Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "75814920",
    "label": "Selection of Vice Presidential Candidates (2)",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75814920"
}

{
    "id": "75814920",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75814920",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Selection of Vice Presidential Candidates (2)",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75814920",
    "collections": [
        "Barry N. Roth Files",
        "Barry Roth's General Subject Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. National Crime Information Center. (01/1967 - 02/1992)",
        "Presidential campaign, 1976",
        "Employee screening",
        "Vice-Presidents"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0076/634262/75814920.pdf",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0076/634262/75814920.pdf",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0076/634262/75814920.pdf",
    "imageCount": 1,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75814920",
    "naId": 75814920,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1976-07-31",
        "month": 7,
        "year": 1976
    },
    "coverageStartDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1976-06-01",
        "month": 6,
        "year": 1976
    },
    "levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0076/634262/75814920.pdf",
    "mediaId": "144329c063811271",
    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 31, folder \"Selection of Vice Presidential\nCandidates (2)\" of the Barry N. Roth Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 31 of the Barry N. Roth Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nReport of the Study Group\non Vice-Presidential Selection\nSCTORD\nInstitute of Politics\nKennedy School of Government\nHarvard University\nJune 14, 1976\nReport of the Study Group\non Vice-Presidential Selection\nInstitute of Politics\nJohn F. Kennedy School of Government\nHarvard University\nJune 14, 1976\n08018\nof\n074479\nTable of Contents\nReport\nI.\nIntroduction\n1\nII.\nStandards for Selection\n6\nIII. Parties\n8\nIV.\nPresidential Candidates\n14\nV.\nBackground Checks\n17\nVI.\nMedia\n20\nAppendix\nA.\nDescription of Study Group\n24\nB.\nList of Study Group Members\n25\nC.\nPress Release of May 21, 1976\n26\nD.\nBibliography of Materials used by Study Group\n28\nE.\nPartial list of Persons Contacted by Study Group\n35\nF.\nQuestions on Vice-Presidential Selection for Presidential Candidates\n37\nG.\nBackground Papers Prepared by Study Group\n1) Background memorandum -- Brown\n38\n2) Party Options for change -- Goddard\n44\n3) Background Checks -- Greenleaf\n51\nH.\nSelected Comment on Vice-Presidential Selection\n60\nNOTE: Summary Press Release of June 14 is inserted in the front of the report.\nFORD\nLIBRARY\n&\n075839\nares\nI. Introduction\nAs the 1976 election approaches, a paradoxical feature of American\nPresidential politics deserves our attention. On the one hand, we select\nour Presidential nominees by a process of exposure and deliberation that\ngrows ever more tortuous and grueling. On the other hand, we continue to\nleave the designation of the Vice-Presidential contender largely to the\npersonal judgment of the nominee, a judgment often exercised rapidly and\nin confusion in the small hours of the morning after the endorsement of\nthe party convention.\nAlthough this \"system\" of Vice-Presidential selection has not served\nthe nation badly, it has been too prone to error. Two facts stand out:\nFirst, the Vice-Presidency today is a major avenue to the\nPresidency itself. Of the 38 American Presidents, 13 (more\nthan a third) were Vice Presidents first. Of the 13 Presidents\nin this century, six were first Vice President, and they have\nbeen President for 34 of 76 years (45 per cent). The odds are now\nabout one to two that the Vice President will one day become\nPresident.\nSecond, recent events in both parties -- specifically the\nresignation of Senator Eagleton from the Democratic ticket in\n1972 and the resignation of Vice President Agnew from office in\n1973 -- suggest that present selection practices contain an\ninherent and unacceptable degree of risk.\n-2-\nLIBRARY\nThe present method of handpicking running mates after nomination has\nFORD\nnot always been the norm in the United States. The original system gave\nis\nthe office to the candidate who ran second in the Presidential contest.\nEach Presidential elector cast two ballots; the runner-up became Vice-\nPresident. This system brought some excellent men to the Vice-Presidency --\nAdams, Jefferson, and Burr. However, the top two contenders tended to be\npolitical rivals before -- and after -- the election. In 1804, the 12th\nAmendment changed the system by providing for separate balloting for President.\nand Vice President. As political parties gained strength (especially after\n1831, when nomination by party conventions replaced selection by Congressional\ncaucuses), Vice Presidents became genuine running mates. Although this system\nhas tended to produce Vice-Presidential nominees who are personally and\nideologically compatible with the head of the ticket, it has also caused an\nemphasis on balancing and short-run electoral calculations, rather than on\nthe Presidential qualities of the Vice President.\nBetween 1972 and 1974 an intense and thorough exploration of alternative\nmethods of Vice-Presidential selection took place. At this time, members\nof the press, television, academia, and the parties discussed in detail the\nmerits and limitations of such proposals as separate primaries (or even\nseparate elections) for Vice-Presidential candidates; announcement of\npossible Vice-Presidential choices by Presidential contenders early in their\ncampaign for nomination; selection of Vice-Presidential nominees by the\nparty conventions themselves; selection by the conventions (or by \"mini-\nconventions\" established by them) from lists submitted by Presidential\ncontenders or by the nominee; rearrangement of the convention's order of\nbusiness to allow more time for deliberation about the Vice-Presidential\nchoice; abolition of the Vice-Presidency itself; and more.\n-3-\nFor a time, alternative approaches to Vice-Presidential selection\nreceived sustained and careful consideration. Hearings and discussions\nwere conducted by the Democratic Party's Commission on Vice-Presidential\nSelection, chaired by Senator Humphrey, and by Subcommittee 2 of the Rule\n29 Committee of the Republican National Committee. Unfortunately, interest\nin the question has gradually subsided, and the momentum for change appears\nto have been lost.\nDemocratic National Chairman Robert Strauss recently explained to\nreporters that:\n\"We have a very poor system for choosing our Vice-Presidents.\nFORD\nI regret we didn't do something about it. We're not going to do a\n\">\ndamn thing to avoid it (another Eagleton affair) except a wing and\na prayer.\"\nSimilarly, Kent B. McGough, Chairman of the Rules Committee of the\nRepublican National Committee, said:\n\"We've received a large number of letters indicating concern\nthat changes in the selection process be made. And we intend to discuss\nit fully. But it's going to be very difficult to make any changes for\nthis year. Maybe 1980.'\nWe do not believe that this state of affairs is inevitable. We take\nthe view that rational discussion and exploration of alternatives should be\ncontinued, and that increased public attention to methods of Vice-Presidential\nselection is itself a necessary first step toward improvement. This report\ndoes not attempt a thorough evaluation of the pros and cons of the wide\nrange of proposals that have been endorsed in one quarter or another.\nInstead, having considered these proposals in some detail and having inter-\nviewed many experts and key actors, we set forth and defend those proposals\nthat we think most worthy of adoption, in hopes of influencing the way the\n-4-\nVice-Presidential nominees are selected in 1976 and of improving the process\nfurther before 1980. We explicitly avoid, at this stage, suggestions\ninvolving constitutional amendment, change in the electoral system, or a\nredefinition of the responsibilities of a Vice President.\nOur general objective is to suggest a set of procedures more likely\nthan the present ones to assure selection of Vice Presidents competent\nto assume the Presidency itself. Our point of departure is not that the\npresent approach has worked poorly on the whole, but rather that it is\nLIBRARY\n2001\ninherently risky. We grant that no Presidential nominee would knowingly\nchoose a running mate unfit to hold the highest office. However, we are\nskeptical that the present system is adequately self-correcting or that\nwe can simply trust future Presidential nominees to exercise \"exquisite\ncare\" in choosing running mates in the absence of procedural reform.\nThe key fact, we think, is that under present arrangements, information\nabout prospective running mates has been, and is likely to continue to be,\nfar too limited. By \"information\" we mean both factual details about the\nbackground, activities, and pronouncements of contenders, and political\nevaluations from the perspective of major elements of party and public.\nThe premise of our recommendations is that the volume of factual and political\ninformation about potential Vice Presidents, and the opportunities available\nto public, media, candidates, and parties to deliberate upon this\ninformation, should be increased. Attaining this goal calls for procedural\nand institutional change which goes beyond the Presidential nominees'\nown exquisite care. In short, we believe that the selection of Vice Presidents\nshould receive a higher priority and should be more open and responsive to\nthe public. Such change will tend to counter the waning public confidence\nin the political process and to affirm the belief of the American people\nin their governmental leadership.\n-5-\nThe recommendations advanced in this report are complementary and\nmutually reinforcing, dependent upon various sets of participants in the\nprocess fulfilling key roles on a largely voluntary basis by assuming\nresponsibilities which we believe are both sensible and feasible. We have\nattempted to define the process as an integrated whole. No single mechanism\ncan be designed or imposed to rationalize the process of Vice-Presidential\nselection by itself. No single organization or set of actors can complete\nthe task. We do not believe that radical changes are desirable or workable;\nour analysis has led us to the conclusion that many proposals which look\nattractive in the abstract upon close perusal add significant liabilities\nto the process. We feel strongly, for instance, that the predominant role\nof the Presidential candidate in the selection of a running mate should be\nprotected.\nWe address, therefore, the practical roles which the parties, the\ncandidates themselves, and the media can usefully and quickly play. Our\nrecommendations recognize the inherently pluralistic and democratic\ncharacter of the process, and we believe their non-dramatic nature makes\nthem more rather than less compelling.\nLIBRARY\nones\nAMERICA\nII. Standards for Selection\nPresident Ford said in May that 11 It is traditional in America that\nthe two parties try to balance a ticket for President and Vice President as\nto geography, as to philosophy, as to personality,\" and he also stated the\nneed for \"some personal compatibility, a comfortable relationship\" in his\nrunning mate. In March, Jimmy Carter included compatibility and balancing\nin listing criteria for selecting his Vice-Presidential nominee, and\nclaimed the first and most important requirement \"is who would be the best\nperson to lead this country if something should happen to me.\"\nWe suspect that most Americans would agree to both of two simple\npropositions: 1) that the primary standard in selecting a Vice President\nshould be competence to be President; and 2) that the standard more often\nemployed in selection is some form of political balancing -- geographical,\nreligious, ideological, etc. Some would argue that because the first duty\nof a politician is to get elected, competence in a Vice-Presidential\nnominee is bound to be considered only within constraints imposed by short-\nterm electoral reality; and that the running mate is above all a political\ninstrument selected with the purpose of countering or avoiding potential\ndeficiencies in the ticket.\nWe believe that neither of these propositions is as straightforward\nas it appears at first glance; nor do we find competence and electoral\nutility as incompatible as is sometimes suggested. We recognize that\nstrong short-term political needs -- for regional balance, to heal party\ndivisions, to prevent the Presidential nominee from being upstaged, and\n-6-\n-7-\nthe like -- may detract from competence as the main criterion.\nHowever, the selection of a running mate with the purpose of maximizing\nthe popular vote, securing key blocs in the electoral college and creating\na sense of representation and legitimacy among various population elements --\ntherefore enabling an administration to govern effectively, is a valuable\naspect of the political process. We doubt, moreover, that close inspection\nof recent cases of Vice-Presidential selection would support the contention\nthat \"balancing\" was determinative of the choice, and that considerations\nof competence were set aside.\nRecommendation:\n1.\nCompetence in Vice-Presidential selection should be the primary\nstandard and balancing can be a secondary factor -- the two are\nneither naturally exclusive nor naturally contradictory.\nThe universe of prominent American politicians is, like the American\npopulation it represents, large and heterogeneous. It is implausible\nthat the dictates of short-term political balance are so compelling, and\nthe available set of high-quality political figures so limited, that a\nPresidential nominee need be forced to sacrifice competency to campaign\nvictory in a possible successor. Moreover, the way in which a Presidential\nnominee responds in naming a running mate will depend in. large part on\nhow the question is posed by the public, the media, and the parties. If\nthese participants insist on a concentration on competence, on extensive\ninformation, and on careful deliberation by themselves and by the candidate --\nand if they take procedural steps to secure this approach -- the political\nutility of a concern with the Presidential qualifications of Vice-Presidential\nnominees is bound to increase.