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Vietnam - General (5)
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Vietnam - General (5)
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John O. Marsh Files (Ford Administration)
John Marsh's General Subject Files
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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The original documents are located in Box 43, folder "Vietnam - General (5)" of the John
Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 43 of The John Marsh Files
at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Russ
THIS IS CONFIDENTIAL - HAS TO
BE "PUT AWAY FOR THE NIGHT"!!!
!!!!!!
cb
THE WHITE
WASHINGTON
closey, losed 12
Jack --
c
FYI - we provided Culver's office
today with a sanitized version
of the DoD report on LCp1 Darwin
Judge. Bill/Hendall hand delivered
it to Culver's Office. if
LIGRARY GERALD ? FORD
Ispan
Russ
M
yes
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Bill
GUILEY
WILL DO
CONFIDENTIAL
DEFART OF DEFENST
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
NITED STATES or AMERICA
MEMORANDUM FOR
Office Executive Mr. WASHINGTON, to Warren the of the President Assistant D.C. Military Gulley 10 20301 MAY Assistant 1975
Subject: Removal of Remains of Two Marines from Saigon
In response to your request attached at Tab A is a narrative
summary of the circumstances surrounding the failure to evacuate
remains of Cpl Charles McMahon Jr., USMC and LCpl Darwin L.
Judge, USMC from Saigon.
As you know the State Department has primary responsibility
in this area since they have jurisdiction over the Marine Security
Guard Detachments. The most recent message on their efforts
to recover the remains is attached at Tab B.
Kimmets Military Colonel, Kenneth R. Assistant USA Bailey K.Saily
Attachments
AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Upon removal of attachments
1776-1976
this document becomes
CONFIDENTIAL
unclas
A
NARRATIVE SUMMARY
Cpl Charles MCMAHON and LCpl Darwin JUDGE were instantly killed
by an artillery rocket at the Defense Attache Office compound
at Tan Son Nhut in Saigon at 4 a.m. Tuesday, April 29, which
would be Monday afternoon, 4 p.m. in Washington, D.C.
Within a few hours, Marine Officers were at the homes of the
parents of the two slain Marines to notify them officially of
the deaths.
Next day a priority radio message was dispatched, at the
height of the evacuation, to our Embassy in Saigon requesting
information on the whereabouts of the remains and details con-
cerning the return of the bodies. We received a message in-
dicating the remains were aboard the carrier, USS MIDWAY.
An inquiry to the USS MIDWAY about the plans for transhipping
the bodies brought the response that the remains of the two
Marines were not aboard. Contact was then made with Marine
Brigadier General Richard CAREY, Commander of the Task Group
that spearheaded the evacuation who was then on one of the
evacuation naval vessels. General CAREY started an investi-
gation to locate the bodies. Telephone calls were made to
UTAPAO and SATTAHIP and all bases in Thailand; the replies were
negative. In the ensuing days, in response to messages from
Washington, D.C., searches were conducted aboard all the 7th
Fleet ships in the area, and then expanded to the U.S. Bases
at Subic and Clark in the Philippines, and Guam, the Marianas.
All ships and land bases responded with negative replies. In-
quiries, interviews and investigations continued over the
weekend; attempts were made to communicate with personnel of
the Defense Attache Office, Saigon, who by this time were
dispersed.
On Tuesday, May 6, General CAREY reported from aboard his ship
that thus far his inquiry had established only that the remains
of the two Marines were received at the Seventh Day Adventist
Hospital near Ton Son Nhut. The Marine Security Guard Detach-
ment Commander, we were advised, had attempted before leaving
Saigon to have the remains evacuated through appropriate
Embassy channels. The Deputy Chief of Mission at the American
Embassy, Saigon stated that the remains had left Saigon on one
of the last USAF C130/C141 aircraft. He understood they were
bound for Clark AFB, Philippines.
It was later determined that the bodies of the Marines were not
aboard any of the fixed wing USAF planes that left Tan Son Nhut
before the airport was closed to fixed wing aircraft.
1
General CAREY advised us that the remains were in all
probability at the hospital and that he was requesting
assistance from Ambassador Martin in recovering the remains
through diplomatic initiatives.
On the evening of Tuesday, May 6, the MCMAHON and JUDGE
families again were called upon by Marine Officers and were
notified of the facts.
They were told:
"We are unable to confirm that the remains of your
son were evacuated from South Vietnam. The last
known location of the remains was the Seventh Day
Adventist Hospital, Saigon, where they were sent
for preparation for evacuation. Be assured we are
doing our utmost to locate and recover your son's
remains.
"
"It is requested that you do not disclose this in-
formation to other than the immediate family mem-
bers for at least one day in order that our con-
tinuing efforts in this regard are not impeded."
After midnight the Office of Public Affairs, Department of
Defense was confirming in response to inquiries from the press
that the bodies of the two Marines were possibly still at the
hospital in Saigon, and at the regular daily press briefing on
Wednesday morning all known details were released to the press.
That same day, the Department of Defense was informed by the
Department of State that the probable source of reports that
the remains had been evacuated was a garbled telecon with the
Seventh Day Adventist Hospital in Saigon at the height of the
evacuation.
2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MESSAGE CENTER
CONFIDENTIAL
VZCZCMLT755
C
0
COMIDERATIVE
:
L
MULT
52854
SECT 60 OF 11819
ACTION
DISTR CJCS(04)1-4 CJCS DJS J3(01)5 J5(01)6 NMCC: DDO(01)7
SECDEF(04)8-11 SECDEF: ASD:ISA(07)12-18 ASD: PA(01)19 DIA: MCCC
CSAF WASH DC
CSA WASH DC
CNO WASH DC
FILE (1)20
COPY NO.
9
(020)
TRANSIT/091925Z/0921127/001:47T0R1292109
ZNY 00000 Zoc STATE ZZH
TFJK537
00 RUEHC RUFHGV RUMJMA RUMTBK
DE RUFNPS #1R19 1291927
EXDIS
EXCLUSIVE
ZNY 00000 ZZH
0 R 091925Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9247
INFO RIMTBK/AMENBASSY BANGKOK 5314
SECURE
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6556
DISTRIBUTION
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA 2501
SECCEP
BT
DEPSEG
0 I D L PARIS 11819
MILASST
SPECASST
MR. WEST
EXDIS
can
CCB
SCTY
E.O. 11652: YGDS-1
OMP
TAGS: AEMR, vs, FR
MILPER
SUBJECT: RECOVERY OF REMAINS OF DEAD SAIGON MARINE
I&F
DSP
SECURITY GUARDS
CABLE ON
REF: (A) STATE 107163 EXDIS (B) MANILA 5982 EXDIS
FILE
1. EMBOFF APPROACHED QUAI ACTING DIRECTOR FOR ASIA
BOLLE MAY 9 CONCERNING RECOVERY OF REMAINS OF TWO
MARINE SECURITY GUARDS (REFTELS). BOLLE EXPRESSED
SYMPATHY WITH U.S. DESIRE, BUT SAID QUAI CONSIDERED THAT
IT WAS ENTIRELY TOO SOON TO ATTEMPT THE HUMANITARIAN
PROJECT THE USG REQUESTED. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS
BASICAILY UNABLE TO LEAVE HIS EMBASSY AND STILL HAD NO
PAGE 1
0
N
F
00010109
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
20
MR93-51, # State Hr. 9/10/93
By KBH NARA, Date 10/29/93
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MESSAGE CENTER
CONFIDENTIAL
52854
CONTACTS WITH THE "SAIGON AUTHORITIES". IT WOULD BE
QUITE TMPOSSIBLE AT THIS TIME TO CHECK AT THE 7TH DAY
ADVENTIST HOSPITAL. BOLLE COMMENTED THAT THE FRENCH
EXPECT THE SITUATION TO BECOME MORE CLEAR VERY SHORTLY
AND FRENCH EMBASSY SAIGON PERSONNEL WOULD BE ABLE TO
CIRCULATE TO ASCERTAIN THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE REMAINS
AND TO DETERMINE A MEANS FOR REPATRIATING THEM. BOLLE
WAS AWARE THAT ICRC IS STILL REPRESENTED IN SAIGON,
BUT MERILLON HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT
HAD CONTACT WITH A COMMUNIST RED CROSS ORGANIZATION AND
(0S0)
HENCE WAS ABLE TO FUNCTION.
2. COMMENT: AS IN THE CASE OF THE LIST OF AMERICANS 305
IN SAIGON, THE GOF IS APPARENTLY VERY RELUCTANT TO BE
30000
YMS
REONLY
DIRECTLY AND PUBLICLY INVOLVED IN MATTERS CONCERNING THE
00
U.S. UNTIL IT IS ABLE TO REGULARIZE THE STATUS OF ITS
894349
30
REPRESENTATION IN SVN. PERHAPS ICRC COULD BE MORE
EFFECTIVE AT THIS TIME.
HSS 32237 YMS
85 YAM session 51 D
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BIRAR 43
BT
JOHBAN
#1819
ORNI
ANNOTES
8888
STAMP FXDIS EXCLUSIVE
1008
NMCC FOR DDO
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NUMBER COPIES
CAP JWM 401
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Hey
MEMORANDUM
DARWIN SUDGE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Park kinsed- -
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-meed info. re bodies
Marshalltown, IOWA-
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Emoneous report that bodes
mere abound carriers - morg.
may not have been brought
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Negotiating throught rench-
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ALRALD
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RUSS ROURKE
FROM:
BUD MC FARLANE RCM
SUBJECT:
The Last Two Marines
Killed in Vietnam
Attached is a report which in sum states that the remains
of the last two Marines killed in Vietnam are still at the Seventh
Day Adventist Hospital in Saigon. Apart from the obvious failure
that this fact represents, I have asked our staff for a prompt
recommendation on the actions that are now necessary to attempt
to recover the remains. I will keep you posted.
Attachment
D GERALD ? 1100
DEPART UNITED OF AMERICA DETAILS
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
STATES
OF
8 May 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. Warren L. Gulley
Executive Assistant
Office of the Military Assistant
to the President
The White House
Pursuant to your request, attached is a Navy position on
the failure to evacuate the remains of the last two Marines to
lose their lives in Vietnam.
Ken
Kenneth R. Bailey
Colonel, USA
Military Assistant
Attachment
AMERICAN REVOLUTION WEENTENNING
1776-1976
DE OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350
MM SMIRICA
8 May 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL K. R. BAILEY, USA
Military Assistant to the Special Assistant
to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
Defense
Subj: Navy Position on Evacuation of Marines
Ken:
Pursuant to your request, attached is the response
from the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy re-
garding the failure to evacuate the remains of the last
two Marines to lose their lives in Viet Nam.
The Secretary of the Navy is aware of this report
and it is the official Navy position at this time.
Isslie Les N. Palmer
Commander, U. Navy
Administrative Aide to the
Secretary of the Navy
Attachment
OF DETINSE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380
IN REPLY REFER TO
LITED STATES OF AMERICA
PAI-JDM-gif
8 MAY 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Subj: Failure to remove the remains of two Marines from
Saigon
Ref:
(a) Telcon Col VITALI to LtGen MCLAUGHLIN, Chief of
Staff, Headquarters, Marine Corps of 8 May 1975
1. Reference (a) requested a report of the circumstances
surrounding the failure to evacuate the remains of Cpl Charles
MCMAHON, Jr., USMC and LCpl Darwin L. JUDGE, USMC, from Saigon,
formerly the Republic of Vietnam.
