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Second Debate, 10/6/76: Issues - Soviet Union, Detente and Nuclear Policy
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Second Debate, 10/6/76: Issues - Soviet Union, Detente and Nuclear Policy
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Michael Raoul-Duval Papers
Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter Debates Files
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Arms control
Debates and debating
Nuclear nonproliferation
Presidential campaign, 1976
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1976
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The original documents are located in Box 27, folder "Second Debate, 10/6/76: Issues -
Soviet Union, Detente and Nuclear Policy" of the Michael Raoul-Duval Papers at the
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Michael Raoul-Duval donated to the
United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives
collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in
the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are
presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject
to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
SALT: WHY STALLED
WHERE WE WERE:
FIRST, AGREEMENT 1972 FOR FIVE YEARS: COVERED
ONLY MISSILES. NEW AGREEMENT INCLUDED
HEAVY BOMBERS, MIRVs AND LASTS THROUGH 1985.
VLADIVOSTOK:
HAS TO GET CEILINGS AND EQUALITY FOR BOTH
SIDES, NO SPECIAL COMPENSATION TO SOVIETS:
I ACHIEVED THIS AT VLADIVOSTOK: WAS MAJOR
BREAKTHROUGH.
REDUCTIONS:
ALSO HAVE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO REDUCE
CEILINGS.
PROGRESS SINCE:
DURING LAST TWO YEARS TREATY 90 PERCENT
COMPLETE: HAVE GOOD VERIFICATION: CEILING
ON HEAVY MISSILES.
REMAINING ISSUE:
NEW WEAPONS: CRUISE MISSILES AND NEW SOVIET
BOMBER IN GREY AREA: ARE THEY STRATEGIC?
HAVE NARROWED DIFFERENCES, CAN SOLVE.
NON PARTISAN:
TWO IMPORTANT FOR PARTISAN ADVANTAGE:
COMPLETE AFTER ELECTION, SUBMIT TO NEW
CONGRESS.
ALTERNAATIVE:
GOOD SALT AGREEMENT IN LONG TERM NATIONAL
INTEREST; ALTERNATIVE IS ARMS RACE: HAVE TO
SPEND 20 BILLION; OWE IT TO AMERICAN PEOPLE
FORD LIBRARY & GENALD
TRY FOR AGREEMENT.
REBUTTAL ON SALT
TOO HIGH:
ACTUAL LEVELS (2400) REQUIRE SOVIET REDUCTIONS
BY 100-150.
ALREADY HAVE AGREEMENT TO MOVE TO
REDUCTIONS
MISSILE THROW
SOVIETS HAVE HEAVIER MISSILES, BUT WE HAVE
WEIGHT:
MORE ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, MORE WARHEADS
BY 3 TO 1; THERE IS OVERALL BALANCE, CAN
MAINTAIN IF CONGRESS SUPPORTS OUR PROGRAMS:
TRIDENT, B-1, NEW ICBMs.
SOVIET ADVANTAGES: WON'T SIGN AGREEMENT THAT IS NOT EQUAL, IN
OUR INTEREST, AND CAN BE VERIFIED.
CRUISE MISSILE
STILL NEGOTIATING: CRUISE MISSILES NEW TYPE
RACE:
WEAPON. MAY OR MAY NOT BE IN SALT BUT U.S.
NOT OPENING NEW RACE.
CONTINUATION OF NIXON-HAK FOREIGN POLICY
GERALD
LIBRARY
ISSUE: IMPACT OF GRF UPON FOREIGN POLICY INHERITED FROM RN-HAK
1. IN EARLY DAYS OF MY ADMINISTRATION, I MADE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT
TO CARRY FORWARD THE GREAT FOREIGN POLICY TRADITIONS OF THE POST-
WAR ERA:
-- IT WAS URGENT THAT OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES UNDERSTOOD THAT
AMERICA WOULD REMAIN THE STRONGEST PEACEMAKER IN THE WORLD.
WE HAVE ENDED THEIR FEARS. (FOR EXAMPLE, I CALLED NATO
AMBASSADORS IN FOR A MEETING THE DAY I TOOK OFFICE TO REASSURE
THEM THAT AMERICA WOULD BE STEADFAST IN ITS COMMITMENTS. )
-- IT WAS EQUALLY URGENT THAT OUR ADVERSARIES UNDERSTAND THAT
THE U.S. WOULD NOT LOSE ITS CAPACITY OR ITS RESOLVE IN THE
(OVER)
MIDST OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS. IT WAS A TIME OF GREAT
TESTING FOR US. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO SHOW FIRMNESS, AND
CONFIDENCE -- TO DEMONSTRATE THE STABILITY OF OUR POLICY
AND OUR WILL. THE STATE OF THE WORLD TODAY ATTESTS TO THE
SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.
2. so CONTINUITY WAS IMPORTANT IN EARLY DAYS, BUT SINCE THAT
TIME, WE HAVE MOVED VIGOROUSLY ON SEVERAL FRONTS WHERE NEW
PROGRESS AND NEW INITIATIVES SEEMED POSSIBLE. AND WE'VE MADE
STRIKING BREAKTHROUGHS:
-- NEW ACCORDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST;
-- NEW AGREEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA;
(CONTINUED)
CONTINUATION OF NIXON-HAK FOREIGN POLICY (CONTINUED)
-- COORDINATED ATTACK ON WORLDWIDE RECESSION LED BY U.S.;
-- NEW U.S. PROPOSALS TO MEET FUTURE FOOD NEEDS, ASSIST
DEVELOPING NATIONS.
EACH OF THESE REPRESENTS A FORD ADMINISTRATION INITIATIVE AND
A FORD ADMINISTRATION BREAKTHROUGH. EACH HAS FURTHERED THE CAUSE
OF PEACE.
FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY
IMMEDIATE UNCLAS
PRECEDENCE
CLASSE MICATION
DEX
FROM: STEPHEN HERBITZ
DAC 62
GPS
LDX
TO: FOSTER CHANOCK
PAGES 10
Denilar
TTY
CITE
INFO:
Jime30077
DTG: 0601152
401
RELEASED Jul BY TOR: 060210Z
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
FORD LIBRARY y GERALD
1976 OCT 6 01 15
WHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Interviewed by
Mr. Frank Tomlinson, ABC News
At the Pentagon
Tuesday, October 5, 1976
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Q: Mr. Secretary, we've got the highest defense budget in history right
now. Why is it so high?
A: We really don't. We really don't. Because it is down, if one corrects
the budget for inflation, which is an interesting point. It is the highest in
terms of the numbers of dollars in the figure for the overall total. But in
point of fact, the budget today is lower in real terms, after correcting for
inflation than it was ten years ago.
The important thing, I think, in looking at a budget of that type is to
look at it several ways. One is the absolute number, and it's a lot of dollars,
there is no question. A second way is, what kind of a buarden is it on the
society. It is the lowest percentage of our gross national product and the
lowest percentage of our federal budget since before the Korean War. So it's
not a burden in that sense as a percentage burden.
The most important way of looking at the budget, however, is, is it enough.
That is to say, if freedom is a very precious thing, and it is, and if the world
is not a perfectly friendly place, and it isn't; then, indeed, are we investing
the kind of resources we need to have the defense capability, the deterrence,
to deter war, to contribute to peace and stability in the world. I think that's
what's important.
Q: Well, in the face of the world situation as it is today, do we stand
any chance of seeing the defense budget go down in the future?
A: Well, I think that what's happened is that the budget that Presidents
have proposed, of both parties, over a period of a decade, have been cut each
year from their proposals. The effect of it is that our budget today is lower
than 10 years ago if you correct for inflation. Now what the future would hold
I think is a function of what the environment in the world is. And to the extent
that the Soviet Union continues its steady expansion as it has during this period
when we have not, then I think it's clear that the United States cannot allow our
country to move to a position of inferiority. So we have to invest to see that
we have a balance and stability and peace in the world.
Were there to be a change of circumstance, obviously, it wouldn't require
the kind of investment we're making. We take the world like we find it and try
to make it better, but the way to make it better is not to become weak and inject
an instability into the world.
Q: There have been some charges by some of the people on the Hill that
the Defense Department is spending too much for exotic, expensive weapons,
such as the B-1 and so on. Do we really need what they call exotic, expensive
weapons?
A: There is historically, of course, in the Defense Department and in the
defense area been a tug of war over the question of continuing to produce a
current weapons system or reaching out to the next level of technology and in
fact taking that step to develop a new system. It's always a compromise and a
set of balances and eventually, new technology takes over inevitably. It has in
the past, it will in the future.
MORE
2.
In the case of the B-1, we have a strategic nuclear balance, it is
important that we keep that balance. It's based on a nuclear Triad of three
separate systems so that we don't have all of our eggs in one basket, so to
speak. The B-52 is one element of the Triad. To the extent the B-52 ages,
as it does, as all systems do, and some of them are you know, 10, 15, 20 years
old, it's important to see that there is a follow-on system. Successive Secre-
taries of Defense and Congresses have authorized the investment in research and
development for a follow-on system. Later this year, the Defense Department
will be making the judgment as to whether or not that particular weapons system
is ready; the performance data and the tests and everything will be available
and the costs at that time and we will approach it in an orderly way.
Q: I was reading in the Congressional Quarterly about the budget and so
on, and it had listed that it was $28 million in there that went to the CIA
Retirement Fund. Why would that go to the CIA?
A: Well, I don't know what particular part of the budget you were looking
at, but there are several ways of arraying the budget figures. One can look at
simply the Department of Defense or you can look at the defense function, and
group other things in. I would guess that that is why, it was probably under
the category of Defense Function.
Q: I think probably one of the most important things that people would
want to know is if we're talking about $104 billion dollars, are we really
getting our money's worth in what we're spending today?
A: Well, the answer is, I think we are to the extent it's humanly pos-
sible at this point in time to do it. I would never suggest that the Pentagon
is a model of perfect efficiency. There is waste. There is waste in most human
activities -- in domestic departments, in the private sector. We have had cost
overruns in the Department. We're breaking our necks to try to see that the
dollars go in the most efficient way possible so that they are in the highest
priority areas and the taxpayer is getting their money's worth.
We find that when comparing our cost escalations against things like the
John Hancock Building or the Washington Metro or the Rayburn Office Building
in the Congress or the Bay Area Transit, that we do pretty darn well. But is
it perfect? No. Will it ever be perfect? I doubt it. But are we breaking our
necks to try to make it more perfect? You bet your life we are.
Q: If we should get a SALT agreement and MBFR, do you think that might
cause us to lower our military stance somewhat, as far as spending money goes?
A: I think that the reason that the President has pursued so vigorously
the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks and the Mutual Balance Force Reduction
Talks is because there is no question but that there is at least the prospect
for a better world if we are able to agree on some caps on some of these systems.
Now, no one suggests that were you able to achieve those caps on some of the
weapons systems that it would solve all of your problems and suddenly you could
reduce all your defense spending and that type of thing. No one is suggesting
that.