\nIII. Parties\nThe political parties are capable of an essential role they are not\nnow filling in the reform of Vice-Presidential selection procedures. A set\nof simple and practical changes in the nominating process could be made\nby the parties which would strengthen the chances of informed and respon-\nsible choice. By undertaking modest but useful reforms, the national\nparties can not only improve Vice-Presidential selection, but also\nstrengthen their own relevance and influence in a period unhappily\nmarked by party decline.\nAs it is now, both parties treat Vice-Presidential selection as a\nlow-priority matter, an afterthought unworthy of serious preparation.\nBoth parties have considered ways to improve selection methods since the\n1972 conventions, but neither has actually changed its procedures. Their\nattitude now seems to be either that time has run out for 1976, or that\nthe need for change has subsided-- even though, as Senator Humphrey said\nin\n1973, \" the interests of the people of the United States require\nreform in this field by both parties before the 1976 conventions.\"\nTwo options for party change that we considered carefully but rejected\nare proposals for an open convention, where the convention chooses the\nnominee by itself, and a \"partially open\" convention, with the decision\nmade by the convention from a short list of preferred choices provided by\nthe nominee. Both of these proposals mean an increased role for the con-\nvention delegates and a decreased role for the Presidential candidate.\nNeither assures reduced risks of faulty selection. A selection by open\n-8-\n-9-\nconvention does not mean that more care is spent in selection. Yet\nthere is a better chance that this method would choose a Vice President\nincompatible with the Presidential nominee, and would increase party\nfactionalism rather than serve as a means of party unity. A \"partially\nopen\" convention avoids incompatibility, but limits the flexibility of\nthe nominee, invites party factionalism, and denies the convention full\nfreedom of choice. This is clearly the worst of both worlds.\nAnother device for selecting the Vice-Presidential nominee that has\nreceived attention is for a \"mini-convention\", constituted by the National\nCommittee membership, to be held perhaps two weeks after the national\nconvention adjourns. The Democrats used this method in 1972 to designate\nSargent Shriver after the resignation of Senator Eagleton from the ticket,\nand there are advantages to it. Delaying the choice provides plenty of\ntime for consultation, background checks, and priority deliberation. On\nbalance, however, we are more persuaded by the disadvantages of a mini-\nconvention approach. The choice has less legitimacy if it is ratified by\na smaller representative group; the function of the Vice-Presidential\nnomination at the convention as a conciliatory and rallying point for\nthe various factions is diluted; and the ticket's chances might be hurt\nby a delayed beginning and a decreased media impact for the campaign\nitself.\nThe recommendations we are making require action by both parties at\nthe 1976 conventions. They involve 1) changes that can be made in time\nto affect this year's choices, and 2) changes to be mandated this year\nLIBRAN\nFORD\nBERALD\n-10-\nto take effect in 1980. * In the first category, we propose procedural\nchanges to take effect at the 1976 conventions in the form of amend-\nments to the temporary rules of the convention: adoption of general\nresolutions stating the importance of Vice-Presidential selection and\nthe necessity of change; amendments to the convention rules rearranging\nthe convention schedule to provide more time for selection; and formation\nof an advisory group to contribute formally to the consultative process.\nIn the second category, we propose changes which would be mandated for\n1980 by resolutions adopted at the 1976 conventions: the rearrangement\nof the convention schedule and the establishment of a formal advisory\ncommittee, again, and, in addition, the adoption of a resolution urging\nspecific action for Presidential candidates before the next convention.\nRecommendations:\n2. The conventions of both the Democratic and Republican Parties should\nadopt resolutions which state the importance of Vice-Presidential\nselection, encourage the candidates and parties to give the process\nthe time and care needed for responsible selection, and affirm an\nintention to improve the selection process.\n3. The parties should rearrange the convention schedule, placing Credentials\nand Rules Committees' reports in the first session, Presidential nom-\nination in the second, consideration of the Platform in the third, and\nVice-Presidential nomination in the final session.\n*\nUnder party rules the process for change--for 1976 and for 1980--begins\nin the Rules Committees of their National Committees, which meet before\nthe conventions and make recommendations on the rules. In the Demo-\ncratic Party, these recommendations are made directly to the Convention.\nIn the Republican Party, they are made to the National Committee, then\nto the Convention Rules Committee, which then presents recommendations\nto the Convention.\n-11-\nThe purpose of this change is to increase the time between the nomination\nof the Presidential nominee and the selection of a Vice-Presidential choice.\nMore time would allow the nominees and their staffs to put more care and\ndeliberation into the final choice, with opportunity for more thorough\nand extensive consultation.\nArguments against rearrangement of the convention schedule focus on\nmovement of the platform debates to the day following the Presidential\nnomination. Some assert that the conciliatory function of the platform\ndecisions may be impaired if they occur after the Presidential nomination,\nand that the platform might reflect the nominee more than the broad-based\nparty, conceivably making it more difficult for some factions to support.\nOn the other hand, equally plausible is the argument that the first instinct\nof a successful candidate upon receiving the nomination is to move toward\nunifying the party. By this logic the platform would become an instrument\nof conciliation rather than of division, an effect which frequently occurs\nwhen platform issues become a pre-nomination test of strength. Furthermore,\nit might well be advantageous for the platform to be approved after the\nnomination because it would better reflect the nominee's position and thus\nbe taken more seriously. The public tends to be skeptical of all platforms;\nrearrangement might give the platform greater credibility.\nIt is also argued that this schedule change would be anti-climactic,\nincreasing the difficulty of retaining an interested television audience.\nWe do not feel that this argument is strong enough to outweigh the advantages\nof a shift in schedule. Indeed, since the major thrust of our recommendations\nis to place more emphasis upon Vice-Presidential selection, one concomitant\nof rearranging the convention schedule could be the building of suspense\nby the national media around the Vice-Presidential nomination.\n-12-\n4. The parties should each establish a formal party consultative mechanism,\nan advisory committee, to assist the party and the Presidential candidate\nin the selection of the Vice-Presidential candidate.\nThe purposes of an advisory mechanism are to insure that there is\npreparation and deliberation on the subject of Vice-Presidential choice\nbefore the convention, to widen the process of consultation that the nominee\nemploys, and to provide information and advice on potential Vice-Presidential\ncandidates to the nominee. A consultative process conducted by a party\nadvisory committee can strengthen the party role while retaining the\nPresidential nominee's dominance in selection. Such a committee would\nbe formed and begin meeting with appropriate staff and resources before\nthe convention. It would compile a list of possible Vice-Presidential\nLIBRARY\ncandidates, and conduct research into backgrounds and issue positions.\nFORD\nAfter nomination of the Presidential candidate, the group would be avail-\nable immediately to meet with the nominee and to share the results of its\nwork. Its advice would in no way be binding, but the participation of\na formal consultative group would increase discussion of Vice-Presidential\npossibilities among representatives of major party elements.\n5. The party advisory committees should request a list of preferred\nVice-Presidential running mates from serious contenders for the\nPresidential nomination.\nBy combining the lists from several prospective nominees, the advisory\ncommittee would generate an extensive group of potential Vice-Presidential\ncandidates, drawn from all segments of the party. The breadth of pre-\nconvention consideration undertaken by the advisory committee might pay\nspecial dividends should the advance planning of the eventual nominee\nprove to be inadequate or mooted by events at the convention itself. This\n-13-\nrecommendation also encourages the Presidential candidates to begin serious\nstaff work on Vice-Presidential selection before the conventions. To make\nit effective, the parties should encourage their candidates to produce\na meaningful list and to make their final choice from it.\n&\n#301\nGERRIC\nR.\nGHOS\nIV. Presidential Candidates\nTraditionally, the Presidential nominees make the actual designation\nof a Vice-Presidential nominee. The nominees are the crucial factor in the\nselection process; their choices may be brilliant or potentially disastrous,\nnot only for the political chances of the ticket, but for the country.\nThe Presidential candidates should therefore take the initiative for\nprocedural change, especially if effective action is to take place in the\nshort time before the 1976 conventions. The candidates are in the best\nposition to give the process the priority and care that it deserves, and\nshould be held accountable for the choice of a Vice-Presidential candidate.\nIn urging special responsibilities in Vice-Presidential selection on\nthe Presidential candidate, along with recommendations affecting other\nparticipants in the process, we seek to strengthen and protect their role\nrather than to diminish it. If their responsibility is to remain a\ncommanding one, however, it should be carried out with a greater commitment\nof time and effort than has generally characterized past behavior, beginning\nwell before nomination rather than immediately following it.\nRecommendations:\n6.\nThe Presidential candidates should have their staffs begin work on\nVice-Presidential selection as early as possible in their campaigns\nand no later than the final round of primaries: developing lists of\npotential candidates, conducting background research, and consulting\nbroadly for suggestions.\n-14-\n-15-\n7.\nThe candidates should discuss publicly the criteria to be used in\nthe selection of a running mate, and are urged to emphasize competence\nto be President as the primary factor.\n8.\nThe candidates should make public a list of serious preferences for\nthe Vice-Presidency before the convention, in order to facilitate\nBERRL\nmedia and public examination; and they are encouraged to initiate\ndirect contact and staff liaison with potential running mates.\nLIBRARY\nFORD\nThe greatest weakness in the present system is the fact that whereas\nthe Presidential candidates go through months of exposure and arduous\ncampaign work before coming to the convention, the Vice-Presidential\ncandidate is often unknown, both to the public and to the nominee. When the\nVice-Presidential candidate happens to be chosen from the ranks of candidates\nactively contesting the primaries, there is much less of a problem, but\nthis cannot be guaranteed. This recommendation is an attempt to correct\nthis weakness in the system without challenging the nominee's prerogative\nto make the choice.\nThere are disadvantages to making up preferential lists prior to the\nconvention. Such a list is likely to involve tactical inconveniences for\nthe candidate, and to promote political balancing of an opportunistic sort\nas names are included from various constituencies simply in order to\ngarner electoral support, not because they are likely to be chosen. List-\nmaking before the convention can also limit flexibility by committing the\ncandidate to certain choices before the events of the convention unfold.\nBut we feel these difficulties do not compete with the benefits of opening\nup the process to the public and the media.\n-16-\n9.\nThe candidates should help develop party reform of Vice-Presidential\nselection, be ready to support a party consultative process, and\nrecommend a change in the convention schedule.\nGERALD\nR.\nFORD\nV. Background Checks\nThe question of background checks on prospective Vice-Presidential\ncandidates is characterized by uncertainty and controversy. Many believe\nthat they would not be worth the risks involved, including possible\nviolation of privacy, abuse of confidential information, lack of credibility,\nand misrepresentation.\nThe study group believes that a thorough examination of a Vice-Presidential\ncandidate's personal and political background, now lacking, is a desirable\ncomponent of the overall process. Informal research and exposure by the\npress, advance investigation by the Presidential candidate's staff, and\nthe considerations of a party advisory committee prior to the convention\nare all essential functions. But by themselves they do not insure adequate\nefficiency and objectivity. The media may do a spotty job, or may be unable\nto commit enough resources to insure thorough coverage of the candidate\neventually selected. As a practical matter the Presidential candidate's\nstaff may not have adequate time or freedom to penetrate deeply enough in\nits investigation. A party consultative committee is likely at some point\nto encounter doubts about how much potentially unflattering material it wants\nto gather on leaders from within its own ranks. These difficulties lead\nus to conclude that something more is needed.