2. Enclosure (1) consists of a narrative chronology of events
and statements from the time of death to the present, 8 May,
1975.
3. Enclosure (2) is a citation of message references in the
possession of this Headquarters.
John n. M.MiLaughlin
JOHN N. MCLAUGHLIN
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
0400/29 Apr (Saigon)
Cp1 McMahon and LCp1 Judge killed by
heavy artillery rocket impacting in
the vicinity of the DAO compound
Saigon
29 Apr 75
Personal casualty notification made
to parents of SNM by Capt. Maloney,
Inspector Instructor Boston (McMahon)
and Capt. Arbelito, Inspector Instructor
Des Moines (Judge). Initial information
provided was that the remains would
probably arrive for burial in 6 to 12
days.
30 Apr 75
A message was sent by Marine Security
Guard Battalion in coordination with
HQMC to CG 9th MAB requesting location/
shipment of remains SNM
1 & 2 May
CTG 79.1 message stated that report
suggests remains SNM are aboard USS
Midway and requested remains be
off-boarded and held army mortuary
Bangkok.
2 May
USS Midway reported to CTG 79.1 that no
remains were aboard
2 May
BrigGen Carey orders investigation
concerning the evacuation of the remains
of SNM.
Adj, FMFPac attempts to trace the location
of the remains, placing telephone calls
to BrigGen Carey, Army and Air Force
Bases at UTAPAO and SATTAHIP Thailand.
In turn military airlift command
SATTAHIP called the USS Midway off the
coast of Thailand, which again stated
there were no remains aboard. Eventually
all Thai bases were contacted with
negative results.
ENCLOSURE (1)
3 May
Throughout the 2d and 3rd of May searches
were conducted of all 7th Fleet ships in
the area and the search efforts were
expanded to U.S. bases at Subic and
Clark in the Philippines. All with
negative results.
3 May
BrigGen. Carey related to FMFPac that an
Embassy Officer indicated the remains
were believed to have been evacuated
by one of the last C-141 or C-130 aircraft
from Tan Son Nhut. Communication by
Adj FMFPac with Hickam AFB indicated
last C-130 departed Tan Son Nhut at 282010Z
Apr 75, 25 minutes after the SNM were
killed. C-130 was committed to evacuating
the crew of a previous C-130 hit by rocket
fire. Communications with 374th Tactical
Airlift Wing Clark AFB, and the pilot
of the last C-130 out of Tan Son Nhut
confirmed the aircraft did not have remains
aboard.
4 May
Adjutant, FMFPac communicated with Marine
Barracks Guam requesting inquiry of
mortuary facilities concerning remains
of SNM. Results negative.
5 May
Inquiry, interviews and investigation
continued. Attempts were made to
communicate with Embassy DAO personnal.
All efforts were negative in that either
the individuals had no knowledge of the
remains or could not be reached.
6 May
CTG 79.1 reported the investigation
completed with the following findings
a) The remains were received at the
Saigon Adventist Hospital.
b) Marine Security Guard Detachment
Commander attempted to have
the remains evacuated through
the appropriate Embassy channels.
2
c) Deputy Chief of Mission, American
Embassy, stated the remains left
Saigon on one of the last USAF
C-130/C-141. Believed headed to
Clark AFB.
d) That the remains were not evacuated
by C-130/C-141 aircraft.
e) That the remains are in all probability
still in Saigon.
BrigGen. Carey has requested assistance
from Ambassador Martin in recovering the
remains through Diplomatic channels.
Ambassador Martin has indicated that he
will initiate appropriate action to
recover the remains.
The following statement was provided to
McMahon and Judge families 062030 May 75:
"We are unable to confirm that the remains
of your son were evacuated from South
Vietnam. The last known location of the
remains was the Seventh Day Adventist
Hospital, Saigon, where they were sent
for preparation for evacuation. Be
assured we are doing our utmost to locate
and recover your son's remains.
It is requested that you do not disclose
this information to other than the immediate
family members for at least one day in
order that our continuing efforts in this
regard are not impeded."
7 May, 1125
The Department of State informed the
Department of Defense that erroneous
telephone communications with the 7th Day
Adventist Hospital, Saigon, were the
probable source of reports that the remains
had been evacuated.
3
CTG 79.1 010330 May75
MSGBn 301721 May75
CTG 79.1 020310 May75 (c)
CTG 79.1 010104 May75 (c)
CTG 79.1 090934 May75 (c)
USS Midway 020720 May75 (c)
CTG 79.1 040437 May75 (c)
CTG 79.1 060652 May75 (C)
SECSTATE 070340 May75 (c) EXDIS EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY
ENCLOSURE (2)
IONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 7, 1975
TO:
Phil Buchen
Jack Marsh M
Max Friedersdorf
Paul Theis
May I have your comments/
concurrence as soon as possible.
Thanks.
Les Janka
x3116
5/8 -
12:40
DRAFT
May 7, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Senator Abourezk's Letter Requesting
Nixon-Thieu Letters
Senator Abourezk has written you the letter at Tab B requesting
copies of the 1972-73 correspondence between President Nixon and
President Thieu. The Senator states that U.S. commitments to South
Vietnam contained in these letters are relevant to hearings his Judiciary
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers will be holding next week on
executive agreements and commitments.
The Senator notes that two of the letters in question were made
public by a South Vietnamese spokesman and states that the letters are
essential to consideration of pending legislation requiring Congressional
oversight of executive agreements.
The draft response to Senator Abourezk declines turning over
the letters and reiterates the arguments you made to SenatorsSparkman
and Stennis regarding the essential need of confidentiality in diplomatic
intercourse. The response also points out the policy and intentions
contained in the letters were stated publicly, that the Administration
has hever invoked any assurances or commitments contained in the
letters as a basis of Congressional action, and that, therefore, the
GERALD R. FORD
record of the Nixon-Thieu exchanges is not relevant to the Subcommittee's
hearings.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter to Senator Abourezk at Tab A.
Philip Buchen, Jack Marsh, Max Friedersdorf and Paul Theis concur.
GERALD + FORD
DRAFT
May 7, 1975
Dear Senator Abourezk:
Thank you for your letter of May 2 regarding the impending
hearings of the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers which will
examine executive agreements and commitments.
I will not be able to respond affirmatively to your request for
copies of letters sent by President Nixon to President Thieu during
1972-73, which according to your letter contain U.S. commitments
regarding American assistance to South Vietnam. A cardinal principle
of diplomatic intercourse is the confidentiality of exchanges between
heads of state. Despite the fact that two of the Nixon-Thieu letters
have been made public, unilaterally, my responsibility to ensure the
effective conduct of American diplomacy requires that the continued
confidentiality of the exchanges not be breached in the interest of
preserving this essential principle for all our diplomatic communications
with other countries.
With specific reference, however, to your concern about
commitments regarding assistance to South Vietnam, I remind you
that President Nixon and members of his Administration stated publicly
and repeatedly that the United States intended to continue its aid rela-
tionship with the Republic of Vietnam and react vigorously to massive
GERALD
-2-
violations of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement. The same policy and
intentions were reflected in the diplomatic exchanges.
Any documents which could be construed as containing or
constituting a government-to-government undertaking have been
provided to the Congress. Furthermore, neither this Administration
nor the previous one has ever invoked any private assurances or com-
mitments contained in any letters as arguments for Congressional action.
Requests for security assistance and opposition to the 1973 prohibition
of the use of military force were always argued on the merits of openly-
stated policy in the belief it was in our national interest to maintain the
necessary conditions for the viability of the Peace Agreement. Our
policy was determined by this view of our interests, not by commitments
or assurances given in any private documents. I do not believe, therefore,
that the record of the exchanges between President Nixon and President
Thieu are relevant to the examination being undertaken by the Subcom-
mittee.
Sincerely,
JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS., CHAIRMAN
JOHN
LELLAN. ARK.
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, NEBR.
ART. MICH.
HIRAM L. FONG, HAWAII
LOWARD M. MENNEDY, MASS.
HUGH SCOTT, PA.
MINCH BAYH, IND.
STROM THURMOND, S.C.
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, N. DAK.
CHARLES MC c. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
MOBERT c. BYRD, W. VA.
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, VA.
United States Senate
JOHN V. TUNNEY, CALIF.
JAMES ABOUREZK, S. DAK.
PETER M. STOCKETT
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
May 2, 1975
The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
For some time the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers has been
examining executive-legislative relations in foreign affairs with
me
special emphasis on executive agreements and commitments. The
Subcommittee held extensive hearings on the subject in April and
May of 1972. Despite congressional attempts to define the powers,
duties and prerogatives of the two branches of the government in
this area of foreign policy, the problem of executive agreements
vis-a-vis the treaty power of the Senate has remained a matter of
increasing concern.
Various legislative proposals are now pending which would prescribe
a congressional role in the making of international agreements, other
than treaties, that commit our national resources. The Subcommittee
presently has before it two such bills requiring congressional over-
sight of these agreements. S. 632 introduced on February 7, 1975,
by Senator Bentsen and S. 1251 introduced on March 20, 1975, by
Senator Glenn. The separation of powers questions involved in
such legislative proposals are vitally important; therefore, we
have scheduled hearings on May 13, 14, and 75, 1975.
Obviously, the letters made public on April 30, 1975, in Washington
by Nguyen Tien Hung, former Minister of Planning for South Vietnam,
are of compelling relevance to these hearings and consideration of
the above-referenced legislation.
Accordingly, I respectfully request that you furnish to the
Separation of Powers Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, copies of the letters of November 14, 1972, and January 5,
17, and 20, 1973, sent by President Richard M. Nixon to President
Nguyen Van Thieu, in which President Nixon makes commitments regard-
ing American assistance to South Vietnam in the post-settlement
period.
The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
May 2, 1975
Page Two
I also request that you send the Subcommittee copies of the letters
of November 11 and December 20, 1972, from President Thieu to
President Nixon regarding American assistance to South Vietnam
in the post-settlement period. I also ask that you transmit to
the Subcommittee copies of any other material or information
related to this correspondence and its substance which is in your
possession. Please let me hear from you regarding these requests
1 by close of business on May 7, 1975. Your cooperation will be
appreciated in view of the time constraints under which we are
operating.
Sincerely,
Powers
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
MAY 7, 1975
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Two years have passed since the last American troops
left Vietnam. Shortly after our withdrawal, draft induc-
tions were terminated. We established an All-Volunteer
Armed Force with the highest pay in history. For the
first time, the Nation's youth could look to the military
for jobs fully competitive with civilian Job alternatives.
America is no longer at war. But peacetime military
volunteers have remained fully eligible for all the wartime
veteran benefits designed to reward those who entered
service during the period of actual hostilities in Vietnam.
The time has now come to terminate wartime benefits
which apply to the new peacetime volunteers. This is con-
sistent with action taken by earlier Presidents in ending
wartime veterans benefits after World War II and the Korean
Conflict.
Today, therefore, I have issued a Proclamation terminating
on May 7, 1975, the eligibility period for those Vietnam
war benefits that the President is empowered by law to
end. At the same time, I am submitting appropriate legis-
lation to the Congress requesting the termination of the
eligibility period for G.I. Bill education and training
benefits -- an action that is solely the prerogative of
the Congress.
