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Vietnam - General (2)
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John O. Marsh Files (Ford Administration)
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The original documents are located in Box 43, folder "Vietnam - General (2)" of the John
Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 43 of The John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 1, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
BOB WOLTHUIS
RKW
SUBJECT:
Senate Foreign Relations Exec. Hearings
on Viet Nam
State Department has been asked by the SFRC to send a witness
for an Exec. Session on Tuesday, April 8. State indicates
their witness will be Assistant Secretary Phil Habib. They
are either recommending or have been asked by the committee
that the Defense witness be Army Chief of Staff General Weyand.
The question they pose is "Do we wish to have this hearing and
these witnesses appearing before a Congressional committee
prior to the President's foreign policy address on Thursday,
April 10, to a joint session of Congress?"
(4/75?]
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
Subject:
Presidential Determination and Authorization
Under Section 614 (a) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended (the "Act"), to
Authorize the Use of Indochina Postwar
Reconstruction Funds to Finance the Evacuation
from South Vietnam, and Related Costs, of
Certain South Vietnamese Nationals and the
Nationals of Other Countries
I recommend (A) that you determine, under Section 614(a)
of the Act, that the use of Indochina Postwar Reconstruction
funds for the purpose of financing the evacuation from South
Vietnam, and related costs, of certain nationals of South
Vietnam and of other foreign countries, without regard to the
limitations of the Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974,
including Section 38, and Section 113 of the Act Making Appropri-
ations for Foreign Assistance and Related Programs for the
Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1975, and for Other Purposes, is
important to the security of the United States, and (B) that
you authorize the use of such Indochina Postwar Reconstruction
funds for this purpose without regard to the above mentioned
limitations.
Section 614 (a) of the Act permits the President to authorize
the use of funds made available under the Act without regard to
restrictions imposed by the Act or any act appropriating funds
for use under the Act, whenever the President determines that
such authorization is important to the security of the United
States. A per country limitation of $50 million does not apply
to any country which "is a victim of active Communist or Com-
munist-supported aggression." The President's authority under
Section 614 (a) of the Act is applicable to the Indochina Postwar
Reconstruction provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974
pursuant to Section 36 (e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.
FORD
&
GENALD
2.
Without such a determination under Section 614 (a) of the
Act, it may not be possible to finance the evacuation from
South Vietnam of nationals of that country and of other foreign
countries. The failure to evacuate these people from South
Vietnam would leave them in danger of harm, perhaps even death,
in the face of Communist aggression, and would raise serious
questions in the eyes of other nations regarding the United
States Government's humanitarian concerns toward those with
whom it has been closely associated and allied for many years.
I therefore believe it to be important to the security of the
United States to undertake such an evacuation and to finance
this undertaking with Indochina Postwar Reconstruction funds.
Although Section 38 (a) (1) (A) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1974 authorizes the use of funds made available under that
Act for relief of refugees, the $70 million authorized for that
purpose may not be sufficient to cover this evacuation and
related costs when this amount is determined and added to other
refugee relief programs already funded. Section 38 (b) limits
the amount that may be transferred out of the other major
categories of assistance authorized under Section 38 (a) into
the humanitarian category to not more than 20 percent of the
amount authorized under each of the other major categories.
Section 113 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act
of 1975 requires Congressional notification of the use of funds
for new Indochina Postwar Reconstruction activities at least
fifteen days in advance of the obligation of such funds. An
evacuation project was not presented to the Congress for
Foreign Assistance Act financing at the time of the fiscal 1975
Congressional presentation. Funds for such a project have been
included in the legislation now before the Congress, but no
funds have been appropriated as yet nor can they be in the time
available. Insufficient funds are available under the Migration
and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, and there is no
time to pursue appropriations thereunder for this immediate need.
Accordingly, this urgent requirement, if it is to be met at all
in the time available, must be met with Foreign Assistance Act
funds. Of course, the use of Indochina Postwar Reconstruction
funds will serve only as a stop gap measure pending passage
of the legislation presently being considered by the Congress.
Ordinarily we would notify Congress of this new activity under
Section 113, but to do so now, and wait fifteen days, will
prevent the successful evacuation of these people.
FOR
GERALD
3.
The evacuation of Americans from South Vietnam is being
funded under other appropriations already available for this
purpose.
Section 652 of the Act requires the President to notify
in writing the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of each intended
exercise of the authority of Section 614(a) prior to the date
of the intended exercise of such authority and to include in
such notification the justification for and the extent of the
exercise of such authority. The attached justification state-
ments and letters to the Congress fulfill this requirement.
Section 654 of the Act provides that no action shall be
taken pursuant to a determination under Section 614(a) of the
Act prior to the date that the determination has been reduced
to writing and signed by the President. It also requires that
such determination be published in the Federal Register unless
the President concludes that such publication would be harmful
to the national security of the United States, in which case
only a statement that a determination has been made, citing the
name and section of the Act, is published. I can perceive of
no security reason which would require that the determination
not be published.
Recommendation:
That you approve and sign the attached letters and
Determination, and thereby also approve the attached justifi-
cation for the Determination.
Approve
Disapprove
BERALO & FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Presidential Determination
No.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 614(a)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (herein-
after, the "Act"), I hereby:
A. Determine that the use of funds made available in
fiscal year 1975 for Indochina Postwar Reconstruction in order
to finance the evacuation from South Vietnam, and other
related costs, of certain nationals of South Vietnam and of
other foreign countries, without regard to the limitations of
the Act, of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, including
Section 38, and of the Act Making Appropriations for Foreign
Assistance and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending
June 30, 1975, and for Other Purposes, is important to the
security of the United States; and
B. Authorize such use without regard to the limitations
referred to in (A) above.
This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.
FORD & LIBRARY DERALD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In accordance with the notification requirement set forth in
Section 652 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,
(hereinafter, the "Act"), please be advised that I intend to
exercise my authority under Section 614(a) of the Act to
authorize the use of Indochina Postwar Reconstruction funds
for the purpose of financing the evacuation from South Vietnam
of certain South Vietnamese nationals and nationals of other
foreign countries without regard to the requirements of the
Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, including Section 38,
and Section 113 of the Act Making Appropriations for Foreign
Assistance and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending
June 30, 1975, and for Other Purposes. Justification for this
action is contained in the enclosed memorandum.
I have determined that such authorization is important to the
security of the United States and will be forwarding my formal
determination to you within the next few days.
Sincerely,
Enclosure
Honorable John Sparkman
Chairman, Committee on
Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
FORD : LIBRARY CERALD
Justification for Presidential Determination to Authorize
the Use of Indochina Postwar Reconstruction Funds to
Finance the Evacuation from South Vietnam, and Related
Costs, of Certain South Vietnamese Nationals and the
Nationals of Other Countries
Although Section 38 (a) (1) (A) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1974 authorizes the use of funds made available under
that Act for relief of refugees, the $70 million authorized for
that purpose may not be sufficient to cover this evacuation and
related costs when this amount is determined and added to other
refugee relief programs already funded. Section 38 (b) limits
the amount that may be transferred out of the other major
categories of assistance authorized under Section 38 (a) into
the humanitarian category to not more than 20 percent of the
amount authorized under each of the other major categories.
Section 113 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations
Act of 1975 requires Congressional notification of the use of
funds for new Indochina Postwar Reconstruction activities at
least fifteen days in advance of the obligation of such funds.
An evacuation project was not presented to the Congress for
Foreign Assistance Act financing at the time of the fiscal 1975
Congressional presentation. Funds for such a project have
been included in the legislation now before the Congress, but
no funds have been appropriated as yet nor can they be in the
time available. Insufficient funds are available under the
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, and
there is no time to pursue appropriations thereunder for this
immediate need. Accordingly, this urgent requirement, if it
is to be met at all in the time available, must be met with
Foreign Assistance Act funds. Of course, the use of Indo-
china Postwar Reconstruction funds will serve only as a stop
gap measure pending passage of the legislation presently
being considered by the Congress. Ordinarily we would notify
Congress of this new activity under Section 113, but to do so
now, and wait fifteen days, will prevent the successful
evacuation of these people.
Without such a determination under Section 614 (a) of the
Act, it may not be possible to finance the evacuation from
i
FORD
South Vietnam, and related costs, of nationals of that country
GERALD
- 2 -
and of other foreign countries. The failure to evacuate these
people from South Vietnam would leave them in danger of harm,
perhaps even death, in the face of Communist aggression, and
would raise serious questions in the eyes of other nations
regarding the United States Government's humanitarian concerns
toward those with whom it has been closely associated and
allied for many years. I therefore believe it to be important
to the security of the United States to undertake such an
evacuation and to finance this undertaking with Indochina
Postwar Reconstruction funds.
FOR
&
GERALD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Speaker:
In accordance with the notification requirement set forth in
Section 652 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,
(hereinafter, the "Act"), please be advised that I intend to
exercise my authority under Section 614(a) of the Act to
authorize the use of Indochina Postwar Reconstruction funds
for the purpose of financing the evacuation from South Vietnam
of certain South Vietnamese nationals and nationals of other
foreign countries without regard to the requirements of the
Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, including Section 38,
and Section 113 of the Act Making Appropriations for Foreign
Assistance and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending
June 30, 1975, and for Other Purposes. Justification for this
action is contained in the enclosed memorandum.
I have determined that such authorization is important to the
security of the United States and will be forwarding my formal
determination to you within the next few days.
Sincerely
FORD
[April 1975?
CONGRESS
(NoTE.-Fill in all blank lines except
SESSION
S.
those provided for the date and
number of bill.)
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
PRELIMINARY WORKING DRAFT
Mr.