\nThe F.B.I. undertakes background investigations on a continuing basis\nto provide information regarding Presidential appointments, and prior to\nthe granting of clearances to permit access by public officials to class-\n-17-\n-18-\nified information. The F.B.I conducted background investigations for the\ntwo Congressional Committees responsible under the XXV Amendment for\nGERLL\nrecommending to the House and Senate the nominations of Gerald Ford and\nNelson Rockefeller to the Vice-Presidency. In these cases, controls were\nset up to assure the confidentiality of the information gathered, which\nproved effective. It may be that under the existing statutory authority a\nsystem could be established for an F.B.I. background investigation of\npotential Vice-Presidential candidates, similar to those completed for\nhundreds of appointed public officials. Such information checks would\nnot involve screening, ranking or judgments of the candidates on the part\nof the F.B.I. The results of the investigations could be made available\nunder careful controls to the Presidential nominee only. There are various\nways to design a workable system, assuming adequate lead-time, the willing-\nness of the prospective Presidential candidates to provide lists of\npreferred running mates, the permission of the prospective Vice-Presidential\ncandidates themselves to be investigated, and the cooperation of the\nPresident and/or the Attorney General. Thus, immediately after nomination,\nthe Presidential nominee could be provided with useful material to help in\nselection.\nYet there are a number of legitimate questions about such an arrangement:\nIsn't this too much of a \"political \" burden to be placed on the F.B.I.?\nShould the F.B.I. be invited into the electoral process? Is there a\ndanger that too much might be expected of the F.B.I. check in terms of\n\"clearing\" a potential candidate? Why shouldn't Presidential candidates\nlikewise be checked out? What real guarantees are there against abuse of\nconfidential information? These questions are valid, and any process of\nbackground checks must be accomplished with a maximum of understanding,\nsupport, and credibility. Otherwise the cost will be greater than the\n-19-\nbenefit, and we would be better off without it. It is this belief that\nleads us to the conclusion that a systematic check for Vice-Presidential\ncandidates should not be undertaken by administrative action and loose\nagreement among the interested parties, but only by way of the legislative\nprocess. This would assure adequate deliberation -- solicitation of views\nthrough public hearings, careful analysis by Committee staff, open debate\nin both houses of Congress, and the chance for Presidential approval of a\nnew statute.\nRecommendation:\n10. The House and Senate bipartisan leadership should set as a high\npriority consideration of legislation authorizing appropriate back-\nground investigations to be conducted by the F.B.I. on prospective\nVice-Presidential candidates, under timely and fair arrangements and\nwith effective controls against violations of privacy. and misuse of\nsensitive information.\n*\n*One version of legislation seeking to accomplish these goals is S.2741,\noriginally introduced in the 93rd Congress, on November 26,1973, by\nSenator William Brock (R-Tenn.)\nBERALD\nR.\nFORD\nAMVUSIN\nVI. Media\nIf the Vice-Presidential selection process is awkward, fragile, and\nperilous, to what extent can the media, in its various roles as reporter,\ninvestigator, and opinion leader, improve this unsatisfactory situation?\nIn reporting and analyzing the words and actions of Vice-Presidential\ncandidates, the press in recent years has done a creditable job. Often it\nhas been a story in search of a reader, overshadowed by the excitement of\nthe Presidential race. There also has been a remarkable amount of attention\npaid to Vice-Presidential selection reform. Understandably, much of this\ncoverage has surfaced in the aftermath of crisis. A number of stories and\nat least one television documentary analyzing the hazards of the current\nselection procedures appeared in the days following the resignation of\nSenator Thomas Eagleton as Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate in 1972\nand the resignation of Vice President Agnew in 1973, but such coverage\ntends to be after the fact and to die out.\nIn 1976, coverage of national candidates has been the most comprehensive\never. With a mindboggling 30 Presidential primaries and more than 20\ncandidates with a potential national constituency, more reporters have been\nassigned, more television specials aired, and more money spent by news\norganizations in following the races than ever before. That professional\nand financial commitment will continue through the fall. But coverage of\nthe campaign itself -- the politics and personalities -- is not enough.\nThe press should earmark a substantial slice of its resources toward\ncalling attention to the inequities and foibles of the present selection\n-20-\n-21-\nBERALD R. FORD\nsystem and toward covering prospective Vice-Presidential candidates.\nThe candidates and the political parties have the major responsibility\nand power to effect the desired changes. But columnists and editorial\nwriters should recommend reforms, and call on the candidates themselves to\nsupport the improvements.\nAs a practical matter, many of the needed reforms will take time to\ncarry out. The urgency of the ongoing campaigns and the uncertainty of the\noutcome leaves the unfortunate possibility that, once again, the selection\nof running mates will be a last-minute decision. In that event, it will be\nmore crucial than ever for reporters to dig deeply into the backgrounds\nand public records of the candidates, acting as a supplement to a highly\nimperfect selection procedure. To the extent that potential contenders for\nthe second slot can be identified and examined in advance, the process will\nbe improved.\nRecommendations:\n11. The press should remind the public of the past failings of the\nVice-Presidential selection process and encourage candidates and parties\nto make changes.\n12. The media should persistently question candidates about their plans\nand preparation for selecting running mates, encouraging sufficient\nadvance work and discussion of the standards on which their choice\nof a running mate will be based.\n13. On the assumption that the Vice-Presidential candidates may again\nresult from a helter-skelter eleventh hour selection process, the\npress should commit reporters, time, and funds to extensive coverage\n-22-\nand investigation of potential running mates before the convention,\nincluding interviews plus in-depth reporting on issues and backgrounds.\n14. The networks ought to prepare now for a \"special\" or series of\nprograms on \"The Vice-Presidential Candidates, 1976\".\n15. The media should plan comprehensive coverage of the Vice-Presidential\nnominees after the conventions.\nAppendix\nA.\nDescription of Study Group\n24\nB.\nList of Study Group Members\n25\nC.\nPress Release of May 21, 1976\n26\nD.\nBibliography of Materials used by Study Group\n28\nE.\nPartial List of Persons contacted by Study Group\n35\nF.\nQuestions on Vice-Presidential Selection for Presidential Candidates\n37\nG.\nBackground Papers Prepared by Study Group\n1) Background memorandum -- Brown\n38\n2) Party options for change -- Goddard\n44\n3) Background checks -- Greenleaf\n51\nH.\nSelected Comment on Vice-Presidential Selection\n60\nFORD i LIBRARY BERALD\n-23-\n-24-\nAppendix A\nHARVARD UNIVERSITY\nJOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT\nINSTITUTE OF POLITICS\n78 Mount Auburn Street\nCambridge, Massachusetts 02138\n617-495-5792\nDescription of\nThe Institute of Politics\nStudy Group on Vice-Presidential Selection\nFaculty Study Groups of the Institute of Politics, John Fitzgerald\nKennedy School of Government, Harvard University, are organized to examine\napplied problems in government and politics. They are comprised both of\nacademic faculty and practitioners, and are designed to make their analysis\nand recommendations available to public officials to whom such information\nmight be helpful.\nThe Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection was set up in February\nof 1976 to examine process and standards in Vice-Presidential selection, in\norder to develop recommendations for improvement affecting the decisions in\n1976 and including changes to be put into effect for 1980. The group expli-\ncitly did not address long-term changes which would involve major electoral\nreform or Constitutional amendment, nor did it study the nature of the job\nof Vice President.\nFour formal meetings were held, and research, interviewing, and\ndrafting assignments were undertaken individually and in smaller groups\nthroughout the four-month period. The group began its work by reviewing\nand analyzing extensive literature on the subject including a wide range\nof proposals for reform; continued by interviewing academic experts on the\nsubject, individuals with significant past experience, and principal actors\nin current electoral effort; and concluded with the preparation of its own\nanalysis and recommendations.\nThe study group's report will be cistributed among the media, party and\ncampaign officials, and political scientists as an agent itself for higher\npriority, public exposure, and constructive change in Vice-Presidential\nselection.\nJune, 1976\nSERVICE\n-25-\nAppendix B\nMembers of the Institute of Politics Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection\nChristopher Arterton\nAssistant Professor of Political Science,\nYale University\nTimothy A. Barrow\nFellow, Institute of Politics; formerly\nMajor of Phoenix, Arizona\nLawrence D. Brown\nAssistant Professor of Government,\nHarvard University\nEugene Carlson\nFellow, Nieman Foundation, Harvard\nUniversity; formerly Economics\nReporter, U.P.I. Washington Bureau;\nVice-President Humphrey's 1968\nCampaign Staff.\nBarney Frank\nState Representative,\nBoston, Massachusetts\nK. Dun Gifford\nVice President for Urban Affairs,\nCabot, Cabot and Forbes; formerly\nChairman of Common Cause/Massachusetts;\nformerly Legislative Assistant to\nSenator Edward Kennedy.\nElizabeth Goddard\nStaff, Institute of Politics.\n(Rapporteur of the Study Group)\nCharles Greenleaf\nMPA Program, John Fitzgerald\nKennedy School of Government;\nformerly Legislative Assistant\nto Governor Milliken of Michigan.\nIra Jackson\nSpecial Assistant to the Director,\nInstitute of Politics; formerly\nAdministrative Assistant to\nMajor Kevin White of Boston\nJonathan Moore\nDirector, Institute of Politics\n(Chairman of the Study Group)\nFORD\nLIBRARY\n&\nGERALD\n-26-\nAppendix C\nNews Office\n1976-71\nHarvard University\nHolyoke Center 1000\nCambridge, Ma. 02138\nTel. 617-495-1585\nMrs. Deane W. Lord, Director\nMay 18, 1976\nFOR RELEASE: Friday, May 21, 1976\nHarvard University's Institute of Politics announced today that ito Study Group\non Vice-Presidential Selection will release practical recommendations\" for select-\ning this year's Vice-Presidential candidates shortly after the June 8 state primary\nelections.\nJonathan Moore, Director of the Institute and Chairman of the Studv Group,\nstated, \"We will be making some formal proposals involving changes in party role\nand convention rules affecting the 1976-80 period. The basic thrust of our work,\nhowever, is to determine what can be done to encourage a more responsible process\nin the selection of the Democratic and Republican Vice-Presidential candidates in\nthe current year.\"\nMr. Moore added., \"The group was set up under the assumption that the current\nsystem for choosing Vice-Presidents is not deliberate, reliable, or efficient\nenough. It is too prone to error.\"\nThe project was announced on February 11. In addition to Mr. Moore, the group\nincludes: Christopher Arterton, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale\nUniversity; Timothy A. Barrow, Fellow, Institute of Politics, Formerly Mayor of\nPhoenix, Arizona; Lawrence D. Brown, Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard\nUniversity: Eugene Carlson, Fellow, Nieman Foundation, Economics reporter, United\nPress International; Barney Frank, Massachusetts State Representative; K. Dun\nGifford, Vice-President for Urban Affairs, Cabot, Cabot, & Forbes, formerly Chairman\nfo Common Cause/Massachusetts and Legislative Assistant to Senator Edward Kennedy;\nCharles Greenleaf, MPA Program, John Γ. Kennedy School of Government, formerly\nLegislative Assistant to Governor Milliken of Michigan; Ira Jackson, Special Assist-\nant to the Institute Director, formerly Special Assistant to Mayor Kevin White of\nBoston. Elizabeth Goddard, of the Institute staff, is the group's reporter.\nThe Study Group on Vice-Presidential selection reviewed and analyzed earlier\nstudies, recommendations, and other literature on the subject. Members of the\ngroup interviewed numerous party officials, 1976 potential Presidential candidates,\nand staff, political scientists, and media specialists in the course of their work.\n\"Despite the strong possibility that the Vice-President will scmeday become\nPresident and the great need for him or her to be competent to fill the responsi-\nbilities of the office, there is too little priority given to how we make the\nchoice,\" Mr. Moore said.\nmore\nDO\n-27-\n\"Yet workable alternatives to the present system are difficult to come by, and\nmany ideas for change carry greater costs than benefits. We have been concentrat-\ning on designing roles for the parties, for the candidates, and for the media.\nBasically, we seek workable ways to improve the process, including greater\nconsultation and more thorough background information. At least at this stage,\nour group is not examining the kind of long-term reform that would involve either\nConstitutional or statutory change.\"\n--end--\n-28-\nAppendix D\nBibliography of Materials Used by Study Group\nAgnew, Spiro, \"Veep on Veeps\", New York Times, Aug. 23, 1972, p. 41.\nAnderson, Jack, and Whitten, Les, \"Change Suggested in Selecting No.\n2\", The Washington Post, Feb. 13, 1975.\nBailey, Stephen K., Statement to the Commission on Vice Presidential\nSelection, Democratic National Committee, Nov. 7, 1973.\nBarzman, Sol, Madmen and Genuises, (Chicago, Jollett Publishing\nCompany), 1974.\nBroder, David, \"Democrats Eye 2nd Convention for No. 2 Spot\",\nThe Washington Post, Dec. 14, 1973.\nBroder, David, \"Democrats Scrap Plan to Pick VPs\", The Washington\nPost Feb. 15, 1974.\nBroder, David, \"The Problem of Picking No. 2,\" The Washington Post,\nOct. 21, 1973.\nBrownfeld, Allan C., \"Choosing a Vice President\", Roll Call,\nNov. 1, 1973.