Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1552375
label
NSC Meeting, 9/14/74
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1552375
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
NSC Meeting, 9/14/74
citationUrl
collections
National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
subjects
Soviet Union
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Arms control
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1552375
coverageEndDate
day
15
logicalDate
1974-10-15
month
10
year
1974
coverageStartDate
day
14
logicalDate
1974-09-14
month
9
year
1974
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
23fecfede0c3eb05
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 9/14/1974" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SAGREM
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
10:00 - 11:30 a. m. (90 minutes)
Saturday, September 14, 1974
The Cabinet Room
From: Henry A. Kissinger HC
I.
PURPOSE
The purpose of this meeting is to review the status of SALT
preparations prior to the resumption of talks in Geneva next
week.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN
A. Background: The U.S. Delegation will return to Geneva
to resume the SALT negotiations on September 18. The
first several weeks of the talks will be largely oratory.
There remain several areas of interagency disagreement
which must be reconciled, and work is in progress to do
this. At this point, the Delegation can usefully discuss
principles
until we have defined alternative proposals
for your decision. The areas of disagreement concern
differing views on how the following issues should be treated.
There are a number of approaches the Delegation could
take during the initial phases of the upcoming talks. For
example, the Delegation could:
- - Stand pat on its previous presentations, which cover all
elements of a comprehensive agreement.
-- Explore some general themes which have heretofore
only been peripherally addressed, if at all, such as
Mutual restraints on deployment
DECLASSIFIED
Reductions
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4
NSL letter 2/19/99
MR 98-40, State letter 9/25/98
Mobile missiles
By at NARA, Date 10/20/98,7:21/99
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
SECRET
SECRET
- 2 -
Address in general terms some of the basic issues
which must later be addressed in detail
Question of equal aggregates
Possibility of compensating advantages
Combining numerical with qualitative restraints
Following the CIA briefing, I would propose to put the
current stage in some overall perspective, review some
of the basic issues involved in developing a SALT position,
and outline some of the principles which the Delegation
could usefully take up when the talks resume next week.
B. Participants: (List at Tab A)
C. Press Plan: The fact of the meeting, but not the subject,
will be announced. White House photographer.
III.
TALKING POINTS
A. At the Opening of the Meeting
1. The purpose of this meeting is to review the major
SALT issues requiring resolution and our general approach to
the negotiations prior to their resumption in Geneva next week.
I want to re-emphasize the importance which I attach to these
negotiations and the successful conclusion of a comprehensive
agreement limiting strategic offensive arms. SALT is the
keystone of our efforts to build a stable relationship with the
Soviet Union and reduce the risk of nuclear war.
2. During this next session of the SALT negotiations,
we will concentrate on a discussion of principles which could
form the basis for the 1985 agreement on which we and the Soviets
are now focusing. We will also seek the Soviet views on the
framework for this agreement.
FIBRARY
3.
While the talks are proceeding in Geneva, we will work
on developing alternative proposals here in Washington. Then,
in late October, having laid the groundwork in Geneva and having
obtained some perspective on the Soviet view, I will send Henry
to Moscow with a specific set of proposals for the 1985 agreement.
SECRET
SECRET
- 3 -
4. Let's begin today by having Carl Duckett give us the
latest intelligence and then Henry will give us a rundown on
where we stand.
B.
At the Close of the Meeting
1. It is clear that reaching agreement with the Soviets on
these complex issues will not be an easy task. The Soviets
clearly are engaged in an ambitious program to improve and
expand their strategic forces. However, we are going to make
a strong effort to curb the momentum of their new programs
in the context of an agreement that is responsive to the security
interests of both of our countries.
2. We want to reach an agreement, if that is possible.
Therefore, as we continue our deliberations, I would like the
focus of the discussions to be on the real issues and on what is
attainable. Let's discuss the issues frankly, but I want it done
in this forum, not in public debate.
3. The discussion today has been very helpful to me in
obtaining a perspective on the different points of view on these
issues. Next week, I will send instructions to the Delegation
which will direct them to lay the foundation with the Soviets
for efforts to conclude a reasonable and equitable agreement.
SECRET
SACRET
Secretary Kissinger's Talking Points
NSC Meeting
10:00 a.m. Saturday, September 14, 1974
-- Mr. President, at today's meeting, I would like to go over the
major issues we face in developing our position for the next round of
strategic arms negotiations.
-- First, I would like to trace briefly the recent negotiating history
of SALT. I will then summarize the issues and discuss the work we need
to complete in the next few weeks.
BACKGROUND
-- The 1972 SALT agreements limited the ABM deployments of the
two sides and, on the offensive side, froze strategic missile deployments
for five years at existing levels: 2350 for the Soviets and 1710 for the US.
-- The SALT I agreements have been the subject of some criticism,
primarily because of this disparity in the numbers of launchers.
Admittedly, the agreement did, for a temporary period, "freeze" a
Soviet advantage in this single measure of strategic capability.
-- Nevertheless, this agreement had the following advantages for the US:
(
First, the US lead in bombers and the US MIRV program were
left untouched.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.4.
FORD
MR 98 2; State litter 2/19/99 9/25/98
NSC letter
By let
NARA, Date 10/21/98, 7/21/99
GERALD
LIBRARY
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
SECRET
2
Second, the very active Soviet heavy missile program was
stopped.
Third, no US programs were stopped; we had no plans to
increase the number of missile launchers in the five-year period.
-- Thus, while the agreement gave the Soviets an advantage on
paper in number of launchers, an admittedly unfortunate consequence,
the Soviet advantage would have been even larger in the absence of an
agreement. Furthermore, given our MIRV and bomber leads, the
agreement left the US with superior strategic capabilities.
-- However, since 1972, the Soviet MIRV program, also unaffected
by the SALT I agreement, has developed at a faster pace than our 1972
estimates projected.
-- As a consequence, if the new heavy, accurate Soviet MIRV
missiles are deployed in large numbers, the Soviet lead in launchers
and throw weight, acceptable in the context of a five-year interim agree-
ment, could be translated into a potentially superior force. Such a
Soviet MIRV force could have a significant effect on both the reality and
perceptions of the strategic balance.
-- Our first efforts in SALT II were aimed at the problem of
numbers of strategic weapon systems:
We proposed a permanent agreement based on equal
aggregate launcher levels (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers).
SECRET
SECRET
3
But the existing disparities (2500 Soviet to 2200 US) could only
be reconciled by either a Soviet reduction, which they would not accept,
or a US buildup, for which we had no programs.
Moreover; the Soviets insisted that US forward-based systems
entitled them to a disparity in launchers.
-- Meanwhile, the urgency of controlling the Soviet MIRV programs
led us to concentrate on a second track of the negotiations, MIRV limits.
We first proposed an interim MIRV freeze on both sides,
which would have held the Soviets to no MIRVs, since their deployment
had not started.
After the Soviets rejected the freeze, we proposed permanently
limiting each side to equal MIRVed ICBM throw weight. This was also
unacceptable to the Soviets since we would have had an advantage of
about 550 MIRVed ICBMs to 360 for the Soviets, as well as our very
large advantage in SLBM MIRVs.
Finally, we explored the possibility of a separate MIRV
agreement based on a numerical difference in MIRV launchers in our.
favor, combined with a two to three year extension of the Interim
BERALD FORD
Agreement.
An important element of this last concept was sublimits. We
wanted to make sure the Soviets limited their deployment of ICBM MIRVs,
which are heavier and more accurate than SLBM MIRVs. Moreover, we
wanted a specific limit on large MIRVed ICBMs -- the SS-18 to limit
the total throw weight of the Soviet MIRV force.
SECRET
4
-- The Soviets made their only concrete MIRV offer in March of
this year -- 1100 US MIRVs to 1000 Soviet MIRVs, with no sublimits.
We found this unacceptable because it would have:
Provided too small a numerical disparity.
Cut off our Trident program (except as a replacement for
Poseidon).
Had us standing still on MIRVs while the Soviets built up.
-- At the June Summit, we proposed a compromise -- 1150 US MIRVs
(our planned level for 1979) to 700 Soviet MIRVs, with a ban on heavy
MIRVed ICBMs. The Soviets rejected this proposal.
-- Faced with a deadlock, the two sides agreed to try a new
approach -- a ten-year agreement expiring in 1985. We see three
advantages in this approach:
The ten-year period avoids some of the uncertainties and
complex trade-offs of a permanent agreement.
Unlike a short-term extension of the Interim Agreement,
a 1985 agreement does not expire in the middle of each side's current
modernization program.