These actions primarily concern future peacetime
volunteers who are neither disabled nor die in service.
I want to emphasize that the termination actions will in
no manner impair the eligibility for full wartime benefits
of the more than 7 million Vietnam-era veterans already
discharged, or those presently serving in our Armed Forces.
more
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
2
Future veterans disabled in service will continue to
receive Veterans Administration compensation and other
service-connected benefits on an absolute par with present
wartime benefits. Families of those who die in service will
receive the same service-connected benefits available to
families of veterans of wartime service.
The period between the cessation of hostilities and the
termination of eligibility for wartime veterans' benefits has
already extended longer in the case of Vietnam than for any
prior war. For virtually all of our World War I military
personnel, the benefit eligibility period ended with the
November 11, 1918, Armistice. For World War II veterans,
eligibility was terminated on most benefits December 31, 1946,
some 16 months after the surrender of Japan. A Proclamation
by President Eisenhower established a January 31, 1955,
termination date for most of the Korean Conflict benefits.
The Proclamation followed the signing of the Korean Armistice
by 18 months.
I believe the actions I have taken today make an equitable
distinction between those who serve in time of war and those who
serve in time of peace. These actions also guard the Nation
against unwarranted future expenditures and will result in
cumulative savings of $1.5 billion over the next five years
after termination.
####
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
MAY 7, 1975
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
FIXING TERMINAL DATE RESPECTING SERVICE IN THE
ARMED FORCES ENTITLING PERSONS TO CERTAIN
VETERANS BENEFITS
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
The Congress has provided that entitlement to certain
veterans benefits be limited to persons serving in the
Armed Forces during the period, beginning August 5, 1964,
referred to as the Vietnam era. The President is authorized
to determine the last day on which a person must have entered
the active military, naval, or air service of the United States
in order for such service to qualify as service during that
period.
The signing of the cease-fire agreements and implementing
protocols on January 27, 1973, between the United States of
America and the Republic of Vietnam, on the one hand, and
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam
on the other hand, has terminated active participation by
the Armed Forces of the United States in the Vietnam conflict.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the
United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested
in me by Section 101 (29) of Title 38 of the United States
Code, do hereby proclaim, for the purposes of said Section
101(29), that May 7, 1975, is designated as the last day
of the "Vietnam era."
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
seventh
day of May in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred seventy-five, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred ninety-ninth.
GERALD R. FORD
####
6-10
JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS., CHAIRMAN
JOHN L. MC CLELLAN, ARK.
ROMAN L. HRUSKA. NEBR.
PHILIP A. HART. MICH.
HIRAM L. FONG, HAWAII
EDWARD M. KENNEDY. MASS.
HUGH SCOTT, PA.
BIRCH BAYH, IND.
STROM THURMOND, S.C.
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, N. DAK.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS. JR., MD.
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA.
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, VA.
United States Senate
JOHN V. TUNNEY, CALIF.
JAMES ABOUREZK, S. DAK.
PETER M. STOCKETT
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
June 9, 1975
The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The White House
Washington, D. C.
me
Dear Mr. President:
During the hearings on executive agreements held on May 13, by
the Separation of Powers Subcommittee, retired Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations, testified that it
was "quite clear" to him that "verbal commitments had been made"
to South Vietnam based on what he was told "in one meeting between
the President, the Secretary of Defense and the members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 30th of November 1972."
When I asked Admiral Zumwalt who had indicated that these were
commitments to South Vietnam, he responded that "the best source,
I suppose, Mr. Chairman, of that would be if you could get a hold
of the tape." The Admiral added that it was his "recollection"
that "it was implicit in a whole series of things that were said,"
but he was unable to recount with complete accuracy everything
that was said at that meeting.
The conversations conducted at that meeting as they pertain to
the making of secret commitments and to the making of international
agreements obviously are crucial to this Subcommittee's study of
executive agreements. Thus, we respectfully request that you make
available to the Subcommittee any tapes or transcripts of tapes of,
or any other material which in any way relates to, the meeting
held on November 30, 1972.
Thank you for your help on this matter.
Sincerely,
James Chairman James Abourezk abourez
FORD
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers
JUN 12 1975
June 10, 1975
Dear Senator:
This will acknowledge receipt of your letter
to the President of June 9 requesting that the
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers be
furnished with material relating to a meeting
reportedly to have been held on November 30,
1972.
You may be assured your letter will be accorded
early consideration.
With kind regards,
Sincerely,
William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant
to the President
The Honorable James Abouresk
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
bec: w/incoming to Philip Buchen for further action.
Dec: w/incoming to John Marsh - for your information.
bcc: w/incoming to Max Friedersdorf - for your information.
WTK:EF:VO:vo
FORD i LIBRARY
MONOGRAPH
COMMUNIST INDOCHINA:
PROBLEMS, POLICIES AND SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT
by
Joseph C. Kun
This monograph
presents individual research
in support of the continuing
World Power Assessment
project of Georgetown University's
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
It is for limited circulation and represents
only the views of the author.
COMMUNIST INDOCHINA:
PROBLEMS, POLICIES AND SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT
by
Joseph C. Kun
February 1976
FOREWORD
The dramatic rush of events in the Indochina peninsula
since the spring of 1975 marked the end of more than a
decade of deep American involvement in Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia. They did not, of course, end major power interest
in that strategically important region. On the contrary,
the removal of United States influence and drastic scaling
down of its military strength in the area have meant that the
Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan
have all moved to try to improve their ties with the new
communist governments in Laos, Cambodia and both North and
South Vietnam. This scramble for influence will affect the
course of events throughout the Far East for years to come.
To analyze the initial developments in the region in
this first year after the US withdrawal, we have asked
Joseph C. Kun to report on the internal developments in each
country and how these have affected regional ties as well
as relationships with the major Asian powers and with the
United States. Mr. Kun is well qualified in this field. He
studied Asian affairs at the University of Budapest and at
Harvard University. He has contributed to studies on Asia
at MIT and Columbia University and has published many articles
on Far Eastern political developments.
This monograph was edited for publication by Ms. Nancy
Eddy of the CSIS staff.
Ray S. Cline
Strategic
Executive Director of Studies
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1
CHAPTER I
THE DOMESTIC SCENE
5
The Two Vietnams
5
Laos: Toward a "People's Democracy"
10
Cambodia: A Unique Experiment
14
CHAPTER II
SPHERES OF INFLUENCE
19
Vietnam: Which Way to Lean?
19
Laos: Friendship with Moscow
20
Cambodia: Closer to Peking
23
The Growth of Sino-Soviet Involvement 24
CHAPTER III INDOCHINA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD
27
Laos: How Much Status Quo?
27
Cambodia: The Limits of Isolationism: 28
Tokyo: A Stake in Indochina
31
Vietnam: What Role for the US?
34
INTRODUCTION
"The wars of Indochina ended with two bangs and a
whimper within a single month last spring." So the pres-
tigious London weekly, The Economist, summed up what took
place in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam in April-May 1975. 1
In retrospect, the communist victory in Indochina was inevi-
table. The Paris agreement, signed more than two years
earlier, was never implemented by the communists, and viola-
tions of the ceasefire continued unabated throughout the
entire period. After August 1974 when, under Congressional
pressure, bombing missions ceased in Cambodia, the US was
not in a position to offer its allies the kind of assistance
required to sustain them any longer unless the North Viet-
namese also ended their support for local communist forces.
No such prospect was forthcoming. In a final show-
down, the communists overran Phnom Penh and Saigon on April
17 and 30 respectively. The door was now open to the imple-
mentation of sweeping political and economic measures aimed
at changing the nature of the existing societies. A few
weeks later, the coalition government that had been in office
in Laos for some 13 months fell apart. By the end of 1975,
all of Indochina was under the firm control of three com-
munist regimes, whose leaders shared the heritage of the
same Vietnam-dominated communist movement, the Indochinese
Communist Party (ICP).
But the emergence of these regimes, accompanied by the
decline of Western influence in the region, did not put an
end to great power involvement in Indochina. Almost simul-
taneously with the withdrawal of the last American officials
from South Vietnam and Cambodia, competition between China
and the Soviet Union for spheres of influence sharpened.
Apparently led by material considerations, the North Viet-
namese leadership abandoned its earlier balanced stand in
the Sino-Soviet conflict. Hanoi's endorsement of Soviet
policies unpopular with the Chinese was rewarded by new,
long-term agreements which in essence guarantee the imple-
mentation of the country's economic plans for the second
half of this decade.
1 The Economist (London), July 12, 1975.
-2-
-3-
Communism in Indochina has many faces. In Cambodia,
The dramatic developments that changed the internal
a new experiment is underway in which, under the slogan of
political situation in the states of Indochina could not
"self-reliance," the population of the cities has been in-
fail to affect the region's relations with the rest of the
terned and mass, forced labor has been used to rebuild the
world. After outlining the recent domestic developments in
country's economy. Rejecting all ties with the Soviet Union,
each of the countries involved, this study will briefly
the Red Khmer leaders rely on the political and economic
examine the foreign policy patterns now evolving there. In
support of the People's Republic of China (PRC).
spite of marked differences in orientation, the new regimes
are expected to retain their existing relations with non-
In contrast, the new communist regime in Laos seems
communist countries and seek new ones. In this context, the
receptive to Soviet influences. However, the Pathet Lao
author sees opportunities for the United States in estab-
leadership which abolished the country's 600-year-old
lishing diplomatic ties with Vietnam, which holds the key to
monarchy and set up a Vietnamese-style People's Democratic
the future of the entire Indochina region.
Republic in December 1975, may find itself under increasing
North Vietnamese domination in the months and years to come.
The third nation, South Vietnam, which was from the
very beginning fully dependent on Hanoi, is now facing an
uncertain future under North Vietnamese tutelage.
The establishment of communist governments throughout
Indochina therefore did not result in friendship and tran-
quility for all. Instead, superpower involvement is once
again on the rise, and the animosities arising from ethnic
and political differences remain. With the impending com-
pletion of the unification process, Vietnam will become the
most populous and, militarily, the strongest power in con-
tinental Southeast Asia.
2 Estimates vary on the actual size of the population
of a united Vietnam. In recent speeches North Vietnamese
Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi and South Vietnamese President
Nguyen Huu Tho, spoke of 43 and 45 million people respec-
tively. At least one North Vietnamese publication claimed
a population of "nearly 50 million people," an obvious
exaggeration. However, with anything over 40 million people,
the unified Vietnamese state would become the most populous
country in continental Southeast Asia.
CHAPTER I
THE DOMESTIC SCENE
1. The Two Vietnams
After some months of hesitation, in the fall of 1975
the Vietnamese communists decided to speed up the unifica-
tion of the two parts of the country. The process, con-
sisting of several phases, is to be carried out over a six-
month period and is scheduled to be completed at the end of
April 1976.
The first two steps toward the merger of North and
South Vietnam were the meeting of a Joint Political Con-
sultative Conference for Reunification, held in Saigon
(now Ho Chi Minh City) between 15-21 November 1975, and the
ratification of the decisions reached by that conference in
the second part of December. During talks between repre-
sentatives of the two parts of Vietnam, it was decided to
hold general elections throughout the entire country at the
beginning of April in order to elect representatives for a
joint all-Vietnam National Assembly. Since the schedule
calls for the election of one deputy for every 100,000
people, the joint assembly is to be a sizable body of over
400 representatives.
