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19077059
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Indochina Refugees - General (3)
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19077059
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document
title
Indochina Refugees - General (3)
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Theodore C. Marrs Files (Ford Administration)
Theodore Marrs' General Subject Files
subjects
Vietnam (Republic)
Refugees
Vietnamese Americans
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1975-06-30
month
6
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1975
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1975-04-01
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4
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1975
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The original documents are located in Box 9, folder "Indochina Refugees - General (3)" of
the Theodore C. Marrs Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 9 of the Theodore C. Marrs Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Clinan Refuger fill
Dated boday
Dr Marrs
June 4,19.95
Belatedly / attached
the Illegram. Please of
are two drafts
GERALD R. FORD LIBRISHA
lex me know what
you finally Thank decide
Julia Jaft
DRAFT
Dear Governor
Recently, I was very happy to sign into law legislation
to assist the resettlement of Vietnamese and Cambodian
refugees who fled their homelands and are seeking a new
life in the United States. I am deeply grateful to the
Congress for its speed in passing this legislation and the
American people for opening their arms to welcome these
refugees to our shores.
is proceeding at the rile of 800/ds
Resettlement of these newcomers has begun, but to
For this reseltement to be fully
/ successful will require the widest possible support.
FE
The primary responsibility for the resettlement lies with
the accredited voluntary agencies which since World War II
have successfully resettled almost 1.5 million people.
They know what is necessary to bring a refugee into a
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
community and support him as he is integrated into American
and consestent with their individual deuseens
life and society. In resettling the Indochinese refugees h, I
that
am assured the voluntary agencies will avoid resettlement
in economically hard-hit areas and will not concentrate the
refugees in specific localities. I hope that you will
direct your State agencies to provide the fullest measure
of support for the work of these voluntary agencies.
In we have addition received to the many pomary offers rule of help of for the the volunter refugees agains,
from State and community leaders. Coordination of the local
efforts and offers of assistance may become a problem in
the coming months. I urge you to give consideration to the
- 2 -
level
creation of a state-> committee which will bring
together the heads of the local resettlement organi-
zations, the involved state officials, and interested
citizens groups to consider refugee issues. The Committee
would permit you to set state goals and standards and to
within your at ati.
the commultee could
monitor, progress, With your backing, it might also be
used to mobilize support in local communities, identify
sponsroship, develop job opportunities, and explore
solutions to problems ranging all-the way from the
certification of professionals to obtaining driver's
licenses.
In some cases, state or local units of government
may want to become involved more directly in the sponsorship
of refugee families -- as the State of Washington has
recently done. Such sponsorship entails the mobilization
of resources from individuals, civic organizations and the
business and labor community to assist in feeding, clothing,
placing children in schools, and providing shelter for
a refugee family until the head of household can find
employment and a degree of self-sufficiency. Sponsorship is
but
not a legal obligation; it is a moral one. Sponsorship
It entails an obligation fall beyond initial financial support,
and
H requires a continuing concern for the effective integration
of the refugee into American society.
The Federal Government through the Inter Agency Task Force
certain
on Refugees is prepared to reimburse costs incurred by a
h
state or local unit of government up to $500 per person
as soon as resettlement is completed.
State and local community involvement with sponsorship
activities should not interfere or compete with the
voluntary agency resettlement programs, but rather would
supplement these efforts by drawing upon individuals
and groups who are not alroady connected with existing
refugee programs.
Sponsorship program should be designed to provide
a full range of services to each refugee in an effort to
reduce their likelihood of becoming welfare recipients.
However, as a protection to the States, the legislation currently provided
the Department of Healthcare welfore the
provides DHEW WITH authority to reimburse up to 100% of
costs for health, income maintenance, and social service
funds to needy refugees who are unable to become self-sufficient
request decycrate
year
in spite of sponsorship efforts.
Mombers of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Refugees
puren.
you ver into stoff to
will be contacting you in the next few days with more
specific information about these programs and point with a of name contact
contact
We have made a good beginning in the resettlement of
know
these newest refugees to our country. I hope that during
the coming months I can count on your support in the inte-
gration of these refugees into American life. What you will
- 4 -
ix
be doing will be in the finest tradition of our country.
evel the values Sincerely, w which we all believe
Gerald R. Ford
Draytz
DRAFT
Dear Governor
:
Recently, I was very happy to sign into law legislation
to assist the resettlement of Vietnamese and Cambodian
refugees who fled their homelands and are seeking a new
life in the United States. I am deeply grateful to the
Congress for its speed in passing this legislation and the
American people for opening their arms to welcome these
refugees to our shores.
Resettlement of these newcomers has begun, but to
be successful will require the widest possible support.
The primary responsibility for the resettlement lies with
the accredited voluntary agencies which since World War II
have successfully resettled almost 1.5 million people.
They know what is necessary to bring a refugee into a
community and support him as he is integrated into American
life and society. In resettling the Indochinese refugees, I
am assured the voluntary agencies will avoid resettlement
in economically hard-hit areas and will not concentrate the
refugees in specific localities. I hope that you will
direct your State agencies to provide the fullest measure
of support for the work of these voluntary agencies.
We have received many offers of help for the refugees
from State and community leaders. Coordination of the local
efforts and offers of assistance may become a problem in
the coming months. I urge you to give consideration to the
- 2 -
creation of a state-wide committee which will bring
together all of the heads of the local resettlement organi-
zations, the involved state officials, and interested
citizens groups to consider refugee issues. The Committee
would permit you to set state goals and standards and
monitor progress. With your backing, it might also be
used to mobilize support in local communities, identify
sponsroship, develop job opportunities, and explore
solutions to problems ranging all the way from the
certification of professionals to obtaining driver's
licenses.
The Director of the Inter-Agency Task Force will be
in touch with you in the next few days with more specific
information on state reimbursement procedures and suggested
opportunities for State involvement.
We have made a good beginning in the resettlement of
these newest refugees to our country. I hope that during
the coming months I can count on your support in the inte-
gration of these refugees into American life. What you
will be doing will be in the finest tradition of our
country.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
- 3 -
state or local unit of government up to $500 per person
as soon as resettlement is completed.
State and local community involvement with sponsorship
activities should not interfere or compete with the
voluntary agency resettlement programs, but rather to wound
supplement these efforts by drawing upon individuals
and groups who are not alroady connected with existing
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
refugee programs.
Sponsorship program should be designed to provide
a full range of services to each refugee in an effort to
reduce their likelihood of becoming welfare recipients.
However, as a protection to the States, THE legislation currently provided
the Department of Healthcare welfore the
DHEW with authority to reimburse up to 100% of
costs for health, income maintenance, and social service
funds to needy refugees who are unable to become self-sufficient
in spite of sponsorship efforts.
request your
desynate
Members of The Inter-Agency Task Force on Refugees
person on
Revenue ter Form Tusto
you stoff
will be contacting you in the next few days with more
specific information about these programs and point with a of name contact
contact
We have made a good beginning in the resettlement of
know
these newest refugees to our country. I hope that during
the coming months I can count on your support in the inte-
gration of these refugees into American life. What you will
- 4 -
x
be doing will be in the finest tradition of our country.
are the values Sincerely, in which we all behind
Gerald R. Ford
DRAFT
Dear Governor
:
Rècently, I was very happy to sign into law legislation
to assist the resettlement of Vietnamese and Cambodian
refugees who fled their homelands and are seeking a new
life in the United States. I am deeply grateful to the
Congress for its speed in passing this legislation and the
American people for opening their arms to welcome these
refugees to our shores.
is proceeding at the rite of 800/ds
Resettlement of these newcomers has begun, but to
For this resultament to be fully
be successful will require the widest possible support.
The primary responsibility for the resettlement lies with
the accredited voluntary agencies which since World War II
have successfully resettled almost 1.5 million people.
They know what is necessary to bring a refugee into a
community and support him as he is integrated into American
and consestent with their individual deuseens.
life and society. In resettling the Indochinese refugees h, I
that
am assured the voluntary agencies will avoid resettlement
in economically hard-hit areas and will not concentrate the
refugees in specific localities. I hope that you will
direct your State agencies to provide the fullest measure
of support for the work of these voluntary agencies.
In addition to the pamary rule of the volunter against,
we have received many offers of help for the refugees
from State and community leaders. Coordination of the local
efforts and offers of assistance may become a problem in
the coming months. I urge you to give consideration to the
- 2 -
level
creation of a state- committee which will bring
together E-tho headh of the local resettlement organi-
zations, the involved state officials, and interested
citizens groups to consider refugee issues. The Committee
would permit you to set state goals and standards and to
within your at ati.
the commultee cauld
monitor progress, With your backing, it might also be
used to mobilize support in local communities, identify
sponsroship, develop job opportunities, and explore
solutions to problems ranging al way from the
certification of professionals to obtaining driver's
licenses.
In some cases, state or local units of government
may want to become involved more directly in the sponsorship
of refugee families -- as the State of Washington has
recently done. Such sponsorship entails the mobilization
of resources from individuals, civic organizations and the
business and labor community to assist in feeding, clothing,
placing children in schools, and providing shelter for
a refugee family until the head of household can find
employment and a degree of self-sufficiency. Sponsorship is
but
not a legal obligation; it is a moral one. Sponsorship
It entails an obligation fall beyond initial financial support,
and
At requires a continuing concern for the effective integration
of the refugee into American society.
The Federal Government through the Inter Agency Task Force
certain
on Refugees is prepared to reimburse costs incurred by a
state or local unit of government up to $500 per person
as soon as resettlement is completed.
State and local community involvement with sponsorship
activities should not interfere or compete with the
voluntary agency resettlement programs, but rather to would
supplement these efforts by drawing upon individuals
and groups who are not already connected with existing
refugee programs.
Sponsorship program should be designed to provide
a full range of services to each refugee in an effort to
reduce their likelihood of becoming welfare recipients.
currently
However, as a protection to the States, the legislation provided
the Department of Healthcare welfore the
provides DHEW with authority to reimburse up to 100% of
costs for health, income maintenance, and social service
funds to needy refugees who are unable to become self-sufficient
request degrate
your
in spite of sponsorship efforts.
Mombers of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Refugees
50
the for oro int to
tolf
will be contacting you in the next few days with more
specific information about these programs and point with a of name contact
untast
We have made a good beginning in the resettlement of
know
these newest refugees to our country. I hope that during
the coming months I can count on your support in the inte-
gration of these refugees into American life. What you will
- 4 -
is
be doing will be in the finest tradition of our country.
ave
to values
w which we all believe
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
Draft /
DRAFT
Dear Governor
Rècently, I was very happy to sign into law legislation
to assist the resettlement of Vietnamese and Cambodian
refugees who fled their homelands and are seeking a new
life in the United States. I am deeply grateful to the
Congress for its speed in passing this legislation and the
American people for opening their arms to welcome these
refugees to our shores.
is proceeding at the rate of 800/da
Resettlement of these newcomers has begun. but to
For this resultament to be fully
successful will require the widest possible support.
The primary responsibility for the resettlement lies with
the accredited voluntary agencies which since World War II
have successfully resettled almost 1.5 million people.
They know what is. necessary to bring a refugee into a
community and support him as he is integrated into American
and consestent with their induratual deuseens
life and society. that In resettling the Indochinese refugees h, I
am assured the voluntary agencies will avoid resettlement
in economically hard-hit areas and will not concentrate the
refugees in specific localities. I hope that you will
direct your State agencies to provide the fullest measure
of support for the work of these voluntary agencies.
In addition to the pomary rule of the volunter against
we have received many offers of help for - refugees
from State and community leaders. Coordination of the local
efforts and offers of assistance may become a problem in
the coming months. I urge you to give consideration to the
- 2 -
level
creation of a state- committee which will bring
together the local resettlement organi-
zations, the involved state officials, and interested
citizens groups to consider refugee issues. The Committee
would permit you to set state goals and standards and to
within your it ati.
the commultee could
monitor progress, With your backing, it might also be
used to mobilize support in local communities, identify
sponsr oship, develop job opportunities, and explore
solutions to problems ranging al the from the
certification of professionals to obtaining driver's
licenses.
In some cases, state or local units of government
may want to become involved more directly in the sponsorship
of refugee families -- as the State of Washington has
recently done. Such sponsorship entails the mobilization
of resources from individuals, civic organizations and the
business and labor community to assist in feeding, clothing,
placing children in schools, and providing shelter for
a refugee family until the head of household can find
employment and a degree of self-sufficiency. Sponsorship is
but
not a legal obligation; it is a moral one. Sponsorship
It entails an obligation beyond initial financial support,
and
H
requires a continuing concern for the effective integration
of the refugee into American society.
The Federal Government through the Inter Agency Task Force
certain
on Refugees is prepared to reimburse costs incurred by a
June 5, 1975
Bangkok, Thailand
President Gerald Ford
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Dear Mr. President,
I am one of several hundred Americans recently evacuated from
Laos. I have worked for the United States Agency for International
Development for over six years and dedicated myself to the Agency's
goals and objectives.
I am writing this letter on behalf of myself and many other
Americans who feel there is an inconsistent and partial imple-
mentation of the policy of accepting Indochinese refugees. It
is the understanding of myself and other United States Government
American employees of Laos that Indochina also pertains to Laos
and is not strictly interpreted to mean Vietnam and Cambodia.
From our recent experience with U.S. personnel in the U.S. Embassies
in Vientiane, Laos and Bangkok, Thailand, we are advised that
there is no blanket authorization for Lao nationals to be accepted
under the Indochina Refugee Aid Bill.
