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    "title": "NSC Meeting, 1/23/75",
    "description": "This file contains material relating to Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR).",
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        "North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (4/4/1949 - )",
        "President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 1/23/1975\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nMEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nThursday, January 23, 1975\n10:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m. (60 minutes)\nThe Cabinet Room\nFrom: Henry A. Kissinger\nI. PURPOSE\nTo review the background and status of the Mutual and Balanced\nForce Reduction (MBFR) talks and consider alternative modifica-\ntions which might be made to the present Alliance position.\nII. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS\nA. Background: After a long history of Soviet proposals for a\nEuropean security conference to bless the postwar boundaries,\nNATO proposed force reduction talks in June of 1968. The\nSoviets were not interested at that time, fearing that they\nmight be accused of freeing up U.S. troops for Vietnam. As\nthe war wound down and it became clear that the proposed\nsecurity conference would not get off the ground without\nparallel discussions on military issues, the Warsaw Pact\nministers announced their interest in troop reductions in\nJune 1970. During my trip to Moscow in 1972, we reached\nan understanding that the security conference (CSCE) and a\ndiscussion of European force reductions (MBFR) would proceed\nin parallel.\nOur proposal to hold force reduction talks was originally con-\nceived as (1) a response to the Soviet CSCE proposal, and\n(2) a vehicle for containing Congressional pressures for\nunilateral U.S. reductions. However, once the talks became\na reality, we concluded that our position should be based on\nNATO's security requirements, not just political factors.\nCORD\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12356, NSC Sec, use 34. 7/21/99\nLIBRARY\nSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nMR98-40, State lifer 9/25/98\nBy let NARA Date 10/20/98,7/21/99 7/21/99\nGERALD FORD HERART\n2\nThe U.S. approach to MBFR was derived from detailed\nmilitary studies conducted over a period of three years. It\nwas first presented to NATO in May 1973, and it has re⁴\nmained the basis for the Alliance position in MBFR up to\nthe present time. It calls for two phases of reductions,\nbeginning with U.S. and Soviet withdrawals of 29,000 and\n68, 000 troops, respectively. The Soviet forces would be\nin the form of a \"tank army\", including 1700 of the Pact's\n16,000 tanks. The second phase would focus on countries\nother than the U.S. and USSR. An additional 157, 000 Pact\nand 48, 000 NATO troops would be reduced in order to reach\na common ceiling of 700, 000.\nWithin a few weeks after the MBFR talks began in October\n1973, the Soviets tabled a draft agreement calling for equal\npercentage reductions on both sides. All states and all force\nelements -- ground, air, and nuclear would participate in\nthe reductions from the outset. Reductions of each country's\nforces would be in proportion to the relative size of its\nforces, and national ceilings would be established for each\ncountry.\nRecognizing that the NATO demands for a Soviet tank army\nand significantly larger Pact troop reductions would be difficult\nto achieve without further NATO concessions, the U.S. told\nthe Alliance in June 1973 that NATO should be prepared\neventually to offer to reduce its nuclear forces in order to\nachieve the Pact \"tank army\" reductions. However, this move\nhas never been made by the Alliance.\nIn summary, after a year of debate, each side has offered only\nminor modifications to its original position, and the talks have\nreached a stalemate. There is disagreement on three\nfundamental issues:\n-- Whose forces should be reduced? -- We say that U.S.\nand Soviet withdrawals should come before those of our\nAllies; the Pact says that all direct participants should\ncommit themselves to specific reductions from the outset.\n-- What type of forces should be reduced? -- Our present\nposition calls for reductions in ground forces only, but\nNATO is studying the possible inclusion of air forces;\nthe Pact says that all types of forces -- ground, air, and\nnuclear -- must be reduced.\nCERALD FORD\nSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nWE\n3\nWhat ratio of NATO to Warsaw Pact forces should\nbe reduced? We say that because of existing\ndisparities, the Pact should reduce significantly more\nthan NATO, leading toward a common ceiling; the Pact\ninsists on equal numerical or equal percentage re-\nductions based on total forces in the area.\nVarious alternatives for breaking the stalemate have been\nconsidered by the Verification Panel. In general, there are\nthree categories of adjustments which could be made to the\nAllied position:\nThe Allies could move ahead on the earlier U.S.\nsuggestion of reducing nuclear forces (warheads, F-4\naircraft, and Pershing missiles). NATO has an ad-\nvantage over the Pact in nuclear forces, so this re-\nduction would be presented as an offset to the asymmetrical\nreduction of Pact tanks and manpower included in the\nAllied proposal.\n-- German forces could be included in the NATO reduction,\nmeeting the major Soviet objective of getting control of\nthe German army.\n-- We could move toward the Pact concept of equal per-\ncentage reductions, essentially abandoning our goal of\nreaching a common ceiling.\nOf these approaches, there is a general consensus in the Verifi-\ncation Panel that nuclear elements continue to be the best. Both\nof the other alternatives would be strongly opposed by our\nAllies, and including German forces would be counterproductive\nto our efforts to shift the burden of European defense to the\nEuropeans. Furthermore, there are good military reasons\nfor restructuring our European nuclear stockpile, and in any\nevent, we are under Congressional pressure to do SO.\nIn summary, the major issue to be decided now is whether this\nis an appropriate time to modify the Alliance MBFR position.\nA failure to do so will inevitably prolong the stalemate, but\nhasty movement may be wasted if the Soviet leadership is not\nin a position to offer corresponding concessions on their side.\nIf we do modify our position, there is generalconsensus that it\nshould be done by adding an offer to reduce NATO nuclear forces,\nin return for a heavy reduction of Pact tanks and manpower.\nFORD\nSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nSACRAT/SENSITIVE\n4\nDirector Colby is prepared to give a briefing on the military\nbalance in Europe. Secretary Schlesinger might also wish\nto make some remarks on that subject.\nAfter your opening remarks, I suggest that you ask Bill Colby\nfor his briefing, then ask me to review the status of the\nnegotiations and the issues to be decided.\nB. Participants: (List at Tab A)\nC. Press Arrangements: The meeting, but not the subject, will\nbe announced. White House photographer only.