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Charles E. Goodell Papers
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The original documents are located in Box 4, folder "Final Report - Draft, 8/29/75 (1)" of
the Charles E. Goodell Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Charles Goodell donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 4 of the Charles E. Goodell Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500
August 29, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOARD MEMBERS
FROM:
LAWRENCE M. BASKIR
may
SUBJECT:
DRAFT FINAL REPORT
Attached you will find a draft prepared by the staff to serve as
the basis for your discussions on the Final Report at Camp David.
The draft contains a number of omissions including numbers and
citations which the staff will be collecting over the next few days.
This draft was prepared by a number of individuals under a severe
time pressure and I must ask your indulgence for any typographical
errors, grammatical mistakes, and imperfect syntax. We have tried,
however, to present you with a draft which gives a complete description
of the Board's operations, and an explanation of the context in which
the Board operated.
If you should have any individual questions you wish answered, the staff
will be available during your discussions at Camp David and, of course,
at any other time.
Attachment
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION
II.
THE PRESIDENT'S CLEMENCY PROGRAM
A. THE NEED FOR A PROGRAM AND ITS CREATION
B. CLEMENCY, NOT AMNESTY
C. A LIMITED, NOT UNIVERSAL, PROGRAM
D. A PROGRAM OF DEFINITE, NOT INDEFINITE, LENGTH
E. A CASE-BY-CASE, NOT BLANKET, APPROACH
F. CONDITIONAL, NOT UNCONDITIONAL, CLEMENCY
II.
PCB CASE DISPOSITIONS
IV.
PCB APPLICANTS
A. INTRODUCTION
B. OUR CIVILIAN APPLICANTS
C. OUR MILITARY APPLICANTS
D. CONCLUSION
V.
MANAGING THE CLEMENCY BOARD
VI.
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
VII.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
VIII.
APPENDICES
I
III &
CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
Current situations often parallel previous ones, causing leaders
facing similar problems to reach similar conclusions. In studying
President Ford's Clemency Program, one need only look back a hundred
years to observe a like situation confronting another President of the
United States. Just days after the Civil War ended, President Andrew
Johnson began weighing whether an amnesty should be declared to heal
the wounds which still divided his reunited nation. The President sought
advice from Attorney General James Speed who counseled to act with
moderation.
"The excellence of mercy and charity in a national trouble
like ours ought not to be undervalued. Such feelings should
be fondly cherished and studiously cultivated. When brought
into action they should be generously but wisely indulged.
Like all the great, necessary, and useful powers in nature
or government, harm may come of their improvident use,
and perils which seem past may be renewed, and other and
new dangers be precipitated.
Just six weeks after he became President, Johnson followed Attorney
General Speed's advice. He declared a limited and conditional amnesty.
To many it was insufficient while to others it was too generous. To the
President, it was a reasonable approach which people of all pursuasions
could find acceptable. Had the President's program not approached the
middle ground, the perils and dangers identified by Attorney General Speed
might well have come to pass.
Over a century later, President Gerald Ford was concerned
about the need to heal America's wounds following another divisive war.
Like President Andrew Johnson, he announced a clemency program six
weeks after succeeding to office; like Johnson, he pursued a course of
moderation. No program at all would have left old wounds festering.
Unconditional amnesty would have created more ill feeling than it would
have eased. Reconciliation was what was needed, and reconciliation could
only come from a reasoned middle ground.
To the members of the Presidential Clemency Board, the
President's program assumed a greater meaning. We came to the Board
as men and women whose views reflected the full spectrum of the public
opinion on the war and on the question of amnesty. As we discussed the
issues, a consensus began to emerge: we all came to see the President's
program as more than a mere compromise, but also an appropriate and
fair solution to a very difficult problem.
It appeared to us that the President's program was anchored by
six guiding principles. Taken together, they provide an excellent means
of understanding the spirit behind his clemency proclamation. They also
established guidelines to help out Board implementation of the
President's program.
The first principle was one about which there was no disagreement:
the need for a program. After almost nine years of war and nineteen
months of an acrimonious debate about amnesty, President Ford decided
that it was time to act. America needed some Presidential response
to the issue of amnesty for Vietnam era draft resisters and deserters.
As he created the program, the President authorized three agencies--
the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and the Presiden-
tial Clemency Board-- to review cases of different categories of draft and
AWOL offenders. He designated a fourth entity, the Selective Service
System, to implement the alternative service aspect of the program.
The second principle was that the program should offer clemency,
not amnesty. Too much had happened during the war to enable Americans
to forget about what had taken place. The President often stated that he
did not want to demean the sacrifice of those who served--or the conscien-
tious feelings of those who chose not to serve. But the inability to forget
does not mean an incapacity to forgive. President Ford declared that he
was placing "the weight of the Presidency in the scales of justice on the
side of mercy. " By ordering that prosecutions be dropped, that military
absentees be discharged and that persons punished for draftor desertion
offenses be eligible for Presidential pardons, he tried to make America
whole again. He offered to restore the rights and opportunities of American
citizenship to people who had been made outcasts because of conscientious
beliefs or their inability to deal effectively with their legal obligations.
Third, he declared that this was to be a limited, not universal,
program. Had he included only those who could prove that their offense
had resulted from their opposition to the war, he would have been unfair
to less educated persons. Instead, the President listed several
draft and desertion offenses which, if committed during the Vietnam
era, would automatically make a person eligible to apply for clemency.
On balance, he drew the eligibility line generously; of the 125, 000 made
eligible, only an estimated 25% actually committed their offenses because
/
of a professed conscientious opposition to war.
Fourth, he decided that this was to be a program of definite, not
indefinite, length. There would be an application deadline, giving every-
one more than four months' time from the program's inception to apply
(later extended by two months). This would enable all cases to be decided
within one year, and--even more important it would put an end to the
amnesty issue. It was hoped that the reconciliation among draft resisters,
deserters, and their neighbors would take place as quickly as possible.
/
Altogether, about 22, 500 eligible persons applied for clemency.
His fifth principle was the cornerstone of the program: all applicants
would have their cases considered through a case-by-case, not blanket,
approach. Clemency would not be dispensed automatically, by category,
or by any rigid formula. The agencies authorized to review clemency
applications were to consider the merits of each applicant's case, with
full respect given to their rights and interests. To the extent possible, case
dispositions had to be fair, accurate, consistent, and timely.
FOR
&
RALD
His final principle was that he would offer most applicants con-
ditional, not unconditional, clemency. Clemency would have to be
earned through performance of several months of alternative service
in the national interest. Regardless of the rightness of wrongness of
an applicant's draft or desertion offenses, he still owed a debt of service
to his country. That debt would have to be satisfied before he could be
forgiven for his offenses.
During the past twelve months the Presidential Clemency Board
has heard close to 16, 000 cases. It has tried to apply the spirit of these
principles to every case. In this report, we explain what actions we took,
what we learned about our applicants, and what we think we accomplished.
Where possible, we also try to put the President's entire clemency program
in some perspective. The policies and procedures of the Department of
Justice, the Department of Defense and the Selective Service System are
useful benchmarks for understanding the full context of the Board's own
policies and procedures.
The report begins with a discussion of how the Board implemented
each of the President's six principles. We then describe how it managed
what was at times a crisis operation. Next, we describe what we learned
from the case histories about the experiences of the civilian and military
applicants. We then try to put the President's program into an historical
perspective through a comparative analysis of other instances of executive
clemency in Amerivan history. Finally, we discuss what we think the
President's program accomplished. We make specific recommendations
to the President about actions he might consider in furtherance of the spirit
underlying the principles of his program.
(
II A
II. THE PRESIDENT'S CLEMENCY PROGRAM
II. THE PRESIDENT'S CLEMENCY PROGRAM
A. THE NEED FOR A PROGRAM- - AND ITS CREATION
FORD
&
GTVS
CHAPTER II:
THE PRESIDENT'S CLEMENCY PROGRAM
A. The Need for a Program -- and Its Creation
Regardless of one's political or philosophical perspective, the war
in Vietnam had a significant impact on the lives of most American citizens.
The war resulted in the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives, including
56, 000 Americans. It forced many more people to leave their homes and
countries. Nightly, color television brought the war into every American
living room, and the nation witnessed the carnage in Vietnam Divisions
between pro - and anti-war advocates widened dramatically. Accentuating the
divisiveness among the opposing factions were such slogans as "America,
Love It or Leave It, " "Peace with Honor, " "Better Red than Dead, " and "Un-
conditional Amnesty Now." Patriotism meant different things to different
people. Most still believed that love of country could best be demonstrated
by defending America on the battlefield. But others insisted that love of
country required a critical assessment of national policy. They felt that by
opposing the war and resisting military induction, they could change American
foreign policy.
Over and above the political consequences of the war are the personal
tragedies resulting from the conflict. Fifty-six thousand Americans lost
their lives; fifty-six thousand Americans families lost their loved ones.
Untold numbers were maimed and crippled. Unfortunately, a grateful country
could do little more than honor the dead and try to console the berea vedia
2
As the war ended, it became painfully clear that even those who
chose not to serve had also suffered. Not only had the war affected the lives
of these 125, 000 people, but their families and friends had also suffered the
trauma of long separations -- many of indefinite duration. The decision to
grant clemency to the evaders and deserters did nothing to diminish the
supreme sacrifice of those who died or lost their loved ones.