A ten-year agreement could stabilize the strategic relation- -
ship toward the end of the present deployment cycle, reducing the
incentive for another round of deployments.
SECRET
5
Issues
-- Now I would like to discuss the major issues we face in
developing our position on the 1985 agreement.
-- The most important of the issues is how to establish some
balance in central strategic systems of the two sides. To do this, we
must deal either directly or indirectly with three elements:
The aggregate number of central system launchers -- ICBMs,
SLBMs, and bombers.
or
MIRVs.
Payload or throw weight.
Aggregates
-- First, let me discuss the question of setting a limit on the
aggregate number of launchers.
-- In SALT I and to date in SALT II, our position on the framework
for a permanent agreement called for equal aggregates in central system
launchers. However, the aggregates issue is complicated by the
current Soviet advantage of about 300 central system launchers, an
advantage which they are projected to maintain through 1985.
6
SECRET
-- It is highly unlikely that we would be able to get the Soviets
to reduce unilaterally their aggregate level as part of a 1985 agreement;
thus, we are left with three alternative approaches to this problem.
First, we could agree to equal aggregates at the Soviet
level of 2500. This would have the advantage of removing the appearance
of inequality from the agreement. But it will not be easy to get the
Soviets to agree to this. They will raise the issue of FBS, and they will
say they need more missiles to counter the Chinese threat. Furthermore,
since we have no plans to build up to 2500, we would have to pay a price
to get paper rights which we might not exercise.
Alternatively we could permit the Soviets some advantage in
numbers of launchers, but insist that this be balanced against a US
advantage in some other important strategic measure -- for example,
MIR V launchers. This approach might be more acceptable to the Soviets.
However, it is more complex than equal aggregates, and will undoubtedly
lead to arguments about whether the resulting balance of asymmetries
constitutes overall equivalence.
Finally, we could attempt to negotiate reductions to a
common aggregate level -- say, 1800 or 2000. While this would avoid
unilateral Soviet reductions, the Soviets would still have to reduce more
than the US. Furthermore, since both sides have planned modernization
programs already underway, it will be difficult to negotiate such deep
reductions until we have agreement on how to limit the modernization FORD
programs.
BERALE LIBRARY \
SECRET
7
-- Thus, none of the possible approaches is without difficulties.
Since we have not yet resolved how to proceed on this issue, we may not
want to engage the Soviets in a detailed discussion of the aggregate
question.
-- In the upcoming talks in Geneva, the Delegation could simply
reaffirm our position on equal aggregates.
-- Alternatively, you may wish to have the Delegation assert the
principle that limiting the aggregate number of central strategic systems
is a necessary element in any long-term agreement. This would neither
imply that we rigidly insist on our earlier position of equal aggregates,
nor would it presage a modification in the US position.
-- Finally, if you wish to show even more flexibility to the Soviets
on the aggregates issue, the Delegation could query the Soviets on their
thoughts on limitations on the central systems aggregate. However,
they would probably respond by reiterating their arguments concerning
the US FBS advantage.
GERALD 1020
SECRET
MIRV Limitations
-- An issue equal in importance to that of aggregate force levels
is qualitative restraints and, in particular, restraints on MIRVs. The
Soviets have agreed to seek a 1985 agreement which includes qualitative
as well as quantitative limitations.
-- Until recently the US has sought limitations on MIR Vs which would
help improve ICBM survivability. However, MIR V levels which would
accomplish this aim would require significant restraints in the Soviet
ICBM MIRV program.
Since the Soviets' SLBM MIRV technology is considerably behind
their ICBM MIR V technology, such restraints would leave them behind
the US overall. For this reason, the Soviets have found all of our
previous MIRV proposals unacceptable.
-- This has led some to believe that we ought to deemphasize MIRV
limits, since the US stands to gain little in terms of ICBM survivability
from any agreement which might be negotiable, and since MIRV limits
might require constraints on a technology in which we presently hold
an advantage.
Others have said that since the number of warheads is perhaps
the best single measure of strategic capability, and since MIRVs
represent the primary means for increasing warhead numbers, MIRVs
must be dealt with in SALT. In other words, unless MIRV programs
are controlled, the arms race will continue relatively unchecked.
Bo FORD
SECRET
9
-- Finally, some have argued that MIRV limits, even if they were
higher than the limits the Soviets have already rejected, could still
contribute to stability. Such MIR V limits might reduce the con-
fidence in launching a preemptive attack, since, with fewer weapons,
each side would be less assured of successfully destroying the other
side's retaliatory forces.
-- Our experience thus far indicates that the Soviets would probably
accept MIRV limits based on a US advantage in the number of MIRV
missiles, in compensation for a Soviet advantage in MIRVed throw weight.
-- However, we may not want to agree to a Soviet MIRVed throw
weight advantage. We may also want to raise the possibility of RV
limits - - for example, limiting the number of RVs per missile.
-- Finally, our approach to MIR must be closely linked to our
approach on aggregates.
-- Until you have determined the approach you wish to take on MIRVs,
you may want the Delegation to emphasize the principle that quantitative
limitations, and in particular limitations on MIR Vs are as important as
quantitative aggregate limits. The Delegation might further state that
MIRV controls should limit not only the number of launchers, but also
take into account the throw weight and numbers of RVs of MIRV systems.
SECRET
SECRET
10
Throw Weight Limitations
-- In SALT II, we've pushed the Soviets hard on missile throw weight
limitations. We have felt that since throw weight ultimately determines
the number of warheads that can be deployed, controlling throw weight
would be a means of controlling the overall potential of strategic missile
systems.
-- However, some have argued that Soviet technology during the next
ten years will not have advanced to the point where the Soviet throw
weight advantage can be converted into effective counterforce capability.
-- In addition, some argue that equal missile throw weight proposals
will only complicate the negotiations, given the differing missile
technologies and force structures of the two sides. Equal missile throw
weight implies either reductions in Soviet throw weight, which will probably
not be negotiable, or "rights" to higher throw weight for the US, which
we probably would not exercise.
-- Others have argued that we should not set a long-term precedent
through an agreement that codifies the Soviet advantage in an important
indicator of total force capacity. However,
There is an important distinction between a US-Soviet throw
weight disparity that results from our own decision to emphasize smaller
missiles, and a throw weight disparity which is codified in an agreement.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
SECRET
11
STARTE
G
Although SALT I was criticized because of the advantage it
gave the Soviets in throw weight, the SALT I agreement did not itself
freeze the throw weight disparity. The US has always been permitted
to increase its missile throw weight, should it decide to do so.
Indeed, if bombers are counted, the throw weight of the two
sides is very nearly equal.
-- Finally, we have the issue of how to include bombers in a discussion
of throw weight. Although missiles represent the major counterforce
capability, bombers have important strategic roles.
At the last SALT session, we offered to include an allowance
for bomber payload in missile throw weight limitations as a means of
inducing the Soviets to accept the throw weight concept.
The Soviets responded by suggesting that the allowance
for bombers be the maximum bomb load -- for example, 60,000 lbs.
for the B-52. This would be clearly unacceptable, since operational
conditions and air defense mean that much less payload can be
delivered to targets.
FORD LIBRARY
SECRET
12.
STARET
-- These problems raise the issue of whether we want to continue to
pursue total throw weight limitations. In particular:
Some believe that we will get enough of an indirect con-
straint on missile throw weight through MIRV limitations, since an arms
race in unMIR Ved missiles is unlikely, and throw weight which cannot
be exploited through MIRVs is of little use.
Others believe we should continue to press this issue,
since throw weight is ultimately the prime determinant of potential
capability, and since even unMIR Ved missile throw weight has some
potential military applications, such as barrage attacks.
-- Since we have not resolved this issue, the Delegation could
take either of two approaches:
Assert the importance of limiting total force capabilities
without indicating whether this means explicit limits on throw weight,
or
Repeat the approach we took at the last Geneva session,
calling for "substantially equal throw weight of central strategic systems. "
Reductions
-- How we approach reductions is another important issue:
There would be major political advantages if the United
States and the Soviet Union could agree to a program of mutual reductions.
In addition, mutual reductions can be conceived as an
integral part of our approach to equal aggregates.
SECRET
SECRET
13
-- So far the Soviets have shown little interest in reductions and
it is unlikely they view reductions as the solution to the disagreement
on aggregates.
-- There is general agreement that we should raise with the Soviets
the issue of reductions:
The Delegation might mention the general desirability
of reductions as an important principle.
It could go further and argue the political advantages of
reductions as well as the potential cost savings.