I wish to point out that inspite of the fact that there was no
violent overthrow of the Lao Coalition Government, Americans were
still evacuated on the basis of harassment and detention by un-
friendly elements includying the Pathet Lao. It was because of
these harassing measures that USAID and some Embassy personnel
were evacuated from Laos to Bangkok, Thailand,
With our departure numerous Lao, includying U.S.G. employees,
and non U.S.G. employees and close associates sought asylum for
political reasons; some in Thailand and some in the United States.
They are seeking asylum, desiring to immigrate to the U.S. as
Indochina Refugees because of their close identification and assoc-
iation with Americans and the American presence. At the present
time they are being rejected because according to Embassy personnel
a blanket authorization for their acceptance is not incorporated
into the Indochina Refugee Aid Bill. Since the passage of this
Bill, the Lao Coalition Government has been dominated by the
Communist Pathet Lao in a swift and non-violent means,
page 2
Because of your compassion for the peoples of Indochina and
because you are the principle sponsor of the Indochina Refugee
Aid Bill, I am pleading that the Lao also be included and be
made eligible for acceptance as Indochina Refugees in justifi-
able cases. If they are not accepted, some will lose their lives
for their previous association, some will be returned to Laos from
Thailand as is anticipated and others will be unable to seek
asylum and will be required to live in a compromising situation
for the remainder of their lives.
I am not the only American to find himslef in this frame of mind.
Other Americans have and are trying to justify individual Lao
cases but are being rejected. If one were to canvass the American
USAID personnel, one would find many who feel the same as I do.
Many of us feel that if Americans can justify a case for accepting
Lao refugees or/and will sponsor the Lao individual or family,
they should be accepted as Indochina refugees. It is very safe to
say that the number of Lao families who would apply under this
set of guidlines is very small; perhaps not more than 300 families.
Whatever act of authority is required to incorporate the Lao into
this authorization seems only fitting and consistent with your
humanitarian and compassionate empathy for all Indochina refugees.
Many Americans who have worked in Laos, would be deeply apprecia-
tive and welcome a revision of the current policy of rejecting the
Lao. Whatever attention, Mr. President, you can give to what I
perceive to be an urgent matter, will certainly be appreciated by
myself as well as those Lao seeking asylum in the United States.
In closing, I wish to express my sincerest regards for your humani-
tarian and empathetic efforts for the people of Indochina, and wish
to express my continued and undivided support for those efforts.
Very Sincerely,
Wellain WSap William
USAID/LAOS
APO 96352
PRONT LINES
January 9, 1
Americans in Laos Tried to Stay With People
"We wanted to demonstrate
forced their departure.
"We
Mekong River in Northwest Laos,
torn up all our papers. There was
area, including the building
to the Lao people there that
didn't want to leave all our Lao-
near the Burma/Thailand border,
no security, no law or order 50 I
schools, roads and wells.
we were with them,' AID
tian friends but it became evi-
was seized by about 100 Laotian
went to see the governor and told
Mr. Huxtable reported the 1
dent
that we could not stay."
Army soldiers early December 24
him I was very sorry but we could
els took over the town because
Area Coordinator Jack Hux-
Leaving with Mr. Huxtable were
and was later occupied by Pathet
not stay in a situation where stu-
alleged corruption by city offici
table said after he and 18
his wife, Margaret, their two chil-
Lao troops who had crossed the
dents were coming into my house
Lao Information Minister S
other Americans stationed in Laos
dren as well as AID employes or
ceasefire line to back up the rebels.
with M-16s and pointing guns at
Vongsak and Interior Minis
were evacuated December 30 from
dependents William W. Sage;
Mr. Huxtable reported that de-
me and demanding the keys to my
Pheng Phongsavanh headed a fc
rebel-held Ban Houei Sai.
Wayne and Thavy Johnson; Gary
spite the growing lawlessness, he
office."
man delegation that held ti
The U.S. Embassy earlier re-
E. Alex; James R. Bowman; Ray-
and his staff made a final effort
The Americans left with a
with the rebel troops.
This is the third time Mr. II
ported the Americans were un-
mond Bonne; Andie Linn and her
on their last day in the province to
promise to return "if the governor
table has found himself caught
der house arrest since the rebels
two daughters. Non-AID Ameri-
reopen the AID office "but it was
and the Lao government can dem-
in an armed clash during his
took over six days carlier. Mr.
cans who also left were Karen
hopeless."
onstrate they have control of the
years in Laos. Twice in the n
Huxtable explained the stay was
Smith; Rev. and Mrs. Jerry Tor-
"Rebel soldiers were stealing
situation." Mr. Huxtable said he
1960s he was forced to flee
voluntary and that only "total
gerson and their three children.
AID fuel, the students had taken
was optimistic about very pro-
vancing North Vietnamese
breakdown in law and order"
The provincial capital on the
over our radio transmitter and had
ductive AID programs in the
Pathet Lao troops in central L
CE OF THE NATION, Bangkok Wednesday, June 4, 1975
NATIONAL NEWS
ANG PAO MUST LEAVE,
CABINET
DECIDES
The Foreign and Interior ministries were instru
ted by Cabinet yesterday to urgently push right
wing Gen Vang Pao out of the country to preven
about 50,000 Meo hilltribesmen from Laos follow
ing him into this country.
A Government spokes-
provided only subsistenc
man said yesterday there are
aid to discourage them from
8,000 Meos in Thailand
staying too long.
now, 6,000 of them chil-
Well-to-do refugees wi
dren. They fled from Laos
not be given any aid, bu
to Thailand when the right-
will be confined to certai
wing politicians in that
areas and the Governmer
country were forced to re-
will tax them in case the
sign.
sell their belongings.
According to the spokes-
man, Thailand has contacted
Refugees must live onl
the US Government to take
in the refugee camps an
care of the Meos, but the
they will not be allowed t
request was turned down as
work outside these camp
the US Government said it
The governor of each pr
could take only 200, believ-
vince is authorized to allo
ed to be Gen Vang Pao's
relatives of Cambodian r
troops.
fugees to take them out
Cabinet also decided that
the camp, but they will t
Thailand will not welcome
kept within the province an
those who seek political
must provide guarantee di
asylum from Laos.
posits.
At the same time Cabinet
Refugees living in place
also decided on a six-point
other than bordering pro
plan to deal with refugees
vinces must be put in reft
who fled into this country
gee camps to be set up b
from Laos, Cambodia and
the Interior Ministry.
Vietnam. The plan aims at
Cabinet also decided
pushing them back into their
give special assistance
countries or third countries
about 1,700 Thai Dam wh
as soon as possible.
moved out of Laos sinc
It was decided that aid
the trouble began there. The
to refugees will be limited
Interior Ministry will com
to the humanitarian level,
up with a definite plan
meaning that they will be
get them jobs.
June 5, 1975
Bangkok, Thailand
President Gerald Ford
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
Dear Mr. President,
I am one of several hundred Americans recently evacuated from
Laos. I have worked for the United States Agency for International
Development for over six years and dedicated myself to the Agency's
goals and objectives.
I am writing this letter on behalf of myself and many other
Americans who feel there is an inconsistent and partial imple-
mentation of the policy of accepting Indochinese refugees. It
is the understanding of myself and other United States Government
American employees of Laos that Indochina also pertains to Laos
and is not strictly interpreted to mean Vietnam and Cambodia.
From our recent experience with U.S. personnel in the U.S. Embassies
in Vientiane, Laos and Bangkok, Thailand, we are advised that
there is no blanket authorization for Lao nationals to be accepted
under the Indochina Refugee Aid Bill.
I wish to point out that inspite of the fact that there was no
violent overthrow of the Lao Coalition Government, Americans were
still evacuated on the basis of harassment and detention by un-
friendly elements includying the Pathet Lao. It was because of
these harassing measures that USAID and some Embassy personnel
were evacuated from Laos to Bangkok, Thailand.
With our departure numerous Lao, includying U.S.G. employees,
and non U.S.G. employees and close associates sought asylum for
political reasons; some in Thailand and some in the United States.
They are seeking asylum, desiring to immigrate to the U.S. as
Indochina Refugees because of their close identification and assoc-
iation with Americans and the American presence. At the present
time they are being rejected because according to Embassy personnel
a blanket authorization for their acceptance is not incorporated
into the Indochina Refugee Aid Bill. Since the passage of this
Bill, the Lao Coalition Government has been dominated by the
Communist Pathet Lao in a swift and non-violent means,
page 2
Because of your compassion for the peoples of Indochina and
because you are the principle sponsor of the Indochina Refugee
Aid Bill, I am pleading that the Lao also be included and be
made eligible for acceptance as Indochina Refugees in justifi-
able cases. If they are not accepted, some will lose their lives
for their previous association, some will be returned to Laos from
Thailand as is anticipated and others will be unable to seek
asylum and will be required to live in a compromising situation
for the remainder of their lives.
I am not the only American to find himslef in this frame of mind.
Other Americans have and are trying to justify individual Lao
cases but are being rejected. If one were to canvass the American
USAID personnel, one would find many who feel the same as I do.
Many of us feel that if Americans can justify a case for accepting
Lao refugees or/and will sponsor the Lao individual or family,
they should be accepted as Indochina refugees. It is very safe to
say that the number of Lao families who would apply under this
set of guidlines is very small; perhaps not more than 300 families.
Whatever act of authority is required to incorporate the Lao into
this authorization seems only fitting and consistent with your
humanitarian and compassionate empathy for all Indochina refugees.
Many Americans who have worked in Laos, would be deeply apprecia-
tive and welcome a revision of the current policy of rejecting the
Lao. Whatever attention, Mr. President, you can give to what I
perceive to be an urgent matter, will certainly be appreciated by
myself as well as those Lao seeking asylum in the United States.
In closing, I wish to express my sincerest regards for your humani-
tarian and empathetic efforts for the people of Indochina, and wish
to express my continued and undivided support for those efforts.
Very Sincerely,
William
USAID/LAOS
APO 96352
FRONT LINES
January 9
Americans in Laos Tried to Stay With People
"We wanted to demonstrate
forced their departure.
"We
Mekong River in Northwest Laos,
torn up all our papers. There was
area, including the buildin
to the Lao people there that
didn't want to leave all our Lao-
near the Burma/Thailand border,
no security, no law or order so I
schools, roads and wells.
we were with them," AID
tian friends but it became evi-
was seized by about 100 Laotian
went to see the governor and told
Mr. Huxtable reported th
dent
that we could not stay."
Army soldiers early December 24
him I was very sorry but we could
els took over the town becau
Area Coordinator Jack Hux-
Leaving with Mr. Huxtable were
and was later occupied by Pathet
not stay in a situation where stu-
alleged corruption by city off
table said after he and 18
his wife, Margaret, their two chil-
Lao troops who had crossed the
dents were coming into my house
Lao Information Minister
other Americans stationed in Laos
dren as well as AID employes or
ceasefire line to back up the rebels.
with M-16s and pointing guns at
Vongsak and Interior Mi
were evacuated December 30 from
dependents William W. Sage;
Mr. Huxtable reported that de-
me and demanding the keys to my
Pheng Phongsavanh headed a
rebel-held Ban Houei Sai.
Wayne and Thavy Johnson; Gary
spite the growing lawlessness, he
office."
man delegation that held
The U.S. Embassy earlier re-
E. Alex; James R. Bowman; Ray-
and his staff made a final effort
The Americans left with a
with the rebel troops.
This is the third time Mr.
ported the Americans were un-
mond Bonne; Andie Linn and her
on their last day in the province to
promise to return "if the governor
table has found himself caug
der house arrest since the rebels
two daughters. Non-AID Ameri-
reopen the AID office "but it was
and the Lao government can dem-
in an armed clash during I
took over six days earlier. Mr.
cans who also left were Karen
hopeless."
onstrate they have control of the
years in Laos. Twice in the
Huxtable explained the stay was
Smith; Rev. and Mrs. Jerry Tor-
"Rebel soldiers were stealing
situation." Mr. Huxtable said he
1960s he was forced to fle
voluntary and that only "total
gerson and their three children.
AID fuel, the students had taken
was optimistic about very pro-
vancing North Vietnamese
breakdown in law and order"
The provincial capital on the
over our radio transmitter and had
ductive AID programs in the
Pathet Lao troops in central
HE VOICE OF THE NATION, Bangkok Wednesday, June 4, 1975
NATIONAL NEWS
VANG PAO MUST LEAVI
CABINET
DECIDES
The Foreignand Interior ministries were i i
ted by Cabinet yesterday to urgently pusi
wing Gen Vang Pao out of the country to I
about 50,000 Meo hilltribesmen from Laos
ing him into this country.
A Government spokes-
provided only sub
man said yesterday there are
aid to discourage the
8,000 Meos in Thailand
staying too long.
now, 6,000 of them chil-
Well-to-do refuge
dren. They fled from Laos
not be given any :
to Thailand when the right-
will be confined to
wing politicians in that
areas and the Gove
country were forced to re-
will tax them in ca
sign.
sell their belongings.
According to the spokes-
man, Thailand has contacted
Refugees must li
the US Government to take
in the refugee cam
care of the Meos, but the
they will not be all
request was turned down as
work outside these
the US Government said it
The governor of ea
could take only 200, believ-
vince is authorized I
ed to be Gen Vang Pao's
relatives of Cambo
troops.
fugees to take them
Cabinet also decided that
the camp, but they
Thailand will not Welcome
kept within the provi
those who seek political
must provide guarai
asylum from Laos.
posits.
At the same time Cabinet
Refugees living it
also decided on a six-point
other than borderir
plan to deal with refugees
vinces must be put
who fled into this country
gee camps to be set
from Laos, Cambodia and
the Interior Ministry
Vietnam. The plan aims at
Cabinet also deci
pushing them back into their
give special assista
countries or third countries
about 1,700 Thai D:
as soon as possible.
moved. out of Lao
It was decided that aid
the trouble began the
to refugees will be limited
Interior Ministry wil
to the humanitarian level,
up with a definite
meaning that they will be
get them jobs.