\nIII. TALKING POINTS\nA. At the Opening of the Meeting\n1. The purpose of this meeting is to review the status of the\nforce reduction talks and consider the options for possible\nmodifications to the Alliance position. With the Vienna talks\nat a stalemate, we should take a hard look at our MBFR\nobjectives and our negotiating stance to see if there is cause\nto change either.\n2. Bill (Colby), would you give US a rundown on the current\nmilitary balance in Central Europe?\n3. Henry, would you review the bidding for us in the negotiations\nand lay out the options we should consider for modifying our\nposition?\nB. At the Close of the Meeting\n1. I believe we should get the talks moving again in MBFR.\nSince there are several reasonable ways to go, I would like\nto give this subject careful thought before making a decision.\n2. Stan (Resor), we will get instructions to you and to NATO\nwithin a few days.\nFURO & LIBRARY BERALD\nSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE\nTALKING POINTS\nNSC MEETING\nThursday, January 23, 1975 -- - - 10:30 a. m.\n-- Mr. President, the purpose of this meeting is to review the\nbackground and status of the MBFR talks and go over alternative\nmodifications which might be made to the present Alliance MBFR\nposition.\n-- Since this is the first NSC meeting on MBFR for you and the\nVice President, I would like to start my remarks with a brief sketch\nof how we got to where we are in MBFR.\nGenesis of MBFR\n-- In the 1950's Moscow made proposals both for a conference\non European security and for withdrawals of foreign troops from\nGermany. During the 60's, the Soviets lost interest in European force\nreductions, lest they appear to free up troops for service in Vietnam.\nBut they continued their efforts to generate a conference on European\nsecurity as a way to gain international blessing of the post-war\nGERAL\nboundaries in Europe.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12356, 2/19/99\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nMR98-40, 13; State letter 9/25/98\nCERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS By let NARA, Date 10/21/98, 7/21/99\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE\n2\n-- We made it clear, for our part, that their long cherished\nsecurity conference would not get off the ground unless they agreed to\nparallel discussions on military issues.\n-- By my September 1972 trip to Moscow, we had reached an\nunderstanding that the security conference (CSCE) and a discussion of\nmilitary issues (MBFR) would proceed in parallel.\n-- Our original proposal to hold MBFR negotiations was largely\na political move in response to Soviet CSCE initiatives and a vehicle\nfor containing pressures for unilateral Western reductions.\n-- Once the talks became a reality, we concluded that MBFR\nshould be based on real NATO military security requirements, not\nsimply on political factors. The U.S. approach presented to NATO\nin May 1973 was based on detailed military analyses conducted over\na period of three years.\n-- We were concerned that the negotiations might provide an\nexcuse for some of our Allies to slacken their defense efforts. So\nour approach called for maintenance and improvement of Alliance\nmilitary capabilities while the negotiations proceeded, and adherence\nto the principle that reductions would be made only as part of an agree-\nment with the Pact.\nFORD & LIBRARY GENALD\nCORD\nCERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n3\nTORRECKET / SENSITIVE\nEvolution of the Alliance Position\n-- The U.S. approach presented three alternatives, each con-\nsidered to be militarily acceptable:\nA common ceiling on ground force manpower to be reached\nin two phases, ten percent withdrawals of stationed forces followed by\nten percent cuts of indigenous forces.\nAn equal percentage cut in U.S. and Soviet forces, which\nwould lead toward parity in total ground force manpower on the two sides.\nReduction of dissimilar threatening elements. This was\n\"Option Three\", and it envisioned offering 1000 nuclear warheads,\n36 Pershing launchers and 54 F-4 aircraft in exchange for about 20%\nof the Soviet tanks in Central Europe.\n-- The Allies agreed on an approach combining all three of these\noptions. We would seek a common ceiling on ground force manpower\nto be achieved in two phases of negotiation:\nA first phase, in which the U.S. and USSR would reduce\nequal percentages of their ground manpower, with the Soviet cut in the\nform of a tank army. This would amount to about 29,000 Americans,\n68,000 Soviets, and 1700 Soviet tanks.\nA second phase, to be negotiated separately, in which\nall the participants on both sides would further reduce to a common\nceiling on ground forces of about 700,000. This would require a ratio\nof Pact-to-NATO cuts in Phase Two of about three-to-one.\nTORSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD\nLIBRAR\n4\nTORATCRY / SENSITIVE\n-- Nuclear elements up to the limits of Option Three were to be\nwithheld, to be available as additional leverage to achieve the tank\narmy objective. From the outset it was assumed that these elements\nwould have to be used, and that without them the Alliance proposal was\nrather one-sided.\nStatus of the Negotiations\n-- The MBFR talks began on October 30, 1973. NATO put forward\nits agreed position while the Pact tabled a draft treaty calling for three\nstages of reductions:\nan initial \"token\" reduction of 20, 000 men per side\na further cut of 5% by each side in CY 1975\na third stage of 10% reductions by each side in CY 1976.\n-- Under the Pact draft treaty:\nall countries and all force elements, ground, air, and\nnuclear manpower and equipment, would be included in each stage.\nreductions would be equal for each side, divided among\nall participants in proportion to the relative size of their forces.\neach nation would sign the treaty individually, thereby\ncreating a ceiling on its forces.\n-- The Soviet approach indicated a greater interest in getting\nGerman reductions, and in placing limits on European forces and\nflexibility, than in getting American troops off the continent.\nhade Gamain for four part\nBEHALD 3. 10.8)\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRART\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE\n5\n-- Our earliest military analysis concluded that equal reductions\nor equal percentage reductions of NATO and Pact forces would favor\nthe Pact by magnifying the effects of the existing armor and manpower\ndisparities. For this reason we have consistently rejected the Eastern\napproach.\n-- The Soviets have shown some flexibility in their proposal\nregarding the makeup of the initial 20, 000 man reduction:\nthey have agreed that the reductions could be made up\nlargely of U.S. and Soviet forces.\nthey have hinted that air and nuclear elements might be\ndeferred to the second stage.\nthey have remained adamant, however, that the size of\nthe reductions for the two sides must be equal.\n-- In the last round theEast proposed a freeze on each country's\nforces while the negotiations continue. It came on the heels of our\nannounced intention to beef up our combat forces in Europe at the\nexpense of support forces, and seems a rather transparent attempt\nto limit Alliance forces to existing levels and inhibit flexibility.