Finally, the Delegation could solicit specific Soviet views
on reductions in a 1985 agreement, calling attention to their previous
statements on the desirability of reductions.
Mutual Restraint
-- The last issue you should consider today is mutual restraint.
-- Early in SALT II, the Soviets raised the issue of restraint in
an attempt to stop our Trident and B-1 programs. Clearly, restraint
is important, but the Soviet idea of restraint -- stopping all US programs
while letting Soviet programs run free -- is unacceptable.
-- Our approach to restraint should be consistent with the principle
of constraining deployments substantially below capacity, and should if
possible slow the Soviet MIRV program.
GERALD ? FORD
SECRET
START
14
-- Two ideas have been raised in connection with restraint:
deployment rate limits and limits on missile testing.
i)
We have never discussed the idea of deployment rate limits
with the Soviets. It is doubtful, however, that they would agree to limits
below their programmed deployment rates.
The purpose of limits on missile testing would be to slow
the Soviet deployment program, and possibly stretch out the tests they
need to get a good statistical determination of missile accuracy. However,
there is still disagreement as to whether missile testing limits that are
in the net US interest can be formulated.
-- If the Delegation broaches the issue of restraint, you may wish
to put this in the context of a general principle of mutual and equitable
restraint in the replacement of strategic systems.
gord CIBRARY
SECRET
SECRET
15
WORK PROGRAM FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS
-- Mr. President, this brings us to our preparations for the next
stage of SALT, which will resume next Wednesday in Geneva.
-- - Initially, the Delegation will discuss and seek Soviet views on
the framework for a 1985 agreement. They would do this by setting
forth the principles discussed above. At your direction, the Verification
Panel has developed these principles for your approval. The principles,
of course, reflect the issues which I have just outlined.
-- The principles are in a sufficiently generalized form so that they
will not limit your choices for later presenting a concrete proposal to
the Soviets. At the same time, this series of meetings with the Soviets
will serve the important functions of developing a framework for the
1985 agreement and of providing you with important additional information
on which to have a concrete proposal.
-- By way of summary, the principles for discussion at Geneva
will include:
Aggregate numbers of central systems,
Qualitative aspects, especially MIRVs, and
Throw weight.
-- In addition, we could present general principles on the agreement
which provide for:
Phased mutual reductions,
GERALD LIQUARY FORD
SECRET
SHEPET
16
Mutual restraint in modernization and replacement of
strategic systems,
Stability in the long-term strategic relationship, and
Verification of the agreement provisions by national
technical means.
-- On the FBS question, which the Soviets will inevitably raise,
the Delegation could respond by repeating the US view that mutual
assurances concerning non-circumvention would form a suitable basis for
dealing with non-central systems. If the Soviets press hard on FBS, you
may wish to consider a more detailed rebuttal.
-- While the Delegation is seeking to develop a suitable framework
with the Soviets, the Verification Panel will continue to work on more
specific proposals for the 1985 agreement. We anticipate that the
various options would be sufficiently developed and analyzed so that you
could review the direction of our efforts at an NSC meeting early in
October.
-- Based on the guidance at that meeting, we would then prepare a
specific set of proposals on the basic framework for the agreement,
which I could present to the Soviet leadership during my October visit.
You may, for example, wish to have two or three proposals of similar
character but of differing levels of complexity.
FORD
LIBRARY
SACRET
Staner
17
-- If we are successful with the Soviets in reaching an agreed
framework for the 1985 agreement, you would then be in a position
to provide guidance to the Delegation to negotiate the details of the
agreement.
FORD
SECRED
4763X
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET ATTA CHMENT
October 15, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davi mo
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC Meeting on SALT,
September 14, 1974
Herewith, for the Secretary's file, is the original of Jan Lodal's
minutes of the September 14 NSC meeting on SALT.
TORSECRETATTACHMENT
FORD is LIBRARY 638870
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09154
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Jan Lodal
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 9/14/74
CREATION DATE
09/14/1974
VOLUME
28 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200004
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 9/14/74
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
sanitized Nseletter 2/10/99
let 5/99
4763X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE NODIS
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Date:
Saturday, September 14, 1974
Time:
10:08 a. m. to 12 noon
Place:
Cabinet Room, The White House
Subject:
SALT
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency Fred Ikle
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees:
State:
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Representative,
SALT
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
CLA:
Carl Duckett
White House:
Gen. Alexander M. Haig
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
NSC:
Jan M. Lodal NMC
DECLASSIFIED EO 12958 Sec. 354
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS XGDS
E.O. 12958 Sectt.S(1) 3.1 b , 6.1(a)
NSC user 2/10/99 ; MR 98-39, #3
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
By let NARA
5/24/99
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
President Ford: Thank you all for coming; it's such a nice Saturday
morning outside. It's been a very busy week, and this was the only day
we could work in the meeting. I see you survived well yesterday, Bill
(to Mr. Colby -- referring to his public appearance on covert operations).
Mr. Colby: Just barely -- sticks and stones may break my bones, but
words will never hurt me!
President Ford: I'm glad to see someone else feels that way. I have
scheduled a press conference for next Monday night, probably on live TV.
I'm glad someone else has laid the groundwork for me.
Secretary Kissinger: Bill faced a group of NSC trained questioners.
Mr. Colby: Kissinger trained! (laughter)
President Ford: (to Ambassador Johnson) Alex, it's nice to see you here
before you take off on this most important mission. I hope we can give
you some good guidelines which can contribute to your efforts.
At the outset, I would like to make two points. First, about two weeks
ago, we had some problems about discussions in other levels of the
government, with the press getting information before we had made
announcements. Since then, I think we have done better. I hope
the attitude is one of keeping things to ourselves until announcements
are made. I do think things are getting better, but our critics will not
be letting us off easy.
Second, I'd like to give you my overall attitudes on SALT. I think SALT
is good for the country. We have the obligation of finding common ground
for a proper agreement. It's better to go in with this attitude than to go
through on cynical or skeptical grounds, saying we want an agreement,
but making it so hard that it won't work. Not just any agreement is
acceptable -- the terms might not be acceptable. But reaching an agree-
ment is in our best interests. We should proceed on the basis that this
is the case.
Bill, perhaps you would like to start by giving us some background. Let
me add that we need not reach any final decisions today -- The purpose
of this meeting is to get clarification on our broad principles. We will
talk again at a later date about specifics. We can then give instructions
to Alex, Henry, and myself (sic) concerning what we ought to have in a
proposal.
FORD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
Mr. Colby: The current Soviet programs for development of intercon-
tinental attack weapons are unprecedented in scope. Four new ICBMs are
being tested, three with MIRVs. Additional ICBMs and submarine launched
ballistic missiles, perhaps with MIRVs, are in early stages of development.
This effort, together with recent Soviet negotiating approaches, strongly
suggests that Moscow is determined to proceed with a major moderniza-
tion of its strategic attack forces, particularly ICBMs.
This chart shows the three current and four new Soviet ICBMs. The
SS-X-16, as you will recall, is the small, solid propellant missile which
will replace the SS-13. - We continue to believe that the Soviets are
developing a mobile version of this missile. The 17 and the 19 are the
two successors to the SS-11, the most widely deployed Soviet system,
but they have at least double the ll's throw weight. The 18 is the replace-
ment for the large SS-9.
All the new systems represent improvements in terms of accuracy,
flexibility, and survivability. Moreover, the 17 and 18 are being tested
with MIRVs. The next chart shows that the Soviets are still firing most
of their new ICBMs at a rapid pace. Experience indicates that Soviet
test procedures require about 20 successful launches before an ICBM
is ready for deployment. All of the new ICBMs are nearing that figure,
and we believe that some version of each will be ready for deployment
in the next six months.
President Ford: Their MIRV missiles also?
Mr. Colby: Yes.
As the test program for these new missiles nears completion, the Soviets
are preparing silos for their deployment. This photograph shows the
massive new segments that are installed after removing major parts of
an old SS-11 silo, to prepare it for the 19 missile system. We call this
silo conversion, and it takes about a year.
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I might point out that they are not
permitted to build new silos under the Interim Agreement.
President Ford: But this modification is permissible?
Mr. Colby: Yes, they have to use the same hole but can modify it.
President Ford: Isn't there a size limitation?
BERRY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
Mr. Colby: Yes, 15 percent.
President Ford: This is a limitation?
