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Ford Foundation Information Paper on Veterans, Deserters, and Draft Evaders
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Ford Foundation Information Paper on Veterans, Deserters, and Draft Evaders
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Charles E. Goodell Papers
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The original documents are located in Box 6, folder "Ford Foundation Information Paper
on Veterans, Deserters, and Draft Evaders" of the Charles E. Goodell Papers at the Gerald
R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Charles Goodell donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 6 of the Charles E. Goodell Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
VETERANS, DESERTERS, AND DRAFT-EVADERS
-- THE VIETNAM DECADE --
Information Paper
The Ford Foundation
September 1974
VETERANS, DESERTERS, AND DRAFT-EVADERS
-- THE VIETNAM DECADE --
Information Paper
The Ford Foundation
September 1974
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
1
I. VIETNAM-ERA VETERANS
3
Profile
5
THE ISSUES
8
Post-Vietnam Syndrome
8
Unemployment
12
Education and Training
13
Drug Abuse
15
Other-than-Honorable Discharges
19
Veterans Administration
23
CURRENT RESPONSE
25
The Veterans Lobby: Old and New
27
The Legislative Picture
31
II. AMNESTY
33
THE AMNESTY IDEA
34
Historical Record
34
Jurisdictional Question
36
SELECTIVE OPPOSITION TO WAR: A LEGAL
PROBLEM
38
POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR AMNESTY
40
Draft Resisters
41
Military Deserters
GERALE FORD
45
Page
POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR AMNESTY (Cont'd)
Other-than-Honorable Discharges
46
Civilian War Protesters
48
THE ARGUMENTS
48
Case for Amnesty
48
Case Against Amnesty
49
CURRENT RESPONSE
50
Ford Administration
51
Congress
52
Citizen Organizations
54
Institutional and Scholarly Interest
55
III CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
57
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C
APPENDIX D
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-1-
INTRODUCTION
No group of Americans was touched as deeply by the Vietnam
conflict as the millions of young men who came to maturity in the decade
between 1964 and 1973. On this group fell most of the burden of fighting
the war. The burden was shared unequally because the nation lacked a
system of universal military service. Nearly 60% of all draft-age men
during these years did not serve in the armed forces.
This report is a preliminary study of the effects of the war on
the lives of a limited part of the Vietnam generation: those who entered
military service and those who became lawbreakers out of opposition to
participation. These are overlapping, not separate, categories. Hundreds
of thousands of Vietnam-era veterans hold other -than-honorable discharges,
many because of their antiwar activities. These young men lived out the
Vietnam years in very different ways, but there is a sense in which none
of them escaped the war. It had a determining effect on all of their lives.
More than seven million persons served in the armed forces
during the Vietnam era. Of this group, more than 2. 5 million actually
were sent to Indochina, where 303, 000 were wounded, half of them seriously.
Another 56, 000 did not return. Many of those who served now face problems --
in education and employment -- that often are complicated by the effects
of their military service: drug abuse, bad discharge records, or psychological
distress. The first part of this report considers the situation of these Vietnam-
era veterans.
FORD CIRRAPY
-2-
The lives of the much smaller group of men who evaded the draft
or deserted the armed forces during the Vietnam years also remained troubled.
Many of them have been formally punished for their crimes; some remain
in exile abroad or underground at home. They all remain under some
degree of legal disability. The second part of this report considers their
situation and prospects.
The final section lists some conclusions and makes specific recom-
mendations for possible Foundation activity.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-3-
I. VIETNAM-ERA VETERANS
Special benefits for veterans are deeply rooted in the American
political tradition. They can be traced to the Revolutionary War, with earlier
precedents stretching back into British and colonial experience. Historically,
benefits have been justified on the grounds that veterans made special
sacrifices for the nation and deserved extra consideration. Central to this
concept are the notions of compensation and readjustment. The veteran,
especially the needy one, should be compensated for his sacrifice, and all
veterans should be assisted in the readjustment to civilian life on an equal
footing with peers who did not serve.
The Revolutionary War produced the first veterans' benefits --- limited
medical compensation and pensions for the needy. The post-Civil War period
saw expanded medical payments and preferential hiring. The present system,
which serves 29 million veterans at an annual cost of over $13 b illion, was
set up mainly by the G.I. Bill of World War II -- a far-reaching readjustment
and compensation program stimulated by memories of veteran protests
during the Depression and concern over the potentially massive impact of
demobilization on the domestic labor market.
The present spectrum of veterans' programs can be grouped
under several broad headings: (1) readjustment programs designed to ease
the veteran's return to the civilian labor market on a par with his non-
veteran peers (principally educational and training programs, employment FORD
GERALD LIBRARY
-4-
services, preferential hiring, loan assistance, and eligibility for unemploy-
ment insurance); (2) medical services provided through the Veterans
Administration (VA) hospital system, and income support for services-
connected disabilities; (3) income support for the needy veteran (principally
pensions); and (4) additional benefits (such as life insurance and mortgage
loans) not generally available to non-veterans. Although many benefits are
delivered on a need basis, eligibility for them most commonly is gained by
any veteran who received a discharge under honorable conditions.
Of most interest to Vietnam-era veterans are the educational and
readjustment assistance programs (commonly referred to as the G.I. Bill)
and the medical support and compensation programs. Older or more
affluent Vietnam veterans may also benefit from the housing loan and life
insurance programs. A few programs run by other agencies are important
to Vietnam-era veterans, including the Veterans Employment Program of
the Labor Department and the Veterans Cost of Instruction Program of the
Office of Education. In addition, several states have their own G.I. Bills
and many local governments have veterans employment and assistance
projects.
Veterans legislation is handled by special committees in Congress.
The major veteran service groups, such as the American Legion, lobby
actively for the interests of their members. They also serve as a major
source of staff personnel at the VA. Most Members of Congress, more
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-5-
than a third of whom are at least nominal members of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars (VFW) or the American Legion, sympathize strongly with
veterans needs. Veterans programs have evolved in a closely-knit political
world where debate has generally not considered basic issues of equity and
need but rather has focused on eligibility criteria and the adequacy of
benefit levels.
The benefit programs also serve other purposes. They have
been a major selling point for recruitment into the armed services and have
proved an effective way to support non-military institutions, such as the
housing industry, universities, and certain kinds of trade and technical
schools. All of this broadens the political base of support for veterans
benefits.
Profile
There are approximately seven million Vietnam-era veterans
(those who served after August 4, 1964) of whom about 700, 000 also saw
service in the Korean conflict. The average age of the Vietnam veteran
is just over 28 years. Over 95% of all Vietnam-era veterans are in the
20 to 34 age bracket, with approximately 22% aged 20 to 24, 56% aged
25 to 29, and 22% aged 30 to 34. Average length of service was 32. 9
months and average age at separation was 23 years. About 35% of all
Vietnam-era veterans went to Indochina.
At the time of enlistment, the typical Vietnam-era veteran was
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-6-
a white high school graduate from a small city or rural area. He was less
likely than his non-veteran peer to have attended college, but more likely
to be a high school graduate. At separation, his median educational attain-
ment was 12. 5 years, giving him more schooling than either his World War
II or Korean counterpart, with 11. 5 and 12. 3 years respectively. In 1973,
blacks accounted for about 10% of the Vietnam veteran population, compared
to 13% of the non-veteran peer population. Defense Department studies
indicate that minority group veterans were nearly twice as likely as whites
not to have graduated from high school, and more likely to score in the
lower deciles on military aptitude tests. Race, educational attainment,
and aptitude are all interrelated in determining the in-service experience
of the Vietnam-era veteran. Sample surveys show that the less educated,
minority group member is more likely to have been sent to Vietnam, and
when there, to have served in combat. Black and Spanish-surnamed veterans
were 60% more likely to have served in combat than white veterans. Whites
were more likely to serve in skilled craft or intelligence and communications
units. College graduates of any color were least likely to serve in Vietnam.
Statistics form only part of the picture of the Vietnam-era
veteran who is readjusting to civilian life. The nation had been deeply
divided by the war and the returning serviceman often felt the effects
GREAT P.. FORD LIBRABY
-7-
of that division. At worst he was viewed with suspicion. Some-
times he felt ignored. Since the return home was without rewards
or recognition, some veterans, particularly the 2.5 million who saw
service in Vietnam, questioned the value of the sacrifice they had
made.
Many Vietnam-era veterans felt their experiences set
them apart from older veterans who had served in more united
times. This feeling contributed to a generalized uneasiness about
participating fully in the typical social and institutional milieu of
the older veteran population: the local American Legion or VFW
post. Thus, the Vietnam-era veteran, even though he shared the
experience of having served, found there was much that he did
not share with his predecessors. These differences placed a
special stamp on the Vietnam-era returnee.
FORD & LIBRARY
-8-
THE ISSUES
The readjustment issues facing Vietnam-era veterans are not susceptible
to easy generalization. There is broad agreement on some problems and consid-
erable controversy over the extent, and even the existence, of others. These
issues vary widely in the extent to which they touch the Vietnam veteran population.
In some areas a virtual absence of sound knowledge makes an informed judgment
impossible. Six problem areas are most frequently mentioned to be of concern to
the Vietnam-era veteran.
Post-Vietnam Syndrome
Perhaps the least understood controversy surrounding Vietnam-era veterans
is over the existence of the Post-Vietnam Syndrome (PVS). Considerable scholarly,
and not SO scholarly, attention has been devoted to the subject. This report can only
sketch the areas of controversy and the differing opinions about the extent and sever-
ity of the PVS.
Several explanations are offered for the existence of the syndrome. The
most prevalent theory argues that Vietnam differed in significant respects from
prior American wars. The Vietnam war was a guerrilla conflict, without distinct
battle lines or defined areas of territorial control. Unlike his World War II
predecessor, the average American soldier was not in the war for the duration of
1/
This report excludes consideration of special problems which may face the
several hundred thousand female veterans of the Vietnam era. In general, the
veteran benefit system is designed to serve a male clientele. The plight of service-
men still classified as "missing-in-action, " and the special difficulties faced by
their families, are also excluded from discussion.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-9-
hostilities, but for a specified time, usually one year. Rotation prevented the
growth of a strong buddy system. The G.I. 's goal became personal survival,
and men became hesitant to take chances during the last weeks of their service.
Adding to this disorientation was a logistical system that brought the soldier
over in a commercial airliner and deposited him in Saigon amid stewardesses
and night life and later returned him, often alone, to the States mere hours after
leaving his combat post.
Severe cases of shell shock and combat fatigue were relatively few in
Vietnam. But several researchers have found broad evidence of anxiety, depres-
sion, distrust of authority, and ambivalence among combat veterans. Dr. Jonathan
Borus of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, who compared combat to
non-combat veterans, found few differences in the pattern of character disorders,
even though they were high in both groups. Another study found that combat veterans
did not display more overtly aggressive behavior than non-combat veterans, although
isolated incidents of violent behavior have received play in the media. Additional
research conducted at VA hospitals shows distinct differences between the clinical
symptoms of younger and older veterans. This literature suggests a fairly high
incidence of behavioral instability, but rejects the extreme view that Vietnam created
large numbers of violence-prone veterans. The extent of criminal behavior among
Vietnam-era veterans remains largely unstudied.
A second line of analysis suggests that the PVS relates to service in the
armed forces rather than participation in combat. Public hostility to the war, anti-
FORD & LIBRARY 938839
-10-
military feeling, and socio-economic differences between those who served and
those who did not contribute to the soldier's sense of rejection, guilt, and hostility
and the feeling that he has been "suckered." " After separation, these feelings have
emerged according to individual circumstances and served to intensify or distort
readjustment. A recent survey of non-college youth conducted by Daniel Yankelovich,
Inc. found significant differences in the veteran sub-sample that support this line of
analysis. Young Vietnam veterans emerge as less optimistic and more alienated,
more prone toward extreme political positions, more likely to use drugs or alcohol,
less likely to be employed, and more likely to view themselves as members of a
minority group that is discriminated against.
A third explanation holds that many readjustment problems of the veteran
are age-related and reflect attitudes of other young Americans. The veteran's
military experience puts added tension on these attitudinal problems and makes it
hard to cope with intergenerational and ethical/moral conflicts. There is little
detailed research to shed light on this view.
Dr. Charles A. Stenger, of the VA Department of Medicine and Surgery,
concludes that the psychological readjustment problems of the Vietnam veteran are
too intertwined with the nature of the war, the nature of the times, and individual
personalities to justify a clinical definition of a Post-Vietnam Syndrome. He argues
that perhaps 20% of veterans are having a difficult time readjusting and cites the
Robins' drug study, the Borus' study and VA research as evidence for this approx-
1/
The Vietnam Drug User Returns, Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention,
1973. (Principal investigator, Dr. Lee Robins, Washington University, St. Louis.)
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-11-
imate level of serious readjustment difficulties. More than anything else the
collective picture that emerges is of instability some of it manifested in identi-
fiable psychological disorders, but much of it appearing in arrest, divorce, and
drug abuse statistics.
The analytical difficulties in this area reflect the limitations of existing
research, which has not adequately controlled for intergenerational and non-
veteran peer group differences. Despite a sizeable research budget, the VA is
constrained in the kind of research it can undertake. It is limited in the extent
to which it can contract for research and has access only to those veterans who
show up at the VA. Little is known about the Vietnam veteran who does not approach
the VA.
Beyond these clinical issues, there are practical and policy issues in attempt-
ing to define and treat a PVS. If the syndrome is defined as a service-related dis-
ability (hence, treatable at VA hospitals), it becomes hard to exclude other older
veterans with psychological problems. This raises both equity and cost implications.