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
BILL
To authorize the President to use the armed forces of the United States
to protect citizens of the United States and their dependents and
certain other persons being withdrawn from South Vietnam, and
for other purposes.
(Insert title of bill here)
1
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That this
ACE may be cited as the "Vietnam Contingency Act of 1975. "
Sec. 2. There is established a Vietnam contingency fund for the
fiscal year 1975 in the amount of $200 million, and such sum is
authorized to be appropriated, to be used for humanitarian and with-
drawal programs in South Vietnam in accordance with the provisions of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, as the President
determines is in the national interest with respect to dealing with the
present emergency in South Vietnam. Such amount shall be available
without regard to the provisions of sections 36 and 38 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1974.
Sec. 3. (a) If the President determines that the use of United
States Armed Forces is necessary to withdraw citizens of the United
States and their dependents from South Vietnam, the President may, in
accordance with the provisions of subsection (b), use such armed forces
GERALD 1917 FORD
-2-
as are essential to and directly connected with the protection of
such United States citizens and their dependents while they are
being withdrawn.
(b) If the President uses the United States Armed Forces for
the purposes stated in subsection (a) of this section, he shall submit
& report on the use of those forces in accordance with section 4 (a)
of the War Powers Resolution and shall comply with all other pro-
visions of that resolution.
(c) In addition to the information required under section 4 (a)
of the War Powers Resolution, the President shall also certify in
writing to the Congress pursuant to section (b) of that section that --
(1) there existed a direct and imminent threat to the
lives of such citizens and their dependents; and
(2) every effort was made to terminate the threat to
such citizens and their dependents by the use of
diplomatic and any other means available other than use
of the armed forces; and
(3) such citizens and their dependents are being
evacuated as rapidly as possible.
Sec. 4. In carrying out the withdrawal of such United States
citizens and their dependents, the President is authorized to use
the United States armed forces to assist in bringing out endangered
foreign nationals if he determines and certifies in writing to the
Congress pursuant to section 4(b) of the War Powers Resolution that --
(a) every effort was made to terminate the threat to such
foreign m tionals by the use of diplomatic and any other
means available other than the use of the armed forces; and
(b) a direct and imminent threat exists to the lives of
such foreign nationals; and
FORD
GERALD
-3-
(c) additional United States armed forces are not required
beyond those essential to the withdrawal of citizens of the
United States and their dependents; and
(d) the duration of the possible exposure of United States
armed forces to hostilities is not thereby extended; and
(e) such withdrawal is confined to areas where United
States forces are present for the purpose of protecting
citizens of the United States and their dependents while
they are being withdrawn.
Sec. 3. The authority contained in this Act is intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of
section 8 (a) of the War Powers Resolution but shall not be considered
specific statutory authorization for purposes of section 5 (c) of
the War Powers Resolution, and such forces shall be removed by the
President if the Congress 50 directs by concurrent resolution.
Sec. 6. The provisions of section 3 (a) of this Act may be
construed to be in derogation of the prohibitions contained in
section 839 of Public Law 93-437, section7741 of Public Law 93-238,
section 30 of Public Law 93-189, section 806 of Public Law 93-155,
section 13 of Public Law 93-126, section 108 of Public Lew 93-52,
and section 307 of Public Law 93-50, only to the extent necessary
to give effect to the provisions of section 3 (a).
is
FORD
GERALD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Jaik- Habibis answer
1
to the blame
Cargess" question
is on Page 12
RALD
June
-
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APRIL 1, 1975
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Palm Springs, California)
THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
PHILIP C. HABIB
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
PRESS BRIEFING ROOM
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
12:20 P.M. EDT
9:20 A.M. PDT
MR. HABIB: I have no opening statement: I
thought it would be better, to suit your purposes, if we
went right to questions.
Q
How would the United States regard Mr.
Lon Nol when he arrives here? As chief of state? As an
important visitor?
MR. HABIB: Marshall Lon Nol, as you know, has
gone to Indonesia for a rest. After that, it is
presumed he will be stopping in Hawaii for medical
treatment. As you will recall, Spencer, some time ago
he had been treated there, and after that, he will
probably be, as his desire, come on to the United
States. It will be treated as not an official visit
in that sense. It is at his request, and our people have
been instructed to provide all the appropriate facilities,
and we will do SO. He remains, as you know, chief of
state constitutionally in Cambodia.
Q
May I ask you about Vietnam? What is the
outlook from the American side as to where this North
Vietnamese-Vietcong offensive is going to stop. Are
they going to roll clear on to Saigon?
MR. HABIB: If you don't mind, that is one
of those questions where I will take a little time to
answer. Quite obviously, what you are seeing taking place
in Vietnam is the massive military violation of the
GERALD
Paris agreements in such a manner that North Vietnamese
regular forces have been committed all over the 1st
Corps and 2nd Corps and have continued their operations
in 3rd and 4th Corps.
MORE
- 2 -
Where they are going to get to and how far they
are going to get is a question that remains to be seen.
As of this moment, the lst and 2nd Corps have
been substantially overrun. Your question is how far is
it going to go? I don't know. The question is, where
will the South Vietnamesa be able to atabilize their military
lines.
I think you have got to go back a little ways
to look at this thing in its proper perspective, and
I am going to impose upon you a bit today for doing so.
Let's face it. If you take a look at the
situation today in terms of North Vietnamese regular
troops in South Vietnam, there are more North Vietnamesa
regular troops in South Vietnam today than there
have ever been before.
There certainly are many more than at the time
the Paris agreements were signed.
As best as we can tell, as many as five or six
out of the eight North Vietnamese reserve divisions have
been committed to the battle in South Vietnam.
If you look at the terms of the agreement that
I tried to explain to some of you before, you know very
well that the agreement that was signed solemnly - a
solemn agreement -- provided, among other things, not
only that there would be a ceasefire, but that the North
Vietnamese would not introduce new forces into South
Vietnam, that weaponry could only be replaced on a
one-for-one basis.
In fact, what has happened is that you have had
gross violation of the agrement from the day it was signed.
In the face of that gross violation of the agreement, we,
in turn, have not been able since 1973 to be responsive to
the breaches of the agreement as signed and endorsed
by the other members --- signed by the North Vietnamese
and endorsed by the other members -- at the Paris
Conference.
Moreover, over a period of time, whereas the
North Vietnamese had been able to introduce into South
Vietnam greatly enhanced and modernized military equipment --
weaponry, ammunition of new varieties, more sophisticated'
whereas they have been able to do that, in fact, rather
than being able to even meet the terms of the agreement
for one-to-one, which permitted one-for-one replacement,
there has been nothing like that flow of arms and material
into South Vietnam for the defense of the Republic of
Vietnam.
MORE
- 3 -
So, what you are seeing is not simply something
that happened in the last week or BO. You are seaing,
in effect, the cumulative results of these gross violations
of the agreement on the part of the North Vietnamese and
the inability to maintain that kind of response over time
that would have been necessary to sustain the agreement.
North Vietnam has deliberately chosen to take
this path of gross violation of the agreement. The
evidence is clear as to what that has involved. In
the past, it has been rather popular to say, "Oh well,
both sidas violated the agreement." That kind of
equivalency is irrelevant, if not completely dishonest.
Of course, there were violations on both sides,
but when you compare them in terms of their relative
degree, the ability of the North to mount the kind of
campaign that you are seeing today depend upon both the
violations in fact, in spirit, and intent. Anybody who
reads anything else into this thing is just blind to
circumstances as they have been evolving for several
years.
Yes, sir?
Q
Are you suggesting that the collapse
of the Saigon government ia due primarily to these
massive North Vietnamese violations and not to any kind
of internal collapse in the Saigon government or the
army?
MR. HABIB: I am suggesting it is a
combination of many factors. As a matter of fact, I am
trying to bring about just that perspective in the
understanding of it.
I think if you are going to look at the situation,
you have to look at it in total. It is true that only some
of the South Vietnamese forces did not, as you put it, sort
of melt away in front of this onslaught, but in order to
understand the circumstances, the situation and the
forces at work, you have got to go back to the physical
presence of the North Victnamese in total violation
of the agreement.
Unless you are prepared to start from that point
and work your way forward, I don't think you will have
full comprehension of just what happened. In terms
of exactly what did happen, you are just as good
an analyst as I am.
I think the Secretary of Defense addressed a good
deal of that yesterday in his press remarks. Quite
clearly, what the South intended to do was to produce
a strategic ithdrawal in the face of this overwhelming
force that was being put against it and its own judgment
of its own capability.
MORE
- 4 -
After all, that was a factor. Now that
strategic withdrawal did not succeed, there
is no question of it. All you have to do is look at
what happened in the lst and 2nd Corps.
Q
What is the United States willing and
able to do about this? I wish you would separate the
answer into two phases; one, diplomatically, what is
the United States willing and able to do about it, and
apart from the diplemacy.
MR. HABIB: First, in terms of what the United
States is able to do about it. As you know, the President
did dispatch General Weyand to take a look at the
military situation and to provide him with a careful
assessment of the situation. The mission --- General
Weyand will be providing that assessment to the
President. I understand General Weyand will be re-
turning the latter part of this week, but that you
will have to get confirmed over at Defense.
When that assessment is completed and available,
the President naturally will then make the decision as
to what will be required.
Obviously, it is quite clear that the necessity
and the need for resources for the South to defend itself
will be greater. There is no question that the losses
have been large, but moreover, and beyond that, the human
tragedy that has been created with respect to the
refugees is of such great dimension that it will
require -- and naturally W3 would expect - that the
United States would contribute to the ameleoration of that
situation.
There will be consideration given -- careful
consideration given -- to both the military and the
economic humanitarian requirements of the situation. As
far as your further question as to what can be done,
I: take it you mean on the diplematic side.