\nMajor Issues in the Negotiations\n-- NATO and the Pact still disagree on three fundamental issues:\nWhose forces should be reduced and when. Our position\nis that.reductions by the U.S. and USSR should precede any specific\nFORD\n380\nLIBRARY\nSTENED\nTOP SECREY/SENSITIVE XGDS\nfor SECAST/SENSITIVE\n6\ncommitments by the other direct participants to reduce. The Soviets\ninsist that all direct participants should at least commit themselves\nto the size and timing of reductions from the outset.\nWhat should be the reduction ratio. Our position holds that\nbecause of existing disparities in ground forces, reductions should be\nasymmetrical and lead toward a common ceiling. The Pact insists on\nequal numerical reductions, or at least equal percentage reductions\nbased on total NATO/Pact forces in the reductions area.\nWhat forces should be reduced. The Allied position calls\nfor reductions in ground forces only. However, we have proposed a\nfreeze on air manpower levels between phases, and possible U.S. air\nmanpower reductions are currently under discussion in the Alliance.\nThe Pact has insisted from the outset that all types of forces -- - ground,\nair, and nuclear -- should be reduced in units, with their armaments.\n-- Against this background we need to take another hard look at\nour objectives in MBFR and any developments that might cause us to\nwant to change them.\nOur Negotiating Objectives\n-- The SALT negotiations and the Vladivostok accord have\nestablished the principle of overall parity between the strategic\nforces of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Because of this development,\nthe current imbalance in conventional forces in Central Europe has\n3)\nemerged as an even more important source of potential FORD instability\nbetween East and West.\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP STORET / SENSITIVE\n7\n-- From the very beginning we have pursued the common ceiling\nconcept because it would help to remove this imbalance, and enhance\nstability by establishing the principle of approximate parity in the\nconventional forces of the two sides. We have also sought the with-\ndrawal of a Soviet tank army a step toward altering the clearly\noffensive orientation of Soviet armored formations and reducing the\nvery large advantage the Pact holds in numbers of tanks.\n-- The Pact negotiators have consistently rejected the Allied\nproposal as too favorable to the West, and as an attempt to gain\nunilateral military advantage. This is true to the extent that our\nproposal seeks parity of outcome, requiring disproportionate reduc-\ntions from the other side, yet offers the East nothing to offset their\nlarger reductions.\n-- MBFR has been accorded a relatively low priority by the\nSoviet leadership and there is little incentive for them to move the\nnegotiations forward. The current stalemate is likely to continue\nunless the Western position is modified.\nModifications to the Alliance Position\nA. Changing what is asked from the other side.\n-- We could modify the Alliance proposal by changing what is\nasked of the other side. Specifically we could reduce the asymmetry\nin the proposed manpower reductions for Phase I (29,000 U.S. troops\nGERALD FORD LIBRART\nSERALD\nFORD\nfor 68, 000 Soviet).\nTOR SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n8\nAny major modification (to an asymmetry of 2 to 1 or\nless) would so increase the disparity in Phase II reductions required\nto reach the common ceiling as to make Eastern agreement to the\nconcept very unlikely.\nWe might find it difficult to avoid an MBFR outcome that\neffectively froze NATO/Pact forces at disparite levels and formalized\nPact superiority in Central Europe.\n-- The twin Allied goals of manpower parity and reduction of\noffensive elements continue to make both military and political sense.\nReducing the asymmetries in our Phase I proposal would undercut\nour efforts to obtain these goals as outcomes for MBFR. What is\nneeded is an additional element which can be added to the Allied\nposition to serve as an offset for these asymmetries.\nB. Adding elements to the current Alliance position.\n-- We could modify our position on phasing and suggest European\nreductions as part of Phase I.\nEarly European reductions (especially German) have\nemerged as the prime Soviet desiderata in MBFR.\nWhile parliamentary pressures for troop reductions have\nincreased European interest in MBFR, not one country has explicitly\nasked to be included in Phase I reductions.\nTOR SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nOF\n3\nLIBRARY\nTRA/SACRET/SENSITIVE\n9\nIt may not be in our interest to suggest such participation,\nrunning counter to our efforts to get our NATO allies to improve their\nconventional military capability and accept more of the burden of their\nown defense.\n-- Nuclear elements might serve as the basis of a trade of\nsubstantial U.S. nuclear capability for a Soviet tank army (including\nboth the manpower asymmetry, and the tanks and associated armaments).\nIntroduction of these elements has been delayed because\nthey were also part of the FBS issue in SALT. With that issue resolved,\nwe can now consider introducing nuclear elements into MBFR.\nNuclear warhead reductions pose little difficulty. There\nis general consensus within the executive that the warhead stockpiles\nin Europe are too high. Congress shares this view and has begun\npressuring Defense for reductions.\nThe other two elements, F-4s and Pershings, raise\nquestions about the sorts of constraints that will result from reducing\nthese systems, and what limits should be sought on Soviet nuclear\nsystems.\nThere is consensus within the Verification Panel that\nacceptable solutions to these problems can be devised in the context\nof the negotiations, and that reduction of these elements in exchange\nfor a tank army remains a good trade.\nis\nOF\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nDERALD\nTRRAST\n10\nTOV SACRET/SENSITIVE\nC. Combine the addition of elements with a change in what is\nasked from the other side.\n-- We could add new elements to the negotiations while at the\nsame time altering what is asked from the other side. We might\nintroduce both nuclear elements and European reductions, while\nreducing the asymmetry in our proposed manpower reductions.\n-- This approach would leave the West very little to bargain.\nwith in seeking further asymmetrical reductions to a common ceiling\nin the next phase of negotiations.\n-- It would force the parties to resolve all the major issues\nin the negotiations before even an initial agreement could be concluded.\nThis would complicate the process of obtaining internal agreement -\nboth within NATO and within the Soviet hierarchy without really\nadvancing our MBFR objectives.\n-- We could still move to this approach after introducing nuclear\nelements if the Allies began to press for early reductions, and we\nwould have the benefit of Soviet reaction to our nuclear proposal.\nApproach to the Allies\n-- Our NATO Allies will want extensive discussion on any proposal\nto modify the current Alliance position. Coming forward with a single\nproposal has the best chance of focusing this debate and obtaining timely\nagreement.\nFORD\nGERALD R.\nLIBRARY\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTQA SINCRE SENSITIVE\n11\nThis approach would work well if the addition of nuclear\nelements is suggested. The Allies have long been on notice of our\ninterest in introducing these elements, and would not feel this proposal\nrequired a complete review of the Alliance position.