Secondly, defining the PVS as a service-connected disability stamps it as a disorder
in a way that may further contribute to the veteran's problems by adding a stigma or
making it more difficult for him to find employment. The VA, through its hospital
system, has tried to encourage more informal counseling techniques and has hired
psychologists and social workers who are themselves Vietnam veterans. While
these measures undoubtedly help, many veterans have rejected the VA and turned
to informal Vietnam veteran self-help and "rap" groups as a way of airing their
problems.
FORD & LIBRARY
-12-
Unemployment
In recent years, unemployment has been serious and persistent for
Vietnam-era veterans. Since the beginning of 1973, however, according to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the unemployment rate for older veterans (ages
25-34) has been comparable to or lower than that for non-veterans. Among younger
veterans (20-24) unemployment has remained markedly higher than for non-veterans.
The changing age composition of the veteran labor force, in recent years, has
brought the overall unemployment rate for veterans to parity with non-veterans.
Yet several factors point to the rate for young veterans (a declining proportion of
all veterans) remaining abnormally high. In particular, because they joined up during
or right out of high school, young veterans have frequently had minimal contact with
the labor market and have not yet had the opportunity to close the educational gap
that exists between them and their non-veteran peers.
In aggregate terms the joblessness of Vietnam-era veterans is primarily
an age-related re-entry problem, affecting younger men who have the least experi-
ence in the labor market. In the absence of special programs, this problem is
inseparable from larger employment and labor market issues facing the economy
as a whole. But this interpretation should not disguise the fact that particular
groups of veterans suffer severe unemployment problems. Non-white veterans,
in particular, suffer markedly higher unemployment rates than white veterans.
The BLS found unemployment among young black veterans at 13.5% during 1973,
down somewhat from the previous year.
See Appendix A. Table 1.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-13-
A special VA survey of readjustment problems in 1972 found an unemploy-
ment rate of 28% for veterans with less than a high school education and a similar
rate for black veterans in general. Joblessness was most severe in cities. Two
additional surveys uncovered serious unemployment among segments of the veteran
population. The Yankelovich study reported 30% unemployment in its veteran sub-
sample and the Robins study of drug abuse revealed that 49% of a sample who were
regular narcotics users also were without jobs.
Although limited in scope, these special surveys suggest severe unemployment
among less educated and minority veterans. Upwards of 450, 000 Vietnam-era veterans
currently have no jobs. The recent upturn in the general unemployment rate suggests
this figure is unlikely to improve in the near future.
Education and Training
Much dissatisfaction voiced by Vietnam-era veterans concerns education and
training benefits under the G.I. Bill. An appendix to this report discusses these
issues in depth. Nevertheless, several comments should be noted here.
Since World War II, education provisions in the G. I. Bill have increased
veterans' access to higher education. After that war, veterans received direct sub-
sistence allowances while tuitions and fees were paid directly to their schools. Today,
however, a fixed benefit is paid to the veteran, which he uses for both subsistence
and educational costs. This difference has led to controversy about the relative
value of ourrent and prior G.I. Bill benefits.
Average purchasing power for some veterans equals that of World War II
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
-14-
veterans, but comparison of the relative value of benefits, when measured against
average earnings of non-veteran peers, shows Vietnam-era veterans to be consider-
ably worse off. They have difficulty finding the part-time jobs needed to supplement
their benefits and depend heavily on their monthly VA checks which are often late
in arriving. Unlike their post-World War II predecessors, they lack access to low-
cost housing on their campuses.
The present system of delivery of education benefits has other consequences
that disturb Vietnam-era veterans. Tuition costs vary from state to state, between
public and private sectors and sometimes between lower and higher quality schools.
This fact influences whether and where a veteran will be likely to use his benefits.
Colleges that formerly received direct federal payments (sometimes at higher, out-
of-state rates) as an incentive to provide special services for veteran-students now
often pay scant attention to veterans' special educational and personal needs.
The use of G.I. Bill benefits varies directly with education levels and
aptitude scores. Defense Department surveys show that veterans with some pre-
service college are nearly three times as likely to use benefits as those who did not
finish high school. Minority veterans with less than a high school education are
slightly more likely than whites to enroll in manpower and skill-training programs.
In general, the veteran with the least pre-service education and the least opportunity
for practical training in the military is also least likely to benefit from educational
and training provisions of the G.I. Bill. About half of all Vietnam-era veterans do
not use their education benefits, at least in part for economic reasons. While extra
FORD & LIBRARY
-15-
benefits are available for remedial and preparatory work, administrative delays
in delivery of checks apparently have caused many men to abandon tutorial programs
needed to pursue higher education.
Despite this unevenness in the use of benefits, the G.I. Bill, one of the
largest and most comprehensive federal scholarship programs, has aided one-half
of the Vietnam-era veterans. This proportion will rise, particularly because of
the recent extension of the eligibility period. The system has worked best for
college-eligible veterans who have access to a range of institutions in their home
states. It has been less successful for educationally deprived veterans, for poor
veterans, and for those who lack easy geographic access to good, low-cost schools.
Comparatively less attention has been given to the needs of those who are
ineligible for college or who might profit more from manpower and skill training
courses. Thus, of the 15% of young veterans who lack a high school diploma, only
9% have enrolled in manpower training programs. One-quarter of all veterans who
use their education benefits attend vocational schools, but two-thirds of them are
in correspondence courses that have high dropout rates and offer programs of
questionable value.
Drug Abuse
The widespread use of drugs in Vietnam has drawn considerable attention
in the media, has been documented by several studies, and has become an issue of
special concern to the Vietnam veterans organizations. This discussion focuses on
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
-16-
the degree and extent of drug usage among the Vietnam veterans, the rehabilitative
avenues open to the drug abuser, and the effectiveness of these channels.
According to the most recent study of drug abuse in the Army, based on
a sample of individuals who returned from Vietnam in September, 1971, rates of
drug usage and addiction in Vietnam were extraordinarily high: 45% of all men
used narcotics, amphetamines or barbiturates at least once; 29% used narcotics
regularly (more than 10 times total and more than weekly) and 20% reported they
were addicted. No single factor explained this high rate of abuse. Users were
more likely to be young, enlistees from large cities, with pre-service records of
truancy, low educational attainment, and arrests, and a longer in-service disciplin-
ary record. Pre-service narcotics addiction (a negligible portion of the total sample)
was linked to abuse in Vietnam but casual pre-service narcotics use was not strongly
linked to in- service use.
Boredom was the most frequently reported reason for abusing drugs in Viet-
nam, although peer-group pressure, insomnia, and homesickness were contributing
factors. The incidence of drug usage was not found to be related to participation in
combat. Taking drugs was a social activity encouraged by easy availability.
After return from Vietnam, the incidence of both any use and frequent use
of drugs declined markedly without recourse to treatme nt or rehabilitation programs.
The Vietnam Drug User Returns (the Robins study).
See Appendix A. Table 2 for general rates of drug use.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-17-
Despite this important decline, drug abuse remains a serious problem. Of all men
in the sample, 3% reported weekly narcotics use after return, (weekly use represents
either addiction or a reasonable danger of addiction), and of the drug positive sample,
35% reported weekly narcotics use. The character of abuse also changed. While
pre-service narcotics abuse was most frequently codeine, after service use was
generally heroin. Post-Vietnam narcotics abuse was linked to a variety of other
readjustment problems. Regular narcotics users were unemployed in 49% of cases,
had been arrested within a ten-month period in 41% of cases, 17% had sought psy-
chiatric care, and 18% of the married men were divorced or separated. Narcotics
abuse was a better predictor of post-service arrests than was a pre-service arrest
record.
Drug abuse by most servicemen can be viewed as a temporary phenomenon
related to the special circumstances of assignment in Vietnam. It remains a serious
problem for a small, but significant, minority of Vietnam-era veterans and has be-
come entangled with a variety of other individual, readjustment difficulties and the
broader socio-economic problems that are found in the urban environment. Most
observers estimate a Vietnam veteran drug population of between 75,000 and 100, 000.
Treatment opportunities open to the addicted veteran depend on his discharge
status, since VA hospital services are available only to those with discharges under
honorable conditions and, in some cases, to those with undesirable discharges. The
services vary considerably in the kind of discharge given to drug offenders. In the
See Appendix A, Table 3.
SERVICE FORD LIBRARY
-18-
Army and Marine Corps around 70% of discharges for drug offenses were undesirable
while the Navy and the Air Force issued predominantly general or honorable discharges
to drug offenders. The character of the discharge differed little according to race.
These data indicate a significant portion of all drug users are either ineligible for
VA services or await a determination which is unlikely to be in the veteran's favor.
More recently drug users in all services have increasingly received honorable
or general discharges, although the Army continues to give a higher proportion of un-
desirable discharges. The services are also making greater efforts to treat drug
users in the service. In Germany, the Army has opened more than 70 Community
Drug and Alcohol Assistance Centers.
For eligible veteran drug abusers, the VA offers a variety of services from
psychiatric counseling to methadone maintenance that in the eyes of most observers
have achieved mixed results. Particular VA hospitals (East St. Louis and Brentwood,
Calif., for example) reportedly have developed imaginative and sensitive drug treat-
ment programs. In other cases, veteran drug abusers have received little effective
help. The VA has relied heavily on methadone maintenance treatment which for many
veterans is merely trading one addiction for another. Veterans themselves appear to
favor private residential rehabilitation programs and peer-group counseling as an
alternative to the VA programs.
The drug abuser can also avail himself of any other governmental or private
drug treatment program. Many veterans hostile to the VA prefer these channels.
This tendency disturbs some drug program managers who feel they are shouldering
a burden that should be carried by the VA.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-19-
Other -than-Honorable Discharges
More than 400, 000 Vietnam-era veterans have left the military without
an honorable discharge. To varying degrees, bad discharges make it harder
to find a job and limit eligibility for veterans benefits. So they have become
an issue for Vietnam veterans and for some Members of Congress. Serious
questions have been raised about the discharge system: Does it offer adequate
safeguards to prevent abuse or inequity? Should a military offense that would
not be a violation of civil law become the basis for an undesirable discharge
that accompanies a veteran for the rest of his life?
There are five discharge categories: honorable, general, undesirable,
bad conduct, and dishonorable. The first two are considered by the armed
services to be under honorable conditions. The last two are under dishonor-
able conditions and mean a veteran forfeits his benefits. They are determined
exclusively by courts-martial under procedures which provide due process
rights. The middle category, undesirable discharge, normally is decided
upon at administrative hearings with fewer safeguards. It usually entails
loss of benefits although procedures are available through which a veteran
may have some or all of his benefit eligibility restored.
A Department of Defense Task Force on the Administration of Military
Justice reported great variation among the services on the grounds for differ-
ent discharges. Thus, while the Army and Air Force cited "discreditable
incidents" as the reason for an undesirable discharge in approximately 25% of
GERALD
-20-
cases, the Navy and Marine Corps gave this as the stated reason in less than
10% of the cases. The criteria for a "discreditable incident" are reasonably
uniform among the services. The study also found that blacks received pro-
portionately fewer discharges under honorable conditions than whites when
controlled for educational and aptitude levels. In all groups bad discharges
increased as aptitude and educational attainment levels dropped.
Much criticism of the discharge system stems from the argument that
the veteran suffers a stigma that inhibits his progress in the labor market.
The best, and almost sole, source of information on this subject is a study
by Major Bradley K. Jones.- In a survey of businesses, educational institu-
tions, and professional societies, Jones found a strong negative response to
other-than-honorable discharges but considerable evidence that employers
tried to distinguish among the categories. All respondents were negatively
influenced to a degree by bad discharges. Although other-than-honorable dis-
charge may result from actions which are of concern to employers, they may
also result from life style offenses (homosexuality), AWOL or conduct such
as "apathy" or "shirking".
Systematic evidence is not available, but bad discharges negatively
affect the veteran's chances of obtaining civil service jobs, passing security
1/"The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: Legal and Empirical
Evaluation" Military Law Review, No. 59, Winter 1973. See Appendix A,
Table 4.
FORD is LIBRARY
-21-
clearances, and joining professional and trade societies. Recent court
cases have recognized the discriminatory power of the bad discharge and
have attempted to mitigate the effects.
For the veteran desiring to upgrade a bad discharge, there are a
number of recourses. All involve lodging an appeal with one of the ser-
vice discharge review boards in Washington, D.C. The veteran may take
his case to the VA or to a veteran service organization. Here, he is
provided with a counselor (generally not a lawyer) who helps him prepare
a case. The American Legion estimates that it succeeds in upgrading
about 20% of such cases. It has recently increased its discharge staff in
Washington to four people. The VA successfully upgrades about 10% to
15% of its cases. Alternatively, the veteran can take his case to the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) or the American Veterans Committee.
¹/Until recently, all discharge papers (honorable and dishonorable)
contained Separation Code numbers (SPN) that contained a coded summation
of the veteran's service record. These classifications cover the full range
of service performance. Thus, while most codes contain the favorable nota-
tion, "expiration of term of service," more than fifty unfavorable codes refer
to specific acts within the military, which may or may not have a bearing on
the veteran's discharge status or punishment by courts martial. These codes
range from "criminal behavior" to "unsanitary habits, " "homosexual tenden-
cies," and "bed wetting. 11 Despite their supposedly confidential nature, these
codes were widely publicized and known to large employers. Printing the
codes on discharge papers is now discontinued.
