /
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CITE
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DTG: 0519482
RELEASED BY: BD
TOR: 051953Z/GP
PECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
SITUATION ROOM
asnor IHM
75 APR 5 PM 4: 02
RALD GEL R. FORD CIBRART
1975 APR 5 19 48
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 5, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DON RUMSFELD
FROM:
JACK MARSH
I would appreciate your passing to the President the following report from Charlie
Leppert prepared after advising the House Leadership of the President's message
to the Speaker and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, concerning the War
Powers matter.
Rep.
Place
Time
Comment
Michel
Peoria, Ill.
12:55 pm "No Comment"
RALD OF R. FORD JBRAHT
T
/s/ CHARLES LEPPERT
Notes:
(1) Tip O'Neill in Israel is being advised in care of the U.S. Ambassador there.
(2)
StAte ANd Defense Advising
Chairman And Ranking member their
jurisdictions committees, House And
Senate. Defense Advising leaders of
Appropriation Committees, Also
about
(3) Vice President Advised last Night MARSH 11:45 pm by Me.
IMEDIATE
UNCLAS
FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY
RECEDENCE
CLASSIFICATION
DEX
JACK MARSH
DAC 143
GPS
Hoopss FOR DON RUMSFELD
LDX
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PECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
'75 APR 5 PM 4:02 02
FORD & LIBRARY RALD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 5, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DON RUMSFELD
FORD À LIBRAR RALD 355
FROM:
JACK MARSH
I would appreciate your passing to the President the following report from Bill
Kendall prepared after advising the Senate Leadership of the President's message
to the Speaker and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, concerning the War
Powers matter. I particularly call to your attention Senator Mansfield's request
contained in his comment:
Senator
Place
Time
Comment
Mansfield
Florida
12:45
O.k. Appreciates being kept informed.
Asked me to tell President he is calling
Democratic Policy Committee meeting
Monday morning to discuss energy,
refugee and Indo-China situation.
Griffin
Maryland
12:50
Has no problem with it. Asked to be
(suburbs)
informed if there is any "flak."
Bryd, R.
D.C.
12:55
This is proper role for President.
Thinks President is handling a
terribly difficult situation very well.
ALL APPRECIATED BEING KEPT INFORMED.
/s/ WILLIAM T. KENDALL
NOTE:
Senator Hugh Scott in Spain is being advised in care of the U.S. Ambassador there.
MARSH
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 7, 1975
* Phil
B.
CERTIFICATE
no to on Mondy
- April
This is to certify that the Undersigned dispatched the he directional President the
of the President's 's report
the n to The Honorable Carl Albert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives from the
President of the United States bearing the date
April 4, 1975 at 10:56 p.m., in care of the United
States Ambassador in Peking, China. A duplicate
copy was delivered to Michael Reed, Legislative
Assistant to the Speaker, at his residence in Alexandria,
Virginia at 12:05 a. m., April 5, 1975.
Counsellor Marsh, to the Jr. President J.
GE RAL RALD LIBRARY 0 A. FORD
*
APR 7 1974
$
*
4
*
=
73 #
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
April 7, 1975
Mr. John O. Marsh, Jr.
Counsellor to the President
The White House
Washington, District of Columbia
Dear Mr. Marsh:
This will acknowledge the receipt and referral of
the message from the President of the United States to
the President Pro Tempore of April 4, 1975, pursuant
to the provisions of Section 4 (a) (2) of the War Powers
Resolution (P.L. 93-148).
The message was transmitted to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee at 12:30 p.m. on April 7.
Sincerely,
Spokford H. Spofford Canfield Canfield
Administrative Assistant to
The President of the Senate
FORD A LIBRAR RALD
}o
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 7, 1975
MEMORANDUM TO:
DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM:
JACK MARSH June
Don, attached is a statement which gave to
Bill Kendall shortly before noon today. It's our understanding
that he planned to issue this to the press.
I thought the President would want to be aware of its contents
and Ron Nessen in the event of press inquiry.
RALD A. FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 7, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:
WILLIAM T. KENDALL
NEK
SUBJECT:
Telegram to Senator Mansfield
Senator Mansfield delivered the attached documents to me at 11:40 a.m.
today. One is his statement to the press regarding the present situation.
The other is a telegram (in French) from Prince Sihanouk, a copy of
which was also given to Bob McCloskey at State at the same time.
ALD 717 ? FORD
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFEELD (D., MONTANA)
FORD A. RALD LIBRARY
GE
Mr. President:
Recent months have witnessed a breakdown in U. S. foreign policy in
widely separated parts of the globe. At the present time, our policy in South-
east Asia is in a state of disarray and it might be said that we have no foreign
policy at all, except to advocate more military and economic assistance.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, we have the situation on Cyprus involving
Greece and Turkey, and in the western part of that sea, an uncertain situation
developing as it affects Portugal. In Latin America, we have over the years, if
not the decades, paid too little attention to that most important part of the
world. At home, we have 8.7 percent unemployment, or eight million Americans
out of work, inflation in the double figures, and a worsening farm situation,
to mention just 2 few of our difficulties.
It is time that we base our foreign policy on the present rather than
on the past, that we revise and review our defense arrangements all over the
world and that we ão so in both areas on the basis of cooperation between the
Executive and the Legislative Branches of government. We have paid 2 high price
for our participation in the Indo-China tragedy in men and money. The Cambodians,
the Laotians and the Vietnamese have likewise paid a terrible price in killed,
wounded, starvation, disease and an increasing number of refugees.
The results of a foreign policy inaugurded six Presidents ago and carried
on down to the present are now at our doorstep. In our domestic policy, we have
seen a bad economic situation become steadily more dangerous and more all-embracing
as far as industry, agriculture and the work force are concerned. The President
and the Congress have approved a tax bill which will add enormously to the budget
deficit, and we have passed a farm bill which will increase government costs.