\nCanham, Erwin D., \"Horse Sheds and Reforms\", Christian Science\nMonitor, Aug. 14, 1972. p. 14.\nCannon, Lou, \"GOP to Shift on Selecting No. 2 Man\", The Washington\nPost, April 28, 1974.\nChilds, Marquis, \"Nation Needs a Better Way to Choose VP's\",\nThe Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1973.\nColeman, William, Letter to Senator Hubert Humphrey, Aug. 23, 1973.\nCronin, Thomas, \"Does the U.S. Really Need a Vice President?\"\nCenter Report, VIII, Oct. 1975.\nDavid, Paul T., Goldman, Ralph M., and Bain, Richard C., The\nPolitics of National Party Conventions (Washington, Brookings)\n1960, pp. 56-59, 135-138, 433-435.\nDavid, Paul T., Goldman, Ralph M., and Moos, Malcolm, The National\nStory (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press) 1953, pp. 229-231.\n-29-\nFORD\nLICENSE\n8.\n07VH39\nDavis, James, W., National Conventions, (Woodbury, N. Y., Barron's\nEducational Series) 1972.\nDemocratic National Committee, Commission on Vice Presidential\nSelection, Excerpts from Hearing Book.\n\"Democratic Proposals for Choosing Vice Presidents\", Congressional\nQuarterly, December 15, 1973, p. 3290.\n\"Democrats Assay Vice-Presidency\", New York Times, Dec. 15, 1973.\n\"Democrats Focus on Vice President\", New York Times, Dec. 16, 1973.\nDiSalle, Michael V., Second Choice (New York, Hawthorne Books Inc.,)\n1966.\nDonovan, Robert J., \"There Must Be a Better Way to Pick Vice-Pres-\nidents\", Los Angeles Times, July 31, 1972.\nEizenstat, Stuart, \"Memorandum on Alternative Possibilities of\nVice-Presidential Selection\", Congressional Record, October\n16, 1973.\nEsch, Marvin, \"Meaningful Reform\", Congressional Record, Aug. 2, 1974.\nEsch Plan: Name Field for V.P. Nominee Before Convention\", Republican\nCongressional Campaign Newsletter, March 11, 1974.\nEtridge, John, \"Nation's No. 2: Is He Always Second Best?\", Los Angeles\nTimes, Oct. 28, 1973.\nFriedman, Saul, \"Talk about Reforms in V-P Pick Fizzles\" Detroit Free\nPress, March 21, 1976.\nFritchey, Clayton, \"The Perpetual Whirl Over Veeps\", Washington Post,\nAug. 5, 1972.\nGallup Poll, Method of Selection of Vice Presidents, 1972.\nGardner, John, Letter to Senator Hubert Humphrey, Sept. 14, 1973.\n\"G.O.P. Hopefuls Urged to List No. 2 Choices\", New York Times, Aug.\n13, 1972, p. 39.\nGriffin, Robert, \"A New Method for Selecting Vice Presidents\",\nCongressional Record, Oct. 23, 1973.\nGriffin, Robert, \"On Choosing Vice Presidents\", Christian Science\nMonitor, Nov. 13, 1973.\n-30-\n\"Griffin to Propose Halting Election of Vice Presidents\", New York\nTimes, October 23, 1973.\nHamilton, Lee H., \"Washington Report: Choosing Vice Presidents,\"\nCongressional Record, Dec. 12, 1973.\nHatch, Louis Clinton, A History of the Vice-Presidency of the United\nStates, (New York, The American Historical Society, Inc.) 1934.\nHerzberg, Donald G., Statement before the Commission on Selection of\nthe Democratic Nominee for Vice President, Nov. 7, 1973.\nHolmberg, David, \"Taft Hits Vice President Selection Setup\", Washington\nStar, Aug. 4, 1972.\nHope, Paul, \"Picking a Clean Candidate\", Washington Star-News, Oct.\n15, 1973.\n\"How to Choose a Veep\", Washington Star, Aug. 18, 1972, p. A-16.\n\"How to Pick a Veep\", National Review, September 15, 1972, pp. 994-995.\nHumphrey, Hubert H., \"Changes in the Vice Presidency\", Current History,\nAug., 1974, p. 58.\nHumphrey, Hubert H., \"Hearings of the Vice Presidential Selection\nCommission of the Democratic National Commission\", Congressional\nRecord, Oct. 16, 1973.\nHumphrey, Hubert H., \"How Should We Select Our Vice Presidential\nNominees?\", Congressional Record, Dec. 11, 1973.\nHumphrey, Hubert H., \"How the President Can Help Improve Vice Presidential\nSelection\", Congressional Record, Dec. 21, 1973.\nHyneman, Charles, Remarks before the Commission on Selection of Vice\nPresidential Nominees, Democratic National Committee.\nKeech, William R; Matthews, Donald R., The Party's Choice, (Washington,\nD.C., The Brookings Institution), 1976.\nKohler, Saul, \"Ford to let F.B.I. aid nominee\" Boston Globe, May 30, 1976.\nLawrence, David, \"The People's Voice In Picking a Vice-Presidential\nNominee\", U.S. News and World Report, Aug. 14, 1972, p. 80.\n-31-\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nLincoln, Gould, \"Selecting Vice Presidents\", Washington Star, Nov. 3, 1973.\nLinde, Hans, Letter to Joseph Califano, Sept. 7, 1973.\nLinde, Hans, Letter to Nathan Polsby, July 13, 1973.\nLinde, Hans, Memorandum to Oregon Democratic Party Officers, \"Method\nof Selecting the Democratic Vice Presidential Nominee\".\nLoeb, James I., \"On Nominating a Vice President\", The Washington Post,\nJan. 27, 1974.\nMcCarthy, Eugene J., \"The Crown Prince\", New York Times, Aug. 17,\n1972, p. 35.\nMeyer, Lawrence, \"Making of the Vice President: A Process Without\nRules\", Washington Post, Oct. 13, 1973.\nMoe, Ronald C., \"The Vice President as an American Crown Prince\",\nWashington Star, Aug. 20, 1972.\nNaming Vice Presidents: Efforts to Improve System\", Congressional\nQuarterly, Jan. 12, 1974, p. 48.\n\"On Picking Vice Presidents\", Chicago Tribune, Aug. 12, 1972, p. 1-10.\nOtten, Alan L., \"Sorting Out a Role for the Veep\", Wall Street Journal,\nAug. 1, 1972.\nParris, Judith H., The Convention Problem, (Washington, D. C., The\nBrookings Institution) 1972.\n\"Party Gets 2 Plans for Vice-President\", New York Times, Dec. 4, 1973.\nPeabody, Endicott, \"Let People Pick Vice President\", Chicago Tribune,\nMay 13, 1972.\nPerry, James M., \"At Last, a Better Way to Pick a Veep\", Congressional\nRecord, November 15, 1973.\nPolsby, Nelson W. and Wildavsky, Aaron B., Presidential Elections:\nStrategies of American Electoral Politics, 2nd e. (New York,\nCharles Scribner's Sons), 1968, pp. 103-108.\n-32-\nPomper, Gerald, Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention\nChoice (New York, W.W. Norton and Co., Inc.) 1966, pp. 174-181.\nPomper, Gerald, Letter to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Aug. 20, 1973.\nRadway, Lawrence, Statement before the Commission of Vice Presidential\nSelection, Democratic National Committee, New Hampshire hearing,\nSept. 25, 1973.\nRauh, Joseph L., Jr., \"Choosing Vice Presidents: Something Is Amiss\",\nLetter to the Editor, Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1974.\nReston, James, \"All Due Reverent Speed\", Washington Star News, Oct. 12,\n1973.\n\"Revision Due in Vice Presidential Selection\", Los Angeles Times, Aug.\n7, 1972, p. II-6.\nThe Ripon Society, The Lessons of Victory (New York, The Dial Press)\n1969.\n\"Role of the Vice Presidency: On Choosing a Vice President\", tran-\nscript of CBS News Special Report, Aug. 6, 1972, reprinted in\nCurrent, No. 144, Oct. 1972, pp. 49-52.\nRule 29 Committee Report, Republican National Committee. (excerpt, p. 22)\n\"Selecting a Veep\", Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 9, 1972, p. 14.\nSheldon, Courtney R., \"How to Pick Vice Presidents\", Christian Science\nMonitor, July 28, 1972, p. 1.\nSidney, Hugh, \"The Horse-Shedding of Hubert Humphrey), Life, August\n11, 1972, p. 12.\nSlocum, Charles A., \"Statement on Vice Presidential Selection,\"\nFebruary 26, 1976.\nSpero, Sterling D., \"Three Ways to Reform the Booby Prize\", New York\nTimes, Nov. 8, 1973.\nStrout, Richard L., \"America's Roulette\", Christian Science Monitor,\nAug. 18, 1972, p. 14.\nSummary of the Vice Presidential Selection Commission Executive\nCommittee Meeting, Democratic National Committee, July 23, 1973.\nSummary of the Boston Hearing, Vice Presidential Selection Commission,\nDemocratic National Committee, Sept. 26, 1973.\n-33-\nter Horst, Jerald \"Let's try harder to fill No. 2 spot\", Chicago Tribune,\nMarch 21, 1976.\n\"There Must be a Better Way to Choose\", Time, Aug. 7, 1972, p. 19.\n\"The Vice Presidency\", Washington Star-News, Oct. 15, 1973.\nTompkins, Dorothy Campbell, Selection of the Vice President: Public\nPolicy Bibliography to Institute of Governmental Studies, Univer-\nsity of California, Berkeley, 1974.\nUngar, Sanford J. F.B.I. (Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press) 1975.\n\"Vice President System is Supported by Agnew\", New York Times,\nAugust 3, 1972, p. 21.\n\"Vice Presidential Candidates\", Washington Star, Dec. 31, 1973.\n\"Vice Presidential Reform\", Chicago Tribune, Nov. 12, 1972, p. 24.\n\"Vice Presidential Selection: Looking for New Ways\", Congressional\nQuarterly June 23, 1973, p. 1631.\nViorst, Milton, \"Challenge to Selection Procedures\", Washington Star,\nJuly 29, 1972.\nViorst, Milton, \"Picking Vice-Presidents\", Washington Star-News, Oct.\n23, 1973.\nWalters, Robert, \"Democrats Eye Panel to Select Vice Presidency\",\nWashington Star-News, Dec. 14, 1973.\nWeaver, Warren, \"Eagleton Episode Stirs Reform Tide\", Washington Star,\nAug. 7, 1972.\nWeaver, Warren, \"Reforms in Choosing Running Mate Sought\", New York Times,\nAug. 7, 1972, p. 20.\nWeisberger, Bernard A., \"Accidental No. 2 Man\", New York Times, Aug.\n10, 1972, p. 35.\nWhite, William S., \"The Vice Presidency\", Washington Post, Aug. 12, 1972.\nWilliam, Grover S., \"Duties etc. relating to Vice Presidents\", American\nLaw Division, Congressional Research Service, March 3, 1975.\nWitcover, Jules, \"Jimmy Carter: The Candidate on the Issues: An\nInterview\", Washington Post, March 21, 1976.\n-34-\nWilliams, Irving G., \"The American Vice-Presidency\", Current History, June, 1974,\np. 254.\nYoung, Donald, American Roulette: The History and Dilemma of the Vice-Presidency,\n(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), 1972, pp. 123-24, 373-75.\n-35-\nAppendix E\nLIBRARY FORD BERALD\nPartial List of Persons Contacted by Study Group\nProfessor Phillip E. Areeda (Harvard Law School)\nPeter Bourne (Carter Campaign)\nDavid S. Broder\nPhilip W. Buchen (The White House)\nJoseph A. Califano, Jr.\nDavid Cohen (Common Cause)\nPeter Curtin (Church Campaign)\nJohn Elliff (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)\nStephen B. Farber (National Governors' Conference)\nJames Farrington (Deputy Assistant Director, F.B.I.)\nSaul Friedman (Knight Newspapers)\nJames L. George (Staff Assistant, Office of Senator William Brock)\nSenator Barry Goldwater\nJoseph Gorman (Congressional Resear ch Service)\nStephen H. Hess (Brookings. Institution)\nJohn Hotis (Office of Legal Counsel, F.B.I.\nEdward H. Mahe (Republican National Committee)\nColin Matthews (Udall Campaign)\nKent B. McGough (Chairman, Rules Committee, Republican National Committee)\nRichard Moe (Administrative Assistant to Senator Mondale)\nSterling Munro (Administrative Assistant to Senator Jackson)\n-36-\nProfessor Richard E. Neustadt (John F. Kennedy School of Government)\nDean Don K. Price (John F. Kennedy School of Government)\nJames H. Rowe, Jr.\nAndrea Rosen (Democratic National Committee)\nWilliam D. Ruckelshaus\nJames Schoener (Senate Rules Committee)\nJohn P. Sears (Reagan Campaign)\nMark A. Siegel (Democratic National Committee\nFredric W. Slight (Ford Campaign)\nSanford J. Ungar (author of FBI)\nTed VanDyk (former aide to Vice President Humphrey)\n-37-\nAppendix F\nHARVARD UNIVERSITY\nLIBRARY\nJOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT\nGERALD\nINSTITUTE OF POLITICS\nFORD\n.y\n78 Mount Auburn Street\nCambridge, Massachusetts 02138\n617-495-5792\nQuestions on Vice-Presidential Selection for Presidential Candidates\n1) Do you perceive a need for change in the Vice-Presidential selection\nprocess?\n2) How are you now approaching Vice-Presidential selection? Are you\ndeveloping lists of potential candidates? Is any background work on\npotential running-mates being done now or is any planned? Do you antici-\npate communicating directly with the potential candidates, in advance of\nthe convention?\n3) Would you agree that competency to be President should be the main criterion\nin the selection of a running-mate? To what extent can competency be com-\nbined with balancing factors (geographic, ideological, religious, political,\netc.) as criteria? Of these balancing factors, which are most important:\nhow would you prioritize them? How important do you think compatibility\nbetween President and Vice-President (personality, issues orientation, etc.)\nis as a criterion for choice of a running-mate?\n4) What do you think of the following proposals for change:\na) Making public a list of potential Vice-Presidential candidates\nbefore the convention.\nb) Institution of a consultative process (such as by party committee)\nto help in the development of a list of potential candidates, or\nto give advice or screening of the candidates proposed by the\nPresidential candidates.\nc) A partially open convention procedure, with the convention\nchoosing the Vice-Presidential nominee from a list provided\nby the Presidential nominee.\nd) Background investigation of potential Vice-Presidential candi-\ndates by the F.B.I., with an emphasis on the privacy rights of\nthe potential candidates (requiring their permission, and limiting\nthe availability of the report).\ne) Rearrangement of the convention schedule (with Presidential nomina-\ntion first, platform second, then Vice-Presidential nomination)\nto provide more time for consideration of the choice for Vice\nPresident.\nf) Postponement of the selection of the Vice President to a time\nafter the convention; making the selection in a mini-convention\nrepresentative of the full convention.\n-38-\nAppendix G1\nLawrence D. Brown\nBACKGROUND MEMORANDUM ON\nVICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION\nThis memo briefly describes some problems with the open and\npartially open convention approaches to Vice-Presidential selection\nand sketches an outline of my own thinking on how we might proceed.\nFirst, three definitions. By the \"present system\" I mean that the\nPresidential nominee suggests his own choice for Vice-President, and\nthe party convention then accepts or rejects it. An \"open convention\"\nmeans one in which delegates themselves nominate Vice-Presidential\ncandidates and the convention itself makes the decision, weighing the\nPresidential nominee's preference as it sees fit. A \"partially open\nconvention\" means one in which the Presidential contenders narrow their\nVice-Presidential lists to a certain number (say five) either before\nthe convention or after it (in which case the nominee does the narrowing)\nand the convention then selects the Vice-Presidential nominee from among\nthose listed.