For example, Thompson V. Gallagher, (5th Circuit Court of Appeals-Dec. 1973)
and a decision of the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission against the
St. Louis Fire Department.
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Here his chances of success are greater, but both organizations are cur-
rently so over-extended that they have stopped taking new cases. These
organizations say that the veteran's chances for success are significantly
enhanced by a personal appearance before the board in Washington, a
requirement that discriminates against the low-income or precariously
employed veteran.
The Defense Department defends the current discharge system
on the grounds that (1) the soldier who serves his country well should be
rewarded and (2) the military needs to know which individuals not to take
back in the future. The system with its threat of lost benefits obviously
forms a strong underpinning to the system of military justice. For the
veteran with a bad discharge, however, the system serves little useful
purpose. The bad discharge contains no rehabilitative mechanism, nor
does it necessarily mete out a just punishment. These discharges are
a neglected problem brought to light by the particular passions of the
Vietnam conflict. A responsible course of action would be one that
sought to reconcile the military's manpower and disciplinary needs with-
out unduly prejudicing the veteran's re-entry into civilian life.
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Veterans Administration
Many complaints by Vietnam-era veterans have been directed at the
Veterans Administration. Dissatisfaction with VA performance is not limited
to the younger or more alienated Vietnam veterans, but extends to neutral ob-
servers, the VA's own personnel, and Congressional offices. For these rea-
sons, the VA itself must be considered a problem area.
Since the close of the Korean era, VA functions have largely been income
support and administration of the hospital system -- activities which consume
approximately three-quarters of the budget. Its clients increasingly have become
the older, needy, and chronically disabled veterans.
The VA response to the returning Vietnam veteran was, in broad terms,
to gear up the employment and educational assistance provisions of the G.I. Bill
and to expand publicity so as many veterans as possible were apprised of their
benefit rights. The VA points to its "Operation Outreach" and the opening of
Veterans Assistance Centers around the country as evidence of its concern for the
returning veteran. While gross statistics in terms of contact made, centers
opened, toll-free phones installed, and "job fairs" held are impressive, it is hard
to assess the real impact of these activities. It is impossible to know, for example,
how many actual job match-ups occur at job fairs, or the proportion of these that
result in employment of any meaningful duration.
Faced with problems that fall outside the framework of the traditional bene-
fit structure, the VA seems to have had difficulty mounting an effective response.
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It has exercised little new program initiative or policy formulation. One know-
ledgeable former VA official traces this failing to the absence of an effective
Vietnam veteran input at the policy-making level.
The VA lacks effective internal program review and evaluation. Program
analysis is largely confined to compilations from existing benefit rolls which limit
research to that portion of the veteran population that seeks aid. It cannot under-
take comparative studies with non-veteran populations. Legal restrictions limit
contracting for outside research. The education and training bill currently before
Congress recognizes these limitations and mandates data collection and evaluation,
but this provision was not recommended for additional funding. Looking beyond the
VA, veterans benefits have been one of the least researched of the major social
welfare programs. The Brookings Institution has done a little work in this area,
and a 20th Century Fund Task Force is examining the general issues of veterans
benefits. Little other scholarly work is underway.
The VA has also been accused of negligence and mismanagement in the de-
livery of benefits to veterans. Although comprehensive analyses do not exist, the
VA's own survey of readjustment problems found that 4.4% had not received their
educational checks. Many big city newspapers have carried critical feature
stories on problems at VA hospitals. To the extent that the level of indignation
reflects the true state of affairs, the VA is in trouble; but it is worth remembering
that with a clientele in the millions, even a low rate of administrative error will
make many people unhappy.
See Appendix A, Table 5.
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Some observers see signs of change at the VA. The current educational
legislation will add veterans representatives on campus and a new system of
check disbursement will go into operation. More VA employees are themselves
Vietnam veterans, mostly at lower levels. But in general the VA response has
been slow. It is least effective in reaching younger, urban, and minority group
veter ns. The low level of resources for evaluation and research and the general
neglect of the VA on the part of scholars and policy analysts suggest that these
reforms may not outlive the current wave of client indignation.
CURRENT RESPONSE
The traditional institutional actors in veterans' affairs continue to shape
the response to those problems. The newer Vietnam veterans organizations
have dented this structure, but their strength and influence are limited.
The current structure of veterans affairs can be summarized as follows:
-- The Executive Branch: Aside from the White House, the Office
of Management and Budget concerns itself with the larger budge-
tary issues, and HEW and the Labor Department have limited
responsibilities for particular veterans programs. The Defense
Department administers a military retirement program and is an
important indirect influence on veterans' affairs. The VA, of
course, has the major administrative role.
-- The Congress: Major responsibility lies with the House Commit-
tee on Veterans Affairs and the younger Senate Veterans Committee.
Particular committees maintain an interest in different pieces of
the veteran program - Senator Ervin's subcommittee on consti-
tutional rights, Senator Hughes' subcommittee on drugs and nar-
cotics, and the judiciary committees of both houses.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
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-- The veterans organizations: Most prominent are the
big lobbies, the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the
American Legion, which also run major service programs
for veterans. Surrounding them are several other large
organizations which generally have a more specialized
membership, such as the Disabled Veterans of America.
Beyond these are special interest veterans groups repre-
senting everyone from Polish-Amêrican to Spanish-American
War veterans.
-- Vietnam-era veterans organizations: There are two types--
a small number of organizations whose membership is large-
ly or entirely Vietnam-era veterans, and other public interest
organizations who have special programs in support of Vietnam-
era veterans.
Major policy-making responsibility in veterans affairs has for many years
resided with the House Veterans Affairs Committee, although the recent creation of
a similar committee in the Senate has altered this picture somewhat. But the House
has long-standing expertise and is considered better versed in the bread-and-butter
issues. Considerable differences mark the perspectives of the two committees.
The House panel is more conservative in outlook, reflecting its membership, and
more prone to hold the line on costs. It generally takes the view that veterans' re-
adjustment problems are all pretty much alike. The House Committee does not re-
gard the poor and the disadvantaged veterans as a natural constituency and is un-
willing to single them out for special attention. The Committee staff has developed
a close working relationship with the VA and the big veterans organizations.
The Senate Committee, on the other hand, seems to take a broader view.
However, the politics of veterans benefits cannot be plotted along conventional
liberal-conservative lines. For example, the problems of veterans were an effec-
tive focal point for Senate-initiated legislation designed to control the abuses of
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
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correspondence schools -- an issue of concern to more than veterans.
The Veterans Lobby: Old and New
The veterans lobby is dominated by the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the
American Legion. With membership in the millions, large budgets, and service
programs run through VA centers throughout the country, these organizations are
a major source of assistance to the veteran. They rightly claim credit for creating
or helping to enact much major legislation. The American Legion is the larger
with 2.7 million members, while the VFW has 1.8 million members. Each claims
450, 000 Vietnam-era veterans in its membership. Both run service programs for
all veterans without regard to membership. Helping the veteran with his benefits
and providing a congenial social environment, they are entrenched in the social
milieu of suburban and small town America.
Both the Legion and VFW recognize that their future organizational health
depends upon attracting the Vietnam-era veteran. The Legion, in particular, is a
strong supporter of the Senate version of the current education and training bill. Alone
among the old-line veterans lobbies, it supported the concerns of the younger Vietnam-
era veteran groups. Nevertheless there remains serious question whether the experi-
ences and often conflicting life styles of the two generations of veterans -- the World
War II men and the youthful Vietnam group -- will really permit much more than a
marriage of convenience.
Closely following the two big service organizations are the AMVETS and the
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
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Disabled Veterans of America, large organizations with more specialized member-
ships. They generally support Vietnam veterans groups only when their interests
coincide and are more normally involved in issues of concern to older veterans.
Beyond these major organizations lies a plethora of specialized groups, some large,
most small, that represent every conceivable kind of veteran subpopulation. Some
carry weight on particular issues, but they are too fragmented to exert concerted
political pressure.
Vietnam-era veterans organizations are few in number, organizationally
weak, and, generally speaking, not major political actors. The National Association
of Concerned Veterans (NACV) is considered most effective in representing the
Vietnam veterans' viewpoint. Formed in 1968 from a coalition of campus-based
veterans groups, NACV is respected on Capitol Hill for its practical approach
to the issues. Although its membership is not large, NACV claims access through
its local affiliates to a large portion of the on-campus Vietnam veteran population.
NACV is trying to become a general membership organization, but is constrained by
its small staff and lack of financing. Reflecting its origins, it devotes its attention
to education and employment, but would like to become more involved in issues such
as drug abuse and bad discharges.
The American Veterans Committee is an older but smaller organization,
claiming a membership of around 20, 000, formed as an alternative to the big
service organizations. It is extensively involved in the current education bill, but
devotes more attention to discharge and civil rights issues and has a long history
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of involvement in civil service hiring preferences for veterans. It is one of the
few organizations providing counseling and legal assistance to veterans seeking to
upgrade their discharge status -- and has been quite successful in this area. Like
NACV, however, it is financially weak and supported largely by volunteer effort.
The Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization (VVAW)
has shown ability to capture media attention to the more radical concerns of Vietnam-
era veterans. But many doubt its political effectiveness because it does not engage
in sustained lobbying on basic issues. Aside from occasional forays to Washington,
the VVAW supports veterans' self-help groups in different parts of the country,
placing primary emphasis on the problems of the disadvantaged and minority veteran
-- drug abuse, bad discharges, alientation, unemployment, and veterans in prison.
The Vietnam Veterans National Resource Project, located in New York,
attempts to promote local self-help projects. It is affiliated with 30 to 40 local
veterans groups. It is particularly concerned about psychological issues and the dis-
advantaged minority veteran.
These four organizations are the only Vietnam-era veterans groups of national
or regional significance. There are a large number of local veterans groups ranging
from rather informal discussion and "rap" groups to small projects with good local
reputations -- such as Twice Born Men in San Francisco. Some of the largest of
these are campus groups tied to the NACV. This is especially true in California,
where large concentrations of veterans attend state colleges.
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In addition to the veterans organizations, a number of public interest groups
support individual projects that deal with one or more of the Vietnam veterans issues.
The ACLU runs a small but highly effective discharge project that provides legal
assistance to veterans with bad discharges and studies other aspects of the military
justice system. The National League of Cities, aided by an HEW grant, provides
technical assistance to a selected number of cities that have veterans employment
and referral services. The National Urban League runs a project to support and
illuminate the position of the minority Vietnam-era veteran.
Given their small memberships the Vietnam veterans organizations are
reasonably effective. The institutional structure exists to give the Vietnam veteran
an effective voice, but it is poorly financed, and thus incapable of creating the kinds
of information flows and assistance hook-ups that many feel are needed. Vietnam
veterans are strongly conscious that they must help themselves amd must define their
own problems. They believe they have the talent and initiative to present their own
case most effectively.
It is not surprising that the most sustained attention has been given to educa-
tion and employment, for these are issues that affect the largest number of Vietnam-
era veterans and attract the broadest support within Congress and the big lobbies.
The Vietnam-era veterans have been much less successful in pressing their concerns
in other areas, e.g., drug abuse, discharges, and the Post-Vietnam Syndrome,
because less is known about these problems and there are fewer institutional channels
through which to press claims.
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The Legislative Picture
The current climate for veterans legislation is uncertain for several reasons.
The President has yet to make a statement specifically expressing his views on the
problems of Vietnam-era veterans, the VA is in the process of changing its leader-
ship, and the Administration's current fiscal stance limits the room for new program
initiatives. There is considerable activity in Congress, but it centers on the current
educational assistance bill or looks ahead to legislative proposals in the areas of
housing loans and life insurance. Prospects for legislation of more immediate con-
cern to the younger Vietnam-era veterans seem dim. Only one piece of legislation of
consequence to Vietnam-era veterans is pending -- the Vietnam Era Veterans' Read-
justment Assistance Act of 1974. This bill was recently reported out of conference
after resolution of differences between the Senate and House versions. There is
considerable dissatisfaction with the final version, however, and President Ford has
suggested that the bill go back into conference. Earlier, President Nixon threatened
to veto the bill on the grounds that it was inflationary.
The bill would increase the educational and training allowance from $220 to
$270 for the single veteran without dependents and extend the delimiting date for utili-
zation of benefits from 8 years to 10 years. The bill also liberalizes and strengthens
the opportunities for tutorial assistance and work study; proposes minimal regulation
of the placement activities of correspondence and vocational training institutes; and
liberalizes the rehabilitation options of disabled veterans. Lastly, the bill establishes
a VET Rep program to place VA representatives on at least 500 campuses to assist
FORD & LIBRARY GERATO
-32-
veteran students. The conference rejected the concept of direct tuition payments to
colleges and extending the eligible training period from 36 to 45 months -- provisions
in the Senate version of the bill that were supported by the Vietnam-era veterans
organizations.
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II. AMNESTY
The preceding section of this report focuses on the problems and
prospects facing Vietnam-era veterans as they return to civilian life. The
vast majority of these men and women were honorably discharged. Their
major task now is to readjust to civilian society and to reintegrate themselves
into American life.
A much smaller group of young people, whose opposition to U.S.
policy in Indochina brought them into conflict with the law or led to other-than-
honorable discharge from the armed services, are still affected directly in
their daily lives by the consequences of their illegal actions. Depending on
their individual situations, they remain convicted draft evaders, holders of
bad discharge records, or fugitives from justice. For this group, full
integration into the post-Vietnam world is difficult at best.