MEMORANDUM
Ted -
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
soulds as
June 5, 1975
Though This
group coved
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Vietnamese Refugees
Kathleen Jim Cannon Ryan KR. In Imi we pful
I don't know if this falls under the orbit of the
Domestic Council. But, the American Anthropological
Association has offered their members' assistance in
helping resettle the Vietnamese refugees in the United
States.
Because of their unique knowledge gathered from years
of studying cultures, anthropologists can assist in
reducing the problems of transition for the Vietnamese
refugees. There are many American anthropologists
that have dealt with the mass relocation of peoples,
and there are many others that are Asian cultural
specialists.
The Association has written Ambassador L. Dean Brown,
and received no reply to date. On the President's
11
Advisory Committee on Refugees there are no social
scientists.
Why not have the White House take the initiative in
using the skills of these people to lessen the cultural
shock of the refugees and the Americans who will be
11
dealing with them.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
CC: Dick Dunham
to
June
&
JUN 5 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PAUL H. O'NEILL 1510'Hill 151
SUBJECT:
Refugee Resettlement Program
Attached is a status report on the refugee resettlement
program. As soon as we have a report from the site
survey teams, I will give you a management plan
indicating steps to be taken to overcome problems
identified.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
Attachment
CC: DO Records - Official File
Director
Director's chron
Deputy Director
Jim Jura
Chron
PHO'NEILL:hh 6/5/75
MANAGEMENT STATUS
OF THE VIETNAM REFUGEE PROGRAM
Present Status*
At this point, U.S. authorities have received approxi-
mately 130,000 Indochinese refugees for processing. As
of June 4, 1975, 24,940 had been resettled in the U.S.
and 1,969 had been released to third countries. The
remainder (roughly 102,000) are divided about equally
between camps in the Pacific and reception centers in
the continental U.S. Refugees in the Pacific are being
flown to U.S. reception centers as soon as space is
available for them.
Approximately 1,225 refugees have expressed a desire
to be repatriated to Vietnam. These cases will be
turned over to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees
for disposition. A very small number of refugees (under
50) have been classified as undesirables, and it is
still uncertain what their ultimate disposition will be.
DOD appears to be operating the camps very effectively
and without special hardship for the refugees.
The refugee population appears to be in generally good
health--much better than expected, in fact. Prolongation
of stay in the Pacific camps, where conditions are more
crowded and jury-rigged than Stateside, will ultimately
mean deterioration in refugees' health status.
Morale of refugees appears good and, in the Pacific,
is maintained by the sense of constant flow to the
U.S. This situation could deteriorate if flow, both
in the Pacific and Stateside, slows appreciably.
The current rate of outplacement from the reception
centers is approximately 700/day. While about 500/day
are from one center (Pendleton) the early start and
composition of refugees at this center may explain the
apparent disparity. With the full operation of Indian-
town Gap center expected soon, and with the campaign
under way urging Governors to have their State agencies
be responsible for blocks of refugees, it is anticipated
that this rate will increase appreciably within a few
weeks.
The attached table contains the latest status report
on refugees
2
A.
Federal Agency Processing Problems
A major bottleneck, that appears to be coming under
control, is the requirement for concurrent clearance
by five Federal agencies, CIA, DOD, State Department,
Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) which is overseeing
the clearance process. For the most part this prob-
lem is behind us because most refugees in the U.S.
have been cleared, and clearances are also proceeding
for individuals in the Pacific.
A further problem is that INS is pressing the voluntary
agencies (Volag) to process those individuals first
who have INS clearance, rather than clearing those
who have Volag-identified sponsors. This position
appears to be mainly for the convenience of INS, and
will act to the detriment of the activities of the
Volags, which already have problems of their own.
INS is attempting to cooperate more: however, by
providing 24-hour clearance turn-around for individuals
in sponsored families where most members already
have clearances. INS is also attempting to clear
all new arrivees in the U.S. on the day of arrival.
B. Voluntary Agency Problems
1. Many observers on the Indochina Task Force believe
that the influx of refugees has been too great
and too swift for the Volags to deal with expedi-
tiously, and that it is unrealistic to expect them
to outplace all the refugees within 3 months or
SO. The Task Force is therefore urging States to
act as block sponsors in order to outplace large
numbers of refugees. This policy may create some
problems:
-States are placed in competition with Volags,
which reduces the Volag's refugee placement workload
volume and reimbursement ($500/person) with possible
adverse impact on overhead expenses.
--Among the blocks of refugees the States take may
be persons for whom the Volags have already veri-
fied sponsors, which costs the Volags funds out-
of-pocket without compensation.
2. Most Volags are presently ill-equipped and unskilled
in handling computerized systems. They have there-
fore raised public complaints and have been slow
to develop procedures consistent with the computer
systems.
3.
Approximately 17,000 potential sponsors have contacted
the Task Force, of whom over 5000 have named the
2
A. Federal Agency Processing Problems
A major bottleneck, that appears to be coming under
control, is the requirement for concurrent clearance
by five Federal agencies, CIA, DOD, State Department,
Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) which is overseeing
the clearance process. For the most part this prob-
lem is behind us because most refugees in the U.S.
have been cleared, and clearances are also proceeding
for individuals in the Pacific.
A further problem is that INS is pressing the voluntary
agencies (Volag) to process those individuals first
who have INS clearance, rather than clearing those
who have Volag-identified sponsors. This position
appears to be mainly for the convenience of INS, and
will act to the detriment of the activities of the
Volags, which already have problems of their own.
INS is attempting. to cooperate more: however, by
providing 24-hour clearance turn-around for individuals
in sponsored families where most members already
have clearances. INS is also attempting to clear
all new arrivces in the U.S. on the day of arrival.
B. Voluntary Agency Problems
1. Many observers on the Indochina Task Force believe
that the influx of refugees has been too great
and too swift for the Volags to deal with expedi-
tiously, and that it is unrealistic to expect them
to outplace all the refugees within 3 months or
so. The Task Force is therefore urging States to
act as block sponsors in order to outplace large
numbers of refugees. This policy may create some
problems:
--States are placed in competition with Volags,
which reduces the Volag's refugee placement workload
volume and reimbursement ($500/person) with possible
adverse impact on overhead expenses.
--Among the blocks of refugees the States take may
be persons for whom the Volags have already veri-
fied sponsors, which costs the Volags funds out-
of-pocket without compensation.
2. Most Volags are presently ill-equipped and unskilled
in handling computerized systems. They have there-
fore raised public complaints and have been slow
to develop procedures consistent with the computer
systems.
3. Approximately 17,000 potential sponsors have contacted
the Task Force, of whom over 5000 have named the
3
specific refugees they wish to sponsor. The
Volags are responsible for verifying all sponsors
to assure that all offers are bona fide and proper.
So far, the Volags are attempting to verify only
the first 1200 name-specific sponsors who have
come forth. It is not clear how the Volags will
divide up responsibility for verifying the addi-
tional sponsors, nor when they will accomplish
the verifications. There is also no procedure
for ascertaining whether all potential sponsors
have been contacted (and in fact some sponsors
who offered their services several weeks ago have
called the Task Force again, since they have not
been contacted yet). Failure to contact sponsors
expeditiously may lose many placement opportunities
now available, and may sour public reaction to the
program. The Task Force is taking steps to exhort
the Volags to expedite their efforts. This may
not suffice if the basic capacity doesn't exist.
4. There exists a certain competitiveness among the
Volags since they receive $500 for each placement
and are therefore reluctant to share information
on available sponsors, which each Volag holds
separately. This means that the sponsor-to-refugee
matching is compartmentized. This and the sheer
volume (relative to capacity) that will inundate
Volag operations may further delay outplacement.
C. General Problems
1. It is believed by some working in the refugee program
that spontancous public interest in the refugee
problem has peaked and that the number of outplace-
ments may begin to decrease shortly.
2. With the onset of summer, many people may be reluc-
tant to undertake sponsorship responsibilities until
summer vacations are over. If so, a substantial
amount of resettlement could be delayed, if not
entirely eliminated with the passing of sponsor'
initial enthusiasm.
We would recommend a Presidential visit to one of
the reception centers with a strong call to the
country to maintain the effort.
D. Budgetary Problems
1. The greater the delay in outplacing refugees, the
greater the costs of maintaining them which may be
a significant threat if the Volags are not effective
in outplacement. In addition, expected climatic
1
conditions in Guam (typhoon season and rains which
increase diseare vectors) militate for the removal
of most refugees to the U.S. If outplacement is
slow, this might require the opening of a fifth
reception center with its high start-up expenses.
E. Review of Management Problems
The Indochina Refugee Task Force has already dispatched
a team to investigate management problems at the recep-
tion centers. They will report back on Friday, June 6,
1975, and should clarify the status of problem areas
and what may be done about them.
REFUGEE STATUS
June 1, 1975
In the U.S. and relocation centers
50,740
At Guam, in Pacific
51,314
Released into the U.S. economy
24,940
Released to other countries
2,093
In U.S.
Chaffee
23,453
Pendleton
15,259
Eglin
4,268
Indiantown
7,760
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
5 June 1975
FOR:
TCM
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
FROM:
JLB
1
Sponsorship
Call (1) A Mr. Glaussen: Sponsorship entails a
moral responsibility to provide a place to stay,
food, clothing and helping with employment.
No written guidelines available.
Comment: His remarks were very general.
Call (2) An unknown person was much more specific
and identified the necessity to provide
food, clothing, medical care, shelter
and employment support until the refugee
is self-sufficient. The person was willing
to take the name over the phone to put on
a sponsor list.
632-9800
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
June 6, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MARRS:
I called 632-9800 with my questions on sponsoring a refugee. The
person who answered the telephone told me that they are only taking
names and telephone numbers and that a Voluntary Agency would call
me within 2 to 8 weeks. I said, but I am interested in sponsoring a
refugee whom I know to be at Camp Pendleton. She said that I should
give her my name and telephone number and she will have a Voluntary
Agency call me - that she didn't know which VA would pick it up, but
someone would be in touch with me. I thanked her.
I called again and said that my group wanted to donate some money
for the refugee resettlement. The woman who answered the telephone
asked if I wanted it to go to a specific person on a monthly basis.
I told her that we had intended to give a lump sum. She said to write
a check to the American Red Cross and indicate that it is for the
Refugee Program. However, if I wanted it to go to a specific refugee
I should give her my name and telephone number and in 2 to 3 months
someone will call me and arrange for the monthly payments.
Velma
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
LIBRARY
June 6, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. TED MARRS
FROM:
ROGER D. SEMERAD
RNS
SUBJECT:
MEETING JUNE 4, 1975, ATTENDED
BY ROGER SEMERAD, JIM FALK,
DR. TED MARRS, FRANK DANIEL
BRIEFING MATERIALS
REQUIRED INFORMATION
Dr. Marrs opened and asked that a draft of 5 or 6 talking points be
provided and when finalized sent to Governor Evans and Mayor Alioto,
"Governor's Conference, New Orleans, La., June 9th - 11th, and
Democrat Mayors Caucus, Boston, Mass. June 9, 1975. 11 (And
members of the Advisory Committee and Interagency Task Force.)
Also he would like positive answers on how Refugees are resettled?
How the $500. 00 grant can be used and will travel expense be
provided? He also asked that appropriate mailing material be
developed.
The trip to Indiantown Gap was cancelled.
Jim Falk recommended any letter asking for state support be held
until after the Governor's Conference.
Dr. Marrs asked that necessary briefing materials and required
information be requested from Julia Taft, (Interagency Task Force)
Noel Koch and Frank Daniel will follow through on these matters.
CC: Koch
Daniel
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 6, 1975
June 6, 1975
FORD LIBRARY
THE HILL 9:00 AM (Senator McGovern)
Lunch - Hogates 1:30 PM
Baltimore Orioles 7:30 PM
June 7
Kennedy Center Matinee - Present Laughter (Begins at 2:00 PM)
Kennedy Center Evening - D.C. Youth Orchestra (Begins at 8:30 PM)
June 8
Morning Free (Zoo ??)
Cook out at Dr. Marrs' Home 4:00 PM
June 9
Morning Free
Dr. Emery Johnson - 2:00 PM (Will be picked up by Dr. Johnson's driver)
(Call 443-1083)
Senator Abourezk 4:00 PM
Grace Thorpe
4:30 PM
June 10 - 11
Norfolk
June 12
TOUR OF THE WHITE HOUSE - 8:00 AM
Mr. Buchen's Office
- 9:30 AM
Mr. Bill Youpee (National Tribal Chairman's Council) (2:00 PM)
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Room 207 Wash., D.C. 20006
Mr. Barney Old Coyote and Dr. Ben Reifle
3:30 PM
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Room 310 Wash., D.C. 20006
June 13
Depart for Mission, South Dakota
ORGANIZATION
PRESIDENT
ALTRUSA INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Miss Muriel Mawer
ASSOCIATION OF JUNIOR LEAGUES
Mrs. Mary C. Poole
(505) 255-9744
Mr. M. M. Richards
CIVITAN INTERNATIONAL
COSMOPOLITAN INTERNATIONAL
Dr. Mahlon Fairchild
DELTA SIGMA THETA
Miss Lilliam Bembow
GYRO INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Warren Schram
(519) 434-5787
KIAWANIS INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Roy W. Davis
LINKS
Mrs. Pauline Ellison
LIONS INTERNATIONAL
Mr. John Balbo
NATIONAL AMBUCS
Mr. Rodney K. Smith
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COLORED WOMEN'S CLUBS Ms. Juanita Brown
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEGRO BPW CLUBS Mrs. Rosalie McGuire
NATIONAL EXCHANGE CLUB
Dr. Porter L. Fortune
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF BPW CLUBS
Ms. Marie Bowden
NATIONAL TRI T
Mrs. Clayton Melcher
NEEDLEWORK GUILD OF AMERICA
Mrs. Walter Thompsen
(212) 843-7754
OPTIMIST INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Ralph Glasscocks
PILOT CLUB INTERNATIONAL
Mrs. Phyllis Manning
QUOTA INTERNATIONAL
Mrs. Lynette Oliver
ROTARY INTERNATIONAL
Mr. William Robbins
(312) 328-0100
RURITAN NATIONAL
Mr. U. L. Lee
Mr. Thomas Bruckman
SERTOMA INTERNATIONAL
SOROPTIMIST FEDERATION OF THE AMERICAS, INC. Mrs. Ruth Klotz
THE UNITED JAYCEES
Mr. David Hale
L'enfant Plaza Hotel Info.