It is recognized that a country's most difficult decision is to send
its sons to war, yet sometimes that decision becomes unavoidable. However,
the decision to go to war should not necessarily color a subsequent decision
to be merciful. By creatinga program of conditional clemency, the Presi-
dent not only exercised his personal authority under the Constitution, but,
hopefully, he also developed a program which would allow reconciliation with
the greatest degree of public cooperation and understanding.
Shortly after assuming his office, President Ford wanted to "bind the
Nation's wounds and to heal the scars of divisiveness," As one of his first
initiatives as President, he created the Clemency Program. When the Pro-
gram began on September 16, 1974, over a year had passed since the last
American combatant had left Vietnam. The President felt that "in furtherance
of our national commitment to justice and mercy" it was time for an "act of
mercy" aimed at national "reconciliation. " He issued Proclamation 4313 to
outline how his program was going to be implemented.
President Ford recognized that desertion in wartime and draft evasion
are serious offenses which, if unpunished, could have an adverse effect on
/ The full text of the Proclamation together with Executive Order 11803
creating the Clemency Board are reproduced verbatim in Appendix
military morale and discipline. Nevertheless, he called for reconciliation.
"Reconciliation among our people does not require that these acts be con-
doned. 11 It did require, however, that certain deserters and evaders have
an opportunity "to contribute a share to the rebuilding of peace among our-
selves and with all nations, 11 and "to earn return to their country. 11 Thus,
President Ford created his Clemency Program. He entrusted its adminis -
tration to three existing government agencies - the Departments of Justice
and Defense, as well as the Selective Service System--and created the
Clemency Board within the Executive Office of the President to consider
applications from people who did not fall within the purview of the other
agencies. These four governmental units were ordered to implement a
program offering forgiveness and reconciliation to approximately 125, 000
draft resisters and military deserters. Never before in this nation's
history had a President offered executive clemency so soon after the
conclusion of the war which gave rise to draft or desertion offenses.
The Presidential Clemency Board
Under the Proclamation and the Executive Order, the Clemency
Board was entrusted with authority to make recommendations to the President
concerning applications received from individuals who (1) had been convicted
of five specific draft evasion offenses, / or (2) had received a punitive or
Undesirable Discharge as a consequence of AWOL or desertion offenses, or
/
Included were violations of Sections 50 App. U.S.C. 462 and 12 or 6(j) of
the Military Selective Service Act.
/
See Articles 85, 86 and 87 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
10 U.S.C. §§ 885, 886, and 887.
(3) were
/incarcerated at the time of the Proclamation in a military or civilian prison
for any of the above offenses.
Of the approximately 125, 000 people eligible to participate in the
program, a vast majority had already been punished for their Vietnam-era
offenses. Their cases became the responsibility of the Clemency Board.
Thus, the number of persons eligible to apply to the Board included 8700 con-
victed civilians and approximately 100, 000 former servicemen given bad dis- -
charges for absence-related offenses.
In order to obtain executive clemency, a Presidential Pardon for
civilian offenders and a Pardon plus a Clemency Discharge for military
/
offenders, an individual had to apply no later than March 31, 1975, and com-
plete a period of alternative service, if any, that was required by the Presi-
dent pursuant to our recommendation.
At the time of the Board's creation, the President originally appointed
nine members of national standing who represented a cross-section of views
both on the war and on the question of amnesty.
Beginning in September, the Board met on a regular basis in Wash-
ington, D.C. As the number of applications began to swell from 860 in early
January to almost 21, 000 by the end of March, it readily became apparent
that the nine original Board Members and the initial staff of eighteen could
not complete the Board's work within a September 15th deadline set by the
/ We were extremely liberal about what we construed to be an application.
In essence, it was any communication received by us or any government agency.
President. Thus, in May the President expanded the Board to eighteen
members and allowed the staff to increase to over 600 to complete the
work on time.
The expanded Board included members with widely ranging exper- -
iences and points of view. Two members openly advocated unconditional
amnesty, and others spoke out strongly against the war. Several believed
that our mistake lay in not pursuing the war effort more vigorously, and a
few were concerned, at first, that the President's clemency program was
hastily conceived and too generous. Five of our eighteen members are
Vietnam veterans; one commanded the Marine Corps in Vietnam during the
latter half of the war; two are disabled; three are women; one of whom has
a husband still listed among those missing in action. Three blacks and one
Spanish-speaking person are on the Board. We also have a former local
draft Board member, an expert in military law, and others with special
backgrounds and perspectives which contribute to a well-balanced Board.
The Department of Justice
Eligible, unconvicted draft evaders were the responsibility of the
Justice Department. Sometime after the issuance of the Proclamation, the
/ cont'd.
from the applicant, his relative, or his designated representative; provided,
that, if necessary, the applicant himself perfected the application within a
reasonable time.
/ Of those convicted draft evaders in group (1) above,
were eligible for
our segment of the Program and
applied; of those discharged absentees
in group (2),
were eligible and
applied; and of those incarcerated
absentees in group (3),
were eligible for the Program and
applied to us.
Attorney General released a list identifying 4, 522 names of individuals the
Justice Department considered indictable for draft offenses within the purview
of the President's program. If an individual's name appeared on this list
and he wanted to apply for clemency, he personally reported to the United
States Attorney in the jurisdiction in which he committed the offense. He
then proceeded to participate in a process similar to plea bargaining whereby
he negotiated the amount of alternative service which had to be completed
before the draft evasion charges against him would be dropped.
In order to be relieved of criminal liability, the applicant would
have to have turned himself in by March 31, 1975, acknowledged his allegiance
to the United States, and satisfactorily fulfilled his pledge to complete up to
24 months of alternative service. By applying the loose guidelines that
were given by the Attorney General each of the 94 United States Attorneys
(or an Assistant United States Attorney under his direction) considered the
cases of applicants who had committed requisite draft evasion offenses in
their judicial districts.
Of the 4, 522 who were eligible for this segment of the program, over
700 applied and were referred to alternative service work.
The Department of Defense
If a member of the armed forces had been administratively classified
as being an unauthorized absentee and had not been discharged, his case
came under the purview of the Defense Department's segment of the program.
These people were technically still part of the military, and the Depart-
ment of Defense had the physical facilities and the administrative capability
to establish a procedure for dealing fairly with the undischarged absentees.
To have received clemency -- to have been relieved of prosecution
for the absence offense, given an immediate Undesirable Discharge, and
offered the opportunity to earn a Clemency Discharge -- the applicant must
have applied before the application deadline, taken an oath of allegiance to
the United States, and taken a pledge to complete up to 24 monthos of alter -
native service. According to the Defense Department of 10, 115 eligible
/
persons, 5, 495 returned and were referred to do alternative service.
II
B.
)
II. THE PRESIDENT'S CLEMENCY PROGRAM
B. CLEMENCY, NOT AMNESTY
GERALD R FORD DIR
II.B.1.
B. CLEMENCY, NOT AMNESTY
In the years before President Ford assumed office, opinion was
sharply divided over what the government's policy should be toward Vietnam-
era draft resisters and deserters. Many felt that their actions could not be
forgiven in light of the sacrifices endured by others during that war. On the
other hand, many Americans believed that war resisters acted in good
conscience to oppose a war they believed wrong and wasteful. Nothing
could repay the war's other victims. They approved, but universal and
unconditional amnesty could end the personal sacrifices of the war resisters.
President Ford chose a middle course. He acknowledged that no aspect
of the Vietnam War should ever be forgotten, officially or otherwise. Too
many casualties had been suffered. But a country lacking the desire to for-
get can still have capacity to forgive. The rancor that divided our country
had sapped its spirit and strength at home and abroad. The national interest
required that Americans put aside their strong personal feelings for the
good of the country. The divisions had to be put to one side in a spirit of
reconciliation SO that America could begin its recovery from the tragedies
of the Vietnam era. Therefore, President Ford announced a program of
clemency, of forgiveness, of reconciliation for Vietnam-era draft resisters
and deserters.
To unconvinced draft resisters, he offered the promise that they would
not be punished for their actions, and they could avoid having a felony
FORD
9788
II.B.2.
conviction on their records. Their prosecutions would be dropped. All
others whose cases had not yet resulted were relieved of any future danger
of prosecution.
To undischarged deserters, he offered an immediate end to their fugi-
tive status, with the promise that they would not be court-martialed or
imprisoned for their offenses. They would receive an immediate Undesir-
able Discharge. To a small number of absentees with particularly good
records or other special circumstances, application to the program resulted
in an immediate discharge under honorable conditions.
To convicted draft resisters, he offered official forgiveness for their
actions through the highest constitutional gesture available to him. They
would receive a full Presidential Pardon.
To deserters who received bad discharges, he also offered official
forgiveness. They would also receive a full Presidential Pardon, plus an
upgrade to a Clemency Discharge.
To those who were then serving prison terms for desertion or evasion,
he ordered an immediate furlough for each person who wished to apply for
clemency. With (one) exception, each of the 170 incarcerated servicemen
and 100 incarcerated civilians applied to the Presidential Clemency Board
and were released. Under the President's directions, the Presidential
Clemency Board gave priority to those cases, and all had their sentences
FORD
HALD
II.B.3.
permanently commuted when the President accepted the Board's recommenda-
tion that they receive clemency.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss what an "amnesty" program
might have offered applicants, along with more details about what the Presi-
dent's program actually did. In doing so, we explore the sources of the
President's power to grant executive clemency.