The controversial question of offering amnesty to those who protested
the war was first raised seriously in the early 1970's, even before U.S.
participation in the hostilities had ended. Since that time an increasing
number of thoughtful citizens and organized groups have wrestled with the
complex moral and political issues that are inextricably bound up in the
amnesty question. Public attention was focused on the amnesty question
anew by President Ford less than two weeks after he took office in
August, 1974.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
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THE AMNESTY IDEA
The idea of amnesty, an act of grace by the state in which persons
guilty of crimes are released from the penalties set by law, has a long history
in the American experience and deep roots in Western history. In cases
involving long and bitter civil dispute, amnesty often has served as a useful
a nd legal means through which magnanimity, rather than punishment, was
exercised in the broad interest of reconciling a divided society. The act of
granting amnesty waives the normal course of the legal process, but at the
same time it reaffirms the legitimacy and the underlying strength of that
process.
Historical Record
Amnesties have been declared by the President, the Congress, or both,
on 37 separate occasions in our history. About half of these actions dealt with
specific categories of Civil War participants, including Union Army deserters
and the former soldiers and officials of the Confederacy.
During this century, amnesty has not come automatically or quickly
for Americans who were found guilty of desertion or draft evasion during
periods of military hostilities. Although Presidents Coolidge, Franklin
Roosevelt, and Truman did take some action, they pardoned only a small
percentage of the total number of convicted offenders.
There is no precedent in our recent history for universal, uncondi-
t ional amnesty covering an entire episode such as the Vietnam War. There
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-35-
was no general amnesty following either World War I or World War II and no
action at all affecting draft law violators or deserters in the Korean War
Period. Nor is there major precedent for amnesty covering persons who
have not been convicted of crimes and are still sought by authorities.
In Europe, post-World War II amnesties were granted in France,
Norway, Germany, Belgium, Japan, and the Netherlands to some persons who
engaged in compromising activities during the war period. More recently,
President de Gaulle in 1966 amnestied most of those persons who had illegally
resisted the French government's policies in Algeria. De Gaulle's action was
the final step in a series of limited, conditional amnesties that began after
the end of the Algerian war in 1962.
Perhaps the most relevant fact about amnesty revealed by the historical
record is that it proceeds in stages. In the aftermath of our Civil War, the
residual passions and bitterness simply did not permit a quick and simple
general amnesty. Not until Congress in 1898 passed the Universal Amnesty
Act was the drawn-out process of pardon completed. The situation in France
during the 1960's was similar.
"This suggests," Professor Joseph Sax of the University of Michigan
Law School told a Congressional committee in 1972, "that historically there
has been a rising tide of support for amnesty, once the government got it underway. "
1/However, American prisoners of war who declined to be repatriated in 1953
after the Korean War and who subsequently moved to China were not prosecuted
when they came home individually in later years. About 20 former POW's are
in this group.
FORD LIBRARY
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This observation leads to the conclusion that the initiatives undertaken by
President Ford in 1974 may be only the first stage in a progressive broaden-
ng of amnesty for draft law violators, deserters, and other offenders of the
Vietnam era.
Finally, Sax noted that amnesties in American history have been
"quite individualized and selective, tailored to the particular situation; and
inevitably, whatever the Congress and the President did after the Vietnam
War
would be similarly individualized. One can simply draw no precedent
from these various actions of amnesty in the past, " he observed, "as a
standard for what should or will be done about the Vietnam War offenders."
Jurisdictional Question
In many nations the power to grant amnesty rests with the legislature
rather than the executive. In our country, however, the President has explicit
"Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States"
under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. Virtually all amnesties have
been issued by or in the name of the President, although a few have been the
result of Congressional initiative.
The question recently has been raised whether Congress also possesses
constitutional authority to enact broad amnesty legislation. A Justice Depart-
ment spokesman, appearing in March, 1974, before a Congressional hearing,
noted correctly that "Congress has never enacted.
a
general amnesty law
purporting to confer clemency by its own actions, and therefore, the Supreme
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
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Court has never had the occasion to adjudicate the constitutionality of such
a law." In Brown V. Walker (1896), however, the Supreme Court did speak
indirectly on the issue. The Court used language which indicated the
President did not have exclusive authority to grant pardon and amnesty.
The Justice Department in March expressed the view that any legisla-
tion which entailed the release of persons convicted for draft evasion would
be "an obvious usurpation of the President's pardoning power" and would
"interfere with the power of the courts with respect to sentencing and proba-
tion. " More recently, a spokesman for President Ford not ed that whatever
a ctions were taken by the President on amnesty would not be submitted to
Congress for approval.
The view that Congress is limited in its power to act is not widely
S hared in the legal community. Nearly every scholar who has examined the
question, led by Professor Louis Lusky of Columbia University Law School, has
concluded that Congress does have the power to act. This conclusion was
formally endorsed in August, 1974 by the American Bar Association (ABA).
At its annual convention the ABA specifically affirmed the power of Congress
(1) to legislate immunity from prosecution for draft resisters; (2) to modify
the terms and conditions of judicial sanctions imposed on those convicted of
crimes; and (3) to enact broad amnesty legislation.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
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SELECTIVE OPPOSITION TO WAR: A LEGAL PROBLEM
Thousands of young Americans, who have become the possible candidates
for amnesty, found themselves in difficulty during the Vietnam era because
there was no way for them legally to act in accordance with their belief that
participation in this particular war was morally wrong. This fact lies at the
bottom of the amnesty issue.
The nation has long recognized the legitimacy of principled or conscien-
tious objection to all war. For pre-1970 potential draftees into the armed
forces, conscientious objector (CO) status was available to any Selective
Service registrant who could demonstrate to his draft board that he had a
religious objection to service and that this conviction was related to a specific
belief in a Supreme Being. Conscientious objectors either were assigned to
noncombatant roles in the military or were placed in civilian public service
j obs for a two-year period. For soldiers who came to hold similar convictions
a fter entering the armed forces, procedures were provided for early discharge
or transfer to noncombatant duty.
Two Supreme Court decisions, both arising from the Vietnam era, have
clarified the scope of conscientious objector status. In Welsh V. U.S. (1970)
the Court broadened the definition of conscientious objection, ruling that belief
in a Supreme Being was not required and that other deeply felt views could
justify classification as a CO. In a second decision, Gillette V. U.S. (1971),
the Court held that selective opposition to the Vietnam War did not justify CO
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
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status for a young man who otherwise was subject to the draft. A draft-eligible
youth who opposed a particular war would have to choose between obedience to
the law and obedience to his conscience.
Proponents of selective opposition to military service contend that no
one should be put in the position of having to make such a choice. Opponents
fear that allowing selective opposition would jeopardize the nation's ability to
raise and maintain military forces. It is clear that the existence of some
mechanism to permit selective conscientious objection during the Vietnam era
would have kept the amnesty question off the public policy agenda in 1974.
Whether that WO uld have been prudent or wise is quite another question.
Much criticism has been directed at the operation of the conscientious
objector classification system during the Vietnam War period. This criticism
extends both to local draft board practices and to the procedures by which
soldiers could apply for discharge on grounds of conscience.
At the draft board level, CO applications received widely differing
treatment, depending on local custom and policy. The Selective Service
administrative pattern of local decision-making inevitably created inequities.
Some boards virtually refused to grant CO status; others were very liberal.
Qualified observers note that the draft system simply was unprepared
to process the flood of CO applications. Comprehensive figures are unavailable,
but actual inductions in one year -- 1971 -- were outnumbered by applications
for exemption from military service. In the first six months of 1971, local
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
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boards and appeal boards granted between 3, 000 and 4, 000 applications, about
one-fourth of the 12, 000 to 14,000 applications received during the same period.
Relatively few servicemen applied for discharge or transfer to non-
combatant status during the period of hostilities. The peak year for such
requests was 1971, when 4, 381 soldiers filed the required forms. About 63%
of these applications were approved. Critics argue that in-service procedures
were unpublicized, that proper forms were often hard to obtain and that officers
actively discouraged their men from making application. The Defense Department
acknowledges it was not easy to obtain a conscience-related discharge, but it
claims an honest effort was made to adhere to the spirit and the letter of
existing regulations.
Not all the alleged shortcomings of CO classification procedures are
supported by detailed evidence, but it is certainly true that some injustices did
occur. Some men should have been discharged or transferred from combatant
roles after they entered the armed forces. Some individuals broke the law and
fled rather than submit to induction or continue in the military. They are among
the possible candidates for amnesty.
POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR AMNESTY
Four distinguishable groups of persons have been widely mentioned as
possible candidates for amnesty. They include draft resisters, military deserters,
veterans with other-than-honorable discharges, and civilian war protesters.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
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Each group has special problems and faces particular legal disabilities. Propo-
nents of universal, unconditional amnesty would restore civil rights, expunge
conviction records, drop pending charges, and upgrade the discharges of all
members of all four groups. Advocates of limited amnesty face the challenge
of devising workable administrative machinery to determine which individuals
in each category could qualify for amnesty.
The amnesty discussion has been characterized by widely varying asser-
tions about how many people are -- or could be -- affected. The fact is that
no one really knows. The most far-reaching blanket amnesty program would
include perhaps 500, 000 persons. If amnesty were limited to cover only those
offenses which clearly resulted from objection to the U.S. role in Vietnam,
this number would shrink dramatically. It probably would not exceed the 100, 000 -
150, 000 range and possibly would be less than 100, 000.
Draft Resisters
According to Justice Department figures, between 16, 000 and 17, 000
men could be affected by an amnesty for Vietnam-era violations of Selective
Service Laws. It is believed that the great majority in this group were motivated
in their illegal acts by opposition to the Vietnam War. About half of these men
were actually convicted; the other half fled after indictment or their cases have
not yet reached the indictment stage.
Of the total number, 7, 932 have been convicted and sentenced by federal
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
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courts. Although the five-year maximum sentence for draft evasion was meted
out to 384 violators, most sentences were far less severe. Nearly half the
offenders were not sent to prison at all but were placed on probation for vary-
ing lengths of time. Prison sentences for the remaining men ranged from an
average of 37. 3 months in fiscal 1968 to an average 17. 5 months in fiscal 1973.
The severity of sentences varied considerably between different regions of the
nation and many men were paroled long before they had served their full terms.
Just over 100 men are still imprisoned for draft-related offenses. (Conviction
statistics cover the period between the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August, 1964
and the end of the draft in December, 1972.)
Initially, more than 190, 000 young men failed to respond to their induc-
tion orders but more than 80% of them eventually did serve. Selective Service
records show that 19, 271 indictments were issued for draft-related offenses
but more than half the indictments eventually were dismissed either because the
FBI found that a violation was not willful or because a registrant agreed to
induction in lieu of prosecution. Of the 9, 118 cases reaching trial, acquittals
were returned in 1, 186 instances.
Amnesty for convicted draft resisters would restore their full civil
rights and release the handful of violators who remain in prison. Those on
probation would be released from further obligations. As convicted felons,
this group of nearly 8, 000 men have lost the right to vote. In many states
they are barred from qualifying for professional licenses and in extreme cases
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they cannot be licensed to drive an automobile. Amnesty also would mean
that records of conviction would be expunged. The second half of the 16, 000
to 17, 000 amnesty candidates includes (as of Jan. 1, 1974) 5, 119 men under
indictment and 3, 080 others whose cases are under study by the FBI and
federal prosecutors for possible indictment. This group -- about 8, 200
men -- includes 3,000 individuals known to be in Canada, about 500 in other
countries (Sweden is the most popular haven), 3,700 non-fugitives in the U.S.,
and 900 whose whereabouts are unknown to the government.
For these men amnesty would mean the dropping of all charges or
prospective charges against them, the expunging of indictment records and
restoration of the freedom to travel. Unlike convicted draft evaders, these
men have not been formally punished for their violations of law. Many of them
have become permanent residents -- or even citizens -- of their new homelands.
Those who live in Canada have formed exile committees in several major
cities and they publish a regular magazine, Amex-Canada in Toronto. This
effort has been aided by the Field Foundation. The exiles are one of the most
conspicuous forces behind the "universal and unconditional amnesty" movement.
But Justice Department figures do not tell the whole story. An undeter-
mined number of Vietnam-era draft evaders either are living "underground"
at home or in exile abroad because they believe they are sought by the government.
In this category belong all those who failed to register for the draft when they
turned 18 but whose delinquency has not been detected by the Selective Service
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-44-
System. The Selective Service never systematically tried to determine if all
eligible males were in fact registered for the draft, relying instead on voluntary
cooperation and the threat of prosecution against known delinquents. Consequent-
1y, experts believe that some thousands of nonregistrants remain vulnerable
to prosecution. It is believed that most of these men live in the U.S., where
they typically lead disjointed lives, moving frequently and hesitant to take
permanent jobs lest their delinquent status be discovered and reported. There
is some basis to these fears, for the Selective Service System continues to
report alleged draft law violations to U.S. attorneys for investigation. Such
referrals numbered about 750 in the first few months of 1974.
Some of the undiscovered draft evaders have fled to Canada or to other
countries, where their presence helps explain the large gap between official
American statistics on the number of exiles (based on violations known to our
government) and on-the-scene estimates by foreign governments and the exile
communities themselves. Thus, American authorities report that Canada
holds about 5, 100 exiles (known draft resisters and deserters) while Canadian-
based estimates range from 7, 000 - 10,000 (Canadian government estimate) to
40, 000 (some exiles' estimates).