MORE
3.
But it's a step. It's a step in creating a more rational environment
and as long as it is consistent with our national security interests, as long
as we're patient and cautious and recognize who we are dealing with, it does
offer that prospect of avoiding some increases that otherwise would inevitably
have occurred. So we are working on it.
Q: Well, when we go after these weapons systems, is there more than you
ever expect in research and development on these? I mean the cost of research
and development. Does that seem inordinately high?
A: Well, if one thinks about science or technology, take something
like research in cancer. One doesn't know when the progress will be such that
there will be a cure for cancer, but we make that investment. In certain scien-
tific areas you are right on the edge of new technology; it's not really possible
to predict with certainty when you will be able to achieve a certain threshold
or goal. As a result, we work with the Congress to try to see that our
research and development is sensible, that we are working on the things that
are important, and will have the greatest potential payoff. There is no question
but that in any scientific endeavor you can make an investment and have it be a
dead end. That does not necessarily mean it was a failure, because you've learned
that that is not an area where you are going to achieve success.
Q: Well, just one final question. When the Pentagon goes after a budget,
does it act like something like a Union negotiation, do you go after the stars
when all you really want is the moon and when they cut it it really does not
hurt you that much?
A: I think that the truth is there was a pattern to that in past years.
I cannot speak from personal knowledge, but my impression has been that in past
years
there might have been an element of that. There has not been
during my time. We made a conscious decision that we would develop a budget
which I could defend to the Office of Management and Budget and to the President
in good conscience; that we really believed was necessary, and that we would
not kind of wink and close our eye when the Congress cut it by a certain amount
as could be the case. Instead, we put forward what we honestly believe is neces-
sary for the country. If we want to have a stable world, a peaceful world, and
assure ourselves that we aren't inferior, that in fact we have the capability
to deter a war, that was the budget we really believed was necessary.
We even went a step further. We told the country and the Congress that
it was not a one year fix, that is to say, we would have to sustain a higher
level of effort over a period of years to assure that the adverse trends as
between the United States and the Soviet Union over the past decade and a half
in fact were arrested, because they were unacceptable trends. They were adverse
to our interests and they couldn't be continued.
- END -
October 5, 1976
SUBJECT: SHARE OF GNP
Mr. Aspin agrees with our current estimate that the Russians
are spending from 10-15% of their GNP on defense. He concurs in
our assumption that this in some way reflects upon the efficiency
of the defense industry in the Soviet Union. He criticizes our
calculation of these statistics. However, the level of their defense
spending relative to their GNP is an indication of their national
commitment to defense. In contrast, it should be noted that the
U.S. spends approximately 5% of its GNP on defense.
SUBJECT: SPENDING TRENDS
Mr. Aspin concurs with our assessment that the Soviets have
increased their defense spending by approximately 3% per year over
the past decade. He fails to note that during the same period U.S.
defense spending has steadily declined.
SUBJECT: WEAPONS PRODUCTION
Mr. Aspin concurs with our position that the Svoiets have a
great many more weapons than the U.S. and continue to produce their
weapons at a higher rate. He argues that their quantitative rate
is "to a certain extent" offset by the increased quality of U.S.
weapons. This is true, however, he fails to recognize that in the
past decade the Soviet Union has made significant progress in
improving the quality of all their weapons systems.
SUMMARY OF ASPIN FACT SHEET
"The overall thrust of the Aspin piece is clear: the statistics
which the U.S. administration has been using about the relative size
of the U.S. and Soviet defense efforts are-being distorted to serve
the Pentagon's purposes; moreover, even if Soviet defense budgets
have been increasing, we need not worry particularly, for only half
of the purported increases can be viewed as 'threatening' to the
United States.
"Although the facts force Aspin to admit that U.S. and Soviet
defense program trends are adverse to the United States -- the central
point of the article -- he spends the bulk of his essay deprecating
the significance of this. The remainder of the article is devoted
largely to the red herring of conceptual problems in the CIA's method
of comparing the absolute size of the Soviet and U.S. defense program.
Thus, he mostly ignores the data showing that, for the better part of
a decade, in manpower, force levels, equipment, and various other
measures, Soviet military strength has been increasing while ours has
been declining
"
SOURCE: Amos Jordan, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, April 1976
SPENDING TRENDS
CHARGE: About half the Soviet increase has gone into manpower and
equipment destined for the Sino-Soviet border, internal
security forces and other missions that cannot be considered
threatening to the United States or its allies.
ANSWER: It is not clear on what basis Representative Aspin calculates
that only about one-half of the Soviet growth is threatening to the U.S.
It is true that a significant portion of the Soviet growth supported
her build-up along her border with China. But not all of these Soviet
forces are "pinned-down" and incapable of threatening U.S. interests in
Europe or elsewhere. In fact, only about one-fourth of the Soviet ground
forces are in the Far East, and one-half are facing NATO -- a very
important difference for defense planners. (Of overall Soviet forces,
far less than 25% are committed against China.) His related observations
that Soviet Far Eastern deployments do not threaten U.S. interests (or,
indeed, Japan's), presumably because they are anti-Chinese, not only
ignores the security interests and troop deployments of the United States
in Northeast Asia but also presupposes an unwarranted Soviet force
inflexibility.
Indeed, apart from data inadequacies, the flexibility of Soviet forces
and the variability of Soviet marginal resource allocations over time
are crucial weak points in his case. In the past several years, for
instance, the Soviets have not put increased military resources into a
build-up against China or in other areas Aspin delineates as "nonthreatening"
but overwhelmingly into "thrcatening" strategic offensive systems and
associated research and development (R&D).
October 5, 1976
SUBJECT: OVERALL DEFENSE SPENDING
CHARGE: Determining who is spending more on defense depends on
what currency is used. Use a dollar comparison and the
Soviets are spending more, use a ruble comparison and
the United States is spending more.
ANSWER: The Soviets spend rubles, while the U.S. spends dollars.
A comparison between the amount of rubles the Soviets spend on
defense and the dollars we spend is virtually meaningless.
So far as spending for military capability is concerned, we have
observed a steady increase, in real terms, on the part of the Soviet
Union over the past 10-15 years. During the same period U.S. defense
spending -- again, in terms of real purchasing power -- has decreased
steadily. This has resulted in a greatly expanded research and
development base and production rates in the Soviet Union that, in
most instances, exceed ours. On a comparable basis, while the Soviet
Union has been increasing those resources it devotes to defense at an
average of three percent a year since 1965 in real terms, our baseline
defense budget has been declining in real dollar terms.
By any reasonable measure of the size of military programs --
ruble-based or dollar-based -- the Soviets have been growing steadily
while the U.S. has declined. As a result, the Soviet program has
exceeded our own for some years and now does 80 by a substantial margin.
October 5, 1976
SUBJECT: STRATEGIC WEAPONS
CHARGE: The Pentagon likes to point out that the Russians have more
missiles and more explosive power in their warheads. But,
the United States has more warheads and, in fact, the United
States lead in warheads has been growing. We have 1,656
missiles; we have thrown away more than 1,500 missiles.
The Russians have 2,330, many of which are older.
ANSWER: Not only do the Soviets have more missiles, as Mr. Aspin
acknowledges, but they also have significantly greater throwweight
and megatonnage. It is true that the U.S. has more MIRV launchers
and deliverable warheads. When all factors are considered --
BERALD FORD LIBRART
including bombers and hard target destruction potential -- the net
assessment is that rough equivalence in strategic nuclear forces
exists today between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As to Mr. Aspin's
notion that many of the Russian missiles are older ones, current trends
indicate that, by the early 1980's, all or most of the Soviet Union's
existing ICBM's could be replaced with a new generation of missiles.
Indeed their new ICBM's, currently being deployed, have substantially
greater throwweight and are significantly more accurate than their
predecessors.
The growing numbers and technological sophistication of Soviet
strategic forces suggest that, unless countered, the strategic balance
that exists today could shift in favor of the Soviet Union in the
period ahead.
October 5, 1976
SUBJECT: MILITARY MANPOWER
CHARGE: Russian military manpower vastly outnumbers ours, but it
always has, in a large part because they use servicemen
where we use civilians.
ANSWER: The Soviet Union has not, until recently, established forward
operating bases that are remote from her borders. The extension of
Soviet power into Central Europe and along the Sino-Soviet border
does not require the extensive out-of-area logistical and support
forces that the U.S. requires. Rather, the Soviets have historically
built roads and railroads as far forward as possible, enabling them to
load combat equipment at the factory and unload it near the front line.
Road and Railroad troops contribute to the specific mission of main-
taining these lines of communication; they are organized to complete
this mission in peace or war. To ignore the contribution of 100,000
Road and Railroad troops is naive. It would be similar to ignoring the
contributions of the "Red Ball Express" and other such transportation
units during the Allies' dash through France in 1944, as well as our
support units today. Similarly, we should not ignore the contribution
of some 250,000 Soviet construction troops maintaining re-supply routes
and engaging in combat engineer activities, including assault forces.
To eliminate KGB border guards from consideration by comparing them to
border patrols is to ignore Soviet history and the mission of their
forces. These units have been used in some cases as the first wave of
shock troops to attack across an international border. Their armament
2
SUBJECT: MILITARY MANPOWER (Cont'd)
includes tanks, self-propelled guns, and armored personnel carriers.
They are not, as some believe, analagous to the U.S. Border Patrol.
In summary, this list of troops, members of the Soviet armed forces
with military organization, equipment, and combat missions, totals
500,000 to 550,000 men who have been incorrectly categorized as non-
threatening.
Some analysts have made the simplifying assumption that Soviet
manpower levels which exceed U.S. manpower levels in strategic offensive
and defensive forces are excess and non-threatening. Quite the contrary,
the Soviets have more strategic weapons to man and they have manned vast
numbers of intermediate range ballistic missiles which threaten our
allies in Europe and Asia. While it is known that the U.S. military
has offset manpower requirements with technological sophistication, it
is faulty logic to assume that any Soviet manpower strength above U.S.
figures is excess to their mission. Are air defense interceptor regi-
ments, which can be moved to "the sound of the guns" excess? If war
were to break out near the Soviet borders, near China or West Germany
for instance, could decision makers exclude the contributions of 150,000
men and several thousand aircraft? Some analysts also suggest that
political officers be excluded from comparing forces. Political officers
are the second in command of most Soviet combat units, army companies
and battalions, navy ships, and air force regiments; they are akin to the
Executive Officer in U.S. military units. While these political officers
are selected for their political orthodoxy, they are trained to assume
the commander's mission: to fight.
(continued)
3
SUBJECT: MILITARY MANPOWER (Cont'd)
Hence, it is difficult to exclude much Soviet manpower on the
premise that they are "non-threatening." In fact, Soviet manpower
levels have become more threatening in that their force level has
increased from 3.4 million men to something in the neighborhood of
4.4 million -- even excluding some 400,000 border guards and internal
security forces. The U.S. presently has 2.1 million Americans in
uniform.
