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This file contains material relating to Ronald Reagan, and the Sunshine Campaign.
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Presidential Campaign - 1976
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1126651
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Presidential Campaign - 1976
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This file contains material relating to Ronald Reagan, and the Sunshine Campaign.
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Benton L. Becker Papers
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Republican National Committee (U.S.)
Presidential campaign, 1976
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder "Presidential Campaign - 1976" of the
Benton L. Becker Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Benton Becker donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the Benton Becker Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
28
MEMORANDUM
TO s
R. H.
FROM:
B. L. B.
DATE:
JUNE 17, 1975
RE 1
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES
This is a follow-up memorandum of our conversation
earlier last week relative to the possibility of President
Ford having mere token or no opposition during the Presi-
dential Primaries of 1976.
I believe that the party would be best served
and the President more highly calculated toward achieving
re-election in 1976, by avoiding party divisiveness during
the Presidential Primaries. The public will receive ample
servings of internal party squabbles through the numsrous
Democratic hopefuls. A working, politically uninvolved
President during this period would demonstrate party unity
(contrasted with the apparent party disunity of the Demo-
crats), and overall Republican support for the Ford Adminis-
tration (contrasted with the myriad of political philosophies
and spokesmen for the Democratic nomination). It would add
an element of sobriety and sanity to presidential campaigning
in general.
GERALD AIIVHEIT FORD
In order to achieve the objective of token
primary opposition, the apparent presidential candidacy
of Ronald Reagan must terminate. An early ending of that
candidacy would, on balance, prove to be helpful to the
Nation at large, to the Republican party, to the Ford-
Rockefeller team and to Governor Reagan himself. I fore-
see no present circumstances whereby Governor Reagan could
wrestle the party nomination from President Ford. I believe,
that when viewed objectively, Governor Reagan can be made
to see his candidacy in the same light.
What the Governor's candidacy can do is to exacer-
bate friction within the party. It may also prove to be
a personal embarrassment, although not fatal, to President
Ford when, and if, a Reagan-Ford "head to head" primary is
held in a southern state such as Florida, the second primary
state. In such event President Ford may find himself un-
happily in a position not unlike President Johnson following
the New Hampshire Primary in 1968. Party wounds would occur,
and counter-efforts would then be undertaken to prevent a
Reagan steam roll effect. All of which could be successfully
done and, in the final analysis, Gerald Ford would be the
Republican Presidential nomination in August, 1976, but the
cost would be high and the friction that occurred would have
to be healed in September and October of 1976. I believe
it to be prudent to avoid that contingency.
- 2 -
FORD R. GERALO LIBRARY
If the premises outlined in this memorandum
are accepted as factual, then an effort should be under-
taken to cause Governor Reagan to formally announce his
support for President Ford's re-election and denounce any
1976 presidential aspirations for himself, leaving only
the possibility of mere token (1.e., Ashbrook-MeCloskey)
opposition to President Ford in the 1976 primaries.
To achieve this result, I suggest that the fol-
lowing program be initiated.
1. Within 90 days following President Ford's
formal announcement of candidacy, six (6) key Republicans
would come forth and publicly announce their support for
President Ford. These individuals are:
a. Congressman John Rhodes
b. Senator Barry Goldwater
c. Former Secretary John Connally
d. Senator Strom Thurmond
e. Senator John Tower
f. Senator James Buckley
The first three, I believe, are already supportive
of President Ford and would be willing to make such public
announcement, if asked. Senator Thurmond, in my judgment,
is the most important individual on the list, but I believe,
that he too would join in, if properly approached. Senators
Tower and Buckley would perhaps be the most difficult to
- 3 -
FORD R. GERALD LIBRARY LIBR ANY
persuade, but given the prior public announcement of the
other four gentlemen, particularly Senator Thurmond, I
believe, they would opt for party unity.
2. Following the public announcement of support
to President Ford referred to above, then a overture should
be made to Governor Reagan. The overture should not be
from the President himself, nor, preferably from anyone
presently within the Administration. The source should
solicit Governor Reagan's public support for President
Ford's candidacy and a renunciation of any individual candi-
dacy for himself in 1976. The source should be prepared to
offer two things in return. They are:
a. A meaningful and significant Cabinet
post in 1976.
b. President Ford's promised neutrality
in 1980. This would import President Ford's
dual promise not to annoint a party standard
bearer in 1980 and his promise to support the
1980 convention choice, whomever it may be.
This offer, when viewed objectively, should be
palatable to the Governor for reasons. They are:
(1) After the leaders of the Republican
conservative movement have announced their
support for President Ford, Governor Reagan's
probability of success is non-existent,
- 4 -
FORD R. GERALO LIBRARY
(2) It affords him a guaranteed public
forum from 1976 to 1980 in a role of an
important Cabinet official, and
(3) It offers him a realistic opportunity
to achieve the Presidency in 1980, subject to
his 1980-primary success. An opportunity that
does not today exist.