As you recall, we anticipated the nature of the
violations of North Vietnam's solemn word, and have
for several years. The answer is they have disregarded
their diplomatic obligations. They signed a solemn agree-
ment. The Administration called particular attention to the
danger in January. The President, the Secretary of
State and other respessibley-authoritativs-officials
have been calling constant attention to these matters
over the last several months, as you know.
The Administration is, however, not blind to
reality and is not also ignorant of the nature of
the North namese intentions and strategy. Quite
obviously, what they decided to do was to go for the
military blow that they have inflicted. This is not
something that was created in two weeks. This is
something that has been planned for some time. You
cannot do this sort of thing in just a weekend of meetings
and decision-making.
- 5 -
They have positioned their forces. They have
positioned their armaments. They have drawn their plans
and they have taken the military course, as I said
earlier, in gross violation of their solamn obligation.
Any other word that one wants to apply to it is just
sheer verbage.
Q
Mr. Secretary, you have said you anticipated
this for several years. It has only been two years since
the Paris agreement was signed. Are you implying you
never expected them to live up to their agreement in the
first place?
MR. HABIB: I don't recall that. Did I say
several years? I thought I said several months. I am
sorry, I mean for several months.
Q
That was my question you took off on.
Could I ask you a follow-up? You spoke of the Paris
accords prohibiting the reintroduction of the North
Vietnamese. As I recall, it was worded there would be
no foreign troops. The reason for that wording, of
course, is diplomatic because they never would admit
they ever had any troops down there, but the United
States well knew why the wording was that way.
What I am asking is, at what point did you
come to the realization that a blow of this size and
extent was necessary? Several months ago, or a year
ago?
MR. HABIB: Obviously, the present campaign -
let me take your question in two parts. First of all,
the North Vietnamese know very well that the agreement
provides that where there is nothing said specifically
about the immediate withdrawal of the North Vietnamese
forces that were then in the South, the agreement
was quite specific that there could not be, could not be
introduced North Vietnamese forces into South Vietnam.
That was clearly understood and clearly stated.
As far as what has happened laterally, I think
you have got to go back to this season's campaign. If
you want to talk about this season's campaign, you have
to go back to about December when, as I said earlier,
after having positioned their forces and undoubtedly
developed their campaign strategy, they began to probe
and push militarily.
You recall at that time we called attention
to that. That continued on over into the new year.
Then, you have got the further movement. You began
to get the movement of the reserve divisions. You began
to get the North, for example, making it very clear
that it was mobilizing. The signs of mobilization were
clear.
MORE
- 6 -
The launching of the latest onslaught was based
upon the earlier proba and the earlier build-up. It is
not hard to read the tea leaves as to what was happening
when this was going on.
Q
Can we go back to the question of before
that, as to what the United States can do diplomatically.
The other side has put forward once again its offer to
negotiate without President Thieu and abide by the
Paris agreements.
How much worth do you put into this, and what
can be done in the way of nagotiation?
MR. HABIB: That is someone to talk about
abiding by the Paris agreement in the face of what
I have characterized as gross violation - gross
violations have been going on for some time. They
now have been raised to the highest point since the
agreement was signed. To speak about returning, in terms
of the Paris agreement, really requires a great deal of
credulity on the part of anyone to accept that.
Q
Does this mean that we are rejecting --
MR. HABIB: On the contrary. As you know, the
United States has always felt the terms of the Paris
agreement should be lived up to, that the terms of
the Paris agreement are to be lived up to right now.
The North Vietnamese make it very clear that they
are not prepared to live up to the terms of the Paris
agreement by their actions. They can say things, they can
talk about things that do not necessarily have to mean
what they say or what they appear to be intended to mean.
When one speaks about the Paris agreement, one
has to talk about what has happened to the Paris agreement.
Are they prepared, in effect, to abide by the terms of the
Paris agreement as it was when they signed it? Are
they prepared to abide by the terms of the Paris agreement?
There is no question that the Paris agreement does not
allow them to do what they are doing. There is no
basis within the Paris agreement for either the
forces in the South that have been put there in violation
of the agreement; the equipment that is in the South,
which has been put there in violation of the agreement;
and the use of those forces and equipment, which is in
violation of the agreement.
There is nothing in the Paris agreement that
permits North Vietnam to move its main forces clearly
in violation of that agreement.
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the 7 -
Q
What about the other part of the question?
MR. HABIB: What was the other part of the
question?
Q
It was about President Thieu.
MR. HABIB: What about him? Would you rephrase
the question?
Q
Is the United States continuing its full
support to President Thieu?
MR. HABIB: This idea that the United States
support this or -- the United States supports the
government of the Republic of Vietnam. The President of
that government is President Thieu. That is the answer
to the question.
Q
Mr. Habib, I am curious about the phrase you
used earlier that it was clear that the United States
would have to provide more -- I think it is fair to
say, if I understand you correctly - in both the
military side and on the humanitarian side.
MR. HABIB: That is correct.
Q Are you talking about more than already
requested for South Vietnam, more than the $300 million
requested in the supplemental?
MR. HABIB: I think the answer to that, of
course, to be technical, will depend on the assessment
that is provided by General Weyand on the mission and the
President's determination. What I am doing is repeating
what the Secretary of Defense said yesterday to the
press, that he anticipated the requirements would be,
of course, greater.
Q
Greater than what?
MR. HABIB: Greater than the amount that was
originally requested. That was the $300 million supplemental.
Q
So, you are talking about more than the
$300 million?
MR. HABIB: I am not stating that. I said that
one can anticipate that possibility, in terms of the
requirement of the situation, but I am not stating that.
I am trying to be responsive to the question.
On the economic side, you will recall there
was not any request on the economic side in terms of economic
assistance for Vietnam beyond that which was appropriated.
There undoubtedly will be required substantial funds
for the care, feading, relocation and shelter of
the masses of refugees that have been generated by
this campaign. Again, I am not stating, I am just
anticipating. I am trying to be responsive to your question.
- 8 -
Q
Does your answer to those two questions,
saving that we are obviously going to_need
more, is this based on the premise of the Selief on your
part and on the part of the United States government
that South Vistnam can still be saved?
MR. HABIB: That, in the end, is going to be
a question that the Viatnamese are going to decide. I
want to make that very clear. The decision
of the Vietnamese to defend themselves is their decision.
It is our decision. or our Congressional and other
organizational responsibilities, to determine what
we are prepared to do to assist them in that process.
What I am saying to you is, if the situation
develops) as it appears to be developing, the requirements
for resources -- which can only come basically, in large
part, from the United States -- are going to probably be
greater than had been anticipated.
Q
You are talking about more arms for the
South Vietnamese government when the question that
seems to be posed by what we are seeing is the question
of whether it is already collapsing and panic may be
setting in in Saigon itself.
MR. HABIB: The answer to that is obviously that
what the South Vietnamese are seeking to do, is to stabilize
the military situation in Three and Four Corps in that
area, which is apparently the next target of the North
Vietnamese, The answer is they are already, in effect,
in battle in some of those areas.
As you know, there has been considerable
activity over in the Tay Ninh area up until this week
and there has been some on the Northern and
Northeastern edges of MR-3, Military Region 3.
Now, the question that you are posing is the
question of a prescience, which I am afraid I cannot give
you the answer, the answer is the test is there,
whether they will be able to defend themselves.
&
OF
FOR
The question that is being put to us, as I
understand it, is are we. prepared to provide the
resources to permit them to defend themselves.
Q
Mr. Habib, following on the relief question,
there is a report of a scheduled meeting of relief agencies
or relief officials here this afternoon. Can you tell
us a little about that, what that is supposed to do?
MR. HABIB: Yes, I think Mr. Parker addressed
the group yesterday. It was on the record. Mr. Parker,
who is disaster coordinator, is meeting with the
volunteer agencies, heads. the volunteer agencies, as I
x
understand it, to look into the question of what might
be done and what can be done in terms of the humanitarian
requirements of the situation.
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- S -
Q
Mr. Secretary, two questions. The first,
is there any reasonable estimate at all in any range
as to the amount of supplies and equipment that
have been lost in the battle, abandoned in the battle?
MR. HABIB: We do not have one as yet, Murray.
I expect that will be part of the assessment, which we
are receiving. It is information of which we have got
scattered bits and pieces. I hesitate to quote figures
on that basis. It is quite obvious there have been
massive losses.
I have ssen some of the figures that have been
used in some of the press reports. Those, to my knowledge,
are not official figures. We willwait until we get
them. When we have some clear idea what has been lost,
we will then have a better idea also of what might be
required.
Q
Let me pursue that a moment, if I may.
The estimates you refer to run up to and beyond $1 billion.
Is the Administration in a position now of seeking from
Congress assistance in the range that will restore
those losses, those massive losses?
MR. HABIB: You are coming back to the question
of what is the assessment that General Weyand is going
to bring back in terms of the situation and the
requirements. I don't think it would be proper to simply
assume, as you are trying to get the assumption to follow
on that, that it will be a replacement of losses.
What will be looked at, I an sure, are the
requirements of the situation. That is not to say that
it is the replacement of everything that has been lost.
Q
Frankly, for a week now, all the questions
we have asked here about the diplomacy, about the
military strategy. about the situation in South Vietnam,
have produced a single answer: The Administration is
waiting for the return of General Weyand.
MR. HABIB: How do you expect the Administration
to make a judgment without the assessment which
it instituted immediately upon the major campaign that
has been mounted, took place?
Q
Wasn't Admiral Gaylor in the area?