The assembly, described as the supreme legislative
organ of the united Vietnam, will meet on April 25. During
the session it will set up a joint government and formulate
a new communist-style constitution. Moreover the meeting
will also settle such formalities as the location of the
capital, the name of the new state (most probably a People's
Democratic Republic of Vietnam), the joint flag and the
national anthem. The end of the session will mark the birth
of a new united Vietnamese state in Indochina on the last
day of April. The date has been chosen to coincide with
the first anniversary of the communist takeover of Saigon
on April 30, 1975.
3 In South Vietnam the ratification was carried out at
a meeting of a South Vietnamese People's Representative Con-
ference which met in Saigon on December 20. In the North,
the same process was accomplished at a session of the National
Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) that met
in Hanoi between 21-27 December.
-6-
-7-
Although all this would seem to be the natural outcome
As one editorial appearing in the North Vietnamese military
of the takeover, the convocation of the unification talks in
daily put it, the country "was already unified in various
November of 1975 came as a surprise to most observers in view
respects during the war years," a surprisingly candid ad-
of earlier statements by South Vietnamese communist officials
mission of the fact that Hanoi never considered the fron-
predicting that unification might take up to five years. As
tiers of South Vietnam an obstacle to armed aggression.5
recently as the summer of 1975, the foreign minister of the
The key problem to be decided upon by the reunification
South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG)
conference, according to the same article, was the "state
vaguely described unification as something to be decided upon
issue, or the formalization of what had in fact been
"in the future" by the peoples of the two Vietnams. 4 At that
achieved by military means.
time, the North Vietnamese regime was still anxious to pro-
mote the separate international recognition for South Vietnam
An early deadline for the completion of the unifica-
by having both halves of the country represented in the United
tion process was particularly important in view of Hanoi's
Nations.
intention to inaugurate its second Five Year Plan at the
beginning of 1976. There remain of course striking dif-
As the policy of rapid unification became accepted, that
ferences in the political, economic and social structures
effort was completely abandoned. The events of the Joint
of the two parts of the country. The official view on the
Political Consultative Conference for Reunification last Novem-
politico-economic status of Vietnam, expressed in the usual
ber showed that even the existence of the South Vietnamese
communist terminology, is that following the takeover in the
National Liberation Front (NLF), a front organization that,
South, the Vietnamese revolution entered a new stage in which
under communist direction, played a leading role in the
"the entire country engages in socialist revolution and
struggle for political control of the South, had become super-
socialist construction." Entry into the socialist stage
fluous. Its forced merger with the Patriotic Front of North
requires, among other things, the planned development of the
Vietnam, a meaningless united front organization composed of
economy, including the nationalization of the private sector,
puppet parties and mass organizations, eliminated it as a
a task that is to be carried out "in conformity with the
symbol of a separate South Vietnamese struggle, one that some
realities existing in each zone of our country." The same
nationalist elements in the south may have cherished in the
scheme also calls for the planned development of cultural
past.
life and the building of "men of a new type" throughout the
entire country. 7
There is a striking contradiction between the gradual-
istic approach with which the Vietnamese communists are pre-
sently proceeding toward the complete unification of the
country, and statements issued before the convocation of the
5 Realize National Reunification and Build a Powerful
reunification conference in November. In articles hail-
Country," Quan Doi Nhan Dan (Hanoi) editorial, November 10,
ing the opening of that conference, Vietnamese communist
1975.
publications openly claimed that unification of the two
6
halves of the country had long been completed in all but name.
Preparations for the second Five Year Plan (1976-1980)
began following the ceasefire in 1973. For the intervening
period, the DRV initiated a two year plan of reconstruction
4
and rehabilitation that began in February 1974.
Interview with Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, Foreign Minister
of the PRG, Le Quotidien de Paris (Paris), July 22, 1975.
7
Final Communique of the Political Consultative Con-
ference For Reunification, Vietnamese News Agency (VNA) in
English, November 21, 1975.
-9-
-8-
Vo Chi Cong, all members of the North Vietnamese party
In spite of the somewhat utopian plans of this kind,
hierarchy. 11 It is not difficult to see how such a team
no one in Hanoi seems to believe that it will be an easy
could find a common language with the Hanoi delegation led
task to transform the South Vietnamese economy into some-
by party ideologist Truong Chinh and other military and
thing resembling a communist model. As a recent Radio Hanoi
political functionaries of North Vietnam.
commentary put it, "Reforming the formerly dependent South
Vietnamese economy and transforming it into an independent
The party organization that was in full control of the
and sovereign socialist economy is an all-sided and hard
NLF since its establishment fifteen years ago will not need
struggle
"8 The Vietnamese apparently do not expect to
to be formally united with its counterpart in the North. The
carry out the transformation and rehabilitation of South
South Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) that sep-
Vietnam's economy without the help of the more industrialized
arated from the VWP in January 1972 has, for all practical
communist states. The talks conducted by (North) Vietnamese
purposes, remained an appendix of the latter. While through-
Workers' Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan in Moscow and
out the war years the PRP avoided public contact with the
Eastern Europe late in 1975 appear to have included arrange-
North Vietnamese party and played down its role as a communist
ments for economic assistance for both parts of Vietnam.9
vanguard organization, in confidential party documents it
The economic and trade agreements signed during his visits
admitted being separated from the VWP in appearance only. 12
were to cover the entire second Five Year Plan. In some
As an article published in the Hungarian party daily
instances, North Vietnam's negotiating partners agreed to
Nepszabadsag last year correctly pointed out, "Vietnam always
coordinate their economic plans with that of Hanoi for the
had only one Communist Party; northerners and southerners
corresponding five year period 10 a commitment that may prove
both united in the VWP. "13 Whether formal merger of the two
quite costly in the long run.
parts of the North Vietnamese party will be deemed necessary
remains to be seen. At any rate, such a move would be an
It may have been due to their having accepted the im-
exercise devoid of any real meaning.
pending unification as a fait accompli that, during the first
round of talks on the subject in November 1975, the leaders
of the South Vietnamese NLF stopped pretending independence
from Hanoi. Although the South Vietnamese delegation to the
11
Pham Hung is a member of the VWP Politburo and secre-
talks included a wide assortment of personalities in all walks
tary of the South Vietnam Committee of the VWP; Vo Chi Cong
of life, the key men in the 25-member group were such seasoned
and Tran Nam Trung, respectively chairman and secretary general
communist functionaries as Pham Hung, Tran Nam Trung and
of the South Vietnam People's Revolutionary (communist) Party
(PRP), are both members of the VWP Central Committee.
12 A cadre document captured soon after the PRP's
8
Our People in the South are Determined to Build an
separation from the VWP declared that the declaration of the
Independent and Sovereign Socialist Economy," Radio Hanoi
former was "a necessary strategy /designed/ to deceive the
commentary, November 6, 1975.
enemy." The new party, the document stated, "must maintain
the outward appearance of a separation from the VWP so that
9 Le Duan visited six East European countries and the
the enemy cannot use it in his propaganda Quoted by
Soviet Union in October-November 1975. According to the
Douglas Pike in Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of
joint communiques issued following the talks, the diplomatic
the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge,
representatives of the South Vietnamese PRG were among those
Mass. MIT Press, 1966), p. 140.
participating on the Vietnamese side.
13
Nepszabadsag (Budapest), June 11, 1975.
10 Agreements on the coordination of national economic
plans were reached with the Soviet Union and East Germany.
Long-term loans were negotiated with Hungary, Bulgaria,
Rumania, East Germany and the USSR. Curiously, no new loan
commitments were made by Poland and Czechoslovakia during
Le Duan's visit.
-10-
-11-
2. Laos: Toward A "People's Democracy"
gave up his office to Kaysone Phomvihan who, as the leader
of the Lao communist movement, became the first communist
The momentum of communist victories in South Vietnam
officially to head the government of what once used to be
and Cambodia in April 1975 could not fail to shatter the
known as the Land of a Million Elephants.
Rightist, Neutralist and Pathet Lao coalition that emerged
in Laos a year earlier. At the beginning of May, organized
In an "action program" presented to the congress by
anti-Rightist demonstrations in Vientiane led to the resigna-
Premier Kaysone, the new regime outlined its policies for the
tion and flight of some cabinet members and generals. The
current period. 15 The program provides for the elimination
gradualistic approach shown by the Pathet Lao during this
of all elements allegedly hostile to the new Laotian politi-
initial period had, however, been interpreted by some foreign
cal system, such as the comprador bourgeoisie and feudal
observers as an indication that the communist-dominated Lao
landlords, and promises to gradually readjust the country's
Patriotic Front (NLHS) was still interested in retaining a
inherently weak economy through nationalization of the re-
coalition government. Some others saw it as a sign of
maining private sector and the establishment of new material
division between moderate and hard-line elements within the
and technological bases "in accordance with the socialist
Laotian communist movement. But, if there indeed was a
system." The political and economic measures outlined in the
division, it did not prevent the Pathet Lao from completing
program, coupled with a cultural indoctrination campaign
the takeover in everything but name by mid-summer.
which is to take effect immediately, are part of the overall
effort to turn Laos into a full-fledged communist dictator-
The entry of the Pathet Lao forces into the principal
ship.
centers of Laos, presumably to accelerate the "integration" of
the two armies in early June, the purge of all non-communist
The most important political event that accompanied the
elements from the police force in July, the emergence of a
recent Laotian upheaval was the sudden change in the status
people's revolutionary administration in Vientiane in August,
of the Laotian communist movement in the fall of 1975. Since
and the political reeducation and social "cleaning up cam-
its formation in 1955, the communist party, known as the Lao
paigns" applied to all strata of the population were stages
People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), had kept out of sight,
in the process that for all practical purposes eliminated the
leaving the NLHS as the representative of the political forces
joint administration of the country.
of "liberation." This practice, shared by the communist
movements of South Vietnam and Cambodia, served to emphasize
The Pathet Lao-directed demonstrations demanding the
the national character of the popular fronts, while obscur-
end of the coalition government in late November were the
ing the leading role played within those fronts by the local
first step toward the formal completion of that process. A
communist movements.
National Congress that met in Vientiane in the first days of
December decided, under communist guidance, formally to dis-
solve both the coalition government and the policy-making
National Coalition Political Council. The country's six-
15 The National Congress of People's Representatives
century-old monarchy, abolished at the same time, was re-
convened by the NLHS Central Committee on December 1, 1975,
placed by a Lao People's Democratic Republic. King Savang
was an ad hoc body composed mainly of representatives of
Vatthana, who had reigned only in name for the past sixteen
the newly formed provincial and local people's councils under
years, was replaced by NLHS chief Prince Souphanouvong as
president.
14
the direction of the new communist leadership. The full
Coalition Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma
text of the "action program," delivered by Kaysone on behalf
of the new government, was carried by Radio Vientiane on
December 4, 1975.
14
In an attempt to retain at least the appearance of
respect for the monarchy which has been extremely popular with
the rural population, the regime appointed the former heir to
the throne, Prince Savang Vatthana, to the titular post of
"supreme counselor" to the President.