FORD is LIBRARY 988970
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Mr. Carter has said that he thinks this nation ought to have as its
ultimate goal zero nuclear weapons for any nations in the world. We
must demonstrate meaningful progress toward the goal of control and then
reduction and ultimately elimination of nuclear arsenals.
1. The United States has, does, and will continue to support and pursue
a goal of reducing nuclear weapons for all nations.
2. There are two superpowers on this earth and both must agree to any
reductions.
3. I will not become party to an agreement that in any way detrimentally
affects the national security interests of the United States or any
of its allies.
4. It would be naive and dangerous to act unilaterally.
(a) The United States would act in good faith, but it is highly
unlikely that most other nations, whatever they claimed, would
do SO.
(b) Atomic weapons can be made smaller than a briefcase and easily
hidden.
(c) Those nations with the least moral restraint about using nuclear
weapons would also have the fewest scruples about concealing them.
5. We cannot depend on the good intentions of others for our national
security. When the very existence of our nation is involved, we must
be vigilant, we must be tough, and we must move deliberately, giving
full consideration to the effect of each step.
Q.
Mr. President, isn't it true that your nuclear effort was
developed purely as a response to Governor Carter's
proposals in May and September?
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
Q.
Mr. President, how do your policies differ from
Governor Carter's in the nuclear area?
Overview Response on Nuclear Issues
Nuclear power is one of the most complex issues we face.
It is also one of the most difficult to discuss in a campaign becaus
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
it lends itself so easily to demagoguery. Fortunately, nuclear
power has traditionally been approached in a bipartisan manner.
There has never been a Republican or Democratic position on questions
of nuclear safety or preventing nuclear proliferation. I hope there
never will be.
As President I have dealt with nuclear issues from three different
perspectives:
First, in assuring that our domestic nuclear power plants are
safe and environmentally acceptable;
Second, preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials which
can be used to make weapons;
Third, in developing a balanced program of nuclear and non-nuclear
research and development which will contribute to reduction of
dependence on foreign oil and our vulnerability to embargoes.
My Administration has taken strong action in each of these
areas. For example:
1. Shortly after I took office, I signed into law the bill creating
an independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Its primary
mission is to oversee the development of the nuclear industry from
- 2 -
the standpoint of protecting public health and safety. This
legislation eliminated the potential conflict of interest that
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
existed in the old Atomic Energy Commission where the
regulatory and promotional responsibilities were combined.
2. In the last two years, I have increased the budget for nuclear
safety regulation by more than 60% from $148 million when Itook
office to nearly $250 million this year.
3. In the fall of 1974, I became concerned that some other
nations, eager to become nuclear suppliers, were being tempted
to offer laxity in the treatment of nuclear materials as a
competitive device. I directed the Secretary of State to find
ways of eliminating this dangerous form of competition. As a
result of this effort, the first Conference of Nuclear Supplier
Nations was convened in London in April 1975. That Conference
has met 6 times and the seven nations have agreed to a much tighter
set of guidelines on nuclear exports. I have directed that the
states
United adopt these guidelines as our policy.
4. In the area of energy research and development, I have
increased our commitments in both the nuclear and non-nuclear
areas. By far the greatest increase, however, has occurred in
the non-nuclear area. Coal research has tripled in the last two
years. Solar energy research has increased about 8 times--conservation
research more than 4 times. We now have a balanced program,
and we expect results in both the nuclear and non-nuclear areas
that will contribute substantially to reducing our dependence
on foreign oil.
But the effort to insure that the benefits of nuclear energy outweigh
its risks have not stopped. Several months ago, I initiated a complex
review of the entire nuclear fuel cycle in both its domestic and inter-
national aspects. That review has now been completed. In the
context of this debate, there is obviously not enough time for me to
FORD & LIBRARY 078835
explain fully the decisions that I have made on this entire range of
issues, but I shall announce them in a very short time.
There is one final point that I would like to make on this whole
question of dealing with nuclear energy, particularly on the question of
proliferation. As in so many other areas of foreign policy, the real issue
which confronts the President is to make very sure that what he proposes
is effective. He cannot be satisifed with mere words. In nuclear proliferation
this means making sure that other countries which have the ability to export
nuclear materials and technology abide by the same set of rules as the United
States. If they do not, then all of our words and all of our efforts are in
vain and the world becomes an even more dangerous place than it is.
Achieving cooperation in these areas requires leadership on our part and a
willingness to negotiate positively but firmly to apply strong pressures, as
we have in some cases, to discourage undesirable developments, and to offer
incentives, as we have in other areas, to encourage cooperation. Unilateral
declarations, not matter how good they may sound, will not prevent nuclear
- 4 -
proliferation, and it is with such proliferation that the President
of the United States must concern himself.
10/4/76
REBUTTAL - NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Mr. Carter's remarks on nuclear proliferation suggest that
he has not followed what has been happening in U. S. foreign
policy and he does not know how an effective foreign policy is
FORD if LIBRARY GERALD
made.
His claim that the proliferation issue has been ignored is
flatly wrong. Shortly after I took office I became concerned that
some other nations, eager to improve their nuclear buiness, were
enhancing their competitive position by offering customers easy access
to plutonium. As a nation, we had three choices:
-- compete along with them. But if we did, the world
would become an even more dangerous place than it is
today;
--issue a unilateral declaration like Mr. Carter has proposed
announcing that we did not like what was happening and
threatening other countries with santions they could easily
avoid or ignore;
--Finally, we could take the initiative to eliminate this
dangerous form of competition once and for all on a world-wide
base.
I choose this third course. As a direct result of our efforts, the first
Nuclear Suppliers Conference convened in London in April 1975.
- 2 -
That conference has met six times and the seven nations have agreed
to a much tigher set of guidelines on nuclear exports. I directed
that as an interim step, the U. S. adopt these guidelines as
our policy.
But I was not satisfied that we had done all in our power to effectively
prevent nuclear proliferation. Last summer, therefore, I called
for a complete review of our policy toward plutonium both here and
abroad. That review was completed a month ago. I have made my
decisions. We are now in the process of ensuring that we get the
kind of international cooperation necessary to make an effective
worldwide policy.
Unlike Mr. Carter, I cannot be content with settling for a speech
which sounds good at home but makes no difference abroad. In the
area of nuclear proliferation this is-particularly true. The blunt
fact is that there are other nations who have the technology, the
resources and the will to supply nuclear materials no matter what we
do or say. In order to stop proliferation we must get the cooperation
of all of those nations. We won't get that cooperation by issuing
unilateral declarations. We have gotten it, and we will continue to get
it, by developing wise policies, and by pursuing those policies through
a course of quite, firm and patient negotiation.
FORD & LIBRARY 9ERALD
THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON PROLIFERATION
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
When the President took office, the United States had
three ways of dealing with nuclear proliferation and pre-
venting the spread of plutonium:
-- no U.S. export of reprocessing facilities
-- support for Non-Proliferation Treaty
-- support of International Atomic Energy Agency Safe-
guards Program
Since taking office, he has expanded enormously U.S. efforts:
-- bilateral pressure on those who would acquire plutonium
facilities elsewhere
South Korea
Taiwan
--- much greater financial commitment to research in
U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency to develop
ways of detecting diversion of plutonium.
-- multilateral cooperation to develop common guidelines
for all nuclear suppliers.
-- London Suppliers Conference, beginning April, 1975,
produced new, tougher guidelines on all nuclear exports.
U.S. has adopted as interim policy.
-- comprehensive review (Fri report) begun summer '76
to review entire U.S. stance toward plutonium:
question assumption whether use of plutonium
is either necessary or desirable.
2
As a result of Fri report, President has made decisions
dramatically changing U.S. stance toward use of plutonium:
-- it is not certain that plutonium use is either
necessary or desirable;
-- before we or others commit to it, it is necessary
to establish that the material can be handled in
such a way as to ensure both safety and non-proliferations
-- calls for a three-year worldwide moratorium on export
of all reprocessing facilities;
-- for those countries which do produce plutonium, to
put it in the custody of the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
-- U.S. initiative to undertake agreements restricting
reprocessing and plutonium use;
-- development of financial and technical alternatives
to use of plutonium until and unless its safety is
assured.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
Rebuttal to Carter if Nuclear Proliferation Issue is Raised by Him
I am glad to see Governor Carter is concerned with the issue of
nuclear proliferation. He has aligned himself with a great number
of Republicans and Democrats who have treated this as a serious,
but bipartisan, issue over the past three decades. I cannot imagine
any sane person who would be against nuclear safety or for a system
which would permit nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of
irresponsible groups or nations.
As in so many areas the real issue which confronts a President
is to make very sure that what he proposes is effective. He cannot
be satisfied with mere words. In nuclear proliferation this means
making sure that other countries which have the ability to export
nuclear materials and technology abide by the same set of rules as
the United States. This requires leadership on our part and a
willingness to negotiate patiently, but firmly. Unilateral declarations
may sound good, but they aren't sufficient to prevent nuclear proliferation.
Let me give you an example, Shortly after I came to office, I
directed the Secretary of State to explore ways to prevent suppliers of
nuclear materials from competing by being lax on the issue of safeguards.
In April, 1975, as a direct result of this effort the first conference of
nuclear supplier nations opened in London. That conference has met
six times and the seven nations involved have agreed on a set of much
stricter guidelines to govern nuclear exports. I have directed that
-2-
these guidelines be adopted as U.S. policy. The effort hasn't
stopped. Several months ago I initiated a comprehensive
re-examination of our nuclear policies. That effort is now just
about completed. We are now consulting with other major suppliers
and I expect to announce my decisions in the very near future.
Editorial Publised Friday, October 1, 1976
in the "OREGONIAN" (State's largest newspaper)
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
THE NUCLEAR CARTER
When Jimmy Carter was campaigning the the May Primary in
Oregon, he told newsmen in Eugene, "If I lived in Oregon, I'd
vote for the nuclear safe-guard measure". Four months later
Carter told an audience of labor leaders in Portland, "I am
not in favor of any moratorium on atomic power plants".
Ballot Measure 9, to which Carter referred during the
Primary, would impose an effective moratorium on nuclear power
construction in Oregon, and as many of the Measure's supporters
hope, it might well block all future nuclear development by
imposing on the utility industry conditions that are impossible
to meet.
In May, Carter took a characteristic State's right stance
by declaring, "I have no objection to States declaring a
moratorium if they understand the end results.' He went on to
say that nuclear power should be used only as a "last resort".
Referring to Ballot Measure 9, Carter said he understood it to
be "more liberal" than the nuclear power measure in California
(later defeated 2-1 by a turnout of 6 million voters), and is
thus more acceptable to me".
Judging by Carter's remarks to the Portland labor gathering
(organized labor strongly opposes nuclear measure, believing it
will cause high unemployment) the Democratic nominee sounded
considerably more pro nuclear in September than he did in May.