MR. HABIB: No, he just went through for a
couple of days. He was in Cambodia, As you know, the
President dispatched General Weyand specifically for this
purpose, and this requires careful study. It has been
given that careful study and, as I said earlier, I think
the President will be receiving General Weyand's report
before the end of the week.
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- 10 -
Q
At the present time, then, there
is no diplomatic activity that the United States has
underway?
MR. HABIB: With respect to Indochina?
Q
Yes,
MR. HABIB: You know, there you get back into the
old business about what is diplomatic activity. There is
a record. There is what has gone on previously. There
is the agreement, itself, to which we call attention
constantly. There are the statements and the positions
expressed by the President and the Secretary.
I don't know what you mean by diplomatic. If
you mean are we trying somehow or another to turn off the
military campaign in favor of a return to agreement,
the answer is, of course, we are. The equivalent answer,
if you look at the other side of the coin, is what you
are dealing with is fundamentally a decision by North Viet-
nam to take the military option and not the diplomatic
option.
The diplomatic option was negotiated. The
North Vietnamese are taking the military option,
and you know and I know that when that military option is
being exercised, it is exercised to the full.
What follows if the military situation is
stabilized -- until it is stabilized, the North Vietnamese
are embarked upon & campaign militarily. If the military
situation stabilizes, will the North Vietnamese continue
to embark upon a military campaign? That is a decision
they will have to make.
Q
The military option may run right through
the center of Saigon.
MR. HABIB: That is your assessment at this
point, Murray.
Q
No, I are asking.
MR. HABIB: If one wants to get into hypothetical
questions of what happens if it all caves in, it is
really not the sort of thing I engage in. You know I
wouldn't. Obviously, there is a grave military situation.
Obviously, the requirements of the situation are for
stabilization of the military situation. There is no
question about that.
Q
But are you saying the United States must
wait until the military option is concluded?
:
MR. HABIB: No, of course not. I am not saying
anything of the sort.
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- 11 -
Q
Could I follow up on that?
MR. HABIB: I knew you would, (Laughter)
Q At the time of the Paris agreement
there was also an international conference that was
convened and a number of major powers, in effect,
ratified those agreements. Murray asked you about
diplomatic activity.
Why, in light of the North Vietnamese penchant
for both diplomatic and military activity taking place
at one and the same time, why hasn't the United States
moved to reconvene that conference?
MR. HABIB: If you will recall, in January the
United States wrote formally to the participants in that
conference and pointed out what was going on and
called their attention to it. We did not get much
of a response.
Q
: You never asked for a reconvening of the
conference.
MR. HABIB: No, we did not at that time.
Q Why?
MR. HABIB: Marvin, North Viernam has taken a
course which is in complete and total violation of
anything that can be construed as the diplomatic so-
lution that was solemnly agreed to.
While they are embarked upon that course, they
show no signs whatsoever of taking any serious steps
to abide by the terms of that solemn agreement. You
asked me a direct question, whether we have actually
called the reconvening, and the answer to that question
is no, not at this time.
Q
My follow-up question was why, and you have
said the North Vietnamese are now pursuing a military
course which is obvious to anybody, and I am asking why
the United States is not doing anything?
MR. HABIB: The answer is quite obvious. The
feeling is until the military situation is stabilized,
they will not be diverted from that course. That is the
historical record with this kind of a situation.
In any event, that does not mean in any way
that we, ourselves, abrogate, disregard, or ( ae any desire
to see the terms of the agreement reinstituted and
re-established. How that comes about and through what
course it comes about, I think there again that is one of
those things that a little bit of time might demonstrate.
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- 12 -
Q
Mr. Habib, you have not blamed Congress
at all.
HR. HABIB: No, I have not said a word about
anything, about blaning anybody. I tried to describe a
situation. I don't know what you maan, Do you want me
to put blame? If I am going to put blame, I an going to
put the blame one place, I will put the blame on North
Vietnam.
Q
Almost every ranking American official has
blamed the Congress, in part, for what is happening in
South Vietnam, including the Secretary of Defense last
night. The fact that you are not raises 4 question in
my mind as to whather the Administration is now changing
its tactic, or do you continue to place a good part
of the blame on the Congress for not appropriating the
money?
MR. HABIB: Let ED describe the situation. I
don't like to use phrases like "Dlame the Congress." That
is your phrase. I described the situation -
Q
That is the situation, Mr. Habib, that
has developed.
MR. HABIB: I will repoat it to you again. Let
me describe it to you. You said I have a right to answer
the question. Lot no answer it my way.
I stated three elements of the situation
and its evolution. I stated, first of all, the
gross violations of the agreement on the part of the
North Vistnamese. I stated, second of all, that since
1973, we have been unable to respond to those gross
violations, and I have said, finally, we have not boan
able to provide the resources necessary to have over
time -- not speaking about last nonth or last week --
over time we have not provided the resources which we
are giving the South Vietnances every reason to believe
they would receive, within our constitutional processes.
You could read that any way you want, but that
is the way I describe the situation.
Q
Mr. Secretary, if I may follow up. While
you have been unable to provide this, the Seviet Union
and the Poople's Republic of China, for their part, have
been supplying North Vintnem rather substantially.
What efforts have you made to try to get them to stop that?
MR. HABIB: You know, there was nothing in the
agreement that provented then from supplying. that the
agreement provides is that replacements in South Victnam
could only be up to a one-to-one basis. The violation
of the agreement resides in North Viotnam sending to
South Victnam military resources beyond the one-to-one
replacement.
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- 13 -
As to what steps one might or might not take
to stop it, one would have hoped that there would have
been a degree of prudence with respect to such things,
but it is quite obvious that North Vietnam has received
all that it has needed to mount this massive campaign.
Moreover, you have got to go back again and
think of it over a period of time, that the North
Vietnamese in North Vietnam have always had substantial
supplies. What the agreement provided was they could
not move them to the South. When they move them to
the South, then they are in violation of the agreement.
Q
Then, are you saying it is all right?
MR. HABIB: I am talking in terms of the legal
requirements of the agreement. I just wanted to make it
very clear I was not accusing anybody of violating
the agreement by the shipment of supplies to North
Vietnam. That is not contrary to the agreement.
As I said, one would have hoped it would have
been exercised with a greater degree of prudence, but
it was not exercised.
Q
If it is not a violation of the Paris
agreement of 1973, isn't it a violation of the U.S.-Soviet
detente in 19727
MR. HABIB: I don't know whether you would go that
far. I don't think we are quite prepared to draw that
sweeping a conclusion.
Q
Following Jim McCarthy's question -- and
picking up the word you used before "prescience" -- I
want to ask you what the motivation is for the desire to
rush military arms to South Vietnam now? Does it grow
out of the conviction the arms will make a critical
difference on the part of ARVN to defend whatever
is left of South Vietnam?
MR. HABIB: Are you referring to this air ship-
ment? Is that what you are referring to?
Q
-- or whatever they will get in the way of
additional resources, or is it a symbolic reply to the
allegations coming from Vietnam about American betrayal?
MR. HABIB: I don't think it is symbolic
in that sense. I think it certainly, in terms of
immediate shipment, has B. certain psychological signifi-
cance. It also has a certain practical, material signifi-
cance. As you know, there has been substantial material
loss, ordinance. As I recall, the first air shipment
that went in was principally Howitzers, 105's or 155's,
I am not sure which. I think it was a little of both,
but it is not intended to be that kind of an answer.
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- 14 -
Quite obviously, the South Vietnamese are
concerned, and that concern is not concealed as to the
ability and willingness of the United States to supply the
military resources that are necessary in the current
circumstance.
The Administration has made clear, as far as
the Administration is concerned, they have the will, and
hope that the Congress will appropriate the funds
that will permit these things to 80 into works.
We are still operating on those obligational
authorities that exist under the original appropriation.
As you will remember, that appropriation was spaced
out on a quarterly basis so that supplies could continue
to roll in. What you are seeing moving in now are supplies
that stem from that original obligational authority.
Q
Mr. Secretary, may I follow up? What plans
does the United States have, if any, for the evacuation of
Americans from Saigon? At what point would you start
evacuating Americans from Saigon? Is there any emergency
plan? That is the first question.
MR. HABIB: Let me answer that first, if I may.
In every country of the world where there is evidence
of a struggle, we have what is known as an emergency
evacuation plan. That is a universal plan. So, the answer
to your question is what plans do we have? We always
have such plans for all countries in the world, what
we call our E&E plan.
Q
Have you started consideration of the
possibility of evacuation?
MR. HABIB: The only thing that is going on at
this point, as you probably have read in the press,
is that some of the dependents on a case-by-case basis,
by choice, are permitted to leave if they so wish, but
there has been no triggering of any evacuation.
While of course, we have taken our people out
of the areas along the coast that fell within the last
week or so, our poeple got out of Danang, our people
got out of Nha Trang and Dilot and Qui Nhon. Those
are all parts of what you might call our local evacuation
plan, but beyond that, the E&E plans are thare. They
are always there. They are there for every country.
You had a second question. Let's take the
second part of the question.
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- 1S -
Q
Where, specifically, would the United
States -- what would the South Vietnamese army have
to do to convince the United States that it had, in fact,
stabilized the military situation and therefore, would be --
MR. HABIB: The evidence has to be clear on
the grounds. At the present time, the defense of Three or
Four Corps are the heart of the matter, and obviously,
the heart of the heart of the matter is the area around
Saigon. That is the area one has to now watch. We will
have to see the capability and we will have to see the
results.
Q
Mr. Habib, if we could examine a little further
your premise that one reason for the present situation is
our inability to provide adequate resources to South Vietnam
to meet its requirements.