We have become the world's chief supplier of arms and 1+ appears that we will sell
to anyone, anywhere, anytime wao wants to buy our armaments often at bargain- ase-
ment prices and, in some cases, we have even given them away. We have helped to
supply our opponents in Indo-China with weapons to use against the governments in
Saigon and Phnom Penh. This armament was not sold to the other side but was
captured or acquired in various manners as was the case of approximately $1 billion
of military equipment left behind in the retreat to the South in Vietnam and similar
situations, though to a lesser degree, have occurred in Cambodia.
The President has indicated that there will be a reassessment of our
foreign policy as it affects the Middle East. I would suggest, most respectfully,
that this reassessment should be conducted 02 2. world-wide basis. The time is
long past due for such 2 reexamination of our foreign and defense policies to take
place, because many of those policies go back to the end of World War II and have
long been subject to revision. We can no longer live in the past, but we must
face up to the present and plan for the future. It isn't a question 02 our credibi-
lity but our will to make necessary changes. It is a question of our judgment and,
in all too many parts of the world, that judgment has not been as sound as 1t
should have been. Military interventions, except in the interests of our own
security, should become a policy of the past and should be conducted only in
proper consultation between the Executive and the Legislative Branches. The Nixon
Doctrine was at least a step away from direct armed intervention and ,in effect, a
return to the Truman Doctrine. Developed further, it could, perhaps, provide a
new and contemporaneous direction to foreign policy.
FORD is LIBRAR A
- 3 -
This is not the time for either the Executive or the Legislative
Branch to begin pointing the finger. If there is any blame to be attached,
and there is a great deal, we must all share in it. None of us is guiltless.
It is time for the Congress and the President to work together in the area of
foreign as well as domestic policy. The President, in his speech 2% San Diego
last week, indicated that he was prepared to go more than half way in working
with the Congress, and I believe the Congress can and should do no less. This
does not mean that there will not be differences between us but 1t does mean that
under the leadership of the President and with the cooperation of the Congress,
we can and we will find a way out of the morass in which our country now finds
itself. Cooperation will very likely not achieve much in the way of headlines,
but those we can do without. Finger-pointing will achieve headlines, temporarily,
but the nation will suffer and so will the Executive and the Legislative Branches.
A few might like nothing better than to witness bitter recriminations between
the Executive and the Legislative Branches; the people weighed down by the
anxieties of these uncertain times would like nothing less. So, let us start
afresh. Let us recognize that there is enough blame to go around and that it
affects all of us. Let us do what we can, together, to bring this country out
of the economic morass and out of the quagmire which we helped to create in Indo-
China. The people cry for leadership and that leadership can come from the
President assuming the initiative and the Congress working with him in tandem.
The people expect no more; they deserve no less.
ALD FORD 9.1.
Telegram
NEA001
WAB014(0524)(1-053447G097)P 04/07/75 0518
ICS IPMIIHA ITSS
IISS FM WUI 07 0518
PMS WASHINGTON DC
UWE3184 PWS724 QAF189 DX25
UWWA HV CNPK 301
PEKING 975/971 7 1600 PAGE 1/50
LT
M LE SENATEUR MIKE MANSFIELD THE SENATE OF THE USA
WASHINGTON/DC
RESPECTED M LE SENATEUR PERMETTEZ MOI DE VOUS ADRESSER LE
PRESENT MESSAGE AFIN DE VOUS EXPOSER CE QUI SUIT DEUXPOINTS UN
CABLE DE UPI WASHINGTON APRIL 5 BY NICHOLAS DANILOFF FAIT CONNAITRE
QUE CITATION CONGRESS WOULD PROBABLY SUPPORT
COL 5
DX25 M PAGE 2/50
SF-1201 (R5-69)
western UMON
Telegram
PRESIDENT FORD IF HE
SENT MARINES TO CAMBODIA OR SOUTHVIETNAM FOR THE STRICTLY
FORD A LIBRARY RALED
LIMITED PURPOSE OF PROTECTING AMERICANS DURING AN EVACUATION
CONGRESSIONAL SOURCES SAID SATURDAY STOP BUT THE SUPPORT WOULD
LIKELY VANISH IMMEDIATELY ONE SOURCE SAID IF FORD TRIED
TO USE SUCH EVACUATION AS A PRETEXT TO UNLEASH A COUNTEROFFENSIVE
DX25 M PAGE 3/50
AGAINST THE COMMUNIST FORCES STOP THE UNITED STATES HAS
DISPATCHED THE CARRIER OKINAWA TO THE GULF OF SIAM WITH 1800 MARINES
HELICOPTERS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT TO ASSIST A POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF
AMERICANS FROM PHNOMPENH VIRGULE SAIGON VIRGULE AND OTHER
INDOCHINESE CITIES STOP PHNOMPENH IS THE LOCALITY MOST LIKELY TO
BECOME
COL 1800
SF-1201 (R5-69)
egram
DX25 M PAGE 4/50
THE SITE OF A MAJOR EVACUATION EFFORT BECAUSE OF THE UNRELENTING
COMMUNIST ASSAULT ON ITS DEFENSE PERIMETER STOP IF THE CAMBODIAN
AUTHORITIES LOSE CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT VIRGULE THE MARINES COULD
BE SUED TO SECURE A LANDING ZONE AND DEFEND IT WHILE AMERICAN