"For the foreseeable future", Carter said this week,
"we' 11 have to continue to operate and build atomic power plants."
Further, he said, "As a nuclear engineer, I know nuclear power
can be safe." Carter shifted his position of last May when he
said he had no objection to States declaring a moratorium and
gave his support to the Oregon measure.
"We should not permit the 50 states to do the regulation,
but the Federal government should let the people know it will be
safe. We can't have 50 different states doing different things
with nuclear power", he told AFL-CIO labor leaders in Portland.
The idea that the Federal government should be paramount in
nuclear regulation goes beyond the position of many opponents
of Ballot Measure 9 who have cited regulations already incorporated
into Oregon law as being SO tough that a moratorium Ballot Measure
is not needed to ensure the safety of nuclear power in the State.
Carter's aides in Atlanta said Thursday, the candidate has
The Nuclear Carter - Cont'd
-2-
not changed his position in opposing nuclear moratoriums, but
they seemed surprised to learn that the Oregon Supreme Court
in reviewing the material provided by opponents in the
Voters Pamphlet did not consider misleading the contention
that the measure would halt nuclear power development in Oregon.
Carter, in reconsidering his May position, perhaps in light
of the California vote and more knowledge about Ballot Measure 9,
intimates that he would not block the expansion of nuclear
power plants if elected President. On the contrary, he has said
he would support some of the things the utility industry would
like to see done. such as the standardization of nuclear plants
to hold down/Eosts and arésolution of development conflicts that
now prevail in Government agencies.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
Note: Oregon Labor Press, official publication of AFL-CIO
published yesterday has headline -- "Carter Opposed Nuclear
Moratorium Measures".
17 The Voters Pamphlet is informational voters piece that goes
to every registered voter in Oregon--prepared by the Secretary
of State--Federally subsidized- in an attempt to fully inform
electorate on position of candidates and Ballot Measures. It
goes to approximately 1.5 million voters.
Carter is listed on page 28 as a supporter of this nuclear
safeguards measure.
Governor Carter has tried to picture himself as having seized the
initiative on nuclear proliferation policy and forced the
country into action.
His facts are wrong; his recommended policies are wrong.
Less than a month after I took office, Secretary Kissinger addressed
the United Nations and set forth in detail United States concerns
about nuclear proliferation.
In January of 1975 -- under my direction -- the first meeting of
the world's nuclear suppliers met at the urging of the United
States in London to discuss restraints necessary to foster non-
proliferation. That group has now developed a common set of
guidelines and their work will continue.
Bilaterally, in each and every attempt at proliferation --
mix
South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Pakistan -- the U.S. -- under my
orders -- stepped in and tried to in an attempt to prevent it.
In my term of office, 16 additional countries have become
signatories of the non-proliferation treaty -- many at the strong
urging of the United States. These included such countries as
Germany, Japan, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium.
Governor Carter's lack of familarity with these facts --disturbing
as it is -- is not as disturbing as his policy direction.
He is suggesting that the U.S. act unilaterally -- he "will make
no new commitments of nuclear technology
to countries which
refuse" to follow U.S. directions. Such a policy fails to
address the very simple point that even though we might not export
these facilities, other countries can and will. Unless we secure
their agreement to act with restraint, we have done nothing to
further non-proliferation.
This is why it is absolutely essential that we cooperate with
FORD & LIBRARY
other nuclear suppliers -- in the negoitiations I set in motion
more than a year and a half ago.
A second disturbing policy direction is his willingness to
have the Federal Government keep its monopoly on certain aspects
of nuclear supply. There isn't a reason in the world why private
industry -- the big corporations he always talks about --
shouldn't be spending their billions of dollars to produce nuclear
1 min
fuel -- especially when it can't even be used for weapon purposes.
But he wants to let Government continue to do it.
The policy we ought to have is the U.S. Government -- acting
together with other supplier governments -- is providing common non-
proliferation guidelines which private industry follows.
That will achieve both our non-proliferation objectives and our
free enterprise objectives.
10/4/76
Mr. Carter's remarks on nuclear proliferation suggest that
he has not followed what has been happening in U. S. foreign
policy and he does not know how an effective foreign policy is
made.
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
His claim that the proliferation issue has been ignored is
flatly wrong. Shortly after I took office I became concerned that
some other nations, eager to improve their nuclear buiness, were
enhancing their competitive position by offering customers easy access
to plutonium. As a nation, we had three choices:
-- compete along with them. But if we did, the world
would become an even more dangerous place than it is
today;
--issue a unilateral declaration like Mr. Carter has proposed
announcing that we did not like what was happening and
threatening other countries with tions they could easily
avoid or ignore;
- - finally, we could take the initiative to eliminate this
dangerous from of competition once and for all on a world-wide
base. I choose this cour
I choose this third course. As a direct result of our efforts, the first
Nuclear Suppliers Conference convened in London in April 1975.
- 2 -
That conference has met six times and the seven nations have agreed
to a much tigher set of guidelines on nuclear exports. I directed
that as an interim step, the U. S. adopt these guidelines as
our policy.
But I was not satisfied that we had done all in our power to effectively
prevent nuclear proliferation. Last summer, therefore, I called
for a complete review of our policy toward plutonium both here and
abroad. That review was completed a month ago. I have made my
decisions. We are now in the process of ensuring that we get the
kind of international cooperation necessary to make an effective
worldwide policy.
Unlike Mr. Carter, I cannot be content with settling for a speech
which sounds good at home but makes no difference abroad. In the
area of nuclear proliferation this is particularly true. The blunt
fact is that there are other nations who have the technology, the
resources and the will to supply nuclear materials no matter what we
do or say. In order to stop proliferation we must get the cooperation
of all of those nations. We won't get that cooperation by issuing
unilateral declarations. We have gotten it, and we will continue to get
it, by developing wise policies, and by pursuing those policies through
a course of quite, firm and patient negotiation.
10/4/76
Mr. Carter's remarks on nuclear proliferation suggest that
he has not followed what has been happening in U. S. foreign
policy and he does not know how an effective foreign policy is
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
made.
His claim that the proliferation issue has been ignored is
flatly wrong. Shortly after I took office I became concerned that
some other nations, eager to improve their nuclear buiness, were
enhancing their competitive position by offering customers easy access
to plutonium. As a nation, we had three choices:
-- compete along with them. But if we did, the world
would become an even more dangerous place than it is
today;
--issue a unilateral declaration like Mr. Carter has proposed
announcing that we did not like what was happening and
threatening other countries with tions they could easily
avoid or ignore;
-- finally, we could take the initiative to eliminate this
dangerous from of competition once and for all on a world-wide
base.
I choose this third course. As a direct result of our efforts, the first
Nuclear Suppliers Conference convened in London in April 1975.
- 2 -
That conference has met six times and the seven nations have agreed
to a much tigher set of guidelines on nuclear exports. I directed
that as an interim step, the U. S. adopt these guidelines as
our policy.
But I was not satisfied that we had done all in our power to effectively
prevent nuclear proliferation. Last summer, therefore, I called
for a complete review of our policy toward plutonium both here and
abroad. That review was completed a month ago. I have made my
decisions. We are now in the process of ensuring that we get the
kind of international cooperation necessary to make an effective
worldwide policy.
Unlike Mr. Carter, I cannot be content with settling for a speech
which sounds good at home but makes no difference abroad. In the
area of nuclear proliferation this is particularly true. The blunt
fact is that there are other nations who have the technology, the
resources and the will to supply nuclear materials no matter what we
do or say. In order to stop proliferation we must get the cooperation
of all of those nations. We won't get that cooperation by issuing
unilateral declarations. We have gotten it, and we will continue to get
it, by developing wise policies, and by pursuing those policies through
a course of quite, firm and patient negotiation.
2
debate
Nuclear
TAB A
Carter Promises
President's Performance
1. World-wide voluntary moratorium
1. Domestically, Administration has pre-
on national sale or purchase of
vented export of all reprocessing
enrichment or reprocessing
facilities through authority under
plants and withholding authority
Section 810 of the Atomic Energy Act
for U.S. domestic commercial
of 1954, as amended.
reprocessing pending
Internationally, U.S. has
- satisfactory completion of a
multinational program designed
- bilaterally, attempted to stop all
to develop experimentally (not
sales of reprocessing equipment and
full scale demonstrations) the
has stopped a sale to South Korea
technology, economics, regula-
and development of a facility in
tions and safeguards
the Republic of China (Taiwan) ;
negotiations are proceeding to
- development of mutually satis-
stop sales to Pakistan and Brazil
factory ground rules for
management and operation, includ-
- multilaterally, developed through
ing next generation of material
the London Suppliers Group a common
accounting procedures and
set of guidelines requiring safe-
physical security requirements.
guards and security measures in
connection with export of sensitive
If both conditions met, all
facilities, including reprocessing
ensuing commercial reprocessing
facilities.
plants should be on a multi-
national basis.
*The President now proposes
- not accepting reprocessing as
inevitable
"We have no firm domestic policy
on reprocessing
"
- undertaking realistic demonstration
program to determine the safeguards,
economics and technological per-
formance of reprocessing
- undertaking extensive research on
potential alternatives to plutonium
recycle
- encouraging other nations to
participate in the demonstrations
and offering to share information
obtained with other nations.
2. No new U.S. commitments on nuclear
2. Administration's policy
technology of fuel would be allowed
unless recipients agree to
has been
*will be
- forego possessing nuclear
forego possessing
forego possessing
explosives
nuclear explosives
nuclear explosives
but only with re-
with respect to
gard to U.S.-
all nuclear
supplied materials
materials and
and facilities
facilities
- refrain from reprocessing
obtaining a U.S.
insisting on
veto over repro-
recipient fore-
cessing on U.S.-
going reprocessing,
supplied materials
whether or not U.S.
and facilities
supplied material
or facilities are
involved
*Fri recommended new proposal.
GEEALD FORD LIBRABY
2
- place all national nuclear
requiring IAEA
requires IAEA
facilities under IAEA safe-
safeguards on U.S.
safeguards on all
guards
supplied materials
civil nuclear
and facilities
materials and
facilities
Renegotiate existing agreements
renegotiating agree-
*to seek to
to include reprocessing safe-
ment only if amend-
negotiate changes
guards
ment to them
to provide U.S.
required for other
veto of reprocess-
reasons
ing involving U.S.
supplied material
and facilities
3. Call for World Conference on
3. Through U.S. initiative in 1974, the
Energy (along the lines of the
International Energy Agency, consist-
World Food Conference) to develop
ing of 18 industrial consumer nations,
world-wide information on energy
was established to consider common
supplies and needs with a view
problems. In December 1975, U.S.
toward establishing a permanent
participated in French-initiated
World Energy Agency
Conference on International Economic
Cooperation (Producer/Consumer Con-
ference) consisting of 27 countries.