Over the past three years, the United States
has given $6.4 billion in military aid to South Vietnam,
and during the same period -- according to the intelligence
community -- the Soviet Union and Communist China have
given North Vietnam $1.5 billion in military aid.
I am quoting, sir, from the intelligence community
report.
I think the question arises out of that,
that with four times, five times as much aid from the
United States why has this not been sufficient to meet
the military requirements of South Vietnam?
MR. HABIB: It has always been true that the
requirements of an extended defense line are much greater
in terms of the resources necessary than the requirements
for an attacking force that could pick or choose its areas.
What was happening in Vietnam over the years ---
and again it is not a question of what happened last week,
John. I am not addressing that in response to your question.
I think, over the years, what you have had is that extensive,
defensive structure of every line of communication, every
province, every province capital, every district capital
with a few exceptions, an attempt for a total defensive
posture.
When the level of assistance began to decline --
and it did, as you know, substantially in fiscal 1975 and
began in 1974 -- then it became a choice as to whether
or not they could still sustain that kind of total,
overall defensive posture.
It was quite obvious that the strategic decision
that was made by the Vietnamese government was to make
that withdrawal. The tactical failure of the withdrawal
in the 1st and 2nd Corps is another matter, but the
strategic decision taken to begin that withdrawal was
based upon an inability to provide the mobility
and the resources that are necessary to exercise that
kind of overall defensive strategy.
- 16 -
That is not surprising. The defense, for
example, of an outlying post depends on the ability
to re-enforce it. You cannot have total strength in every
spot when the other fellow could pick his spot to hit you.
so, the defense of an outlying post depends on
the mobility to get there, and it depends upon firepower.
If you don't have the mobility and you don't have the fire-
power, you then have to change your strategy. They tried
to do so, and it did not work, at least in 1st and 2nd Corps.
Q
Mr. Habib, to sum up on Doug Kiker's
questions, we realize there is an emergency evacuation
plan. I understand there are about 650 U.S. Marines
on those Navy ships that are lying off the coast of
Vietnam. Are they involved in an evacuation plan?
MR. HABIB: Do you mean the ships that just
went in for the evacuation of refugees?
Q
Yes,
MR. HABIB: I don't know what the figures are for
the number of Marines on the ships that went in.
Normally, chips carry = emall complement of
Marines for ship's duty, but for that, you had batter
address that to the Defense Department.
Quite obviously, that kind of question, in
terms of how many are there and what they are doing,
ought to be addressed to the Defense Department. I am
not competent to answer that.
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- 17 -
Q
Could you tell us if the South Vietnamese
have anough divisions remaining in fighting strength
to stabilize the military situation?
MR. HABIB: I would rather not go into the
order of battle at the moment. I certainly am not going
to make any judgments. That is going to be put to the
test. I am not going to assume that they can't do it,
which I think some of the questions have indicated. I
think that that is something that they are going to have
to determine out of their own strength and spirit.
Q
Mr. Secretary, in view of the resistance
of the American public and Congress to the $300 million
already asked, where does that leave you when you talk
about anticipating the possibility of needing more than
$300 million?
MR. HABIB: The question is one which will have to
be put and addressed -- the circumstances will have to be
described, the requirements will have to be justified.
It will have to go through the process that we normally
go through in these things, and then in its wisdom the
Congress will decide. That is the process, and it is one
that is going to be gone through,
Q
Has the process started?
MR. HABIB: The Congress is adjourned at the
moment.
Q
No, I mean the process of the Administration.
MR. HABIB: Yes, in terms of assessing the
requirements, as I have been accused of as has been
going on (Laughter) for a while, and the answer is yes,
that is exactly what the assessment -- among the other
things, that is one of the things the assessment concludes,
among other things, the assessment of the situation as
well as the requirement. I think that is what the President
charges.
Q
In view of what you describe as North
Vietnam's gross violation of the Paris agreement, has this
country or has South Vietnam any obligation to obey that
agreement any further?
MR. HABIB: Under normal international conven-
tions -- I think there was some sort of convention signed
in Geneva some years ago -- obviously, when one signatory
to an agreement violates the agreement, the other
R.50
signatory is then free to do what he wishes.
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GERALD
- 13 -
There is no intention on the part of the United
States to abrogate the agreement. On the contrary, as
we have tried to make clear, as the President and the
Secretary have, the United States look to North Vietnam's
gross violation agreement as at the heart of the matter.
We would not take that position if we thought
in terms of the nonapplicability to the agreement.
How much longer do we want to go?
Q
Cambodia, with Lon Nol having left, do you
see any possibility of any negotiation?
MR. HABIB: If you ask that of the Cambodian
government, the government in Phnom Peny, that is their
most profound desire, and their most profound hope, and
maybe their most profound prayer. It certainly is
ours.
The President has always spoken for some time
now -- it is not something that happened last week -- of
the desirability of a compromise settlement. Is that
possible in the present circumstance. There again, that is
one of those things that is going to be put to the
test.
There is no lack of desire on the part of the
people in Phnom Penh, from everything we know, to seek a
resolution of the conflict in which the killing stops
and somehow or other Cambodians decide what happens
then. It would not be from lack of wanting on their part,
but it may be from lack of wanting on the part of the
Khner Rouge
You obvicusly have :a situation there where
the Khmer Rouze have a military bit in their teeth, and
they keep pounding away. Indiscriminate rocket
bombing of Phnom Penh is not a military -- in the old
days, we would call that terror bombing, but those
phrases have gone out of fad now.
Q
You described the military situation as
grave in South Vietnam. Would you describe the political
situation as grave, and can you give us your assessment
of the political situation?
MR. HABIB: I don't think it would serve any
useful purpose for me to comment on the internal
situation now, Jerry. After all, I am on the record and
I am a government official. I just don't think it would
serve any useful purpose for me to comment on the
internal political situation in Vietnam.
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- 19 -
Q
Mr. Secretary, a two-part question. Is
there anything that President Thieu has conveyed to the
United States that conveys any feeling on his part that
the United States has sold out or betrayed South Vietnam?
That is the first question. The second one is, giving
the portrait you have just given us of the fidality of
the North Vietnamese to a solemn agreement, did the United
States genuinely believe, when it signed that agreement
on January 27, 1973, that the North Vietnamese would in
fact honor the agreement as it was written?
MR. HABIB: The answer to the first part of your
question is President Thieu has not communicated any
such feeling. On the contrary, whatever feeling that
has been communicated has been the confidence that the
United States will not let South Vietnam down.
with respect to our attitude toward the
agreement when it was signed, quite obviously the agree-
ment was negotiated in good faith. We signed it in
good faith, and we had expected it to be carried out,
in the major sense, in good faith.
Obviously, in circumstances in which that
agreement was signed, nobody expected perfection with
respect to every clause and every cease-fire line and
every point within it, In terms of its gross terms, in
terms of its gross requirements, in terms of the general
thrust that you set the military war aside and you then
pursue the continuing controversy through measures other
than military, there is no question we had a right to
expect that,
After all, it was not only solemnly signed, but
it was endorsed by a convocation, including the major
DOVORS. As far as we were concerned and as far as the
South Vietnamese were concerned, that has always been the
basic thrust of the policy.
I P10 not one of those who will tell you the
government ir Saigen never violated the agreement in one
respect. Tou know that is not true, and they know it is not
true, and I know it is not true, but in terms of the
gross requirements of the agreement, the overall purposes
of that agreement, there is no question that they had
nothing to lose by abiding by it.
But the North Vietnarsse, from the beginning, began
the build-up in violation. You would have hoped, we went at
them in the beginning and said knock it off, in effect,
or this is a violation of the agreement.
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- 20 -
You will recall the Secretary met in 1973
twice in respect to the violations of the agreement, but
the build-up went on. It took its ultimate evolution
in the current campaign.
Q
Mr. Habib, back on relief, can you tell
us what the niceties of it are in terms of the --
MR. HABIB: Requirements?
Q
-- well, in terms of the hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, of displaced people in the
Southern part of Vietnam, whether the United States
and other relief agencies, relief organizations, can some-
how get relief supplies to those people in the areas that
have already been overrun or whether we have just written
them off now?
MR. HABIB: In the first place, we would
hope that those people would be permitted to get out,
to exercise their rights of freedom of movement.
Some of you might recall that Article 13 of the
Declaration of Human Rights gives people that right,
the right of freedom of movement, so we would certainly
support the desire of those people to pick the place in
which they would like to be.
Now, we will do what we can to provide the
assistance to those to whom we can get it. We are
already embarked on that project. I think Mr. Parker
explained that to you. We will be seeking additional
resources for that purpose, and you have already seen
a clear indication that that is something that. in the
traditional American experience, not only our people
expect of us, but averybody expected of us, and I
know we will not disappoint them in that regard.
We have also, of course, supported the South
:I
Vietnamese in their appeal to the United Nations and
other countries in the world to provide the assistance
that will be necessary, and some countries are already
coming forward, not only with respect to the svacuation.
of the refugees, but with respect to their care, their
feeding and their relocation.
It is going to take great sums. There are
more than just a few hundred thousand people involved.
No one knows how many will be able, in any event, to
get to that position where you can treat them and care
for them.
Spencer?
MORE
- 21 -
Q
Mr. Secretary, you spoke of the earnest
desire of the United States to see a settlement in
Cambodia. The settlement would be between what
parties? Who would represent the Khmer Rouge? Would
that be Norodom Sihanouk's coalition, or what?
HR. HABIB: The United States has made it clear,
and I will refer you back to a conference we had here
not long ago, and if you want the precise wording, you
really better look at that piece of paper, but E3
I recall, what we said at that time was something to
the effect that it is not a question of personalitics
that is involved.