Amnesty for the undiscovered and unpunished draft law offenders would
mean freedom to resume normal lives at home or to return to American society
from abroad. Because of their precarious legal position, violators in this
group have produced few public spokesmen. They obviously do not want their
FORD & LIBRARY 07V838
-45-
identities revealed to American authorities.
Military Deserters
Over the fiscal 1965-73 period the Defense Department reports that
495, 689 servicemen (and women) on active duty deserted the armed forces.
Technically, a desertion is an absence-without-leave of more than 30 days.
As of December 31, 1973, all except 28, 661 deserters had been returned to
military control. When the Defense Department considers the question of
amnesty for deserters, it is referring exclusively to this group who remain
"at large," both in the U.S. and abroad. The Defense Department says 2, 099
in this category are known to be abroad while the whereabouts of the others
are unknown.
Although the gross number of desertions in the Vietnam era seems
large, the desertion rate is at least comparable with figures for World War II,
when ideological opposition to the war effort was virtually nonexistent. The
A rmy desertion rate reached a modern peak of 73. 5 per thousand men in
fiscal 1971, compared to a high of 63. 0 in calendar 1944. Nonetheless,
desertion rates in all services climbed dramatically from fiscal 1965 to the
early 1970's. Since the end of U.S. participation in the Vietnam War, rates
have declined substantially.
Legally, deserters who remain at large have an unfulfilled military
obligation. When returned to military control, a minority of them are court
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-46-
martialed but more often they receive more lenient punishment.
Upon conviction for desertion, a soldier is usually sentenced up to six
months in prison and given a less-than-honorable (usually a dishonorable) dis-
charge. During the Vietnam era about half the 550, 000 courts-martial
p roceedings were connected with absences from duty, including desertions.
No responsible analyst contends that all desertions, or even most
desertions, result from objection to war. Some men flee the military because
of family problems; others leave while under confinement for other military
offenses. In one study, the Defense Department said no specific reason for
desertion could be established in nearly half the cases under review.
At the very least, conditional amnesty for deserters would affect some
of the nearly 29, 000 fugitives from military justice, those whose desertions
were motivated by antiwar feelings or convictions. Unconditional amnesty
would free the entire group from the threat of prosecution.
Pro-amnesty groups believe the much larger number of men who were
tried and punished for desertion also should benefit from amnesty. All of them
have had discharge records which deny them eligibility for veterans benefits
and make it difficult to obtain jobs.
Other-than-Honorable Discharges
Roughly 5. 7% of the seven million Vietnam-era veterans received
other-than-honorable discharges in fiscal 1965-73. There are 424, 868 persons
in this group. Just over half the cases were general discharges. Although
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
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pro-amnesty groups include veterans with general discharges in the category
of those who need relief, it is unclear what the practical effect of upgrading
their discharges to "honorable" would be. A veteran with a general discharge
is eligible for all veteran assistance programs and there is little compelling
evidence that he suffers from severe discrimination in employment.
In the three more serious categories of discharge, there were nearly
163, 000 undesirable discharges, which usually result from administrative
hearings rather than courts-martial; more than 29, 000 bad conduct discharges,
and nearly 3, 000 dishonorable discharges, the least desirable category of
separation from the armed services.
Some of these bad discharges resulted from illegal actions prompted by
opposition to the Vietnam War. Examples of such actions are antiwar activism
on military bases, desertion, or refusal to obey orders. But qualified experts
believe that most bad discharges had nothing to do with ideology. Unfortunately,
few statistics on this aspect of the problem are available.
The result of amnesty for some veterans with bad discharges would be
an upgrading of their discharge papers and consequent eligibility for educational,
housing, medical and pension benefits which now may be denied those in the
three lower discharge categories. A major administrative problem under any
limited amnesty program would be how to determine if opposition to the war
really was the root cause of a veteran's bad discharge.
GERALD FORD LIBRART
-48-
Civilian War Protesters
Little public discussion has been heard about a fourth major group of
possible amnesty candidates: civilians convicted for antiwar activities during
the Vietnam era. Thousands of men and women were arrested for taking their
political views into the streets, but relatively few were convicted of serious
crimes. In almost all cases, convictions were obtained in state, not federal
courts. Those convicted of felonies remain deprived of some civil rights and
may have difficulty gaining certain types of employment, especially in the
licensed professions. There are no good estimates on the number of persons
in this category.
THE ARGUMENTS
Opinions about amnesty remain sharply divided. Feelings are often very
strong. At its heart, the question involves the proper balance between compas-
sion, justice, and law. Until relatively recently, arguments about the merits of
amnesty have been interwoven with judgments about American participation in
the war itself. Until these two issues are fully separated, the continuing
controversy about the war could impede any attempt to make progress on
amnesty.
Case for Amnesty
The most broadly-based argument for amnesty, with or without condi-
tions attached, is that a compassionate policy toward those who violated the
FORD is LIBRARY GRAVED
-49-
law will help heal the domestic wounds caused by the war in Vietnam. Advocates
of this view argue that a substantial number of violators are basically loyal
citizens, capable of constructive and creative effort in American society. They
recognize that many who went into exile -- or to prison -- believed that one or
the other course of action was the best way to dramatize their objections to
the war. They understand that many young men faced a terribly difficult deci-
sion between obedience to conscience and obedience to the law. Advocates also
point out that some young violators may have acted upon a misunderstanding
of Selective Service regulations or at the suggestion of misguided advisors.
They contend that restoration of domestic unity outweighs, in this case, the
value of further punitive measures.
Advocates of universal and unconditional amnesty base their argument
somewhat more narrowly. They argue that in withdrawing from Vietnam the
U.S. implicitly admitted a mistake in foreign policy. Those who first recognized
this error and protested against the policy are therefore vindicated and deserve
amnesty. At the foundation of this argument is the belief that the lawbreakers
are guilty of no crimes and that it is the nation which is guilty.
Case Against Amnesty
Opponents argue that amnesty would invite future violations of military
law and undermine the discipline which is fundamental to military morale and
effectiveness. Conscription in a future war would be impossible if draft-age
FORD & LIBRARY CERALD
-50-
men thought they could flout the law and simply wait for an amnesty to
exonerate them. The individual who breaks the law must accept the consequences
of his acts, otherwise the legal system is seriously undermined and weakened.
Opponents also argue that amnesty would offend those who did serve
in Indochina and in previous wars. It would be especially repugnant to former
prisoners of war, to those who suffered physical disabilities in combat and to
the families of the soldiers who died. The U.S. withdrawal was possible, they
contend, only because the efforts and sacrifices of Americans brought our
o bjectives within sight. Draft evaders and deserters did not share this
responsibility, increasing the burden borne by those who did serve. They
should not be rewarded for failing to support their country in time of war.
CURRENT RESPONSE
From relatively small beginnings in the early 1970's, when the amnesty
issue was the exclusive property of outspoken antiwar activists, some major
religious groups, and a segment of the Democratic Party, an ever-broadening
political constituency has taken shape to support some degree of action.
President Ford's announcement in August that he personally favored and
would implement a policy of leniency toward Vietnam-era offenders marked an
important step in the separation of the amnesty question from the issue of U.S.
policy in Indochina. Through their public statements and writings, several
prominent Republicans -- including Senator Robert Taft, Jr. (R-Ohio), Senator
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-51-
Mark Hatfield (R-Oregon), former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and former
Army Secretary Robert Froehlke -- had earlier expressed similar views. The
President's action has helped establish amnesty as a legitimate subject for
serious consideration by Americans of all political persuasions.
Over the past 2 1/2 years, public opinion polls show very little movement
on the limited question of amnesty for draft evaders in exile. According to both
Gallup and Harris surveys, about one-third of the public favors unconditional
amnesty for this group. About 60% favor amnesty with some conditions attached,
with the rest undecided. In March, 1974, Gallup noted that only 6% of the public
favored jail sentences for draft evaders, a policy which the President also has
rejected. Harris reported at the same time that fully two-thirds of his under-30
sample, which includes many veterans, favored unconditional amnesty.
It is unclear whether the public understands the full scope and complexity
of the amnesty question. Until President Ford's recent statement there had
been relatively little news media coverage or discussion of amnesty since the
1972 Presidential campaign. The issue has not received detailed treatment
by the television networks.
Ford Administration
Speaking on the subject of draft evaders and deserters, President Ford
on August 19 told a VFW convention in Chicago that he would throw "the weight
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-52-
of my Presidency into the scales of justice on the side of leniency. " The
President specifically rejected both "amnesty" and "revenge. " He said an
"earned reentry" program would allow violators to rejoin American society.
Since that time Administration officials have studied a variety of possible plans
but few firm details of the President's intentions have been made public.
Congress
A growing feeling in Congress that some action on the amnesty question
was needed has been left in limbo by the initiatives undertaken by the White House.
Congress probably will not seriously consider action until the President has spoken.
However, three main legislative approaches have been suggested: (1)
blanket amnesty for whole categories of offenders, favored by Representatives
Ron Dellums (D-California), Bella Abzug (D-New York), and others; (2) the
so-called earned immunity approach backed by Senators Robert Taft, Jr. (R-Ohio)
and Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island); and (3) the tentatively-named National Recon-
ciliation Act being drafted in the office of Senator Philip Hart (D-Michigan).
The Dellums-Abzug approach extends amnesty automatically to all
draft evaders, deserters, and civilian war protesters (such as the destroyers
of draft board files) and sets up a five-member Amnesty Commission, named
by the President and Congress. The commission could grant amnesty for
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-53-
violations of other federal laws and could upgrade other-than-honorable dis-
charges. It would work on a case-by-case basis; applicants would have to show
that opposition to the war was at least partly responsible for their legal diffi-
culties or bad discharges.
The earned immunity bill authored by Senator Taft covers only draft law
violators. A five-member Immunity Review Board named by the President would
consider applicants for immunity on a case-by-case basis. For successful appli-
cants who completed up to two years of alternate service, prosecution would be
dropped. As Taft told a House subcommittee, his bill is designed to provide "a
practical method whereby
individuals could return to this country or cease
to be fugitives without creating further divisions among Americans." This ap-
proach reportedly was the starting point of President Ford's thinking on amnesty.
It seems to have widespread support on Capitol Hill.
The Hart bill, not yet introduced, is a carefully thought-out attempt to
deal with several classes of offenders. A National Reconciliation Commission,
operating on a case-by-case basis, would grant unconditional amnesty to draft
resisters and deserters. Upon application by an individual offender, the com-
mission would search out his records, certify his amnesty automatically, and
inform the applicant if separate, non-amnestiable charges were pending against
FORD & LIBRARY 074839
-54-
him. Conviction records would be expunged and all civil rights restored. The
bill in its present tentative form does not deal with the other-than-honorable
discharge problem. Amnestied deserters, however, would be granted general
discharges from the armed forces.
Hearings on amnesty were held for three days in March, 1974, before
a House Judiciary subcommittee chaired by Representative Robert Kastenmeier
(D-Wisconsin). More than fifty witnesses were heard, representing every possible
shade of opinion on the subject. The 900-page printed transcript of the hearings
provides an up-to-date summary of all these positions. The subcommittee may
draft its own bill early next year.
Citizen Organizations
Many religious bodies, including the National Council of Churches,
United Church of Christ, United Presbyterian Church, and the National Catholic
Conference, have taken formal positions in favor of unconditional amnesty at recent
national conventions. A major public education campaign, including distribution of
statements by religious leaders, copies of pending bills, and other study materials,
is conducted by the National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objec-
tors from a Washington office. Spokesmen for this group say public interest in the
question, as measured by incoming queries, has increased steadily over the past
two years.
Perhaps the most effective pro-amnesty organization is the ACLU, which
runs a special public education effort from offices in New York. The amnesty
project is directed by Henry Schwartzschild, who has become a highly visible FORD
GERALD LIBRARY
-55-
proponent of unconditional amnesty.
In addition to the major religious groups and the ACLU, literally dozens
of smaller organizations have set up a New York-based steering group, the
National Council for Universal and Unconditional Amnesty (NCUUA). It serves
as a national-level spokesman for these groups, many of which are purely local
in membership. In 1973, the council sponsored a two-day conference
on amnesty in Washington to act as a catalyst for further public education and
lobbying efforts.
Opponents of all amnesty proposals are not similarly organized. Perhaps
the most outspoken foes of leniency are the old-line veterans groups, led by the
Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the defense establishment. The moderate view
on amnesty is not well served by organized groups. The leading spokesmen for
a middle path at this juncture are individual public officials such as President Ford,
former Defense Secretary Laird, Representative Edward Koch (D-New York, and
Senator Taft.
Institutional and Scholarly Interest
As far as can be discovered, major public policy-oriented institutions have
not taken great interest in amnesty. Some individual scholars, like Professor
Louis Lusky of Columbia University Law School and Professor Joseph Sax of Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School, have examined carefully the major legal questions
involved. Institutions such as the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and
the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton have not addressed themselves to the issue.
Interest in amnesty among major foundations apparently is increasing.
Since 1972 the Field Foundation has granted $110, 000 to the ACLU amnesty project.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-56-
A smaller institution, the DJB Foundation of Scarsdale, New York, provided
$45, 000 in 1973 to finance the NCUUA-sponsored national amnesty conference
in Washington.
At least three major foundations have approached the ACLU recently
to express interest in some phases of the amnesty question. These were the
Stern Fund (David Hunter), the John Hay Whitney Foundation (Hugh Burroughs)
and the Twentieth Century Fund (Josh Nelson). The Whitney Foundation was
interested in local research and public education programs, while the
Twentieth Century Fund wanted to pursue the problem of the administration of
any amnesty program. No grants have yet emerged from these discussions,
as far as is known.