ZONTA INTERNATIONAL
Ms. Eleanor Jammel
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
Elective
Administrative
ACTIVE 20-30 INTERNATIONAL
James Krembas, President
R. T. Bud Rogers Exec. Director
414 Second St., No. 117
1915 I Street
Hermosa Beach, Calif. 90254
Sacramento Calif 95814
paul Telford, 2nd Vice President
3940 w Compton Blvd Suite L
Lawndale, Calif. 90260
ALTRUSA INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Miss Muriel Mawer, President
Mrs. Dorothy E. Kuehlhorn, Exec.
2600 Seattle 1st Natl. Bank Bldg.
332 S. Michigan Ave., Room 934
Seattle, Wash. 98154
Chicago, Ill. 60604
THE ASSOCIATION OF KINSMEN CLUBS
James Scarrow, President-elect
P. N. (Pete) Harly, Frec Directo:
7 55 Glencameron Road
Thornhill, Ont. L3T 3N1 Canada
CIVITAN INTERNATIONAL
M. M. Richards, President
Frank J. Bulgarella, Exec. Adm.
115 North 21st' St.
Birmingham, Ala. 35203
Belford Roberts, President elect Richard J. Mady, Asst. Exec Adm.
115 North 21st St
Birmingham Ala. 35203
COSMOPOLITAN INTERNATIONAL
Dr. Mahlon Fairchild, President
James H. Hardenbrook, Exec. Vice-1
P. O. Box 4588
Dr. Ralph Stocker Pres elect
Overland, Kansas 66204
KIWANIS INTERNATIONAL
Ted R. Osborn, President-elect
R. P. "Reg" Merridew, Secretary
Lexington, Kentucky
101 E. Erie Street
Chicago, Ill. 60611
L./A. Hapgood, Associate Secretary
101 F. Erie Street
Chicago, Ill. 60611
LIONS INTERNATIONAL
Joseph M. McLoughlin
Terrence (Terry) J. McCann, Treas
P. O. Box 4667
York and Cermak Roads
Stamford, Conn 06907
Oak Brook, Ill. 60521
- 37 -
(Participants - Cont'd)
Elective
Administrative
THE NATIONAL EXCHANGE CLUB
Lee Wells, Secretary
3050 Central Avenue
Toledo, Ohio 43606
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL WOMEN'S CLUBS
Mrs. Maxine R. Hays
Mrs. Lucille H. Shriver, Director
655 Laurel St.
2012 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Junction City, Ore. 97448
Washington, D. C. 20036
OPTIMIST INTERNATIONAL
Ralph Glasscock, President
Hugh H. Cranford, Exec. Secretary
407 S. Washington
4494 Lindell Blvd.
Clinton, Mo. 64735
St. Louis, Mo. 63108
Patrick L Grady President-elect
Ray Millard, Assoc Exec Secretary
637 Round Hill Rd.
4494 Lindell Blvd.
Indianapolis, Ind. 46260
St. Louis, Mo. 63108
Retails
PILOT CLUB INTERNATIONAL
Mrs. Phyllis Manning, President
Mrs. Cookie C. Brooks, Exec. Admin.
Route 1, Box 876
P. O. Box 4844
Flagstaff, Ariz 86001
Macon, Ga. 31208
Mrs. Onna Mae Ellis, Pres.-elect
Mrs. Lazelle L. Payne, Office Mgr.
P. O. Box 204
P. O. BOX 4844
Enterprise, Ala. 36330
Macon, Ga. 31208
QUOTA INTERNATIONAL
Mrs. Lynette Oliver, President
Mrs. Dora Lee Haynes, Exec. Director
5415 Quince Road
1145 - 19th St., N.W.
Memphis, Tenn. 38117
Washington, D. C. 20036
RURITAN NATIONAL
L. W. Bibb III, President
Russell Burgess, Exec. Secretary
7114 Timberlake Rd.
P. O. Box 487
Lynchburg, Va. 24502
Dublin, va. 248084
U. L. (Buddy) Lee, Jr., Vice-Pres.
Sue Gilbert, Administrative Asst.
Route 3, Box 220
P. 0. Box 487
Raleigh, N. C. 27603
Dublin va. 24084
SERTOMA INTERNATIONAL
Thomas K. Bruckman, President
Harvey L McCray, Exec. Director
1900 E. Meyer Blvd.
Kansas City, Mo. 64132
- 38 -
(Participants - Cont'd)
Elective
Administrative
SOROPTIMIST INTERNATIONAL OF THE AMERICAS, INC.
Mrs. Ruth B. Klotz, President
Mrs. Valerie F. Levitan, Exec. Dir.
665 - 44th St.
1616 Walnut St.
Des Moines, Ia. 50312
Philadelphia, Pa. 19103
TOASTMASTERS INTERNATIONAL
John F. Diaz, President
Robert T. Buck Engle, Exec. Director
2808 S. Dorsey Place
2200 N. Grand Avenue
Melbourne, Fla. 32901
Retured
Santa Ana, Calif 92711
George Cr Scott, Sr. Vice-President J. William Venable, General Mgr.
1600 Standard Plaza Bldg.
2200 N. Grand Avenue
Portland Ore. 97204
Santa And, Calif. 92711
THE UNITED STATES JAYCEES
Lloud Bandy, Director of Services
Box
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102
Y'S MEN INTERNATIONAL
Roy E. Naylor
Gerald L. Heyl, Secretary Genera1-U.S.
U S. Area Treasurer
600 N. Long Beach Blvd.
Long Beach, Calif. 90812
ZONTA INTERNATIONAL
Miss Eleanor Jammal, President
Mrs. Martha K. Baumberger, Exec. Dir.
59 E. Van Buren St.
Chicago, Ill. 60605
- 39 -
DRAFT
THE
LIBRARY
Refugee Issues
Monday, June 9, 1975
Room 248, Executive Office Building
I. Presidential Reports to the Congress
- Responsibilities
- Timing
II. Presidential Status Reports on Refugees
- Schedule
- Content
III. Interagency Problems - Ms. Taft
IV. Other Problems filled Ms. Taft
DRAFT
SENATE ORD LIBRARY
Bill Fisher
Owill to Jula
action plan for milestons
We want to support you -
puch over anyone who needs
pusling
Julia
of we help current note
"lve will be out by October"
Snow and in 90 days (ie.by
end of July)
SSA going & undertake
forancial Enonge accomtancy ment a
to as a meetral body!
(I) HEW - 100,000,000
(2) state pay LDOD means 305,0M
(3) AID - 40 M has been ppent,
Current with average 1,6M /day but
this include set up costs,
DOL α HEW to look into long from activity
DOL - job follow up
HEW - SRS regs- -
Jash force Jonce has to be truly intergency
c strong state involvement -
- eg negatrication thank
(phonded so to Wake?)
* ( Frank is Julia's deputy )
Frank Wisener
There were 80,000 in passfer when K
/
people
43000 non
57,000 now in camps
30,000 have moved and
(3,000 to 3 nd )puntries)
in no for Security clearance, we had no
early warning
- improved by juduing commettee
Biggert problem:
Volags
state
$30,000
5
military
650,000
Red Coops
Bus, group
NAB
NAFEID
I
Pres Report
Huddleston amendment
requirements of be
- Draft on 19th from tash force
-
Ives Report
People an Sucan 1
Provide darly typ shut an
Given phane down plan -
JUN 5 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PAUL H. O'NEILL 1510'kkill
SUBJECT:
Refugee Resettlement Program
Attached is a status report on the refugee resettlement
program. As soon as we have a report from the site
survey teams, I will give you a management plan
indicating steps to be taken to overcome problems
identified.
Attachment
FORD LIBRARY GERALD
CC: DO Records - Official File
Director
Director's chron
Deputy Director
Jim Jura
Chron
PHO'NEILL:hh 6/5/75
MANAGEMENT STATUS
&
FORD
OF THE VIETNAM REFUGEE PROGRAM
RALD
Present Status*
At this point, U.S. authorities have received approxi-
mately 130,000 Indochinese refugees for processing. As
of June 4, 1975, 24,940 had been resettled in the U.S.
and 1,969 had been released to third countries. The
remainder (roughly 102,000) are divided about equally
between camps in the Pacific and reception centers in
the continental U.S. Refugees in the Pacific are being
flown to U.S. reception centers as soon as space is
available for them.
Approximately 1,225 refugees have expressed a desire
to be repatriated to Vietnam. These cases will be
turned over to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees
for disposition. A very small number of refugees (under
50) have been classified as undesirables, and it is
still uncertain what their ultimate disposition will be.
DOD appears to be operating the camps very effectively
and without special hardship for the refugees.
The refugee population appears to be in generally good
health--much better than expected, in fact. Prolongation
of stay in the Pacific camps, where conditions are more
crowded and jury-rigged than Stateside, will ultimately
mean deterioration in refugees' health status.
Morale of refugees appears good and, in the Pacific,
is maintained by the sense of constant flow to the
U.S. This situation could deteriorate if flow, both
in the Pacific and Stateside, slows appreciably.
The current rate of outplacement from the reception
centers is approximately 700/day. While about 500/day
are from one center (Pendleton) the carly start and
composition of refugees at this center may explain the
apparent disparity. With the full operation of Indian-
town Gap center expected soon, and with the campaign
under way urging Governors to have their State agencies
be responsible for blocks of refugees, it is anticipated
that this rate will increase appreciably within a few
weeks.
*
The attached table contains the latest status report
on refugees
2
A. Federal Agency Processing Problems
A major bottleneck, that appears to be coming under
control, is the requirement for concurrent clearance
by five Federal agencies, CIA, DOD, State Department,
Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) which is overseeing
the clearance process. For the most part this prob-
lem is behind us because most refugees in the U.S.
have been cleared, and clearances are also proceeding
for individuals in the Pacific.
A further problem is that INS is pressing the voluntary
agencies (Volag) to process those individuals first
who have INS clearance, rather than clearing those
who have Volag-identified sponsors. This position
appears to be mainly for the convenience of INS, and
will act to the detriment of the activities of the
Volags, which already have problems of their own.
INS is attempting to cooperate more: however, by
providing 24-hour clearance turn-around for individuals
in sponsored families where most members already
have clearances. INS is also attempting to clear
all new arrivces in the U.S. on the day of arrival.
B. Voluntary Agency Problems
1. Many observers on the Indochina Task Force believe
that the influx of refugees has been too great
and too swift for the Volags to deal with expedi-
tiously, and that it is unrealistic to expect them
to outplace all the refugees within 3 months or
so. The Task Force is therefore urging States to
act as block sponsors in order to outplace large
numbers of refugees. This policy may create some
problems:
--States are placed in competition with Volags,
which reduces the Volag's refugee placement workload
volume and reimbursement ($500/person) with possible
adverse impact on overhead expenses.
--Among the blocks of refugees the States take may
be persons for whom the Volags have already veri-
fied sponsors, which costs the Volags funds out-
of-pocket without compensation.
2. Most Volags are presently ill-equipped and unskilled
in handling computerized systems. They have there-
fore raised public complaints and have been slow
to develop procedures consistent with the computer
systems.
3. Approximately 17,000 potential sponsors have contacted
the Task Force, of whom over 5000 have named the
3
specific refugees they wish to sponsor. The
Volags are responsible for verifying all sponsors
to assure that all offers are bona fide and proper.
So far, the Volags are attempting to verify only
the first 1200 name-specific sponsors who have
come forth. It is not clear how the Volags will
divide up responsibility for verifying the addi-
tional sponsors, nor when they will accomplish
the verifications. There is also no procedure
for ascertaining whether all potential sponsors
have been contacted (and in fact some sponsors
who offered their services several weeks ago have
called the Task Force again, since they have not
been contacted yet). Failure to contact sponsors
expeditiously may lose many placement opportunities
now available, and may sour public reaction to the
program. The Task Force is taking steps to exhort
the Volags to expedite their efforts. This may
not suffice if the basic capacity doesn't exist.
4. There exists a certain competitiveness among the
Volags since they receive $500 for each placement
and are therefore reluctant to share information
on available sponsors, which each Volag holds
separately. This means that the sponsor-to-refugee
matching is compartmentized. This and the sheer
volume (relative to capacity) that will inundate
Volag operations may further delay outplacement.
C. General Problems
1. It is believed by some working in the refugee program
that spontancous public interest in the refugee
problem has peaked and that the number of outplace-
ments may begin to decrease shortly.
2. With the onset of summer, many people may be reluc-
tant to undertake sponsorship responsibilities until
summer vacations are over. If so, a substantial
amount of resettlement could be delayed, if not
entirely eliminated with the passing of sponsor'
initial enthusiasm.
We would recommend a Presidential visit to one of
the reception centers with a strong call to the
country to maintain the effort.