\n-- Any other modification would be much less expected and cause\na much more comprehensive review. In this case we might want to\nsubmit a series of options for altering the Alliance position, without\nindicating any specific preference.\n-- This would be particularly useful if we were considering\nEuropean participation in Phase I, SO as to avoid any appearance\nthat the U.S. was pressuring its Allies into reductions.\n-- Let me summarize the issues before us:\nShould a modification be made to the current Alliance\nposition on MBFR?\nShould that modification involve a change in what we ask\nof the other side, the addition of new elements to the current Alliance\nposition -- either early European reductions or U.S. nuclear systems,\nor a combination of these two approaches ?\nHow should such a modification be presented to our Allies,\nas a single proposal or as one of a series of possible options to be the\nof\nbasis for extensive Alliance review?\nSTREET\n0867\nTOD SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nMEMORANDUM\n652X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nFebruary 3, 1975\nATTACHMENTS\nMEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nJeanne W. Davis one\nSUBJECT:\nMinutes of NSC Meeting on\nMBFR, January 23, 1975\nHerewith, Jan Lodal's minutes of the NSC meeting on MBFR.\nWe are preparing a summary memorandum for your signature\nto the Vice President.\nAttachment\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE UT 2/95.\nATTACHMENTS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nFORD\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09166\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMinute\nCREATOR'S NAME\nJan Lodal\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nPresident Ford\nTITLE\nMinutes, NSC Meeting, 1/23/75\nCREATION DATE\n01/23/1975\nVOLUME\n24 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200008\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n1\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 1/23/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nexcised NSC letter 2/10/99\nuts/99\n652X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\nMINUTES\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nDATE:\nThursday, January 23, 1975\nTIME:\n10:37 a.m. to 11:35 a.m.\nPLACE:\nCabinet Room, The White House\nSUBJECT:\nMBFR\nPrincipals\nThe President\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nSecretary of Defense James Schlesinger\nChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. George S. Brown\nDirector of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle\nDirector of Central Intelligence William Colby\nOther Attendees\nState:\nDeputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll\nAmbassador Stanley Resor\nCIA:\nBenjamin Rutherford\nLIBRARY\nWhite House:\nMr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the\nPresident\nLt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft\nNSC:\nJan M. Lodal\nDECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 364\nFORD is LIBRARY CENALE\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 15 3.4 (b) (i) and(w)\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nMR 98-39, MR 14; NSCULAR 2/10/99\nBy let NARA, Date 5/24/99\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n2\nPresident Ford: Thank you all very much for coming. As you know, this\nmeeting is on the topic of MBFR. I would like to be updated on where we\nstand. I'm familiar with our offer and the Soviets' counteroffer, and when\nI was Vice President, I had an in depth briefing by Bruce Clarke. But I've\nnot had anything since then, except that I talked briefly to Stan last\nSeptember. Stan, you go back Sunday?\nAmbassador Resor: Yes. Our first meeting with the other side will be\non January 30.\nPresident Ford: Bill, do you have a briefing for us?\nMr. Colby: Mr. President, MBFR focuses on Central Europe, where the\nlargest and most critical elements of military strength on both sides are\nlocated. However, the discussions exclude substantial military forces in\nthe flank states of both sides, even though they are important to the overall\nmilitary balance in Europe. Further, reinfor cements from France,\nBritain, and the Soviet Union are close enough to Central Europe to alter\nthe balance there if time permits. But the reductions area would be the\ndecisive battleground. Should conflict erupt there suddenly, the forces\nshown on this next board -- expanded, of course, by local mobilization\nwould be the principal combat elements immediately available to both sides.\nThese numbers are based on our most recent intelligence. There are\nminor disagreements between these numbers and the agreed NATO numbers.\nIt is in Central Europe that the Pact has the greatest preponderance of ground\nforces, and it is this imbalance that we are addressing in the MBFR nego-\ntiations.\nThe national forces of both sides in Central Europe are approximately the\nsame size. The major disparity between NATO and the Pact strengths\nstems from the Soviet forces stationed in the reductions area. These\nconstitute approximately half of the forces available to the Pact, and the\nmajor part of the Pact's offensive power. Furthermore, Soviet forces\nin the reduction area have been increased by about 100, 000 men in the\npast 8 years and have significant strength in tanks -- while NATO\nforces have not grown appreciably.\nThe withdrawal of a Soviet Army from Central Europe would reduce\nSoviet offensive capability significantly. Just as importantly, it would\nprobably force the Soviets to change their plan of attack. I can illustrate\nthis briefly. We have good evidence that the Soviet generals believe their\nforces in the reduction area are capable of undertaking major offensive\noperations against NATO's center region without prior reinforcement\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD is LIBRARY 038830\nLISBACE GERALD ? FORD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n3\nfrom the USSR. Although they clearly expect reinforcement after a week\nor so, exercises as far back as 1969 consistently indicate that they intend\nto exploit their initial numerical superiority by a high-speed offensive\nonce hostilities begin. I would like to add, Mr. President, that\nPresident Ford:\nMr. Colby:\nSecretary Kissinger: Is that just your theory, or based on some informa-\ntion?\nMr. Colby:\nSecretary Kissinger: Mr. President, that is essentially the\nMr. Colby: It's more like a\nSecretary Schlesinger:\nPresident Ford:\nMr. Colby:\nTQP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD\nLISTREY GERALD :| FORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITVE\n4\nSecretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, the quality of U.S. tactical air\nvastly exceeds the quality of Soviet air. On the overall balance, taking\nquality into account, the air situation looks quite good. Looking only at\nthe numbers would lead you to be unduly pessimistic. This same analysis\ndoes not apply to the tanks --\nPresident Ford: The 2 to 1 aircraft advantage looks awesome.\nSecretary Schlesinger: That also leaves out our reinforcement capability.\nWe could have an additional 1500 aircraft in Europe very quickly.