"Clemency"
Clemency can be defined as the tendency or willingness to show forbear- -
ance, compassion, or forgiveness in judging or punishing, or an act or deed
of mercy of lenience. The President's authority to grant clemency is
derived from a number of specific powers which he has under the Constitution.
His authority to grant pardons permits him to grant clemency to a particular
person or group of persons. By granting a pardon to a particular individual
the President is often prompted by the desire to show compassion or leniency.
It is not necessary that the individual be convicted of or even charged with
an offense. In addition to the President's Constitutional authority to grant
pardons, the President is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
Pursuant to this authority the President may order any branch of military
service to upgrade the discharge of those who were previously given discharges.
The President may also grant clemency through his ability, as the Chief
FORD
GERALD
II.B.4.
of the Armed Forces. Pursuant to this authority the President may order
any branch of military service to upgrade the discharge of those who were
previously given discharges. The President may also grant clemency through
his ability, as the Chief Executive of the Executive Branch, to direct that
federal criminal prosecutions be dropped. He may instruct subordinate
federal officers not to enforce particular criminal statutes against individuals
to whom he wants to grant clemency. He may commute sentences and fines,
(but not return sums already paid).
And he may, of course, grant stays or relief from execution -- a constitu-
tional "reprieve."
The Presidential Pardon is the supreme constitutional act of forgiveness
or mercy. It is an act made by society, through the Chief Executive, sig-
nifying that it will disregard the offense for which an individual was originally
prosecuted. It thus removes the social blot of a criminal conviction and
relieves any continuing legal disabilities. Because a pardon is an act of
executive grace, it may be given to right a wrong, to correct an injustice,
or to excuse a repentant wrongdoer. It may be offered to ease the harshness
of the law when personal hardship or the public good is involved. The Con-
stitution grants the President the sole discretion to exercise his power of
pardon. He is not answerable to the judiciary or to Congress for his decisions.
He may not be ordered to grant pardons, nor may his pardons be revoked.
II.B.5.
He is answerable in his exercise of this power only to his conscience and
to his understanding of the country's welfare.
Once an individual receives a Presidential Pardon, it restores federal
civil rights lost as a result of the conviction, such as the right to vote, hold
federal office, or sit on a federal jury. Also, the laws of most states
recognize Presidential Pardons as a matter of comity, restoring the right
to vote in state elections, to hold office, and to obtain licenses for trades
and professions from which convicted felons are often barred under state
law. A pardon does not change history, and it does not compensate for any
rights or benefits, legal or economic, that the individual has already suffered
before his pardon. The pardon operates prospectively only. A pardon is
merely a Presidential expression that the stigma of conviction has been
removed, and that its recipient should no longer be discriminated against
when seeking jobs, credit, housing or any other opportunities. However, a
pardon offender is not considered as though he never committed the offense.
Although the Executive Order did not state explicitly that a Presidential
Pardon was to be the form of clemency offered to applicants, it was clear to
the Board that this was the President's obvious intent. There is no other
form of clemency action which would have had meaning. The Board discussed
the problem in its first sessions, and the President confirmed the Board's
understanding that he wished a pardon to be the form of clemency offered to
II.B.6.
convicted evaders and to military absentees, whether they had been dis-
criminated against when seeking jobs, credit, housing or any other oppor-
tunities. However, a pardon offender is not considered as though he never
committed the offense for which he was pardoned. A full pardon removes
most of the legal disabilities of the offense, but it does not bring to the
pardoned man treatment equal to that accorded a person who has never com-
mited an offense.
Although the Executive Order did not state explicitly that a Presidential
Pardon was to be the form of clemency offered to applicants, it was clear
to the Board that this was the President's obvious intent. There is no other
form of clemency action which would have had meaning. The Board dis-
cussed the problem in its first sessions, and the President confirmed the
Board's understanding that he wished a pardon to be the form of clemency
offered to convicted evaders and to military absentees, whether they had been
discharged by court-martial or administrative action. The grant of a pardon
to a person who had violated military law and who had been discharged for
this act without a conviction in a military court raised a new issue. Tradi-
tionally, pardons have been given only following criminal convictions. A
review of the President pardoning power reveals that he pardons the act, not
merely the judicial consequences that may have flowed from it. On a number
of prior occasions, past Presidents have granted pardons to persons who had
/ "On the other hand, if character is a necessary qualification and the
commission of a crime would disqualify even though there had been no
criminal prosecution for the crime, the fact that the criminal has been
convicted and pardoned does not make him any more eligible. 11
II.B.7.
suffered administrative penalties for a wrongful act, even though they had
never been convicted of a crime. President Ford, therefore, decided he
would offer pardons to the persons who had been given Undesirable Dis-
charges for AWOL but who had not been convicted in a military court. This
group comprised over half of all applicants to the Presidential Clemency
Board.
In his Proclamation, the President also ordered that Clemency Discharges
should be offered to former servicemen. The circumstances of violators of
military discipline are different from those who violate civilian law. A
military offender not only may receive a sentence of imprisonment or a fine,
but he also may be released with a discharge which characterizes his unsatis-
factory service. While a pardon affects the conviction, it has no impact on
the type of discharge granted. For that reason, the President provided
that recipients of clemency should also have their discharge recharacterized
with a Clemency Discharge, a new designation created especially for this
program.
The Clemency Discharge is intended by the President to be a "neutral"
discharge, and is considered neither under "Honorable Conditions" nor under
"Other Than Honorable" conditions. Military records (i.e., DD-214 forms)
are recharacterized with the new Clemency Discharge, which is "in lieu of"
and in "substitution for" the earlier discharge which could have been Dishon-
orable (under dishonorable conditions), or Bad Conduct or Undesirable (under
other than honorable conditions).
The Pardon of Former President Nixon is the best known, but by no means
the first or only precedent for this.
/ (insert A.G. opinion)
II.B.8.
A Clemency Discharge is better than a Bad Conduct or Undesirable Dis-
charge because it is neutral, but not as good as a General Discharge, which
is affirmatively under honorable conditions. By express direction in the
Proclamation, a Clemency Discharge bestows no veterans benefits in and
of itself. Neither, however, does it adversely affect any veterans rights
been
which might have conditionally available to holders of Undesirable or Bad
Conduct Discharges. Otherwise, the President's act of clemency would
have the ridiculous effect of impairing and not improving the lot of applicants.
Neither common sense nor the language of the Proclamation supports such
a result. Thus, while there is no change in benefit status for individuals who
receive a clemency discharge, those who originally had Undesirable Dis-
charges or Bad Conduct Discharges can still appeal to the Veterans Admin-
istration for veterans' benefits.
The President's Program was intended as a unique and supplemental
form of relief to certain classes of former servicemen. It was not intended
to operate to deny the statutory or administratively granted avenues of relief
that already exist. While perhaps the relinquishment of those rights could
have been made a condition of the President's Program, clearly no such
intent was expressed in his Proclamation. For that reason, all military
applicants who receive a Clemency Discharge can also apply for a further
II.B.9.
upgrade through the appropriate military review boards. Their
chances
for success should be much better with a Pardon and Clemency Discharge
than with their original discharge.
Although the Board's phase of the clemency program offered pardons
and clemency discharge, the Department of Justice and Department of the
Navy phases also offered important benefits. The Department of Justice
program had the effect of dropping pending federal criminal prosecutions
against fugitive civilians who were indicted for specific draft evasion offenses.
The Defense Department program gave relief from possible court-martial
proceedings against military absentees. Each person who chose to partici-
pate in the Department of Defense and Department of Justice program was
in jeopardy of a conviction. For fugitive servicemen, the maximum penalty
was five years imprisonment and a Dishonorable or Bad Conduct Discharge.
By participating, these servicemen automatically ended their fugitive status
and were relieved of this prospect. They simply spent one to three days at
Fort Harrison and received an Undesirable Discharge. Even if they failed
to complete alternative service, no charges would be brought against them
unless it could be shown that they did not intend to perform alternative service
when they received their discharge. Therefore, they could re-enter society
in vastly improved circumstances. To be sure, however, many DOD partici-
pants did sign up for alternative service in order to earn the additional social
advantages of a Clemency Discharge.
II.B.10.
In some respects, the DOJ program was the most generous of the
three segments. Fugitive civilians with draft evasion charge faced the
possibility of a criminal conviction and a maximim of 5 years in prison and
$
fine. In return for no more than 2 years alternative service, and in
many cases less, their prosecutions were dropped and they were relieved
(GO TO PAGE 11)
II.B.11.
of their dreadful prospect. They also were freed from the
enduring stigma of a felony conviction. In this they were even more
fortunate that their counterparts in the Clemency Board program,
since it is far better to have no felony conviction that a pardoned con-
viction.
The Clemency Program also resulted in the closing of case files of
all civilians who may have committed specific Vietnam-era draft of-
fenses but who were never indicted for those offenses. On
,
the Department of Justice requested all United States Attorneys to submit
a list of all persons against whom they either had or would soon have in-
dictments issued. Prior to this request, 6, 239 prosecutions had been
commenced by the United States Attorney and a larger number of investi-
gations were underway which could result in indictments. As the lists
were submitted, 1, 717 prosecutions were, in effect, dismissed. Some of
the United States Attorneys discontinued nearly all of their prosecutions. In
t he Northern District of California, well known for its leniency towards
draft violators, 286 of 315 pending cases were closed. In the Eastern
District of Missouri, only 27 out of 216 cases were closed. On
,
Attorney General Edward Levi declared that the Department of Justice would
not prosecute Vietnam-era draft violators who were not on the final list of
4, 522 persons. Those 1, 717 individuals with indictments pending received
what amounted to unconditional amnesty. If they were in exile and had com-
mitted no other offenses, they were free to come home. If they were in the
United States, they could plan for the future without worry.