The Board is familiar with previous discussions in this subject area
with the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Foundation.
GERALO FORD LIBRARY
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III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
President Ford's initiative to offer leniency to Vietnam-era
deserters and draft evaders is a most welcome beginning in dealing with
the problems of young Americans that arose as a result of the war in
Vietnam. The President's initial actions will not cause the question to
vanish, but he has legitimized renewed discussion of the issue at the
center of the political spectrum. Rather than solving all the complexities
at a single stroke, the President's actions probably will come to be
considered as an important first step toward full national reconciliation.
The residual bitterness of past conflicts has been dissipated by several
stages of action. That may well become the pattern in the case of Vietnam.
The shape and timing of future steps is not yet known. They will depend
ultimately on public education, research, and the evolution and intensity
of public opinion.
The draft evader-deserter group is not large -- perhaps 45, 000
to 65, 000 persons -- but they have evoked great passion and controversy. In
the heat of emotion, the special problems facing the much larger group
of Vietnam-era veterans have tended to be neglected. The time may
be ripe to widen the focus of attention to include these men and their
situation, in the twin interests of equity and furthering the national
healing process.
The majority of Vietnam-era veterans seem to be adjusting
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
-58-
well to civilian society in the mid-1970's. Their relative socio-economic
status will improve over time. But for a significant minority, severe
problems remain. Some studies already document the incidence of
unemployment, drug abuse, psychological instability and even criminal
behavior among this minority. The problems are linked to low educational
levels, minority group membership, bad discharges, and urban environ-
ments.
Four broad areas emerge as topics needing analysis and action
in the near future: (1) levels of existing benefits compared to the needs
of Vietnam-era veterans; (2) the way federal agencies dispense these
benefits; (3) the special needs of honorably discharged veterans who
belong to minority groups, live in urban areas, may have drug or
psychological problems, and are probably unemployed (between 100, 000
and 150, 000 individuals); and (4) less-than-honorably discharged men
who suffer from job discrimination and loss of VA benefits in many
cases (between 150, 000 and 200, 000 individuals).
Dispassionate and useful studies exist in some of these areas.
But there is need for analysis of the subject as a whole. A high-level
commission, either appointed by the President or with his approval,
could launch this research and stimulate public awareness in a
responsible manner. If a Presidential commission is set up, we would
recommend that the Foundation offer support for some research activities.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
-59-
Private funds can help with research that might otherwise not be undertaken. If such
funds come from several sources, they would provide some measure of broad-based
community support.
Whether or not the President establishes a Commission, the Foundation
should consider, in concert with others, a research program that would focus on some
issues in these areas which are likely to remain difficult and pertinent for some years.
The program would enlist qualified individual scholars or groups, providing small
grants with detailed research goals.
Examples of areas where foundation-supported study could play a useful and
constructive role are:
The processes of adjustment to military life and readjustment to
civilian life;
The consequences of the current discharge system with a view to
developing alternative recommendations;
The issues of conscientious objection to war, with an analysis
of the consequences of permitting selective opposition to par-
ticular conflicts;
The role and functions of the Veterans Administration in the
past and present, and in various possible futures;
Equity issues in veterans benefits;
Veterans and crime;
Veterans and psychological problems;
The special problems of female veterans;
The administrative machinery for amnesty decisions; and
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-60-
The numbers and the legal status of civilian war protesters who
were convicted of state and federal offenses during the Vietnam
period.
The Board may also want to consider support for the fledgling organizations
which are attuned to the specific problems of the Vietnam veteran. They are gen-
erally financially strapped, and rely on membership dues, small foundations, and
other donors for funds. Assistance should reflect a "self-help" approach that
takes account of the veterans' own desires and capacities. These groups help edu-
cate the public and perform many services: vocational, educational, and psychologi-
cal counseling, job placement, and, where available, legal aid. The Foundation
clearly could not undertake major support for a substantial number of these groups,
but there may be a few (e.g., the American Veterans Committee, or the Vietnam
Veterans National Resource Project) whose functions and position among veterans
make it important for us to be helpful.
The legal needs of Vietnam veterans fall into two general categories: (1)
individual aid in petitioning the VA, the Defense Department, and other agencies on
a range of problems including discharges, benefits and disability determinations;
(2) monitoring of government agencies, rule-making, and class litigation. Although
the Foundation probably lacks funds to help in the first category, it could, if the
Board approves, play some role in the latter type of assistance. Staff would not re-
commend the creation of a new institution to meet these needs, but would suggest
either grants to legal organizations now active in the field or supplementary grants
to Foundation-supported public interest law and/or civil rights litigation entities.
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
APPENDIX A
BALD
---------
TABLE 1
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES OF VIETNAM-ERA VETERANS AND NON-VETERANS 20 TO 34
YEARS OLD, 1970 - 74
Chart 1. Unemployment rates of Vietnam-era veterans
and nonveterans 20 to 34 years old, 1970-74
[Seasonally adjusted quarterly averages]
Percent
20 to 34 years
10.0
Veterans
5.0
Nonveterans
0
20 to 24 years
15.0
Veterans
10.0
Nonveterans
5.0
0
25 to 29 years
10.0
Veterans
5.0
Nonveterans
0
30 to 34 years
5.0
Nonveterans
Veter
0
FORD
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
à
LIBRARY
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Source:
TABLE 2
DRUGS COMMONLY USED IN VIETNAM
(Interviewed General Sample, N = 451)
Proportion
Reporting Use
Alcohol
92%
Marijuana
69*
Heroin
34
Opium
38
Amphetamines
25
Barbiturates
23
*Estimated.
Source: The Vietnam Drug User Returns, Special Action Office for Drug Abuse
Prevention, 1973
TABLE 3
PREVALENCE OF WEEKLY DRUG USE IN 3 TIME PERIODS
(in General Sample, N = 451)
Narcotics
Amphetamines
Barbiturates
Marijuana
Total
Of Userst
Total
Of Userst
Total
Of Userst
Total
Of Users
(201)
(180)
(131)
(314)
Total
Before service
*
1%
3%
20%
2%
16%
12%
42%
In Vietnam
27%
62
7
29
9
40
-
I
Since Vietnam
3
35
6
38
3
23
25
56
Net change
+3%
+34%
+3%
+18%
+1%
+7%
+13%
+14%
* <0.5%.
Tin any of the 3 time periods.
Source: The Vietnam Drug User Returns, Special Action Office for Drug Abuse
Prevention, 1973
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF DISCHARGE EFFECTS BY TYPES
OF DISCHARGE*
A. Discharge Inquiries (questions 4-7) :
Inquire into
Look at
Write armed
Discharge
Accept word
Discharge
forces
65.6%
51.8%
46.8%
8.6%
B. Acceptance Policies (questions 8-23) :
Policy
Reject
Influenced
Automati-
Look
by
cally
Behind
Probation
I. General
51.2%
15.1%
77.1%
17.9%
II.
Undesirable
69.1%
28.8%
66.7%
15.6%
III. BCD
75.0%
35.4%
62.2%
14.4%
IV. Dishonorable
77.4%
43.3%
56.3%
11.6%
*Percentages on left of vertical line are total affirmative responses of which those on the
right are a portion.
Source: Military Law Review, 1973
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TABLE 5
Readiustment Problems of Veterans by Race. Rank. Educational Level and Sex
Personal
Have Not
Health Fro-
No
Hard Time
Received
Unable to
Hard Time
blems Affect-
Hard Time
Hard Time
Adjust-
Finding a
Hard Time
Educational
Find My-
Getting
ing My Work
Finding a
or Unable
ment
Steady
Making
Check From
self (Feel
Along With
or Personal
Place to
To Get
Other
Life
Live
a Loan
Problems
Group
Problems
Job
Ends Meet
VA
Lost)
Civiliens
Grand Total
48.4%
22.6%
23.8%
4.4%
11.7%
1.8%
7.1%
5.9%
7.0%
12.1%
Officers
63.4
14.1
13.1
2.8
6.7
1.3
5.3
2.7
3.3
8.5
4.5
12.1
1.8
7.3
6.2
7.3
12.4
Enlisted Personnel
47.3
23.3
24.7
Educational Level
01-11th Grade
39.6
30.7
29.2
5.5
14.1
1.9
10.5
9.0
11.4
14.8
12th Grade
46.7
23.8
24.5
4.3
13.1
2.1
7.6
6.4
7.2
12.6
One or more years
20.6
4.1
8.4
1.2
5.0
4.0
5.2
10.3
of college
54.8
17.5
Race - Male Enlisted
Reservists Only
Negro
31.5
34.4
30.1
7.7
16.8
2.4
9.4
11.8
12.4
18.2
Non-Negro
51.2
20.5
23.6
4.0
11.5
1.6
5.7
5.2
6.3
10.8
GERALD
?
FORD
LIBRARY
Source: The Veterans Administration, "Readjustment Profile for Recently Separated Vietnam Veterans.' "
1973
APPENDIX B
FORD
&
PERALD
APPENDIX B
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RESOURCE MATERIALS
I. VETERANS
BOOKS AND AUTHORED ARTICLES:
Jonathon F. Borus, M.D. "Reentry I: Adjustment Issues Facing the Vietnam
Returnee," Archives of General Psychiatry, Vol. 28, April 1973
"Reentry II: "Making It" Back in the States, " American Journal of
Psychiatry, 103:8, August 1973
"Reentry III: Facilitating Healthy Readjustment in Vietnam Veterans,"
Psychiatry, Vol. 36, November 1973
"Incidence of Maladjustment in Vietnam Returnees, " Archives of General
Psychiatry, Vol. 30, April 1974
P. Bourne, Men, Stress, and Vietnam, Little, Brown & Company, 1970
G.A. Braatz and G.K. Lumry, "The Young Veteran as a Psychiatric Patient,"
Military Medicine, November 1969
Stanley Burmich, "An Analysis of the Situation in Which the Vietnam-era
Veteran Makes the Transition from Military to Civilian Life, " Stanford
University, September 1973
E. Crumpton and L.R. Mutalipassi, "The Young Veteran Patient, " Paper
Presented at Annual Meeting, Western Psychological Association,
April 1970
Eli Flyer, Manpower Research Notes (1970-1974), Directorate for Manpower
Research, Dept. of Defense, Washington, D.C.
K.R. Gover, B.J. McEaddy, "Job Situation of Vietnam-era Veteran,"
Monthly Labor Review, August 1974, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Washington, D.C.
Bradley K. Jones, "The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: Legal and
Empirical Evaluation, " Military Law Review 59, Winter 1973
Page 2.
Sar A. Levitan, Swords into Plowshares: Our G.I. Bill, Olympus Publishing
Co., Salt Lake City, Utah, 1973
"Do Vietnam Veterans Get Enough?" February 1974, manuscript
J.L. Lifton, Home From the War, Simon and Schuster, 1973
Maurice Lorr and Richard P. Youniss, "An Inventory of Interpersonal
Style, " Journal of Personality Assessment, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1973
Mackie McLellan, "From Nietnam to the Streets of America, " manuscript, 1963
Murray Polner, "Profile of Vietnam Veterans, " Office of the Chancellor of
New York City Public Schools, 1972, manuscript
C. Shatan, "Post-Vietnam Syndrome," The New York Times, May 6, 1972
Edward F. Shuman, "Military Justice Without Military Control, " The Yale
Law Journal, June 1973
George F. Solomon, "Psychiatric Casualties of the Vietnam Conflict with
Particular Reference to the Problem of Heroin Addiction, " Modern
Medicine, September 20, 1971, pp. 199-215
"Three Psychiatric Casualties from Vietnam," Archives of General
Psychiatry, December 1971, Vol. 25, pp. 522-524
"A Prediction of Delayed Stress Response Syndromes in Vietnam
Veterans," with Mardi J. Horowitz, unpublished manuscript
Paul Starr, The Discarded Army: Veterans After Vietnam, Report of
Ralph Nader's Center for Study of Responsive Law, 1973
Gilbert Y. Steiner, The State of Welfare, The Brookings Institution,
FORD
Washington, D.C., 1971, Chapter 7
Charles A. Stenger, Dept. of Medicine & Surgery, Veterans Administration,
LIBRARY
Washington, D.C. (various articles)
M.R. Stuen and K.B. Solberg, "The Vietnam Veteran: Characteristics and Needs,"
Paper presented at the American Psychiatric Association Meeting, May 1970
Page 3.
REPORTS AND SOURCE DOCUMENTS:
ACLU Discharge Project, "1973 Report, " Washington, D.C. (other documents)
"Changing Youth Values in the Seventies: A Study of American Youth,"
Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., New York, 1974
"Data on Vietnam Era Veterans," Veterans Administration, Washington, D.C. 1973
Final Report on Educational Assistance to Veterans, (The ETS Study)
Committee on Veteran Affairs, U.S. Senate, 1973
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., "A Study of the Problems Facing
Vietnam Era Veterans: Their Readjustment to Civilian Life, " Study #2131
for Veterans Administration, October 1971
Readjustment Profile for Recently Separated Vietnam Veterans, Department
of Veterans Benefits, Veterans Administration, Washington, D.C. 1973
"Recommendations of Veterans Organizations, 1974. Committee on
Veterans Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives
Report of the Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice in the
Armed Forces, Department of Defense, 1972, Washington, D.C.