CITIZENS ARE FLOWN BY HELICOPTER TO THE
DX25 M PAGE 5/50
AIRCRAFT CARRIER STOP
HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS MIGHT BE CALLED IN TO SUPPRESS ENEMY FIRE STOP
FINCITATION M LE SENATEUR PERMETTEZ MOI DE VOUS DIRE LOYALEMENT
QUE A LHEURE ACTUELLE LES FORCES ARMEES POPULAIRES DE LIBERATION
NATIONALE DU CAMBODGE ONT LA POSSIBILITE DE CONQUERIR POCHENTONG
AIRPORT ET MEME PHNOMPENH MAIS QUE SI
DX25 M PAGE 6/50
SF-1201 (R5-69)
Telegram
western Union
NOUS TARDONS A LE FAIRE CEST
PARCEQUE NOUS NE VOULONS PAS DONNER AU PRESIDENT GERALD FORD DES
USA LE PRETEXTE TANT DESIRED POUR LANCER CONTRE NOUS LES FORCES
ARMEES DES USA STOP CERTES NOS HEROIQUES COMBATTANTS NE SONT
NULLEMENT EFFRAYES DAVOIR A AFFRONTER ENCORE
UNE FOIS LES FORCES ARMEES DES
RETR MSG
NNN
FORD
NNNN
OR
it
SF-120: (R5-69)
Telegram
NEA002
WACO14(0524)(1-0534510097)PD 04/07/75 0519
ICS IPMIIHB IISS
IISS FM WUI 07 0519
PMS WASHINGTON DC
UWDSSI1 PWS725 QAF190 DX25
UWWA HV CNPK 302
PEKING 975/971 7 1600 PAGE 7/50
LT
M LE SENATEUR MIKE MANSFIELD THE SENATE OF THE USA
WASHINGTON/DC
USA SI PUISSANTES SOIENT ELLES MAIS NOUS ESTIMONS QUE NOUS
AVONS LE DEVOIR DE EVITER DES COMPLICATIONS INUTILES QUI
PROLONGERAIENT ET INTENSIFIERAIENT TROP CRUELLEMENT LA GUERRE CHEZ
NOUS ET LES SOUFFRANCES INDICIBLES DE NOTRE PEUPLE STOP NO US FAISONS
DONC EXPRES DE LAISSER DISPONIBLE LUNIQUE RUNWAY DE POCHENTONG
AIRPORT CECI AFIN
SF-1201 (R5-69)
Telegram
western UNION
DX25 M PAGE 8/50
FORD A. ALL LIBRARY
DE LAISSER AUX AMERICAINS SE TROUVANT ENCORE
DANS PHNOMPENH ET A LEURS COLLABORATEURS CAMBODGIENS LE TEMPS ET
LA FACILITED DE SEN ALLER SAINS ET SAUFS DU CAMBODGE STOP MAIS
TOUT EN SACHANT PERTINEMMENT QUE LA GUERRE EST
IRREMEDIABLEMENT PERDUE PAR LA SOIDISANT QUOTE REPUBLIQUE KHMERE
UNQUOTE FACE A NOTRE RESISTANCE
DX25 M PAGE 9/50
NATIONLE LE PRESIDENT FORD MAINTIENT EXPRES
DANS PHNOMPENH PLUSIEURS CENTAINES DE AMERICAINS DANS LESPOIR
EVIDENT QUE NOUS FINIRONS PAR NOUS IMPATIENTER ET PAR LANCER
UN ASSAUT DIRECT CONTRE POCHENIONG ET PHNOMPENH DONNANT AINSI
AUX FORCES ARMEES DES USA LA POSSIBILITE DINTERVENIR AU CAMBODGE
COMME CE FUT LE CAS EN MAI
SF-1201 (R.5-63)
relegram
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1970 STOP LOPERATION SOIDISANT DEVACUATION ET DE PROTECTION
DES VIES AMERICAINES NEST QUUN SIMPLE PRETEXTE
POUR DECLENCHER UNE NOUVELLE INVASION MILITAIRE MASSIVE DE NOTRE
PETIT PAYS STOP IL ESI VRAI QUE LE CONGRES DES USA SE PRONONCERAIT
IMVANQUABLEMENT CONTRE UNE TELLE INVASION STOP MAIS QUI EST ASSEZ
NAIF POUR IMAGINER
COL 1970
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QUE PLACED DEVANT UN FAIT ACCOMPLI LE CONGRES US PUISSE STOPPER LE
PROCESSUS DUNE INVASION EN REGLE DU CAMBODGE
PAR LES FORCES ARMEES DES USA POINTINTERROGATION LHONNEUR DES USA
ET DU DRAPEAU DES FORCES ARMEES US ETANT ENGAGED VIRGULE LE CONGRES
US SE TROUVERAIT DANS LOBLIGATION MORALE ET PATRIOTIQUE DE
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APPUYER LES EFFORTS DE GUERRE DU PRESIDENT FORD STOP.
RESPECTED M LE SENATEUR VIRGULE LE CAMBODGE EST UN PAYS NONALIGNED ET
NEST PARCONSEQUENT LIE AUX USA PAR AUCUN TRAITE DALLIANCE STOP MEME
AVEC LA SOIDISANT QUOTE REPUBLIQUE KHMERE UNQUOTE LES
USA NE SONT NULLEMENT LIES PAR UN
ACCORD QUELCONQUE DASSISTANCE
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PEKING 975/971 7 1600 PAGE 13/50
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M LE SENATEUR MIKE MANSFIELD THE SENATE OF THE USA
WASHINGTON/DC
MILITAIRE STOP EN OUTRE LES USA
AFFIRMENT OFFICIELLEMENT QUE LA GUERRE AU CAMBODGE EST UNE GUERRE
CIVILE STOP DANS CES CONBITIONS NOUS CAMBODGIENS NE COMPRENONS
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PAS POURQUOI LES USA INSISTENT SI LOURDEMENT POUR FAIRE SURVIVRE
A TOUT PRIX UN GANG DE TRAITRES CAMBODGIENS AU MOYEN
C
DE TOUTES SORIES DAIDES RUINEUSES
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ET HONTEUSES POUR LE GRAND PEUPLE AMERICAIN
OF FORD LIBRA
STOP PUISQUE CEST UNE GUERRE CIVILE POURQUOI LES USA
C
MAINTIENENT ILS DANS PHNOMPENH DES CENTAINES DE DIPLOMATES DE
FONCTIONNAIRES ET DOFFICIERS ET LES EXPOSENT ILS SCIEMMENT A DES
(
ACCIDENTS MORTELS ALORS. QUE TOUS LES PAYS ALLIES ET SATELL-
ITES DES USA ONT DEJA FERMED
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LEURS AMBASSADES A PHNOMPENH ET EVACUED TOUS LEURS DIPLOMATES LEURS
FONCTIONNAIRES LEURS TECHNICIENS ETC POINTINTERROGATION LES USA
AFFIRMENT QUILS SATTARDENT AUPRES DES TRAITRES PHNOMPENHOIS
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PARCERUILS VEULENT EVITER UN BAIN DE SANG STOP OR COMME VOUS LAVEZ
SI BIEN DIT VIRGULE M LE SENATEUR VIRGULE LE TRANSPORT INTENSIF
DE NOUVELLES ARMES
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ET MUNITIONS PAR LIMMENSE AIRLIFT US DE U TAPAO THAILANDE A
PHNOMPENH DEVELOPPE ET PROLONGE INDEFINIMENT CET HORRIBLE BAIN DE
SANG STOP DAILLEURS UN TEL AIRLIFT SE JUSTIFIE DAUTANT MOINS AUJOU-
RDHUI QUE LA MAJEURE PARTIE DES NOUVELLES ARMES EI MUNITIONS
US TOMBENT REGULIEREMENT AUX MAINS DE NOTRE ARMEE
POPULAIRE DE
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LIBERATION NATIONALE.