D. Budgetary Problems
1. The greater the delay in outplacing refugees, the
greater the costs of maintaining them which may be
a significant threat if the Volags are not effective
in outplacement. In addition, expected climatic
4
conditions in Guam (typhoon season and rains which
increase disease vectors) militate for the removal
of most refugees to the U.S. If outplacement is
slow, this might require the opening of a fifth
reception center with its high start-up expenses.
E. Review of Management Problems
The Indochina Refugee Task Force has already dispatched
a team to investigate management problems at the recep-
tion centers. They will report back on Friday, June 6,
1975, and should clarify the status of problem areas
and what may be done about them.
REFUGEE STATUS
June 1, 1975
In the U.S. and relocation centers
50,740
At Guam, in Pacific
51,314
Released into the U.S. economy
24,940
Released to other countries
2,093
In U.S.
Chaffee
23,453
Pendleton
15,259
Eglin
4,268
Indiantown
7,760
INDOCHINA EVACUATION AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS
A STUDY MISSION REPORT
prepared for the use of the
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
Ninety-Fourth Congress
First Session
June 9, 1975
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman
INTRODUCTION
1
I. EVACUATION FROM SAIGON
5
II. REFUGEE MOVEMENT
12
1. Profile of the Refugees
12
2. Refugee Processing in the Pacific
17
3. Role of the Military Services
18
Conditions on Guam
18
Typhoon Danger
21
Health Problems
22
4. Role of the Task Force: The Bottlenecks
23
III. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION
26
1. Resettlement Planning
27
2. Internationalization of Resettlement
27
3. Dependence Upon the Voluntary Agencies
33
4. Resettlement Problems
41
5. Processing Problems
45
IV. CAMBODIAN REFUGEES
50
V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
- 1 -
INTRODUCTION
The Subcommittee has closely followed humanitarian
problems in Indochina since 1965 -- a decade of concern over
our Nation's efforts to help alleviate the problems of refugees
and other war victims throughout the area. Since the early
days of this year, the Subcommittee's concern necessarily
focused on the escalating humanitarian needs among the people
of Cambodia and South Vietnam, and the issues and problems
raised by the President's plan to evacuate "tens of thousands"
of Cambodian and Vietnamese nationals prior to the collapse
of the Lon Nol regime in Phnom Penh and the Thieu regime in
Saigon.
From the first days of this year's crisis in these
countries, the Chairman expressed deep concern over the plight
of the people and the course of American policy in South East
Asia. Among other things, staff consultations were held with
appropriate officials of international organizations and others
in Geneva, Switzerland and elsewhere. On March 21, the Chair-
man made a private appeal to the President, urging his "personal
consideration of new initiatives for the better protection and
care of refugees and war victims in all areas" of Cambodia
and South Vietnam, The Chairman's suggestion involved the
resources and good offices of the United Nations and other
international bodies to help bring peace and relief to the
- 2 -
people of the area. The appeal was never answered or pursued.
On March 26, the Chairman introduced emergency legislation
to provide humanitarian aid, under international auspices, to
war victims in Cambodia and South Vietnam. A United Nations'
appeal for this purpose was issued on March 30. And in the
days that followed the Chairman consulted with United Nations
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and his colleagues in New York,
and with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and others.
Regrettably, and despite the urgings from many quarters,
there was little give in the Administration's policy toward
South East Asia, and the familiar and bankrupt patterns of
the past continued to govern our actions in Cambodia and South
Vietnam. Moreover, throughout March and April, our national
leadership stood virtually paralyzed, as events rapidly overtook
whatever small decisions were being made to meet the growing
crisis of people and the impending collapse of the American
sponsored regimes in Phnom Penh and Saigon.
Public and executive session hearings on "Humanitarian
and Evacuation Problems in Indochina" were held before the
Subcommittee or the full Judiciary Committee on April 8, 15,
25 and 30, and on May 13. Additionally, the full Judiciary
Committee frequently met in executive session to consider
evacuation problems and the movement of evacuees and refugees
- 3 -
from Cambodia and South Vietnam to the United States.
As problems mounted in the movement and processing of
evacuees and refugees from Cambodia and South Vietnam, the
Chairman dispatched a Study Mission to assess conditions in
the field. From May 3 to May 12, Mr. Dale S. deHaan, Staff
Director to the Subcommittee, amd Mr. Jerry M. Tinker, Staff
Consultant, visited refugee staging and reception areas at
Subic Bay in the Philippines, Guam, and Camp Pendleton, in
California. The report that follows reflects the Study Mission's
preliminary findings and recommendations based on the hearings,
observations in the field, and other inquiry.
Additional travel was undertaken by Mrs. Dorothy Parker,
Minority Counsel to the Subcommittee, who is filing a separate
report.
The Study Mission wishes to acknowledge its deep appre-
ciation for the cooperation and assistance provided by American
officials in the field, including Congressman Antonio Borja
Won Pat of Guam; the Governor of Guam, Ricardo Bordallo;
Ambassador William H. Sullivan in Manila; Rear Admiral
Doniphan B. Shelton, Commander of the Naval Base, Subic Bay;
Rear Admiral George S. Morrison, Commander of Naval Operations
in the Marianas, his colleagues on Guam; and Brig. General
Paul Graham, Commanding General, Camp Pendleton, California.
- 4 -
The Study Mission moved freely in the refugee areas of
the Philippines, Guam, and Camp Pendleton; talked with scores
of new arrivals and other refugees in the camps; and met
with a broad range of officials involved in the program. In
addition, extensive conversations have been held with members
of the President's Inter-agency Task Force on refugees, with
representatives of the voluntary agencies involved in the
resettlement of the refugees, with representatives of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and
others. Additional conversations have been held with members
of the President's National Advisory Committee on Refugees
and members of the White House Staff.
On April 21, the Chairman also requested the assistance
of the General Accounting Office (GAO) "in monitoring,
reviewing, and compiling on an urgent basis all relevant
budgetary, legal, policy and related information" concerning
the evacuation and movement of Vietnamese nationals from
South Vietnam. When such information is made available to the
Chairman, it will be printed in a separate report.
- 5 -
I. EVACUATION FROM SAIGON
From the beginning, the President's plan to evacuate
"tens of thousands of South Vietnamese," seems to have been
less of a plan, than it was a vague intention, barely stated.
As events have shown, whatever plan existed was implemented
badly, plagued with disorganization, and undertaken with little
command control in the field. Moreover, again and again, events
in the field rapidly overtook whatever decisions our national
leadership was making.
According to the Congressional testimony of Department
of State officials, the Embassy in Saigon was requested in
late March to provide weekly status reports on the total
numbers and welfare of Americans and "others for whom the
United States had emergency evacuation responsibility.'
Subsequent cables from the Department to the field were aimed
at gathering from the Embassy in Saigon information relating
to the categories of Vietnamese whom, according to Department
officials, "the United States had a moral obligation to
evacuate and who would be most endangered under a communist
regime."
The first public indication by the President of his plan
to evacuate Vietnamese came in his address on April 10th to
a joint session of Congress:
- 6 -
I must, of course, as I think each of
you would, consider the safety of nearly
6,000 Americans who remain in South
Vietnam, and tens of thousands of South
Vietnamese employees of the United
States Government, of news agencies, of
contractors and businesses for many
years whose lives, with their dependents,
are in very grave peril. There are tens of
thousands of other South Vietnamese in-
tellectuals, professors, teachers, editors
and opinion-leaders who have supported
the South Vietnamese cause and the
alliance with the United States, to whom
we have a profound moral obligation.
I ask the Congress to clarify
immediately its restrictions on the use of
U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for
the limited purposes of protecting American
lives by ensuring their evacuation if
this should be necessary, and I also ask
prompt revision of the law to cover those
Vietnamese to whom we have a very special
obligation, and whose lives may be in
danger, should the worst come to pass.
On April 17, Secretary of State Kissinger commented on
the President's statement in answer to questions raised before
the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D. C
The Secretary indicated that:
If the worst should come to pass and if
it were not
possible to stabilize the
situation, we feel we have a moral obligation to
help in the evacuation of many of those whose
association with us now endangers their lives.
How to bring this about and by what steps and
at what period is an extraordinarily delicate
question. And it is one that I really cannot
answer in an open press conference.
- 7 -
Evacuation was indeed a "delicate question". For the
Administration, many important issues were involved, including
the viability of holding Saigon and keeping an enclave in
South Vietnam. But most indicators suggest that the delicacy
had more to do with inter-agency squabbling and a tug of war
over the substance and control of evacuation policy and other
matters between Washington and the Embassy in Saigon, than
anything else.
Evacuation began in March with "Operation Babylift". The
orphans and other children moving to the U.S. were often accompanied
by American personnel and dependents, as well as certain
Vietnamese nationals. Given developments in South Vietnam,
this movement of evacuees and refugees escalated considerably
in the weeks that followed, on both military and commercial
air craft, and, in the final hours before the transfer of
power in Saigon, on helicopters from U.S. naval vessels off-
shore. Many thousands more were picked up from boats at sea.
As of April 28, the following categories of Vietnamese
had been targeted for evacuation from South Vietnam and
"parole" into the United States. The number entailed some
130,000 people.
1) up to 4,000 orphans --
2) some 10,000 to 75,000 relatives of American citizens
or permanent resident aliens --
- 8 -
3) up to 50,000 "high risk" Vietnamese, including past
and present U.S. government employees; officials
whose cooperation was necessary for the evacuation
of American citizens; individuals with knowledge of
sensitive U.S. government intelligence operations;
vulnerable political or intellectual figures;
communist defectors; employees of U.S. firms
operating in Vietnam; employees of voluntary agencies;
certain labor officials; and participants of U.S.
government sponsored programs.
The record is clear that there has been little relation-
ship between the categories of Vietnamese targeted for
evacuation and parole into the United States, and the refugees
now under U.S. control. In fact, the whole process of defining
categories, ceilings, and the like, was little more than a
charade, and a very misleading ingredient in the President's
plan to evacuate and resettle refugees from South Vietnam.
As High officials on Guam estimated to the Study Mission,
"half the Vietnamese we intended to get out did not get out --
and half who did get out, should not have." This theme was
heard by the Study Mission again and again in the field, and
is best illustrated by visiting and talking with the refugees
on Guam and elsewhere. It is further illustrated by the
Administration's inability to supply a meaningful numerical
- 9 -
breakdown of the refugees by the April 28 parole categories,
and by the simple fact that on May 6, General Leonard F.
Chapman, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) found it necessary to inform the Judiciary
Committee of the need to create a new parole category, covering
"approximately 69,000 Vietnamese" under American control who
did not meet the qualifications of the previously established
categories. In the field at Camp Pendleton, this new parole
category was labeled the "other" or "catch-all" category.
And General Chapman's projected number in this category
represents at least half of the refugees under U.S. control.
Included in the "catch-all" category are farmers,
fishermen, students, street vendors, small shop keepers,
local policemen, common soldiers and many others who do not
fit the prescribed evacuation and parole guidelines stated
to Congress in late April. Clearly, it was to be expected
that some farmers and fishermen and others outside the estab-
lished parole categories might become involved in the U.S.
evacuation effort. But when half or more of the refugees
fall into categories outside those targeted for evacuation,
muchless parole into the U.S., serious and troubling questions
arise over the planning and command control of the President's
plan. And these questions were readily known to high officials
in our government from the first days of the airlift from
- 10 -
Saigon. But in the rush of events, cover-up was the answer
of those in control.
A good illustration of this in the early days was the
handling of some of the earliest arrivals on U.S. military
aircraft at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Among
these first arrivals were hundreds of Vietnamese who were
undocumented or clearly outside the categories of people
targeted for evacuation and eventual parole into the U.S.,
including unattached women and children, maids and others.
The situation was such, that in mid-April the U.S. Embassy in
Manila cabled an urgent alarm to Saigon and requested that
the flow of such aliens cease. The flow of such aliens
apparently ended, or at least slowed down. But the problem
of what to do with those at Clark remained, One of the
solutions was to "document maximum number of conceivably
entitled aliens as immigrants". As a result, within a few
days in April hundreds of Vietnamese, mainly unattached women
and children, were simply issued regular immigrant visas to
the United States. And others were simply paroled under
false pretenses. At one point, on April 18, the Department
of State even suggested to questions from Congress that many
of these Vietnamese causing a problem were "confidential"
and fell into "high risk" categories targeted for evacuation.
- 11 -
But this was never accepted as fact, and it is vigorously
denied by Embassy officials in Manila.
is
- 12 -
II. REFUGEE MOVEMENT
So far, some 131,000 refugees have come under U.S.
control. Additional thousands are present in other countries.
At least 40,000 of those under U.S. control were rescued at
sea or escorted from Vietnamese coastal waters to Subic Bay
or Guam. The rest left Saigon by air.
As always, the flow of these refugees was dictated by
circumstances. And the number under U.S. control is double
the number initially anticipated by Administration officials.
1. Profile of the Refugees
The first wave of refugees, involving some 10,000 to
15,000 people, began to move a week to ten days before the
collapse of the Saigon government and the final evacuation
effort on April 29th-30th. The Vietnamese who left during
this period were essentially those who were able, somehow, to
establish an American connection, who claimed to be dependents
of Americans, or were in the company of an American and
therefore processed as dependents. Countless others simply
found their way through the gates of Tan Son Nhut airport, and
boarded commercial, or, more likely, U.S. military aircraft.