Source Material on the Vietnam Era Veteran, Committee on Veterans
Affairs, U.S. Senate 1974
"Summary of Veterans Legislation Reported, " Committee on Veterans
Affairs, U.S. Senate
"Veterans Benefits under Current Educational Programs," Department of
Veterans Benefits, Veterans Administration, Washington, D.C.
Veterans Drug and Alcohol Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
Report of Committee of Veterans Affairs, U.S. Senate 1973
The Vietnam Drug User Returns, Special Action Office for Drug Abuse
Prevention, Washington, D.C., 1973. Principal investigator, Lee Robins,
Ph. D., Washington University, St. Louis (also called the Robins Study)
"The Vietnam Era Veteran, Challenge for Change, " Veterans Administration, 1971
Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974. Report of the
Committee on Veterans Affairs, U.S. Senate
Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Conference
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Report, U.S. Senate
Who Serves When Not All Serve. Report of Commission to Study Selective
Service System (appointed by President Lyndon Johnson, 1967)
Page 4.
II. AMNESTY
AMEX-Canada, magazine published by U.S. exiles in Canada (Toronto, Ont.)
Amnesty, hearings before House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice (Washington, 1974)
Amnesty: A Brief Historical Overview, Library of Congress Congressional
Reference Service (Washington, 1973)
Amnesty for Draft Evaders and Others: Pros and Cons and Possible
Compromises, Library of Congress Congressional Research Service
(Washington, 1973)
Congress and the Amnesty Issue, Library of Congress Congressional
Research Service (Washington, 1973)
"Draft Resisters in Exile: Prospects and Risks of Return, " Columbia Journal
of Law and Social Problems (1971), pp. 1-24
Mark Hatfield, Arlie Schardt, and William Rusher. Amnesty ? The Unsettled
Question of Vietnam (Lawrence, Mass., 1973)
Louis Lusky, "Congressional Amnesty for War Resisters Policy Considerations
and Constitutional Problems," Vanderbilt Law Review (1972), pp. 525-555
James Reston, Jr., The Amnesty of John David Herndon (New York, 1973)
Selective Service and Amnesty, hearings before Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Administrative Practice and Procedure. (Washington, 1972)
William D. Wick, "The Case for an Unconditional, Universal Amnesty for
Draft Evaders and Armed Forces Deserters, " Buffalo Law Review (1972),
pp. 311-334
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APPENDIX C
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APPENDIX C
Following is a listing of persons whose views were solicited and considered in the
preparation of this report. In nearly all cases they were contacted by telephone or
interviewed in person. In a few cases their views were obtained from recent public
statements or position papers.
NAME
AFFILIATION
David Addlestone
American Civil Liberties Union
Discharge Project
Washington, D.C.
David Baker
United States Navy
Washington, D.C.
Mike Beanan
University of California
Office for Veteran Affairs
Irvine campus
Janice Berman
San Francisco Examiner
Sandie Beth
Mt. Diablo Peace Center
Walnut Creek, California
Ron Bitzer
Vista Project
San Francisco, California
Charles Branan
Veterans Administration
Department of Veterans Benefits
Washington, D.C.
Mandy Carter
War Resisters League
San Francisco, California
Jack Colhoun
Staff Editor
AMEX Magazine
Toronto, Ont., Canada
Tim Craig
Director
National Association of Concerned Veterans
Washington, D.C.
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NAME
AFFILIATION
William P. Dixon
Majority Counsel
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration
of Justice
Washington, D.C.
Bill Du Fosse
San Bernardino Valley College
San Bernardino, California
Leslie Dunbar
Executive Director
The Field Foundation
New York, New York
Stuart Feldman
Veteran Coordinator
National League of Cities/U.S. Conference
of Mayors
Washington, D.C.
Richard Filer
Veterans Administration
Department of Medicine and Surgery
Washington, D.C.
Eli S. Flyer
Directorate for Manpower Research
Department of Defense
Alexandria, Virginia
Richard Frank
Center for Law and Social Policy
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Goldsmith
Legislative Assistant
Senate Armed Services Committee
Office of Senator Stennis
Katherine Gover
Research Economist
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Washington, D.C.
Julian Granger
Legislative Assistant
Senate Subcommittee on Drugs and Narcotics
Milton S. Gwirtzman
Attorney
Washington, D.C.
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NAME
AFFILIATION
Larry Hatfield
San Francisco Examiner
Sen. Mark O. Hatfield
Washington, D.C.
(R-Ore.)
Rose M. Hick
Antelope Valley Jr. College
Veterans Services
Lancaster, California
Roger Hickey
Public Media Center
San Francisco, California
Warren Hoover
National Interreligious Service Board for
Conscientious Objectors
Washington, D.C.
Steve Houston
Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors
Bishop Cochran
San Francisco, California
Frank Ivey
Assistant to Congressman Dellums
Berkeley, California
Dr. H.R. Kormus
Former Veterans Administration Psychiatrist
Berkeley, California
Robert E. Lynch
Deputy Director
National Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation
Commission
American Legion
Washington, D.C.
Barry Lynn
United Church of Christ Center for Social Action
Washington, D.C.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
NAME
AFFILIATION
John Matthews
DeAnza College
Office of Veterans Affairs
Cupertino, California
Mike McCain
Vietnam Veterans Against War
San Francisco
Guy McMichael
Chief Counsel
Senate Veterans Committee
Washington, D.C.
Oliver Meadows
Staff Director
House Veterans Committee
Washington, D.C.
Robert K. Musil
National Council for Universal
and Unconditional Amnesty
Washington, D.C.
Frank Noffke
California State University
Long Beach, California
Dr. Albert Piltz
Regional Director
VCIP Program
U.S. Office of Education
San Francisco Region
Jim Remillard
California State University at Chico
Office of Veterans Affairs
California
James Reston, Jr.
Author
Washington, D.C.
Don Rice
Twice-Born Men
San Francisco
Dick Rust
Legislative Assistant
Senator Inouye
Washington, D.C.
Professor Joseph Sax
University of Michigan Law School
Ann Arbor, Michigan
Arlie Schardt
American Civil Liberties Union
Washington, D.C.
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NAME
AFFILIATION
John Schulz
Editor
Selective Service Law Reporter
Washington, D.C.
Harry Schwartzchild
Director
American Civil Liberties Union
Amnesty Project
New York City
John Sessler
Drug Abuse Council
Washington, D.C.
Ms. J. C. Shaeffer
Education & Training Division
Veterans Administration
Washington, D.C.
Duane Shank
National Interreligious Service Board
for Conscientious Obj ectors
Washington, D.C.
Ed Shenk
Grossmont College
Veterans Affairs Office
California
J. Smith
Director
Gonzalo Orrego
Vietnam Veterans National Resource
Project
New York City
Regnia Sneed
Federal Trade Commission
San Francisco
Dr. George F. Solomon
Director of Medical Education
Fresno County Health Dept.
Former V.A. Psychiatrist & Stanford
Medical School Professor
Fresno, California
John Steinberg
Legislative Assistant
Office of Senator Cranston
Washington, D.C.
Dr. Charles Stenger
Dept. of Medicine & Surgery
Veterans Administration
Washington, D.C.
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NAME
AFFILIATION
Bob Steven
Former Asst. to Donald Johnson,
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland
Donald Tucker
Legislative Assistant to
Senator Philip Hart (D-Mich.)
Office of Senator Hart
Washington, D.C.
John H. Vaisey
Attorney
San Francisco, California
Rick Wedgle
Former Aide to Congressman Dellums
Berkeley, California
Fred Wilcox
KCBS
San Francisco
June Willenz
Director
American Veterans Committee
Washington, D.C.
Bob Winston
Veteran Representative
University of California
Berkeley
R. James Woolsey
Former General Counsel
Senate Armed Services Committee
Washington, D.C.
Amy Zinn
Aide, Senator Cranston
San Francisco Office
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APPENDIX D
&
Appendix D
EDUCATION AND THE VIETNAM-ERA VETERAN
Vietnam-era veterans focus their dissatisfaction with current G. I. Bill
educational benefits on several issues: the real economic value of the benefits as
compared to those available to veterans of World War II and the Korean War; the
inadequacy of the benefits to support full-time student status, especially for
married veterans with families; delays in payment, which cause the least affluent
veterans to make erratic and often incomplete use of their benefits; and the
ineligibility of many veterans with "bad discharges" for any educational benefits--
an ineligibility which has disproportionate impact upon minority veterans.
Related to the adequacy and delivery of G. I. Bill benefits is a series
of additional problems affecting the ability of Vietnam-era veterans to complete
postsecondary programs. They, and the veterans' advocates now appearing on
campus (as a result of NEW funds made available to colleges under the 1973 Amend-
ments to the 1965 Higher Education Act), are particularly concerned about low
sensitivity on the part of faculty and administrators to veterans' special educational
and personal problems, inadequate vocational and personal counseling, insufficient
or nonexistent emergency and long-term loans and scholarships for veterans, and
the inability of student veterans to find the part-time jobs necessary to supplement
G. I. benefits.
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DESCRIPTION OF G. I. BILL EDUCATION BENEFITS
Veterans who have served on active duty for at least 181 days since
January 31, 1955, and who received discharges under conditions other than
dishonorable or for service-connected disability are eligible for one and one-half
months of full-time education benefits for each month of active duty. The
maximum educational entitlement is thirty-six months. These benefits must be
used within eight years of the veteran's discharge. Legislation now in conference
would extend the delimiting period from eight to ten years.
Present monthly benefits provide $220 for a single veteran, $261
with one dependent, $298 with two dependents, and $18 for each additional
dependent. These amounts were intended by Congress to meet only part of a
veteran's educational expenses. Beyond his monthly benefit he is expected to
borrow or earn the balance needed for remaining educational and maintenance
expenses. Benefits are reduced proportionately for part-time students.
In addition to these basic benefits, special aid is available for
veterans without high-school degrees, those needing special courses to qualify
for admission to institutions of higher education, and those needing tutorial
assistance while in college. Use of these benefits does not reduce the thirty-six
month full-time entitlement.
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REAL ECONOMIC VALUE OF EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS
The major issue relating to educational benefits in the 1970's is
their adequacy. Congress has traditionally viewed education benefits as merely
an aid to reintegration into civilian life, a supplement to self-help efforts, rather
than a full subsidy for veterans' postsecondary education. Although the first
G. I. Bill covered less than the cost of attending school full-time, Vietnam-era
veterans claim current benefits are worth less than those available to previous
veterans, buy a lower-quality education, and are administered according to a
system which creates geographical and other inequities which did not exist under
earlier bills.
Congress, the VA, and the previous Administration were not
particularly responsive to these contentions, partly because of the memory of
abuses prevalent after World War II, when tuition payments were made directly
to schools, and partly because of the cost of increasing benefits. Vietnam
veterans also argue that the established World War II veterans' organizations
have not made increased education benefits a high priority. Only recently have
grassroots organizations of young veterans publicized the issue.
The value controversy has most often taken the form of comparing
benefits provided to World War II veterans and to Vietnam-era veterans (though
this may not be the most revealing way to look at the issue). The focus of
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Congressional discussion presently is the highly-publicized report of the
Educational Testing Service (ETS), prepared under contract with the VA,
comparing educational benefits under the three G. I. Bills, and the VA rejoinder
to that study. The ETS study concludes that the Vietnam-era veteran has less
purchasing power for education than did the World War II veteran, after cost-of-
living adjustments are made. Additionally, it concludes that a veteran's
financial ability to use G. I. Bill benefits depends more upon his state of residence
than any other factor. The VA, using the same data, concludes that benefits are
roughly equivalent, and does not concern itself with variations in purchasing
power from state to state.
The comparison of residual purchasing power of education benefits
depends significantly upon whether the veteran attends a public or private college.
A veteran at a public institution with average tuition costs is apparently somewhat
better off than his World War II counterpart. If he attends an average tuition-
level private institution, he is worse off. (See Table I.) The reason for the
difference is that after World Warr II, tuition costs under the G. I. Bill, up to a
ceiling of $500, were paid directly to the institution. Subsistence money was
paid directly to the veteran. But Vietnam-era veterans must pay their own tuition
out of a uniform monthly check which makes no allowance for the great disparity
between average public and private tuition costs in the 1970's. Since nearly 80%
of veterans using education benefits attend public institutions, these figures can
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF WORLD WAR II AND VIETNAM ERA
ADJUSTED TO CONSTANT DOLLARS AS OF CALENDAR
FOR VETERANS IN ATTENDANCE AT INSTITUTIONS OF H
VA
assistance
average
Average Rem
school year--
cost of
for
Period of service and school year
9 months
tuition²
ex
World War II (calendar year 1947):
Public.
$1,303
:
$241
$
Private
1,720
658
Vietnam Era (calendar year 1971):
Public.
1,575
367
Private
1,575
1,781
Vietnam Era (Public Law 92-540):
Public.
1,980
367
Private
1.980
1.781
-5-
be interpreted, as the VA views them, to mean that the average Vietnam-era
veteran is eligible for benefits equivalent to those offered World War II veterans.
The figures in Table I should be viewed, however, with several
reservations. First, the selection of the years 1947 and 1971 yields a compari-
son which shows relatively more generous present benefit levels than if 1948
benefits were compared to those of 1974, because World War II benefits were
increased in 1948 and recent inflation has substantially eroded the purchasing
power of present benefits. Second, the figures in Table I apply only to single
veterans. A married veteran with two dependents must earn $133 per month
above his G. I. Bill payments to equal the purchasing power of his World War II
counterpart. Third, other changes both in the G. I. Bill and in general social
and economic circumstances throw into doubt the utility of comparisons of this
kind. For example, World War II veterans had access to low-cost on-campus
housing, and to an expanding postwar job market. Cheap housing lowered sub-
sistence costs and job availability reduced likelihood that the VA check would be
the veteran's only source of income. On the other hand, World War II benefits
were reduced if the veteran had other earnings, a provision which does not apply
now. And World War II veterans did not have access to recent forms of federal
assistance such as food stamps and scholarship loans. The effect of these factors
on the comparison of benefit values are not easily assessed. They have not
figured in the conclusions drawn from the available data by ETS and the VA.