\nWe seem to agree that the main general objective of changes in the\nsystem should be to move toward procedures more likely than the present\nones to assure selection of men who would make worthy Presidents should\nthat need arise. At a less general level, we also seem to agree that\nnew procedures should provide 1) more time for deliberation about\npotential Vice-Presidents, and 2) more scope for deliberation (usually\nreferred to as \"greater participation\" by those seeking a larger role\nfor the convention itself, that is, the rank and file delegates, and\n\"more extensive consultation\" by those favoring a larger role for prom-\ninent party figures). Presumably, the greater the time allowed for\ndeliberation, the less important it Jecomes to deal explicitly with\nthe scope of participation, because, given time, opinions will out.\nHowever, the reverse does not also hold. For example, chapter two of\nthe Ripon Society's The Lessons of Victory (New York: Dial Press,\nInc., 1969) describes the selection of Spiro Agnew, which consisted of\na rapid and superficial process of rather extensive consultation.\nNevertheless, the time dimension is much more troublesome than appears\nat first glance. Every step toward preconvention specificity diminishes\nthe Presidential contenders' flexibility, and responsiveness to\nemerging trends. Every step toward post convention delay violates the\ncandidate's (and the party's) desire to get a team together and off\nand running.\n-39-\nTo my mind, the major problem with the open and partially open\nconvention approach is that it does not directly address either of the\nobjectives mentioned above. Enlarging the convention role in Vice-\nPresidential selection does not inherently extend or deepen the delib-\nerative process, and thus does not go to the heart of the problem. To\nthe degree, then, that improved deliberation can be accomodated within\nthe present system, the advantages of this system, and the disadvantages\nof the open convention approach, appear more compelling.\nThe best succinct discussion I know of the advantages and of the\nopen and partially open convention approach (and others) is contained\nin a memo from Stu Eisenstat to the Democrats' Vice-Presidential Selection\nCommission (the so-called \"Humphrey Commission\")*. What I have to say\nhere is nothing new, but let me list briefly, in no particular order,\nwhat I consider to be the major disadvantages of the open and partially\nopen convention approaches.\n1. An open convention could exacerbate party factionalism. Any appear-\nance of party unity might break down, and, depending upon the balance of\npower within the convention, the Presidential nominee might get saddled\nwith a Vice-President who is incompatible. This would be offset by\npartial openness (selection from the nominee's list) but this has its\nproblems too. If the change is billed as a step toward \"openness\" (as\nit is bound to be), then explicit statements of preference from the\nnominee will make it appear a mockery in some eyes. If, on the other\nhand, the nominee is prevented from expressing his first choice (which\nis practically impossible), he may either not get his man, or may list\nhis man and four throwaways. The point of making changes, it seems to\nme, should be to equip the convention (or some subdivision of it) to\nevaluate the mominee's choice in the context of other contenders, and\nto provide information and advice to Presidential contenders (and the\nnominee) as their decision-making processes unfold. \"Openness\" reforms\ndo not address this point straightforwardly.\n2. Openness enhances the deliberative process only if the delegates\nknow the candidates' Vice-Presidential choices far enough in advance\nof the convention to give them time to deliberate. But advance listing\n(unless limited to one or two Vice-Presidential choices apiece) may lead\nto extreme ticket-balancing, as the obligatory blacks, women, religious\nand regional figures, and so forth appear on the lists to win factional\nsupport. Even if the number of preconvention choices is limited (which\nis probably infeasible), the prime concern will be short-term coalition-\nbuilding.\n3. Openness could lead to complex and probably undesirable factional\npatterns, as state delegations bargain support for A for President in\nexchange for support for B for Vice-President. It's far from clear that\nthe result would be to accentuate quality.\n*\nThis memo is reprinted in the Congressional Record, 16 October 1973.\n-40-\n4. Although it is true that the President is tortuously selected, and\nthat the Vice-President must be worthy to become President, it is probably\nalso true that there is strong sentiment among party and public for letting\nthe President name his man. There are many reasons for this. The first\nis the need for flexibility. Granting that quality should come first, the\nneed to balance ideological, regional, and other appeals within the set of\nhigh-quality contenders varies from one time and situation to another.\nThe nominee -- the party's leader -- can assuage party splits when in the\nnature of the case a (split) convention cannot. The Vice-President is\nbound to remain the nominee's major, short-term political instrument in\ntrying to do so.\nSecond, selection of a Vice-President is a Presidential nominee's\nfirst and most prominent exercise of discretion and judgment. Taking the\nchoice away from him may diminish his public legitimacy (the top man is\nsupposed to be \"responsible\" add \"accountable\"). It may be too that\npeople like to think of the ticket as a \"team\", not a juxtaposition.\nThird, as Hans Linde has pointed out, unless the President finds his\nrunning-mate personally and ideologically compatible (which he alone can\ndecide), he may not keep him informed about and included in what's going\non. This would reduce the Vice-President's capacity to assume the\nPresidency.\nThese points seem to me to argue rather strongly that the costs of\nthe open and partially open approaches are likely to outweigh the benefits.\nNow I want to set down a few vague thoughts explaining the rudiments of\nwhat I consider a sensible approach to procedural change.\nAs I said above, I think that the major emphasis should be on\nVice-Presidential quality. (By \"quality\" I mean selection of a Vice-\nPresident whom large numbers of people other than the Presidential\nnominee would be content to see occupy the highest office if the major\npertinent facts were known, and if the need arose.) In arguing the need\nfor change, there are basically two different approaches. One is to argue\nthat the present system (and the Vice-Presidents and Vice-Presidential\nnominees it produces) are simply not very good. I am not convinced that\nthis is true. The second line of argument is that the system is basically\nsound, but unacceptably risky. I believe that Vice-Presidents in general,\nand Vice-Presidents who became President, have been, on the whole, of high\nquality. I believe too that the system is to some degree self-correcting.\n(As Stephen K. Bailey said it in a statement to the Humphrey Commission in\nNovember 1973, after the Eagleton and Agnew affairs, nominees are likely\nto exercise \"exquisite care\" in selecting running-mates even without\nprocedural changes. Nor do I believe that Presidential nominees do --\nor would -- knowingly choose flawed men.\nHaving granted all this, however, the key fact remains that informa-\ntion (broadly defined) has been and remains too limited. In selecting men\nfor high office, \"political information (insights of knowledgeable politicians\nand party notables about contender's style and performance) and \"factual\"\ninformation (data about personal honesty, background, and the like) are\nequally valuable and perhaps inextricable.\n-41-\nMoreover, the Eagleton and Agnew cases suggest that under some conditions,\nthe logic of party unity may lead not to nomination of major party figures\nbut rather to inoffensive and little-known individuals. These facts, it\nseems to me, argue for explicit procedural change; it is not prudent to\nleave the choice almost wholely to the personal judgment of the nominees'\nand their top aides. In short: we should look to modest procedural\ninnovations which might reduce the risk of seriously flawed candidates\nby enhancing the time and scope for deliberations.\nIf we accept this general orientation, then it seems to me that\nwe come down to three basic questions:\n1. What should be the mechanics of deliberation? -- in particular,\ndo we want to argue for an institutionalized party role (beyond the\ndelegates themselves), or leave it mainly to contenders, press, and public?\n2. What should be the timing of the deliberative process? -- in\nparticular, should it fall mainly before the convention or after it?\n3. What should be the extent of the process? -- in particular, do\nwe want to leave it to the contenders and their staffs, the parties, the\npress, and the public; or do we want to consider FBI checks?\nThese three questions comprise the heart of the matter, in my view. Let\nme set down quickly my tentative thoughts on these three questions, and\nsuggest the implications of these thoughts.\n1. I think that there should be some sort of institutionalized\nparty role in Vice-Presidential selection, beyond convention ratification\nof the Presidential nominee's personal choice. I take this view for three\nreasons. First, I share the position of many political scientists (some\nof whom discussed this and related points before the Humphrey Commission)\nthat the apparent decline of national party organization is something to\nworry over. I do not believe that we should encourage the increasingly\npopular view that the candidate is everything and the party is nothing;\nnor do I think that we should recommend changes that work in that direction.\nIf possible, I would like to see the institutional role of the parties\nstrengthened.\nSecond, I believe that some party role is needed to fill information\ngaps that would inevitably remain if consultation were left mainly to the\ncontenders, their staffs, the press, and the public. The viewpoint of\nparty officials may be distinctive and valuable; it should be built into\nthe process.\nThird, I agree with Charles Hyneman's observation to the Humphrey\nCommission that \"Proof that well known men and women are involved in the\nselection and that deliberation is going on\" would lend legitimacy to the\nVice-Presidential selection process and increase public confidence in it.\nThese \"well known men and women\" should come from the ranks of the parties.\n-42-\n2. I believe that a pre convention deliberative process is preferable\nto a post convention process. As James I. Loeb remarked in reference to\narguments in favor of the 1972 Democratic \"mini-convention\" (held after the\nconvention itself had adjourned):\nif it were adopted as a regular device, it\nwould mainly serve three purposes: to underscore\nthe indecisiveness of the presidential nominee\nto weaken any semblance of party unity and to\nestablish an all-time record for anticlimax.*\nMoreover, as Congressman Marvin Esch of Michigan has pointed out, a delayed\nVice-Presidential nomination would give an appearance of \"smoke-filled-room-\npolitics,\" \"secret deals\" and \"power brokers. \" ** Also, might not unit-rule\nproblems in weighting delegate votes arise under such procedures? All\npost-convention processes with which I am familiar run up against problems\nsuch as these.\n3. I would refrain from recommending new forms of FBI checks on\nVice-Presidential contenders. On the one hand, the possible costs of such\nchecks -- in terms of loosely-controlled investigations, violations of\nprivacy, abuse of confidential data, and others -- are unclear but potentially\ngreat. On the other hand, I am not convinced that the benefits to be gained\nfrom such checks are sizeable, let alone large enough to outweigh the\npotential costs. I would want to think long and hard before endorsing an\nexpanded, institutionalized FBI role in electoral politics. To my mind,\na workable system of party consultation, and an expanded dialogue among\npolitical actors -- party, candidates, press, and public -- ought to do\nthe job.\nFollowing these observations where they seem to lead, I would incline\nto favor a process something like this: the parties should establish some\nsort of committee on Vice-Presidential selection, with appropriate staff,\nwhich would go to work a month of two before the convention. The committee\nshould contact active Presidential candidates (somehow defined) and solicit\nfrom them lists (of some reasonable length ) of persons whom they (the\ncontenders) think should be considered as potential Vice-Presidential\nnominees. The committee would then compile and make public one general\nlist of contenders for Vice-President. \"hose listed could remove themselves\nfrom consideration if they wished. The committee would carry out staff work\nand consult widely with various party elements about the respective merits\nor limitations of those listed. Discussion would proceed among media and\npublic. The big problem is, how deep would the committee dig, and how public\nwould this \"dossier\" become? One report noted that the Democratic Commission\n* Washington Post, 27 January 1974\nCongressional Record, 2 August 1974\n-43-\non Vice-Presiential Selection, faced with similar proposals, \"was reluctant\nto get into 'screening' r'digging up dirt', and made it clear the advisory\npanel it recommended would compile publicly available information only.\"*\nEven a consultation process limited in this way need not be superficial,\nhowever. Such a panel might go a long way toward increasing the store of\nfactual information and considered opinion of which candidates and delegates\nmight avail themselves in reaching their decisions.\nAt the convention the order of business might well be changed to\nplace platform adoption between the selection of the Presidential and\nVice-Presidential nominees. This suggestion would seem to run counter to\nthe concern for party prerogatives expressed above, but several consider-\nations persuade me that this is not the case. A platform adopted after,\nand guided by, the Presidential nominee would enjoy a closer link in the\npublic's mind with the head of the ticket. A platform, after all, is not\nonly a declaration of general party position, but also -- even more so\na statement of goals a new administration would attempt to pursue. Nor\nwould rearrangement of the schedule necessarily impair the platform's\nrole as party unifier; the nominee's need to unite the party behind him and\nto heal convention wounds would probably lead him to\nstrengthen the platform's traditional reconciliation functions.