Mr. Duckett: Yes
Secretary Schlesinger:
President Ford:
Mr. Duckett:
Secretary Kissinger: I might point out that the fact that they have to modify
the silos creates something of an advantage for us. This permits us to tell
which ones have MIRVs. Without the modifications, we were worried that
they could pop a new missile in the 11 holes, giving us no way to tell
which have new missiles. This is the reason we have confidence we could
verify the MIRV agreements we had proposed -- we were convinced they
can't deploy the new missiles without modifying silos.
Mr. Duckett:
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. By way of background, Mr. President, you
might be interested in knowing what happened in 1972. Brezhnev first
said they wanted the agreement to permit no modifications to the silos.
The next day, Gromyko had to sheepishly withdraw this and insist on
permitting a 15 percent increase.
Secretary Schlesinger: These new missiles will have three or four times
the throw weight of the ones they are replacing. Thus, while the modifica-
tions may be an intelligence advantage, they are a strategic disadvantage.
Mr. Colby: In monitoring the expected deployment, the fact that the silos
for each type of new system have unique configurations will help us.
This newly acquired photograph shows silo components for the 17 at one
complex. This is the first evidence of conversion for this system in the ORD
field.
LIBRARY
TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE
5
Mr. Duckett:
Mr. Colby: There are indications that a grand total of 601 SS-11 silos will
be converted. There is also silo conversion activity at SS-9 complexes,
to prepare for deployment of the 18. If the Soviets go this route for the
whole SS-9 force, about 300 more silos would be involved. There is also
a program to modernize certain SS-11 silos for a newer version of the
missile. There are indications that 420 SS-11 silos will be modernized.
The SS-11, you will recall, does not carry MIRVs.
Thus, on the basis of these and other developments, there appears to be
a Soviet potential for about 1, 000 MIRVed missiles (including some sub-
marine launched) by around 1980. This total is close to the SALT limits
for 1980 which the Soviets proposed last March.
To explore future possibilities, let me assume two situations, some results
of which we can see on the charts I will show. The first situation assumes
that the Soviets will intensify their weapons development programs,
anticipating that the Interim Agreement will lapse in 1977. In this pro-
jection we assume that they would pursue all attractive options, success-
fully push the limits of technology, and deploy at sustained rates similar
to the highest annual rate demonstrated in the past. The second situation
assumes that the launcher limits for the Interim Agreement will be adhered
to for the indefinite future. It also incorporates our "best estimate" of
what the Soviets are likely to do on ICBM modernization and conversion
programs, and a MIRV program for ballistic missile submarines. It
attempts to reflect the Soviets' plan to upgrade their force and may be
compared with current US programmed forces shown on the chart.
In the first situation, we project an increase in heavy ICBM deployment,
a large mobile missile force, and a ballistic missile submarine force
larger than allowed by the Interim Agreement. Under these conditions,
US forces would presumably also go up. On the other hand, the "best
estimate" is constrained by the levels of the Interim Agreement, and
envisions a slower rate of deployment and technical achievement. A new
heavy bomber is projected in the first case but is not included in our
"best projection". Neither force includes the Backfire -- the new Soviet
swing-wing bomber intended primarily for operations in Europe and Asia,
but with a potential for attacking the US. If the Backfire were included,
it could add -- in our "best estimate" as many as 250 delivery vehicles
to the 1985 total.
President Ford: How much of a jump would that be?
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
6
Mr. Colby: It would just be a little jump in the curves.
President Ford: It would be a comparable jump in both curves?
Mr. Duckett: Yes -- The fourth one has heavy bombers, but not Backfire.
Mr. Colby: The next chart, of on-line missile reentry vehicles, both
ICBMs and SLBMs, shows that even though the number of Soviet missiles
is constrained by the Interim Agreement, the total number of reentry
vehicles deployed is likely to surpass the programmed number of US
missile RVs by 1980.
President Ford: May I look at that again? They catch up with no more
missiles?
Mr. Colby: Yes. The reason for the current disparity is MIRVs, which
they deploy.
Secretary Kissinger: These charts contain no bombers?
Mr. Colby: That's correct -- they're missiles only.
President Ford: But they include the submarines?
Mr. Colby: Yes.
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I should point out that on this chart,
the Soviet MIRVs are approximately one megaton each, whereas the bulk
of ours are much smaller,
We deployed a large number
of small warheads in order to represent no hard target threat to the Soviets.
Theirs will be a hard target threat to us.
Mr. Duckett: Perhaps another way of saying that is that they have less
need for accuracy with one megaton weapons.
Mr. Colby: The next chart shows the number of weapons with bombers
added.
President Ford: Does this one include Backfire?
Mr. Colby: The next chart adds in the weapons carried by bombers.
Because of the US superiority in bombers, the total number of weapons
in the US programmed force remains above our best estimate of the Soviet
force for well past 1980. The Soviets consider bombers important to the
strategic balance, however, and have nearly 10,000 surface-to-air
missile launchers to employ against them.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENAITIVE
7
Mr. President, we should now address the question of how the Soviets
view the quantitative relationship of the strategic forces, now and in the
future. This chart illustrates our view of how they might expect this
balance to appear in 1974, 1980, and 1985. The chart shows how the
present modernization and MIRV program expands the number of weapons
warheads and bombs -- in spite of a relatively stable number of delivery
vehicles - -ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The Western forces
include the bombers and missiles of our European allies, as well as US
forward based aircraft all of which the Soviets believe must be considered.
They have also indicated that they include a threat from China (which we
have not shown) along with the Western threat.
The chart also shows Soviet medium bombers, MRBMs, and IRBMs in
dashed lines. While the Soviets resist inclusion of these forces in SALT
negotiations, we know that they consider them in their own evaluation of
the overall strategic balance. We believe that the comparative number of
weapons is an important strategic measure to the Soviets. They now have
fewer weapons than the US, but lead in throw weight and megatonnage.
Looked at from this point of view, the Soviets can tell themselves that
their new programs are designed to narrow the gap in an area where the
present balance favors the US.
Ultimately, military power depends on how effectively it can be used to
deter, influence, or wage war. Evaluating total strategic force is a
complex matter.
President Ford: These charts presume we do not change our throw weight?
Mr. Duckett: We have just shown the programmed forces and not tried
to guess what we might do. We think they may assume that our throw
weight will be increased.
Secretary Kissinger: In our discussions with them they don't discuss
throw weight; they have emphasized the number of reentry vehicles. It
is perhaps likely that their focus on the number of reentry vehicles which
can be put on missiles may be because of their throw weight advantage,
but they profess that RVs, and not throw weight, concern them.
Mr. Colby: We have not tried to estimate their estimate of us -- we have
shown only the US program.
Secretary Schlesinger: Our budget has in it R&D for a larger missile,
either for replacement in our present silos, or, if we needed to, we
could change the basing. They know we have this program. But I should
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSTIVE
8
point out that increases in throw weight and RVs are bad for both sides.
One of our main objectives is to preserve the present crisis stability by
avoiding an explosion in RVs and throw weight.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Also, through our R&D we can do a lot --
we are planning to double the throw weight on Minuteman III.
President Ford: If we make the decision to deploy.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Yes, and hopefully to double the accuracy.
President Ford: Within the 15 percent limit?
Secretary Kissinger: You're saying that the existing missile will have
more throw weight?
Secretary Schlesinger: No That we will double the yield, not the throw
weight.
Deputy Secretary Clements: I was trying to use the simplest of terms --
it's the yield that matters, that's what you use the throw weight for. And
we plan to double the yield and the accuracy.
Secretary Kissinger: In addition, you are developing a larger missile
there are two separate things at work here.
President Ford: And when you increase the size, you obviously will
increase the yield.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Yes, and we will increase the yield on the
Minuteman III through improved miniaturization.
Secretary Kissinger: By applying our technology, on a bigger missile we
can get either many more RVs, or higher yields.
Dr. Ikle: The Soviets can also within their existing silos build missiles of
greater throw weight.
Deputy Secretary Clements: There is a technology gap in our favor. It's
only a guess, but I would say it's 8-10 years. They couldn't do now what
we can do.
President Ford: What about the testing limitations -- Are we precluded
from any of this?
LIBRAR
TOP/ SECRET/SENSNTIVE
9
Secretary Schlesinger: No sir -- Our estimate is we will have this ready
by May 1, 1976.
President Ford: That is within the threshold agreement?
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.
President Ford: If they are behind in technology, aren't they precluded
from doing this by the threshold agreement?
Secretary Schlesinger: In addition to yield-to-weight ratio, we are
improving accuracy, which they can do also. There will be some con-
straints on high yield weapons, but we estimate that we have no advantage
in high yield weapons, but only in lower yield weapons.