II.B.12
The DOD Program provided
a special form of clemency to 46
individuals who were diverted from the Department of Defense clemency
program at Fort Harrison. Most of these individuals had served meritoriously
in Vietnam or had been the victims of severe administrative errors which led
to their offenses. They received immediate discharges under honorable
conditions, qualifying them for full veterans' benefits. Two other indivi-
duals were allowed to return to military service, with no penalty. They
were much like the
individuals which the Board had recommended
to receive upgraded discharges by the President.
Not "Amnesty"
The debate over the President's program was often framed in terms
of whether the President should have granted "amnesty" and not merely
/
"clemency.
11
The word amnesty derives from amnestia, the Greek
word for forgetfulness. It connotes full official forgetfulness, an oblitera-
tion of the fact that a past offense ever existed. It restores rights and
benefits lost on account of the past offense to the maximum effect possible
under law. "Its effect is to obliterate the past, to leave no trace of the
offense, and to place the offender exactly in the position which he occupied
before the offense was committed, or in which he would have been if he had
/
not committed the offense.
The difference between amnesty and clemency is as much a semantic
dispute as anything else. The terms have been used interchangeably in
American history. The differences bet ween advocates of cleme ncy and
advocates of amnesty really involve what rights or benefits sould be
offered to recipients of a reconciliation program.
(type in footnotes)
II.B.13.
Under the President's program, civilian participants who were
unconvicted received as much as they could -- they were freed from
prosecution. Those who were convicted received a pardon, which is the
most a President can give to a convicted offender. Indeed, there is no
significant legal difference between a pardon and an amnesty:
"Some distinction has been made, or attempted to be made,
between pardon and amnesty. It is sometimes said that the
latter operates as an extinction of the offense of which it is
the object, causing it to be forgotten, so far as the public
interests are concerned, hilst the former only operates
to remove the penalities of the offense. This distinction is
not, however, recognized in our law. The constitution does
not use the word 'amnesty, and, except that the term is
generally employed where pardon is extended to whole
classes of communities, instead of individuals, the dis-
tinction between them is one rather of philological interest
than of legal importance.
Even though the President may grant a particular group of convicted
individuals an "amnesty, 11 each member of the group would only receive a
pardon. The President could not constitutionally return any fines paid, or
compensate for time spent in prison. This requires a legislation appro-
priation by Congress. The President could not, moreover, expunge and
erase all records of a conviction, since this would also require legislative
authority to obliterate the record of a judicial act. At most, the President
may direct that Executive branch records of convictions be sealed.
The President legally could have offered more benefits to military par-
ticipants. Through his authority as Commander-in-Chief, he could have pro-
vided that they receive discharges under honorable conditions, with full entitle-
ment to veterans' benefits. The President however, believed that it would be
wrong to reward unsatisfactory service with benefits the law intended to go
only to those whose service has been satisfactory.
(to be supplied)
#U
II
C
II. THE PRESIDENT'S CLEMENCY PROGRAM
C. A LIMITED, NOT UNIVERSAL, PROGRAM
A Limited, not Universal, Program
When the President announced his clemency program, he made it applicable
only to those who had been punished for draft or AWOL offenses during the Vietnam
War, and to those who had been charged with these offenses but were still at
large.
Inescapably, some line had to be drawn between those who were eligible and
those who were not. That line was drawn in a very generous manner. In order to
emcompass Vietnam-era offenders who opposed the war on conscientious grounds, the
President enumerated a sizeable list of offenses. He deliberately decided not to
impose a test of conscience. He did so both because he felt it was necessary to
offer clemency to a broader class of individuals, and because there was no other fair
way to include the less articulate whose offenses were caused by opposition to the
war.
As a consequence, the President opened his program to thousands of persons
who did not necessarily commit their offense because of clearly identifiable moral
or ethical objections to the war. Inevitably, objective definition included
individuals whose offense was in no way attributable to opposition to the war. But,
in another sense, it would have been improper to regard those with articulate
opposition to the war as the only persons with a legitimate claim for clemency.
The complex Selective Service procedures favor the better-educated, and the
sophisticated. Those who could not express themselves well may have had deeply
felt feelings about the war, but may not have been successful in pursuing their
legal opportunities. A fair program of clemency cannot be restricted to those
already favored by education, income, or background.
In a broader sense, moreover, the atmosphere of division, debate, and confusion
about the war had an impact on all those called to serve. If the war had been
universally regarded as critical to the survival of America, few would have placed
-2-
their personal needs or problems above those of the country. This was not
such a war, and many of those who failed to serve did so, consciously or
not, because the needs of the country were not as evident to them as the
personal sacrifices they or their families had to endure.
For these reasons, the President's definition of those eligible to
participate was properly phrased in terms of offenses committed, and not
the reasons for the offense. By so doing, the President extended a
clemency offer to Vietnam veterans who went AWOL to fin a civilian doctor to
treat their wounds or who they could not adjust to garrison duty. Likewise, he
extended it to servicemen with families on welfare who went AWOL to support them
-- and to civilians from disadvantaged backgrounds whose itinerancy led to their
failingto keep their draft boards informed of their wherabouts. In the thousands
of cases like these which we have reviewed, we have reviewed, we have found that
they were victims of the Vietnam era as much as those who conscientiously opposed
the war.
In the discussion below, we explain the clemency program's eligibility
criteria in some detail. We then pose some of the difficult questions of
eligibility or jurisdiction which we had to decide, giving the reasoning
behind our decision.
CRITERIA
The Presidential Proclamation established three criteria for eligibility:
First, because the intent of the President was to "heal the scars of
divisiveness" that were caused by the Vietnam War, the Program applied only
to offenses that occurred during this war. This period was defined as
extending from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 4, 1964) through the day
-3-
that the last American combatant left Vietnam (March 28, 1973)
Secondly, the Program was not a universal program that applied to all
offenses that occurred within the qualifying period. For an applicant to
be eligible for clemency, he must have committed one of the offenses speci-
fically listed in the Proclamation. Military applicants must have violated
Articles 85, 86, or 87 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. These
articles apply to desertion, absence without leave, and missing movement,
respectively. Draft evaders must have committed one of the following
violations of Section 12 of the Selective Service Act:
*
(1) Failure to register for the draft or register on time
(2) Failure to keep the local draft board informed of his current
address,
(3) Failure to report for or submit to preinduction or induction
examination,
(4) Failure to report for or submit to induction itself, or
(5) Failure to report for or submit to or complete alternative
service under the Act.
Thirdly, to be eligible, an applicant must not have been an alien precluded
by law from reentering the United States.
**
The eligibility tests set by the President did exclude some fugitives,
convicted offenders, and discharged servicemen whose offenses were in fact
related to their opposition to war. For example, there were a few military
*
The cite for the Military Selective Service Act was incorrect in Proclamation
4313 and Executive Order 11803.
**
See 8 USC 1182 (a) (22)
-4-
applicants who, out of conscientious objection to the war, refused to report
to Vietnam. Instead of going AWOL, these men faced Court-Martial for willful
disobedience of a lawful order. Had they gone AWOL, they would have received.
clemency; because they remained on their bases and accepted the punishment
for their actions, they still have their bad discharges. Other examples include
the applicant who had been convicted of draft card mutilation or aiding or
abetting draft evasion. Both of these were Section 12 offenses of the Selective
Service Act, but these applicants were ineligible for clemency
Before the President announced his program, there was considerable
debate in Congress and elsewhere about the kinds of offenses that properly
should be included in a clemency or amnesty program. As with most disputes
on the subject, there was little consensus. There were no differences, however,
over the propriety of including absence offenses and induction offenses, be-
cause the vast proportion of Vietnam-related offenses were of this type. *
The inclusion of other categories of offenses involving calculated interference
with the draft system, or with military discipline, or involving violence or
destruction of property would have had a far more serious impact on respect for
law and military discipline.
When we began applying the eligibility criteria, there were obvious
cases of persons eligible to receive clemency. Any one convicted for having
committed one of the specified Selective Service offenses during the designated
time period was eligible. Similarly, anyone receiving a "bad discharge" as a
consequence of an absence offense committed during the period was also eligible.
*
Over half of the - Undesirable, Bad Conduct, and Dishonorable Discharges during
the Vietnam era were for AWOL.
CERALD
-5-
Honorable or General Discharge cases were not eligible, nor were any discharges
prior to August 4, 1964. The Board also rejected cases in which the underlying
facts of the offense may have supported a charge over which we had jurisdiction,
but in which the individual was in fact prosecuted for a non-qualifying offense.
Thus, an Article 92 conviction for failure to obey an order to go to an
appointed place could have been charged as an AWOL. An individual discharged
for a civilain conviction could also have been discharged for AWOL. The Board,
however, was bound by the clear words of the Executive Order.