\nAfter the nominee had been selected, and while the platform was under\nconsideration, the nominee would consult with the advisory committee about\nhis preferred choices, would avail himself of the information and opinions\ncompiled, and would then name one individual. The convention would then\nvote. The nominee would retain the option of naming a running mate not on\nthe committee's list, but if he did so, it might be agreed that the convention\nadjourn and vote by \"mini-convention\" a week or so later in order to allow\ntime for research and consultation.\nThis approach strikes me as a fairly sensible extrapolation from\nthe observations presented above. Whether it is feasible in practice is\nanother matter however.\n*\nCongressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 January 1974, pg. 49\n-44-\nAppendix G2\nElizabeth Goddard\nPARTY OPTIONS FOR CHANGE OF VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCEDURES\nTechnically it is possible for the parties to make changes this\nyear which would affect Vice-Presidential selection. These, for\nreasons of time, would probably be procedural changes, such as a\nrearrangement of the order of business. It would be very difficult\nat this point to enact changes which would influence the behavior\nof the potential candidates, such as requiring them to provide\nlists of potential running-mates, although it would be possible\nto institute some form of consultative process on a short notice.\nRealistically, it is not likely that a sitting convention is\ngoing to make changes which would take effect immediately. We\nshould make recommendations for immediate action at this con-\nvention, but realizing that changes will probably not be made\nfor 1976, we should stress two things: 1) the importance\nand priority that should be given to Vice-Presidential selection,\n2) the necessity for making the rule changes in this convention\nfor effect in 1980 (not the formation of more committees to study\nthe question, but the actual enactment of the changes themselves).\nSelective Listing of Party Options for Change\n1) Rearrangement of convention schedule (Presidential nomination,\nplatform, then Vice-Presidential nomination).\n2) Institution of a formal consultative process (party committee\nto be a screening committee, or simply an advisory group).\n3) Open convention - choice left entirely up to delegates.\n4) Presidential nominee makes public a list of potential running-\nmates after nomination, and the convention chooses from this list.\n5) The Presidential candidates make public lists of potential\nrunning-mates before the nomination;\n-45-\na) the convention chooses from the list (allowing for inclusion\nof names of defeated Presidential candidates.\nb) the Presidential nominee indicates a preference before the\nconvention selects the Vice-Presidential nominee, (allowing\nfor the inclusion of names of defeated Presidential candidates).\n6) Convention chooses Vice-Presidential nominee from a list provided\nby a party committee, or other criteria.\n7) Post-convention choice of the Vice-Presidential nominee:\na) by committee, or mini-convention\nb) by the Presidential candidate\nAnalysis of Selected Options\n1) If other reforms in the Vice-Presidential selection process have\nbeen made, such as a pre-convention listing of potential running-mates,\na provision for background investigation and institution of a consultative\nprocess, then the proposal for a rearrangement of the convention schedule\nis not as important, because these measures would mean that care and\ndeliberation in the choice were taking place even before the convention.\nBut in the situation that will probably exist this year, with none of these\nreforms taking place, the rearrangement of the convention schedule becomes\nan important and necessary change. It would provide time, which is crucial,\nfor the nominees and their staffs to regroup and proceed in some orderly\nfashion, and for a more extensive consultative process to insure party.\nacceptance, and to do the checking that is needed.\n2) Consultative process. The institution of a consultative process\nis an important reform, as it is a way to increase input into the selection\nprocess while retaining the candidate's dominance in the choice. A con-\nsultative mechanism could begin at this convention although there would\nbe logistical problems, mainly of time, since the consulting would probably\nbe taking place at the convention rather than before. This is a process\nthat should be suggested for 1976 but recommended strongly for 1980. The\nbest proposal seems to be for a consultative committee, or advisory group,\nwhich meets before the convention (and possibly holds hearings) discusses\nand does research into potential Vice-Presidential prospects; then at the\nconvention, is available to the nominee in an advisory capacity.\n3) Open convention. This is the most readily available option since\nit already exists in fact though not in practice. There are merits to\nsuch a system, but it does not guarantee an improvement in the Vice-\nPresidential selection process, and is not the best vehicle for change.\n-46-\n4) Presidential nominee makes public a list after nomination, and the\nconvention chooses from this list. This is not an ideal solution, as it\ndoes nothing to insure that time has been spent in the choice, and it does\nnot provide time for checking of the choices.\n5) Presidential candidates make available lists before the convention.\nThis option is the most promising. It provides for several things which\nare desireable:\n1) It insures that the Presidential candidates begin thinking\nabout, and actively working on, Vice-Presidential selection\nbefore the convention.\n2) It makes the potential candidates known and available for\npublic and media exposure, background checking, etc.\n3) It retains candidate control over the process (especially\nif the nominee makes a preference known) while allowing\nmore participation from public and party.\nIt is not very likely that such a system could be instituted this year,\nunless done voluntarily by the candidates. It should be strongly recommended\nas a change to be made for 1980, however. The party could make it a require-\nment for candidates with a certain number of delegates or whatever. There\nare potential problems however, such as the possibility of a drafted nominee\nwho would not have made a list public.\nRecommendations\n1) That the parties adopt general resolutions stating that Vice-\nPresidential selection deserves more care than it presently receives, and\nurging that, especially this year, the Presidential candidates do their\nhomework before the convention, and give Vice-Presidential selection priority.\n2) For 1976, changes be made in the rules to allow:\nA) rearrangement of the convention schedule\nB) consultative mechanism\n3) For 1980: At this convention changes be made in the rules to\nrequire in 1980:\nA) That the candidates announce a list of potential running-mates\nbefore the convention (allowing the candidate to make preference\nknown at the convention)\nB) That a party advisory group be formed to serve in a consultative\ncapacity.\n-47-\nFORD\n074879\nC) That the convention schedule be rearranged (to allow time\nfor the candidate to choose from the list and from the\nunsuccessful Presidential candidates, and time for con-\nsultations with party elements to take place.\nA Resolution to be adopted, which recommends the careful use of FBI back-\nground investigation, stressing the need to respect the individual's privacy\nand the need to have the individual's permission.\nDescription of Rules Committee Procedures\nFOR THE DEMOCRATS:\nThe Rules Committee of the National Committee meets before the Convention\n(June 19, 20, and possibly the 21st). Only the members of the committee are\npresent. Any member of the Committee can bring up any resolution for change.\nThe Rules Committee then makes its recommendations to the Convention directly\n(each delegate receives a copy of their report), and the Convention votes\non the recommendations.\nPossible Means of Change in the Rules For 1976 = Amendment to Rules\nAt the Rules Committee meeting, it will be moved to adopt the temporary\nRules in the Convention Call as the Permanent Rules. At this point, there\nwill be attempts to amend these rules, rule by rule. Vice-Presidential\nselection amendments could be proposed at this time, by a member of the\ncommittee.\nOther Ways\nThe Convention can enact changes that have not been accepted by the\nRules Committee:\n1) By minority report of the Rules Committee (25%)\n2) By suspension of the Rules of the Convention\n3) Also any delegate can request a special order of business\n(the Rules Committee has to agree before this is done)\nChanges for 1980\nThese would come up at a different time in the Rules Committee meeting.\nThey could be proposed as a simple resolution, or as a charter amendment.\n-48-\nFOR THE REPUBLICANS\nThe Rules Committee of the Republican National Committee meets before\nthe convention. It makes recommendations to the National Committee, which\nmakes recommendations to the Convention Rules Committee, which begins\nmeeting several days before the convention. The Convention Rules Committee\nmakes recommendations to the full Convention.\nThe Chairman of the Rules Committee of the National Committee, Kent\nB. McGough, has indicated that input from interested parties is welcome.\nThe best time for this would be the June 24 meeting of the Rules Committee,\nat which time they will hold a hearing on Vice-Presidential selection.\nAttachments to Party Options Paper: Summary of Republican Party Actions\non Vice-Presidential Selection\nSummary of Democraitc Party Actions\non Vice-Presidential Selection\n-49-\nREPUBLICAN PARTY ACTIONS\nON VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION\nSubcommittee 2 of the Republican National Committee's reform group,\nthe Rule 29 Committee, considered the question of changes in Vice-\nPresidentail selection methods. They held hearings and solicited recom-\nmendations in the spring of 1974.\nThe preliminary report of the Rule 29 Committee was submitted\nto the Republican National Committee by June 30, 1974. The final\nreport was presented by January 1, 1975. The Republican National\nCommittee acted upon this report on March 5-6, 1975.\nThere is one section in the Rule 29 Committee report which deals\nwith Vice-Presidential selection. It is a resolution which\nrecommends that the Republican National Committee continue to review\nproposals to improve the Vice-Presidential nominating process at the\nnational convention, emphasizing the need for more time for the selec-\ntion of the nominee.\nBefore the 1976 convention, the Rules Committee of the Republican\nNational Committee will meet and consider the recommendations of the\nRule 29 Committee. The Rules Committee then makes recommendations\nto the Convention Rules Committee, which makes recommendations to the\nconvention as a whole. On June 24, the Rules Committee of the Republican\nNational Committee will hold a hearing to consider further proposals\nregarding Vice-Presidential selection. In the words of the Chairman\nof the Republican National Committee, Mary Louise Smith, \"Because\nof the great amount of interest in this subject, our pre-convention\nRules Committee will devote considerable time to the matter during\nits June meeting.\nFor the convention this year, the Republican National Committee\nhas no plans to make changes in their Vice-Presidential selection process;\nthe actions of the Rules Committee are aimed at the 1980 convention.\n-50-\nDEMOCRATIC PARTY ACTIONS\nON VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION\nAt the miniconvention to select a Vice-Presidential nominee in\nAugust, 1972, the Democratic National Committee established a commission\nto study Vice-Presidential selection with the purpose of recommending\nchanges in the selection procedures of the party convention. Under\nrules adopted in 1972, the commission had until January 1, 1974, to make\na report to the National Committee.\nThe first meeting of the Vice-Presidential Selection Commission was\nheld June 20, 1973, in Washington, D.C. The chairman of the Commission\nwas Senator Hubert Humphrey. At this meeting, the full commission of\nseventy-five people established an eighteen person executive committee,\nwhich then scheduled a meeting in Washington on July 23-24 to discuss\nmeans of gathering information and suggestions.\nThe executive committee held hearings in the fall of 1973 and solicited\nwritten opinions on the subject of Vice-Presidential selection.\nSeveral recommendations were produced by the executive committee,\nwhich, after slight alteration, were accepted on December 13, 1973, by\nthe full commission. The proposals called for the formation of a\nscreening committee, the lengthening of the convention by one day,\nand the option of postponing the choice of a Vice-President to a mini-\nconvention twenty-one days after the national convention.\nThe proposals of the Commission on Vice-Presidential Selection\nwere presented to the Democratic National Committee. The Committee\nremoved the section suggesting the formation of a screening committee,\nbut took no further action on the proposals. None of the proposals were\nincluded in the Charter which was adopted at the 1974 miniconvention\nin Kansas City.\nAs it stands now, the Democratic National Committee has no plans to\nchange the Vice-Presidential selection process, and they have no plans for\nany action on the Report of the Vice-Presidential Selection Commission.\n-51-\nAppendix G3\nCharles Greenleaf\nBackground Checks of Possible Vice-Presidential Nominees\nThis paper preliminarily reviews the major considerations in conduct-\ning a background investigation of possible Vice-Presidential candidates\nand outlines proposals for consideration by the study group.\nPro-Con\nVirtually everyone admits that the Presidential candidates should have\nmore information about the potential running mates then has been available\nin the past. The choice of Thomas Eagleton in 1972 and of Spiro Agnew\nin 1968 are illustrations of the need for more information.