Mr. Duckett: This chart shows what they could do with an accelerated
program. The throw weight goes off the scale, and the megatonnage
would match this slope.
Secretary Schlesinger: Bomber payload and missile throw weight are not
completely comparable. That chart shows bomber loadings, but we have
to remember they have 10,000 SAMs. This means that bomber penetration
is degraded.
Mr. Colby: I would like to mention two aspects of this problem -- the
survivability of ICBM forces, and the number of fatalities a nuclear
exchange could produce. The first of these will be significantly influenced
by force developments on both sides.
This chart shows hypothetical US and Soviet views of the survivability of
their fixed ICBM force from 1974 through 1985. Any such calculation is
subject to a number of uncertainties, only one of which is illustrated.
Two methods of targeting -- one weapon per silo, and a multiple alloca-
tion of up to three weapons per target -- are shown because of considerable
uncertainty regarding the number of RVs that could be allocated with
confidence to a target. The US Minuteman Force is assumed to be up-
graded to 1,000 Minuteman III missiles, with improved guidance and
yield.
The projected qualitative improvement in the Soviet ICBM force in our
current best estimate causes the number of Minuteman survivors to
decrease rapidly by the 80s. Soviet ICBM survivors will increase
through the 70s, as the new harder Soviet silos become operational,
but could decrease if the US deploys the improved version of the
Minuteman III.
FORD VIBRARY
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
10
General Brown: This depends somewhat on targeting. In our operational
plans, we don't know how to do the targeting well enough to get that many
weapons on each silo, and we think we're as good as they are at targeting.
In other words, our war games don't come out quite so pessimistic.
President Ford: The targeting problem affects both sides?
Mr. Colby: Yes.
Mr. Duckett: There's an interesting sidelight concerning the new silos.
President Ford: How do we do it?
Deputy Secretary Clements: Well, our method is no better the hole ends
up the same depth! (laughter) It's not a damn bit better.
Mr. Duckett: I understand some recent work by the Defense Science Board
indicates that only two rather than three weapons can be put on each silo,
so this chart might be a little misleading.
Mr. Colby: The other charts show that even with this survivability problem,
President Ford: With the forces that are left?
Mr. Colby: Yes. In addition, they could do enormous industrial damage.
Secretary Schlesinger: That assumes they don't relocate their population.
They could reduce their population fatalities dramatically by relocating
their population out of the cities, although we could continue to destroy
their industrial floor space.
Dr. Ikle: Their people would still be subject to fallout.
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, they would have to contain the fallout.
General Brown: We do our computations looking at the long-term effects.
You might remember on your trip to Omaha, Mr. President, that we
TOP' SECRET/SENSITVE
TOP\SECRET SENSITIVE
11
target for 70 percent damage on the industrial floor space, and, of course,
this gets much of the population.
President Ford: Is there any evidence of their planning for relocation?
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes -- they have an extensive civil defense pro-
gram. We don't know how well trained their population is, but they have a
big program.
Mr. Duckett: In this respect, we see no facilities to handle this population
once they're outside the city -- they seem to have no food supplies, and
so forth.
President Ford: Well all I can say is, that I hope their effort works out
better than our aborted effort has in this respect.
Mr. Colby: The conclusion of all this is that the basis of a mutually deter-
rent strategic balance is likely to remain essentially intact. But many
specific features of the forces of both sides will change. Uncertainties
about the quality and operational practices of these forces will become
more important to the assessment of the strategic balance than simple
quantitative measures, like numbers of launchers and warheads.
These, Mr. President, are some of the basic elements of the strategic
relationship we see ahead. I would now like to consider that relationship
within the broader context of how the Soviets view the total Soviet-American
relationship, as this will be the framework in which they approach the
forthcoming SALT negotiations. Marxism-Leninism still provides the
Soviet leaders with a set of ready-made prejudices, but their appraisals
of the outside world are increasingly pragmatic. Both from what they say,
and how they behave, the Soviets clearly regard the US as a potent com-
petitor.
In economic terms, they have great respect for our economic strength,
and have not concluded that US problems are gravely debilitating. They
are particularly conscious of our lead in the technological field. Their
military concerns, in turn, stem chiefly from the technological gap.
Consequently, and despite all their own gains, the Soviets do not feel
they have achieved a guaranteed strategic equality with the US. They
tend to over-insure, and they want to catch up in areas where they are
behind -- like MIRVs -- as well as prevent any erosion in their relative
position.
In the world arena, the Soviets believe that their military buildup of the
last decade is the primary factor that has forced Washington to turn from
FORD
TQP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
12
cold war to detente. Although they believe the relative position of the US
has declined, they still take a sober view of the magnitude and scope of
US influence. They expect, however, so long as detente is maintained,
to be able to advance their interests. Moreover, they still seem convinced
they can maintain detente while pursuing vigorous military programs.
These perceptions have a number of implications for SALT. First, much
as the Russians might want the image of strategic superiority for its
political value, they doubt that the US will allow them to gain an overall
strategic lead in the next ten years. (In fact, they may see a chance
that we will pull ahead in some areas.) Their hope is for an opportunity
to forge ahead in the longer run. Second, the Soviets see much to be done
in other areas economic, technological, political. Detente is their
current strategy creating the most favorable atmosphere for making
progress in these areas.
Brezhnev himself probably wants some kind of deal on SALT, but he has
proven a hard bargainer, and cannot act independently of his Politburo
colleagues. Both he and they are heavily dependent on the military to
formulate their views of the present and future strategic relationship.
The Soviet military almost monopolize both the data and the expertise
in this area, and is inclined to present "worst case" analyses of US
strengths.
President Ford: Worse case from their point of view?
Mr. Colby: Yes. Finally, the Soviet leadership as a group is aging.
Their successors will probably want to preserve detente. But their in-
fighting could make it harder to take specific decisions in the sensitive
area of arms control.
In the meantime, Mr. President, the Soviets see no promising alternative
to detente as a way of meeting their problems. If they came to think
detente was in genuine danger, they would want to try to shore it up. As
they approach a new US President, they will be anxious to learn -- and to
influence -- your concept of the relationship. In particular, they will
want to assess your terms for a strategic arms agreement, whether you
are prepared to offer significant limits on US programs, and how you
might react to a failure to reach agreement.
President Ford: Thanks very much, Bill. Could I look at the economic
comparison chart once again -- I was listening to you talk.
we think it is an accurate picture of their view.
Mr. Colby: Yes. This chart is taken from open Soviet publications GER and
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOPSECRET/SENSTIVE
13
President Ford: They are 85 percent as good in agriculture?
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, that's in grain output only.
Mr. Colby: With about 30 percent of their population compared to a much
smaller percentage for ours. Their productivity is much worse.
Deputy Secretary Clements: This would also be much changed if you
included the whole Western world rather than just the US versus the
Soviets.
President Ford: Even if you included the Block countries?
Mr. Colby: Yes -- The Block countries add very little.
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll: Also, their per capita income figures are not
on the same qualitative basis. These figures don't recognize the qualitative
difference.
Dr. Ikle: These are from their public sources.
President Ford: You said these are not public?
Mr. Colby: No. They are public. We have reasonable confidence they
are accurate. Of course, in the military area, they close off all infor- -
mation entirely.
President Ford: Thank you, Bill. Henry, now why don't you give us your
ideas on where we should go in this meeting and what we should do to pre-
pare for Alex's return.
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I would like to first review the status
of our SALT preparations. Then I will go over the general strategy we
might follow in the upcoming talks. All of this has been reviewed by the
Working Group of the Verification Panel and the Verification Panel itself.
First, to pick up on Bill's point. There is no question but that detente
serves some Soviet purposes -- they wouldn't be in it otherwise. How-
ever, the question we have to ask ourselves is, what American purposes
are served by detente. We should remember that from 1969 through 1971,
we refused to offer them any significant trade or other concessions until
the Soviets had moderated some of their foreign policy conduct. The
SALT negotiations accelerated right when we were in the middle of the
Vietnam war, and there was serious question about our ability to maintain
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE
14
our programs. In 1971, the Defense budgets were being cut everywhere.
Thus, the situation has to be seen in the context of what we could have
sustained otherwise.
We need not be driven by previous considerations; I'm speaking of the past
and that is subject to change. But there are a number of considerations
that apply to our current situation.
First, it is easy to talk about superiority, but this is one of those concepts
which is peculiarly difficult to translate into strategic and military useful-
ness. There might be some political effect associated with the perception
of superiority, but the level of fatalities involved makes the deliberate
decision to initiate general strategic nuclear war perhaps the most
difficult decision any leader can make. Thus, when we consider invest-
ments in strategic forces, we have to consider their usefulness, and
whether it is better to put our efforts into more strategic forces or
into tactical forces.