These thoughts represent my and former Congressman
H. Allan Smith's. H. Allan believes that given the conditions
outlined within this memorandum, Governor Reagan will
ultimately accept the proposal.
I urge that the thoughts contained herein be
considered.
- 5 -
GERALD F. FORD
28
MEMORANDUM
TO I
R. H.
FROM:
B. L. B.
DATE:
JUNE 17, 1975
RE :
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES
This is a follow-up memorandum of our conversation
earlier last week relative to the possibility of President
Ford having mere token or no opposition during the Presi-
dential Primaries of 1976.
I believe that the party would be best served
and the President more highly calculated toward achieving
re-election in 1976, by avoiding party divisiveness during
the Presidential Primaries. The public will receive ample
servings of internal party squabbles through the numerous
Democratic hopefuls. A working, politically uninvolved
President during this period would demonstrate party unity
(contrasted with the apparent party disunity of the Demo-
crats), and overall Republican support for the Ford Adminis-
tration (contrasted with the myriad of political philosophies
and spokesmen for the Democratic nomination). It would add
an element of sobriety and sanity to presidential campaigning
in general.
GERALD LISHARY FORD
In order to achieve the objective of token
primary opposition, the apparent presidential candidacy
of Ronald Reagan must terminate. An early ending of that
candidacy would, on balance, prove to be helpful to the
Nation at large, to the Republican party, to the Ford-
Rockefeller team and to Governor Reagan himself. I fore-
see no present circumstances whereby Governor Reagan could
wrestle the party nomination from President Ford. I believe,
that when viewed objectively, Governor Reagan can be made
to see his candidacy in the same light.
What the Governor's candidacy can do is to exacer-
bate friction within the party. It may also prove to be
a personal embarrassment, although not fatal, to President
Ford when, and if, a Reagan-Ford "head to head" primary is
held in a southern state such as Florida, the second primary
state. In such event President Ford may find himself un-
happily in a position not unlike President Johnson following
the New Hampshire Primary in 1968. Party wounds would occur,
and counter-efforts would then be undertaken to prevent a
Reagan steam roll effect. All of which could be successfully
done and, in the final analysis, Gerald Ford would be the
Republican Presidential nomination in August, 1976, but the
cost would be high and the friction that occurred would have
to be healed in September and October of 1976. I believe
it to be prudent to avoid that contingency.
- 2 -
GERAU R. FORD LIBRARY
If the premises outlined in this memorandum
are accepted as factual, then an effort should be under-
taken to cause Governor Reagan to formally announce his
support for President Ford's re-election and denounce any
1976 presidential aspirations for himself, leaving only
the possibility of mere token (1.e., Ashbrook-McCloskey)
opposition to President Ford in the 1976 primaries.
To achieve this result, I suggest that the fol-
lowing program be initiated.
1. within 90 days following President Ford's
formal announcement of candidacy, six (6) key Republicans
would come forth and publicly announce their support for
President Ford. These individuals are:
a. Congressman John Rhodes
b. Senator Barry Goldwater
C. Former Secretary John Connally
d. Senator Strom Thurmond
e. Senator John Tower
f. Senator James Buckley
The first three, I believe, are already supportive
of President Ford and would be willing to make such public
announcement, if asked. Senator Thurmond, in my judgment,
is the most important individual on the list, but I believe,
that he too would join in, if properly approached. Senators
Tower and Buckley would perhaps be the most difficult to
- 3 -
GEFALD R. FORD LIBRARY
persuade, but given the prior public announcement of the
other four gentlemen, particularly Senator Thurmond, I
believe, they would opt for party unity.
2. Following the public announcement of support
to President Ford referred to above, then a overture should
be made to Governor Reagan. The overture should not be
from the President himself, nor, preferably from anyone
presently within the Administration. The source should
solicit Governor Reagan's public support for President
Ford's candidacy and a renunciation of any individual candi-
dacy for himself in 1976. The source should be prepared to
offer two things in return. They are:
a. A meaningful and significant Cabinet
post in 1976.
b. President Ford's promised neutrality
in 1980. This would import President Ford's
dual promise not to annoint a party standard
bearer in 1980 and his promise to support the
1980 convention choice, whomever it may be.
This offer, when viewed objectively, should be
palatable to the Governor for reasons. They are:
(1) After the leaders of the Republican
conservative movement have announced their
support for President Ford, Governor Reagan's
probability of success is non-existent,
- 4 -
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
(2) It affords him a guaranteed public
forum from 1976 to 1980 in a role of an
important Cabinet official, and
(3) It offers him a realistic opportunity
to achieve the Presidency in 1980, subject to
his 1980 primary success. An opportunity that
does not today exist.