\nHowever, there are strong arguments that background checks by the FBI\nare an invasion of privacy. Furthermore, any screening process or infor-\nmation gathering effort by a political party will be criticized as an\nattempt at \"backroom\" influence of the selection process.\nMajor Considerations\nWho should conduct the background checks and political screening?\nThe FBI is the only organization equipped to do an extensive personal\nbackground investigation. Outside the government, investigative journal-\nists, such as Jack Anderson, will conduct inquiries without much encourage-\nment.\nPolitical screening of a Vice-Presidential prospect's public record\ncould be done by the Presidential candidates or by the party organizations.\nThe press and various interest groups will also have a major role in\npublicizing the record of leading Vice-Presidential contenders.\nWhat should be checked?\nAn FBI check, if authorized, would probably be in the nature of a\n\"full field investigation,\" not as massively detailed as the checks of\nGerald Ford and Nelson Rockefeller when they were Vice-Presidential\nnominees.\nAside from an FBI check of personal information, there should be a\nreview of the public record of the potential Vice-Presidents. Positions\ntaken throughout his political career should be documented. Material on\n-52-\nCongressional service is relatively easy to collect, compared with infor-\nmation about a person's record at the state or local level.\nWhen should the checks be made?\nThe information should be collected prior to the nominating\nconventions. Sanford Ungar's recent book, The FBI, indicates that it\nnormally takes fifteen days to investigate a Presidential appointment.\nThe background check on Nelson Rockefeller used 350 agents and took a total\nof 1,400 interviews. A pre-nomination investigation of several possible\ncandidates would not be as extensive, but it would require a week or two\nat least.\nA comprehensive review of the political record of possible nominees\nwould take longer, whether done by the staff of a Presidential candidate\nor by a political party committee.\nAction by the Study Group\nI submit two proposals for consideration by the study group: 1) an\nFBI check mechanism and 2) a research process by the party organizations.\n1) FBI Check. Any study group recommendaion for FBI background\nchecks depends upon further study by us of existing practices and\nauthorities. If statutory authorization is not required for an investiga-\ntion, the President could ask the FBI to conduct a \"top secret\" security\nclearance for potential Vice-Presidential choices in the following manner:\n*Presidential candidates with a reasonable chance of getting the\nnomination would be allowed to submit to the FBI up to 10 possibilities\nfor Vice-President.\n*The Presidential candidates should inform their choices of the pending\nbackground check and give them a chance to decline being investigated.\n*The results of the FBI check would be available only to the winner of\nthe nomination. Unused data would be destroyed.\n(This concept is similar to the bill introduced in 1973 by Senator\nWilliam Brock. The bill has not been introduced in the current Congress,\nnor has any bill pertaining to FBI checks of Vice-Presidential candidates.)\n2) Research on Candidates by the Party Organizations. One would hope\nthat Presidential candidates would direct campaign staffers to scrutinize\nthe public records of possible Vice-Presidential nominees, but it is\nunlikely that the candidates have the money or the time to accomplish this\nproject adequately, particulary when the pre-convention campaigns are\nclosely contested.\nInstead of just relying upon Presidential candidates to do research\nabout their choices for running-mate, the party organizations should help\ndo the job of screening in a formal role.\n-53-\nIn 1973 the Humphrey Commission proposed that the Democratic\nNational Committee establish an Advisory Committee on the Vice-Presidential\nnomination. The Advisory Committee of 7-10 members could be selected\nafter consultation with all Presidential candidates in the party. The\nCommittee would collect information from public records about all potential\nVice-Presidential nominees. Its work would not in any way be binding,\nthe Committee should make no recommendations whatsoever, and it should\nsubmit its information to the nominee at the convention.\nThese two proposals, the FBI checks and the candidate research by the\nparty, are examples of specific actions that the study group must produce,\nif we are to have any impact on reforming the Vice-Presidential selection\nprocess.\nAttachments: excerpt from the Congressional Record, November 26, 1973\na bill, S.2741, 93d Congress, November 26, 1973\n-54-\nCongressional Record\nUnited States\nof America\nPROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE\nCONGRESS, FIRST SESSION\nVol. 119\nWASHINGTON, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1973\nNo. 181\nSenate\nBy Mr. BROCK:\nS. 2741. A bill to provide for an in-\nleased only to the winner of the Presi-\nvestigation of the character and past ac-\ndential nomination and only with the\ntivities of potential Vice-Presidential\nwritten consent of the person investi-\nnominees by the Federal Bureau of In-\ngated. Also, only the Presidential candi-\nvestigation. Referred to the Committee\ndate himself and one other staff member\non the Judiciary.\nchosen by the Presidential candidate may\nMr. BROCK Mr. President, as every-\nview the records at all times.\none knows, we will soon be voting on the\nAn FBI agent would serve as custodian\nconfirmation of a new Vice President.\nof the records. After the selection of the\nEvents of the past 15 months amply\nVice President by the party convention,\ndemonstrate the need to take a hard look\nall investigation reports including the in-\nat the methods by which a Vice President\nvestigation of the Vice-Presidential can-\nis chosen.\ndidate shall be destroyed. It will be a\nWhen we examine both history and\nFederal offense of up to 5 years im-\ncurrent events, we see that there is a vast\nprisonment and a $50,000 fine for un-\ndifference between the scrutiny that a\nlawful disclosure of the results of any\npotential President and a potential Vice\ninvestigation.\nPresident receives. Normally, a man who\nMr. President, this bill I am introduc-\ndesires the office of President of the\ning will provide the means to prevent the\nUnited States must receive a great deal\nrecurrence of events such as the ones of\nof publicity if he hopes to even have a\nthis past 15 months. The investigations\nchance of being elected. During the time\nprovided for by this bill should determine\nperiod between a potential President's\nthe fitness of the man who, if elected.\nname being mentioned as a possible can-\nwould be a heartbeat away from the\ndidate and his actual nomination, the\nPresidency. At the same time, this bill\ncandidate is subjected to intense exam-\nforbids the leaking of information about\nination by the press and the general\nthe people being investigated, and thus\npublic. This examination keeps a Presi-\nit safeguards their rights of privacy.\ndential candidate constantly in the pub-\nSALIENT POINTS OF BILL\nlic eye. Such scrutiny has often resulted\nFirst. At the conclusion of the final\nin a candidate's withdrawing from the\nPresidential primary of final nomi-\nPresidential race.\nnating convention, but in any case at\nThis is not true of a potential Vice\nleast 1 month prior to the party con-\nPresident, however. Under the present\nvention, those candidates with at least\nmethod of choosing the Vice President,\n10 percent committed delegates at that\nthe candidate who is selected is more\ntime, or the top three contenders, shall\noften than not relatively unknown to the\nhave the right to submit to the FBI the\npublic. This means that a Vice-Presi-\nnames of not more than 10 persons to\ndential candidate virtually never re-\nbe investigated for the office of Vice\nceives the scrutiny that a Presidential\nPresident.\ncandidate receives. Often, less than 24\nSecond. The investigation shall con-\nhours passes between the time of a Pres-\nsist of the normal procedures used for\nidential candidate's nomination and a\na top secret clearance.\nVice-Presidential candidate's nomina-\nThird. These investigations shall be\ntion. Adequate investigation is impossible\nreleased only to the winner of the Presi-\nunder such circumstances.\ndential nomination, and only with the\nToday, I would like to introduce a bill\nwritten consent of the person investi-\nwhich will eliminate many of the prob-\ngated. Also, only the Presidential candi-\nlems created by the present system of\ndate himself and one other staff member\nchoosing the Vice President. This bill\nchosen by the Presidential candidate\nwould allow, but not require, Presidential\nmay view the records. and at all times,\ncandidates with a reasonable chance of\nthere shall be an FBI agent present as\nwinning the nomination to submit the\ncustodian of records.\nnames of up to 10 possibilities for Vice\nGERAED\nFourth. After selection of the Vice\nPresident to the FBI. Reasonable chance\nPresident by the party convention, all in-\nof winning means that a candidate ei-\nFORD\nvestigation reports including the investi-\nther has 10 percent of the delegate votes,\ngation on the Vice-Presidential candi-\nor is among the top three contenders.\ndate shall be destroyed.\nThe investigation of the contenders\nshall consist of the normal procedures\nLIBRAR\nFifth. It shall be a Federal offense of\nup to 5 years imprisonment and a $50,000\nused for a top-secret clearance. The re-\nfine for unlawful disclosure.\nsults of the investigations shall be re-\n-55-\n93n CONGRESS\n1sT SESSION\nS. 2741\nIN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES\nNOVEMBER 26, 1973\nMr. BROCK introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred\nto the Committee on the Judiciary\nA\nBILL\nTo provide for an investigation of the character and past\nactivities of potential Vice-Presidential nominees by the\nFederal Bureau of Investigation.\n1\nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-\n2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,\n3 That, for purposes of this Act, the term-\n4\n(1) \"Presidential primary\" means any election\n5\nheld for the expression of a preference by the voters of\n6\na State for the nomination of a candidate for election\n7\nto the office of President;\n8\n(2) \"political party\" means any political party\n9\nwhose candidate for election to the office of President in\n10\nthe most recently conducted Presidential election received\nII\n-56-\n2\n1\nmore than 10 per centum of the total number of votes\n2\ncast throughout the United States for all such candidates,\n3\ntreating votes cast for the election of Presidential and\n4\nVice-Presidential electors who are affiliated with a\n5\npolitical party as votes cast for the Presidential candidate\n6\nof that party;\n7\n(3) \"national nominating convention\" means a\n8\nconvention held by a political party for the purpose of\n9\nnominating the candidate of that party for the office of\n10\nPresident; and\n11\n(4) \"Presidential candidate\" means an individual\n12\nwho—\n13\n(A) is qualified under the Constitution to serve\n14\nas President if elected to that office, and\n15\n(B) files with the Attorney General, not later\n16\nthan thirty days before the date on which the na-\n17\ntional nominating convention of a political party is\n18\nscheduled to begin-\n19\n(i) a statement in writing personally\n20\nsigned by him stating that he is a candidate for\n21\nthe nomination of that party for election to the\n22\noffice of President; and\n23\n(ii) statements in writing personally\n24\nsigned by a substantial number of delegates who\n25\nare entitled to vote in such convention for the\n-57-\nBEARALD\n3\n1\nselection of the candidate of that party for elec-\nFURD\n2\ntion to the office of President stating that they\n3\nintend to vote for the nomination of that individ-\n4\nual as the candidate of that party for election to\n5\nthe office of President when the convention is\n6\nheld.\n7\nFor purposes of clause (ii), an individual shall be\n8\nconsidered to have furnished statements from a sub-\n9\nstantial number of delegates to the national nomi-\n10\nnating convention of a political party if he has fur-\n11\nnished the greatest, next greatest, or third greatest\n12\nnumber of statements from such delegates, or if he\n13\nhas furnished statements from 10 per centum of\n14\nsuch delegates.\n15\nSEC. 2. (a) The Attorney General upon receiving a\n0\n16\nwritten request from a Presidential candidate shall conduct\n17\nan investigation through the Federal Bureau of Investigation\n18 of not more than ten individuals listed in that request by the\n19 Presidential candidate as potential Vice-Presidential nom-\n20 inees. The investigation shall be of the same nature, extent,\n21 and scope as an investigation conducted by the Federal\n22 Bureau of Investigation in connection with the granting of\n23 a top secret security clearance to any individual employed\n24 by the United States.\n-58-\n4\n1\n(b) No evidence or information obtained by an investi-\n2 gation conducted under subsection (a) shall be released to\n3 any person without the written consent of the individual who\n4 is the subject of the investigation.\n5\n(c) If an individual investigated under subsection (a)\n6 consents in writing under subsection (b) to the disclosure of\n7 the evidence and information obtained in- that investigation,\n8 the Attorney General shall permit inspection of such evi-\n9 dence and information by the Presidential candidate who re-\n10 quested the investigation together with one other person des-\n11 ignated by the candidate, if such candidate has been nomi-\n12 nated by the national nominating convention of the political\n13 party with which he is affiliated. Any such inspection shall\n14 be carried out on premises designated by the Attorney Gen-\n15 eral in the presence of an employee of the Federal Bureau\n16 of Investigation, who shall be custodian of such evidence\n17 and information. No copy, record, or memorandum of any\n18 matter contained in such evidence and information shall be\n19 made by the candidate or the person designated by the candi-\n20 date to inspect the evidence and information with him, and no\n21 piece of such evidence or information shall be removed from\n22 the custody of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.