The United States is not seized of that
problem, nor are the Cambodians in Phnom Penh. They have
made it clear again and again that no one is any obstacle
to peace, The obstacle to peace in Cambodia, the
obstacle to a stopping of the shooting in Cambodia, is
the unwillingness of the Khmer Rouge to have anything to
do with anything except what they are doing.
They won't talk to anybody. There is no
attempt at finding a way out other than at the end of a
gun. All you have to do is to read the impassioned
appeal of the authorities in Phnon Penh to realize that
the war does not go on because they want it to.
Thank you very much, gentlamen.
END (AT 1:10 P.M. EDT)
(AT 10:10 A.M. PDT)
April 2, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: DON RUMSFELD
FROM:
JACK MARSH
Attached is a copy of a speech which Senator Griffin gave in the
Senate last Wednesday.
1 had mentioned to the President that Griffin had given the speech
but I did not have a copy at the time.
Attachment
JOM/dl
R. FORD
GERALD
FOR RELEASE: PM'S
MARCH 26, 1975
Remarks by
U. S. SENATOR ROBERT P. GRIFFIN
for delivery in
The United States Senate
March 26, 1975
DROPPING THE TORCH ?
Mr. President: In 1961, when John F. Kennedy took the oath as
President, he stirred the hearts of freedom-loving people around the
world with these words:
"Let the word go forth from this time and
place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch
has been passed to a new generation of Americans --
born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined
by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient
heritage -- and unwilling to witness or permit the
slow undoing of those human rights to which this
FORD
Nation has always been committed, and to which we
are committed today at home and around the world.
GERALD
"Let every Nation know, whether it wishes us
well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any
burden, meet any hardship, support any friend,
oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival
and the success of liberty." (Emphasis supplied)
Our country has been a major factor in holding the world
together in modern times because other Nations, friend and foe
alike, have believed that the United States means what it says.
Every American President in the last 35 years -- and there
have been seven of them -- has been called upon to recognize the
dangers of unchecked international aggression.
Each of those Presidents -- from Franklin Roosevelt to Gerald
Ford -- has taken the position that America's interests are served
by helping other free Nations to defend themselves against aggression.
Indeed, that resolve on the part of the United States was so
meaningful that beginning on March 19, 1965 -- ten years ago this
month -- the United States even sent its own troops to fight beside
the South Vietnamese.
(more)
-2-
By 1968, there were 500 thousand Americans in Southeast Asia,
and United States expenditures to support the effort there exceeded
$80 million a day.
By comparison, the $300 million requested now by President Ford
for Vietnam is roughly equivalent to 4 days of expenditure support
at 1968 levels.
It appears obvious now that Congress will take off for an Easter
recess without according the White House even the courtesy of a vote
on its urgent request for emergency assistance to Cambodia and South
Vietnam.
By default -- and through caucus decisions of the majority party --
it has become painfully obvious to all who watch -- in the United
States and around the world -- that Congress is turning its back on
allies in Indochina who are struggling to defend themselves.
Such an abandonment by Congress -- not only of allies but of a
huge investment that includes 50,000 American lives --- should at
least be a conscious and deliberate cision made by the Senate as a
whole -- for it is a decision that carries with it into history
consequences and responsibility of enormous proportions.
Perhaps it is possible that Congress -- by doing nothing or by
taking a vote ---- will turn hollow the ring of John Kennedy's inspiring
words and will forsake basic principles upon which Presidents of both
parties have stood so firmly through the years. But I cannot allow
this to happen without at least speaking out.
I know that the people of America are tired of Vietnam. No member
of this Senate needs to be reminded of that. Americans are tired of
reading about Vietnam, of hearing about Vietnam, of watching Vietnam
on television; and they are tired of paying for Vietnam.
I realize also that the dictates of political expediency -- and
perhaps of political survival -- press hard for outright termination
of all U. S. assistance, once and for all.
I am familiar with the opinion polls. Yet, I cannot help but re-
call the admonition of Winston Churchill during the last World War:
"Nothing is more dangerous in wartime than to
live in the temperamental atmosphere of a Gallup Poll,
always feeling one's pulse and taking one's temperature."
Were the task of a Senator nothing more than studying public
opinion and casting each vote with the majority, I might more
efficiently return home and leave my responsibilities in the care
of a computer.
But surely our responsibilities here in the Senate reach beyond
the mechanical task of echoing public opinion. That point was made
by Edmund Burke in 1774 when he told his constituents:
"Your representative owes you, not his industry
only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of
serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion."
In our understandable frustration with Vietnam, it is tempting
to assume that if we just cut off all aid to South Vietnam, the
people of that area will settle their own problems and the rest
of the world can live in peace again.
As the Washington Star recently observed, some people take the
FORD
view that:
cutting off aid to our allies is something
GERALD
like cutting off oxygen to a dying patient, to spare
(more)
- 3 -
these long-suffering people more agony. We have talked
ourselves into the idea that, in supplying Vietnam and
Cambodia with the means of defending themselves, it is
we who have instigated and perpetuated the war and it is
our obligation to end it."
Unfortunately, it is not that simple.
There are in South Vietnam today several million people who, in
one way or another, have openly opposed the Communists. Many of them
took their position after we convinced them that the United States
would stand by them. Statements by Vietnamese Communist leaders, as
well as the lessons of history, give no assurance that these individ-
uals will not be killed or imprisoned following a North Vietnamese
victory.
In 1946, the Secretary General of the Indochinese Communist
Party ominously asserted:
"For a newborn revolutionary power to be
lenient with counter-revolutionaries is
tantamount to committing suicide.'
When Ho Chi Minh took over North Vietnam in 1954, a massive
purge resulted in an estimated 50,000 executions and, in-
directly, in the deaths of several hundred thousand more --
and this was after nearly a million potential victims had
fled to the South.
In the 1968 Tet offensive, hundreds of bodies were found in
mass graves outside Hue -- and great numbers of others still
are not accounted for.
And public statements by North Vietnamese leaders give a fore-
taste of events to come. Three years ago, North Vietnam's
Minister of Public Security laid down this official policy
for dealing with dissidents:
"In our dealings with counter-revolutionary
elements in the recent past, we have still
not properly used violence."
In and out of Congress, many have salved their consciences with
the assumption that South Vietnamese people really prefer Communism
anyway. For those Americans, it should be interesting -- and dis-
turbing -- to see on television that the hundreds of thousands of
refugees, who flee for their lives from the recently abandoned
provinces, are moving South on the clogged highways -- not North.
On the face of the record, it is just unrealistic to suggest that
an end to United States aid will end the killing in Vietnam.
The consequences of such a decision would be felt in our own
country too. Earlier this month I met with an Ann Arbor constituent,
James H. Warner, who for over five years was a prisoner of war in
North Vietnam. Like other young men who were held captive, Warner
received considerable abuse because he did not "cooperate" with his
Communist hosts.
In the course of our conversation, Warner expressed great con-
cern about the fate in Congress of President Ford's request for
continued aid to Vietnam and Cambodia. There was deep emotion in
his voice as he wondered aloud about the possibility that Congress
might deny the request. Why, he wondered, had he endured so much
to keep faith with his country -- if America's leaders were going
to respond now by abandoning the cause for which he fought.
BERALD
-
(more)
-4-
If Congress takes the "easy" course, Warner's case is only
illustrative of the bitterness that will be felt by thousands of
veterans who fought in Vietnam.
Many who advocate ending all U. S. aid to Vietnam assume that
Communist North Vietnam would become a peaceful member of the inter-
national community once it gained control of Saigon. Unfortunately,
that is not likely to be the case.
As we know, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the deposed Cambodian head
of state, is in exile in Peking. In one of the last public state-
ments he made before being ousted in 1970 by a unanimous vote of his
National Assembly, he wrote in a Japanese foreign affairs quarterly,
Pacific Community, about the importance of the United States main-
taining a presence and providing assistance to the victims of
Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. He did not expect the
Americans -- for whom he had (and has) little affection -- to remain
in Asia for altruistic reasons -- but he believed the United States
should remain in its own self-interest. He concluded:
" /T/he Communization of Cambodia would be the
prelude to a Communization of all Southeast Asia and,
finally, (although in a longer run) of Asia. Thus it
is permitted to hope that, to defend its world interests
(and indeed not for our sake), the United States will not
disentangle itself too quickly from our area -- in any
case not before having established a more coherent policy
which will enable our populations to face the Communist
drive with some chance of success."
Already Sihanouk's concerns of 1970 are being borne out in the
wake of our apparent abandonment of South Vietnam and Cambodia.
Thailand, for example -- a close ally for decades -- has shown
signs of a moving away from its relationship with the United States
and toward the Communist powers.
Earlier this month, a respected journalist, Keyes Beech, wrote:
"One by one, the small Nations of Southeast
Asia are moving closer to Peking -- not in terms
of ideology but on practical grounds.
"Within the past few days, both the Philippines
and Singapore have taken conciliatory steps toward
their giant Asian neighbor.
A compelling case can be made that these political changes in
Southeast Asia are the direct consequence of a decline in American
credibility in the area. Small Nations which in years past have
relied on the word of the United States are now concluding that, in
the long run, America's word is no longer credible. Under such
circumstances, it would hardly be healthy for them to resist the
expansion of Chinese or North Vietnamese influence in the region.
American abandonment of Indochina would almost certainly have
consequences in other parts of the world as well.
In the Middle East, our ability to assist in the search for
peace depends largely on our credibility with participants in the
dispute. Recent reports from Jerusalem have noted a growing concern
about the reliability of the United States -- a concern related by
some to the apparent U. S. abandonment of its allies in Indochina.