Second, as Bill's charts show, with the multiplication of weapons and the
explosion of technology, after the next rounds of arms deployments are
completed, both sides will still be essentially in strategic equilibrium.
If both sides can realize this, perhaps we can at least slow the buildup
or arrest it, or perhaps turn it around.
Third, over an indefinite period, an unconstrained strategic arms race
is not compatible with a political relaxation of tensions. If we were to
sustain an arms race, we have to demonstrate an overwhelming Soviet
threat. It would be hard to sustain trade and other relations in this
environment. It is obvious that the US cannot fall behind. If Soviet
forces increase, that is what we will have to do. But the political
dimensions will also change. In the past, we have attempted to get an
equitable agreement to avoid this situation. A relationship can continue
to be constructed if we can get an equitable agreement, leaving behind
the question of what is an equitable agreement.
Turning now to our objectives in SALT, Mr. President, we have had
four objectives:
-- First, to break the momentum of the Soviet buildup and
set ceilings on the level of forces. We have concentrated on equal
aggregates.
-- Second, to control the qualitative arms race, which has been
a codeword for MIRVs. For other qualitative improvements, such
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE
15
accuracy and yield-to-weight ratios, we have made essentially no efforts.
"Qualitative improvements" has been a codeword for MIRVs.
-- Third, to moderate the deployment of new generations of
weapons.
-- And fourth, to turn down the arms race with reductions. Of
course, reductions require the interim negotiation of an upper ceiling.
For example, if we agreed on a level of 2,000 by 1985 but no interim
ceiling, the Soviets could continue building up to, for example, 2800 by
1984 and tell you that they would take all the reductions in the last year.
Thus, we need some kind of ceiling, but this could be expressed in many
ways.
SALT I was a step in meeting our first objective, numerical ceilings.
SALT I dealt with numbers in a situation where we had no programs to
increase numbers. The JCS, both as a group and individuals, did not
want new submarine programs; they wanted to concentrate on Trident.
Thus, there was no possibility of an increase in land-based missiles,
and no interest in an increase in sea-based missiles, and bombers were
not constrained by the agreement. It is open to some argument whether
we stopped the Soviet program or just did to them what we did to ourselves
and froze their existing program. At any rate, there were no constraints
on US programs growing out of the agreement. One could make a reasonable
argument that the agreement was used to accelerate US programs -- that
Trident, accuracy, and other programs would not have been funded without
the SALT I agreements.
But as Bill Colby's charts show, the Interim Agreement becomes obsolete
in 1977. Before then the Soviets will put new launchers in old holes, but
without the Interim Agreement we could see an increase in numbers.
It is less costly to dig new holes than to modify the old ones. When this
is considered, seeing the Soviets program to modify silos, it is clear
that the Interim Agreement constrained numbers significantly.
Dr. Ikle: It cost more or less the same to modify the silos or build new
ones.
Secretary Schlesinger: If we had to enlarge the holes, we would have to
remodel concrete.
Deputy Secretary Clements: But we have sufficient volume or "cube" in
our holes so that our technology permits large increase in missile size
in the same holes.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOPSECRET/SENSIAE
16
Secretary Kissinger: We do not have to dig new holes to increase our
capability.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Isn't that right, George?
General Brown: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: Without an Interim Agreement, we could be talking
about quite substantial numbers.
Turning to the present situation, SALT is stalemated. In Geneva, both
sides have presented positions which reinforce the perception of the other
that they are trying for unilateral advantage. I think we have been more
responsible than they have, but our proposals have primarily constrained
their programs. Of course their proposals constrain us but do not con-
strain their own programs.
In Geneva, we have focused on equal aggregates and equal throw weight.
We have made essentially no progress with this approach.
In March, during my conversations with Brezhnev, the Soviets proposed
a different approach -- a continuation of the Interim Agreement numbers
for a three-year period, while giving us an 1100 to 1000 advantage in
numbers of MIRV missiles. But this would have constrained our Trident
program -- we would have been able to deploy it only by replacing Poseidon
and Polaris. At the same time, it constrained essentially nothing on their
side.
President Ford: What would have been the impact on the B-1 program?
Secretary Kissinger: None. Under the Interim Agreement, both sides
can increase the number of bombers. We can also put missiles on air-
planes, something they are concerned about. That's why I have been
asking the DOD to do this, to demonstrate a capability.
President Ford: Do we have any affirmative program for this?
General Brown: We have one -- the air-launched cruise missile program.
Secretary Schlesinger: We are also going to demonstrate, first over the
desert and then over the ocean, the capability to launch a missile from
a C-5. But we have no full-fledged program -- this is just a demonstration
to show the Soviets we can do it.
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSTIVE
BRARY
17
President Ford: Will they know in advance about it?
Ambassador Johnson: It has already been in the press.
Secretary Kissinger: They seem to be worried about this capability. In
all their propositions, they have suggested limits on air-to-surface
missiles.
In any event, their proposal in March was unacceptable and this led to a
deadlock. At the Summit this year, President Nixon proposed a shorter
two-year extension of the Interim Agreement to 1979, to fit in better
with our Trident program, to be coupled with MIR V limits of 1100
launchers and 700 for them.
President Ford: And they stuck with 1100 to 1000?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But even our proposal would have required
them to retire very little. The Soviets seem to be considering it seriously.
They had two Politburo meetings, and at the airport in one meeting,
Brezhnev asked me to explain it to Ustinov, the head of their defense
industries. But they had two generals there, and every time I said some-
thing, they jumped up showing Brezhnev charts with how much harm it
would do -- they probably wanted to change the squadron size ! (laughter)
Mr. President, in MBFR, I don't want to get into the details, but we are
thinking of giving up some squadrons, but George keeps changing the
squadron size -- pretty soon he will only have two airplanes per squadron!
(laughter)
President Ford: He just wants more generals!
Secretary Kissinger: At any rate, we were trying what we thought was a
fair proposal, but they finally refused it. And then we proposed a new
agreement on a 10-year basis. There are several advantages to this:
-- First, any five-year proposal cuts into both sides' programs,
or simply ratifies what both sides are doing anyway. It also cuts off our
programs, when the other side could easily break out. There are many
uncertainties in a five-year period. Even if they would limit MIRVs to
750, they might be below the number at the end of the period, but then
could really take off with their programs in 1979 or 1980. The same is
true for us. The full impact of our Trident and B-1 programs will not
be felt until 1980 and later. Therefore, we thought that if we could go
to a 1985 approach, we could constrain or stretch out programs, and in
this atmosphere, we would be less vulnerable to a breakout.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
GERALD FORD
18
Second, Brezhnev kept saying that he needed the appearance of
equality, which he doesn't believe they now have, given our lead in
weapons. I should point out that for some measures like throw weight,
it is our choice that we are behind. They didn't force us to deploy
smaller missiles.
Secretary Schlesinger: The reason the US chose small missiles was
because we were trying to exercise restraint, so that the Soviets would
not perceive any threatening hard target capability. This was Secretary
McNamara's explicit decision. He was trying to counter a potential
7000 interceptor ABM, and he did it by fractionating our existing pay-
load. The Soviets are increasing their payload by a factor or at least
two as they fractionate.
Secretary Kissinger: But Brezhnev's major point, that with the warhead
gap there would not be an appearance of equality, had merit. We have
expressed a need for a numerical equality in numbers of weapons through
our equal aggregates approach ourselves.
As Bill said, and I have had no prior discussion with him about this, I
believe this is an unusually good time to make progress.
President Ford: Have they agreed on the principle of ten years?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes.
It is my impression that their bureaucratic problem is worse than ours.
For example, prior to Gromyko's joining the Politburo, he was not per-
mitted at Politburo meetings even to comment on military programs.
He was not permitted any research or analytical staff for military
matters. All military input and technical data came from the defense
department.
Deputy Secretary Clements: That sounds like a great system! (laughter)
Secretary Schlesinger: (to Clements) That cuts you out too, Bill!
Secretary Kissinger: The result of the bureaucratic situation is that
historically, every arms control idea has come from the US. Whenever
they generate a scheme, they have to stick to it because they have no
flexibility. Dobrynin once told me that the general at the Geneva talks
has instructions not to agree with Semenov on anything so that it all has
to go back to Moscow for decision.
President Ford: So their civilian representative can make no decisions.
TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE
19
Secretary Kissinger: That's right. At the beginning of SALT I, we knew
more about Soviet programs than the Soviet civilians on their Delegation.
Ambassador Johnson: One of their military men asked us not to talk so
much about their programs, saying that they did not provide this infor.
mation to their own civilians.
Secretary Kissinger: Even now, Gromyko is so far behind the power curve
that he can do little but repeat his briefing papers. He can't say anything
on his own. Thus, if we don't break the deadlock, it is inconceivable
that they could come up with a new approach.
Bureaucratically, if we do come up with a new idea, we will have to submit
it through your channels to Brezhnev directly, so that he can study it
before it has been beaten down by his bureaucracy. If it is submitted
through Alex in Geneva, it will be beaten down before it has a chance.
All of this, Mr. President, affects the strategy of how we should proceed.
Alex should go back and talk principles -- he should convey primarily
a mood, not concrete proposals. He can also explore some areas we
have not yet explored. Then in early October, after one or two more
NSC meetings, we can give our ideas in your channels to Brezhnev.
Then I will go to Moscow, and if we can agree on principles, we can
feed this back to Geneva, where it will take months, and maybe years,
to work out the details of the final agreement.
At today's meeting, we want to put before you some of the problems,
although we do not yet have solutions. For example, there is the question
of aggregates. If we agree to numbers at the Soviet level, we will have
to build up. At lower levels, the Soviets will have to reduce considerably
before we do. Or finally, we could try to balance some slight numerical
advantage for an advantage in some other measure.
A second problem is attempting to balance the number of RVs on each side.
We have a large lead in the number of RVs, but our yield is infinitesimal
compared to the Soviets.
Secretary Schlesinger: There is no problem if Henry can obtain MIRV
limits on us versus throw weight limits on them. We can reduce the
number of reentry vehicles. We could go to three on Poseidon. To the
extent they worry about numbers, we can adapt, although I don't believe
it is in the Soviets interest to have us do this.
Secretary Kissinger: I'm not saying any particular formulation is the
answer, but just what the issues are.
LIBRARY
TQP'SECRET/SENSITIVE
TORSECRAT SENSITIVE
20
Third, there is the question of the throw weight to numbers area. And,
fourth, there is the Soviets' constant reference to overseas based systems.
Ideally, we can move this discussion to MBFR when you talk to Resor
later today, we will have some time to talk about this. But this is not
likely to come up in the next month, so Alex need not discuss this in
Geneva.
Ambassador Johnson: I agree.
Secretary Kissinger: There is no need to modify our previous positions
in Geneva. However, it is important for Alex to indicate some flexibility
in the context of a ten-year agreement. Second, he can raise issues we
have not dealt with before -- for example, reductions, which we have not
seriously talked about. Another area, which is full of complexities and
details, concerns the deployment rates of new systems.
President Ford: Deployment rates of new systems?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We could either prohibit new systems, but
that is tough to monitor. Or we could permit, for example, if we had a
limit of 1000 MIRVs over a ten-year period, we could also add a limit
on construction of less than 100 a year.
Mr. Duckett: I should point out, Mr. President, that at the peak of the
deployments of their SS-9s and SS-11s, they were digging 265 holes a year.
This would compare to numbers even lower than those Henry mentioned.
Secretary Kissinger: If we could stretch their deployments over a ten-year
period, there would be a different strategic significance. Alex could dis-
cuss this in general, although we don't have a final position on it.
In the Verification Panel, we are trying to put together various numerical
schemes. Perhaps within the next two weeks, we can present them to you
here.
President Ford: And then we would submit them in my channels to Brezhnev.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, Even after you approve a particular approach,
we have several ways of handling it. We could give them one scheme, or
perhaps two or three of different levels of complexity. It makes no sense
to give them three schemes of the same complexity and let them choose,
but for example, we could give them one very crude approach, with
numbers only, and others more complex.
TOP SECRET/SENSTTIVE
21
In the next day or two, we will give you the various instructions received
from the agencies for your choice, and then we can give instructions to
Alex for his talks which begin on Wednesday.
President Ford: Then these instructions will follow the overall pattern
of more flexibility?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes -- perhaps not so much flexibility, but a better
tone. He can also open up these new areas. On the aggregates, I see
little he can do other than repeat our past statements.
Ambassador Johnson: The key is how for cefully I repeat our past require-
ments for equal aggregates. If I don't repeat this, it will be seen as
significant. If I do repeat it, they may just say this is the same old stuff.
President Ford: But if the past pattern remains true, they won't have any
new ideas either.
Secretary Kissinger: I am certain they will have no new proposal. It's
possible they will present their old proposal in a more flexible manner,
but if they had a new proposal they would submit it directly to you, not to
Alex through Semenov. But Brezhnev has no system to develop new
proposals, unless it is in reaction to a proposal of ours.
President Ford: Their military is so dominant, that they are completely
inflexible without pressure from Brezhnev.
Secretary Kissinger: Finally, they will come down on one approach, and
they won't care what the analysis is. For example, they gave us some
numbers in Moscow, which if you counted all aircraft carriers on station
and all F-111s in the world with maximum loadings, you could work out
a scheme with those numbers, but they had no flexibility.
President Ford: Our approach will have to be predicated on that assump-
tion?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Grechko is a very able guy, but he doesn't
think in SALT terms. If we come in with a proposal, Brezhnev can do
something more which might go beyond just satisfying their bureaucracy.
President Ford: Jim, do you have any comments?
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I have a presentation which gives
the details of the force balance. I could give this now or later as you
prefer. Also I have some observations, There are two main objectives
GERALD
LIBRARY
LIBR
TQP SECRET/SENSITIVE
22
of arms control -- to improve the crisis stability of the situation, and to
improve the arms balance. To improve crisis stability, we prefer to hold
down the size of the forces. As we add to destructive capability, with
a constant number of aim points on each side, there could be a growing
temptation to strike first.
On the other hand, when talking to the arms balance, we are talking about
what is perceived as a relation of the two sides. At present, their force
is not greater than ours. But I think Alex should stress the functional
relationship between their force deployments and ours. What they decide
to deploy affects our deployments. In effect, they are choosing our
deployments.
Because of some of the factors Henry has described, I don't think they
understand this. The Soviet military perceive that they can unilaterally
adjust their forces, thus I think it is worthwhile for Alex to stress this
relationship.
President Ford: What you are saying is true, but among ourselves in this
room, we have to recognize that we have a problem they don't have. We
have to sell our programs to the Congress. We should recognize this
among ourselves, although I don't think Alex should say this to them in
Geneva (laughter) -- but as a practical matter, this is what we face.
Secretary Schlesinger: But the Soviets' perception is that the US can move
fast when the climate is right. In 1958, when they launched Sputnik we
reacted and had a man on the moon in ten years. In 1961, shortly after
we perceived a missile gap, we were putting Minutemen out at the rate
of one every two days. They believe that if they ever arouse American
concerns, we can respond, and that it is not in their interest to do so.
I might now show you just a few charts.
(Referring to models of an SS-9 and a Minuteman III) This is their SS-9
missile. It carries a 20 to 25 megaton weapon. By comparison our
Minuteman is much smaller. Their follow-on missile, the SS-18, is
about the same size as the SS-9. Each one has eight times the payload
capacity of a Minuteman.
President Ford: Just to clarify this, as you go to higher yields, as you
mentioned Bill (Clements), doesn't this make a difference?
Secretary Schlesinger: It depends on the size and the yield-weight ratios.
In the long run, with this size, we can't retain our technological advantages
in yield-to-weight ratios. We may retain our advantages in accuracy, but
as Soviet accuracies improve, this gets less important.
TOP SECRET/SENSPNVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
23
President Ford: Bill, how does the eight-to-one ratio change -- it must if
you double the yield.
Secretary Schlesinger: The ratio doesn't change -- our yield, pound for
pound, is better.
Deputy Secretary Clements: When we double the yield, the dimensions
don't change. But in any event, accuracy is more important than yield.
The capability of the little ones grows enormously with accuracy. If
technology stays the same, which it probably will do over the next ten
years, we will have this advantage.
President Ford: And the impact on the targeting will be the same if we
can get the accuracy?
Secretary Schlesinger: No -- no one in the real world will know accuracy
precisely. We will know about different degrees of accuracy, but never
know precisely what our accuracy is. Throw weight can compensate for
accuracy, as is shown in this chart. This shows the impact of uncertain
inaccuracy.
Secretary Kissinger:
Secretary Schlesinger:
Secretary Kissinger:
Secretary Schlesinger: There would be some downward adjustment in
this curve, yes.