\nPresident Ford: From where?\nSecretary Schlesinger: From the U.S. We can't reinforce quickly with\ntanks, but we can with saircraft.\nPresident Ford: But you saydthe quality of their tanks is different?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Their tanks essentially match our capabilities.\nPresident Ford: Incidentally, how are you coming with the expedited\nMC-60 program?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Very well. We will be up to 600 in June and up to\n1,000 by 1976.\nPresident Ford: Per year?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Yes sir.\nMr. Colby: They would also hope to\nis\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD i LIBRARY GERMLD\nCERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE\n5\nPresident Ford: Are those IRBMs?\nMr. Colby: No -- Scuds and Frogs.\nSecretary Schlesinger: This is only in the NATO guidelines area.\nMr. Colby: It is now less important than air delivery systems. However,\nit certainly cannot be ignored.\nis\nFORD\nGERAL\nLIBRARD\nLIBRATT\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP\\SECRE SENSITLVE\n6\nSome mention should be made of our Allies and their attitudes toward\nMBFR. Britain, West Germany, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands,\nand Luxembourg are directly participating in the negotiations -- the other\nAllies are observers. The West European Allies entered into MBFR re-\nluctantly. They did not want to see the US military presence in Europe\nreduced, and feared that the negotiations themselves would be divisive.\nNow, because of economic and political pressures, the British, Dutch,\nand Belgians would like to cut their own forces. The West Germans are\nof course not feeling the economic pinch so much, but would expect to be\na part of any Western reductions.\nFinally, the Soviets have an interest in some progress in MBFR, since\nthey probably see the negotiations as contributing to their overall objec-\ntives in East-West detente. They need, at a minimum, to keep the talks\ngoing in order to help maintain movement in the Conference on European\nSecurity. But they also have real security interests in the MBFR\noutcome -- especially their hope of at least constraining the growth\nof, or, ideally, reducing West German military strength. With respect\nto the US, they would like to see a reduction in our nuclear capability in\nEurope -- but not at the expense of an increased West German capability.\nIn regard to their own forces, the Soviets can be expected to drive a hard\nbargain. They will stress equality of reduction rather than equality of\nremaining forces. In particular, they will focus on US nuclear strength\nand the German military potential.\nPresident Ford: Thank you very much Bill. Henry, would you like to\nbring us up to date on where we stand --\nSecretary Kissinger: I would like to sum up the history of the negotiations,\nfollowing on to what Bill Colby has said, and review the modifications which\nmight be made to the Alliance position now.\nMBFR originated in the 1950s with Soviet proposals for both a European\nsecurity conference and for withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany.\nDuring the 1960s, the Soviets lost interest in European force reductions,\nlest they appear to release forcesfor service in Vietnam. But during the\nlate '60s, their interest seemed renewed for a variety of reasons. In the\nend, we went along with MBFR for basically two reasons: First, as a\nresponse to Soviet CSCE initiatives and second, for Congressional reasons,\nas a counter to Mansfield Resolution pressures. The Europeans went along\nfor essentially the same reasons.\nFORD & LIBRARY SERALD\nis\nFROM\nCERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nLIBRARY\nTOPSECRET/SENSIVE\n7\nAs the talks started, we developed an interest in seeing if we could use\nMBFR for rationalizing the analysis of NATO strategic issues. In NATO,\na serious discussion of these issues had not taken place, and we thought\nMBFR might be helpful in getting one started.\nSo we went into MBFR with a mix of motives. It has to be seen in that\ncontext.\nThe US developed essentially three concepts for the reductions. The first\nwas a common ceiling on ground force manpower to be reached in two\nphases -- 10 percent withdrawals of stationed forces followed by 10 percent\ncuts of indigenous forces.\nThe second was an equal percentage in US and Soviet forces which would\nlead to a common ceiling on ground force manpower.\nThe third was a reduction of dissimilar threatening elements, including\n1,000 nuclear warheads, 36 Pershings, and 54 F-4s. This led to a\ndiscussion with George Brown where he's been able to change the size\nof the squadrons to get the reduction he wants! (laughter) This is the\nso-called nuclear option.\nThe Allies agreed on an approach combining all three of these options.\nWe would seek a common ceiling on ground force manpower to be\nachieved in two phases of negotiation.\nBERAL FORD LIBRARY\nLIBRARY GERALD R. FORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n8\nThere would be a first phase, in which the US and USSR would reduce\nequal percentages of the ground force manpower, with the Soviet cut\nbeing in the form of the tank army. We would take out manpower only,\n29,000 troops, while the Soviets would take out 68, 000 troops and an\nadditional 1700 tanks.\nPresident Ford: 68,000 would be included in the tank army?\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes -- the 68, 000 represents the tank army.\nSecretary Schlesinger: In addition, each side would take out 15% of its\nmanpower.\nSecretary Kissinger: The percentage cut would be the same. We\nfigured out that the tank army would be 68, 000, and took the same\npercentage cut for the US.\nWe have had trouble figuring out why Stan Resor has not been able to\nconvince the Soviets to accept this approach. It must be because he is\na Yale man (laughter).\nWe also proposed a second phase, in which both sides would reduce\nfurther to a common ceiling of about 700,000. Again, this would require\na three to one ratio of Pact to NATO cuts in the second phase.\nPredictably, the Soviets did not accept our proposal. They put forth a\nproposal with several differences. Where we have stressed equal\npercentage reductions, they stressed equal numbers. We said the US\nand Soviets should reduce first, and the Soviets were more interested in\nNATO and Warsaw Pact allied reductions. This is because the larger\nthe German slice they could get, the more they were able to trade good\nGerman divisions for lousy East European divisions.\nIt is important to realize that the significance of cuts are two-fold: the\ncut itself, but also that a cut establishes a ceiling. 54 F -4 aircraft is\nnot a large number but it does establish a ceiling on this type of aircraft.\nThis is why the Soviets were anxious on German reductions since even\na small cut would have the great advantage of establishing a ceiling on\nall German forces.\nThe Soviets have shown some flexibility in their proposal. They have\nproposed an inital reduction of 20, 000, made up largely of US and Soviet forces.