-12-
-13-
During the second part of 1975, the LPRP suddenly
it may receive from other communist regimes, for its future
abandoned its earlier low posture and began to project an
economic development Laos will have to rely primarily on
entirely new image. In articles and broadcasts issued during
Hanoi. In a recent interview with the North Vietnamese news
this period, the party was described as the originator and
agency, LPRP Secretary General Kaysone Phomvihan placed
undisputed leader of the entire revolutionary process. In
strong emphasis on this requirement by pointing out that in
this respect it not only overshadowed the NLHS, but made the
building up its economy, Laos "now very much needs the
latter seem almost superfluous. As a recent Pathet Lao
assistance and cooperation of all fraternal and friendly
broadcast put it, "Facts show that the Lao People's Revolu-
countries, first of all Vietnam. "18
tionary Party has been the organizer and leader of all
victories of the Lao revolution. "16
In addition to the economic necessities, the educa-
tional and family ties that connect the new leaders of Laos
The completion of the Pathet Lao takeover in December
with North Vietnam are likely to contribute to the special
brought the entire Indochina region under the control of
relationship between the two regimes. 19 All this, plus the
communist parties, sharing the common heritage of the Indo-
possible North Vietnamese reluctance to withdraw completely
chinese Communist Party. The stress placed in recent state-
from Laotian territory should be sufficient to ensure the
ments on the Lao People's Revolutionary Party's early ties
Pathet Lao leadership's loyalty to Hanoi. 20
with the ICP, a movement set up in 1930 by the Vietnamese
communist leader Ho Chi Minh, suggest that the new Laotian
regime will give a very high priority to its relationship with
18
the Vietnamese party. 17
Kaysone's interview with a Vietnamese news agency
correspondent, broadcast by Radio Pathet Lao on October 20,
Party ties alone, however, cannot satisfactorily ex-
1975. Emphasis added.
plain the Laotian communists' affinity to Hanoi. During the
19
past decades, North Vietnam sustained the Lao liberation
Kaysone Phomvihan is half Vietnamese, while Prince
movement by direct military presence on Laotian territory and
Souphanouvong is married to a Vietnamese woman. The two,
by material and political assistance. No matter how much aid
like many other Pathet Lao leaders, received their formal
education in Hanoi in the 1930's. For biographic informa-
tion on Kaysone and other leaders of the LPRP leadership
see Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of
16
Pathet Lao news agency in English to Southeast Asia,
Neutralization (New York:Praeger, 1964), pp. 72-83.
October 27, 1975, outlining a Radio Pathet Lao commentary of
20
October 25. Emphasis added.
There is no reliable information on the number of
North Vietnamese troops presently on Laotian territory.
17
This emphasis on the importance of the Indochinese
Estimates range from 36,000 to as low as 12,000 men. It is
Communist Party as "the precursor of the LPRP" appears in
generally agreed that the North Vietnamese are still main-
almost all recent statements dealing with the communist party's
taining a sizable force in the Ho Chi Minh Trail area of
role in the revolutionary struggle. As a Radio Pathet Lao
southern Laos in addition to the troops in the territories
commentary put it, "Due to its just cause and correct policy,
firmly under Pathet Lao control.
the LPRP, continuing the work of the Indochinese Communist
Party, has successfully organized and led the people of all
nationalities and placed them under the Lao Patriotic Front
"
Radio Pathet Lao, October 29, 1975. Emphasis added.
-14-
-15-
3. Cambodia: A Unique Experiment
By forcing the urban population into the countryside
and by shifting large masses of people from one end of the
The new Cambodian regime, controlled by hard-line
country to the other, 23 the regime is trying to fulfill major
elements of the Red Khmer movement, have chosen a new, un-
construction tasks in the countryside, particularly those
charted path toward a communist revolution. The "Cambodian
connected with irrigation. The replacement of dikes with
road," the regime's uprooting of the urban population and its
higher, more sturdy structures is an important part of the
reliance on forced labor, is a new experiment on which most
work performed by former urban residents in various parts
communist countries prefer to remain silent.
of the country. The constitution promises full employment
for all citizens, a principle that is being implemented by
The state system introduced by the Cambodian regime
the utilization of forced labor on such projects. The "full
at the end of 1975 is quite different from those being formed
equality of all citizens,' as claimed by the constitution, is
in Laos and the two parts of Vietnam. The difference begins
being achieved through the abolition of private property
with the name of the new Cambodian state. Instead of calling
which, in the words of the government report, led to the
it a People's Republic, the regime chose "Democratic Cam-
disappearance of both "rich and poor classes" for the simple
bodia" as the official name of the country. The new state
reason that "everybody works either in the fields or in the
constitution, adopted by a so-called Third National Congress
factories."
in December 1975, set down the fundamental principles along
which the country is to be governed. 21
The constitution does not clarify the exact nature of
the state system now being instituted in Cambodia. With the
From that document, and from an explanatory report on
promulgation of that document, "Democratic Cambodia" became
the constitution delivered to that assembly by Vice Premier
a republic. However, that term is not used in the constitution
Khieu Samphan, 22 there emerges the image of a unique totali-
and in his report Khieu Samphan carefully avoided any refer-
tarian society in which the state takes full charge over all
ence to the abolition of the monarchy. However, the consti-
aspects of the life of the population without considering the
tution provides for the establishment of a state presidium,
wishes of any single individual. Collectivity covers not only
comprised of a president and a first and second vice president.
ownership and the forms of production, but it extends to all
The presidium is described as a form of collective leadership
aspects of the people's livelihood and work, barring the most
set up with the purpose of avoiding mistaken decisions by any
elementary personal belongings of the individual. Collective
single individual: "A collective leadership is less prone to
ownership is universal. All main production facilities and
make errors."
the means of transportation have been declared collective
property. Farming and rural production have also been
collectivized. While there is no mention in the constitution
23
of the role of the private sector in the basic services and
Cambodian refugees reaching Thailand reported in
commerce, it may be assumed that as far as such things still
January 1976 that toward the end of 1975 the Cambodian
exist, they will be performed on a collective basis.
authorities initiated a new wave of migration that is be-
lieved to rival the forced evacuation of city residents from
Phnom Penh in April 1975. According to the reports, peasants
as well as many of those who had been forced to leave the
21
The Third National Congress met in Phnom Penh on
capital are "being shifted principally into the more sparsely
December 14, 1975. The full text of the constitution was
populated northwestern area of the country, primarily
carried by Radio Phnom Penh on January 5, 1976.
Battambang province." David A. Andelman in The New York
Times, January 21, 1976.
22
Khieu Samphan's report on the constitution is the
single most comprehensive document on the political system
now emerging in Cambodia. Although it was delivered at the
Third National Congress in December 1975, the text of the
report was released only at the beginning of this year.
Radio Phnom Penh, January 5, 1976.
-16-
-17-
The new system has yet to be implemented in practice.
Premier in charge of foreign relations, Son Sen, Vice Premier
As of January 1976 the regime continued to rely on some of
in charge of defense, and Hu Nim, Minister of Information and
the institutions set up by Prince Norodom Sihanouk during his
Propaganda. The same men are also believed to be the leading
exile in Peking. Sihanouk himself was still being described
functionaries of the elusive Cambodian communist movement.
as head of state, and decrees were being issued in the name
The Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party (CPRP), which is
of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia. It may
thought to be the real force behind the Red Khmer movement,
be safe to assume, however, that the publication of the consti-
remains in the background; neither its leadership nor its
tution signalled the beginning of a new phase in the country's
organizational structure is known to the outside world. It
recent turbulent history, and that the last vestiges of the
is characteristic of the unique nature of the new constitution
monarchy will disappear in the near future. 24
that it makes no reference to political parties, including
the communist CPRP.
At least in theory, supreme state power in Cambodia is
to rest with an Assembly of People's Representatives, com-
The new regime places great emphasis on Cambodia's
posed of 250 members. of which over half come from the peas-
national traditions and rejects foreign cultural influences,
antry. The representatives to this body are to be elected
primarily those from the West. One important factor that
through "direct and prompt general elections to be held
appears to have played a part in the regime's abrupt up-
throughout the country every five years.
rooting of the urban population following the Red Khmer take-
over of the capital was the Red Khmer leadership's anger over
The exact form of government administration to be set
the "bourgeois" habits of the city dwellers. In his report
up in Phnom Penh is not specified in the constitution. Real
Khieu Samphan mentions specifically the city population's
power seems to be wielded by a very small group of indivi-
lack of national character and their enjoyment of what he
duals who led the Red Khmer armed forces to victory last
calls vestiges of corrupt and reactionary culture. 26 In an
April. The most influential member of this group is Khieu
effort to promote national tradition, the regime introduced
Samphan who, although a Vice Premier, clearly outranks all
the policy of complete rejection of Western influence, in-
other members of the administration, including Premier Penn
cluding Western-style clothing. In Khieu Samphan's words,
Nouth 25 The few visible members of the Cambodian com-
"we dress in line with our national mores, in accordance
munist leadership besides Khieu Samphan are Ieng Sary, Vice
with the realities, and within the means of our people and
our nation."
The regime's concern over the reconstruction of the
24 The role Sihanouk is to play in the new Cambodian
economy, its rejection of foreign cultural influences and the
regime is not clear. In spite of his two visits to Phnom
striving toward a classless society, all reflect a kind of
Penh following the Red Khmer victory, the Prince remains
messianism that is frequently present at the early stages of
something of an outsider to the regime. It is possible
that he will be assigned to a honorary post, probably out-
side of Cambodia.
26
Parts of Khieu Samphan's report betray a sur-
25 Penn Nouth, a close associate of Sihanouk, appears
prisingly naive attitude toward foreign cultural influences:
to have no real influence over government decisions. His
"Look at what the former regime/ did to their followers:
retention as Premier may be a gesture toward the Prince who
the houses of Phnom Penh are full of unthinkable things.
is still believed to enjoy great respect among the rural
I do not know how to describe them. These homes have no
population.
national character at all
-18-
CHAPTER II
SPHERES OF INFLUENCE
revolutionary movements, particularly in Asia. However, the
history of world communism has shown that this kind of naive
messianism tends to diminish rapidly soon after the new
1. Vietnam: Which Way To Lean?
communist officialdom becomes entrenched in bureaucratic
routine. It may be due to their awareness of such a possi-
While the reunification of the two halves of the
bility that the new Cambodian leaders are purposely trying
country will most directly benefit Hanoi, Moscow has appar-
to maintain revolutionary elan and avoid a slowdown in the
ently scored some important gains from recent developments
pace of economic reconstruction. Similarly, the desire to
in Indochina. VWP First Secretary Le Duan's trip to the
eliminate the effect of foreign influences on the population
Soviet Union and East Europe in the fall of 1975 revealed
may be a factor in the regime's unwillingness to relax its
a shift in North Vietnamese policies, from the state of
policies of labor exploitation and population shifts within
careful balance between Moscow and Peking to a perceptibly
the country.
pro-Soviet stance. In the joint communiques signed during
the visit, the North Vietnamese gave their approval to
policies that the Chinese have openly criticized in recent
years.
Hanoi's endorsement of such touchy issues as East-
West detente, the results of the recent Conference on Securi-
ty and Cooperation in Europe and the (pro-Soviet) Portuguese
Communist Party's efforts to gain an upper hand in that
country, were certain to antagonize the Chinese leadership.