CE DONT ENTRE PARENTHESES NOUS REMERCIONS LE PRESIDENT FORD STOP
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AMITIE ET UNE SINCERE COMPASSION POUR LE PEUPLE CAMBODGIEN STOP ET
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DE CE QUE LES USA DEVRAIENT FAIRE POUR NE PAS SE DESHONORER
EN PERSISTANT A MENER CHEZ NOUS UN COMBAT IJUSTIFIABLE STOP M LE
SENATEUR PERMETTEZ MOI DAVOIR UNE FOIS ENCORE RECOURS A VOUS POUR
VOUS PRIER DE BIEN VOULOIR TRANSMETTRE AUX HONORABLES MEMBRES DU
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M LE SENATEUR MIKE MANSFIELD THE SENATE OF THE USA
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QUE JE PRESENTE DANS LE SEUL BUT
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QUI DRESSE HELAS DEPUIS PLUS DE CINQ ANNEES DEJA NOS DEUX PAYS LUN
CONTRE LAUIRE STOP VEUILLEZ AGREER M LE SENATEUR LES ASSURANCES DE
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E DEFENSE THE DIPART FENSE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D.C.. 20301
STATE
LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS
April 7, 1975
Memorandum for Mr. Jack Marsh
Counselor to the President, The White House
I made the following calls on the President's report to the Speaker
and President Pro Tempore. In each case I read paragraphs 2, 3,
and the last paragraph. I offered to read the rest, but in each case
they declined.
Thurmond said he approves the action and believes that the
President should have sent Armed Forces to South Vietnam sooner.
Clearly he was not referring merely to refugee evacuation.
McClellan said that he approves the action. Had no further
comment.
Mahon had no comment, but he did ask me to provide material,
on Monday, for a speech he will make on the floor, on the history
of aid to Vietnam. His theme, he said, will be that we have sent
many billions in military aid and economic aid, that he would have
preferred the full $1B in FY 75 military aid but he believes the
withholding of $300M would not have made a significant difference
in the outcome.
Cederberg had no comment.
Senator Stennis was traveling in Mississippi, according to his
AA, Mr. W.E. Cresswell. I outlined the message to Cresswell
he said he would forward it whenever he could.
Senator Young was on the golf course. I passed the message to
his AA, Mr. Sylvester.
Jack Edwards was out sailing. Chuck Hammond left the
message with his secretary.
FORD
Chuck and Jim Kneale also informed Ed Braswell, Joel Bonner,
Mike Hugo, Charles Murphy, Guy McConnell and Frank Slatinshek.
Ralph Preston was traveling and could not be reached.
Dis
Richard Fryklund
CC:
Mr. Tom Latimer
Mr. Martin Hoffmann
FORD & LIBRAR ELD
April 7, 1975
CONGRESSIONAL RECORDSENATE
S5279
Oh, I can understand a stampede. We
LEAVE OF ABSENCE
EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED
can go into any theater and if somebody
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
As in executive session, the Acting
were to yell "fire," there would be a
ask unanimous consent that I may ab-
President pro tempore (Mr. STONE) laid
stampede. But heaven knows, I never
sent myself from the Senate tomorrow
before the Senate messages from the
have seen a father shove his wife aside
and possibly part of the following day.
President of the United States submit-
and his children aside so that he could
The B-1 will make its first supersonic
ting sundry nominations which were re-
run to safety and leave them to die.
flight, and I want to be there to observe
ferred to the appropriate committees.
If that is what we have done in South
it.
(The nominations received today are
Vietnam, I say that the quicker the bet-
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
printed at the end of the Senate proceed-
ter to bring it to an end.
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
ings.)
Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I am
appreciative that the Senator from
Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE) permits me
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN-
APPROVAL OF BILL
to ask a question and make an obser-
ATOR TALMADGE, AND SENATOR
A message from the President of the
vation.
HELMS ON WEDNESDAY
United States stated that he had ap-
In the early 1960's, General of the
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
proved and signed the enrolled bill (S.
Army Douglas MacArthur said, in es-
I ask unanimous consent that on Wed-
332) to authorize appropriations for the
sence, that it would be a grave mistake
nesday, after the two leaders or their
fiscal year 1975 for certain maritime pro-
for the United States to commit a mas-
designees have been recognized under
grams of the Department of Commerce.
sive land army on the Asian continent.
the standing order, the Senator from
I mention this counsel from General
Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) be recognized
MacArthur because the Senator from
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
for not to exceed 15 minutes.
Rhode Island indicated that there were
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
On March 26, 1975, during the ad-
those who, from time to time, warned us
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
journment of the Senate and under the
of the eventual result of military involve-
ment in Asia. The predicted tragedy con-
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
authority of the order of Wednesday,
I ask unanimous consent that on Wed-
March 26, 1975, a message from the
tained in those warnings has come to
pass. It is not my intention to look back,
nesday, after the remarks of Mr. TAL-
House of Representatives was received
MADGE, Mr. HELMS be recognized for not
stating that the Speaker had signed the
but I thought that the record should
to exceed 15 minutes.
enrolled bill (H.R. 2166) to amend the
reflect the warnings MacArthur gave
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to pro-
many years before we committed U.S.
forces to South Vietnam.
pore. Without objection, it is 60 ordered.
vide for a refund of 1974 individual in-
come taxes, to increase the low-income
This concern was initially expressed
allowance and the percentage standard
by MacArthur in 1951 in hearings before
ORDER FOR SENATE RESOLUTION
deduction, to provide a credit for personal
the Senate Armed Services and Foreign
110 TO RETAIN ITS STATUS ON
exemptions and a credit for certain
Relations Committees when he talked of
THE CALENDAR
earned income, to increase the invest-
our inability to maintain large units of
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
ment credit and the surtax exemption,
ground troops 10,000 miles away.