\nBut even a reduction of 1, 000 Germans would have the additional effect\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD\nLIBRARY\nLIBRARY GERALD ? FORD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n9\nof putting a ceiling on the Germans. They have hinted that their\nnuclear reductions might be deferred to the second phase, but they\nhave remained adamant that the size of the reductions for the two\nsides must be equal.\nInitially, the Allies were content to let the US and the Soviets reduce\nonly their forces. They saw putting off their reductions to the second\nphase as a device to keep their forces up. Leber and others stated that\nif the reductions were in the second phase, they could go to their\nparliaments and tell them that reductions were eventually coming, but after\nby some time. But the domestic pressures have increased in Europe,\nand the tendancy now is for the Europeans to want to be included in the\nfirst phase.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Except the Germans who have tended to move\nin the opposite direction.\nPresident Ford: To keep their forces up?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Schmidt has moved in the opposite direction\nas opposed to Brandt, who wanted to reduce.\nSecretary Kissinger: They also don't want to give up a tremendous\nbargaining chip, namely a ceiling on their forces.\nPresident Ford: Does their changed attitude follow through to US reductions?\nSecretary Schlesinger: No, they are prepared to see us reduce.\nSecretary Kissinger: They view our reductions largely as a reaction to\nMansfield. The Europeans believe that reductions we take in MBFR would\nbe less than what we would take unilaterally.\nNATO and the Pact still disagree on three fundamental issues. First,\nwhose forces should be reduced and when. We believe that the US and\nthe USSR should reduce first, but the Pact insists that all participants reduce\nfrom the outset.\nSecond, what should be the reduction ratio? Our position is that reductions\nshould be asymmetrical and lead to a common ceiling. Our position is equal\npercentages, but they believe the reduction should be equal numbers, a position\nnot supported by our figures.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nLIBRARY GERALD 38\" 7082\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n10\nFinally, what forces should be reduced. Our position calls for reductions\nin ground forces only, but we have proposed a freeze on air manpower,\nand possible US reductions of air manpower. The Pact has insisted from\nthe outset that all types of forces -- ground, air, and nuclear -- should\nbe reduced in units with their armaments.\nThese disagreements are why we need to take another look at our objectives\nin MBFR and in developments that might cause us to reconsider them.\nThe SALT negotiations at Vladivostok established the principal of equality\nand gave us a good argument for equality in MBFR. Vladivostok also\nadds urgency, since the movement to a balance in strategic forces. adds\nurgency on the conventional front. Once strategic equality is accepted\naround the world as a fact of life, conventional imbalances will be even\nmore important. So, as Bill Colby said, we have taken an approach\nwhich attempts to enhance the defense and reduce the offensive capability.\nSo far, the Soviets have shown no major interest in MBFR. Nothing\nthey have said to you, Mr. President, or to me in our neogtiations shows\nany great interest. They simply repeate to you or to me what they say\nto Stan in Vienna. This means the Politburo has not yet engaged the issue.\nWe will have to see whether or not in the next six months the Soviets will\nput this on the front burner. If they have a desire to keep detente going,\nthey will do SO.\nSecretary Schlesinger: There is an embassy cable in indicating that\nthere might be some growth in their interest in MBFR.\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes. If that is true, some change in our position\nis imperative if we are to make progress. No Soviet leader can go to\nthe Politburo and say he has traded 29, 000 Americans for a tank army\nincluding 68, 000 Soviets.\nPresident Ford: The tank army withdrawal would reduce tanks by how\nmany?\nSecretary Schlesinger: 1700.\nSecretary Kissinger: Intellectually, we have several ways of going:\nis\nFORD\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nGERALD\nLIBRATE\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOPSECRETVSENSTIVE\n11\n-- We could change what's asked from the other side. We could\nbring the numbers closer together. This might make the first phase more\nsalable, but in the second phase, we will have to get even greater\nasymmetries in the Pact cuts. This could push the common ceiling\nindefinitely into the future.\n-- Secondly, we could add elements to the current Alliance position.\nFor example, we could move up indigenous reductions, something of\ngreat interest to the Soviets because of their concerns for Germany, or\nwe could add nuclear elements -- a thousand warheads, 54 F-4s, and 36\nPershing launchers. And finally, we could combine these approaches with\na slight reduction in the Pact withdrawals we propose and introduce some\nnuclear forces.\nI believe there was a consensus within the Verification Panel that we should\ngo no further at this time than to introduce the nuclear package _0 a thousand\nwarheads, 54 F-4s, and 36 Pershing launchers.\nSecretary Schlesinger: We would like to increase that to 2, 000 warheads.\nSecretary Kissinger: The nuclear package our Allies know about is a thousand\nwarheads, 54 aircraft, and 36 Pershings. Perhaps in June, after telling\nthem we have been restudying this, we could go to 2, 000.\nPresident Ford: Out of 9, 000?\nSecretary Kissinger: Seven thousand.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Out of 5,000 in the NATO guidelines area.\nDirector Ikle: Forty percent of those in the area.\nSecretary Kissinger: In addition, we have to look at the tactical question.\nThe only thing the Allies know about is 1,000 warheads. We could either\nstick with the present package, or give up the 1, 000 additional immediately.\nThe worst thing would be to tell the Allies we want to reduce 2, 000, but only\nput forth a reduction of 1, 000. The Russians will know we have something\nelse to offer and wait for it. If we want to hold back, we don't want to brief\nthe Allies on the additional 1, 000.\nI believe there is a consensus that it is time to introduce the nuclear package.\nSome modifications may be necessary as time goes on, but I believe it\nwould be premature to handle these now. We need to get the Soviet reaction\nto the introduction of the nuclear package first.\nFORD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n12\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\nThere has also been consideration given to introducing the nuclear\npackage piecemeal --\nPresident Ford: Pershings, and then F-4s? --\nSecretary Kissinger: Right. There is a consensus that we should introduce\nit all at once. On the question of whether we should add a thousand warheads,\nwe have not had a full discussion. Jim just worked out the agreement that\nwe could get up to 2, 000.\nStan will need approval of some kind of approach, Mr. President, before\nhe leaves on Sunday.\nPresident Ford: Jim, do you have anything to add?