However, between the areas of obvious jurisdiction and those where there
was obviously none, there were numerous gray areas in which difficult legal
determinations of jurisdiction had to be made. Here, too, the actions of the
Board were committed by the terms of the Proclamation and Executive Order. We,
nontheless, recognized that this was a clemency program, requiring us to
interpret broadly and generously the jurisdictional boundaries. To be narrow
and unduly legalistic in determing eligibility would be contrary to the spirit
of the program.
One of the first questions presented was that of timely applications. We
decided to accept oral, written, and third-party applications for the purposes of
satisfying the January 31, and later March 31, deadline. We also accepted
applications misdirected to the Department of Justice or to other federal offices.
We recognized that many people were not fully aware of the details of the program,
and we did not wish to penalize anyone whose intent to apply was clear. However,
we ultimately had to receive a written, personal confirmation of the applicant's
desire to participate.
While the rules were readily agreed upon, individual cases sometimes
presented difficult questions of proof, especially when persons made oral
-6-
applications to other agencies and written evidence of the call was not kept.
We recognized the danger of having rules so informal as to encourage abuse.
Fortunately, there were few instances in which a question of timeliness arose.
The definition of qualifying offenses posed more difficult legal questions.
For example, a person might have failed to report to induction prior to August 4,
1964, but indicted after that date. The Executive Order clearly stated that
the date of conviction was not determinative, but rather the date of the offense.
The Selective Service Act obligations covered by the program are of a continuing
nature. The obligation exists until the conviction is final.
If an individual failed on two or more occasions to report, he was indicted
only for his last failure. The individual had technically committed a criminal
act with each failure. Because the offense was a continuing offense, we had
jurisdiction over the applicant's case. This meant that for all draft evasion
offenses listed in the Executive Order, we had jurisdiction if either the
offense had commenced or a conviction had been rendered within the qualifying
period.
A second problem involving timing of the offenses arose in a few civilian
cases in which an indicted individual had declined to participate in the Justice
Department program and insisted on a trial which had not been concluded when he
applied to the Board. After much consideration and discussion with the
Department of Justice, we agreed to accept anticipatory applications of persons
whose convictions, if they occurred, would happen after the deadline for appl-
cations passed. To refuse these applications would have meant, in effect,
denying the individual's constitutional right to stand trial for his offenses
We accepted these applications with the understanding that our existence was
GERALD
limited in time, and the applications could not remain pending indefinitely.
-7-
The military cases presented more difficult questions of interpretation,
especially as regards the meaning of the phrase "as a consequence" in the
Executive Order provision:
"The Board
shall consider the case of persons who
(1) Have received
punitive or undesirable discharges as a consequence of violations of Articles
85, 86, or 87
"
We decided that the phrase did not mean "as a consequence" only of an AWOL.
For this reason, cases involving mixed discharges - - - discharges for AWOL and
other non-qualifying offenses -- were accepted. This meant that when an individual
was administratively discharged for unfitness or frequent involvement with
authorities, and AWOLs were among the acts which led to the discharge, the AWOL
could be viewed as one, if not the only, cause of the discharge. This
occasionally meant that an individual might have been administratively discharged
for unfitness for one hour's AWOL, plus numerous other minor infractions. It was
impossible to devise any objective method to separate out cases in which the AWOL
could be determined as legally irrelemant to the discharge. For this reason, we
accepted jurisdiction in these mixed cases but reserved decision on the question
of whether clemency should be granted, and on what conditions. * We did not
wish to reject any application for which we conceivably had jurisdiction, since the
right to have a case considered should be broadly granted.
The court-martial cases presented similar difficulties because, unlike civilian
courts, sentences are not rendered separately when an individual is convicted on
several different charges, one of which was an AWOL. Since an individual might well
have been court-martialed for a major felony and a very short AWOL, it was obvious
that the discharge would have been awarded irrespective of the AWOL offense,
In
RALD
-8-
court-martial cases, however, military regulations defined the maximum
punishments for different offenses. Thus, we consulted the Manual for Court-Martial,
1969, Table of Maximum Punishments to formulate simple rules to determine when we
had jurisdiction. If an applicant received a BCD, DD, or an Undesirable Discharge
in lieu of court-martial:
(1) We had jurisdiction if the AWOL offenses that commenced within the qualify-
ing period standing alone were sufficient to support the discharge that the appli-
cant received;
(2) We had jurisdiction if neither the AWOLs that commenced within the qualify-
ing period nor any of his other offenses--considered independently--were
sufficient for the discharge that the applicant received;
(3) We did not have jurisdiction if the AWOLs that commenced within the
qualifying period were insufficient and one of his other offenses--considered
independently-- was sufficient for the discharge that the applicant received.
The exclusion from the program of persons who were precluded by law from
re-entering the United States posed difficult problems. If an order of a court or the
Immigration and Naturalization Service had already decided the question, we were
bound by that determination. But we considered ourselves incompetent to decide
complex questions of immigration and citizenship law properly within the province
of the courts and the Department of Justice. For that reason, we provisionally
accepted the cases of persons for whom no such determination had yet been made. We
made tentative decisions on the cases subject to a determination by the Justice
Department on eligibility, and we forwarded them to the President with a recommendation
that he not act until proper judicial or administrative determinations had been made.
Conclusion:
GERALD
Despite these difficult questions of jurisdiction, almost
% of our
as
2,100 ineligible cases were for such simple reasonsAdischarges unrelated to AWOL
- -9-
and discharges prior to August 4, 1964. Only () cases fell into the
categories which involved the more difficult questions of interpretation
described above.
&
FC
GERALD
II III D
II. THE PRESIDENT'S CLEMENCY PROGRAM
D. A PROGRAM OF DFFEINITE, NOT INDEFINITE, LENGTH
FORD
II-D-1
D. A Program of Definite, not Indefinite Length
When President Ford announced the establishment of the Clemency
Program, his Proclamation specifically limited the period of time in
which applicants could be accepted. Originally, he set January 31, 1975
as the application deadline. Due to the publicity and press coverage that
heralded the announcement of the Clemency Program, we and the others
newly involved in its administration assumed that all eligible people knew
about their eligibility and understood what benefits could be derived from
applying for clemency. Therefore, we thought that four and one half
months gave potential applicants an ample opportunity to decide if they
were going to apply.
For the first three months of its existence, the Presidential Clemency
Board maintained a low profile. We reasoned that people should not be
pressured while making up their minds whether to apply and that it would
be improper for us to solicit their applications. To have done otherwise
might have aggravated the wounds the President desired to heal. Because
we assumed that those who were eligible knew about their eligibility, we
decided to quietly process our applications and not try to encourge anyone
to apply. We soon learned, however, that this assumption was incorrect for
our part of the program. After reviewing the first several hundred cases,
we learned that most of our applicants were not well-educated, articulate
persons--but rather poorly-educated, disadvantaged individules who were
not likely to be informed about the details of the President's program.
FORD & LIBRAK GERALD
II-D-2
Our military applicants did not fit the stereotype of the war resister.
We were concerned that all the media attention on Canadian exiles might
have been keeping these discharged servicement from learning that they,
too, could apply for clemency.
In the middle of December; when only about 800 people had applied to
the Clemency Board, a limited survey of potential applicants took place
in Seattle, Washington. A veteran's counseling organization located
twelve former servicemen eligible for our segment of the program. All
of the twelve knew about the existence of the Program. However, none
of them knew that they were eligible for clemency.
On the other hand, it appears that people eligible to participate in
the other parts of the program were better informed. The chart which
follows on page
identifies a consistent rate of applications for the
Justice and Defense Departments' aspects of the program. Contrast that
with the Clemency Board application rate, which increased dramatically
between January 6 and March 31, 1975.
Much of the early publicity surrounding the program highlighted
the activities of those who fled to Canada. It was the emigrant draft
evader and military deserter who formed the basis of the stereotype that
most Americans perceived would benefit from the program. Because they
had fled, they generally knew that charges were pending against them and
that returning without applying for clemency meant apprehension and trial.
GERALD
II-D-3
By contrast, the vast majority of our applicants had already completed
the punishment for their offense and were trying with greater or lesser
success to rehabilitate their lives. They usually had heard about the
program, but mistakenly had thought it was designed to help those who had
gone to Canada.
Once we realized that many of those eligible to apply to us knew nothing
about their eligibility, we began an extensive public information program.
On January 7, 1975, through the cooperation of the Department of Justice,
7, 000 information kits were mailed to convicted draft evaders. Through-
out the month of January, similar kits were mailed to government agencies
that possibly could have some contact with our applicants, such as the
Veteran's Administration, employment offices, welfare offices, penal
institutions, and post offices. Board Members General Lewis Walt and
Father Theodore Hesburghtaped public service radio and television announce-
/
ments explaining how one could apply to the Clemency Board. On Jan-
uary 14, 1975, these announcements were mailed to 2, 500 radio and television
stations across the United States. During the month of January seven
members of our Board participated in one-day "blitzes" of sixteen of the
major cities across the country. These yisits consisted of a Board member
going to a city for one day, holding press conferences, participating in
various radio and television talk shows, and giving interviews to reporters
/ To comply with the "fairness doctrine, " these announcements neither
advocated nor defended the program; they simply informed the public
of a possible benefit and how to learn more about it.
&
FOR
II-D-4
from the city's major newspapers. To keep national media focused on
the program, Chairman Charles E. Goodell held numerous press con-
ferences in Washington, D. C., and elsewhere during January. Unfortun-
ately, the media kept its spotlight on the 15, 000 fugitives and Canadian
exiles rather than the 110, 000 convicted draft resisters and discharged
servicemen who we were trying to reach. However, the result of our
public information campaign was a dramatic increase in our application rate.