The Conference is in the process of
developing world-wide information on
energy resources and needs, common
research strategies, capital sources
and needs, etc. U.S. has also pro-
posed an International Energy Institute
to provide technical assistance on
energy matters to developing countries
and that proposal will probably be
finalized in December. U.S. has
proposed an International Resources
Bank to guarantee against political
risk on investments for development
of energy resources and other minerals.
4. Support strengthening of IAEA
4. In 1976, Administration requested
safeguards and inspection
$5 million increase in IAEA voluntary
authority
contribution; in addition, U.S. has
over past 2 years more than doubled
other technical assistance to IAEA.
*Even more assistance would be recom-
mended.
5. Place U.S. civil nuclear facilities
5. The Administration has been negotiat-
under IAEA safeguards
ing placement of U.S. civil nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguards for
some time. Formal submission of
"We have failed to fulfill our
agreement was made to, and accepted
under international safeguards.
by, the IAEA Board of Governors on
September 17. The Administration will
now proceed to implement the agreement.
6. Support enlargement of U.S.
6. Administration has proposed legisla-
Government-owned enrichment
tion, passed by the House of Repre-
facilities to insure that U.S.
sentatives, which would authorize
is a reliable supplier
both public and private expansion of
enrichment facilities.
"We have no
...
clear programs to
deal with
uranium enrichment."
*Fri recommended new proposal.
3
7. Explore international initiatives
for
- multinational enrichment plants
There are already two multinational
plants -- both in Europe -- and
Administration has encouraged foreign
investment in new privately-owned U.S.
enrichment plants.
- multinational spent fuel storage
U.S. has encouraged IAEA consideration
areas
and possible implementation of multi-
national spent fuel and plutonium
storage under IAEA auspices; other
participants are receptive and
*President would now announce need for
IAEA study to proceed with such a
regime.
as alternatives to national enrich-
ment and reprocessing plants.
8. Correct disproportionate emphasis
8. Of the Nation's total energy research
in energy R&D, placing more
and development budget, private
emphasis on renewable energy tech-
industry provides about 90% of the
nologies, and relatively less
amount spent on non-nuclear research
emphasis on nuclear power
(oil, gas,coal, etc.) but only 15%
of the Nation's nuclear energy
research. The Federal Government,
fulfilling its historic research role
in the sensitive nuclear area, has
tended to equalize this disparity and
this role needs to be continued.
"Over the last eight years, our
Nevertheless the President has
government has failed to explore
increased the non-nuclear energy R&D
non-nuclear alternative energy
budget by $202 million to $671 million
research and development budget in
in FY 1977. This increase changed the
nuclear fission.'
proportion of non-nuclear items from
20% to 35% of Federal research.
Currently, we estimate that 60% of the
total Nation's energy total research
efforts are in in the non-nuclear field
and 40% are in the nuclear field.
9. Convert breeder reactor research
9. The breeder reactor is the only
to a long-term, possibly multi-
demonstrated, inexhaustible source of
national effort.
energy. (Large-scale solar and fusion
plants are decades away.) To stretch
out current levels of breeder reactor
research -- as the phrase "long-term"
implies -- can only delay answering
crucial questions on environment,
economics and safety.
10. Negotiate with the Soviet Union
10. The Administration has
- comprehensive test ban treaty,
- proposed on several occasions over
with a five-year moratorium
the years a comprehensive test ban
on testing of both weapons
treaty; obstacles have been failure
and "peaceful nuclear devices"
of the Soviets to agree to on-site
while treaty is being negotiated
verification procedures and the un-
willingness of France and the Peoples
Republic of China to become parties;
since prospects of progress appear to
be dim, continuing negotiations are
not likely to be fruitful in the
near future
- through the SALT talks, strategic
- reached accords at Vladivostok
nuclear forces and technology
which limits numbers of strategic
reductions
weapons; Administration is currently
negotiating remaining issues, once
limits of numbers are in place,
President intends to commence
negotiations on reductions in numbers.
* Fri recommended new proposal.
Carter's Charge
President's Performance
1. "We have no
clear programs to
1. The President has committed to
deal with
management and
having a licensed facility for
storage of radioactive wastes." "
long term storage of high level
wastes when the facility is needed,
generally agreed to be 1985. To
that end he has directed the Energy
Research and Development
Administration (ERDA) and the
Environmental Protection Agency
to develop and publish necessary
standards and environmental
statements. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has agreed to cooperate.
ERDA will build the facility. The
President's 1977 budget increased
funding for the nuclear waste
management program from $12 million
to $66 million.
2. Our Government is now unable to
2. Differences between amounts of
account for some 100,000 pounds
nuclear materials carried in the book
of nuclear material, of which
accounts and the results of a
6,000 pounds is weapons grade.
physical inventory in Government
facilities have been less than a
fraction of 1% and represents an
accumulation -- in some cases
of 29 years. The discrepancy
does not represent material that
has been lost or stolen. However,
every discrepancy has been
thoroughly analyzed to determine
the reason for its occurrence.
These reasons have included
personnel errors, instrumentation
errors and deposits of material.
on the literally hundreds of
miles of piping and valves within
large plants.
GERALO FORD LIBRARY
To further increase accuracy and
timeliness of such materials
accounting, the President has
increased ERDA's safeguards
research and development program
from $7 million in FY 1975 to
$20 million in FY 1977. Likewise,
overall support for safeguarding
ERDA's facilities has been
doubled by the President over the
last two years to $176 million.
3. "President Ford has shown us
3. The President's proposal for new
where his priorities lie by
nuclear fuel facilities was
holding legislation to strengthen
unanimously reported out by the
U.S. nonproliferation hostage to
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
his highly controversial proposal
and has passed the House of
for private ownership and operation
Representatives. It would not
of nuclear fuel and facilities." "
only provide for the needs of the
Nation -- with minimal government
of financial assistance -- but would
also reestablish the important role
of the United States as a worldwide
nuclear fuel supplier. U.S. fuel
supply agreements with other
countries have always been
conditioned on the recipients'
2
undertaking strong measures to
safeguard nuclear facilities -- and
thereby contribute significantly
to the world's nonproliferation
goals. A number of Senators refused
even to let this House passed
proposal come to a vote in the
Senate.
The President has worked closely
with the sponsors of the non-
proliferation bill in an effort to
reach agreement on key provisions
and fully supported the non-
proliferation initiatives with his
suggested changes.
The President sought to have both
measures considered by the Senate
since both bills aid in our non-
proliferation objectives.
4. During the years of Republican
4. During the President's
indifference we have done little
Administration, 16 countries joined
to encourage the dozen or more non-
the NPT including Germany, Japan,
NPT countries with active nuclear
Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.
programs to join."
The U.S. played a key role in
encouraging these countries to sign.
10/4/76
REBUTTAL - NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Mr. Carter's remarks on nuclear proliferation suggest that
he has not followed what has been happening in U. S. foreign
policy and he does not know how an effective foreign policy is
made.
His claim that the proliferation issue has been ignored
ALD is R. FORD LIBRARY
flatly wrong. Shortly after I took office I became concerned that
some other nations, eager to improve their nuclear buiness,were
enhancing their competitive position by offering customers easy access
to plutonium. As a nation, we had three choices:
-- compete along with them. But if we did, the world
would become an even more dangerous place than it is
today;
--issue a unilateral declaration like Mr. Carter has proposed
announcing that we did not like what was happening and
threatening other countries with sentions they could easily
avoid or ignore;
--Finally, we could take the initiative to eliminate this
dangerous form of competition once and for all on a world-wide
base.
I choose this third course. As a direct result of our efforts, the first
Nuclear Suppliers Conference convened in London in April 1975.
- 2 -
That conference has met six times and the seven nations have agreed
to a much tigher set of guidelines on nuclear exports. I directed
that as an interim step, the U. S. adopt these guidelines as
our policy.
But I was not satisfied that we had done all in our power to effectively
prevent nuclear proliferation. Last summer, therefore, I called
for a complete review of our policy toward plutonium both here and
abroad. That review was completed a month ago. I have made my
decisions. We are now in the process of ensuring that we get the
kind of international cooperation necessary to make an effective
worldwide policy.
Unlike Mr. Carter, I cannot be content with settling for a speech
which sounds good at home but makes no difference abroad. In the
area of nuclear proliferation this is-particularly true. The blunt
fact is that there are other nations who have the technology, the
resources and the will to supply nuclear materials no matter what we
do or say. In order to stop proliferation we must get the cooperation
of all of those nations. We won't get that cooperation by issuing
unilateral declarations. We have gotten it, and we will continue to get
it, by developing wise policies, and by pursuing those policies through
a course of quite, firm and patient negotiation.
THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON PROLIFERATION
When the President took office, the United States had
FORD i LIBRARY
three ways of dealing with nuclear proliferation and pre
venting the spread of plutonium:
-- no U.S. export of reprocessing facilities
-- support for Non-Proliferation Treaty
-- support of International Atomic Energy Agency Safe-
guards Program
Since taking office, he has expanded enormously U.S. efforts:
-- bilateral pressure on those who would acquire plutonium
facilities elsewhere
South Korea
Taiwan
-- much greater financial commitment to research in
U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency to develop
ways of detecting diversion of plutonium.
-- multilateral cooperation to develop common guidelines
for all nuclear suppliers.
-- London Suppliers Conference, beginning April, 1975,
produced new, tougher guidelines on all nuclear exports.
U.S. has adopted as interim policy.
-- comprehensive review (Fri report) begun summer '76
to review entire U.S. stance toward plutonium:
question assumption whether use of plutonium
is either necessary or desirable.
2
As a result of Fri report, President has made decisions
dramatically changing U.S. stance toward use of plutonium:
-- it is not certain that plutonium use is either
necessary or desirable;
-- before we or others commit to it, it is necessary
to establish that the material can be handled in
such a way as to ensure both safety and non-proliferations.
-- calls for a three-year worldwide moratorium on export
of all reprocessing facilities;
-- for those countries which do produce plutonium, to
put it in the custody of the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
-- U.S. initiative to undertake agreements restricting
reprocessing and plutonium use;
-- development of financial and technical alternatives
to use of plutonium until and unless its safety is
assured.
Overview Response on Nuclear Issues
Nuclear power is one of the most complex issues we face.
It is also one of the most difficult to discuss in a campaign because
it lends itself so easily to demagoguery. Fortunately, nuclear
FORD & LIBRARY OFRALD
power has traditionally been approached in a bipartisan manner.
There has never been a Republican or Democratic position on questions
of nuclear safety or preventing nuclear proliferation. I hope there
never will be.
As President I have dealt with nuclear issues from three different
perspectives:
First, in assuring that our domestic nuclear power plants are
safe and environmentally acceptable;
Second, preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials which
can be used to make weapons;
Third, in developing a balanced program of nuclear and non-nuclear
research and development which will contribute to reduction of
dependence on foreign oil and our vulnerability to embargoes.