\n23\nSEC. 3. Upon the nomination a candidate for election\n24 to the office of Vice President by the national nominating\n25 convention of a political party all evidence and information\n-59-\nGERALD\nR.\n5\n1 obtained under section 2 relating to potential Vice-Presi-\n2 dential nominees of that party shall be destroyed and no\n3 memorandum, copy, or other record of such evidence or\n4 information shall be retained.\n5\nSEC. 4. No evidence or information obtained under or in\n6 connection with an investigation carried out under this Act\n7 shall be admissible in any proceeding before any court of the\n8 United States or of any State.\n9\nSEC. 5. The disclosure, release, or retention of evidence\n10 or information in violation of the provisions of this Act shall\n11 be punishable by a fine not to exceed $50,000, imprison-\n12 ment for not to exceed five years, or both.\n-60-\nAppendix H\nSELECTED COMMENT ON VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION\nEach Presidential election year brings, with measured regularity,\na rising chorus of complaints about how Vice Presidents are selected.\nSolemn pledges \"to do something\" about the selection process ring through\npolitical party caucuses, and the heavy artillery of the political pundits\nthunders in at just the right moment, for effect.\nIt was all well said in 1906 by Finley Peter Dunne:\n\"It's sthrange about th' vice prisidincy,\" said Mr. Dooley.\n\"The prisidincy is th' highest office in th' gift iv th' people.\nTh' vice prisidincy is th' next highest an' th' lowest. It isn't a\ncrime exactly. Ye can't be sint to jail f'r it, but it's a kind iv\na disgrace. It's like writin' anonymous letters. At a convintion\nnearly all th' dillygates lave as soon as they've nomynated th'\nprisidint f'r fear wan iv them will be nomynated f'r vice prisidint.\"\nMr. Dooley would, however, be suprised at the recent history of\nVice-Presidential selection, during which the Vice Presidency has\nbecome more and more of a sought-after prize. Being Vice President is\ninescapably the best way to become President.\nOf the 38 American Presidents, 13 (or more than a third) were\nVice Presidents first. These 13 have been President for more than\na third of the nation's 200 years. The figures for this century are\neven more startling. Of the 13 Twentieth Century American Presidents,\n-61-\n6 were first Vice President, and they have been President for 34 of the\n76 years (45 per cent). Putting it another way, in this century the\nodds are about one to two that the Vice President will one day become\nPresident.\nWhether or not changing the way Vice Presidents are selected is\nan idea whose time has finally arrived is a good question. It may\nsimply be that the Vice Presidency is like the weather: everyone\ncomplains about it, but no one can change it.\nThe following excerpts from editorials, columns, and so forth\nare illustrative of the thousands of pages written on this subject---\nand they reveal the near-unanimity of judgement that it is, indeed,\ntime for a change in how we select Vice Presidents.\n-- K. Dun Gifford\n-62-\nEndicott Peabody, Chicago Tribune, May 13, 1972\nWe cannot have a Vice President, a potential President,\nwho has been chosen by anything less than a deliberative and\ncollective decision by a free and open convention.\nMilton Viorst, Washington Star, July 24, 1972\nI am convinced that one of the reforms both parties should\nhave high on the agenda for 1976 is a procedure for choosing\nthe vice presidential candidate as openly as the Democrats this\nyear chose their presidential candidate.\nCourtenay R. Sheldon, Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 1972\nA simple switch in the order of business at political\nconventions could help avoid another \"agony over Eagleton\".\nThe Democrats are already thinking about such a plan, says\nJoseph A. Califano, Jr., general counsel of the Democratic\nNational Committee.\nClayton Fritchey, Washington Post, August 5, 1972\nEvery four years there is a new round of hand wringing\nover the way American Vice Presidents are chosen. The only\ndifference is that, in the wake of the Eagleton crisis, the\nwails are even louder.\nAdmittedly, our hit-and-miss way of selecting vice-\npresidential nominees leaves a great deal to be desired, but\nin practice it hasn't worked too badly.\nErwin D. Canham, Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 1972\nThe Eagleton mess could easily have been avoided. But\ntotal reform of the process by which vice-presidential can-\ndidates are chosen is more complicated. It ought to be done.\nTo have the vice-presidential candidate designated by a\nweary presidential nominee, under the worst of circumstances,\nis an intolerable risk.\nAlan L. Otten, Wall Street Journal, August 17, 1972\nAt the moment all public attention is still focused on\nbetter methods for picking a vice presidential nominee. The\nDemocratic disaster over the dropping of Senator Eagleton and\nthe embarrassingly prolonged pursuit of a substitute has\ntouched off an avalanche of proposals for improving the process.\n-63-\nRichard L. Strout, Christian Science Monitor, August 18, 1972\nVice presidents can be fun. Without them how could we\nidle away the time agreeing that there ought to be a better\nway of picking vice presidents? Then we go on to something else.\nFive presidents in office since 1900 were at one time or\nanother targets of assasins. In all, eight vice presidents\nhave filled vacancies. Six of these eight were chosen without\nmuch more thought of their qualities than a city political\nmachine gives to picking a candidate for coroner.\nEditorial, Los Angeles Times, August 7, 1972\nThe selection process used by both parties in respect to\nvice presidential candidates is out of date and defective\nthere must be a more responsible way than the present system.\nThe parties won't face the problem again until 1976. That\nshould be enough time to find an alternative.\nEditorial, Christian Science Monitor, August 9, 1972\nThe traumatic problems which Democratic presidential\ncandidate George McGovern has just undergone in choosing a\nrunning mate have sharply spotlighted the weaknesses in the\nAmerican system of selecting and electing a vice president.\nAny new system that is worked out should at the least\nallow for a broader and more representative group of selectors\nfor the nominee, and aim to bring in the strongest possible\ncandidate on the basis of merit.\nEditorial, Chicago Tribune, August 12, 1972\nWhat the authors of these and other proposals overlook is\nthat the present system is workable and is probably the most\nsensible in sight. It occasionally flounders because the\ndelegates have traditionally voted for the man chosen by the\nPresidential nominee, and that Presidential nominee can\nsometimes be an amateurish bumbler.\nSuch was the case in the Eagleton affair. The reformers'\ncomplaint is not with the system, but with the bad judgement\nof one George S. McGovern.\nEditorial, Washington Star, August 18, 1972\nThe short sojourn of Senator Thomas Eagleton on the\nDemocratic national ticket ought to have the one salutary\neffect of getting people to think about how we choose vice\npresidential cnadidates. There must be a better way.\n-64-\nEditorial, Chicago Tribune, November 12, 1972\nIn anyevent, we see no reason to junk the present system\nand resort to experimentation. What is needed is to let the\nsystem work as intended.\nNew York Times, December 15, 1972\nSpurred by memories of the 1972 Eagleton case, a Democratic\nparty commission has proposed creation of a screening committee to\ncheck the background of future Vice Presidential possibilities.\nNew York Times, December 16, 1972\nA Democratic party commission has agreed on a series of\nproposals to provide more careful selection of Vice Presidential\nnominees. The commission recommended creation of an advisory\ncommission to check the backgrounds of possible nominees\nIt also adopted a procedure that would insure at least 48 hours\nbetween the selection of the Presidential and Vice Presidential\nnominees.\nTheodore H. White, \"The Making of the President 1972\"\nThe way Americans choose vice presidents has always been\nabsurd, but never quite so absurd as in the Democratic exercise\nof 1972 No one had been assigned to do any kind of background\ncheck (on Eagleton).\n(In contrast), Nixon thought that Agnew's speech nominating\nNixon was the best. Nixon was enormously impressed by the man\nwith the square-cut jaw, the athletic frame, the commanding\npresence on the screen\nJames Reston, New York Times, October 12, 1973\nThe Agnew Affair, following on the Eagleton Affair, suggests\nagain that the normal procedures for selecting vice presidential\ncandidates in America have been almost criminally negligent,\nso maybe they should be examined before President Nixon picks a\nsuccessor for Spiro Agnew.\nLawrence Meyer, Washington Post, October 13, 1973\nOne of the obvious pitfalls in selecting a vice presidential\ncandidate--made painfully obvious by events over the last 15 months--\nis how a hastily made choice of running mate can come back to haunt\nthe presidential nominee.\nPaul Hope, Washington Star, October 15, 1973\nMost other presidential candidates probably have used equally\nslipshod procedures in selecting their running mates, but the cases\nof Eagleton and Agnew make a pressing case for finding a better way.\n-65-\nGENALD\nR.\nDavid S. Broder, Washington Post, October 21, 1973\nFORD\n(The parties) pick their vice presidential candidates overnight\nin a frantic, disorganized and essentially closed series of meetings\nwith an exhausted, distracted presidential nominee.\nNew York Times, November 8, 1973\nTwo top Democrats (Hubert H. Humphrey and Robert S. Strauss)\nindicated support today for a proposal to remove the selection of\nfuture Vice Presidential nominees from the Presidential nominating\nconventions.\nMarquis Childs, Washington Post, November 13, 1973\nOne good thing that can come out of all this grisly business\nis some hard thinking about how we choose our Vice Presidents.\nThis has been a form of political Russian roulette with luck\nmore often than not against the first party pulling the trigger.\nSurely never again can a weary political convention allow\nthe presidential candidate to pick an unknown, out of the hat.\nDavid S. Broder, Washington Post, December 14, 1973\nA Democratic Party commission yesterday recommended\ngiving future presidential nominees better information and\nmore time to pick their running mates\nThe Commission recom-\nmended that an advisory panel of party \"wise men\" assemble all\navailable information about prospective vice presidential\ncandidates\nEditorial, Washington Star, October 15, 1973\nThe Republican and Democratic parties should give serious\nconsideration to the matter before the 1976 conventions. At\nthe very least, more time for investigation and contemplation\nshould be given between the time the presidential nominee\nis selected and the deadline for his choosing a running mate.\nEditorial, Washington Star, December 31, 1973\nIt appears that the Democratic party might be getting\naround to changing the haphazard and hazardous method of\nchoosing vice presidential nominees. It's high time.\nLou Cannon, Washington Post, April 28, 1974\nStrong Republican sentiment for changing the way in which\nthe GOP chooses its vice presidential nominee became apparent\nyesterday at a meeting of the party's reform committee.\n-66-\nJoseph L. Rauh, Jr., letter to the Editor, Washington Post, December 3, 1974\nRecent events have evoked considerable agreement that\nsomething is amiss with the existing methods of choosing Vice\nPresidents\nThe (Democratic) party conference this weekend\nshould explore ways to moving in the direction of a more\ndemocratic selection of the Vice President.\nJames Reston, New York Times, May 19, 1976\nReporter are usually accused of being too nosey in\ntheir questions to Presidential candidates\nbut on the\nproblem of picking Vice Presidents, they have probably\nbeen too casual and even indifferent.\nWe need to take a hard look at the problem of selection\nnow, and at least between the end of the primaries in early\nJune and the opening of the conventions in July, insist on\nasking the leaders not only where they are going but who's\ngoing with them.\nJohn Adams, first American Vice President\nMy country has in its wisdom contrived for me the most\ninsignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived\nor his imagination conceived.\nI am vice president. In this I am nothing, but I may be\neverything.\nDaniel Webster, in rejecting the Vice Presidential nomination in 1848\nNo, thank you. I do not propose to be buried until I am\nreally dead and in my coffin.\nHarry Truman\nLook at all the Vice Presidents in history. Where are\nthey? They were about as useful as a cow's fifth teat.\nJohn Nance Garner, to Lyndon B. Johnson at the 1960 Convention\nI'll tell you, Lyndon, the vice presidency isn't worth\na pitcher of warm spit.\nRichard M. Nixon, before being elected President\n(The Vice Presidency is a) hollow shell--the most ill-\nconceived, poorly defined position in the American political\nsystem.\n-67-\nSpiro T. Agnew, New York Times, August 23, 1972\nThe very nature of the democratic system in itself precludes\nany guarantee that a Vice Presidential nominee will conform to\nsome platonic idea of who is \"perfect\" for the job. It is also\nthe fact that, whatever its imperfections, our present system\nhas passed the pragmatic test time and again. By this standard\nalone, it is immeasurably superior to the retrogressive \"reform\"\nproposals which some critics are now advancing.\nPresidential nominee Richard Monckton (a fictional character in\nJohn Erlichman's novel, The Company), talking about his running mate\nto an aide just after having received the nomination:\n\"Having him spend his television time doing a lead into my\ntaking the stage here. What do you think of that?\"\n\"That's great, if he'll do it,\" said Flaherty.\nMonckton compressed his lips in anger. \"Why the hell\nshouldn't he do it, if we tell him to?\"\n\"He's a pretty proud man; a former Governor and all that.\nHe may want to do his own statement.\"\n\"Wait, Frank. Let's settle that one thing right now. He's\nVice-President for only one reason: I picked him and put him\nthere. Doesn't he know that, Frank?\"\n\"Yes, sir, I'm sure he does.\"\n\"Then there should be no problem. Just tell him that's\nwhat I've decided, Frank. Cold turkey. He'd better begin to get\nused to instructions. Right?\"\n\"Yes, sir.\""
}