I ask unanimous consent that Senate
to reduce percentage depletion for oil
Mr. PASTORE. I recall that in Novem-
Resolution 110, a resolution coming over
and gas, and for other purposes.
ber, 1967, I was invited to the White
under the rule, not come over under the
Under the authority of the order of
House by Lyndon Johnson, who was then
rule but retain its status on the calendar
Wednesday, March 26, 1975, the Acting
President of the United States, and we
until April 22.
President pro tempore (Mr. METCALE)
just chatted a bit. It was about 6 o'clock
in the evening. We were alone. He asked
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
signed the above enrolled bill on Thurs-
pore. Without objection, it is 80 ordered
day, March 27, 1975.
me the question at the time. I thought he
was pulling my leg, if I may use the ver-
On March 2, 1975, during the adjourn-
nacular.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
ment of the Senate and under the au-
He said:
RECEIVED DURING ADJOURNMENT
thority of the order of March 26, 1975,
John, do you think I should not seek re-
a message from the House of Represen-
election and I should bring my term to an
Under the authority of the order of
tatives was received stating that the
end?
March 26, 1975, a message from the
House has agreed to the resolution (H.
President of the United States was re-
Frankly, the remark flabbergasted me
Res. 269) electing JOHN J. McFaLL, a
celved on March 31, 1975, transmitting
a little. I repeat, I thought he was pull-
Representative from the State of Cali-
the third annual report on the status of
ing my leg.
fornia, Speaker pro tempore during any
advisory committees covering the year
The following March, in 1968, when he
absence of the Speaker, such authority
1974, which, with the accompanying re-
announced his decision on television, it
to continue not later than April 11, 1975.
port, was referred on April 1, 1975, to
brought my mind back to the statement
the Committee on Government Opera-
he had made the previous November.
tions. The message is as follows:
REPORT OF A COMMITTEE RE-
I said:
CEIVED DURING THE ADJOURN-
Mr. President, why do you say that?
To the Congress of the United States:
MENT OF THE SENATE
He looked me straight in the eye and
In accordance with the provisions of
said:
section 6(c) of the Federal Advisory
Under the authority of the order of
Committee Act, the report on the status
Wednesday, March 26, 1975, Mr. MAG-
I have been unable to unite the country.
of advisory committees in 1974 is here-
NUSON, from the Committee on Com-
And that is the result of Vietnam.
with forwarded.
merce, on Friday, April 4, 1975, reported
Vietnam has divided the country. There
This is the third annual report. It is
with amendments the bill (S. 229) to
is no unanimity that we continue.
organized to improve public access to in-
amend the Endangered Species Act of
If Lyndon Johnson, in my humble
1973 to make it more consistent with the
formation concerning specific advisory
opinion, though that would not have hurt
committees and the Federal agencies
Marine Mammal Protective Act of 1972
him at the next election, I think he
to whom they provide advice.
(Rept. No. 94-63)
would have run for reelection. It is my
GERALD R. FORD.
firm conviction that that might have
THE WHITE HOUSE, March 28, 1975.
COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECU-
happened. But he told me distinctly, "I
TIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.
have been unable to unite the country."
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
I said:
MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT
pore (Mr. STONE) laid before the Senate
Mr. President, has it ever occurred to you
Messages from the President of the
the following letters, which were referred
that the reason is Vietnam?
United States were communicated to the
as indicated:
Today, I repeat, the chickens have
Senate by Mr. Heiting, one of his secre-
A communication from the President of
come home to roost.
taries.
the United States concerning U.S. participa-
FORD
3
RALD
5280
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
April 7, 1975
tion in international humanitarian relief
in Europe"; to the Committee on Armed
year 1975. Referred to the Committee on
efforts to transport refugees from South
Services.
Foreign Relations.
Vietnam: to the Committee on Foreign Re-
TRANSFEE AUTHORITY FOR THE DEPARTMENT
By Mr. HANSEN (by request)
lations and ordered to be printed in the
OF TRANSPORTATION (8. Doc. No. 94-30)
S. 1361. A bill to amend title 38, United
RECORD. The communication is as follows:
A communication from the President of
States Code, to authorize a program of as-
sistance to States for the establishment, ex-
[White House Situation Room]
the United States transmitting a request for
a transfer authority for the fiscal year 1975
pansion, improvement, and maintenance of
APRIL 4, 1975.
in the amount of $850,000 for the Depart-
veterans cemeteries, and to provide for trans-
Hon. JAMES EASTLAND,
ment of Transportation; to the Committee
portation of bodies to a national cemetery.
President pro tempore, U.S. Senate,
Referred to the Committee on Veterans' Af-
Doddsville, Miss.
on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.
fairs.
As you know, last Saturday I directed
By Mr. BAYH:
United States participation in an inter-
8. 1362. A bill to amend title 37 of the
national humanitarian relief effort to trans-
PRESENTATION OF A PETITION
United States Code in order to provide in-
port refugees from Danang and other sea-
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I send
centives for lawyers to enter and remain in
ports to safer areas farther south in Vietnam.
to the desk for myself and my colleague,
the Armed Forces. Referred to the Committee
The United States has been joined in this
humanitarian effort by a number of other
Sentaor PELL, a resolution adopted by the
on Anmed Services.
countries who are offering people, supplies
General Assembly of the State of Rhode
By Mr. MOSS:
S. 1363. A bill to facilitate the exchange of
and vessels to assist in this effort. This effort
Island memorializing the President of
school lands between the States of Utah and
was undertaken in response to urgent ap-
the United States and the Congress to
the Navajo Tribe. Referred to the Committee
peals from the Government of the Republic
appropriate $30 million to the unemploy-
on Interior and Insular Affairs.
of Vietnam because of the extremely grave
ment fund of the State of Rhode Island
By Mr. INOUYE:
nature of the circumstances involving the
and ask that it be printed in the CON-
8. 1364. A bill to amend the Comprehensive
lives of hundreds of thousands of refugees.