My Administration has taken strong action in each of these
areas. For example:
1. Shortly after I took office, I signed into law the bill creating
an independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Its primary
mission is to oversee the development of the nuclear industry from
- 4 -
the standpoint of protecting public health and safety. This
legislation eliminated the potential conflict of interest that
existed in the old Atomic Energy Commission where the
regulatory and promotional responsibilities were combined.
2. In the last two years, I have increased the budget for nuclear
safety regulation by more than 60% from $148 million when Itook
office to nearly $250 million this year.
3. In the fall of 1974, I became concerned that some other
nations, eager to become nuclear suppliers, were being tempted
to offer laxity in the treatment of nuclear materials as a
competitive device. I directed the Secretary of State to find
ways of eliminating this dangerous form of competition. As a
result of this effort, the first Conference of Nuclear Supplier
Nations was convened in London in April 1975. That Conference
has met 6 times and the seven nations have agreed to a much tighter
set of guidelines on nuclear exports. I have directed that the
states
United adopt these guidelines as our policy.
4. In the area of energy research and development, I have
increased our commitments in both the nuclear and non-nuclear
areas. By far the greatest increase, however, has occurred in
the non-nuclear area. Coal research has tripled in the last two
years. Solar energy research has increased about 8 times--conservat
research more than 4 times. We now have a balanced program,
and we expect results in both the nuclear and non-nuclear areas
on foreign oil.
But the effort to insure that the benefits of nuclear energy outweigh
its risks have not stopped. Several months ago, I initiated a complex
review of the entire nuclear fuel cycle in both its domestic and inter-
national aspects. That review has now been completed. In the
context of this debate, there is obviously not enough time for me to
explain fully the decisions that I have made on this entire range of
issues, but I shall announce them in a very short time.
There is one final point that I would like to make on this whole
question of dealing with nuclear energy, particularly on the question of
proliferation. As in so many other areas of foreign policy, the real issue
which confronts the President is to make very sure that what he proposes
is effective. He cannot be satisifed with mere words. In nuclear proliferation
this means making sure that other countries which have the ability to export
nuclear materials and technology abide by the same set of rules as the United
States. If they do not, then all of our words and all of our efforts are in
vain and the world becomes an even more dangerous place than it is.
Achieving cooperation in these areas requires leadership on our part and a
willingness to negotiate positively but firmly to apply strong pressures, as
we have in some cases, to discourage undesirable developments, and to offer
incentives, as we have in other areas, to encourage cooperation. Unilateral
declarations, not matter how good they may sound, will not prevent nuclear
- 4-
proliferation, and it is with such proliferation that the President
of the United States must concern himself.
DETENTE
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
We have deep differences with the Soviets. But we both have
the capacity to destroy the world. This imposes an obligation to reduce
the danger of nuclear war and confrontation.
My policy is to start from a position of unquestioned strength.
-- The Soviets will not negotiate if we are weak; on this basis
I believe we can make progress in areas of mutual interest -- particularly
in controlling nuclear arms.
We will always resist when challenged, but also be prepared to
negotiate if there is good will. The record will be uneven; this is not
surprising after decades of hostility. But we owe it to our children
to persist in the search for peace between the two strongest nuclear
powers.
Rebuttal
We have struck hard bargains in every area;
the
In SALT, we insisted on equality and I got it in/Vladivostok
agreement;
At Helsinki, we insisted on greater freedom of movement for people
and exchange of ideas, and we are holding the Soviets to it;
In trade, we got a good five year grain deal for our farmers with
the Soviets barred from raiding our markets and driving up prices.
We can't call for defense cuts, and expect the Soviets to respect weakness.
We can't confront the Soviets and then have Congress back down als
in Angola.
SALT
If we want long term peace, we have to control the nuclear
arms race. Otherwise we risk an explosion.
In 1972 we froze the number of missiles but only for five years.
I got a new agreement in 1974 with Brezhnev on equal ceilings through
1985 for heavy bombers as well as missiles. This is a major break-
through.
We can go even further. We have agreed that we can reduce
these weapons, and that will be the next major step, after we complete
the current negotiations.
This effort at nuclear arms control is in our national interest.
We owe it to future generations to limit these weapons and reduce the
danger of nuclear war. The alternative is to pour billions of dollars
into a new round of weapons -- and both sides will come out about equal.
But any agreement will have to be equal, and one we can monitor against
violations.
Rebuttal
I will not sign any agreement that is not equal, that can be
verified against cheating, or that gives the Soviets an advantage.
We have agreed to equal ceilings at a level that will force the
Soviets to reduce next year. We can proceed with our programs --
Trident and B-1 and a new missile so there can be no Soviet gain in
strategic balance.
- 2 -
We have a good agreement, we will finish it, and then go to
reductions.
The
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
11 Dupont Circle, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 797-6450
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CALL:
Saturday, October 2, 1976
Tom Halsted (202) 797-6450
(202) 363-7505
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ANSWER TEN ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS
The Arms Control Association today released the texts of the
responses of Presidential candidates Ford and Carter to a ten-part
questionnaire the Association had submitted to them earlier this year.
FORD LIBRARY SERVIC
They were asked to describe their arms control and disarmament
views and to set forth their specific ideas on how to deal with the
dominant problems in the field, among them SALT, nuclear proliferation,
nuclear weapons testing, nuclear and conventional weapons deployment,
and the growing trade in conventional arms. The responses provided
by the Ford and Carter campaign committees, together with the
Arms Control Association's questions, are enclosed.
The Arms Control Association is a nonpartisan national membership
organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of effective
policies and programs in arms control and disarmament. The Associa-
tion's Directors are: William C. Foster, Chairman, Archibald S.
Alexander, Anne H. Cahn, Barry E. Carter, Joseph S. Clark, William
T. Coleman, Jr., William H. Dodds, Adrian S. Fisher, Thomas L.
Hughes, James F. Leonard, F.A. Long, Saul H. Mendlovitz, David
A. Morse, Robert R. Mullen, Herbert Scoville, Jr., Gerard C. Smith,
Barbara Stuhler, Lawrence D. Weiler, and Herbert York. The
Executive Director is Thomas A. Halsted.
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
OCTOBER 2, 1976
PRESIDENT FORD'S AND GOVERNOR CARTER'S RESPONSES TO ACA QUESTIONAIRE
Question 1:
Do you support the proposition that arms control and disarmament objectives are central
to national security? If so, what would you do in your Cabinet appointments and through
your policies to implement this view?
FORD:
CARTER:
President Ford most definitely feels that continued
I believe that the mutual balance of terror is an
negotiations with the Soviet Union, in an effort to
inadequate foundation for a peaceful and stable world
reduce both the level of tensions between the two nations
order. While maintaining our military strength and the
and the dangerous arms race, are necessary to protect
American nuclear deterrent are essential to world order
the interests and security of the United States. As he
under today's conditions, we also need a positive arms
stated in February of this year:
control program as a coordinate element of national
"it is my duty
to do all that I
security policy. The specific steps I favor in the
can to reduce the level of danger by
various major arms control areas are outlined in my
diplomatic means. So my policy for
answers below.
national security can be summed up in
three words: peace through strength.
I believe it is far better to seek
negotiations with the Soviet Union
(based on strength)
than to permit
a runaway nuclear arms race and risk a
nuclear holocaust."
To implement these views the President has apppointed
and retained men, dedicated to such policies, both to
Cabinet and sub-Cabinet positions: Donald Rumsfeld,
formerly our Ambassador to NATO, later the President's
chief of staff, and now serving in another position of
high responsibility as Secretary of Defense; Secretary
of State Kissinger; Brent Scowcroft, assistant to the
President for national security affairs; and Fred Ikle,
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
The President will continue to appoint men of such
high quality to these and other positions in the future.
Furthermore, the policy of attempting to negotiate with
the Russians will continue. Arms control and disarmament
efforts in other parts of the world will be continued
as well.
(MORE)
CONTINUED
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
PAGE 2
PRESIDENT FORD'S AND GOVERNOR CARTER'S RESPONSES TO ACA QUESTIONAIRE
Question 2: Do you believe that cessation of the arms race and general nuclear disarmament should be
forward? the objective of the United States? If you do, what specific proposals would you put
FORD:
CARTER:
While cessation of the arms race and general
The international atomic weapons race must stop.
nuclear disarmament are the ultimate goals of United
I believe that the ultimate goal of this nation should
States policy, they cannot be attained easily or quickly.
be the reduction of nuclear weapons in all nations of
The immediate aim, therefore, of the President's policy
the world to zero. Clearly, this is an ultimate rather
of negotiations is the relaxation of tensions and con-
than an immediate objective, and it may not occur in my
tinued steady gains in our relations with the Soviets.
lifetime. But I would work toward ending the world's
The US policy of controlling the strategic arms race has
growing dependence on atomic weapons by specific measures
been carried on under five Presidents; the agreement at
in the areas of SALT, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear
Vladivostok is aimed at quantitative limitations on such
testing, as outlined below.
weapons. Continuation of our present policy of peaceful
negotiations is our best hope for ever attaining nuclear
disarmament.
Question 3: Do you believe that The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should be strengthened and
given a more important role in developing and implementing national security policies?
If so, how?
FORD:
CARTER:
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency occupies
An early task of my Administration would be reform
a prominent position within the decision-making
of the organization of our national security agencies.
structure of the Ford Administration with regard to
In such a reform, I would emphasize that arms control
national security policies, and no change in that
considerations must be given a major voice in national
position is foreseen. President Ford regards the
security deliberations.
Agency as an important factor in the development of
The Republican Administration has gutted ACDA,
policies in its area. The current Director, Dr. Fred
and that is one of the reasons they have made so little
Ikle, participates in National Security Council meetings
real progress in arms control. Its functions must be
when arms control, disarmament, and arms transfer
revitalized.
questions are under consideration, and ACDA also plays
The exact role of ACDA, or any other agency, would
a prominent role as a member of the Verification Panel
be established in the context of my general review of
where basic policy discussions in this field are studied.
organizational questions. Certainly I would insure that
This indicates the esteem in which the President holds
my Administration would abide by the spirit as well as
the Agency and its officers, and the responsibility he
the letter of the Zablocki Amendment, which requires arms
is willing to lay upon it in elaborating upon his
control impact statements on major new weapons programs--
policies in this complex and crucial policy area.
a requirement which the present Administration has
slighted.
CONTINUED
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
PAGE 3
PRESIDENT FORD'S AND GOVERNOR CARTER'S RESPONSES TO ACA QUESTIONAIRE
Question 4: SALT:
a. Do you favor a SALT II Treaty based generally on the 1974 Vladivostok Accords? If not,
explain your objections.
FORD:
CARTER:
President Ford views SALT II as an extension of
The Vladivostok levels are too high. Moreover,
SALT I, inasmuch as both are parts of our major, over-
despite the ballyhoo, the Administration has not been
all arms control objectives. He feels that SALT I
able to produce an acceptable agreement on the Vladivostok
was quite successful and deserves to be followed up:
guidelines in two years of trying and there still appear
"Those who argue that SALT talks
to be important issues unresolved. Information on the
jeopardize the security of the United
details of the obstacles have not been made public.