As John Goshko of the Washington Post Foreign Service reported
March 12:
"Many Israelis, drawing a comparison between
their own situation and events in Southeast Asia,
say openly that they fear that the same thing may
happen here."
GERALD
And Marilyn Berger, also of the Washington Post, reported from
the Middle East on March 20:
"The imminent fall of Cambodia and even South
Vietnam
are said to be raising new obstacles
in the current negotiations.
"Israelis are questioning the value of assurances
Arabs are said to be questioning the need to make
concessions when American aid to Israel might soon be
diminished, just as it has been in Cambodia and South
Vietnam.'
These are deeply disturbing developments. They pose tough,
hard questions which deserve answers before we pull the rug from
under our allies in Indochina.
Mr. President, if and when the Senate moves toward a vote on
supplemental aid to Cambodia and South Vietnam, each member will
have to wrestle with his own conscience in deciding whether a vote
against it will best serve American interests and the cause of
world peace.
For one, I do not believe that such a move would serve those
high purposes. Furthermore, it would signal a new turn toward
isolationism -- and the world of 1975 is too small, too inter-
dependent for that.
A great statesman of the past from my State, Senator Arthur H.
Vandenberg, appreciated the role we must play in the world, when on
July 6, 1949, he said:
"Much as we might crave the easier way of lesser
responsibility, we are denied this privilege. We can-
not sail by the old and easier charts. That has been
determined for us by the march of events. We have no
choice as to whether we shall play a great part in the
world. We have to play it in sheer defense of our own
self-interest. All that we can decide is whether we shall
play it well or ill."
America will play a decisive role in world affairs -- whatever we
do -- whether we stick to our word and maintain our credibility -- or
whether we turn our back on friends and betray their hope for freedom.
What we do will have consequences, for good or ill -- consequences
which we dare not ignore.
Although the hour is late -- very late -- the question of U.S.
aid to Cambodia and South Vietnam is still open.
Our action -- or inaction -- will send a message, loud and clear,
to the rest of the world -- a message to friend and foe alike that
will ring through history as resoundingly as did President John
Kennedy's stirring words of January 20, 1961.
Shall the word go forth, from this time and place -- that
the torch has been dropped?
Or, shall the message from this Congress be that America --
sadder, perhaps -- but wiser, we hope -- and tempered with a
clearer sense of the limits of our power -- still stands proud
and true to herself, to her friends, and to the cause of liberty!
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 25, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH:
JOHN MARSH
MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF m.f.
FROM:
WILLIAM T. KENDALL
SUBJECT:
Speech to be delivered by Senator Robert Griffin
Wednesday, March 26, 1975
Senator Griffin has asked that I transmit the attached speech to you.
He will deliver it on the Senate floor tomorrow morning. The speech
is a defense of Administration policy in Southeast Asia.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
general
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WHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74
4/3/75
Copies of telegram given to
General Scowcroft and Bill Roberts.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1975
TO:
DICK CHENEY
FROM:
JACK MARSH
A representative of Senator Helms staff delivered this to the
White House at 9:00 p.m. for transmission to the President.
You can expect press inquiry on the attached tomorrow.
Please call to Nesson's attention.
FOR
ШО
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<
RUEADWW
The on-going tragedy in Vietnam demands action without delay.
I believe that you should immediately assign to the Commander of the U.S.
7th Fleet, Vice Admiral George Steele, the mission of utilizing the Fleet
for the purpose of evacuating every refugee who wants to leave Vietnam.
Our facilities at Con Son Island off the Vietnamese coast, on
Okinawa, at Clarke Air Force Base and Subic Bay in the Phillipines, and
American bases in Guam, Taiwan and Thailand, should be utilized for
emergency refugee processing centers. The United States should immediately
dispatch emergency military medical teams from Hawaii.
The whole operation can be carried out by the U.S. Navy and
CINCPAC. My personal inquiries ascertain without question that the 7th
Fleet can perform the task of total evacuation of two million refugees or
more within seven days. I am informed that the availability of emergency
refugee centers and of military medical teams is beyond any doubt. Furthermore,
(SP) (SP)
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Senator Jesse Helms
<==
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Page 2
the Vietnamese Navy has 90 blue water ships and 2,000 smaller crafts which
also can be used for this mission.
Today, my office has received reports from Saigon by telephone.
These reports may be summarized as follows:
"There is total chaos in Saigon, panic that cannot be
described, chaos that borders on anarchy. People are
committing suicide. This morning over the loudspeakers
and megaphones the people of Saigon were advised to get
on any kind of boat or sampan and get out to the South
China Sea where they will be picked up by American
ships. In the countryside, civilians by the thousands
are being slaughtered by the Communists while attempting
FORD : LIBRARY 076870
(SP) (SP)
SIGNATURE
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Senator Jesse Helms
III
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Page 3
to flee. Other thousands are floating helplessly
on small craft and logs off the coast of Vietnam."
Mr. President, these are not soldiers of war I am talking
about. These refugees are war's tragic victims, helpless in the face
of the onslaught before them.
In the name of God and humanity, Mr. President, we must act now.
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
1975 MAR 3 02 08
'75 APR 2 PM 10 39
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
GERALD R. FORD
WHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74
CONFIDENTIAL
Determined por E.O. 12355, Sec. 1983 1.3
to be an administrative marking and
Archivist's Cancelled memo of March 16,
By
DAO NARA date 6/19/86
April 2, 1975
TO:
DICK CHENEY
PALM SPRINGS
FROM:
JACK MARSH
The following summaries are a result of inquiries on the Vietnam
situation directed to the members:
BESALD
&
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1975°FV
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
NARA date 16, 1983 and
4/19/84
THRU:
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:
CHARLES LEPPERT, JR.
Colg
SUBJECT:
Reaction of Member Contacts on
Situation in Southeast Asia.
George Mahon
Not in his district. American people are disturbed about
the situation in South Vietnam. But there does not seem to be a change in
the American people's sentiment that the South Vietnam Army will not fight.
Americans do not feel they should stay in there until the end of the century.
The U.S. has expended tens of billions of dollars to help these people defend
themselves from the Communists. The fault lies not with the lack of
American aid but the unwillingness of the South Vietnam army to fight.
People here feel more military aid is money down the drain and eventually
there will be a blood bath in South Vietnam. The patience of the American
people has been worn down on this issue. President ought to avoid criticism
of the Congress on this. The $300 million requested for aid would not have
changed the situation in South Vietnam or brought about sweetness and light
there.
A1 Cederberg
His own assessment is that it's a sad situation but don't know
what we can do about it. American people are sad about it but they are frankly
disillusioned and do not know what to think about the situation there. Most
people now are concerned about the South Vietnam Army and need an assess-
ment of their abilities especially in light of the abandonment of equipment, etc.
Looks as though Theiu's withdrawal was premature and ill-advised.
John McFall
Feel strongly about aid to South Vietnam. People in Cali-
fornia want people of South Vietnam to have a chance but Thieu made decision
to withdraw and retreat leaving millions of people to die or be stranded with
the Communists. President should take a stand and not run from the press
on this issue. He cited John Murtha's talk with George Meany and support
of AFL-CIO for aid. Feels President should talk to Meany. Questioned Phil
Burton's position and stated "he's probably saying my people were right and
we are winning. 11
8,5083
GERALD
2
Most Members of Congress are not aware of the offers made by South Vietnam
government to bring about settlement. People now are asking if there is
anything that can be done to help these people? Is it possible to help them
now?
Feels President should talk to American people and tell them the status and
situation in Southeast Asia and what's possible and not possible for us to do
and why it's important for us to do anything. Always been the policy of the
U.S. that if 20 million people want to fight for their freedom we as a nation
could support them. My people in California want to help save these people.
Joe Addabbo and a substantial group in the Congress want to help but don't
know what will happen now under present circumstances.
Bob Michel
Reaction to Southeast Asia is mixed. American people are
uncertain and unsettled about the situation there. They are looking to Congress
for answers and asking if the U.S. is throwing in the sponge? On Cambodia
he says yes but on South Vietnam it's different he says and would vote for more
money and aid. But then raises the question that the South Vietnam Army not
holding up so it looks like we can only provide humanitarian assistance. It's
too hard to call. People want answers but the sentiment in Congress is no
military aid. The way the army has folded up makes military aid unconscion-
able. He doesn't know specific military situation but it doesn't look like they
can regroup to amount to any kind of offensive without some kind of leadership
and discipline.
Sam Stratton
Strongly favors aid to Southeast Asia if it can be effective
aid and not too late to be helpful. Catching Hell for taking that position but
some people that listen are also in favor while most are against that position.
Still feels this is a case where the U.S. should stick its neck out and make
a real fight for aid for these people. Most in Congress against that position
and the 75 freshmen are a real problem on this.
If President laid the facts on the line and stated the need to give these people
a real chance to defend against the Communists and it would take X amount
of dollars for ammo and equipment to do it then ask us to get on with it,
I'd support the President - only problem is the recent situation of abandon-
ment of equipment, etc. -- but we ought to go ahead and make a fight for aid
to these people.
Ralph Preston
Not available - away on vacation.
(Staff)
App.
FOR
SERALD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
WILLIAM T. KENDALL not
SUBJECT:
Comments on Vietnam situation
Senator Griffin
(Not much comment) Feels he might need
briefing on Saturday. I agree, if it can be
arranged since he made speech on subject
backing Administration last week.
Seemed stunned by march of events.
Senator Mansfield
(He called to give me his vacation telephone
number starting tomorrow.) Feels Congress
will resist military aid money but give all
needed for humanitarian relief. Mentioned
loss of $600 to $1 billion in equipment. Told
me aid package was scheduled to come up but
issue now in grave doubt.