Indeed, applications to the Board increased from 870 on January 7, 1975,
to 5, 403 before the January 31st deadline expired. Due to this increase,
/
the President extended the application deadline to March 1, 1975.
The public information campaign was continued in earnest. On February
17, 1975, the Department of Defense mailed 21, 000 information kits to dis-
charged military personnel with punitive discharges who were eligible for
the program. Kits were not sent to the 75, 000 eligible persons with admin-
istrative discharges because of the excessive costs of obtaining their
addresses and the difficulty of identifying those whose administrative dis-
charges resulted from AWOL-related offenses.
More information kits were sent to government agencies, and radio
and television announcements were distributed to another 6, 500 stations.
Several Board members made additional one -day visits to eight key cities,
/
some of which had previously been visited.
Chairman Goodell continued
to hold several press conferences in order to draw attention to prior
/ The cities visited were
&
/ Cite Presidential announcement.
/ The cities visited were
SRALD
II-D-5
misunderstandings concerning our eligibility criteria. Finally, the
media began to recognize the difficulties we were having in communicating
with our potential applicants.
Again there was a dramatic increase in our application rate: An
additional 6, 000 applications were received during the month of February,
with our total exceeding 11, 000. At our request, the President extended
the application deadline for one last time. Knowing that March 31, 1975
was going to be the final deadline, we intensified our efforts to reach our
applicants. We continued our earlier efforts and we sent the staff across
the country to regional offices of the Veterans Administration. Workshops
in thirty-three cities were attended by over 3, 000 veterans' counselors-
many of whom, surprisingly, had not yet learned that former service-
men with bad discharges were eligible for clemency.
Close to 10, 000 applications were received during March, and
21,000 applications by the time we finished counting. We had ten or
twenty times what we once thought possible. Eventually, we learned that
16,000 of those 21, 000 were eligible for our program. Some ineligibile
cases were referred to the Justice and Defense Departments for processing,
but most of the 5, 000 ineligible applications, could not come under any part
of the President's program. Some applicants had served in previous wars,
while others had committed offenses that were not covered under the
Proclamation or the Executive Order.
GERALD
/ Appendix shows examples of changes in newspaper coverage.
in
/ See Chapter
II-D-6
The administrators of the Departments of Justice and Defense
segments of the program also attempted to inform their applicants con-
cerning their eligibility under the programs. Although no coordinated
effort was initiated by the Department of Justice, some United States
Attorneys took it upon themselves to inform the public about the program.
For example, the United States Attorney in Detroit agreed to be inter-
viewed by radio stations in Canada.
In December, the Department of Defense mailed 7, 000 letters to the
parents of known military absentees. Most of the Defense Department's
success in reaching applicants resulted from the complimentary descrip-
tions by applicants of the humane treatment they had received at Fort
Benjamin Harrison.
The final application tallies were 700 out of 4, 522 eligible for the
Justice program (a 16% response); 5, 600 out of 10, 115 eligible for the
Defense program (a 55% response); 2, 000 out of 8, 700 convicted civilians
eligible for our Board's program (a 23% response); and 14, 000 out of
90,000
approximatdy 100,000 former servicemen also eligible for our program
(a 14% response). Altogether 22, 300 applied to the President's program,
17% of the 123, 000 believed eligible to apply.
is
GERALD
II-D-7
PCB- 21,000*
APPLICATIONS RECEIVED BY
20,000
EACH SEGMENT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY PROGRAM
17,500
15,000
12,500
10,000
7,500
DoD 5,504
5,000
2,500
DoJ 701
0
&
FORD
9/15/74
11/1/74
1/1/75
3/1/75
5/1/75
10/1/74
12/1/74
2/1/75
4/1/75
GERALD
* Approximately 6,000 were later found ineligible
HW
II
E
FAND
GERALD =
II. THE PRESIDENT'S CLEMENCY PROGRAM
E. A CASE-BY-CASE, NOT BLANKET, APPROACH
II-E, -1
E. A Case-By-Case, Not Blanket, Approach
Introduction:
The President could not have been clearer in his request to each agency
to act upon clemency applications on a case-by-case basis. His proclamation
declares that "in prescribing the length of alternative service in individual
cases, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the appropriate Department, and
the Clemency Board shall take into account such honorable service as an
individual may have rendered prior to his absence, penalties already paid
under law, and such other mitigating factors as may be appropriate to seek
equity among those who participate in this program." (Emphasis added).
In the words of our Chairman, Charles E. Goodell, our mandate was "to deal
with applicants as individuals, not as an undifferentiated mass."
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently read the Consti tution
to authorize the President to exercise his pardon power on a case-by-case
basis, recently noting that the very essence of the pardoning power is to
treat each case individually.
While many who opposed the President's program did SO because they believed
that a blanket approach to the problem was best, the President's approach had
significant advantages. Primarily, it permitted the Board and the other
agencies to distinguish among individuals with differing backgrounds, offenses,
and circumstances. While more difficult to administer, the case-by-case ap-
proach enabled the program to do justice, by fashioning results to fit the
many differing people who applied to the program. Advocates of a blanket ap-
proach often believed that the sterotype of the morally sincere pacifist who
acted on principle is the only type of individual involved in this clemency
The Board consistently decided to recommend an immediate pardon to this in
dividual, but fairness would not have been achieved if the program treated the
less deserving in the same way. A case-by-case approach was more costly, and
E-2
it required greater time and staff to administer, but it was the heart of
the President's approach. Treating applicants by classes or groups, with
automatic dispositions for each general category would have demeaned the
value of a Presidential Pardon; it would have treated the individuals who
applied as groups of objects, rather than as human beings and citizens
with whom reconciliation was the goal.
The Presidential Proclamation and Executive Order were much less clear,
however, as to the procedures and substantive standards which we were to
use in reaching individual case dispositions. We found ourselves in a
situation similar to the allegorical King Rex in Lon Fuller's The Morality
of Law. King Rex wanted to reform the legal system of his country. Possessing
the general power of law-maker, but lacking the tools to write a code, he de
cided to proceed on a case-by-case basis. He hoped that certain rules and
regulations would become apparent with the passing of time:
"Under the stimulus of a variety of cases, he hoped that his
latent powers of generalization might develop and, proceeding
case by case, he would gradually work out a system of rules
that could be incorporated in a code. Unfortunately, the de-
fects in his education were more deep-seated than he had
supposed. The venture failed completely. After he had handed
down literally hundreds of decisions, neither he nor his sub-
jects could detect in those decisions any pattern whatsoever.
Such tentatives toward generalization as were to be found in his
opinions only compounded the confusion, for they gave false leads
to his subjects and threw his meager powers of judgment off
balance in the decision of later cases."
FOR
King Rex died "old before his time and deeply disillusioned with his
subjects. " 6/
GERALD
To avoid the fate of King Rex, we had to understand the limitations as
well as the advantages of a case-by-case approach. It facilitates protection
of individual rights, but it also threatens inconsistency and slowness of
judgment. It places a great burden on techniques of administration and
E-3
and management. It also leads to higher stakes. A mistake, error, omission
or abuse of discretion may lead to total confusion or chaos in decision-
making -- leading to the embarrassment of the President and an unfair treat-
ment of our applicants.
Rather than proceed like King Rex, we took a number of steps to insure
the fairness, accuracy, consistency, and timeliness of our case dispositions.
Essentially, we imposed rules upon ourselves. These procedural and substan-
tive rules changed periodically as circumstances required, but they provided
us with a measure of self-control which benefited our processes and, we think,
our applicants.
In this chapter, we describe these rules and the procedures we established
for setting and following them. At the outset, however, it is important to
understand the basic philosophy of our case-by-case process.
The Board desired to make the procedure as simple as possible, with a
minimum of technical requirements with which an individual had to comply.
We wanted the procedure as open as possible, so that the applicants would be
aware of how the Board was proceeding with his case and what it was using as
the basis for its actions. We wanted to encourage the fullest possible par-
ticipation by applicants. Above all, the Board and the staff wished to make
the Presidential Clemency Board a model of fair and open administration in
keeping with the Presidential nature of our responsibilities and the importance
of our task.
Unfortunately, the Presidential Clemency Board had no direct precedents to
guide it in setting up procedures. When the Board first met, it looked for
guidance from past precedents of other clemency programs and the law of
clemency. However, there has been very little written on processing clemency BRALD
applications and the procedures used by Presidents in arriving at a decision
to pardon. Articles and cases dealing with the pardon power usually talk only
E-4
in terms of substance. Witness the following statement by Alexander
Hamilton:
"Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign
prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered
or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes SO
much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to ex-
ceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a
countenance too sanguinary and cruel
The reflection, that the
fate of a fellow creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally
inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of
weakness or connivance would beget equal circumspection, though of
a different kind".
Hamilton did not refer to procedure. He did speak, however, of the
President's sense of responsibility and feelings for humanity as possible
restraints on the pardon power. Similarly, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court were often couched in terms of "publicy policy". and "humanitarian
considerations. " They referred to the general precepts of democratic govern-
ment, that the President represents the people and that he must act on their
behalf.