These thoughts represent my and former Congressman
H. Allan Smith's. H. Allan believes that given the conditions
outlined within this memorandum, Governor Reagan will
ultimately accept the proposal.
I urge that the thoughts contained herein be
considered.
- 5 -
GERALD LIBRARY R. FORD
29
MEMORANDUM
TO $
R. H.
FROM:
B. L. B.
DATE:
JUNE 17, 1975
RE :
SUNSHINE CAMPAIGN
Recently, I have had what I consider to be an
interesting thought. I have chosen this devise to put on
paper and place it within the Hartmann Legion of possible
things to do in the near future.
The idea incorporates two useable virtues. They
are, (1) favorable public relations for the candidacy of
Gerald Ford, and (2) openess and candor in presidential
politics.
That idea is simply this. Following his nomination
at the 1976 Republican Convention and during the course of
his acceptance speech at the convention, nominee Gerald Ford
announces that his presidential campaign will be conducted
differently then any other presidential campaign in our
history. Using an idiom employed in Florida politics, for
a different purpose, it might be called a Sunshine Campaign,
indicating that all things done will be open to public
viewing.
FORD
L/S
R.
GERALD
The President (or later his campaign manager)
would announce that ten (10) members of the media, columnists,
newspapers, television, radio, etc., will be selected to
serve as media "insiders" to the Ford Presidential Campaign.
These ten (10) individuals will have complete access, at
all times, to all campaign materials, literature, speeches,
contribution lists, solicitations, etc. They will be in-
vited to attend strategy sessions. No element of the cam-
paign will be denied them. They will be issued keys to the
offices that house the campaign headquarters, retain access
to all file cabinets, and be allowed to view any campaign
material whatsoever.
Guiderules reflecting premature disclosure of
strategy sessions would, of course, be required, but the
media should be taken at its word to treat this unprecedented
approach in a fair and unbiased manner. The new Federal
Campaign Election Law requires full disclosure anyway, so
this devise would merely hasten contemporaneous disclosure
of relevant information in the public interest.
I believe this approach is both healthy for the
general political climate of the Nation and serves the best
interest of President Ford. This approach coincides with
President Ford's public and private personality of candor
and becomes even more effective by the fact that it is
implimented in the presidential campaign of an incumbent
- 2 -
3
President. Its contrast with 1972 is awesome, and likewise,
a contrast will be deduced about the personalities and
staff of the past and present Republican nominee.
TORD LIBRARY & 977479
- 3 -
29
MEMORANDUM
TO :
R. H.
FROM:
B. L. B.
DATE:
JUNE 17, 1975
RE :
SUNSHINE CAMPAIGN
Recently, I have had what I consider to be an
interesting thought. I have chosen this devise to put on
paper and place it within the Hartmann Legion of possible
things to do in the near future.
The idea incorporates two useable virtues. They
are, (1) favorable public relations for the candidacy of
Gerald Ford, and (2) openess and candor in presidential
politics.
That idea is simply this. Following his nomination
at the 1976 Republican Convention and during the course of
his acceptance speech at the convention, nominee Gerald Ford
announces that his presidential campaign will be conducted
differently then any other presidential campaign in our
history. Using an idiom employed in Florida politics, for
a different purpose, it might be called a Sunshine Campaign,
indicating that all things done will be open to public
viewing.
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
The President (or later his campaign manager)
would announce that ten (10) members of the media, columnists,
newspapers, television, radio, etc., will be selected to
serve as media "insiders" to the Ford Presidential Campaign.
These ten (10) individuals will have complete access, at
all times, to all campaign materials, literature, speeches,
contribution lists, solicitations, etc. They will be in-
vited to attend strategy sessions. No element of the cam-
paign will be denied them. They will be issued keys to the
offices that house the campaign headquarters, retain access
to all file cabinets, and be allowed to view any campaign
material whatsoever.
Guiderules reflecting premature disclosure of
strategy sessions would, of course, be required, but the
media should be taken at its word to treat this unprecedented
approach in a fair and unbiased manner. The new Federal
Campaign Election Law requires full disclosure anyway, so
this devise would merely hasten contemporaneous disclosure
of relevant information in the public interest.
I believe this approach is both healthy for the
general political climate of the Nation and serves the best
interest of President Ford. This approach coincides with
President Ford's public and private personality of candor
and becomes even more effective by the fact that it is
implimented in the presidential campaign of an incumbent
- 2 -
GERALD FORD
President. Its contrast with 1972 is awesome, and likewise,
a contrast will be deduced about the personalities and
staff of the past and present Republican nominee.
GERALD & FORD LIBRARY
- 3 -