And all evidence from the field suggests that very little
control was effectively maintained by the U.S. Defense Attache's
Office in restricting access to U.S. military flights to those
- 13 -
Table 1: REFUGEE FLOW (as of June 5)
On Hand at
1. Overseas Bases
Total Capacity
Last Report
Thailand
1,600
366
Clark
856
450
Subic Bay
10,000
5,921
Wake
8,000
6,814
Guam
50,000
37,956
Hickam
130
67
51,574
2. Continental U.S.
Ft. Chaffee
24,000
23,453
Pendleton
18,000
15,259
Eglin
5,028
4,268
Indiantown Gap
15,000
7,760
50,740
Total in camps
102,314
3. Total Released from system
25,583
4. Total Released to Third Countries
2,093
5. Repatriation requests
1,322
Grand total
131,312
- 14 -
legitimately authorized for evacuation. With a little
persistence and luck, and perhaps some forgery, almost any
Vietnamese with an apparent American connection could get on
board. And this occurred even as the Embassy's Consular
Section dragged its feet in processing Vietnamese relatives
of American citizens who were targeted for evacuation and
parole, and refused all calls for help. As suggested earlier,
the irregular flow of refugees quickly became evident to the
U.S. Embassy in Manila and military authorities at Clark Air
Force Base in the Philippines.
A second wave of refugees came during the last days of
April and the helicopter evacuation just prior to the transfer
of power in Saigon. An estimated 86,000 Vietnamese and
Americans were evacuated during this short period, including
U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin, the entire staff of the U.S.
Mission, most other Americans in Saigon, several high ranking
Saigon civilian and military officials, a number of Vietnamese
employees of the U.S. Mission, and others deemed "high risk",
or lucky enough to be at the right spot at the right time.
However, thousands of others, targeted and eligible for
evacuation, were left behind.
The bulk of this second wave of refugees was composed of
people targeted for evacuation and parole into the United
States. But the fact remains that this second wave of
- 15 -
refugees -- the targeted, high priority group -- represents
only slightly more than half of the total number of Vietnamese
who were evacuated, and, in the main, under United States
control.
A third wave of refugees, involving at least 40,000
Vietnamese, left in small boats or other vessels, and com-
mandeered aircraft. The arrival of this third group during
the first two weeks of May -- at Subic Bay in the Philippines
and Guam -- significantly altered the character of the
Vietnamese refugee population. Increasingly, the refugee
profile was of farmers, fishermen, local tradesmen and
vendors, students, and common soldiers. Few speak English,
and fewer still fully comprehend the implication of their
plight as refugees.
While the Study Mission was on Guam, it observed this
change first-hand, as the U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command
vessel, the "Pioneer Commander," docked at 6 a.m. on May 7th.
Watching the more than 6,000 refugees disembark, observing
them during the initial processing stage, and interviewing
many of them, it was clear that most were from local villages
along the coast. They were farmers, soldiers and, in one case,
an entire fishing village.
Many gave the impression of not understanding where they
were, or why they were there. Some had simply fled in panic
- 16 -
from conflict and violence -- as Vietnamese have fled for
years -- and had joined a flotilla of small vessels along
the coast awaiting to see developments unfold. Instructed
to "rescue" Vietnamese on boats deemed not seaworthy, elements
of the U.S. 7th Fleet hovered for several days along the coast,
scooping-up Vietnamese from their boats. Once in the military
pipeline, their destination was the United States. Exactly
how many never intended to travel to the Philippines or Guam,
muchless to continental United States, will never be fully
known. But the Study Mission's observations and interviews
in the field, suggest that the number is substantial.
It is important to note this divergence in the refugee
profile, and the different characteristics of the first two
waves of refugees as compared to the last, in order to
recognize some potential resettlement problems. The early
arrivals on Guam were considered by most officials engaged in
the processing to be generally well educated, skilled and
professional people who should have few major problems in
resettling and adjusting in the United States. In fact, some
INS officials believe that the early groups are probably better
prepared for life in the United States than either the
Hungarian or Cuban refugees.
Although there is still no systematic data on the refugees
-- only 20,000 have been screened to date as to education,
- 17 -
skills, or resources -- it is apparent that the first group
came from upper income and education groups in South Vietnam,
while the later arrivals were generally poorer and less
educated. The full resettlement implications of this contrast in
the characteristics of the refugee population will not be
known until officials finally complete a thorough census --
already delayed too long to be as helpful as it could in
resettlement planning.
2. Refugee Processing in the Pacific.
Perhaps the only regrettable move by the military services
in their refugee effort is the code name given their task --
"Operation New Life" -- which has an uncomfortable ring with
the old "New Life Hamlets" or "strategic hamlets" of the Diem
regime many years ago. Despite the ill-chosen name, however,
the fact that the military services could and did respond
compassionately and effectively to a human tide of refugees ---
to move, feed, shelter and care for some 130,000 men, women
and children -- is an outstanding tribute to the leadership,
capability, organization and tireless work of the American
military services. At all points visited by the Study Mission,
without exception, the services have performed exceptionally
well in meeting emergency humanitarian needs, and they deserve
the high tribute and commendation of Congress and the American
people.
- 18 -
3. Role of the Military Services.
The military services have been charged with the movement
and the initial care and maintenance of all refugees under
U.S. control. Military installations and personnel have
been marshalled all along the line in support of this task,
from the Pacific fleet, the U.S. Army in Korea, to bases in
the continential United States. Guam was selected as the
Pacific staging area and a program was established to offer
temporary shelter while necessary processing arrangements were
undertaken for onward movement to continental U.S. Subic Bay,
Clark Air Force Base, and Utapao in Thailand, were seen as
transit points, and Wake Island became a overflow point from
Guam.
Confronted with belated orders and few guidelines, the
commanding officers at bases in the Pacific and in this country
have nonetheless moved effectively in receiving the refugees
and in providing them with the essentials of life.
Conditions on Guam.
The military services clearly understood, and have planned
for, what the civilian side of the Task Force did not: that
"wasted days" -- even one or two days -- in a logistic/support
operation of this magnitude, can spell disaster. Once a
backlog begins, once the system falls behind, it is difficult
- 19 -
to catch up, and a temporary situation can become a longer
term disaster. There is no clearer evidence of this today
than the shambles which the refugee processing and resettle-
ment program has become -- with a back-log of refugees,
which threatens the humane resettlement of people in the
shortest possible period of time.
Guam, as well as Wake Island, are supposed to be short
term staging or holding areas before refugees are sent to
Camp Pendleton or other centers for complete processing and
resettlement in the U.S. But the short stay on Guam is now
turning into weeks and months for some 40,000 refugees who
remain on the island. The bottleneck, aside from jeopardizing
the expeditious resettlement of the refugees, also jeopardizes
the health and well-being of thousands of men, women and
children held twenty or more to a tent. With the passage of
each day, the best plans and efforts of the military services
are overtaken more and more by a log-jam out of their control.
As temporary facilities, the installations on Guam are
excellent, and the military services organized in a remarkably
short period, tent cities, field kitchens, sanitary facilities,
extensive medical and public health facilities, and a range
of other services for the refugee population. However, with
the growing delay in the onward movement of refugees, serious
- 20 -
problems have arisen, particularly at the Orote Point camp
where the bulk of the refugees live.
Temporary tents, erected on a sandy, coral base, are
now beginning to weather. The approach of the rainy season,
with heavy rains at times, makes tent life miserable, at best.
Because of the coral base, rain is not readily absorbed,
resulting in water running through some tents and around
others. Obvious health and sanitation problems are developing,
as water contains bacteria from shower and latrine run-off,
which even on dry days poses significant odor and health
problems. In addition, the rainy season brings with it an
increased threat of mosquito-born diseases -- particularly
malaria and dengue fever, which are endemic to Vietnam --
and which may pose a danger to both the refugees as well as
the local population of Guam.
The military services have taken a series of actions to
alleviate the health and sanitation problems, but these have
necessarily been temporary, stop-gap efforts. As the days
drag on, however, further and more costly steps will be
required, even as temporary measures, to keep up with
increasing health hazards.
According to recent reports, for example, plans are now
being made to relocate tents as the ground around them becomes
contaminated. The up-grading of sanitation facilities alone
- 21 -
will cost another $5.7 million. Temporary sewer lines will
be installed in some areas. Wood toilet structures will be
replaced on a 10 to 15 day cycle. Shower and washing
facilities will be up-graded. Coral roads are being built.
All of these steps and more, however, are only temporary --
to up-grade facilities that could easily be undone by tropical
weather patterns, particularly the increasing danger of
tropical storms and typhoons.
Typhoon Danger. The dangers of tropical storms and
typhoons are very real, and authorities on Guam have rightly
taken this threat seriously. The tents at Orote Point can
only withstand wind up to 30 knots. And the chance of wind
and weather conditions going beyond that, increases dramatically
from now to the end of November. The probability of a severe
tropical storm near Guam jumps from 13% in April-May, to
26% in July-August, to 39% to 48% in the fall. Similarly,
the probability of a typhoon jumps from 13% today, to 24% in
the later summer months. Although the military has attempted
to draw up a storm and typhoon plan, there are facilities on
the island to house only some 15,000 refugees in typhoon
"resistant" shelters -- not typhoon proof shelters. Clearly,
much hardship and the danger of deaths must be seriously
anticipated, unless the current refugee population on Guam
can be significantly reduced.
- 22 -
Health Problems. Health procedures and care have been
generally adequate to date, and remarkably few health problems
have been reported. First aid stations greet refugees as
they disembark on Guam, and emergency cases -- only a few so
far -- are taken by ambulance to base hospitals. Medical
personnel on board the ships and air craft arriving at Guam,
have usually identified the seriously ill, who have disembarked
first.
Medical screening on Guam consists primarily in asking
refugees if they have had any serious medical problems, in
quarantining suspected patients with communicable diseases,
and in giving extensive immunizations to children. In-camp
medical treatment has, in the main, been provided by several
Army field hospital teams, and to date they have been
extraordinarily successful in avoiding public health problems
and maintaining fine medical care.
The overall medical condition of the refugees has been
found to be good. Although there were cases of dengue fever
and malaria, the overall medical situation is reported as
excellent. However, all medical officers agree that if the
refugees are required to stay on Guam for the periods of
time now seen, health and sanitation standards at the camps
must be improved substantially in order to avert a potentially
serious medical situation,
- 23 -
Overall, physical conditions on Guam remain tolerable,
in large part because of the constant vigilance of the
military services. But all officials agree that the
temporary situation on Guam can only get worse with each
passing day. There are growing morale problems among the
refugees, too much idle time, emerging law and order problems
and increased incidents of criminal acts. There is only the
faint beginnings of any educational program -- of English
classes or other training programs -- and they are limited
by the availability of teachers, supplies, and facilities.
Recreation facilities are almost non-existant.
Obviously, the immediate solution to the health, safety,
sanitary, as well as the financial and humanitarian aspects
of the refugee situation on Guam, is to move the refugees on
-- as rapidly as possible -- to better "safe havens" and
resettlement opportunities. This should involve a matter of
days, not weeks and months; because the welfare of people and
lives are at stake.
4. Role of the Task Force: The Bottlenecks.
The civilian side of the evacuation and resettlement
effort has regrettably fallen far behind the accomplishments
of the military services. From the start, the Task Force has
been characterized by a failure of leadership, poor organization,
inadequate planning, and belated decision making. Unlike the
- 24 -
military services, the civilian side allowed too many "wasted
days" to pass -- permitting events to overtake plans, and
actions to fall behind requirements.
The onward movement of refugees -- from Guam to processing
centers in continential United States, and to resettlement
opportunities in local communities -- was allowed to come to
a virtual standstill for over a month. It is not for the lack
of the military service's ability to physically move the
refugees, but rather to the lack of civilian planning for
expeditious processing and resettlement.
Regrettably, the Task Force and its predecessor were
behind events from the very beginning. The President's
announced intention April 10 to evacuate "tens of thousands"
of Vietnamese was followed by weeks of administrative paralysis
and indecision. Whereas the military services began immediate
planning for the movement and care and maintenance of the
refugees, when alerted to the possibility of the evacuation
and reception of refugees, on the civilian side little or no
effort was made to plan ahead and mobilize resources in
government and the private sector for refugee processing and
resettlement.
After the President's initial indication of a plan to
evacuate Vietnamese civilians, it was more than a week before
- 25 -
he appointed Ambassador L. Dean Brown to provide high-level,
inter-agency coordination for the movement and reception of
refugees. Over two weeks elapsed before the voluntary agencies
were approached, muchless consulted, about resettlement
processing and planning -- and then only after a public hearing
before the Subcommittee on Refugees and the Chairman's
initiative in arranging an appointment between Ambassador
Brown and the agecies. And, despite the availability of funds,
weeks passed before resettlement contracts were pursued with
the agencies and some funds began to flow into their efforts
and work. And even today, not all contracts have been
finalized and signed, nor have all agencies received needed
funds.
In the main, a sloppy laissez-faire approach characterizes
the President's refugee program, and the question of who's
in charge arises in the minds of many Americans concerned
over our special obligation to the refugees and their welfare
and resettlement in the U.S.
- 26 -
III. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION
As is true in most refugee problems, following a period
of care and maintenance and custodial assistance, the options
usually available to refugees are resettlement in the initial
receiving country, resettlement in other countries, or
voluntary repatriation to their native lands. In the case
of the Vietnamese refugees under U.S. control, all three
options are being pursued. But the large bulk of the
refugees will be resettling in the U.S.
During April and most of May, the President's program
was little more than a logistical pipeline, run very well by
the military services, but coming rapidly to a dead-end.
For once a refugee was airlifted out of Vietnam, or scooped-up
out of the sea, or received at base areas, he was expeditiously
moved and housed and cared for by the military services. But
the fundamental question of where he went from there, and what
he did -- all the issues involved in resettlement -- were not
catching-up with the pipeline.