This situation has been brought about by
GRESSIONAL RECORD and referred to the
Employment and Training Act of 1973 to
large-scale violations of the agreement end-
proper committee.
provide manpower programs for native Ha-
waiians. Referred to the Committee on Labor
ing the war and restoring the peace in Viet-
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
and Public Welfare.
nam by the North Vietnamese who have
pore (Mr. STONE). Without objection, it
By Mr. STEVENS (for himself and
been conducting massive attacks on the
is so ordered.
Mr. GRAVEL)
northern and central provinces of South
The resolution, which was referred to
B. 1365. A bill to authorize the Secretary
Vietnam.
the Committee on Appropriations, is as
of the Interior to convey to the city of
In accordance with my desire to keep the
follows:
Haines, Alaska, interests of the United States
Congress fully informed on this matter,
in certain lands. Referred to the Committee
and taking note of the provision of section
SENATE RESOLUTION MEMORIALIZING THE
on Interior and Insular Affairs.
4(A) (2) of the war powers resolution
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
S. 1366. A bill to authorize the Secretary
(Public Law 93-148), I wish to report to
CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE $80,000,000 TO THE
of the Interior to waive recovery of certain
you concerning one aspect of United States
UNEMPLOYMENT FUND OF THE STATE OF
costs for extraordinary wind and ice damage
participation in the refugee evacuation ef-
RHODE ISLAND
to certain facilities. Referred to the Commit-
fort. Because of the large number of refu-
"Whereas, the State of Rhode Island is
tee on Public Works.
gees and the overwhelming dimensions of
burdened with an unemployment rate of 15
By Mr. PACKWOOD:
the task, I have ordered U.S. naval vessels
per centum, twice the national average; and
S. 1367. A bill to amend. the Immigration
to assist in this effort, including Amphibious
"Whereas, the State of Rhode Island, in or-
and Nationality Act to eliminate the legal
Task Group 76.8 with 12 embarked helicopters
der to fulfill its responsibility to more than
custody requirement and the requirement
and approximately 700 marines. These naval
70,000 unemployed citizens, has depleted all
of residence and physical presence in the
vessels have been authorized to approach
available unemployment funds; and
United States for the naturalization of chil-
the coast of South Vietnam to pick up refu-
Whereas, The only alternative would be to
dren adopted by U.S. citizens. Referred to
gees and U.S. nationals, and transport them
increase the employer's amount of contribu-
the Committee on the Judiciary.
to safety. Marines are being detailed to
tion to the unemployment fund, an action
S. 1368. A bill to confer U.S. citizenship on
vessels participating in the rescue mission.
which would only cause more businesses to
certain Vietnamese children and to provide
The first vessel entered South Vietnam ter-
close their doors: Now, therefore, be it
for the adoption of such children by American
ritorial waters at 0400 a.m. EDT on April 3,
"Resolved, That this Senate of the State of
families. Referred to the Committee on the
1975.
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations
Judiciary.
Although these forces are equipped for
hereby memorializes the Congress and the
By Mr. SPARKMAN (by request)
combat within the meaning of section 4(A)
President of the United States to appropriate
S. 1369. A bill to limit cost-of-living ad-
(2) of Public Law 93-148, their sole mission
an outright grant of thirty million dollars
justments of annuities under the Foreign
is to assist in the evacuation including the
to the state unemployment fund; and be it
Service Retirement System for a specified
maintenance of order on board the vessels
further
period of time, and for other purposes. Re-
engaged in that task.
"Resolved, That the secretary of state be,
ferred to the Committee on Foreign Rel:
As stated above, the purpose of the intro-
and he is hereby, respectfully requested to
tions.
duction of United States naval vessels into
transmit B duly certified copy of this resolu-
By Mr. SPARKMAN:
Vietnamese waters is to assist in an interna-
tion to the President of the United States
S. 1370. A bill to amend and improve 5
tional humanitarian effort involving vessels
and the members of Congress from Rhode
U.S.C., section 7342 (Public Law 90-83). Re-
of several nations, including both military
Island."
ferred to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
and civilian craft. The United States partici-
tions.
pation in this effort includes the charter of
By Mr. BELLMON:
commercial vessels, the use of military Sealift
INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND
S. 1371. A bill to amend title 38 of the
command vessels with civilian crews, as well
JOINT RESOLUTIONS
United States Code to provide for cost-of-
as United States naval vessels with military
crews. This effort is being undertaken pur-
The following bills and joint resolu-
living increases in educational benefits. Re-
ferred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
suant to the President's constitutional au-
tions were introduced, read the first time
thority as commander-in-chief and chief
and, by unanimous consent, the second
executive in the conduct of foreign relations
time, and referred as indicated:
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED
and pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act
By Mr. WEICKER:
BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
of 1961, as amended, which authorizes hu-
S. 1358. A bill for the relief of Simeon Ziv-
manitarian assistance to refugees, civilian
kov and his wife, Paca Zivkov. Referred to
By Mr. MUSKIE (for himself and
war casualties and other persons disadvan-
the Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. HUMPHREY)
taged by hostilities or conditions relating to
By Mr. MUSKIE (for himself, Mr.
S. 1359. A bill to coordinate State and
hostilities in South Vietnam.