How do these general instructions relate to the procedural obligations
of a Board such as ours? The panoply of rights accorded individuals under the
Due Process Clauses do not apply to the clemency process. The rights to clemency
review and to a clemency hearing are nowhere guaranteed in the Federal Con-
stitution. A recent federal court decision disposed of arguments in the con-
trary by stating:
"
we find plaintiff's argument that he was entitled to a due
process hearing before the President could attach the challenged
condition to be clearly specious. (Footnole)
Therefore, it cannot be argued that procedural due process, as formulated
by the United States Supreme Court in more common administrative proceedings,
is required by law. In those cases, the court has generally found that the
requirement of a fair hearing prior to the termination of various public
benefits requires certain procedural elements peculiar to an adversary
trial-type proceeding: Timely and specific notice, opportunity to confront
E-5
and cross-examine witnesses, opportunity to appear in person or through counsel, and
impartial decision-maker, and a written decision stating the result and the reasons
therefor. The more discretionary and personal nature of the clemency process is not
necessarily bound by these specific requirements.
The Board concluded, therefore, that it was sui generis and not required to
follow any particular requirements. It considered itself not bound by the Administrative
Procedure Act, for example, since it was only an advisory body to the President,
onligian
assisting him with recommendations as to how he should exercise his personal power
under the Pardon Clause. Although not required to do so, the Board followed the APA
as a model for its procedures and operations, since the Act represents the considered
judgment of Congress on how agencies should proceed. As we stated in our final regu-
lations,
"Because it is a temporary organization within the White House Office, the
sole function of which is to advise the President with respect to the exer-
cise of his constitutional power of executive clemency, the Board does not
consider itself formally bound by the Administrative Procedure Act. None-
theless, within the time and resource constraints governing it, the Board
wishes to adhere as closely as possible to the principles of procedural due
process. The administrative procedures established in these regulations
reflect this decision."
The Board devised a provisional set of regulations which we published in the
Federal Register on November 27. Copies were sent to veterans groups, civil liberties
groups, amnesty and clemency organizations, and to every member of Congress. In all,
the Board distributed
copies of our proposals and we received 40 written responses
to the proposed rules and many other informal comments. For the most part, the regu-
lations were well received.
Having rules--and following those rules--only matters if those rules are reasonable
and fair. We developed rules of procedure and substance to reflect, as best we could,
l
the cement spirit of the President's program. In the first half of this chapter, we
n
describe these procedures in more detail: What kinds of information we used, how case
SERALD FORD LIBR
"
E-6
summaries were prepared, how the Board decided cases, and how we tried to protect the
privacy of our applicants. In the second half, we focus on our substantive rules--
our baseline formula and our aggravating and mitigating factors. At the outset,
however, an overview of our process is helpful.
Summary of Procedures
In brief, our process began with a telephone call or letter from an individual
inquiring about clemency. The PCB program was entirely voluntary and no person
suffered any penalty for declining to participate, or for withdrawing at any time,
even after a formal offer of clemency by the President. For this reason we accepted
any affirmative expression of interest as a provisional application, whether oral or
written, and we accepted applications made on an individual's behalf by third parties.
While these were sufficient to satisfy the application deadline, we required a per-
fected application before we would complete action on a case.
When an application was received, we mailed back a full set of instructions
explaining the program, the individual's rights, and information on other avenues of
relief he might wish to pursue in addition to the clemency program. In order to make
the process as unthreatening as possible, we required from the individual only the
minimum amout of information necessary for us to order pertinent government records.
We did encourage the applicant to send in as much additional information as he wished,
and we informed him of the important factors which the Board would look to in review-
ing his case. We encouraged the applicant to seek legal counseling and we informed
him of specific sources that might be available. We assured him of the confidentiality
of our process.
We then began his case file and gave him a case number. Preliminary questions of
jurisdiction were resolved by our staff, who then began the information-gathering pro-
FORD
cess. First, we ordered of icial records and files. After they had been received
a staff attorney was assigned to his case summary, which would later be used as the
GERALD
basis of our case disposition. This case summary was the key element of our entire
E-7
case-by-case appraoch. When the case summary had been prepared, our quality control
staff reviewed it carefully for fairness and accuracy. The case was then ready for
presentation to our Board, and the summary was mailed to the applicant. for his comment.
Because of our reliance on government files, we counted heavily on the individual's
review of his summary for corrections and elaborations. We also wished the individual
to know what materials the Board was considering in reviewing his case. Finally, we used
the mailing of the summary as another opportunity to encourage the applicant to send
additional information to us on his own behalf.
A three or four-person Board panel then received copies of the applicant's case
summary a few days before the actual case presentation. Each panel member read the
case summary, making notes and tentative personal evaluations. When the panel acted
on the applicant's case, the staff attorney who prepared the summary was present with
the entire file to answer questions and make additional comments on the case. Also
present were a scribe to keep accurate records and a panel counsel to advise that the
staff attorney and Board panel on our rules and precedents.
In our deliberations, we usually had to answer four questions: First, did the
applicant deserve clemency of any kind? If the answer was "yes," we determined the
applicant's baseline or starting point for the calculation of his alternative service
assignment; we identified which of our aggravating and mitigating factors applied
in his case, and we finally decided what period of alternative service he had to
perform to earn his clemency. If he were a military applicant with combat experience,
we asked a fifth question: Should we recommend him for an immediate discharge up-
grade and veterans benefits? The staff attorney, scribe, and panel counsel were
present during all deliberations, which were closed to the public to ensure privacy.
The individual had a right to be present, and the Board granted personal statements
in instances where it was necessary for a full understanding of the case.
In order to attain as much consistency in decisionmaking as possible, any member
BERALD FORD LIBRAS,
E-8
of the Board could freely refer a case for reconsideration by the Full Board. A
computer-aided review of Panel dispositions helped Board members identify which
cases they wished to reconsider by the full Board. A case was considered final
only when acted on by the President.
Our final disposition was sent to the President as a recommendation. He then
signed a master warrant, which was returned to us so we could notify the applicant of
the President's decision. The applicant had the right to file a motion for recon-
sideration within 30 days. If he did not file such a motion, he either accepted or
refused the President's offer of clemency.
Acquiring Information
To act upon our applications on a case-by-case basis, we needed specific infor-
mation about our applicants. Naturally, we could not expect each Board member to re-
view the voluminous files for each case. We relied on our legal staff to gather and
summarize pertiment information. The quality, industry and dedication of the staff
attorneys played a key role in how the case came to us. While every Board member had
the right to examine any information, this right was never actually exercised. We
collected and used four different kinds of data: (1) application and intake information;
(2) official records; (3) written correspondence from applicants, their representatives,
or other interested parties; and, (4) personal contacts and oral statements by appli-
cants or their representatives.
Our collection of information about applicants often began with their first con-
tact with us. Many letters from applicants explained the reasons for their offenses
and described their present circumstances. When submitted, these materials proved
very enlightening. The impact of a personal letter from an individual detailing the
circumstances of his situation was very effective in most instances. It often made a
dramatic difference in the kind of recommendation the Board made. Unfortunately
FORD & LIBRARY 9.18.10
E-9
written personal statements were submitted in only % of the cases. They were
read verbatum whenever available.
For the most part, however, we placed a high reliance on official records.
Lacking the time and resources to do much independent investigation, we had to assume
the accuracy of the records unless they were evidently in error. There was good
cause for worry about the accuracy and completeness of the official records. A sur-
vey of our staff revealed that 61% of the military files were not adequate to under-
stand the individual and his circumstances fully. Over 20% of the files contained
incorrect, contradictory or confusing information. Specific instances of omission
and neglect in file-keeping involved miscalculation of periods spent AWOL, dates of
summary and special court martials, time spent in confinement, and amount of creditable
military service. In cases concerning individuals who were told to "go home and await
assignment orders", the personnel file often revealed no record of any kind. The
Military Personnel File was often not sufficient in detail to draft a case summary
which would inform the Board of the "whole" individual and the specific reason for
the offense.
When problems arose, staff attorneys resolved them on a case-by-case basis. They
made extensive attempts to reach the applicant or his family, and other possible
sources of information. Because the staff did not have the means to make investi-
gative trips, these efforts were limited to phone calls. They were further limited
by the fact that the privacy and confidentiality rights of applicants preclosed some
avenues, such as employers, which might have proved useful.
In the civilian cases, our action attorneys normally used presentence reports
as their primary source of information. We realized that the original function of the
Sections of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure describe the contents
these reports:
GERRAD FORD LIBRARY
(1) When Made. The probation service of the court shall make a pre-
sentence investigation and report to the Court before the impo-
sition of sentence or the granting of probation unless the court
E-10
presentence report was solely to aid the sentencing judge in deciding whether or
not to assign probation or a particular length of incarceration. Statistics show
that in the United States, 80 - 90% of all criminal cases are resolved by guilty
pleas. Our own statistics showed that 67.6% of our civilian applicants pled guilty,
and that 5.9% pled nolo contendre. Thus, the crucial determination for the judge
in these cases was to determine what sentence to impose, and not whether or not the
defendant was guilty or innocent. Presentence reports were developed to provide the
sentencing court with precise information upon which to base a rational sentencing
decision.
The Federal Rules encourage the use of presentence investigations by the probation
services. Rule 32 (c), as amended in 1966, provides that the sentencing court "may
disclose to the defendant or his counsel all or part of the material contained in the
report of the presentence investigation". (emphasis added). Because practice has
differed from one judge to another, many defendants never saw the evidence upon which
the sentencing judge based his decision. In cases where defendant or counsel never
saw the presentence report, there is a greater likelihood of inaccuracies, erros,
and omissions.
cont'd from P. E-11
or its contents disclosed to anyone unless the defendant has pleaded
guilty or has been found guilty.