Senator Packwood
(A strong supporter of aid in the past) "We
have given all we can, more than North Vietnam
has received. We can't give them the will to
fight. " Working on orphan evacuation. For
humanitarian aid.
Senator Case
This is human tragedy no one could have
prevented. Stop trying to blame others (and
Congress). President S hould take the high
road.
Bill Simpson (Eastland)
Everyone heartsick and dismayed. "What can
(StAff)
anybody do now?"
Jim Callaway - App.
Away on vacation
(STAFF)
Pete Bonner - App.
Away on vacation
(Staff)
Russ
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
for follow up Leppert
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1975
MR. MARSH:
Congressman McCollister called (from
Omaha) re the likelihood of Saigon's being
invaded. A church in his District, which
has missionaries over there, has contacted
him about any provisions for evacuating
people from Saigon (via boat). Congressman
McCollister would like to know your
thoughts on this, and whether, in fact,
the Navy might be sending boats.
PH: (402) 334-8077
Connie
NOTE: He seemed to feel that Saigon
would "go under" somewhere within
the time frame of "48 hours". McCollister
would like to hear from you at your
earliest convenience.
BERALD R. FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Max-
Carld are of your
people advise
includister of this.
Note Classification
Jane
FORD : LIBRARY SERVID
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
March 17, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RUSSELL A. ROURKE
FROM:
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
WK
SUBJECT:
Status of Follow-up on Swain Group's
Efforts on Missing-in-Action in Vietnam
Mr. Marsh told me that Representative McCollister wants to know
what the Executive Branch is doing to follow up efforts of Ken Swain's
group to locate U.S. missing-in-action in Vietnam. (Ted Marrs
discussed this matter with Swain last October.) You or Mr. Marsh
can tell McCollister the following:
Dr. Roger Shields, Defense's Chief POW-MIA representative,
will be meeting again with Swain's group on March 18. Larry
Ward of this group has just returned from Vietnam and should
be able to report on any progress he made in getting new in-
formation on MIA identification. Dr. Shields is following up on
the group's findings and, principally for this purpose, he will
be going to Vietnam within the next few weeks. Progress in
this endeavor largely depends on the group's personal contacts
in Vietnam, most of which appear to be with Montagnards
(mountain tribesmen) of the Western Highlands. It should be
noted that recent intense fighting in this area may well impede
further progress in developing the contacts or operations needed
to further this mission.
For Mr. Marsh's and your information, Shields says the group is fall-
ing off from its original story about identifying living missing-in-action.
They now seem to be concentrating on the recovery of remains; although
they claim their Montagnard contacts have offered to check out stories
of U.S. prisoners in Communist hands. Shields personally feels some
remains may be recovered, but there is little chance of getting anything
on living POW's. Shields also believes the Montagnards may be working
SECRET
MR 92-7, #4, NSC ltc 10/29/92
By KBH NARA, Date 12/23/92
SECRET
2
on behalf of FULRD (an old anti-GVN Montagnard independence organi-
zation) and may insist on a U.S. guarantee for Montagnard autonomy
in return for their cooperation on MIA's. While Swain and Highlands'
missionaries in general probably favor such a move, it is obviously
out of the question. In any case, the capture of Ban Me Thuot and the
probable GVN abandonment of most of the Western Highlands almost
guarantee the futility of the whole operation.
FORD
GERALD
ANNIC
SECRET
IMM
Confidential CL ASSIFICATION FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY
PRECEDENCE
FROM: Jack Marsh
DEX
DAC 084
GPS
TO: Dick Cheney
LDX
PAGES 2
(Palm Springs)
TTY
CITE
INFO:
DTG: 030215E
RELEASED DH BY:
TOR: 0302262
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
1975 MAR 3 02 08
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
&
'75 APR 2 PM 10:31 10: 31
GERALD
WHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74
MEMORANDUM
Confident
Archivist'st's Determined Deter per to be
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: Drck CHENEY
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1975
DAD memo an 12356, 16, Sec. 1983 1.3 ark and
1/1/16
MEMORANDUM TO:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
RUSS ROURKE
SUBJECT:
TELEPHONE CALL FROM DAVE
LOVENHEIM (REP. FRANK HORTON'S A.A.)
Dave indicated that Frank Horton and he were extremely concerned
over the deteriorating humanitarian aspects of the situation in Vietnam
and that they were concerned that the President will be roundly accused
of "fiddling while Rome burns. 11 Horton makes the following plea:
1)
President Ford should return to Washington immediately and
undertake a coordinated program of humanitarian aid to Vietnam,
which would include a call for an emergency session of Congress
and a request to the United Nations to provide an umbrella of
productive support in Indochina to permit the safe withdrawal
of civilian refugees.
In any event, Horton believes the President's presence at Palm
Springs at this time could be disastrous.
MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFIED /Confidenion
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1975
By DOTO 1983 and
date
6/19/82
MEMORANDUM TO:
DICK CHENEY
FROM:
JACK MARSH
The following have been in touch with the White House today on
the Vietnam situation:
(1)
Sam Devine - Called to ask if anything is being
formulated on helping Vietnam refugees. Stated that he
was anticipating a lot of calls in the next 48 hours on
what the U.S. is doing to help the refugees to take them
to Australia, or the West Coast. Who will make that
decision and what department will carry it out? Told him
that in any situation like this there are plans developed to
get Americans out but nothing definite yet on that. Of
course, President has ordered ships to assist in refugee
evacuation. All these contingent plans are being updated according
to the situation there.
(2)
McCollister - Called twice expressing concern about
safety of U.S. missionaries. Indicated a number of
constituents calls about S/V, particularly in support of
assistance to the refugees.
GERALD FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
THRU:
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:
CHARLES LEPPERT, JR.
CoLg.
SUBJECT:
Reaction of Member Contacts on
Situation in Southeast Asia.
George Mahon
Not in his district. American people are disturbed about
the situation in South Vietnam. But there does not seem to be a change in
the American people's sentiment that the South Vietnam Army will not fight.
Americans do not feel they should stay in there until the end of the century.
The U.S. has expended tens of billions of dollars to help these people defend
themselves from the Communists. The fault lies not with the lack of
American aid but the unwillingness of the South Vietnam army to fight.
People here feel more military aid is money down the drain and eventually
there will be a blood bath in South Vietnam. The patience of the American
people has been worn down on this issue. President ought to avoid criticism
of the Congress on this. The $300 million requested for aid would not have
changed the situation in South Vietnam or brought about sweetness and light
there.
A1 Cederberg
His own assessment is that it's a sad situation but don't know
what we can do about it. American people are sad about it but they are frankly
disillusioned and do not know what to think about the situation there. Most
people now are concerned about the South Vietnam Army and need an assess-
ment of their abilities especially in light of the abandonment of equipment, etc.
Looks as though Theiu's withdrawal was premature and ill-advised.
John McFall
Feel strongly about aid to South Vietnam. People in Cali-
fornia want people of South Vietnam to have a chance but Thieu made decision
to withdraw and retreat leaving millions of people to die or be stranded with
the Communists. President should take a stand and not run from the press
on this issue. He cited John Murtha's talk with George Meany and support
of AFL-CIO for aid. Feels President should talk to Meany. Questioned Phil
Burton's position and stated "he's probably saying my people were right and
we are winning. 11
GERALD R. FORD
2
Most Members of Congress are not aware of the offers made by South Vietnam
government to bring about settlement. People now are asking if there is
anything that can be done to help these people? Is it possible to help them
now?
Feels President should talk to American people and tell them the status and
situation in Southeast Asia and what's possible and not possible for us to do
and why it's important for us to do anything. Always been the policy of the
U.S. that if 20 million people want to fight for their freedom we as a nation
could support them. My people in California want to help save these people.
Joe Addabbo and a substantial group in the Congress want to help but don't
know what will happen now under present circumstances.
Bob Michel
Reaction to Southeast Asia is mixed. American people are
uncertain and unsettled about the situation there. They are looking to Congress
for answers and asking if the U.S. is throwing in the sponge? On Cambodia
he says yes but on South Vietnam it's different he says and would vote for more
money and aid. But then raises the question that the South Vietnam Army not
holding up so it looks like we can only provide humanitarian assistance. It's
too hard to call. People want answers but the sentiment in Congress is no
military aid. The way the army has folded up makes military aid unconscion-
able. He doesn't know specific military situation but it doesn't look like they
can regroup to amount to any kind of offensive without some kind of leadership
and discipline.
Sam Stratton
Strongly favors aid to Southeast Asia if it can be effective
aid and not too late to be helpful. Catching Hell for taking that position but
some people that listen are also in favor while most are against that position.
Still feels this is a case where the U.S. should stick its neck out and make
a real fight for aid for these people. Most in Congress against that position
and the 75 freshmen are a real problem on this.
If President laid the facts on the line and stated the need to give these people
a real chance to defend against the Communists and it would take X amount
of dollars for ammo and equipment to do it then ask us to get on with it,
I'd support the President - only problem is the recent situation of abandon-
ment of equipment, etc. -- but we ought to go ahead and make a fight for aid
to these people.
Ralph Preston
Not available - away on vacation.
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
3
Sam Devine
Called to ask if anything is being formulated on helping
Vietnam refugees. Stated that he was anticipating a lot of calls in the next
48 hours on what the U. S. is doing to help the refugees to take them to
Australia, or the West Coast. Who will make that decision and what
department will carry it out? Told him that in any situation like this there
are plans developed to get Americans out but nothing definite yet on that.
Of course, President has ordered ships to assist in refugee evacuation. All
these contingent plans are being updated according to the situation there.
F3RD is LIBRARY GERALD