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I have two comments. I recommend\nthat we stick with our objective of getting the tank army because our ability\nto verify manpower reductions is minimal. The intelligence community\nhas increased the estimates by 70, 000 in the last year. Verifying the\nmovement of manpower is difficult without a series of collateral constraints\nwhich will be almost impossible to negotiate. We have to have something\nthat we can verify.\nSecond, the Chiefs have recommended reduction of 1,600 warheads as\npart of the readjustment of US tactical nuclear forces. In addition, we\nhave to give Congress a report on the Nunn Amendment. Personally, I\nbelieve it is more likely that Congress will move on warhead reductions\nthan on the Mansfield approach.\nPresident Ford: More likely than on manpower?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Yes. Also, we can move warheads back in\nrapidly in an emergency. Therefore, I would recommend the package\nthe Chiefs recommend, but add to the package enough to bring it up to\n2, 000 warheads.\nHenry referred to deficiencies in NATO's strategic discussions. But in\nthe last year, I think there has been much increased understanding in NATO.\nThey've accepted our flexible response strategy based on three legs of the\nTriad. They are coming to understand the importance of conventional\ndefense. That is why it is important for us to emphasize our agreement\nwith the importance of conventional defense.\nin\nFORD\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nGERALD\nLIBRAGUE\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SE SENSITIVE\n13\nThe Soviets moved in 100, 000 men during the Czechoslovakian coup.\nBut the US had made many improvements. For example, the Seventh\nArmy was in poor shape during the Vietnam War, but is now back in\ngood condition.\nPresident Ford: Our Seventh Army?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Yes. And we have added two brigades by\nconverting support forces to combat forces. The Germans can field\n1.2 million men in 48 hours. So the balance has probably improved\nslightly to the advantage of the West in the last year. Over the last\nsix or seven years NATO has been retreating, but last year, it improved.\nOur objectives on MBFR have been two. First, to improve security\nin Western Europe. This had led us to concentrate on getting out the\ntank army. And we have agreed not to be stampeded into movement that\ndoes not serve our ultimate objective of improved security.\nSecond, we want to get the Allies to do more. If we place limits on\nWestern forces, we cannot get them to increase their manpower and\nbudgetary support.\nIt is important not to undermine these basic objectives by accepting some\nshort term possible deal held out by the Soviets.\nThe Soviet objectives are first to thwart movement toward European\nunity.\ni\nFORD\nFORD i LIBRARY\nGERALD\nLISTRATE\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SENSITIVE\n14\nSecond, their other objective is to get control of the Bundeswehr -- the\nGerman Army. This, of course, conflicts directly with our own objective\nof getting the Germans to do more.\nWe should keep in mind these two objectives. I think so far that the\nnegotiations have gone well.\nFin ally, I think the Congressional situation on the Mansfield resolution\nhas improved.\nPresident Ford: Even with the new Congress?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Yes -- I have sat down with some of the new\nDemocrats. They are not Bella Abzugs;they want to make a serious\nappraisal of defense needs, and not only react to Vietnam. I believe\nwe can hold the House, and the climate in the Senate is better than it\nwas a few months ago.\nPresident Ford: I hope you are right, but my visceralreaction leads me\nto the opposite conclusion.\nSecretary Kissinger: I can't judge votes, but in meetings with them,\nthe new members seem somewhat less ideological, but I don't know how\nthey will vote.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Brock Adams just gave a long speech on security\nto the New York Delegation which was well received. Getting their\nideological mind-set out of Vietnam is very important.\nPresident Ford: My analysis is predicated on two events. First,\nEddie Hebert was the leader of the anti-Mansfield forces. His being\nthrown out will lead to less anti-Mansfield sentiment. Second, Phil Burton\nhas become to a considerable extent a force. His voting record, I\nsuspect, has been consistently in favor of Mansfield. I believe the\nSpeaker is on our side, although O'Neill is on the other side. Mel Price\nhas consistently supported Hebert's view, but he's not the hard tough\nspeaker and debator that Hebert has been. He will stand up -- he's a\ngood man, but he's not the tough leader Hebert was.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Hebert's ouster had more to do with personality\nthan policy\nGLRALD FORD LIBRART\nR.\nFORD\nGERALD\nLISTAGE\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE\n15\nPresident Ford:\nI hope you're right.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Even in the press, the New York Times and\nthe Christian Science Monitor and other publications are now coming out\nin favor of NATO.\nSecretary Kissinger: They all wanted out of Vietnam, and now they will\nwork on getting out of NATO.\nSecretary Schlesinger: I believe they are changing on NATO.\nPresident Ford: This Congressional situation argues for two things --\nfirst, a stronger positive public support for national defense OV Second,\na more realistic appraisal of our MBFR position.\nGeorge, do you have any comments?\nGeneral Brown: The chiefs recommended 1600 warheads. But with\nsome arm twisting, I got them to agree to accept 2000. They had\nrecently reviewed our deployment plans and concluded that we could\ntake out a total in NATO of 2200. If we took all these out of the NATO\nguideline's area, this would bring the total to 2800. But I have been\nworking for some time to get our number down to a more defensible\nlevel. The basis on which our requirements have been stated have been\nindefensible. For example, a lot of it is based on target lists: which\nincludes things like each command post. Some of these are mobile,\nand we don't have the intelligence to know where they are to hit them.\nSecretary Kissinger: I think we should avoid loading the nuclear\nreduction up too much. First, the Allies will think you made some\nsecret agreement in Vladivostok. Second, we have to look at this not\nonly in terms of the inherent capability of the forces, but from broader\npolitical considerations. Third, I remember when Secretary McNamara\nwould present detailed analyses telling them how they should change their\nforces. While he might have been right, although I disagreed with him\non many issues of substance, the issue with the Allies was the volatility\nof the American position.\nFor example, withdrawal of nuclear\nwould have an\neffect quite apart from the direct military implications. There would\nbe significant foreign policy consequences.\nIdon't mind these withdrawals in the context of MBFR, but I'm worried\nabout any unilateral reductions. The timing would have to be very careful\nof\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALL SOND LIBEARY\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTCP/SECRET/SENSTTVE\n16\nI would lean toward presenting only what the Allies heard before\nVladivostok, and saving the 600 to 1000 additional warheads for\nlater.