States are badly mistaken. In
Whether next year it would be best, if there is still no
Vladivostok we began negotiating an
agreement, to seek to implement the Vladivostok ceilings
agreement which, if successfully com-
and go on from there to agreements on reductions and
pleted, will place equal ceilings on
technological controls, or whether a new approach would
missiles, heavy bombers, and multi-
be required is a judgment on negotiating policy that I
headed missiles
We are continuing
would make only after careful review of where the talks
the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
stand in January, 1977.
with the Soviet Union for the simple
but very good reason that these nego-
tiations offer the best hope for sanity
in super-power relations".
b. Do you believe the SALT II Treaty should place restrictions on the deployment of strategic
cruise missiles?
FORD:
CARTER:
Although cruise missiles may eventually have some
I recognize the possible utility of cruise missiles
limitations placed upon them as part of a comprehensive
of certain kinds for maintaining the effectiveness of
arms. control plan, the Administration does not favor
our bomber deterrent. On the other hand, strategic
the imposition of unilateral restrictions on their
range cruise missiles also present important arms con-
development prior to firm commitments by the other side.
trol issues because of the difficulty in verifying
At present the development of a US cruise missile is
their characteristics and the number of platforms from
well advanced over Soviet efforts and is continuing as
which they could be launched. So cruise missiles pose
an essential element in our strategic arsenal.
a case of the need for arms control factors to be
considered before deployment decisions by the United
States. If I were satisfied that an agreement would be
adequately verified, I would accept, in return for
appropriate Soviet commitments regarding controls on
their weapons, some limits on strategic range cruise
missile deployments in a new SALT agreement.
CONTINUED
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
PAGE 4
PRESIDENT FORD'S AND GOVERNOR CARTER'S RESPONSES TO ACA QUESTIONAIRE
C. After SALT II, what should our goals for SALT III be?
FORD:
CARTER:
President Ford sees the intent of SALT III as a
The core of our dealings with the Soviet Union
continuation of attempts to negotiate limits on strategic
must be mutual reduction of arms and halting the race
nuclear arms. The particular goals will depend upon
in strategic technology. We should negotiate to reduce
the exact achievements of the SALT II negotiations and
the present SALT ceilings on offensive weapons before
the stage of technological development when the SALT III
both sides start a new arms race to reach the current
negotiations begin. As a general concept, SALT II is
maximums, and before new missile systems are tested or
intended to apply quantitative limitations on numbers
committed for production. Attaining these objectives
of vehicles, while SALT III would provide the upper limits
will require hard bargaining with the Soviets, but
on quantitative capabilities and stabilize the strategic
I'm not afraid of hard bargaining with the Soviet Union,
positions of the two super-powers.
and it would strengthen the support for the agreements
that can be reached and show that SALT is not a one
way street.
Question 5: Nuclear Proliferation:
a. What steps should the United States take to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons?
FORD:
CARTER:
President Ford believes that there are several steps
We must make halting proliferation of nuclear
the US must take, and must continue, in order to prevent
weapons a top national priority.
the spread of nuclear weapons:
As President, I would take the following eleven
Through diplomatic channels, encourage
steps to control further nuclear proliferation:
universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation
1. I would call upon all nations to adopt a
Treaty. The recent ratification by Japan,
voluntary moratorium on the national sale or
and the accession of many of the Western
purchase of enrichment or reprocessing plants--
European countries over a year ago, demon-
a moratorium which should apply retroactively
strate the viability of the Treaty.
to the recent German-Brazilian and the
Through mutual security arrangements,
French-Pakistan agreements.
create the protection that permits countries
2. I would make no new commitments for the
to forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
sale of nuclear technology or fuel to coun-
By seeking to lessen regional tensions, the
tries which refuse to forego nuclear ex-
President hopes to reduce the motivation
plosives, to refrain from national nuclear
for the development of nuclear weapons by
reprocessing, or to place their nuclear
states in that region.
facilities under IAEA safeguards.
(MORE)
CONTINUED
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
PAGE 5
PRESIDENT FORD'S AND GOVERNOR CARTER'S RESPONSES TO ACA QUESTIONAIRE
By following a policy of imposing inter-
3. I would seek to withhold authority for
national safeguards on all exported nuclear
domestic commercial reprocessing until the
facilities, and avoiding the transfer of
need for, the economics, and the safety of
sensitive materials, help to meet the legiti-
this technology is clearly demonstrated.
mate needs for electrical power generation
If we should ever decide to go forward with
without providing a capability for weapons
commercial reprocessing, it should be on a
development. At the same time, we must not
multinational basis.
be quixotic in our supply policy since we
4. I would call for an international Con-
will drive recipients to other sources or
ference on Energy, to provide a forum in
to develop their own independent capacity,
which all nations can focus on the non-pro-
and thereby lose our influence and ability
liferation issue. Such a Conference must
to exert control over international nuclear
also explore non-nuclear means of meeting
affairs.
energy demands of other nations so that no
Because the US is not the only supplier
state is forced into a premature commitment
of nuclear technology, President Ford wants
to atomic power.
to obtain the cooperation of other suppliers
5. I would support a strengthening of the
in applying safeguards and restrictions on
safeguards and inspection authority of the
exports. We recently have had good results
IAEA and place all of our own peaceful
in concerting the export policies of the
domestic nuclear facilities under those
major supplier nations, but the President
safeguards.
will continue to press for even stricter,
6. I would seek to renegotiate our existing
and more broadly based, controls and restraints.
agreements as a nuclear supplier, many of which
were entered into before we began insisting
The effectiveness of the International
on reprocessing safeguards and which are now
Atomic Energy Agency is an important key
inadequate.
to achieving an international nuclear
7. I would take steps to ensure that the U.S.
regime where power needs are met under
is once again a reliable supplier of enriched
appropriate safeguards against diversion
uranium - the fuel for civilian reactors which
of nuclear materials to weapons. The
is unsuitable for weapons - by supporting
President believes we should work with the
enlargement of our government-owned facility.
IAEA, both through contribution of money,
8. I would explore international initiatives
and the provision of technical support to
such as multinational enrichment plants and
continuously update and enhance its
multinational spent fuel storage areas which
effectiveness.
could provide alternatives to the establish-
ment of enrichment or reprocessing plants on
a national basis.
9. I would redirect our own energy research
and development efforts to correct the dispro-
portionate emphasis which we have placed on
nuclear power at the expense of renewable
energy technologies. Our emphasis on the
breeder reactor must be converted into a long
(MORE)
term, possibly multinational effort.
CONTINUED
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
PAGE 6
PRESIDENT FORD'S AND GOVERNOR CARTER'S RESPONSES TO ACA QUESTIONAIRE
10. Finally, I would follow through on my
belief that the United States can and should
negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty
with the Soviet Union, and reduce, through
the SALT talks, strategic nuclear forces and
technology.
11. I would encourage the Soviet Union to join
us in a total ban of all nuclear explosions
for at least five years. This ban would
include so-called "peaceful nuclear devices."
b. Should the United States export nuclear fuel and equipment for nuclear power plants to
countries which have refused to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty?
FORD:
CARTER:
The President has not restricted US nuclear
I believe it is important that we create incentives
cooperation to only those countries that have ratified
for all countries to participate in the Non-Proliferation
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, because such a policy
Treaty. For that reason, we should refuse to sell
would not effectively function as a non-proliferation
nuclear power plants and fuels to nations who do not
tool. Other suppliers, who may themselves not be
become a party to the NPT or who will not adhere to
parties to the Treaty, could step in and provide the
strict provisions on international safeguards of nuclear
nuclear facilities and materials, with fewer restraints
facilities or who refuse to refrain from national
than we require. The US not only insists that all of
nuclear reprocessing.
its exported nuclear material be under international
safeguards, but also exercises some additional bilateral
controls over the development of the recipient countries'
nuclear program. For example, nuclear fuel cannot be
reprocessed abroad without US approval.
C. (If your answer to b. is "yes") Should the United States insist that non-parties to the
NPT to which such materials are exported be required to place all their peaceful nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguards?
FORD:
CARTER:
The President considers it an important objective
I believe such a requirement would be a wise one,
to achieve full safeguards on all nuclear facilities in
and that the United States should negotiate with other
non-weapon states. As the first major step in this
supplier nations to make it a condition of all sales.
direction, the key suppliers have undertaken to require
The possibility of achieving such a common position
safeguards on all their exports, thereby closing off
has not been fully explored by the present Administration.
(MORE)
CONTINUED
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
PAGE 7
PRESIDENT FORD'S AND GOVERNOR CARTER'S RESPONSES TO ACA QUESTIONAIRE
external sources of unsafeguarded facilities. He would,
of course, encourage the application of safeguards to
all indigenous facilities as a condition of export,
but does not believe we can enforce such a policy with-
out the cooperation of the other suppliers. Again, a
unilateral US policy simply would not be effective. We
are, however, continuing to meet with the other suppliers,
and expect further progress toward this objective.
Question 6: Nuclear Testing:
a. Do you support a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, verified by national technical
means? Please state your position.
FORD:
CARTER:
President Ford does indeed support a Comprehensive
I support a comprehensive test ban agreement with
Test Ban backed by adequate safeguards, and has taken
the Soviet Union, covering both weapons tests and so-
steps to bring us closer to such a goal. Such a ban
called "peaceful" nuclear explosions. The United
would be useful in stemming the tide of the arms race,
States and the Soviet Union should conclude such an
first by the ban itself, and second, by fostering a
agreement immediately, to last for five years, during
spirit of cooperation between the United States and
which they should encourage all other countries to join.
the Soviet Union.
At the end of the five year period the agreement can
be continued if it serves the interests of the parties.
Such a ban would be a significant arms limitation agree-
ment between the United States and the Soviet Union,
and, as other nations joined, could have highly favorable
effects in reducing the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
National verification capabilities over the last twenty
years have advanced to the point where we no longer have
to rely on on-site inspection to distinguish between
earthquakes and even very small weapons tests, so a
comprehensive test ban verified by national technical
means would be acceptable.
(MORE)
CONTINUED
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
PAGE 8
PRESIDENT FORD'S AND GOVERNOR CARTER'S RESPONSES TO ACA QUESTIONAIRE
b. Do you believe that the proposed Threshold Test Ban (permitting underground tests
up to 150 kilotons and Soviet peaceful explosions of multiple devices totaling higher
yields with U.S. observers present) will be a useful step in controlling nuclear wea-
pons? Please state your position.