HUMPHREY, and Mr. BROCK)
local government budget-related actions
You will appreciate, I am sure, my difficulty
S. 1359. A bill to coordinate State and local
with Federal Government efforts to stim-
in telling you precisely how long United
States forces may be needed in this effort.
government budget-related actions with
ulate economic recovery by establishing
Federal Government efforts to stimulate eco-
Our present estimate, however, is that this
a system of emergency support grants
operation may involve the presence of
nomic recovery by establishing a system of
to State and local governments. Refer-
United States naval vessels in Vietnamese
emergency support grants to State and local
red to the Committee on Government
waters for a period at least several weeks.
governments. Referred to the Committee on
Operations.
GERALD R. FORD.
Government Operations.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNTERCLYCLICAL
By Mr. McGEE (for himself and Mr.
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1975
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HUMPHREY)
S. 1360. A bill to provide additional hu-
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, today I
A letter from the Secretary of Defense
manitarian assistance authorizations for
am introducing with Senator HUMPHREY
transmitting a secret document entitled "Im-
proving the Combat Proportion of U.S. Forces
South Vietnam and Cambodia for the fiscal
legislation which I believe will provide
FORD
s
April 7, 1975
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE
H2465
one significant new assumption-that Con-
Mr. PEYSER, for 20 minutes, today.
BILLS PRESENTED TO THE
gress has earned the right to a meaningful
Mr. BROOMFIELD, for 45 minutes, on
PRESIDENT
voice in policymaking because of the Viet-
April 8.
nam record of failures, bad judgments and
Mr. HAYS of Ohio, from the Commit-
(The following Members (at the re-
deceptions. Whatever restraints the lawmak-
tee on House Administration, reported
ers may have had were removed by Water-
quest of Mr. DUNCAN of Oregon), to
that that committee did on the follow-
gate, which shredded away the last vestige
revise and extend their remarks, and to
include extraneous matter:)
ing dates present to the President, for
of an omnipotent presidency. Hence, the leg-
his approval, bills of the House of the
islators believe all the more that they are
Mr. GONZALEZ, for 5 minutes, today.
following title:
justified in challenging White House au-
Mr. BRADEMAS, for 5 minutes, today.
thority on a broad front.
Mr. DRINAN, for 15 minutes, today.
On March 26, 1975:
H.R. 4592. An act making appropriations
CONGRESS MUST PROVIDE BALANCE
Mr. EILBERG, for 5 minutes, today.
for foreign assistance and related pro-
"Back in the 1950s and early 1960s
grams for the fiscal year ending June 30,
the American people implicitly trusted their
1975, and for other purposes.
president," observes Republican Rep. Pierre
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
On March 27, 1975:
duPont of Delaware, a member of the recent-
By unanimous consent, permission to
H.R. 2166. An act to amend the Internal
ly rebellious House Foreign Affairs Commit-
revise and extend remarks was granted
Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for a re-
tee. "They believed what he did was clearly
fund of 1974 individual income taxes, to
in the best interests of the country. Because
to:
increase the low-income allowance and the
of everything that has happened, this trust
Mr. MADDEN and to include extraneous
percentage standard deduction, to provide
is gone. It's vanished. Now the people are
matter.
a credit for personal exemptions and a credit
saying to the Congress, you get involved be-
(The following Members (at the re-
for certain earned income, to increase the
cause we'd like a balancing force on these
quest of Mr. KASTEN, and to include ex-
investment credit and the surtax exemption,
questions."
traneous matter:)
to reduce a percentage depletion for oil and
The mandate has a notable irony. While
Mr. KEMP in two instances.
gas, and for other purposes;
President Ford and Secretary of State Kis-
H.R. 2783. An act to continue the national
singer dwell on the need to preserve credi-
Mr. CRANE in five instances.
insurance development program;
bility and trust abroad, Congress is more
Mr. PEYSER in three instances.
H.R. 3260. An act to rescind certain budget
concerned about reestablishing credibility
Mr. ASHBROOK.
authority recommended in the message of
and trust at home.
Mr. BELL.
the President of November 26, 1974 (H. Doc.
A NAVIGATOR AS WELL AS A HELMSMAN FOR
Mr. BUCHANAN.
98-398) and as those rescissions are modi-
THE SHIP OF STATE
(The following Members (at the re-
fied by the message of the President of Janu-
There is little evidence the administration
quest of Mr. DUNCAN of Oregon), and
ary 30, 1975 (H. Doc. 94-39) and in the
has got the message or that it will voluntarily
to include extraneous matter:)
communication of the Comptroller General
of November 6, 1974 (H. Doc. 93-391), trans-
veer from the old ways. The ship of state may
Mr. SISK in two instances.
mitted pursuant to the Impoundment Con-
indeed need only one helmsman in most mat-
Mrs. LLOYD of Tennessee in five in-
trol Act of 1974; and
ters, as Lincoln said, but Congress is deter-
stances.
H.R. 4075. An act to rescind certain budget
mined to help chart the ship's future Journey
Mr. ANNUNZIO in six instances.
authority recommended in the Message of
in foreign seas. Until the White House awak-
Mr. ANDERSON of California in three
the President of January 30, 1975 (H. Doc.
ens to this fact, the outlook is for continued
instances.
94-39) and in the communications of the
confrontation rather than cooperation and
Comptroller General of February 7, 1975 (H.
a new period of genuine bipartisanship.
Mr. GONZALEZ in three instances.
Mr. McCoRMACK.
Doc. 94-46) and of February 14, 1975 (H.
Doc. 94-50), transmitted pursuant to the
Mr. HARRIS in 10 instances.
Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
(Mr. BRADEMAS asked and was given
Mr. McDONALD of Georgia in 10 in-
permission to extend his remarks at this
stances.
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
Mr. FRASER in 10 instances.
ADJOURNMENT
traneous matter.)
Mr. RANGEL in 10 instances.
Mr. DUNCAN of Oregon. Mr. Speaker,
[Mr. BRADEMAS' remarks will appear
Mr. EILBERG in 10 instances.
I move that the House do now adjourn.
hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]
Mr. McFall.
The motion was agreed to; accordingly
Ms. ABZUG in 10 instances.
(at 12 o'clock and 16 minutes p.m.) the
Mr. DRINAN.
House adjourned until tomorrow, Tues-
(Mr. YATES asked and was given per-
Mr. HARRINGTON in 10 instances.
day, April 8, 1975, at 12 o'clock noon.)
mission to extend his remarks at this
Mr. DODD.