Ambassador Johnson: Of course, accuracy is important only in a counter-
force role, not for soft targets.
Secretary Schlesinger: Accuracy is important for any selective tar geting.
For cities, it matters not at all.
TOP SECRETY SENSITIVE
2020 CIGRAPY
24
Mr. Colby: Of course, even if they destroy our Minuteman, we have other
elements remaining -- our submarines and bombers.
Secretary Schlesinger: In March, our proposal recognized the substantial
difference between ICBMs and SLBMs, in yield, accuracy, and command
and control. ICBMs are the basis of both counterforce and selective
attack capabilities. They are the main threat.
The Soviets may tend to brood about our lead in warheads, but here are
some indications of the overall balance (shows chart titled "perceived
balance").
President Ford: Is this as perceived by us or by them?
Secretary Schlesinger: The numbers are simply the facts as we know them.
The issue is how these numbers are perceived in Europe, China, and else-
where. They are behind in bombers, which is somewhat offset by their
fighters, but only somewhat. But they are ahead in megatonnage and
throw weight. In warheads, we also have an advantage, but they are
closing that gap. They tend to dwell on the one area where they have a
disadvantage.
But over the next seven years, the Soviets will be leading in all areas.
They will increase substantially their missile throw weight, over double
the present. The bomber gap will be narrowed, and they will reach war-
head parity, unless we can constrain the development of MIRVs, which
tend to drive the warhead balance. By most criteria, the US would be
perceived as having less capable forces.
President Ford: This is if they do what we project them to do, and we
do what we plan?
Dr. Ikle: There is one other factor here, and that is our advantage in
ASW capability.
Secretary Schlesinger: Now I would like to show you the situation we faced
at the end of SALT I as we proceeded into SALT II. This is a chart which
I presented to President Nixon when I was in Bill's job at the CLA. The US
had some advantages, and the Soviets had other advantages, plus as we
now see in retrospect, an impressive ongoing development program. But
things came out a rough balance. However, our positions of advantage,
many technological, are transitory. As they get on-board computers and
other technology, our advantages will wane, if not disappear.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
FORD HIBRARY
25
In 1972, by fractionating to very small RVs, we could deploy a large number
of RVs. But if they support their throw weight, ultimately, they could out-
class the US. We could react in two ways. First, we could expand,
increasing our forces, but this would also increase instabilities. Second,
what we would prefer to do, is to hold down each side.
This is why I think Alex should stress the functional relationship between
their choices and our responses.
President Ford: Alex should tell them that instead of being guided by an
inflexible military, they should be guided by their knowledge of the opposite
situation on our side.
Secretary Schlesinger: Henry is in a better position than I am to judge if
that is the proper message, but we can be educated. The US must convey
the US intent to match them.
Secretary Kissinger: Many of these inequalities are not the result of the
Interim Agreement. They existed before the agreement and would have
existed regardless of the agreement. All our ongoing missile programs
are permitted by the agreement we could increase our throw weight if
we desire.
Mr. President, we have to look at what we can realistically do. It is not
a bad message to give them, that their deployment rate affects ours. To
do this, I hope our Defense shows the maximum number of new develop-
ments, but if we are realistic, we have to realize that they have four new
programs, which represent a major investment in resources. They cannot
give up their approach. In any ten-year program, maybe they could give
up one, but the 17 and 19 will survive, and the 18 too in one form or
another. The question is what price we want to pay to have a single war-
head instead of MIRVs, and from some of the things I have heard recently,
I am not convinced it is all that much in our interest to pay much of a
price for that. But if we can stretch out their missile deployments over
an 8-year period, this would help.
We also should have a sense of the time frame in which we are dealing.
Throw weight is worrisome if it can be translated into accuracy and yield.
Up to now, the most they have tested is eight warheads on their larger
missile and six on their smaller. We have to assess what they can do
in the time period. If they can modify only about 610 holes, with no
more than six warheads each, the advantage of the throw weight will
be apparent only in the 80's. The throw weight problem is not upon us
now when it is upon us we will have to tell you.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
LIORARY
TOP
26
Most of the analysis, yield, and accuracy relate to ability against fixed
targets. Thus, the percent of your force which is fixed versus mobile is
important, and the percent of theirs that is fixed is much greater.
We cannot drive them to smaller missiles over the next 10 years. Their
system doesn't permit changing the type of their weapons. Perhaps we
can change the numbers, but not the types. The question is that at some
point both sides will equal out, and where does technological advantage
even out.
Secretary Schlesinger: If we can constrain their MIRV, it would help.
With seven or eight million pounds of throw weight MIRVed, that puts our
Minuteman force at risk. We would have to put missiles on aircraft or
take other action, or convince them to slow down their rate of deployment.
Secretary Kissinger: If Alex can make as his first point that they are deter-
mining our force through their decisions, this will help.
Ambassador Johnson: If I could also convince them of the desirability of
providing some information on what they plan to do, this would reduce
our uncertainty.
President Ford: Have they ever done this?
Secretary Kissinger: Not at Alex's level. In March, they told us that they
were having trouble with their SLBM MIRVs, and that their SLBM MIRVs
would be slower than their ICBMs. I believe this is the first time they
have formally told us something like this.
President Ford: Is there any harm in asking them for such information?
Secretary Kissinger: It depends on how Alex does it.
Alex: I would simply state the desirability of having the information not
offered as a proposal.
Dr. Ikle: If we could get this point across to their military, by stating
that the lack of information is harmful.
Secretary Kissinger: Over the next few months, about the most Alex can
hope to do is to get them to understand that an all out deployment by them
is not costless. The information idea is OK, but it is not relevant until
we have some agreement in principle on doing something about the deploy-
ment rates.
TORSECRET/SENSTIVE
TORSTCRET/SENSTIVE
27
President Ford: So Alex will follow this course, of the US being more
flexible. If we can then get the right terms in an agreement, we will sign
it, even though we are saying that if they pursue their programs, we will
have to do something to respond.
Secretary Schlesinger: And if RVs are of major concern to them we are
willing to do something about them.
Mr. Colby: Ultimately, we have to get both sides to ask the question of
how much is enough.
Secretary Kissinger: We are dealing here in two time frames. First,
the major thing Alex can do by the end of October is to emphasize the
new approach of the ten-year agreement and that their programs are
forcing us into new programs. Jim's suggestion can help. We can
convince them that every military program is not a net asset. Second,
we can open new areas, for example reductions. Then in early October,
we can put some models before them. Alex will know them, although he
will not discuss them in Geneva. Then if we can get agreement in
principle, Alex will have a real negotiation on his hands.
President Ford: Of course, the credibility of Alex saying that we will
match them is related to the actions of Congress on the military budget
now before them.
Secretary Schlesinger: Every item in the strategic forces has been
approved.
President Ford: We should make this more visible.
Secretary Schlesinger: The House vote was taken on the day of the Soviet
parliamentarian's visit here. Ed Hebert, partially to embarass Bella,
called for a vote, and it passed 390 to 35.
Deputy Secretary Clements: That is why the cruise missile program is so
important. The Soviets are very sensitive to this. Right Henry?
Secretary Kissinger: Right -- I'm chuckling because I have been trying
to keep it going.
President Ford: Well gentlemen, this meeting has been very helpful. We
will have to put in writing the kind of direction Alex should take. Alex,
when do you need this?
Ambassador Johnson: I am leaving Monday morning.
GERALD FORD
TOR SECRET/SENSITVE
TQRSECRET/SENSITIVE
28
Secretary Kissinger: We can send them to him by cable. We want time to
put before you the various proposals made by the agencies.
Ambassador Johnson: I have to be walking something of a tight rope
throughout these talks.
President Ford: Like walking across Niagra Falls ! George do you have any
comments?
General Brown: I would only remind us that many of their deployment pro-
grams start now, while ours come later. We could get ourself in a box,
and jeopardize our B-1 and Trident.
Ambassador Johnson: But you would have no objection to my saying that
their deployment rates are higher than we like.
Deputy Secretary Clements: They should know this.
Secretary Schlesinger: We should stress our flexibility. We do not have
to start our new programs and increase our budget which can be adjusted
to their programs. We are prepared to sacrifice large throw weight
missiles. There is no need to deploy them, but we will maintain the
balance.
President Ford: Fred, do you have any comment?
Dr. Ikle: Only that I think we do face a major opportunity.
President Ford: Well thank you gentlemen, and good luck Alex. With you
there, I have confidence that the negotiations are in good hands.
gel
TOR/SECRET/SENSITIVE