Moscow and its East European allies will have to repay
North Vietnam for its endorsement of Soviet policies by
supplying the united Vietnamese regime with expensive machine-
ry to refurbish the heavy industrial base in the North and
keep both North and South supplied with consumer goods that
are in short supply in Vietnam. 27 For the Soviet Union,
27 An agreement signed in December 1975 on Soviet
economic and technological aid to North Vietnam in the 1976-
1980 period envisaged cooperation in such diverse areas as
the construction of large power generating projects, chemical,
machine-building and coal industries, projects for the pro-
duction of building materials, for the food and light indus-
tries, as well as in geological prospecting, agriculture and
other branches of the Vietnamese economy. Radio Moscow,
December 18, 1975. Details on the agreement were given by
Vitaly Morozov, First Vice Chairman of the USSR State
Committee for Foreign Economic Relations in an interview
with the Soviet news agency TASS on January 4, 1976.
-21-
-20-
During the years prior to the communist victory,
the existence of a united Vietnam and the long-term pros-
Moscow's dealings with the Lao liberation movement were con-
pect of a Vietnam-led federation of communist states evol-
ducted primarily through Soviet agencies outside the country,
ving in Indochina represent both a guarantee against the
such as the Soviet embassy in Hanoi. The collapse of the
rapid spread of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and a
three-sided coalition which, among other things, led to the
promise of economic, political, and, possibly, military
reduction of the US diplomatic presence and the elimination
advantages in a region of considerable strategic importance.
of the giant US aid effort, resulted in the sudden influx
of Soviet personnel in Laos. While estimates vary, Western
On the other hand, the appearance south of the PRC's
journalists reporting out of Vientiane last fall detected
borders of a strong, Soviet-oriented Vietnam would be most
a numerical increase of Soviet personnel in Laos from some
unwelcome to the Chinese leadership. Although while in
100 in June to 300-500. 29 These figures include embassy
Peking in September 1975 Le Duan was received by Mao,
personnel, pilots and technical specialists of all kinds,
Chinese disappointment with the Vietnamese leader could
operating both in the capital and in the countryside.
easily be detected from the failure of the two sides to
publish a joint communique on the talks. Disagreements were
Prior to November 1975, most foreign supplies arrived
also evident from Le Duan's abrupt departure from Peking and
via Thailand, due to landlocked Laos' continued dependence
the lack of a return banquet for his Chinese hosts, which is
on the port of Bangkok and the Thai rail network for its
most unusual during such visits. Hanoi's own reservations
import requirements. 30 The early completion of an all-
about China's anti-Soviet stance were clearly expressed by
weather road from Vientiane to the former liberated areas in
the Vietnamese news agency's unusual treatment of Chinese
the northeast that would tie up with the North Vietnamese
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's banquet speech made in Le
road system, a project to which the regime reportedly is
Duan's honor: the VNA version of the speech missed Teng's
remarks in which he warned against the superpowers (a
giving very high priority, should eventually eliminate the
need to rely on Thailand for the transit of imported goods.
pseudonym for the Soviet Union), as being the "biggest inter-
national exploiters and oppressors of today."
2. Laos: Friendship With Moscow
29 Fox Butterfield from Vientiane in The New York Times,
October 21, 1975.
The bulk of economic assistance the Laotians will be
receiving from communist countries other than North Vietnam
30 Until November 1975, Laos relied on the Thai rail
is likely to come from the Soviet Union. Throughout the
network for the import of almost everything from rice to
1960s, Moscow contributed to the Pathet Lao and Neutralist
gasoline. But the recent differences with Thailand that led
war effort weapons and other aid material that reached Laos
to the closure of the border between the two countries have
by road and, to a lesser extent by air, via North Vietnam.
made the Vientiane regime greatly dependent on North Vietnam
Soviet assistance was, however, greatly stepped up after the
for its imports. An emergency protocol signed between North
Pathet Lao regime established itself in Vientiane in nid-
Vietnam and Laos on December 3 specified that as of that date
1975.
28
foreign aid contributions would be directed to Haiphong
harbor and will be transported to Laos by air or road. The
protocol stipulates that in 1976 the Vietnamese side will
transport 60,000 tons of material and aid originating from
28
The Lao people have received constant, unconditional
third countries to Laos. The Vietnamese will also help
and sincere material and moral support and assistance from the
Laos repair a number of highways thereby facilitating road
party, government and fraternal people of the USSR, particu-
communications between the two countries. Radio Vientiane,
larly after. the seizure of administrative power throughout
December 6, 1975.
the country. Radio Pathet Lao, November 7. 1975. Emphasis
added.
-22-
-23-
For the Soviet Union, the emergence of a friendly com-
munist regime in Laos has obvious advantages. Laos is a
The Pathet Lao takeover in Laos presupposes that the
very poor country, possessing only a few light industrial
1961 agreements on Chinese road building be reconsidered
enterprises. The cost of Soviet aid to Vientiane will there-
by the new Vientiane administration. For the time being,
fore remain far below what the Soviet Union is spending on the
the Laotians appear to be willing to further utilize the
economic reconstruction of the two Vietnams. On the other
Chinese project and have made a new arrangement for the con-
hand, the introduction of new aid projects will provide Moscow
struction of a new stretch of road in 1976.31 However, the
with excellent listening posts south of the Chinese border.
regime must sooner or later limit the road builders' mono-
The Laotian regime's alliance with North Vietnam should pre-
poly over much of the northwestern part of Laos. During the
vent China from exerting an influence on the Indochina region,
past 15 years, the Chinese crews enjoyed a form of extra-
with the possible exception of Cambodia. Meanwhile, the
territoriality, due both to the remoteness of the area in
Soviet presence in Vientiane could bolster some of the forces
which they operated and to the inability of the Royal Laotian
within the Laotian communist movement who may hope to retain
armed forces to exert control over the road builders.
the country's independence from Hanoi.
Since the early 1960's, Chinese activity in Laos has
3. Cambodia: Closer To Peking
taken three different forms. First, unlike the USSR, while
maintaining diplomatic relations with the governments under
Although it relies on Chinese support, the Red Khmer
Prince Souvanna Phouma, China has also maintained official
in Cambodia have thus far shown no interest in openly taking
representation at Prince Souphanouvong's NLHS headquarters
sides in great power rivalries now shaping up in Indochina.
in Phong Saly. The Chinese consulate in the latter was mainly
Perhaps out of ideological considerations, Phnom Penh rejects
concerned with the coordination of China's material and
any relationship with Moscow. While they accept Chinese
military aid and with travel arrangements for NLHS func-
assistance, there is nothing to indicate that the Cambodian
tionaries outside of Laos. Second, Chinese weapons, mainly
leaders will allow their country to become the "Albania" of
the light variety, reached the NLHS area through the road
Southeast Asia.
connecting Phong Saly with the town of Meng La in Yunnan
province.
The Soviet leadership's belated attempts to pacify
Prince Sihanouk by breaking diplomatic relations with the
The third and potentially most important form of
Lon Nol government in March 1975 came at a time when Sihanouk
Chinese activity concerned the construction of a complex and
himself was rapidly losing control over Cambodian develop-
extensive road network that runs across the rugged terrain
ments. China, which gave shelter to the Prince following
of northwest Laos in a northeast-southwest direction,
his ouster in March 1970 and later became the main weapons-
reaching the Burmese and Thai borders at two separate points
supplier to the Red Khmer movement, remains the primary
and the Mekong river at a third.
source of foreign economic assistance to Cambodia.
The road building project that the Chinese conducted
At the moment neither China nor the Soviet Union pose
for over 13 years employs an estimated 10,000 construction
a direct threat to Cambodia's independence. However, perhaps
workers, presumably all members of the Chinese People's
as a result of their concern over being surrounded by North
Liberation Army (PLA). The roads, and those working on them,
have been protected by an undetermined number of PLA troops,
including both infantry and antiaircraft battalions.
31 At the end of 1975, a new group of Chinese road
builders arrived in Laos to begin work on the Nambak-Luang
Prabang road in early 1976. Pathet Lao News Agency,
December 30, 1975.
-24-
-25-
Vietnamese-dominated areas, the new Red Khmer leadership
extensive reliance on Soviet and East European economic aid
has formally declared its opposition to being drawn into
for the new Five Year Plan period is likely to contribute to
alliances with outside forces. The Cambodian constitution,
the deterioration of relations between North Vietnam and the
promulgated in January 1976, provides for a "neutral, non-
PRC. Conflicting territorial claims, even if the territory
aligned, sovereign and democratic state with territorial in-
involved is minuscule, can only add to what appears to be a
tegrity." Moreover, in a separate article on Cambodia's
potential clash between the two neighbors. 32
foreign policy, the document specifically rejects the idea
of allowing foreign military bases on Cambodian territory,
In view of the Laotian communists' close ties with the
and provides for "absolute struggle against all forms of
North Vietnamese leadership, the future of Laotian-Chinese
outside interference in its internal affairs, be it through
relations seems greatly to depend on Hanoi's relationship
subversion, military aggression, or any other means.
with the PRC. Any rift between the Vietnamese and Peking
would almost inevitably be reflected in Vientiane's attitude
The constitution's emphasis on independence, neu-
toward China. Closer to home, a potential source of conflict
trality and nonalignment, may be due to earlier instances
would be a Pathet Lao demand for the withdrawal of Chinese
of Vietnamese aggression which left a strong mark on the
construction units from Laotian territory. Chances are that
memory of the Cambodian people. Since April 1975, a large
any attempt by the new Vientiane leadership to terminate
segment of the Vietnamese community is believed to have left
earlier agreements with the PRC on the construction of roads
Cambodia for South Vietnam. However, due to the lack of exact
in northwestern Laos would be angrily denounced by the Chinese
delineation of sections of the border between Cambodia and
as a "flagrant violation" of existing treaties.
Vietnam, it is impossible to determine whether Vietnamese
troops are presently stationed within the territorial limits
of the new Cambodian state.
32 Before the communist takeover in April 1975, the
4. The Growth Of Sino-Soviet Involvement
government of South Vietnam claimed ownership of both the
Paracel Islands and the Spratlys. Shortly after taking
possession of the South, Vietnamese communist units seized
Predictions as to the long-term effect of the Sino-
the Poulo Wai Island group, also claimed by Cambodia. Hanoi's
Soviet conflict on Indochina are almost impossible to make
interest in the offshore islands is evident from the Quan Doi
at this juncture. However, a variety of factors, such as
Nhan Dan editorial, referred to in Footnote 5, which stated:
North Vietnam's siding with Moscow on a number of political
"Today, our national unification is the firmest and of the
issues, Hanoi's disagreement with Peking on the meaning of
highest degree; from Lang Son to Ca Mau and from the mainland
"hegemonism," and the steady growth of Soviet economic assis-
to the offshore islands, our country is now actually unified."
tance to the DRV have apparently driven the Vietnamese com-
Emphasis added. The latest reiteration of the Chinese claim
munists closer to the Soviet fold.
to the islands came in a Kwang-ming Jih-pao (Peking) article
of mid-November in which the Chinese leadership strongly re-
Peking's reaction to this development may be reflected
asserted its view that the Spratlys were a part of China's
in the intensification of Chinese diplomatic activity through-
"sacred territory." The article warned that the Spratlys,
out Southeast Asia. The Chinese may try to increase their
like Taiwan, would "certainly be returned to the motherland."
influence over the countries not yet committed to North Vietnam
For an interesting roundup of conflicting claims to the
or the Soviet Union, such as Cambodia, Burma, Malaysia and
Spratlys, see Fox Butterfield in The New York Times, January
Thailand. The recent Soviet gains in Laos and Vietnam
25, 1976.
are, however, bound to result in the further sharpening
of the Sino-Soviet competition in Indochina. Hanoi's
CHAPTER III
INDOCHINA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD
1. Laos: How Much Status Quo?
The new Pathet Lao government's relations with the
rest of the world will depend on its ability to retain a
semblance of independence in its dealings with individual
foreign states. The communists' willingness to retain dip-
lomatic ties with the United States has been interpreted by
some Western observers as an attempt to use the US as a
counterweight to North Vietnamese, Soviet and Chinese in-
fluence in Laos. A more likely explanation is the new
Laotian leaders' awareness of the economic problems con-
fronting the country in the months and years to come.