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. HOLLAND in 10 instances.
Mr. CONYERS in two instances.
EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.
[Mr. YATES' remarks will appear
Mr. MATSUNAGA.
Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive
hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]
communications were taken from the
Speaker's table and referred as follows:
SENATE BILL REFERRED
LEAVE OF ABSENCE
675. A letter from the President of the
A bill of the Senate of the following
United States, transmitting & proposed
By unanimous consent, leave of ab-
title was taken from the Speaker's table
amendment to a supplemental appropria-
sence was granted as follows to:
and, under the rule, referred as follows:
tion for fiscal year 1975 for the Department
Mr. PRESSLER (at the request of Mr.
of Commerce (H. Doc. No. 94-91); to the
S. 555. An act to amend the Consolidated
MICHEL), for the week of April 7, on ac-
Committee on Appropriations and ordered
Farm and Rural Development Act; to the
to be printed.
count of illness.
Committee on Agriculture.
676. A letter from the President of the
Mr. AUCOIN (at the request of Mr.
United States, transmitting a report on par-
DUNCAN of Oregon), for 3 days (through
ticipation of U.S. naval vessels in the evacu-
April 9), on account of death in family
ENROLLED BILL SIGNED
ation of refugees in South Vietnam, pur-
(mother-in-law).
Mr. HAYS of Ohio, from the Commit-
suant to section 4(a) of the War Powers
Mr. DERWINSKI (at the request of Mr.
tee on House Administration, reported
Resolution (Public Law 93-148); to the Com-
MICHEL), on account of official business.
mittee on International Relations.
that that committee had examined and
677. A letter from the Acting Secretary
found truly enrolled a bill of the House
of Agriculture, transmitting a draft of pro-
SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED
of the following title, which was there-
posed legislation to amend the Federal In-
upon signed by the Speaker:
surance Act and for other purposes; to the
By unanimous consent, permission to
H.R. 2166. An act to amend the Internal
Committee on Agriculture.
address the House, following the legisla-
Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for a re-
678. A letter from the Under Secretary of
tive program and any special orders
fund of 1974 individual income taxes, to inc
Agriculture, transmitting the annual report
heretofore entered, was granted to:
crease the low-income allowance and the
for calendar year 1974 on the Department's
(The following Members (at the re-
percentage standard deduction, to provide a
administration of the Animal Welfare Act
quest of Mr. KASTEN) to revise and
credit for personal exemptions and a credit
of 1970, pursuant to section 25 of the act
for certain earned income, to increase the
(7 U.S.C. 2155); to the Commitee on Agri-
extend their remarks and include ex-
investment credit and the surtax exemption,
culture.
traneous matter:)
to reduce percentage depletion for oil and
679. A letter from the Deputy Director,
Mr. KEMP, for 15 minutes, today.
gas, and for other purposes.
Office of Management and Budget, Executive
FORD
LIBER
DI
(Date & Time Stamp)
(Date & Time Stamp)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SIBLE TEF
Operations Center
INAPPROFE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
LDX. MESSAGE RECEIPT
Oh.
S/S #
1975 APR ,
75 APP 9 47 11.28
AM ID 49
LDX MESSAGE NO.
335
CLASSIFICATION ancl
,
NO PAGES 2
DESCRIPTION OF MSG. memo to mr. march
FROM: Officer R.n.Closhey , Office N
23436
7256
:
,
Symbol
Extension
Room Number
LDX TO:
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION:
ROOM NUMBER:
W.H.
mr. wash
,
,
6586 , sit. Rom.
,
,
1
,
,
,
,
,
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FOR:
CLEARANCE
/
INFORMATION
/
/
PER REQUEST
/
/
COMMENT
/
/
REMARKS:
VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY:
Executive SMitter Secretariat Officer)
stated
Fib
Powers give fla
with
FORD A LIBRA CERALD RALD
the
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2000
Washington, D.C: 20520
UNCLASSIFIED
April 9, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John O. Marsh
The White House
Subject: President's Message to the Speaker
of the House and President Pro Tem
of the Senate in Connection with
the War Powers Act
At the request of your office, we sought to
contact the Chairman and ranking minority members
of the two foreign relations committees and drew
on language in the President's message, to brief
them.
We reached HIRC Chairman Morgan in Pennsyl-
vania. He listened carefully and was obviously
taking notes. His only comment was "thank you
very much for informing me". We next reached
Ranking Republican HIRC member Broomfield. He
was equally attentive and at the end said, "I am
all for it; the President is taking just the right
step. He can count on my support.
In spite of all-day telephone efforts on
Saturday and Sunday, we were unable to reach
Sparkman or Case personally. We did get through
to SFRC Chief of Staff Pat Holt, however. Holt
simply thanked me for the message and promised to
inform Sparkman, if we were unable to reach him
first. He inquired whether the "War Powers report"
would also be sent to the Committee. We responded
that the President's message had gone to the Speaker
and President Pro Tem. He accepted this and said,
"Well, we will get it via that route." Then, failing
to reach Case before he left for Geneva Saturday night,
we spoke with his foreign affairs staff man Steve
Bryen. Bryen was most appreciative and said that he
would see that the Senator was made aware of the fact
that we had filled him in.
FALD EE R. FORD VERART
UNCLASSIFIED
- 2 -
No cables were sent.
Per
Robert J. McCloskey
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations
RALD GE R. FORD VIBRARY
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
April'll, 1975
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
TEXT OF LETTERS FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
April 11, 1975
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
I hereby transmit draft legislation to carry out
the recommendations made in my April 10, 1975
address to the Congress with respect to Indochina.
The enclosed draft bills authorize additional
military, economic, and humanitarian assistance
for South Vietnam, and also clarify the avail--
ability of funds for the use of the Armed Forces
of the United States for humanitarián evacuation
in Indochina, should this become necessary.
I urge the immediate consideration and enactment
of these measures.
Sincerely,
GERALD R. FORD
RALD GE
FORD A LIBRARY
# # # #