(2) Report. The report of the presentence investigation shall contain
any prior criminal record of the defendant and such information about
his characteristics, his financial conditions and the circumstances
affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in
granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant,
and such other information as shall be required by the court. The
court-before imposing sentence may disclose to the defendant or his
counsel all or part of the material contained in the report of the pre-
sentence investigation and afford an opportunity to the defendant or
his counsel to comment thereon. Any material disclosed to the defen-
dant or his counsel shall also be disclosed to the attorney for the
government.
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E-11
Although the Presidential Clemency Board relied primarily on presentence re-
ports as the basis for its knowledge in civilian cases, its use had some draw-
backs. If the applicant did not take advantage of his opportunity to "correct" his
case summary, we may have made decisions on the basis of erroneous information in
the reports. Second, in cases where the applicant had never seen his presentence
report, and did not exercise his right to see our files, our case summary may have
been the beurer of information such as IQ score, history of mental difficulties,
wife's statements, or parent's observations as to why applicant committed his original
offense, which the defendant was not aware of at the time of his judicial sentencing.
Third, a terrific burden was placed on both our action attorneys and quality control
attorneys to search for and verify information. Action attorneys contacted the
applicants in
% of our cases. They also often talked with parents, probation
officers, or prison officials. However, reliance on oral communications with appli-
cants, both civilian and military, posed difficult problems. Locating the applicant
was never easy, since he was most likely at work or away during normal working hours.
Considerations of privacy dictated not contacting him at his place of work. Appli-
cants were often surprised and tongue-tied by a call from a White House office, and
they were often less articulate than usual. Memory under such circumstances was
often hazy.
Perhaps the most serious of the problems the staff faced in oral communications
involved incriminating inform tion. The staff attorney's role was neither that of
counsel for the applicant nor that of his adversary. His function was to elicit as
much relevant information, good and bad, as he could. Yet, our attorneys had a pro-
fessional responsibility to inform the applicant that he need not submit any infor-
mation and especially not aggravating material. Balancing these considerations and
FORD & GERALD LIBRAR
E-12
and insuring that the applicant also understood them required a high degree of
professional care. Instructions on these matters were distributed and reinforced
9
by oral reminders to our attorneys. The high sense of professional responsibility
and còncern for applicants' rights exhibited by our staff was an important element
in insuring that this procedure worked well.
Our heavy reliance on oral communications had one important corollary advantage.
Applicants were greatly impressed with the individual attention their cases were
receiving. Many had never had such close and personal contact with a government
office before, much less from an attorney on the staff of a White House activity.
We are convinced that the time and trouble that our staff took to discuss cases
with applicants convinced them and their families of the seriousness of the program
and the importance attached to it by the President.
As American involvement in the Vietnam War drew to a close, some judges began auto-
matically giving probation rather than imprisonment for draft offenses. While this
lenient treatment was welcomed by defendants, ironically it put them in a more diffi-
cult position before the Board, because we had no information upon which to evaluate
their applications.
Case Summary Preparation
Our preparation of the file for decision revolved around the case summary.
The Case Summary, generally about two pages in length, included a short statement
from existing governmental files summarizing all information on an applicant that
may be relevant to the Board's decision regarding clemency. We forewarned the case
writer that the summary would be sent to the applicant for additions and corrections,
that it would be given to Board panel for detailed review and would be the basic
document for all further action concerning the applicant, and that it might become
public.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
We felt it crucial that the completed form contain a narrative which identi
fied the individual as a person and that it allow us to look behind. the welter of
dates and offenses at a human being. It had to present the individual in human terms.
E-13
Our action attorneys received detailed instructions concerning the drafting
of the case summary's four major parts: (1) Offense and Present Status; (2) Back-
ground; (3) Circumstances of Offense; and (4) Chronology. The following describes
the contents of each part:
1. Offense and Present Status. The offense was stated in correct, but not
legal language. (Applicable statutes, regulations, or Code were not cited.)
Present status was similarly made clear. The remaining items included name
of sentencing court; total time served; discharge status; total creditable
service; age; and date of application. The purpose of these latter items
was to give the Board a first impression of the individual in terms of the
factors directly affecting his case.
2. The Background statement provided a narrative picture of the applicant
as an individual. Use of the following, family background/stability; place
race age:
where raised; race; age; educational level and test scores; phsyical health and mental
health; marital status and present residence; number of dependents; employ-
ment history; parole recommendation; custody level; type of conscientious
objector status; and a brief statement of his beliefs. The list of "possibles"
was neither inclusive nor exclusive, and it formed the nucleus of the para-
graph. Most action attorneys followed a record of chronological order in
presentation of facts. They were instructed to use only information taken
from official files, and personal conclusions were kept to a minimum. Any
judgments madee were labeled as such, and the sources from which they came
were identified.
3. Circumstances of Offense. The basic circumstances surrounding the
applicant's offense was also stated in specific, but not legal language
The statement provided a narrative description of the when, why, and where
BERALD R. of FORD LIBRARY
the applicant's offense. Included was information concerning any event in
E-14
the life of the applicant which was pertinent to the particular offense.
Whenever possible, the action attorney phrased the statement of circumstan-
ces of the offense in terms of the aggravating and witigating circumstances
utilized by the Board. The action attorney did not, however, make sub-
jective statements concerning mitigating and aggravating circumstances. All
pertinent entries in this section were identified. All derivative or con-
clusory judgments were always cited to the source.
4. The Chronology was as detailed as space permitted. The action attorney
started with Date of Birth and proceeded through the last recorded date of
interaction with the legal or military system. This was sometimes in the
future for such events as "expiration of full term" for incarcerated prisoners,
"expiration of probation" for those out on probation, and so forth. All
entries were non-technical and transparently clear, such as graduated from
high school" or "jumped bail." Possible errors or contradictions were marked
with asterisks, and a brief explanation was given at the botton of the page.
Although the summary was designed to be as full a statement as possible of
relevant facts, the Board decided some information was extremely prejudicial
and should not be brought to its attention. Thus, the summary did not in-
clude mere arrests, misdemeanors, or juvenile offenses. We omitted closely
identifying information such as names, specific addresses, college or high
schools, and employers. The staff was instructed to avoid making subjective
characterizations, generalizations or conclusionary statements. Specifically
i
FORD
prejudicial matter which had no bearing on the case were omitted. We created
an unusual internal check on the preparation of the case summary to control
GERALO
LIBRARY
staff error, omission, abuse of discretion, and inconsistencies. This check
referred to as "Quality Control," functioned by a special group of attorneys
checking the work of all others. As a general proposition, the Quality Control
E-15
unit reviewed the summary for improper characterizations, excludable terms,
and prejudicial material. All corrections, additions and deletions suggested
by Quality Control were conclusive unless the action attorney could convince
the quality control attorney that the suggested changes should not be made.
This was a unique operation, for which we could find no parallels in govern-
ment legal processing. Although we relied heavily on the professionalism,
knowledge, and experience of attorney sin preparing case-work, the Board felt
that an independent control was necessary. The Board's legal staff of over
300 was drawn from many different agencies. Naturally, no attorney had ever
practiced Clemency Board law before. In order to ensure that rapidly
changing Board rules were followed, and that all cases were written in a con-
sistent, complete and accurate manner, the independent quality control function
was necessary. Without one, the Board could have no confidence that the
summary before it was an accurate reflection of the information bearing on the
case. For all its uniqueness, the process worked extremely well, and staff
attorneys did not regard this as a reflection on their professional competence.
We instituted a further check by allowing the applicant to participate in
the drafting of his case summary. The following letter, pursuant to Section 101. (b)
of our Rules and Regulations, vas sent with the initial case summary to each appli-
cant:
"Your application to the Clemency Board has been received. We are sending
to you some additional information which will help you understand how we
will review your case.
The most important thing that you should look at is the Initial Case Summary.
This is a brief statement of the facts of your case and your personal back-
R
FORD
ground that has been made from your files. The summary has been enclosed so
that you may see the main tool that the Board will use when we review your
HERALD
case. Like the Board, you and your attorney may also see your entire file.
Please read your summary very carefully. If anything in the summary is wrong
or if there is anything you want. to explain, please tell the Board. You
E-16
may also tell the Board of any other information that you think we should
consider. If we do not receive your comments twenty days from the date of
this letter, we may have to go on with your case without them.
We have also sent to you the Instructions for preparing summaries. This is
what the Presidential Clemency Board gave to its lawyers to tell them how
to prepare your summary. We hope that it will explain to you what each item
on your summary means. "
Sending the applicant a copy of his summary was the only means we had of
checking the accuracy of the official files that formed the basis of our information.
It also served as a double-check on the accuracy of our staff work. In some measure,
it served as a substitute for the lack of personal contact we had with the applicant.
On whole, the responses from applicants demonstrated that the summaries were
generally free from significant error. The Board was disappointed, however, in
the low number of persons who responded to the summary. While this may have been
due to the acceptability of the document to the applicant, we suspect that many
individuals did not fully understand the importance of responding to us. In all,
about ( %) of our applicants submitted written comments or corrections to the
summaries.
FORD i LIBR GERALD