\nPresident Ford: These negotiations as I understand them do not\nAmbassador Resor: That is correct.\nSecretary Kissinger: It's somewhat the reverse of what I said in\nthe Verification Panel when I argued against bleeding out elements one\nat a time, but I am worried that if we throw in the additional thousand\nwarheads, given the mentality of the Europeans, they will say what the\nhell has happened So I recommend presenting the existing package\nfirst, and then do some missionary work on them before adding the others.\nPresident Ford: The thousand warheads, 36 Pershings, and 54 F-4's --\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes, which they have heard before Vladivostok\nand cannot say you made up only because of Vladivostok.\nAmbassador Resor: This is the package Don presented to them in July\nof 1973.\nSecretary Kissinger: This is not an insignificant package, especially\nwhen you consider that the Soviets also get ceilings on nuclear forces,\nF -4's and Pershings. They cannot sluff this off. If we have an additional\nthousand warheads, we can throw them in later.\nSecretary Schlesinger: To some extent I believe I disagree with you.\nNot with respect to diplomatic tactics,\nBut in the NATO guidelines area, the British support\nsubstantial US reductions. In Germany, the SPD supports reductions and\nthe CDU has said in its conference that it is prepared to see a reduction\nfrom 7000 warheads to 5000 warheads, although this is throughout\nEurope as a whole. With this kind of change, even in the CDU, we can\nmove forward, so long as the US improves its nuclear capabilities.\nPresident Ford: You mean our tactical nuclear capabilities?\nis\nFORD\nGERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GENALD\nLISTER\nTOR.SECRET/SENSILVE\n17\nSecretary Schlesinger: Yes. And we would not touch the weapons given\nto Germany\nunder our program of cooperation.\nAlso, I am not sure we can hold onto these warheads with Congress.\nI would leave the tactics to Henry, but I believe the Allies are ready\nfor the introductions.\nDr. Ikle: I think we can gain a great deal by adding 600 or a 1000\nwarheads. This will make the Russians see that we are really in business.\nOn the other hand, it will be sensitive with the Allies. But if we sit on\nthese nuclear reductions, we may get blamed for holding up change for\nreasons of MBFR.\nPresident Ford: Stan, have you gotten any reaction on these nuclear\nforces from the Soviets -- have you talked to them about these, or have\nthey negotiated only with our NATO Allies?\nAmbassador Resor: Not even that really. In July of 1973, Don told the\nAllies of our recommendation to put in Option III. NATO then got General\nGoodpaster as SACEUR to do an estimate of the military implications,\nand SACEUR found it reasonable. We had trilateral discussions with the\nUK and FRG last spring, and the UK gave us a paper this fall that had\nbeen coordinated with the Germans on the nuclear package. It took the\nline that we couldn't move in MBFR without using it, that we would have\nto put it in. But we have not had active discussions with the Allies since\nlast spring, and that was purely academic.\nMr. Rumsfeld: Although, it leaked into the newspapers so the Warsaw Pact\ncountries are not unaware of the proposal.\nAmbassador Resor: Yes. The Pact must be wondering why we haven't\nused it yet. Their recent tactic has been to propose a very small initial\nstep.\nis\nFORD\nPresident Ford: A small number of ground force reductions?\nGERALD\nAmbassador Resor: Yes, or a freeze on manpower\nLIBRARY\nDr. Ikle: Given their knowledge of Option III, perhaps adding the extra\nthousand warheads would be something new.\nSecretary Kissinger: They haven't seen the package yet, so that must\nindicate to them that there has been some problem with it. We've never\nhad any reaction from them on it. To sweeten it right away might give\nthem the wrong idea, particularly since they are in a state of flux them-\nselves.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n18\nPresident Ford: How long will it take them to react to a proposal such\nas this?\nAmbassador Resor: It is hard to say. It will probably be March 15\nbefore we can get something through the Alliance and therefore March 27\nbefore we can have it on the table. They will have to send it to Moscow,\nand Henry has a better feel than I on how long it would take to react, but\nit would be several weeks.\nSecretary Kissinger: I believe it depends, Mr. President, on how they\nwant to gear it to Brezhnev's meeting with you. If they want to gear it\nto the meeting, you will hear in your channels about it. That is why I\nwould hold the additional warheads until we get a response. It would\nprobably be a month at least.\nThis will be the first approach to BS reductions we will have ever\nmade. In that sense it should be seen as a major breakthrough. I don't\nthink they will accept the proposal but they can't ignore it.\nPresident Ford: Anyone else? Before you go back Sunday Stan, we will\ngive you some guidelines. I do think we ought to find some solution. I\nthink your analysis in DOD has been very helpful. But I would tend\ntoward the lower figure. This is no final answer now, but I believe it\nwould be a better strategic approach. I will let you know by Sunday\nmorning.\nAmbassador Resor: One final point -- I have seen several Congressmen\nrecently, and they always ask if we have a realistic position which may\ninitially succeed. I believe that if we can get this down, we will be in\na better position to convince them that we do.\nPresident Ford: Thank you all once again.\nis\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD\nFORD & LIBRARY 6ERALD\nLIBRATE\nMISFR REDUCTION AREA\nGreenland\nNorwegian\nIceland\nSea\nSweden\n?\nFinland\nNorway\nNorth\n&\n2\na\nBaltic\nNorth\nSea\nAtlantic\nDenmark\nSea\nU.S.S.R.\nUnited\na\nIroland\nKingdom\nEast\nPoland\nGermany\nOcean\nEnx. Wast\nCzech.\nGermany\nMustria\nLIDER\nHungary\nFrance\nSwitz\nRomania\nBlack Sea\nItaly\nYugoslavia\nBulgaria\nAnderrs\nPortugal\nAID.\nTurkey\nSpain\nGreece\nI\na\nMediterranean\nSea\nTunisia\nAlgeria\nMorocco\nLibya\nEgypt\nNATO\nWARSAW PACT\nLIBRAST GERALD ? FORD\n594352\nOFFENSIVE ORGANIZATION OF PACT FORCES IN NGA\nTop Secret Sensitive\nTORO\nLIBRARY\nis\nGENALD\nDEN.\nTOTAL FORCE\n27-Govist Divisions\n29-East European Divisions\nUS\nEAST GERMANY\nNORTHERN FRONT\nPolish Armies\nNETHERLANDS\nFEDERAL\nCENTRAL FRONT\nPOLAND\n5 Societ Armies\n2 Eas German Armies\nBELGIUM\nREPUBLIC\nLUX.\nOF\nSOUTHWEST FRONT\n2 Czech Armies\nFRANCE\n1 Soviet Army CZECHOSLOVAHIA\nGERMANY\nBENALB FORD LIBRARY\nAUSTRIA\nSWITZERLAND\nHUNGARY\nBULGANIA\n54435\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\ncTop Secret Sensitive\n594354\n774\nLIBRADY\nBLERED\nURID 2.° FORD LIGRARY\nFORD & LIBRARY OF\nsegret\n594355\nMajor force elements in the reduction area\nBednet\nCombat aircraft\nManpower\n(Combat capable\n(Hundred thousand)\naircraft assigned\nTanks\nto combat units)\nTotal\nGround\nAir\nGERALD FORD\nUSA\nROLLIBRARY\nLIBRARY\nSecret\n594356\nSoviet strategic missiles targeted against Europe\nHard sites\nSoft sites\nTotal\nSS-5\nSS-4\nFORD i LIBRARY 034400\nSS-11\nFORD i LIBRARY\nTop Secret Sensitive\n594357"
}