Although all US aid effort has been terminated and
AID officials left the country before the June 30, 1975,
deadline set by the Pathet Lao, the new administration may
hope that the United States could still be persuaded to con-
tribute to the maintenance of former projects by supplying
spare parts and technological and engineering know-how.
Until last June, the US acted as the principal contributor
to the five-nation Foreign Exchange Operation Fund (FEOF),
a consortium set up to underwrite the kip, and thereby pro-
vide Laos with its only means to make purchases in non-
communist markets.
Pathet Lao officials not familiar with the workings
of the US government may feel that the willingness to retain
an American diplomatic presence in Vientiane could lead to
the reversal of Washington's decision to stop payments to
the Fund. 33 For the time being, however, the retention of
friendly relations with the remaining members of FEOF,
Australia, England, France, and Japan, are becoming even
more important. Unless new Western credits are forth-
coming, the country's reliance on the communist world, and
particularly on Vietnam, for the supply of economic
necessities will become heavier.
33 The Pathet Lao authorities who ordered the closure
of all AID facilities by the end of June, later complained
about Washington's decision to cut off all economic assis-
tance. American aid to Laos in FY 1975 amounted to some
30 million dollars. In July 1975, Congress prohibited any
further aid to Indochina, including assistance given through
international agencies.
-28-
-29-
Laos' relations with the rest of the world have on the
whole remained unaltered in spite of the breakdown of the
Ironically, the Prince, whose dislike of radicalism
coalition government in mid-1975. The Pathet Lao charges
is well-known, cited this unusual situation as the reason for
against Thailand, which resulted in the sudden deterioration
the new Cambodian regime's lack of readiness to normalize
of Thai-Lao relations over a border incident last fall,
relations with France. As Sihanouk put it, "We cannot receive
appeared to be an exception. Since any long-term disruption
large numbers of ambassadors at the same time; there is a
in the relations between Bangkok and Vientiane would have
shortage of water and electricity in Phnom Penh; there is not
serious economic consequences for Laos, some observers feel
even a market The Prince also made it clear that he had
that it was the North Vietnamese regime that tried to turn
little say in the matter: "The home leadership, which is
the differences between the two countries to its own advan-
following the world situation closely, will decide; it will
tage. Any real or imaginary danger to the new Laotian state's
give its judgment. 35
independence would serve as an excuse to continue the deploy-
ment of North Vietnamese forces on Laotian territory indefi-
The "home leadership," meaning the Red Khmer leaders
nitely.
in Phnom Penh, has thus far shown little interest in estab-
lishing relations with the rest of the world. As of
Having achieved a military victory with North Viet-
January 1976, there were only six diplomatic missions in the
namese help, the Laotian communists may now find that the
capital, although plans have reportedly been made to set up
country's political and economic independence may at least
relations with Rumania, Yugoslavia and Algeria. 36 It is
partially hinge on their ability to hold on to existing
likely, however, that the gradual normalization of the
contacts with the non-communist world, and particularly with
domestic situation will allow for the inclusion of more
the nations of Southeast Asia. The more Laos' relations
"neutralist" countries in this category.
with its immediate neighbors is allowed to deteriorate, the
more its reliance on Hanoi will increase. A long-term con-
But the hard realities of the country's economic
flict with Thailand would further worsen the country's
situation demand that Cambodia also deal with its neighbors
economic situation, thereby limiting the new regime's
in Southeast Asia. Vice Premier Ieng Sary's visit to
ability to retain its grasp over the conduct of domestic
Bangkok at the end of October was a breakthrough in this
affairs.
respect, although it did not lead to the establishment of
embassies in the two capitals. 37 However, a second meeting
2. Cambodia: The Limits Of Isolationism
35 Le Monde (Paris), October 11, 1975.
Nine months after the Red Khmer took over Phnom Penh,
the once bustling metropolis remains an empty shell. Follow-
ing his brief visit to the capital in September 1975,
36 Up to the beginning of February, the Pathet Lao had
Sihanouk estimated that some 100 thousand people were left
received new ambassadors from North Vietnam, North Korea,
in what once used to be a city of three million inhabitants.
34
Albania, Cuba, and the PRG of South Vietnam. The Chinese
ambassador, formerly accredited to Sihanouk, now resides in
Phnom Penh.
34 In an interview with a Japanese newspaper, Sihanouk
37 As a result of Ieng Sary's visit to Thailand, the
implied that the evacuation of the capital's three million
Red Khmer's first contact with the non-communist world, the
residents was due to persistent food shortages. The Daily
two countries agreed on the immediate establishment of
Yomiuri (Tokyo, English edition), October 21, 1975.
diplomatic relations. Prior to the establishment of em-
According to most foreign estimates, the population of Phnom
bassies, an issue on which Sary remained very vague, liaison
Penh never exceeded the 1.8 million mark.
offices were set up in towns along the Thai-Cambodian border.
According to Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan, these
offices will deal with all kinds of contacts, including
"political, immigration, trade and other matters."
-30-
-31-
between Ieng Sary and Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai
In the long run, the Cambodian communists may find it
Chunhawan, held in November revealed something about the
difficult to keep the North Vietnamese at a distance. The
new Cambodian leadership's independence from its communist
pointedly correct but cool reception given to the North
neighbors. The talks happened to coincide with the sharp
Vietnamese ambassador upon his arrival in Phnom Penh in
deterioration of Thai-Laotian relations and the incident
October 1975 may have been designed to demonstrate the
that temporarily closed parts of the border between Laos and
regime's desire to treat Hanoi as an equal. However, the
Thailand. 38 Thus the Laotian and North Vietnamese attacks
impending reunification of the two parts of Vietnam brings
on the Thai leadership had little effect on the independent-
Cambodia in direct contact with the North Vietnamese. The
minded Red Khmer which prefers to put national interests
lack of exact delineation of its border with South Vietnam
above communist "internationalism, at least on the regional
and the suspected presence of some North Vietnamese troops
scale. 39
on Cambodian territory could give rise to conflicts between
the Chinese-oriented Cambodians and Soviet-oriented North
Soon after the establishment of the Lao People's
Vietnamese. This would be all the more likely if relations
Democratic Republic in December, the Laotian communists sent
between Hanoi and Peking were to further deteriorate in the
an official delegation to Phnom Penh in search of closer
future.
relations with the Red Khmer regime. In spite of the high
level talks between the two sides, the final communique merely
Cambodia's "neutralism" therefore may be a source of
reiterated the principles of independence, sovereignty and
irritation to the Vietnamese leadership. The two regimes'
territorial integrity. Although the communique included a
relations could be further complicated by conflicting terri-
pledge for the strengthening and developing of the relations
torial claims that came to light as a result of the Vietnamese
between the two countries, no agreement was signed on
occupation of the Poulo Wai Islands in June 1975. 41
specific topics such as trade or transportation, and no formal
diplomatic relations were established. 40
3. Tokyo: A Stake In Indochina
By the end of 1975, the most important non-communist
38 The meeting, which took place on November 17, was,
power to have established a presence in Vietnam was Japan.
according to the official Cambodian statement, "extremely
Tokyo's strong preoccupation with this region can be ex-
successful" and proceeded in an "atmosphere of friendship
plained both by Japan's geographical closeness to the Indo-
and understanding." Radio Phnom Penh, November 22, 1975.
china peninsula and by the extensive economic ties it already
had with the rest of Southeast Asia. The Vietnam agreement
39 Phnom Penh's relationship with Thailand was,
of January 1973 that led to the military disengagement of the
however, briefly disrupted in December due to a minor
United States from Indochina was quite naturally seen by the
border incident over the ownership of a loosely delineated
Japanese as an opportunity to establish a presence in that
strip of the frontier in Western Cambodia. Although the
region. In 1974, Japan and North Vietnam concluded an
clash ended with the two sides agreeing on a ceasefire, the
agreement on diplomatic relations, although the formal
exact ownership of the territory involved remains unresolved.
opening of embassies was postponed pending the outcome of
40
The text of the joint Lao-Cambodian communique was
carried by Radio Phnom Penh on December 19, 1975.
41
On June 10, 1975, Vietnamese communist troops in-
vaded the Poulo Wai Island group about 55 miles off the
Cambodian coast. The ownership of the islands had been
contested by the former non-communist governments of South
Vietnam and Cambodia.
-32-
-33-
economic talks. Those talks resulted in an important agree-
Changes that have recently become apparent in North
ment signed in Hanoi in October 1975. The Japanese make no
Vietnam's attitude toward China and the Soviet Union have
secret of the fact that the agreement, a 8,500 billion yen
somewhat altered the original Japanese view of the power
(ca. $30 million) grant-in-aid to the DRV, is in essence a
relations in a postwar Indochina. Following the Vietnam
form of reparation for damage caused to Vietnam during World
agreement of 1973, the Japanese saw Southeast Asia as being
War II. 42 But Tokyo's willingness to agree to the Vietnamese
no longer a focal point of the power struggle among the
demand that made the opening of embassies conditional on
superpowers. They also evaluated the North Vietnamese
economic assistance reflects a lingering inferiority complex
communists' balanced stand between Peking and Moscow as a
that the Japanese continue to exhibit in their dealings with
guarantee of Vietnam's continued independence from both
the nations of Southeast Asia. In addition to this, there
communist powers.
appears to be a concern that, if pushed too hard, the Japanese
approaches to the countries of this region could be taken as
In the light of the latest developments, the Japanese
a new attempt at the domination of Southeast Asia, if only in
now begin to realize that the intensification of the Sino-
the economic sense. 43
Soviet competition in Indochina may complicate their own
diplomatic activity in that region. They also believe that
In spite of this, the Japanese government seems to be
China's impatience with Japan over the latter's stand on the
convinced of the economic and political advantages that would
"hegemony" question, which remains the key issue blocking
result from the establishment of full diplomatic relations
the Sino-Japanese treaty talks, may have something to do with
with the countries of Indochina and particularly with North
the Soviet diplomatic and economic offensive in Indochina. 46
Vietnam. Economically, it is hoped that the high initial
investment will pay off at a later date in the form of North
Nevertheless, relations are actively being sought not
Vietnamese orders for heavy industrial equipment necessary for
only with Hanoi but also with the rest of Indochina. Diplo-
the speedy reconstruction of the country's industrial base. 44
matic contacts with Laos have been retained in spite of the
Politically, the Japanese feel that Vietnam has been, and is
gradual abolition of the coalition government since last May
likely to remain, the key power in the area, and its influ-
and the formal assumption of power by the Laotian communists
ence on its neighbors will be even stronger in the years to
at the end of 1975. The Japanese government has also extended
come. It is through its ties with Hanoi that Tokyo hopes to
recognition to the Red Khmer in Cambodia and the PRG in South
mend its relations with the rest of Indochina. 45
Vietnam. The Japanese embassy in Saigon, which remained open
following the communist takeover in April, has had little
formal contact with the South Vietnamese authorities and its
42
personnel has been reduced drastically. In spite of their
The Daily Yomiuri (English edition), October 11, 1975.