It is a tragic mark on the President's refugee program
and the record of the Task Force, that the fundamental issue
of the refugees' future has only recently been addressed in
any serious, systematic and thoughtful way -- and this is
many weeks after the first arrivals on our shores. And
- 27 -
even today a great deal remains to be done in terms of policy,
planning, and program -- let alone implementation -- before
the refugee bottleneck is broken and meaningful resettlement
is truly underway. For all intents and purposes, the
resettlement program has not really begun. Most of those
who have been resettled, have merely joined family members
in this country. The real refugee still remains in camps.
1. Resettlement Planning.
Not until the middle of May did the Task Force formulate,
at least on paper, a resettlement plan for the President's
refugee program. The plan is premised on four basic principles:
1. Maximum internationalization of the problem;
2. Maximum dependence on international and domestic
voluntary agencies and private resources;
3. Minimum impact on areas in the United States currently
suffering high rates of unemployment; and
4. Maximum coordination among the many federal, state
and local government and community organizations
together with the voluntary agencies, that will be
involved in refugee resettlement.
However, in the weeks since these principles were
submitted to the Subcommittee, the public record indicates that
they have, in the main, remained on paper. And there is a
continuing gap between what is said and what is done.
2. Internationalization of Refugee Resettlement.
For too many weeks, the refugee program was little more
than a logistical effort of moving people from one place to
- 28 -
another, and ultimately to camps in the United States.
Nowhere along the way was there a clear-cut opportunity for
the refugees to really sort out their future, and consider
whether they wanted to resettle in the United States, some
other country, or, equally important, to opt for repatriation
to his homeland.
Although representatives of the international community
arrived in Guam by early May -- the Inter-Governmental Committee
for European Migration (ICEM), the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as immigration officials from
a number of countries -- there was no systematic fashion in
which they were brought into the refugee screening or inter-
viewing process. As the INS officers on Guam, and later at
Camp Pendleton, told the Study Mission, even the Third Country
option, muchless repatriation, was not posed to the refugees.
As one officer stated, "if it comes up by chance during the
immigration interview, we send him to the Department of State
officer."
Although the Administration indicated from the outset
that they sought Third Country resettlement opportunities for
Vietnamese refugees -- and the Department of State ordered on
April 27th every American diplomatic mission abroad to make
a demarche to this effect -- here at home too little was
being done to facilitate this process. For example, the role
- 29 -
of ICEM was met with some confusion in the field. And it
was only a few days ago that authorities at Camp Pendleton
finally allowed ICEM representatives to have access to the
base.
Thus, even as the Department of State was complaining
by cable to the world that "the response of the world community
to this tragedy so far has been minimal
the reaction of
most has been either indifferent or even negative," and that
the U.S. had decided "to launch a vigorous diplomatic campaign
to bring our concern to the world community" about the Vietnam
refugee crisis -- here at home officials were slow to tap the
resources of international agencies such as ICEM. More time
was spent in needlessly criticizing the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, who was also appealing for resettlement
opportunities, than in developing constructive and realistic
proposals for action. Once again, precious time was lost,
and even today too little progress has been registered in
facilitating refugee resettlement in other countries.
The current statistics (as of June 5, 1975) on Third
Country resettlement totals 2,093, and breakdowns as follows:
Canada
1,396
Switzerland
1
Britain
3
South Korea
3
Australia
82
New Zealand
6
Philippines
182
Guam
100
France
98
Thailand
5
Okinawa (Japan)
65
others
65
repatriation
to Cambodia
88
- 30 -
Table 2:
PROVISIONAL REPORT ON MOVEMENTS ASSISTED BY THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION
UNDER THE SPECIAL PROGRAMME FOR RESETTLEMENT FROM INDO-CHINA
25 April - 26 May 1975
Countries of First Asylum
Countries of Resettlement
Total
Guam
Hong
Singapore
Thailand
Others
Kong
Australia
71
71
Transportation assistance
2
2
Processing assistance
69
69
Canada
1,237
1,231
6
Transportation assistance
8
2
6
Processing assistance
1,229
1,229
I
France
90
10
40
40
Italy
1
1
Korea
1
1
New Zealand
4
3
1
Singapore
2
2
Switzerland
1
1
United Kingdom
4
4
U.S.A.
1,731
205
222
1,278
26
Direct
1,401
-
97
1,278
26
via Guam
330
205
125
-
à
TOTAL
3,142
1,323
245
222
1,279
73
- 31 -
Table 3: INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION
Caseload of Pefugees in processing for departure under the Special Programme for
Pesettlement from Indo-China as at 20 May 1975
Preferred country
Refugees located in:
of resettlement
Total
Guam
Hong Kong
Singapore
Thailand
Australia
635
378
238
15
4
Austria
9
-
9
-
-
Belgium
170
107
62
-
1
Brazil
1
-
1
-
Canada
765
-
765
-
-
Fed Rep. of Germany
77
6
71
-
-
France
1,856
1,186
642
15
13
Gabon
4
4
-
-
-
Greece
3
3
-
-
-
Hong Kong
179
28
144
7
-
Indonesia
1
-
1
-
-
Iran
12
10
2
-
-
Italy
30
2
28
-
-
Ivory Coast
21
21
-
-
-
Japan
50
11
39
-
are
Korea
1
1
-
-
-
Laos
20
-
20
-
-
Morocco
3
-
3
-
-
Netherlands
8
8
-
-
-
New Caledonia
2
2
-
-
-
New Guinea
3
-
3
-
-
New Zealand
6
2
4
-
-
Norway
73
-
-
-
73
Pakistan
17
-
17
-
-
Philippines
19
13
6
-
-
Singapore
35
9
6
20
-
Sweden
14
-
14
-
-
Switzerland
27
9
13
-
-
Taiwan
110
52
50
3
-
Thailand
63
9
54
-
-
Tunisia
3
-
3
-
-
United Kingdom
53
4
49
-
-
United States of America
2,730
-
1,694
205
831
Zaire
4
4
-
-
-
Total
7,004
1,369
3,943
270
922
- 32 -
Voluntary Repatriation. During its field visit in early
May, the Study Mission sensed that for personal reasons
significant numbers of refugees -- in the hundreds or
thousands -- would probably opt for voluntary repatriation
to their native land. Small numbers, in fact, had already
petitioned American officials for the opportunity to return.
In testimony before the Subcommittee on May 13, Ambassador
Brown confirmed this development, and indicated that the
UNHCR was working on the problem.
Today the UNHCR has represnetatives in refugee areas in
the U.S. After consultations with the Provisional Revolution-
ary Government of South Vietnam, the UNHCR has prepared a
questionnaire/application form by which Vietnamese may apply
for repatriation. These forms are now available at all
refugee camps, and Red Cross offices throughout the United
States will have the forms available should a Vietnamese
refugee, at some future date, wish to apply for repatriation
even after resettlement in a local community.
Although diplomatic contacts have been made by the
UNHCR's representatives in Saigon, and agreement in principle
has been reached with the PRG that it will accept Vietnamese
repatriates, there remains uncertainty over the time involved
in processing repatriation applications, and the circumstances
- 33 -
surrounding the possible travel and return to their homes.
Best estimates, however, indicate that it will involve
several weeks, perhaps some months, before all those
refugees who want to go home will be able to actually return
to South Vietnam. Until then, they will remain the responsibility
of the United States, and they must be treated and cared for
in a humane manner. So far, close to 2,000 refugees under
U.S. control are pursuing voluntary repatriation. The number
will probably increase in the weeks and months ahead.
3. Dependence upon the Voluntary Agencies. Private
voluntary agencies have traditionally played a crucial role
in the effective resettlement of refugees, and they are
committed to doing what they can in providing resettlement
services to the new arrivals on our shores. In the end, the
private sector -- mainly the voluntary agencies and their
local constituencies -- will provide the human, one-to-one
basis on which people are resettled and integrated into
communities to become self-supporting and productive members
of our society.
On paper, this has been recognized by the Task Force.
Even before the Administration had the vaguest idea of an
operational plan for refugee resettlement, high officials
were readily invoking the names of the voluntary agencies,
saying they were central to the program. Regrettably,
- 34 -
however, these same officials had neglected to even contact
the agencies.
For example, on April 24th, the Department of State,
in responding to an inquiry from Senator Kennedy, indicated
that the Department "has been in close communication with the
American Council of Voluntary Agencies
as a result of which
the following seven agencies have agreed to undertake their
traditional role in resettlement efforts." In fact, the
seven agencies listed had not all been contacted. Moreover,
they had not met with the Task Force, let alone made any
agreements to undertake the resettlement of refugees.
Indeed, the record shows that it was not until after a
Subcommittee hearing on April 25th, subsequent to the Depart-
ment of State letter, that a meeting finally took place between
the voluntary agencies and Ambassador Brown and the Task Force.
At that meeting, as one participant phrased it, "the Task
Force began to rediscover the wheel," and recognize the
essential role of the voluntary agencies in any resettlement
program. Even so, the unfortunate fact remains that for over
a month, from April 26th until the first week of June, the
role and function of the agencies was neglected, muddled,
and little or no funds granted to support their work.
Despite the repeatedly stated plan of the Administration
- 35 -
to "depend" upon the voluntary agencies. There has been
a basic failure to consult, involve, and support their activities.
Below is a partial listing of some of the problem areas that
have been encountered, and which, in many cases, still hamper
the functioning of the agencies in resettling refugees.
1.) Failure to genuinely consult and coordinate with
the voluntary agencies: At the outset, few on the Task Force
apparently appreciated or understood the role of the voluntary
agencies in refugee resettlement -- despite the constant
reference to them by Task Force members. It was clear from
the early meetings between representatives of the agencies
and members of the Task Force that the involvement of the
agencies was almost an after-thought. The agency representa-
tives were subjected to patronizing lectures and patted on the
hands, but never genuinely consulted or involved in the decision-
making process. They were "informed" of decisions, and
"notified" of developments -- often days later -- even though
those decisions directly affected their work in refugee
resettlement.
For example, the agencies were notified after the sites
had been chosen for the reception camps, and after the refugees
started to arrive, although the agencies were expected to have
staff on hand to assist in the reception of the refugees.
- 36 -
Decisions as to processing procedures, forms to be used, and
other basic questions involved in the sorting and helping of
people, have frequently been made without any involvement
of the voluntary agencies. Procedures have been changed,
guidelines altered, and instructions reversed, without the
notification, muchless any consultation, with the agencies.
The list of such instances is long -- too long --- and
this neglect of the role, expertisé, and function of the
voluntary agencies has contributed significantly to the
shambles in which the entire refugee program has been stuck
for well over a month. Worse still, countless thousands of
refugees have not been resettled as a result.
2.) Failure to give priority to the support requirements
of the voluntary agencies: The Task Force, and particularly
some of its senior civilian coordinators in the field, failed
at the outset to take seriously the role and importance of
the agencies in the field. In the case of Camp Pendleton,
military authorities who were naturally unfamiliar with the
agencies, positioned them in small tents far removed from the
processing center, where they should and must be located. Not
informed of the error by the civilian coordinator who had
never bothered to visit the agencies, the camp commander
learned of the mistake only indirectly. When informed, he
ordered the error to be corrected immediately.
- 37 -
For the agencies to do the job they are expected to do
by the Task Force -- and to contribute, as they want to, to
the expeditious resettlement of refugees in as short a period
of time as possible -- the Task Force should have given early
and high priority to supporting and facilitating the work of
the voluntary agencies. Regrettably, the provision of office
facilities -- telephones, desks, typewriters, etc. -- in
sufficient number and in sufficient time, has not been a
priority with the Task Force, and it has resulted in many
wasted days for the agencies as well as for the refugees.
Even in recent days, after the Task Force had pledged to do
better in the opening of the camp at Indiantown Gap, no
typewriters were available.
These are small, nitty-gritty items, but it should have
been in the interest of the Task Force to provide such basic
support in order to avoid delays. The voluntary agencies are
crucial, and they want to help, but they simply do not have
the resources nor manpower to do what the government can and
should do in providing basic support. If the military services
can fly tens of thousands of refugees around the globe in a
matter of days, and provide food and shelter and health care
for 130,000 people in two weeks time, surely the Task Force
could mobilize sufficient typewriters and telephones and
paper clips to help the voluntary agencies do their job.
- 38 -
3.) Failure to provide funds expeditiously to the
voluntary agencies: The record of the past month and a half
is one of unfulfilled promises to provide urgently needed
funds to the voluntary agencies. Over and over again, during
hearings of the Subcommittee, in personal inquiries by the
Subcommittee Chairman, and in communications and meetings with
the Task Force, the issue of contracts with the voluntary
agencies was mentioned, only to be given false and misleading
information. It adds up to a month of false promises and
sheer incompetence.
During the Subcommittee hearing on April 25th, and again
on April 30th, the issue of federal funding of the resettlement
efforts of the voluntary agencies was reviewed. The frustrations
of the agencies was made clear during the April 25th hearing,
and as a result the Chairman asked Task Force representatives
on April 30th the simple question: "Have you signed any
contracts with voluntary agencies now?" The answer, from
Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for Ease Asian
and Pacific Affairs, and James Wilson, Director of the Emergency
Humanitarian Relief Committee of the Task Force, was as follows:
Mr. Wilson. As I said earlier, we have signed contracts
with the voluntary agencies only for the Cambodian refugees.
We are negotiating now adjustments in their contracts for the
Vietnamese refugees.
Mr. Habib. I presume in a week or so we will have those
completed.
- 39 -
Senator Kennedy. You will have what completed?
Mr. Wilson. The contract renegotiations. It will be
done in a matter of just a few days now.