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ETS concludes that for both single veterans and those with dependents,
and for veterans attending both two-year and four-year public colleges, the "real
value" of educational benefits is lower today than after World War II. The main
basis for this conclusion is that present benefits constitute a much smaller pro-
portion of average earnings than did World War II G. I. benefits--a fact consis-
tent with the VA conclusion that present benefits are higher in real purchasing
power for the veteran attending an average-tuition public college, since average
earnings have increased over the decades following World War II much more
rapidly than have consumer prices. The result is that Vietnam-era veterans
attending public institutions which charge average or below average tuition enjoy
slightly more purchasing power, after tuition is paid, than did their World War II
counterparts, but that their benefits are considerably smaller than those of the
World War II veterans when compared to the average earnings and standard of
living of the respective contemporaries who did not see active duty.
Most economists would conclude from these facts that the average
Vietnam-era veteran does not receive benefits equal to those available after
World War II. Viewing education as an investment in human capital, the rate
of return or value to the veteran of his investment of time depends upon the cost
borne by the veteran himself, including both direct educational expenditures and
foregone earnings. The value of the G. I. Bill subsidy can be measured by how
much it lowers the veteran's cost of education. Foregone earnings have been
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shown in extensive empirical studies to be a far more significant educational
cost than the direct expenditures component. The cost of foregone earnings for
a full-time veteran-student can be measured by average earnings in the economy.
Since current benefits meet a much smaller fraction of this cost than did the
older benefits, it is clear that--viewed in a human capital investment framework--
the average Vietnam-era veteran receives a G. I. Bill subsidy of much lower
value than that provided to veterans in the 1940's.
This analysis, concentrating on relative benefit levels, which has
been the focus of discussion about adequacy of education benefits, omits important
non-economic considerations: the sacrifices borne by, and the readjustment
needs of, the two groups of veterans. The World War II veteran was more likely
to have served in combat zones, to have served longer tours of duty, and to have
been a battle casulty. His life was distrupted for a longer period, and he received
less adequate pay and medical care. But while only a minority of Vietnam-era
veterans served in Vietnam, seldom for longer than a year, their sense of
sacrifice, if different, is nonetheless real. These veterans look not to the conomic
status of World War II veterans, but to the economic status of their own peers who
escaped military service--a group better educated, more fully employed, and from
a more upwardly-mobile background than the veterans. If the purpose of G. I.
benefits is to reintegrate servicement into civilian life on equal footing with those
who did not serve, it is the contemporary economic disparity which is the signif-
icant one.
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UTILIZATION OF EDUCATION BENEFITS
The second major conclusion of the ETS study links use of educational
benefits to state-by-state variations in cost and availability of public post-
secondary education. This problem, a serious one for Vietnam-era veterans, did
not exist after World War II when tuition (up to a $500 ceiling) was paid directly to
colleges, leaving veterans with a standard subsistence benefit, wherever they lived
and whether they attended public or private institutions. Today a California veteran
pays $200 of G.I. Bill benefits for tuition at a state college, while a New Jersey or
Ohio veteran pays from $600 to $800 to attend a similar institution.
Per capita payments to veterans vary greatly from state to state. Calif-
ornia leads the major states, with veterans utilizing over $1, 230 in benefits per
capita during Fiscal 1968-72; New Jersey and Ohio veterans used approximately
half as many G.I. Bill dollars per capita in the same period. These figures corre-
late directly within the availability of low-cost public institutions. California has
far more Vietnam veterans than any other state: 35% of these veterans use their
education benefits at colleges while fewer than 14% of Indiana veterans, and only
16% of Ohio and Pennsylvania veterans use their benefits.
States with comprehensive low-cost public post-secondary education for
their residents are granting a substantial subsidy to students, with the true cost
of education more accurately reflected in their out-of-state tuition rates. Congress
probed post-World War II G.I. Bill abuses and was disturbed by the practice of
charging veterans the out-of-state rate. Congress later cut off direct tuition payments
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in part for this reason. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Federal Govern-
ment should figure the true cost of education in computing G.I. benefits, rather
than shifting the burden to the states. Moreover, payment of out-of-state rates
challenged colleges to attract veterans by providing special services and programs,
an incentive not now present.
Another effect of the differential between in-state tuition rates and out-of-
state rates is to limit the educational options available to veterans. Out-of-state
tuition levels at land-grant colleges approach tuition at private colleges; the cost
level has increased fivefold since 1945, now averaging almost $2,000 per year.
The total subsistence plus tuition benefit for a single veteran, $1,980, makes it
equally unlikely that he will attend a private college or that he will be able to leave
his home state. The problem is especially acute in New England and Eastern states
where up to 50% of enrollment in higher education is in private institutions. Veterans
in these states have few options.
Comparison of state-by-state use of the G.I. Bill with the number of
community and junior colleges in the state shows a strong correlation between utiliza-
tion and nearby location of low-cost, easy-access educational facilities. In areas
where public school tuition is high and public facilities limited, available studies
suggest there may be an increased use of correspondence schools, where completion
Some critics of the G.I. Bill are also urging Congress to consider the cost of
hidden federal subsidies paid to veterans in the form of welfare and food stamps.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
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rates are low.
In short, the value to the veteran of his education benefits depends more
upon where he lives than any other single factor. The same variable affects which
educational alternatives are within practical reach of veterans dependent upon G.1 I.
Bill benefits.
Proposals to allow variable tuition allowances have been opposed by the VA
on the ground that variations in the cost of education are not the responsibility of
the VA or the Federal Government. This attitude reflects an assumption that veterans
should not be placed in a better position than non-veteran students who face the same
tuition disparities. Whether veterans alone should be freed from the inequities of
financing higher education, in addition to receiving the existing educational subsidy
of the G.I. Bill, is the policy question underlying debate over variable tuition allow-
ances. Veterans groups point to high post-World War II figures for veteran enroll-
ments at Harvard and Yale in 1947-48, contrasted with 1.5% and .8% respectively
for 1971-72. Even at the land-grant colleges, Ohio State enrolled 51% veterans in
1948-49, and only 7% in 1972-73, and the University of California fell from 44% in
1948-49 to 6.5% in 1972-73. The shift from direct tuition payments is not the only
reason for these changes. Almost universal conscription in World War II, contrasted
with widespread student deferments among Vietnam-era college students, and higher
admissions criteria in the 1970's that tend to exclude rather than welcome the typical
Vietnam-era veteran, contribute to these changes.
FORD & LIBRARY
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But veterans are aware of their concentration in community colleges, and
while there are some educationally sound reasons for such a choice (e.g., avail-
ability of remedial and supplementary programs, receptivity toward adult students
and awareness of their special needs, flexible scheduling of classes, an easier
transition into student life), many express resentment about being channeled into
them by the G.I. Bill.
Finally, in assessing the impact of economic factors in patterns of utiliza-
tion of educational benefits, it has been argued that use of G.I. benefits is inverse
to need. VA statistics show that 15% of returning Vietnam-era veterans have less
than a high school education, but these veterans constitute only about 3% of the total
enrolled in college or junior college under the G.I. Bill. A recent study concluded
that veterans who had some preservice college are twice as likely to make use of the
G.I. Bill than those who had none.
Veterans' advocates on campus claim that even these figures are inflated,
since VA figures include only those who apply for benefits. Many veterans -- especially
those from minority and educationally disadvantaged backgrounds -- drop out of school
because of late arrival of checks and other economic pressures. For example, in
San Diego County in the fall of 1973, of 20,000 students receiving G.I. Bill subsidies,
997 were forced to withdraw from school and 1,692 dropped from full-time to part-
time status as a result of delayed VA checks. Educationally and economically
disadvantaged veterans often must discontinue needed tutorial sessions because tutors,
unlike colleges, are unable to wait for checks to arrive. Moreover, these veterans
FORD LIBRARY
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often require extensive supporting services which few colleges are now providing
for veterans. Until June 30, 1973, when Veterans Cost of Instruction (VCI) funds
were distributed to colleges, only a $4 processing fee was available to colleges for
paperwork involved in enrolling veterans, in sharp contrast to extensive investment
after World War II in special programs and facilities for veterans.
OTHER ISSUES AFFECTING VETERANS' POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION
The nearly 50% of eligible veterans who fail to utilize their education
benefits have been the target for outreach efforts by the VA, VCI on-campus rep-
resentatives, and self-help groups. No systematic assessment of the effectiveness
of these efforts is available yet. Those engaged in outreach efforts believe their
task would be greatly simplified if the military conducted a uniform, thorough pre-
discharge program of information about the G.I. Bill. Existing programs in the
military are not national in scope, and depend for their success upon the commitment
of local unit commanders. In many cases, Vietnam veterans are discharged directly,
alone or in small groups without benefit of transition programs. The great burden
of educational, vocational, and personal readjustment counseling falls upon the
approximately thirty public and private groups involved in veterans' outreach programs.
In 1968 the VA began Operation Outreach, a major effort to inform veterans
of their benefits and to encourage utilization through a series of mailings, toll-free
telephone numbers, and regional counselors. Estimates of success vary. The number
of participating veterans has increased somewhat since 1968, but non-VA groups claim
credit for the increase. Critics say the VA relies on poorly written direct-mail
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
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brochures which receive little attention.
The other major federally-supported outreach program is the Veteran's
Cost of Instruction Payments (VCIP) program administered by the U. S. Office of
Education. It provides funds to colleges for veterans' services in proportion to the
increase in veteran enrollments or the percentage of veterans enrolled. It is in-
tended to encourage special attention to veterans' needs; campus representatives,
often Vietnam-era veterans themselves, attempt to find veterans where they gather --
in poolrooms, unemployment offices, job fairs.
The VCIP program on some campuses is a vital and energetic self-help
program; on others it is an ineffectual, distrusted, overburdened and poorly-supported
token effort. The reason for this mixed record is that campus administrators have
full control over local programs. Staffing, workloads, facilities, and policies vary
greatly from campus to campus. Where commitment to veterans' problems is low,
the program may be viewed as an opportunity to obtain and divert federal money for
other purposes. Also, precarious yearly funding gives VCIP programs an insecure
institutional base. Further, by definition, most VCIP support goes to the campuses
doing the best job of recruiting and retaining veteran students. Those doing little
for veterans, do not even bother to apply for VCIP funds. Even on campuses where
VCIP programs are vigorous, staff must spend much time which should be devoted
to veterans' educational services helping veterans instead to obtain delayed checks
from the VA. Without money the veteran will drop out of school. If VCIP staff
cannot help veterans with this problem their credibility with veterans is diminished
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and the VCIP program loses effectiveness. One VCIP director kept a log for one
and one-half months of complaints which he attempted to expedite through the V.A.
Of 40 inquiries, 27 received no response whatever; keeping track of these cases
absorbed most of the energy of that VCIP office. Its experience is not unusual. A
new Veterans' Representative Program, operated by the VA, may alleviate some
of these problems. In addition to providing on-campus assistance to veterans with
G.I. Bill difficulties, this program will employ more young veterans in VA regional
offices, presumably reducing communication barriers between VA personnel and
Vietnam-era veterans.
CONCLUSION
Vietnam-era veterans do not benefit from the G.I. Bill education benefits
to the extent that older veterans did. Though average purchasing power for some
categories of veterans is equal to or greater than that of World War II veterans, the
value of benefits in terms of human capital investment is far less than the value of
the first G.I. Bill. Moreover, many categories of veterans are worse off econom-
ically, whatever measure is used. Geographical tuition inequities and other pressures
force many veterans into community colleges and correspondence schools. Few of
them attend academically prestigious institutions, public or private, for many reasons:
higher tuition, less receptivity to the needs of adult undergraduates; higher admission
standards applied to a middle-range achievement population; lack of special admissions
and supplementary courses. Their educational choices are limited; though data are
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unclear, their completion rate may be lower than for their peers or for World
War II veterans. Nearly 50% of them fail to utilize their benefits, probably in
part for economic reasons.
More than in previous wars, some returning Vietnam-era veterans seem
to adopt economically marginal, even radical life styles, partly from political
identification, and partly because lack of part-time employment forces them to
subsist on late and relatively small G. I. Bill checks. Colleges do not provide
them with low-cost housing as they did after World War II. Veterans use other
forms of federal and local assistance: food stamps, welfare, unemployment
compensation, state-subsidized tuition. It has been argued that these hidden sub-
sidies ought to be included in the G.I. Bill package, to permit veterans a more
dignified and less anziety-ridden transition into civilian and student life.
Other more specific recommendations include building a tuition-equalizer
into the education benefit, through direct payments or some form of voucher system;
providing support to the non-VA organizations which do the most effective work in
outreach, counseling, and advocacy for veterans; establishing an adequate student
loan and scholarship program for veterans, who are often ineligible for such funds
because of their access to G.I. benefits; increased vocational counseling and work-
study opportunities for veterans; and a system of legal representation for veterans
which would provide adequate counsel at low (or no) cost; to assist in benefit appeals
and upgrading bad discharges.
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