43
These factors in Japan's relationship with Southeast
46
Asia were elaborated upon by Masataka Kosaka in Options for
Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), November 12, 1975. At the
Japan's Foreign Policy (London: Institute for Strategic
end of 1975 the Japanese government suddenly relaxed its ear-
Studies, 1973, Adelphi Papers No. 97), pp. 22-27.
lier objections to the inclusion of a so-called "hegemony"
44The first years of official contacts more or less
clause in the long-pending peace treaty with China. It is
encouraged this notion: Japanese-DRV trade in 1975 amounted
impossible to determine what, if any, role Soviet involvement
in Indochina had in that decision.
to some 15 billion yen and appears to be growing.
45
Asahi Evening News (Tokyo, English edition),
November 5, 1975.
-34-
-35-
expressed interest in establishing a dialogue with the PRG,
the Japanese must have come to the conclusion that sooner or
of diplomatic contacts with the US conditional on American
later all dealings with, 47 the Vietnamese must be channeled
reconstruction aid to North Vietnam, a demand that the Ford
directly through Hanoi.
administration feels it cannot comply with in view of the
changes that have taken place in the situation in Indochina
since the signing of the Paris agreement three years ago.
4. Vietnam: What Role For The US?
In spite of this, however, last fall both the US and
Up to now, Hanoi's relationship with Japan has centered
North Vietnam made some initial gestures that opened the way
primarily on economic matters. The North Vietnamese are now
toward a dialogue between the two governments. The first
interested in creating economic as well as political rela-
such gesture was the DRV's releasing of nine Americans who
tionships with the major industrial powers of the West, in-
had elected to stay in South Vietnam during the US evacuation
cluding the United States. Some progress has already been
in April 1975. Somewhat later Hanoi accepted some 1500
made in that direction. 48 But as the date of unification
Vietnamese refugees who chose to return to their homeland.
approaches, Hanoi must embark on a bolder foreign policy course
In return, the US allowed a Quaker organization, the American
that involves establishing contacts with powers that were con-
Friends Service Committee, to resume shipments of small
sidered hostile during the years of confrontation.
quantities of relief supplies to Vietnam. In December, the
DRV invited members of the House Select Committee on Missing
Ever since North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong re-
Persons to discuss the fate of some 850 US military personnel
opened the issue of normalizing relations with the US in June
listed as missing in action or held prisoner in Indochina, a
1975, 49 the problem has been widely discussed by American
move that appeared as a promising beginning toward the solu-
political and journalistic circles. In their recent state-
tion of a major outstanding issue between the two governments.
ments, the North Vietnamese leaders have made the establishment
Although the meetings held between the Select Committee and
the North Vietnamese brought only moderate results, 50 both
during those sessions, and in communications with some members
of the US Congress, the North Vietnamese expressed interest in
47
The PRG seems to have no illusions about its role
establishing diplomatic relations with the United States. 51
in Vietnam's foreign relations after reunification. Speaking
about the post-reunification stage, a PRG diplomat revealed
that the South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry will move to Hanoi.
50
On December 21, 1975 the North Vietnamese released
However, the same official saw a continuing role for Saigon
the bodies of three American pilots killed in the Vietnam war.
in the handling of Vietnam's economic contacts with the non-
However, Hanoi still declines any knowledge of the fate of
communist world. Interview given by the director of the
the rest of the US military personnel listed as missing or
Press Department of the PRG Foreign Ministry to a Japanese
killed in Indochina during the war.
newsman at the end of October. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo),
November 1, 1975.
51
In a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy, the North
48
Vietnamese indicated the willingness to return the remains
As of 1975, the North Vietnamese maintained diplo-
of two American marines killed in Saigon in the last days of
matic relations with a number of industrialized countries
the US withdrawal from South Vietnam. During a trip to Hanoi
such as Australia, France, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
and Saigon in January 1976, Senator George McGovern con-
Kingdom.
cluded that the US should consider the problem of negotiation
49
without undue haste.
In a speech before the DRV National Assembly on June
3, 1975, Dong's remarks on normalization of US-Hanoi contacts
were the first instance in about a year and a half that a
senior North Vietnamese official had directly addressed him-
self to the problem.
-36-
-37-
However, the half-hearted approach Hanoi has thus far
However, the North Vietnamese seem genuinely inter-
shown toward the issue of locating and returning the persons
ested in buying "capitalist" goods and technology and, in
still missing in Indochina may be due to the Vietnamese com-
certain areas, the purchase of US technology and know-how
munists' underestimation of the importance attached to that
may be more attractive than that available at other free-
problem by the American public. It was perhaps to help the
world markets. Recent hints by Hanoi on the regime's willing-
North Vietnamese leaders better to understand Washington's
ness to renegotiate the contracts of US firms formerly en-
view on this matter that, in a speech delivered on December 7.
gaged in offshore drilling along the South Vietnamese coast
President Ford confirmed the basic principles of US policy
is the most important indication that economics may be the key
toward the newly established regimes of Indochina. "Our poli-
to the future of US-Vietnamese relations. 53
cies toward the new regimes of the peninsula," the President
stated, "will be determined by their conduct toward us. We
Hanoi may also be counting on a possible change in
are prepared to reciprocate gestures of goodwill -- parti-
Washington's attitude toward the present embargo on US busi-
cularly the return of the remains of Americans killed or
ness with Vietnam. The Vietnamese leaders may argue that
missing in action, or information about them. 52
under increasing pressure from American oil companies, the
administration will soon stop blocking new legislative moves
What makes the President's words all the more relevant
aimed at ending the embargo. The Vietnamese appear fully to
is that presently there is little public or congressional
understand that the embargo must be lifted before American
pressure on the administration calling for a speedy decision
companies can resume oil exploration off the coast of South
on the recognition of the Vietnamese regime. Whatever pres-
Vietnam. However, they may not understand that legislative
sure there may be in that direction, it comes from US busi-
moves toward lifting the embargo may be dependent on Hanoi's
ness circles in the Far East that are interested in the
willingness to locate and return the remains of Americans
lifting of the US embargo against Cambodia and Vietnam.
still missing in Indochina.
On the other hand, in spite of the DRV's continued
insistence on American reconstruction aid, the frequent calls
for US recognition betray a certain degree of urgency. In
53
Such willingness was expressed to Western newsmen by
view of North Vietnam's involvement in the Sino-Soviet con-
the chief representative in Singapore of the North Vietnamese
flict, Le Duan and other Vietnamese leaders may believe that
National Import-Export Corporation who stated that US oil
American diplomatic presence in Vietnam could help alleviate
companies must make new applications if they want to make a
existing pressures from China and the Soviet Union. In the
contribution to Vietnamese oil exploration. (Reuters from
long run, the North Vietnamese leadership will find it diffi-
Singapore, November 25, 1975). During meetings between the
cult to make US reconstruction aid a precondition to the
North Vietnamese and members of the Select Committee on
establishment of relations. Some hardliners within the
Missing Persons last December, the American participants
Vietnamese communist leadership may already be opposed to
received the impression that the Vietnamese were interested
accepting money from the US on purely ideological grounds.
in a "mutually profitable" oil deal, once relations with the
US had been normalized. The New York Times, December 8,
1975. For an up-to-date roundup on the role oil may be
playing in future US-Vietnamese relations see Forbes, January
52, These principles were part of President Ford's
15, 1976, pp. 17-18.
"Pacific Doctrine,' outlined in a speech delivered in Hawaii,
upon his return from a visit to the People's Republic of
China and other Asian countries in December 1975.
-38-
Many people in the United States are aware of the
potential advantages of having diplomatic ties with a coun-
try that is rapidly assuming a pivotal role in Indochina.
But the establishment of relations with Hanoi is neither a
matter of urgency, nor is it absolutely necessary for the US.
In the words of a recent editorial on the subject, "they need
us more than we need them. "54 On the basis of that tenet,
the administration may want to proceed slowly in its efforts
to establish formal ties with the Vietnamese. Without setting
preconditions of its own, it should keep reminding Hanoi of
the issue that concerns most Americans when it comes to US-
Vietnamese contacts, the matter of the servicemen still un-
accounted for in Indochina.
There is one additional factor that should be con-
sidered in this respect: the North Vietnamese leaders are
not likely to be in a position formally to negotiate with
the US on behalf of a united Vietnamese state prior to the
date of unification which is now set for April 30, 1976.
Therefore, the administration has a reasonable period of
time at its disposal to evaluate the new atmosphere now
shaping up in Indochina. With no reason to rush the
matter, Washington has an edge over the Vietnamese, one that
should be taken full advantage of.
54 The Washington Post, November 24, 1975.
1
3/20/26
NEWS
FOREIGN POLICY
HAK Sounds A Note Of Caution: Secretary Kissinger said
Friday that US "contingency plans" against Cuba are aimed at
trying to caution the Soviet Union and the Castro government that
further intervention in Africa could have "serious consequences. "
Kissinger acknowledged that his warnings to Cuba had been
a kind of psychological warfare against that country and the USSR
Richard Valeriani (NBC) reported.
Kissinger told a Senate subcommittee (on NBC film) : "I
would ask everybody to keep in mind that we are dealing here
with a situation in which we are attempting to discourage or
deter Soviet and Cuban involvement before it has reached the
stage where crisis decisions have to be taken.' "
Kissinger added (on ABC/CBS film) : "There is no urgent
situation at this moment that requires a crisis decision. We
should not look at this immediate situation in terms of planning
a military move in any time frame that is now immediately foreseeable.
We are rather trying to call the attention of the USSR and of
Cuba to the serious consequences of contemplated action."
Bernard Kalb (CBS) said Kissinger diffused the sense of
urgency that seemed to be reflected in the disclosure of
contingency plans and warnings to Cuba.
"The Secretary of State was edging his way along a precarious
tightrope, reassuring Congress that no action is imminent or
even in active planning, and that before any military move is
taken Congress will be consulted. What would happen if Congress
refused to give its consent to such a move? Nobody asked and
Kissinger didn' volunteer an opinion," Ted Koppel (ABC) reported.
-- AP; UPI; Networks (3/26/76)
US Considering Talks With Hanoi: The State Department
announced Friday that it has sent a message to the Communist
government of North Vietnam, signalling an American willingness
to hold official talks.
"As President Ford arrived in California, White House aides
were concerned that Republican conservatives may not like the
idea of negotiating with the North Vietnamese," John Cochran (NBC)
reported.
Tom Jarriel (ABC) reported that the President "stopped short
of saying exploratory talks were underway, but implied they are
under consideration because a congressional delegation that
visited Hanoi believes they would be useful."
Ford said (on ABC/NBC film) : "That congressional committee