There then follows this exchange with Senator Fong:
Senator Fong: Will that include the cost of resettlement
in the contract? The voluntary agencies will get these people
into various communities?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir, The normal procedure is to
establish an amount, an estimated amount per refugee who is
resettled, and this will appear in the contract, subject of
course to adjustment, depending on how the actual situation
develops.
Senator Fong. Most of the expenses that will be incurred
by the voluntary agencies will be paid through this fund that
we are talking about?
Mr. Wilson. The voluntary agencies, of course, operate
on the basis of the contributions that their own organizations
in many cases provide and on the basis of the funds that
come to them through the government contracts.
Senator Fong. In this case there is no special provision
in there. There is not a special fund for this, for the
voluntary agencies.
Mr. Wilson. The voluntary agencies have already begun
solicitations so far as their own funding goes. We are the
ones who will pick up the government contract.
Senator Fong. Do you anticipate that most of the expendi-
tures by the voluntary agencies will be paid by the Federal
Government?
Mr. Wilson. It varies from agency to agency, Senator
Fong. In many cases the funds that the government provides
are almost entirely matched by the private contributions that
come through those agencies.
Despite this unequivical testimony -- as well as repeated
assurances to the Subcommittee throughout May, including
- 40 -
testimony on May 13th from Ambassador Brown that "we will
sign them as fast as possible" the fact remains that not much was
done. As of the first week of June, not all the contracts
have been signed, and few funds have yet reached the voluntary
agencies to assist in the resettlement of the refugees.
This has been an unconscionable and disgraceful failure.
Worse still, those contracts originally proposed to the agencies
were filled, contrary to Habib's and Wilson's testimony, with
irrelevant and burdensome requirements, that questioned the
integrity and long record of performance and efficiency of
the church groups and voluntary agencies. Nothing symbolizes
more the floundering of the White House and the Task Force
than its inexcuseable delay in making and implementing high
priority decisions essential to the resettlement of the refugees,
whom the government itself evacuated, than the muddle and delay
and confusion which has surrounded the need for the government
to provide urgent funds to the voluntary agencies.
As the weeks dragged on without contracts signed and no
funds reaching the agencies, officials at the Task Force had
blame for everyone but themselves. At first it was the
agencies' responsibility for not making their plans and
intentions clear. Then it was Congress for not providing
funds, although some funds were available under transfer
authority. Yet, in more than two weeks since funds were
- 41 -
authorized and appropriated by Congress, not all the contracts
had been signed, there was until this past week serious
confusion over the terms of the contracts.
4. Resettlement Problems: Minimizing the Impact on
Areas in the United States.
All previous experience in resettling refugees provides
the clear lesson that the refugee problem does not end with
the initial resettlement. Despite the invaluable and crucial
role of the voluntary agencies in providing institutional
support to sponsors to help them when resettlement breakdowns,
many aspects of resettlement still depend upon governmental
support and action. The Indochina refugee evacuation was a
decision made by the President and by the federal government,
and the successful resettlement of the refugees remains an
obligation, first of all, of the government.
The Executive Branch has clearly recognized and stated
this obligation -- again, on paper. Spokesmen for the
President have said that all state and local programs can
and should be utilized to assist in refugee resettlement, and
that the Federal Government would provide 100% reimbursement
for all costs incurred. Regrettably, this assurance, if it
is truly the Administration's policy, has not been clearly
communicated to all levels of state and local government.
Reports to the Subcommittee confirm that aside from a May 3
cable from the Task Force to all Governors, and some messages
- 42 -
from HEW to state social welfare agencies, no follow-up
information has been provided to elaborate the government's
proposal.
This has left many state capitals with a feeling of
uncertainty as to precisely what services are reimburseable,
and which are not. For example, the office of a New England
Governor has received only the May 3 cable from the Task Force.
Because the state is now facing a 12.3% unemployment rate, there
is considerable anxiety over the potential impact of Vietnamese
refugees on state services and the employment picture. Yet
the Governor, despite his offices inquiries, has no information
or guidance on the state's responsibilities in receiving
refugees and on the issue of federal payments for any state
services provided the refugees.
Even where HEW has informed state welfare agencies of the
proposal to reimburse all costs incurred, official notification
down the line has been slow or nonexistant. For example, the
Administrator of the nation's largest social welfare program,
has yet to receive any official notification on any aspect
of the resettlement program.
After refugees have been provided resettlement opportunities,
a number of follow-on programs are required. Some refugees
will need additional counselling and orientation to American
life. Others will need special language training and other
- 43 -
programs to assist them in becoming productive and self-
sufficient members of American society.
To assist in the process, the Task Force has been forced
to propose that a number of governmental programs be made
available to the refugees -- programs, in some instances, that
the Administration has cut-back or eliminated for Americans.
The following programs have been listed by the Task Force,
in a statement submitted to the Subcommittee, as being planned
to augment the efforts of the voluntary agencies, individual
sponsors, and local community services and resources:
1. establishment of a Job Bank to determine employment
opportunities in relation to the refugee's location,
his skills or his potential.
2. establishment of an Educational Services Program,
including:
a. assessment of the English language proficiency
(written and oral), and equivalency of previous
education to the U.S. educational system.
b. assessment of vocational skills and counselling
on vocational training and opportunities.
C. identification or development of appropriate
educational materials.
d. establishment of English language traning programs.
e. establishment of vocational education programs
with an English language component.
f. provision for training necessary for re-accreditation
for professionals wishing to practice their previous
skills in this country (e.g., doctors, lawyers, and
teachers).
- 44 -
g. identification of educational institutions with
previous experience in teaching foreign nationals,
especially Vietnamese and Cambodian.
h. establishment of a central dissemination and
referral service to assist refugees and sponsor
agencies in obtaining appropriate educational
materials, e.g., phrase books for families who
have sponsored refugees with limited English
capacity.
i. assistance under presently organized Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare programs once
the refugee's permanent resident status is
established -- e.g., student financial assistance
programs for higher education and programs for
limited English speaking students (under the
Emergency School Assistance Act).
3. establishment of a Social Services Program. Social
services through public agencies would be limited in
the same manner as they apply to other residents of
the states and communities in which the refugees are
located. Assistance will be provided to refugees
who have a high risk of becoming dependent on
assistance unless they receive help with pressing
problems. The major purpose of this assistance is
to help individuals and families achieve self-support
and remain self-supporting. The services expected
to be most needed are:
a.counselling related to obtaining and retaining
employment.
b. referral to community resources -- such as vocational
rehabilitation for persons who have disabilities
which constitute barriers to self-support.
C. arranging for needed medical services.
d. homemaker service where a parent has to be
hospitalized for an illness and there is no one
available to take care of the children.
e. arranging for day care for children, if necessary,
when a parent is in vocational rehabilitation.
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All of the above services and programs are important.
But, again, there is little evidence than many, if any, are
really off-the-ground. For example, the simple provision of
training necessary for re-accreditation of professionals
wishing to practice their previous skills, such as doctors
and dentists, has. not begun. There is absolutely no reason
that this program should not be functioning. Proposals have
come from several universities fully capabable of beginning
such a program now -- such as the University of Oklahoma or
the University of Miami (which assisted during the Cuban
program). Yet decisions to support such programs have not
been made, although funds are immediately available.
Until the Task Force moves to implement the wise and
essential programs it has listed on paper, little progress
can be expected in truly resettling refugees as productive
members of the community.
5. Processing Problems.
What should have been an orderly, expeditious and
relatively straight forward procedure for processing Indochina
refugees has turned into a nightmare for officials and
refugees alike. Once again, it is a problem of implementation,
rather than a lack of guidance.
The elements of the process are clear enough: reception
of the refugees; screening (by INS) ; issuance of social security
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cards and HEW counselling and screening; voluntary agency
counselling for sponsorships; verification of resettlement
sponsors; final INS processing (Security Check verification);
and final outprocessing and travel arrangements. Regrettably,
this process came to a virtual standstill throughout the month
of May, and is still stuck in a mire of clearances.
Statistics on the number of refugees actually processed
out of camps to date speak for themselves. According to the
Task Force, as of the first week of June -- well over a month
after the process began -- 102,314 refugees, out of the 131,000
refugees who have come under United States control, remain to
be out-processed. In short, 80% of all the refugees are still
in camps awaiting resettlement. And of this total to be
processed, half are still on overseas bases awaiting transfer
to the reception camps where meaningful screening for resettle-
ment begins.
For many weeks during May there simply was no movement
of refugees out of camps in the United States. By the first
week of June, some slight progress was reported by the Task
Force, indicating that an average of 600 to 650 refugees
were moving out of camps each day. Assuming that this increased
rate will continue under current processing procedures --
which is not likely -- it will still take six months at a
minimum to empty the camps.
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More likely, significant numbers of refugees will be
remaining in camps for a longer period of time -- in fact,
some officials involved in the processing estimate that the
time frame may be up to a year or more.
One totally unnecessary bottleneck in the screening
process to date has been the INS security check. The law
provides for a security check, and it was proper that it be
applied. However, as it has been implemented, the security
clearance process has become an inexcuseable delay in the
refugee process, and no adequate explanations have been offered
as to why the clearance process was allowed to become quite
so muddled, or so lengthy.
According to the Task Force, as of June 5th, of the 70,687
refugees who have arrived in camps in the U.S., 67,932 have
been processed by INS, of which 23,284 have been cleared by
INS for departure, and 18,418 have actually departed camps.
Only 1,210 refugees have sponsors but are stuck in camps
because they do not yet have clearances.
Presumably this clearance bottleneck can be broken in
the weeks ahead. In the meantime, an effort has recently been
made to close the gap between those refugees who have sponsor-
ships but not yet security clearances, by instructing camps
to cable Washington all names of refugees who have sponsors
and clearing them first.
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Table 4 :
Refugee Resettlement Projections
(through the Voluntary Agencies)
No. of Refugees
Agency
Near-Term Projection
U.S. Catholic Conference
20,000+ refugees
Church World Service
10,000
Lutheran Immigration
11,700
United HAIS Service
10,000
International Rescue Committee
5,000
American Council for Nationa-
lities Service/Traveler's Aid
5,000
Tolstoy Foundation
2,000
Czechoslovak Refugees Fund
2,000
Total
65,700 refugees
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There is also a growing backlog of refugees in need of
sponsorships, in part because the work of the voluntary agencies
has been hampered by the lack of funds and support, and also
because data on the refugees is not available for resettlement
planning. The voluntary agencies have indicated that in the
next few months they can, together, resettle at least 65,700
refugees. Table 4 outlines the number of refugees each agency
projects that it can resettle over the short-term.
Obviously, this projection leaves almost half the refugees
unsettled, and there are growing pressures within the Task
Force to go around the agencies and seek resettlement sponsor-
ships through various service organizations or state or local
governments. Already the State of Washington has won approval
to be a sponsor of refugees. The danger involved in taking
this route, is that only the voluntary agencies have a proven
record of following up refugee resettlement. A local service
club may become a sponsor of a refugee family with the best of
motives and the highest of spirits. But when or if the reset-
tlement situation breaks down no one is there to provide
assistance or the experience necessary to help.
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IV. CAMBODIAN REFUGEES
Although the Indochina war came last to Cambodia, it was
first to be evacuated, and the first to have refugees airlifted
to the United States.
On April 11, U.S. military forces, including 350 ground
combat Marines, 36 helicopters, and supporting tactical air
and command/control units were deployed to Phnom Penh. Thus,
"Operation Eagle Pull" began, and in little less than four
hours 82 American citizens, 35 Third Country nationals, and
159 Cambodians, mostly Khmer employees of the U.S. Embassy,
were evacuated.
This constituted the "first wave" of Cambodian refugees,
and was the group for whom parole authority was first requested.
But, as in the Vietnamese situation, there was a second and
third wave of Cambodian refugee movement, although far less
in magnitude, yet involving similar problems.
On April 21, ten days after the evacuation of Phnom Penh,
the Department of State revised its estimate of the number of
Cambodians who might come to the United States. Considering
the number of Cambodian diplomats and others outside of the
country at the time of the collapse of the government, the
fact that some 1,200 were evacuated in the weeks preceding the
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evacuation, and the reports of refugees crossing the border
into Thailand, the Department indicated that the maximum
number of Cambodians who might seek admission to the United
States would be approximately 6,000.
The total number of Cambodian refugees who have fled
since the collapse of Phnom Penh has now nearly doubled that
figure. However, only some 3,000 are currently estimated
as eligible, under the parole authority, for admission into
the United States. There are currently under United States
control some 2,600 Cambodians, including some 900 at Camp
Pendleton, 500 at Indiantown Gap, and 1,200 at Utapao Air Base
in Thailand. Less than 100 Cambodians have yet to be processed
out, principally from Camp Pendleton, and the 500 at Indian-
town Gap arrived from Utapao only during the first week of June.
Reports from the field indicate that some Cambodian refugees
are still moving across the border into Thailand, creating a
serious diplomatic and humanitarian problem for the Thai
government. Best estimates are that some 5,000 to 8,000
Cambodian refugees are in Thailand, and efforts are being
made to facilitate their identification and resettlement.
Of this group, the Task Force estimates that several hundred
might be eligible, on a case by case basis, to come to the
United States.
In addition, there are 250 Cambodian diplomats and
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dependents remaining in eight countries around the globe.
The United States has indicated that they will be considered
for admission to the U.S. only if the host countries expell
them and if international agencies have been unable to provide
assistance. Already two countries have expelled Cambodian
diplomats -- India and Indonesia -- and the U.S. has
tentatively agreed to assist.
The Cambodians now in camps have been housed and
processed separately from the Vietnamese, and there has been
a wise attempt to keep them together as much as possible.
Separate arrangements have been made with the voluntary
agencies for resettling the Cambodians.