FORD:
CARTER:
The President sees the Threshold Test Ban as a
The so-called Threshold Test Ban Treaty represents
useful step toward the ultimate goal of controlling
a wholly inadequate step beyond the limited test ban
nuclear weapons, in that it brings us closer to a
of 13 years ago. The so-called "on-site" inspection
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban with its attendant
provisions of the peaceful nuclear explosions agreement
benefits to the world. As the President said on
signed recently may be a concession in Soviet eyes, but
June 7, 1976:
contrary to Administration claims, they are no compen-
"For 25 years, American Presidents
sation for the PNE agreement's dangerous legitimizing
have been trying to negotiate the
of peaceful nuclear explosions, which are indistinguish-
peaceful experiments in nuclear ex-
able from bombs.
plosions. We have been trying for 25
years to get on-site inspection in the
Soviet Union, to see whether they were
living up to those agreements. I have
just signed, about 10 days ago, a
negotiated settlement that gives the
United States the right to make certain--
to make positive--in the Soviet Union,
that the agreement they signed is lived
up to".
President Ford is concerned that we not stop there, but
continue to press forward in our negotiations to achieve
still more gains under the nuclear test policy of his
Administration.
(MORE)
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THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
PAGE 9
PRESIDENT FORD'S AND GOVERNOR CARTER'S RESPONSES TO ACA QUESTIONAIRE
Question 7: Would you increase, reduce, or maintain the present levels of U.S. nuclear weapons in
South Korea? in Western Europe? If you favor reductions, over what time frame?
FORD:
CARTER:
President Ford has no plans for altering the current
We have many tactical nuclear weapons, some of
level of US military commitments overseas; the present
great size, both within this nation and outside the
deployment represents a careful balance of forces worked
continental limits of the United States. The present
out over a period of many years and is tailored to meet
deployments are more than adequate to accommodate our
the security needs of the US and our allies. In Western
deterrence needs. Tactical nuclear weapons should be
Europe, however, we can visualize that under the proper
withdrawn from unnecessarily exposed positions and their
circumstances such as a reduction in Warsaw Pact forces
numbers related to realistic missions for such weapons.
in central Europe, the US could withdraw a limited number
In particular, tactical nuclear weapons should be
of tactical nuclear weapons, and in fact NATO has offered
withdrawn from Korea as a part of a gradual withdrawal
to do just this. At the same time, the President is
of U.S. ground forces which in turn would be part of
determined to resist attempts at unilateral US disarmament.
an overall coordinated plan to reduce tensions on the
Korean peninsula. This would involve several steps:
--we must see that Korea can defend itself;
--we will leave adequate air support and build
up South Korean air capability;
--we will act only in full consultation with
both South Korea and Japan. It is essential that
nothing be done to cause turmoil in Japan;
--we will seek to encourage the Communist
powers to engage their North Korean friends in a
search for a reduction in tensions in the area.
Question 8: Do you believe the United States should make it a policy not to be the first to use
nuclear weapons in certain circumstances? If so, under what circumstances?
CARTER:
FORD:
The policy of the United States, as expressed by
The use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances
the Ford Administration, has always been that it will
would be an awesome step. I am not hopeful that any
not precipitate a nuclear war. The nuclear capacity of
nuclear war could stay limited. The present Admini-
the United States will be used only when it is seen as
stration has been entirely too casual in discussing the
absolutely essential to the security of the United
possibility of nuclear war, and in appearing to threaten
States and its Allies; for example, an actual nuclear
initiation of nuclear war for political purposes, or for
attack upon this nation. Except in such circumstances,
fighting so-called limited nuclear wars. The concentration
the task of our nuclear forces is to act as a deterrent
of our defense policy, especially our nuclear policy,
must be on deterrence. Unfortunately, we cannot renounce
to an attack by any aggressor.
(MORE)
CONTINUED
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
PAGE 10
PRESIDENT FORD'S AND GOVERNOR CARTER'S RESPONSES TO ACA QUESTIONAIRE
first use of nuclear weapons in those limited situations
where vital and essential United States interests maybe
threatened by military aggression against us or our
allies. This is part of deterrence; of ensuring that a
war will never begin. However, I believe we need to
insure that we and our allies have conventional capa-
bility to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons.
Question 9: Should the United States initiate efforts to control the sales abroad of conventional
armaments? What specific steps should be taken?
FORD:
CARTER:
The demand for armaments of all types around the
I am particularly concerned by our nation's role
world is great, and the number of suppliers is large.
as the world's leading arms salesman. Our sales of
Therefore, any attempt to curtail arms sales will
billions of dollars of arms, particularly to developing
probably be unsuccessful unless all nations involved
nations, fuel regional arms races and complicate our
in the sales of weapons can come to some sort of agree-
relationships with other supplier nations. We cannot
ment. Otherwise, the market will be open only to those
be both the world's leading champion of peace and the
who choose not to participate in the agreement.
world's leading supplier of weapons of war. If I become
President Ford is unwilling to create a situation in
President I will work with our allies, some of whom
which the more responsible nations are forced to sit
also sell arms, and also seek to work with the Soviets,
by, having agreed to cease arms sales abroad, while. the
to reduce the commerce in weapons. We must assess
less scrupulous nations who opt not to join the agreement
every arms sale on an individual national basis, to
are allowed to be the sole suppliers to the ever-
insure that the only sales we make are those that pro-
increasing market. Such a unilateral curtailment would
mote peace in the regions and carry out our committed
do little to restrict the traffic in arms.
foreign policy. At the same time, there are certain
Furthermore, the President is determined that the
arms sales programs, notably those to Israel which
United States retain the option to provide our friends
are necessary so that Israel can pursue peace from a
and allies with the weapons necessary to protect them-
position of strength and security. Our diplomacy in
selves. If we expect them to assume the burden of their
this area should be based on a four part approach:
own defense, they must be able to obtain the resources
(a) An international conference of suppliers and
necessary for that defense. The United States cannot
consumers to put the issue to the forefront of the
be a party to any agreement that would prevent us from
world's arms control agenda, (b) greater US self-
aiding those who depend on our support.
restraint, (c) work with western suppliers and the
The Ford Administration is, however, being very
Soviets to dampen down arms sales promotion, and
judicious in the sales of US arms abroad so that arms
(d) support for regional efforts to limit arms buildup.
are provided only to those who can demonstrate a valid
need for them. We are encouraging other friendly
supplier nations to exercise equal caution along these
lines. The President has directed that all possible
steps be taken to prevent acquisition of arms from us
by those who would put them to illegitimate uses.
(MORE)
CONTINUED
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
PAGE 11
PRESIDENT FORD'S AND GOVERNOR CARTER'S RESPONSES TO ACA QUESTIONAIRE
Question 10: Do you believe the United States should support the proposed World Disarmament
Conference?
FORD:
CARTER:
The concept of a World Disarmament Conference has
Arms control is a worldwide concern: Nonprolifer-
been employed as part of a Communist propaganda campaign
ation is important to both nuclear weapons and non-
for many years; the US has consistantly held that such
nuclear weapons states. SALT is in the interest of all,
a broadside approach is unlikely to yield real results.
not just the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. arms sales divert
In keeping with his policy of seeking to achieve peace
resources from development and build regional tensions
through negotiations, President Ford has supported plans
that could lead to world war; the whole world ultimately
for various meetings in which nations could gather to
bears the burden of expending our planet 'sresources on
formulate programs for specific disarmament objectives.
arms. Therefore, all elements of the world population
In fact, the US has participated in meetings in Geneva
must be fully represented in arms control efforts. At
of this nature. The President would not favor our parti-
the same time, we must treat arms control as a serious
cipation in large and unstructured conferences if they
business, not an occasion for posturing or propaganda.
appeared to be simply a tool by which certain groups of
For that reason, I am skeptical about very large
nations would elaborate unworkable proposals, and subvert
scale disarmament conferences with no clear agenda.
such meetings to their own purposes.
But if we can develop an appropriate agenda, I would
The President is of the opinion that the results
favor as broad a conference as possible on the control
of arms control and reduction conferences must fully
of conventional weapons in order to move this issue
protect the security of the United States. The costs,
to the front rank of the world's concerns. I also
benefits, and responsibilities of disarmament plans
favor an international conference on energy to provide
must be fully shared on a fair basis by all nations
a forum in which all nations can focus on the non-
involved. No nation should be allowed to gain an
proliferation issue as well as other energy issues.
advantage at the expense of another. An equitable
agreement would be one which will bring about true world
disarmament.
##
SALT: WHY STALLED
WHERE WE WERE:
FIRST, AGREEMENT 1972 FOR FIVE YEARS: COVERED
ONLY MISSILES. NEW AGREEMENT INCLUDED
HEAVY BOMBERS, MIRVs AND LASTS THROUGH 1985.
VLADIVOSTOK:
HAS TO GET CEILINGS AND EQUALITY FOR BOTH
SIDES, NO SPECIAL COMPENSATION TO SOVIETS:
I ACHIEVED THIS AT VLADIVOSTOK: WAS MAJOR
BREAKTHROUGH.
REDUCTIONS:
ALSO HAVE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO REDUCE
CEILINGS.
PROGRESS SINCE:
DURING LAST TWO YEARS TREATY 90 PERCENT
COMPLETE: HAVE GOOD VERIFICATION: CEILING
ON HEAVY MISSILES.
REMAINING ISSUE:
NEW WEAPONS: CRUISE MISSILES AND NEW SOVIET
BOMBER IN GREY AREA: ARE THEY STRATEGIC?
HAVE NARROWED DIFFERENCES, CAN SOLVE.
NON PARTISAN:
TWO IMPORTANT FOR PARTISAN ADVANTAGE:
COMPLETE AFTER ELECTION, SUBMIT TO NEW
CONGRESS.
ALTERNAATIVE:
GOOD SALT AGREEMENT IN LONG TERM NATIONAL
INTEREST; ALTERNATIVE IS ARMS RACE: HAVE TO
GERALD FORD VIBRARY
SPEND 20 BILLION; OWE IT TO AMERICAN PEOPLE
TRY FOR AGREEMENT.
REBUTTAL ON SALT
TOO HIGH:
ACTUAL LEVELS (2400) REQUIRE SOVIET REDUCTIONS
BY 100-150.
ALREADY HAVE AGREEMENT TO MOVE TO
REDUCTIONS
MISSILE THROW
SOVIETS HAVE HEAVIER MISSILES, BUT WE HAVE
WEIGHT:
MORE ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, MORE WARHEADS
BY 3 TO 1; THERE IS OVERALL BALANCE, CAN
MAINTAIN IF CONGRESS SUPPORTS OUR PROGRAMS:
TRIDENT, B-1, NEW ICBMs.
SOVIET ADVANTAGES: WON'T SIGN AGREEMENT THAT IS NOT EQUAL, IN
OUR INTEREST, AND CAN BE VERIFIED.
CRUISE MISSILE
STILL NEGOTIATING: CRUISE MISSILES NEW TYPE
RACE:
WEAPON, MAY OR MAY NOT BE IN SALT BUT U.S.
NOT OPENING NEW RACE.